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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE OWERRI JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT OWERRI BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE O. Y. ANUWE Dated: July 07, 2015 SUIT NO. NICN/EN/111/2013 Between Mr. Joseph Umunna Jude Adibe - Claimant And 1. Futo Community Bank of Nigeria Limited 2. Professor J. E. Njoku (Chairman Board of Directors) Defendants/Respondents 3. Orje Ishegh-Nor (Secretary Board of Directors) 4. Mr. B. N. Nwobasi (Acting Manager) Representation A.C.J. Okorie for the Claimant I. P. Ananaba for the Defendants JUDGMENT This action was originally commenced at the Federal High Court, Owerri Division on the 24th day of April 2006. The suit was subsequently transferred to this court by an order of transfer dated the 1st day of March 2013. The file was received in the registry of this court on the 6th day of May 2013. By a Complaint filed on the 15th day of November 2013 pursuant to an order of this court, the Claimant claimed against the Defendants jointly and severally as follows: (1) A Declaration that in matters of staff discipline including power to hire and fire, internal dispute among the staff of the 1st defendant, it is the Board of Directors and Management of the 1st defendant that have exclusive power to deal with disciplinary problems among the staff. (2) Declaration that it is wrong for the Board of Directors of the 1st defendant to delegate its power of staff discipline to an independent/ad hoc body unknown to the 1st defendant, from outside the 1st defendant, only for the Board to turn round, acted on the recommendation of the body in other to discipline a staff. (3) A Declaration that the termination of the claimant as the 1st defendant’s accountant by a letter dated 25th April 2003 signed by the 3rd defendant, the Secretary of the Board of Directors without complying with the method of termination contained in the letter appointing the claimant on 11th January 2001 and also on recommendation of a panel set up by the 2nd defendant as the chairman of the Board of Directors to investigate internal conflict between the claimant and the 4th defendant is unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, null and void and of no effect. (4) An Order reinstating the claimant to his position as the Accountant without loss of seniority from the date of issuance of the purported letter terminating the claimant’s appointment dated 25th April 2003. (5) An Order that the claimant’s salaries allowances claims entitlements and benefits due and payable to the claimant be paid to him with effect from the purported dated of termination of his appointment. (6) In the alternative N6,000,000.00 (Six Million Naira) damages for wrongful termination of appointment. Upon the matter coming up for the first time in this court on the 19th day of September 2013, Counsel on both sides sought and obtained leave of court to adopt the pleadings filed in the Federal High Court as having been properly filed in this court. On the 29th day of October 2013 when hearing commenced, the Court discovered during the Claimant’s testimony, that there was need for the parties to re-file their processes to bring them in compliance with the rules of the National Industrial Court. The Court so ordered; on which note, the Claimant re-filed his Complaint and Statement of Claim claiming against the defendants the reliefs stated above. The defendants filed their Statement of Defence on the 20th day of November, 2013 along with their witness’ written statement on oath and list of witnesses. Hearing resumed on the 2nd day of October 2014. The Claimant testified for himself as CW1 while Mr. Geoffrey Udo Atubi, the MD/CEO of the 1st Defendant testified for the defendants as DW1. Hearing was concluded by the 25th day of November 2014, and parties were ordered to file their final written addresses in accordance with the rules of this court. The defendants filed their final written address on the 4th day of December 2014 while the Claimant filed his Final written address vide a motion for extension of time on the 11th day of February 2015. Same was deemed properly filed on the 19th day of March 2015. Parties adopted their respective Final Written Addresses on the 22nd day of April 2015. The brief facts of this case as gleaned from the pleadings are that the claimant was employed as an accountant in the 1st defendant by a letter dated 11th January 2001. Within a period of three years’ service, there was an allegation of internal conflict between the claimant and the 4th defendant. The 2nd defendant set up an administrative panel to look into the internal conflict. By a letter dated 25th day of April 2003, the claimant’s employment in the post of accountant to the 1st defendant was terminated based on the report of the administrative panel, which recommended that the claimant’s appointment be terminated. In the defendants’ address, counsel proposed two issues for determination, to wit: (a) Whether the claimant’s appointment was properly terminated. (b) Whether the claimant is entitled to damages of N6 Million in the alternative. Arguing his first issue, counsel submitted that recourse had to be made to the nature of the claimant’s employment; that is whether the said employment is one governed by statute or one under the common law i.e. Ordinary Master/Servant Relationship. In the instant case, both the pleadings and evidence before the court show that the claimant was duly employed into the service of the 1st defendant as evidenced by Exhibit “A” i.e. the letter of appointment dated 11/1/2011. Counsel submitted that the terms and conditions of the appointment is as shown in Exhibit “A” as there had been no other agreement between the parties. Therefore, the contract of employment is one of Master and Servant, the 1st defendant being an incorporated legal entity. See Iloabachie vs. Phillips (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 787) 264. See also Daodu vs. U.B.A. Plc (2004) 9 (Pt. 878) @ 291 – 292, paras H – A, 296, paras. G – H. Against the above background, in an ordinary case of master and servant as in this case, the master can terminate the contract of appointment with his servant at any time for good or bad reasons or for no reason at all. Thus, in a contract of employment where a right to terminate the contract is given to either party, the validity of the exercise of that right cannot be vitiated by the existence of motive or improper motive. In the instant case, the claimant’s conditions and terms of service are as contained in Exhibit “A” and the same confers on either party the right to terminate same with three months’ notice. The essence of Notice as provided for in Exhibit “A” was simply to inform the claimant that his services are no longer required so that he can start to make alternative arrangement elsewhere. Thus non service of the requisite notice on an employee whose employment is terminated does not make the termination void. In a situation such notice is not given, what the employee is entitled to is his earnings during the period of notice as the requisite damages. See Osisanya vs. AfriBank (Nig.) Plc. (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1031) 565 @ 578 – 579 Paras G – H. Indisputably, the 1st defendant paid the claimant 3 months’ salary on the day the termination letter i.e. Exhibit “J” was served on him. In other words, the claimant was paid 3 months’ salary in lieu of Notice and thereafter asked to go. The 3 months’ salary which the claimant collected was not for job done. It is the submission of counsel that the 3 months’ salary collected was in lieu of notice See Nze vs. N.P.A (1997) 11 NWLR (Pt. 528) 210 @ 222. On the claimant’s contention that he was not given fair hearing by the panel that looked into the matter, counsel submitted that fair hearing simply means, giving a person an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the claimant was duly heard before a decision was taken against him because the evidence before the court showed that the claimant appeared before the panel and presented his case. See the case of Nkwocha vs. MTN Nig. Com. Ltd. (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1099) 439 @ 459 – 460, paras. H – A. Regarding the authority of the panel to act, counsel argued that it was not in dispute that it was the board of directors that appointed the members of the panel. The claimant duly submitted to the panel and never complained. At the end of the enquiry, the report of the panel was sent back to the Board who now terminated the appointment. Exhibit “J” shows that it was the 3rd defendant who was the Secretary of the Board who signed the letter of termination, thus conclusively proving that it was an act of the Board. The law is settled that where there is a power conferred on a person to appoint a person either to an office or to exercise any function, whether for a specific period or not, the power includes power to remove or suspend him. In the instant case, if the 3rd defendant by virtue of her powers as Secretary of the Board of the 1st defendant could sign Exhibit ‘A’, she would equally be invested with powers to make or sign Exhibit ‘J’ on behalf of the board. See the case of Okomu Oil Palm Co. Ltd. vs. Iserhienrhien (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 710) 660 @ 678 para G, page 86 paras. D – G. Furthermore, the claimant had the duty of showing that by the appointment non-members of the Board into the panel that looked into his case; any rule setting up or regulating the 1st defendant was breached. That duty was not discharged by the claimant as no evidence was at all led to show that any such rule was breached. Again the claimant had the onus of showing that by the constitution of the said panel, any injustice was done to him especially given the fact that he was not in any way coerced into submitting to the panel. The claimant also failed to prove this. On the issue of re-instatement and an order for payment of unearned salaries, allowances and claim etc. it is the contention of counsel that such claims are insignificant because the employment of the claimant has no statutory flavor but that of ordinary master and servant relationship in common law. In the case of U.B.A. vs. Chinyere (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1203) 453 @ 475, paras D – E, the Court of Appeal held as follows: “One other thing worthy of being noted here is that the real effect of granting of the 3 reliefs as it did, the lower court would without any doubt, have re-instated the respondent to his place of work. This is against the law, that it is not the business of the court to force a willing employee on an unwilling employer, except with respect to a contract with statutory flavor. The employment of the respondent herein is not one that is protected by statute. A re-instatement would therefore be wholly inappropriate”. On the second issue as to whether the claimant is entitled to his alternative claim of Six Million Naira as damages for wrongful termination of appointment, Counsel submitted that the measure of damages must be the salaries that would have been paid during the period of notice, if no salaries had been paid as stipulated in Exhibit ‘A’ for the simple reason that the claimant’s appointment is that of ordinary master and servant under common law. See Cooperative & Commerce Bank (Nig.) Ltd. vs. Okonkwo (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt. 735) 114 @ 134. See also UBA vs. Chinyere (supra) at page 475, paras A – C. Exhibit ‘A’ which is the only document embodying the terms of contract of employment clearly stated that appointment may be terminated by either party giving three (3) months’ notice. On the other hand, Exhibit ‘J’ i.e. the letter of termination dated 25/4/2003 clearly showed that the Claimant would be paid three (3) months’ salary in lieu of notice, which the claimant collected after he was terminated. Having collected the 3 months’ salary in lieu, counsel submitted that the claim for damages of Six Million Naira is highly misconceived. See Sea Trucks Nig. Ltd vs. Pyne (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 514 @ 537 – 538. See also Odiase vs. Auchi Poly, Auchi (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 547) 477 @ 495. In light of the foregoing, counsel submitted that the termination of the claimant’s appointment was not wrongful. Assuming however, but without conceding that the said termination was wrongful, the measure of damages entitled to be paid to the claimant is nothing more than the three (3) months’ salary in lieu of notice which salary he already collected. To order otherwise would amount to double compensation. See F.H.A vs. Sommer (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 17) 533. In conclusion of counsel’s argument, counsel urged the court to rely on the case of Mr. Ohaka Umesi David vs. Mr. Kola T. Adefila & Anor an unreported decision of this court delivered on the 2nd day of October, 2014, and resolve the foregoing issues in favour of the defendants and dismiss the claimant’s claims. The Claimant’s counsel in his final written address filed on the 11th day of February 2015 formulated the following five issues for the determination of the court: (1) Has the Board of Directors of FUTO Microfinance Bank of Nigeria Limited powers to appoint agents to handle its business of staff control and discipline, to manage for it or act on the recommendation of such agents in its business? (2) Considering Exhibit “A” letter dated 11th January 2001 appointing the claimant an Accountant in FUTO Microfinance Bank of Nigeria Limited (1st defendant on record) and Exhibit “J” letter dated 25th April 2003 terminating the claimant’s appointment as the Accountant to FUTO Microfinance Bank Nigeria Limited, will it be correct to say that the Defendants complied with the method of termination of this employment between the claimant and the defendants as contained in Exhibit “A”. (3) Considering the state of pleadings and evidence led by the parties with regards to Professor Ogwude’s administrative Panel’s recommendation on which the termination of the claimant’s employment is based, was the claimant given fair hearing in the panel? (4) What law governed and, or regulated the employment of the claimant as Accountant to FUTO Microfinance Bank of Nigeria Limited; The common law or statute law? (5) Was the claimant not entitled to be reinstated to his position as the Accountant of FUTO Microfinance Bank Nigeria Limited, or in the alternative is he not entitled to damages for wrongful termination of his employment? In his argument of the first issue, counsel argued that the Board of Directors of the 1st defendant having exclusive power of staff discipline which discipline includes powers to hire and fire staff of the 1st defendant and the power to discipline the staff of the 1st defendant cannot be delegated to an outside body by appointing an agent to carry out the Board’s duty of staff control or discipline. Thus the internal conflict that led to the setting up of the administrative panel bordered on staff discipline among the senior officers of the 1st defendant which falls within the powers of the Board of Directors to deal with, instead, the board shifted the burden as it were, to an external body to deal with, by appointing an administrative panel made up of the tutorial and non-tutorial staff of Federal University of Technology Owerri. See Paragraph 6, 20, and 21 of the claimant’s amended statement of claim, paragraph 2,9,11 of the defendants’ statement of defence. Counsel contended that the panel on its own changed the internal conflict into charges of non-performance of functions, truancy and indiscriminate absenteeism, without the defendants leading evidence to show that those charges were the cause of internal conflict between the claimant and the 4th defendant of the 1st defendant, the immediate cause of setting up of the panel in reference and this change amounted to springing surprise on the claimant by the defendants. Notwithstanding this fact, the termination of the claimant’s appointment as the 1st defendant’s accountant was based on these charges raised by the panel, not on internal conflict as seen from the content of Exhibit “J” letter of termination of the claimant’s appointment dated 25th April, 2003. It is counsel’s submission that because the defendants failed to give evidence on the proceedings of the panel on whose recommendation, it terminated the appointment of the claimant during trial, neither did they call the Chairman of the panel to testify and tender the proceedings, its findings and its recommendations in this court, the Court cannot act on the extract of the panel’s recommendation found in the letter of termination of employment Exhibit “J” where it states thus: “The board of directors, following the recommendations of the Administrative panel which found you liable as charged, for non-performance of functions truancy and indiscriminate absenteeism contrary to your conditions of service, approved that your appointment be terminated with immediate effect”. Counsel submitted that this administrative panel is an agent appointed by 1st defendant’s Board of Directors, the Board does not have powers to appoint without first obtaining prior consent of governor of the Central Bank to appoint Administrative panel to handle the internal conflict between the two principal officers of the bank that apparently borders on discipline. See section 8 Microfinance Act. It is the position of counsel that the appointment of an Administrative Panel to handle the 1st defendants’ staff discipline, extended to the daily functions of the claimant which invariably amounted to employing management agent or transferring the business to any agent without prior approval of the Central Bank of Nigeria’s governor. See Section 8(e) of Community Bank’s Act, Based on the foregoing, counsel urged the Court to hold that 1st defendants’ Board lacked power to appoint the Administrative Panel to determine the discipline of any of 1st defendant’s erring staff or the recommendation of the termination of 1st defendant’s accountant a senior officer of the 1st defendant employment who was replaced by another officer without prior approval of National Board and the Central Bank governor. That is the appointing and setting up of the Administrative panel is ultra vires the powers of 1st defendant Board, and any act done or action taken by it based on the panel’s recommendation is act done or action taken without jurisdiction. In effect, the termination of the claimant’s appointment is action taken without jurisdiction and thus void. In arguing the second issue, counsel referred the Court to paragraphs 7 – 9 and 25 of the claimant’s amended statement of claim, paragraph 11 of the defendants statement of defence, and submitted that Exhibit ‘A’ appointing the claimant, contained therein method of bringing to an end the relationship of master and servant, between the two parties. The method of determining contract of employment between master and servant is not built into the letters of appointment but in contract agreement on employment. The relevant portion of Exhibit “A” provides: … This appointment may be terminated by either party by given three (3) months’ notice. Please indicate in writing whether this offer is acceptable to From the above reproduced portion of Exhibit ‘A’ appointing the claimant the 1st defendant’s accountant there is no attachment or qualification attached to the notice to be given in the event of any of the two parties wishing to terminate the relationship between the claimant as accountant of the 1st defendant, and the 1st defendant as his employer. Exhibit “A” was signed by the Secretary of the Board Orje Ishegh-nor and copied to the 2nd defendant on record as well as 4th defendant also on record. Exhibit “J” dated 25th April, 2003 terminating the claimant’s employment as an accountant of the 1st defendant was signed by the same secretary who signed Exhibit “A” – Orje Ishegh-nor. The letter written and signed by the same person has very remarkable differences. The relevant portions of Exhibit “J” “The Board of Directors following the recommendations of the Administrative Panel which found you liable as charged for Non-performance of functions, truancy and indiscriminate absenteeism contrary to your conditions of service approved that your appointment be terminated with immediate effect. In effect therefore, your appointment with FUTO Community Bank of Nigeria Limited is hereby terminated. Consequently, you are directed to hand over to the Ag. Manager of the Bank, all banks property in your possession. Thereafter you will be paid three months’ salary in lieu of notice”. From the reproduced portion of Exhibit “J, counsel submitted that Exhibit “J” appeared not to have been written on authority of the board of 1st defendant or on behalf of the board. Comparing Exhibit “A” and Exhibit “J” shows that the defendants did not comply with the method stated in the letter Exhibit “A” by which any of the two parties, is entitled to determine a master/servant relationship between the claimant as 1st defendant’s accountant and the defendant as the employer. See the case of Ibama vs. S.P.D.C (2005) 132 LRCN 2585 @ 2698 A.F the defendants did not establish that they followed the prescribed condition as could be seen in Exhibit “A” and what they stated in Exhibit “J”. Counsel submitted that the defendants did not comply with the method of termination of the claimant’s appointment because Exhibit “A” did not provide that the claimant would instead of three (3) months’ notice receive three month’s salary in lieu of notice, with the payment made when the claimant had submitted all properties of the bank to the 4th defendant, with the effect of making the termination wrongful in law. On issue three, counsel argued that the claimant was denied fair hearing by the Panel wherein the claimant was found liable according to the charge for non- performance of functions, truancy and indiscriminate absenteeism. This assertion is premised on the general principle that an employer who decides to dispense with the service of his employee can do so in law, provided he follows the method prescribed and agreed upon by the master/servant themselves without giving any reason of what he has decide to do with the services of his servant. But where the employer gives reason or reasons giving rise to his action, he had a burden of proof in law, to prove the reason or reasons for his action. Where it is a criminal allegation, the employer needs to prove the allegation beyond reasonable doubt as provided for in Section 135(1) of the Evidence Act 2011. In the instant case, the recommendation to terminate the appointment of the claimant in his position contained the words “liable” and “charged”, which presupposes criminal allegation that need be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Conversely, if the panel regarded the charges against the mere civil allegations, the defendants are not relieved of the burden of proof under Section 131(1) Evidence Act 2011. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended in Section 36(1) provides: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to fair hearing within a reasonable time by court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartially”. Counsel pointed out that the claimant submitted Exhibit “I” (the position paper on the internal conflict) on 27th January 2003 and appeared alone before the panel. The 4th defendant was not invited to appear; neither did he submit any position paper. This, counsel submitted, presented a situation where the claimant was not afforded an opportunity defend himself against any allegation against him. See paragraphs 23 of the claimant’s amended statement of claim, admitted by the defendants in paragraph 9 of their statement of defence. This situation according to counsel, was a breach of the claimant’s right to fair hearing. Also, counsel argued that the findings of the panel were contrary to the main purpose of the setting up of the Administrative panel. It was this panel that recommended the termination of the claimant’s appointment. In the case of Union Bank of Nigeria vs. Ogbe & Ors (1975) 2 NWLR (Pt. 350) 649, it is settled that an employer is not obliged to accept or implement any of the recommendations of a Board of inquiry. Moreover the defendants in Exhibit ‘A’ never brought to the notice of the claimant that non-performance of functions, truancy and indiscriminate absenteeism in Exhibit “A” constitute factors that could result in termination of the claimant’s employment. Counsel submitted by the authority in Ebor vs. Progressive Insurance Co. (1987) Vol. 12 Quarterly Law Report, that the claimant is not bound by reasons for termination not contained in his appointment letter. Furthermore, it is the contention of counsel that the presence of one Mr. S.N. Opara a member of the board of directors in the panel, the absence of the 4th defendant before the panel, and his not submitting a position paper like the claimant, evinced bias on the defendants’ part, making them accuser/prosecutor and at same-time the Judge. Therefore, the panel was in total breach of the doctrine of Nature Justice of “Nemo Judex in causa sua”. It is counsel’s submission that the claimant’s termination which was based on the panel’s findings that were reached in breach of constitutional provisions of fair hearing rendered the termination null and void. Arguing issue four, counsel submitted that the employment of the claimant by 1st defendant is statutory, because it is regulated by the law creating the 1st defendant that is, the Federal University of Technology Act Cap 143 Section (i) (C) of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. Similarly, microfinance or community Banks in Nigeria including the 1st defendant (being the direct employer of the claimant), are creatures of the statute by virtue of Community Banks Act Section 1(i) (a) – (c) Cap C18 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria which was later changed to microfinance banks with special powers to carry on functions contained in subsection (i) (a) – (c) by which Act, the 1st defendant came into existence. Based on the foregoing, counsel submitted that the employment of the claimant in the 1st defendant is one regulated or governed by the statute in the manner Federal University of Technology Owerri staff employment are regulated and governed by the statute referred to above on the following pertinent reasons (i) The 1st defendant is licensed under the name of the Federal University of Technology Owerri and it bears the University name as its owner, in a similar position like bookshops, schools and properties acquired and owned by the university all the staff that are employed to work in the establishment are bona fide staff of FUTO, whose employments are regulated by the statute. FUTO by the power conferred on it by the statute which created it was able to establish 1st defendant. See Section 3 (i) & (m) Federal University of Technology Act Cap 143, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. (ii) Apart from 1st defendant being part of the Federal University of Technology Owerri, its staff would enjoy similar conditions of service, as part of the university staff constituted members of the board of directors of 1st defendant, the secretary of the board who wrote and signed Exhibits “A” and “J” is a bona fide staff of Federal University of Technology Owerri, now an incumbent registrar of the University from her position as secretary to the board, the claimant was before his appointment was terminated, through administrative panel’s, report a bona fide employee of Federal University of Technology Owerri’s Microfinance Bank Limited, a body created by law and licensed and supervised by the Financial Government Institution in Nigeria. See Olaniyan vs. University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599 the claimant is entitled in his employment in a body owned and run by Federal University of Technology Owerri like his counterpart in the University, to enjoy regulated employment. See also the case of Shitta-Bey vs. P.S.C. (1981) 1 S.C 40 Further the claimant is a principal staff of community/Microfinance Banks who cannot be replaced or removed without seeking and obtaining prior consent/approval of the Central Bank Governor. Referring to Pages 15 & 17 of the Regulatory and Supervisory guideline for microfinance bank (MFBS), counsel urged the court to resolve the above issue by holding positively that the claimant’s employment in which the employer admitted no other terms of employment except as contained in Exhibit ‘A’ contrary to the defendant admission in Exhibit “J” that the claimant’s employment in the 1st defendant is regulated by conditions of service elsewhere. This assertion corresponds with the defendants’ finding the claimant was liable as charged for non-performance of function, truancy and indiscriminate absenteeism, and issue of three (3) months’ notice without payment of salary in lieu of notice. Such charges are often rooted in conditions of service not contain in an appointment letter. All these are submitted by counsel to be features of employment with statutory flavour. On the foregoing counsel urged the court to hold that the claimant’s employment is regulated by statute. Regarding the fifth issue counsel submitted that in the instant case, there is no service agreement signed by employer and the employee regulating their conduct as submitted by the claimant that this employment is that regulated by the Act under which FUTO staffs work. This is why the defendant stated in the letter of employment Exhibit A, that to determine the employment, a party needs to give the other three months’ notice. This is characteristic of employment with statutory flavour. See the case of Ziitch vs. Rivers State Civil Service commission (2007) 145 LRCN 530 & 540. In this case, the onus of proof that termination of employment was unlawful is on the employee. In this case the claimant has placed before the court Exhibit A and J to show that the defendant did not follow the method contained therein to terminate this employment, in addition to paragraphs 22, 24 and 24 (ii) of his amended statement of claim to show the defendants never availed the claimant with conditions of service despite persistent demands for it. Based on the foregoing that the termination of the employment of the claimant was null and void and without any legal effect, the claimant submitted that he is entitled to be reinstated on the basis of the principle laid down in the case of Shitta Bey vs. P.S.C (1981) 1 SC 40. Terms of employment cannot be subject to guess work. Finally the defendant failed to adopt the method stated in Exhibit “A” with which to bring to an end the contract of employment. Counsel therefore urged the Court to resolve this issue in the positive. In counsel’s specific Reply to the Address of Defendants Counsel, the submissions made are identical to those canvassed in the consideration of the issues he formulated for the court’s determination and do not need to be reproduced here. At the conclusion of counsel’s submissions, he urged the Court in view of issues 1 – 5, to enter judgment in this suit in favour of the claimant and grant all the reliefs sought in this suit. I have heard learned counsels to the parties in their final written addresses and I have also considered all the pleaded facts of the parties together with the evidence adduced by the witnesses called by the parties in this suit. From the case presented by the parties, only one issue appears to me to arise for determination in this suit. The issue is whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs he seeks in this suit? The case of the claimant is that by a letter dated April 25, 2003, that is Exhibit J, the claimant’s employment with the 1st defendant was terminated. It is consequent to that termination of his employment that the claimant has brought this action against the defendants claiming the reliefs as contained in his amended Complaint. In proving his case, the claimant testified for himself as the only witness. In his evidence, the claimant said he was employed by the Board of Directors of the 1st defendant in 2001 as an accountant. His employment letter, dated 11th January 2010, is in evidence as Exhibit A. After accepting and fulfilling the conditions of the offer, the claimant resumed duty on 1st March 2001. When he resumed duty, the 4th defendant, who was then the acting manager, did not introduce the claimant to the intricacies of the office and on 27/7/2001, the 4th defendant assigned an incomplete schedule to the claimant. The preparation of final accounts was omitted from the schedule given to the claimant. Because of this practice in the 1st defendant, the claimant wrote Exhibit C to the Board of Directors of the 1st defendant where he explained to the 2nd defendant the practice he discovered in the 1st defendant and suggested ways to avoid fraud and losses in the 1st defendant. The claimant stated that trouble started for him after he wrote Exhibit C as he started noticing hostile and uncooperative attitude of the 4th defendant towards him. When he later on wrote Exhibit D to the 4th defendant, the 4th defendant threatened to sack him and also blackmailed him before the 2nd defendant by accusing him of fraud, truancy and inability to perform the functions of his office. On 9/9/2001, the 4th defendant issued him a query demanding the claimant to explain the claimant’s failure to post into books, accumulated debit and credit advances vouchers. The claimant said he replied the query where he told the 4th defendant that the said documents have been with the 4th defendant who had refused to release them to the claimant. The 4th defendant also queried the claimant on 4/10/2002 by alleging absenteeism. The claimant also replied this query on 10/10/2002. In July 2003, the 2nd defendant set up an investigation panel to investigate the conflict between the claimant and the 4th defendant. The chairman of the investigating panel, Prof. Ogwude, is not a member of the Board of Directors of the 1st defendant. Except one Mr. S. N. Okpara who is a Board member, other members of the panel are not members of the Board. The letter inviting him to the panel was signed by the administrative officer to Prof. Ogwude. The writer is not a member of the panel. Another letter by the same person dated same day requested the claimant to submit a written representation on the conflict between the claimant and the 4th defendant and also the schedule of duties given to him by the 4th defendant. The claimant complied with these requests and on 27/1/2003, he appeared alone before the panel where he was questioned by the panel members on the issues for which he was invited. The panel did not invite the 4th defendant to face the claimant during his appearance before the panel. The claimant had no opportunity to ask questions from the 4th defendant on the allegations laid against the claimant. On 25/4/2003, he received Exhibit J terminating his employment. The claimant asserted that he could not be said to have breached any term of the condition of service as there was no condition of service available in the employment of the 1st defendant. The claimant further testified to some facts to show that the termination of his employment was wrongful and not in accordance with the contract of service. The defendants denied the allegations and claims of the claimant. In defence of the claims, DW1, who described himself as the MD/CEO of the 1st defendant, testified for the defendants. It is his evidence that the claimant was given the necessary orientation upon his employment and the schedule of duties given to him was what the management deemed fit for the claimant’s office. He further said the letter the claimant wrote to the Board, Exhibit C, was not given attention because it was not properly routed as it was supposed to be passed through the 4th defendant, who, according to the witness, was never hostile to the claimant. DW1 also said that the claimant’s conditions of service are as stated on the employment letter, Exhibit A. To DW1, the claimant does not require any warning before his employment can be terminated and the allegations the claimant was confronted with by the panel borders on truancy, absenteeism and non-performance. The claimant was given opportunity to defend himself of these allegations after which the panel found the allegations to be true. The claimant had previously been given queries and warnings for truancy, absenteeism and non-performance. The panel also found that the claimant was not competent for the office of an accountant. The panel submitted its report to the 1st defendant upon which the Board took the decision to terminate the claimant’s employment. DW1 admitted that the claimant’s employment was terminated but he said the termination followed due process and was in accordance with terms of the claimant’s employment. The starting point in resolving the issue formulated for determination in this judgment is to determine what nature of employment relationship existed between the parties. This becomes necessary in view of some of the reliefs sought by the claimant. In reliefs 3 and 4, he sought a declaration that the termination of his employment is unconstitutional, null and void and an order that he be reinstated to his position of accountant in the 1st defendant. Whether these reliefs can or cannot be granted depends on whether his employment is one governed by statute or one of ordinary master and servant relationship. In his written address, the defendants counsel argued that in view of Exhibit A and the fact that the 1st defendant is a registered company, the claimant’s relationship with the 1st defendant was merely that of master and servant. The claimant’s counsel however disagreed with the view of the defendants counsel. He submitted that the 1st defendant did not acquire its legal personality through incorporation but it is a creature of the statute. He referred this court to Section 1 (C) of the Federal Universities of Technology Act. The claimant’s counsel also submitted that microfinance or community Banks in Nigeria are created by the Community Banks Act, particularly Section 1(i) (a) – (c) thereof. Based on these factors, the claimant’s counsel concluded that employment of the claimant in 1st defendant is one governed by the statute. An employment is said to have statutory flavour or governed by statute where the terms and conditions of the contract of employment are specifically provided for by statute or contained in a regulation made under the statue. See OLORUNTOBA-OJU vs. ABDUL-RAHEEM (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 497) 1 at 42; N.I.I.A vs. ANYAFALU (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 325) 141 at 162; CBN vs. JIDDA (2001) FWLR (Pt. 47) 1065 at 1082. Thus, the question whether a contract of employment is governed by statute or not depends on the construction of the contract itself or the relevant statute. In this case, the claimant pleaded in paragraph 2 of his amended statement of claim that the 1st defendant is “a company incorporated in Nigeria”. In paragraphs 7, 8 and 9, it is pleaded that the claimant was appointed by a letter dated 11th January 2001 and the same letter set out conditions of the employment which include to whom the claimant was answerable and the parties’ right to terminate the employment. The said employment letter was admitted as Exhibit A. In paragraph 24 also, the claimant contended that throughout his service in the 1st defendant, he was never given a condition of service of the 1st defendant. Besides Exhibit A, the claimant did not plead or give evidence of any other condition of service. Furthermore, throughout his pleading or evidence, there is nowhere the claimant linked his employment to an employment under the Federal University of Technology Act. His case is that he was employed by the Board of Directors of the 1st defendant and the 1st defendant is an incorporated company. He has not shown that the 1st defendant was also established by the Federal University of Technology Act. He cited Section 1 (C) of the Act. That sub-section established the Federal University of Technology, Owerri. The 1st defendant was not established anywhere in that Act. More so, Exhibit A did not emanate from Federal University of Technology, Owerri. The claimant’s counsel has further argued that the 1st defendant is licensed under the name of the Federal University of Technology Owerri and it bears the University name as its owner, in a similar position like bookshops, schools and properties acquired and owned by the university and that all the staff that are employed to work in the establishment are bonafide staff of the University and enjoy similar conditions of service as staff of the university whose employments are regulated by the statute. I find this submission of the claimant’s counsel to amount purely to conjecture. This is because the argument is not supported by the pleading or evidence of the claimant. It is counsel’s personal attempt to create a vain statutory flavouring to the claimant’s employment. The address of counsel cannot take the place of evidence. The claimants counsel also referred to Section 1 of the Community Bank Act as if the 1st defendant was established under the Act. The section merely permits the establishment of Community Banks. There is nowhere in the Act the 1st defendant was established nor where the conditions of service of staff of the 1st defendant was provided for. From the pleadings and evidence of the claimant, the 1st defendant is only an incorporated company with a Board of Directors directing its affairs. The only condition of service shown to this court is the one contained in Exhibit A. Exhibit A itself is not derived from any statute and upon thorough examination of its content, there is nowhere it made the claimant’s employment subject to any statute or regulation. In the result, the claimant has not shown that the 1st defendant is a creation of statute or that the condition of service of the 1st defendant is contained in a statute or in a regulation derived from a statute. I find that the claimant’s employment and Exhibit A do not enjoy statutory flavour. His employment with the 1st defendant is that of master and servant relationship. Having been determined that the relationship between the claimant and the 1st defendant is one of master and servant, I shall now turn to consider the issue to be determined in this case, which is, whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought in this case. The crux of the claimant’s complaint in this suit is his allegation that the termination of his employment did not accord with the terms of his employment. It is on that basis he claims in relief 3 as follows- “A Declaration that the termination of the claimant as the 1st defendant’s accountant by a letter dated 25th April 2003 signed by the 3rd defendant, the Secretary of the Board of Directors without complying with the method of termination contained in the letter appointing the claimant on 11th January 2001 and also on recommendation of a panel set up by the 2nd defendant as the chairman of the Board of Directors to investigate internal conflict between the claimant and the 4th defendant is unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, null and void and of no effect. From the wordings of this relief, two reasons are manifest therein for which the claimant seeks the declaration. First is that his letter of termination did not comply with the method of termination stipulated in his employment letter and the 2nd is that it was wrong for the Board of Directors of the 1st defendant to act on the recommendation of a panel of investigation into an internal conflict between the claimant and the 4th defendant to terminate his employment. Then, there is also reliefs 1 and 2 where the claimant sought declarations to the effect that in matters of staff discipline including power to hire and fire, internal dispute among the staff of the 1st defendant, it is the Board of Directors and Management of the 1st defendant that have exclusive power to deal with disciplinary problems among the staff and that it is wrong for the Board of Directors of the 1st defendant to delegate its power of staff discipline to an independent/adhoc body only for the Board to turn round to act on the recommendation of the body in the discipline of a staff. The foundation for these reliefs has been laid in the claimant’s evidence where the claimant testified to the following facts- i. The conflict was between him and the 4th defendant. The Board of Directors of the 1st defendant did not look at the conflict but allowed itself to be dictated to by a panel. ii. The power of the Board to hire and fire can only be done by the Board itself and not through another body. The board did not act within its powers when it approved the termination of the claimant’s appointment on the recommendation of an administrative panel. iii. The Board is the accuser and also the judge in that a member of the board was a member of the panel. v. In his letter of employment, there is no provision for 3 months’ salary in lieu of notice. The claimant was not given 3 months’ notice as required in the letter of employment. vi. He was not given fair hearing before the panel as he didn’t face his accuser vii. He was not shown the report and recommendation of the panel viii. He has never been queried by the Board ix The letter terminating his employment is not a termination letter but a letter conveying the decision of the 15th meeting of the Board of Directors of the 1st defendant x. The termination letter was not signed on behalf of the 2nd defendant by the 3rd defendant and the 3rd defendant has no power to terminate claimant’s employment. These are the facts relied upon by the claimant to allege that the termination of his employment was unconstitutional, null and void. It is trite law that in master and servant employment, the employer can terminate the employment of the employee at any time and for any reason or for no reason at all. See NEPA vs. ENYONG (2003) FWLR (Pt. 175) 452 at 469; TEXACO NIG. PLC vs. KEHINDE (2002) FWLR (Pt. 94) 143 at 160. It is also settled that whether termination of employment is wrongful or not depends on the terms of the contract of service. See MOMOH vs. CBN (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 395) 420 at 434. The condition of service generally provides for the manner the employment can be terminated among other general terms of the contract. Where there is a condition of service setting out the procedure for termination, it is that procedure that must be followed and termination will be considered wrongful if the procedure is not followed. But in a clear case where there is no condition of service, the court cannot create an agreement for the parties by stipulating a particular mode of termination. The question to ask at this point is whether, in the contract of service between the parties, the 1st defendant has the right to terminate the employment of the claimant, and if it has, what is the procedure to be followed? The only document which contained conditions of the claimant’s employment is Exhibit A. No other condition of service was shown. In fact, in his evidence-in-chief, the claimant said the defendants did not give him any condition of service and under cross examination, he said Exhibit A contains some terms of his employment. Therefore, the conditions of the claimant’s employment can only be considered in terms of Exhibit A. In the 4th paragraph of the claimant’s employment letter, Exhibit A, the claimant was informed, among other terms of the employment that “This appointment may be terminated by either party by giving three (3) months’ notice.” It is therefore clear from Exhibit A that the 1st defendant has the right to terminate the employment of the claimant. What is left to be determined is whether in the exercise of the 1st defendant’s right, the 1st defendant complied with the prescribed procedure in Exhibit A. The claimant’s complaints are that the termination of his employment was unlawful because the power of the Board to hire and fire can only be done by the Board itself and not through another body and that the termination letter was not signed on behalf of the 2nd defendant by the 3rd defendant and the 3rd defendant has no power to terminate the claimant’s employment. To the claimant, those steps did not comply with Exhibit A. It is these complaints that found his claim of unlawfulness of the termination. Exhibit A is a letter of employment dated January 11, 2001 and signed by Orje Ishegh-Nor, Secretary, Board of Directors, FUTO Community Bank. The terms set out in the body of the letter are- i. The Board of Directors approved the claimant’s appointment as the accountant of the 1st defendant Bank, ii. He will be responsible to the Manager for the day to day operation of the 1st defendant bank and he will be answerable to the Board of Directors through the 4th defendant, who is the manager of the 1st defendant. iii. His total emolument will be N185,232.00 per annum, subject to annual review by the Board following excellent performance iv. The appointment may be terminated by either party by giving 3 months’ notice to the other. v. He was expected to assume duties immediately after submission of a medical certificate of fitness, three referee reports and a signed undertaking by a guarantor. Besides the provision for 3 months’ notice, Exhibit A did not state how to exercise the right to terminate the employment. I do not see anywhere the 1st defendant is under duty to observe what the claimant now complains about. The only procedure for termination of the claimant’s employment as laid out in Exhibit A is that the claimant must be given 3 months’ notice of termination. Outside this, there is nowhere any particular procedure was laid out for the 1st defendant to follow when it decides to terminate the claimant’s employment. The matters forming the grounds of the claimant’s reliefs 1 and 2 are not specified in the conditions of the employment. Exhibit A did not state how the Board should exercise its right to terminate the employment or which particular person to sign the letter of termination or on what reason/basis the claimant’s employment can be terminated. From the contract of service between the claimant and the 1st defendant, I do not see where the 1st defendant or its Board was put under obligation to observe any particular procedure during the termination of the claimant’s employment. In the absence of a condition of service specifying these matters, this court cannot now question the 1st defendant on the procedure it chose to adopt in the exercise of its right under the contract. The role of the court in the exercise an employer’s right under the contract was put this way in NEPA vs. ENYONG (SUPRA) at 469: “A master can terminate the contract of employment with his servant at any time for any reason or for no reason at all, provided the terms of the contract of service between them are complied with. The motive which led an employer to lawfully terminate the servant’s employment is not normally a relevant fact and the court will not have business with such motive but will only give effect to the contract of service between the parties” The provisions of a written contract of service binds the parties to it and it is outside the province of the court to look elsewhere for the terms of termination of the contract other than in the written agreement. Therefore, in this case, the contract of service is the bed-rock upon which the claimant must found his case and he succeeds or fails upon the terms of the contract of service. This court will not look outside the terms in the contract in deciding the rights and obligations of the parties in this suit. Reliefs 1 and 2 sought by the claimant seek the order of this court to create a condition of service for the parties outside what is stated in Exhibit A. This court cannot do so. This court is bound by the condition of service existing between the parties. Since Exhibit A did not state which body is to exercise disciplinary power over staff of the 1st defendant and how the disciplinary power is to be exercised, the declarations sought in reliefs 1 and 2 cannot be made. These reliefs are accordingly dismissed The claimant also found his case on the allegation that he was not given fair hearing before his employment was terminated. In his evidence the claimant alleged that the Board is the accuser and also the judge in that a member of the board was a member of the panel; he was not given fair hearing before the panel as he didn’t face his accuser; he was not shown the report and recommendation of the panel and he has never been queried by the Board. In this case, the evidence of the claimant, in paragraph 17 of his evidence, shows that the 4th defendant had accused him of fraud, truancy, inability to perform the functions of his office and absenteeism. The 4th defendant had also served him two queries- the 1st demanding the claimant to explain the claimant’s failure to post into books accumulated debit and credit advances vouchers and the 2nd query alleging absenteeism. The claimant said he replied both queries. In July 2003, an investigation panel was also set up to investigate the conflict between the claimant and the 4th defendant. The claimant was invited to the panel and he was also told to submit a written representation which he did and he appeared before the panel. It was after the panel proceedings that he received Exhibit J on 25/4/2003 terminating his employment. In the evidence of the defendants, they did show that the claimant was previously given queries and warnings for truancy, absenteeism and non-performance. According to DW1, these were also the allegations the claimant was confronted with by the panel and the claimant was given an opportunity to defend himself after which the panel found the allegations to be true and it accordingly recommended the termination of the claimant’s employment in the report. In the matter of staff discipline, an employer must observe the principles of fair hearing before an employee is sanctioned. See FOLURUNSHO vs. WAEC (2011) ALL FWLR (Pt. 556) 422. However, the matter of fair hearing in a master and servant relationship, it has been held, does not require more than disclosing the allegation to the employee and giving the employee an opportunity to answer to the allegation. In NATIONAL BANK OF NIGERIA vs. OMOTAYO (2002) FWLR (Pt. 114) 454 at 466, it was held that- “To satisfy the rule of natural justice and fair hearing, a person likely to be affected by a disciplinary proceeding must be given adequate notice of the allegation against him to enable him make a representation in his own defence”. Also in NEPA vs. ENYONG (SUPRA) at 472, it was held as follows- “I think it is on the basis of this emphasis of fair hearing that the Supreme Court decision in the recent case of Osakwe vs. Nigeria Paper Mills Ltd (1998) 10 NWLR (Pt. 568) 1, can be explained. There it was held that where an employee is confronted with an allegation of crime by the employer and the former is given an opportunity of explaining himself, then he cannot later turn around to say he was not given a fair hearing” Therefore, the obligation of the defendants before the claimant’s employment was terminated does not exceed to disclose the complaint to the claimant and he be given a chance to react to the allegation. Although the claimant has alleged that he was never queried by the Board before his employment was terminated, I find this to be untenable in view of the delegation of control in Exhibit A. In his evidence, the claimant said the letter of his employment directed him to be answerable to the 4th defendant. In the 2nd paragraph of Exhibit A, it is provided that the claimant is answerable to the Board of Directors of the 1st defendant through the 4th defendant. The implication of this condition is that the Board has delegated some powers of control over the claimant to the 4th defendant. Therefore, where the 4th defendant queries the claimant, such query will be deemed to be query by the Board. I find from the evidence of the parties that the defendant sufficiently observed the required level of fair hearing before the claimant’s employment was terminated. By his own evidence, the claimant admitted that he was given query, he was invited to face a panel and he also made representations to the panel. He cannot now allege that he was not given fair hearing. The part of the claimant’s case that the Board is the accuser and also the judge in that a member of the board was a member of the panel is not lost to me. The claimant testified that one Mr. S.N Okpara is a Board member and also a member of the investigating panel. The claimant has however failed to set out the list of the members of the Board and that of the panel to enable this court make a finding on this allegation. It is thus clear that the claimant had notice of the allegations through the queries and the investigative panel and he was given an opportunity to respond to the allegations. In my view, this evidence establishes that the claimant was given fair hearing before he was dismissed by the 1st defendant from its employment. In any case, in the relationship of master and servant, what determines the wrongfulness of a dismissal is the condition of service and not the notion of fair hearing. Therefore, where a contract of service gives a party a right to determine the contract in the manner stipulated in the terms and conditions of service, the employee cannot be heard to complain that he has not been given fair hearing as the issue does not arise. STRABAG CONSTRUCTION NIG LTD vs. ADEYEFA (2001) FWLR (Pt. 60) 1538; OSAKWE vs. NIGERIAN PAPER MILL (1998) 7 SCNJ 222 at 231. As I have observed previously above, the only condition in Exhibit A on the procedure for the termination of the employment is the giving of 3 months’ notice. The claimant says he was not given 3 months’ notice as required in Exhibit A before his employment was terminated. The defendants did not specifically deny this allegation but contended that the termination of the claimant’s employment followed due process. Without much ado on this issue, I find as a fact that the defendants did not give the claimant 3 months’ notice but they rather gave him 3 months’ salary in lieu of notice. Exhibit A did not provide an alternative for salary in lieu of notice. This is the crux of the claimant’s complaint. To him, he was to be given 3 months’ notice and not 3 months’ salary in lieu. Failure to give him the 3 months’ notice made the termination of his employment wrongful. It is settled law that the terms of a condition of service must be followed in terminating the employment of a servant. Where the termination is done in a manner in contravention of the condition of service, the termination is wrongful and the employer must pay damages for breach of contract. See NEPA vs. ENYONG (SUPRA) at 474; ARINZE vs. FIRST BANK (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 639) 78. It is thus obvious that the defendants did not comply with the terms of Exhibit A when they failed to give the claimant 3 months’ notice. The termination of the claimant’s employment is therefore wrongful on that ground. Among the claimant’s several reliefs is a declaration that the termination of his employment is unconstitutional, null and void and an order reinstating him to his employment. I have earlier in this judgment held that the claimant’s employment is that of master and servant employment. In such an employment relationship, a termination of an employee’s employment by the employer cannot be declared null and void. By the nature of reliefs 3 and 4 sought by the claimant, they are unusual remedies for an employee whose employment is not covered by statute. This was the opinion of the Supreme Court in ESIEVWORE vs. NEPA (2002) FWLR (Pt. 124) 398 at 408 when their Lordships held thus - “Employment with statutory backing must be terminated in the way and manner prescribed by the relevant statute and any manner of termination inconsistent therewith is null and void and of no effect. But in other cases governed by only agreement of parties and not by statute, removal by way of termination of appointment or dismissal will be in the form agreed. Any other form connotes only wrongful termination or dismissal but not to declare such dismissal null and void. The only remedy is a claim for damages for wrongful dismissal… for this wrongful act, he is only liable in damages and nothing more.” Their Lordships held further at the same page as follows- “The principle is that where there has been a purported termination of a contract of service, a declaration to the effect that the contract still subsists will rarely be made.” I must state that in master and servant relationship, as in this case, once any of the parties have exercised his right under the contract to terminate the employment, whatever perceived defect exist in the termination is irrelevant, the employment is nonetheless terminated and the court will not impose an employee on the unwilling employer. Thus, once an employment is terminated, whether wrongly or lawfully, the relationship has been brought to an end. The principle was reiterated in IKHALE vs. FAAN (2003) FWLR (Pt. 181) 1726 at 1742 where it was held that- “It is the law that in ordinary cases of master and servant, a repudiation of the contract of employment by wrongful dismissal of the servant by the master puts an end to the contract”. Thus, in purely master servant relationship, of the nature of this case, re-instatement cannot be granted. This is on the principle that specific performance of contract of service cannot be ordered in master and servant engagement. See JIRGBAGH vs. U.B.N PLC (2000) FWLR (Pt. 26) 1790 at 1807; U.B.N LTD vs. OGBOH (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 380) 647. The employee’s remedy, where the termination of the appointment or dismissal is found wrongful, can only be in award of damages. Therefore, notwithstanding any alleged wrongfulness in the termination of the claimant’s employment, the employment cannot and should not be treated as subsisting. Accordingly, reliefs 3 and 4 are also dismissed. The claimant also sought an Order directing the defendants to pay him his salaries and allowances and benefits due and payable to him from the date of termination of his appointment. The evidence of the claimant in this case shows that his employment was terminated on 25th April 2003 and he was informed in Exhibit A that he will be paid 3 months’ salary in lieu of notice. Under cross examination, the claimant admitted that he was paid the 3 months’ salary and he was not owed any outstanding salary. The claimant ceased to be in the 1st defendant’s employment from the date of the termination and he has since not rendered any service to the 1st defendant. The claimant cannot be entitled to salaries for the period he was no longer in the employment. An employee, who has been dismissed, whether lawfully or otherwise, cannot claim for wages for service he never rendered. The Supreme Court in OBOT vs. CBN (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 310) 140 held that- “An employee dismissed in breach of his contract of employment cannot choose to treat the contract as subsisting and claim for salaries and entitlements he would have earned up to the end of the contractual period”. Therefore, it is my view and I so hold that the claimant is not entitled to his claim for salary from the date of termination of his employment. The claimant has shown by his evidence that he was paid 3 months’ salary at the time of he was given his termination letter. It is this 3 months’ salary the claimant contends in this case was paid in lieu of the required 3 months’ notice but which payment was not stipulated in Exhibit A. To all intent, as disclosed in the evidence of the claimant, the defendants paid the 3 months’ salary to the claimant in lieu of notice. I have held earlier that the claimant is entitled to damages resulting from the defendant’s failure to give him 3 months’ notice as required in Exhibit A before his employment was terminated. The measure of damages usually awarded in contract of service cases where the termination is found to be wrongful is the amount of salary for the period of notice which the employer would have given to terminate the employment. The claimant was entitled to 3 months’ notice under the contract; therefore, the amount the claimant is entitled to as damages in this case is 3 months’ salary in lieu of the notice. That is the sum he would have earned over the period of notice required to lawfully terminate his employment. By his evidence, the claimant has admitted having been paid the sum he is entitled to as damages and he did accept it at the time. This court cannot award it to him a second time. That will amount to double compensation. As for the claimant’s alternative claim for damages of N6,000,000.00 (Six Million Naira) for wrongful termination of his employment, it is my view that he is not entitled to this sum nor to any other sum under the head of damages. As it has already been said in this judgment, the damages the claimant is entitled to have already been paid to him. The point must also be stressed that general damages is not awarded in actions between master and servant. It is settled law that an employee cannot be awarded general damages in an action between him and his master. See P.Z & CO. LTD vs. OGEDENGBE (1972) All NLR 206 at 210; PIONEER MILLING CO. LTD. vs. NANSING (2003) FWLR (Pt. 151) 1820 at 1827-1828. The claimant’s claim for damages also fails. In the final result, I find no merit in the claimant’s case. All his claims fail. The suit is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge