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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT ABUJA BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP, Hon. Justice B.A. Adejumo, OFR……………………………………………………….....President (President, National Industrial Court of Nigeria) Date: 24th day of June 2015 NICN/LA/157/2013 BETWEEN: MILAN INDUSTRIES LIMITED…....………….………………..…………………………………..……....CLAIMANT AND MANISH SHARMA.................................................................................................DEFENDANT REPRESENTATION: DAMILOLA AJEYALEMI (MISS) FOR THE CLAIMANT JUDGMENT This action was initiated by the Claimant against the Defendants by means of a Complaint dated and filed on 28thMarch, 2013. The Claimant claims against the Defendants jointly and severally the following reliefs: i. A Declaration that the Defendant breached his contract of service with the Claimant when he disengaged from its employment without giving the required three (3) months' notice. ii. An order that the Defendant pays the Claimant damages in the sum of N315,000.00 being three (3) months salary in lieu of notice. iii. An order that the Defendant pays the Claimant the sum of $5, 100 being three (3) months' salary paid off shore in lieu of notice. iv. An order that the Defendant refund to the Claimant the sums in paragraphs 16(c) - (f) being the expenses incurred by the Claimant in the employment of the Defendant. v. The sum of 25, 000.000.00 as general damages against the Defendant for the breach of Clause 18 of the Contract of Service dated 26th February, 2009. By way of reference, the Defendant through his counsel, Babatunde Kasumu, Esq., filed a Memorandum of Appearance 0n 1st July, 2013. That was the only practical step taken by the Defendant in defence of the case against him. After this, several adjournments were granted to enable learned counsel to file necessary processes in defence of the case. This was not to be. Rather, on the 30th day of September, 2013, the Court having heard and considered the application made by learned counsel for the Defendant granted leave to counsel to discontinue from representing the Defendant. An application by learned counsel for the Claimant urging the Court to proceed to hear the case immediately was rejected by the Court. Consequently, the case was adjourned to 11/11/13 for hearing. On 11/11/13 the Defendant was neither present in court nor represented by counsel. What is more, no explanation was given for the absence of the Defendant. This prompted counsel for the Claimant to apply that the Court should proceed to hear the case considering that the sole witness for the Claimant was in court. The Claimant was granted leave to open his case. The sole witness for the Claimant, Emmanuel Akinyemi was sworn on oath with the holy bible and gave evidence as the CW. He informed the Court that he lives in Mowe, Ogun State, and that he works with the Claimant Company as Manager (Legal). The CW stated that he swore to a witness statement on oath on 25th March, 2013, and having identified same, he adopted it as his evidence before the Court. The witness statement on oath was tendered in evidence, admitted and marked Exhibit CLW CLW 3. Also admitted in evidence was a document referred to as Contract of Service, Milan Industries Limited marked Exhibit CLW4 - CLW10. Apart from these, a number of other documents were admitted in evidence and appropriately marked as exhibits in the case. The witness having completed his evidence in chief urged the Court to grant the Claimant's claims. In his evidence in chief, the CW stated that the Defendant was employed by the Claimant in September, 2011 to work on latter's hotel project at 52/54 Kofo Abayomi Street, Victoria Island, Lagos pursuant to a contract of service agreement executed by the parties. It was the evidence of the CW that the Defendant disengaged from the services of the Claimant without giving the 3 months' notice stipulated in the contract of service agreement. This according to the witness is due to the failure of the Defendant to return to work at the expiration of the leave that was granted to him. The CW further deposed to the fact that it was later discovered that the Defendant had taken up employment with Cubic Contractors Limited. The witness stated that the sudden departure of the Defendant from the employment of the Claimant created a void in supervision of assembling works on the Claimant's Hotel Project as the Claimant had no assembling plant supervisor for over 3 months. It was his evidence that the Claimant is entitled to damages for the breach of contract and bearing in mind that the Claimant incurred huge expenses in bringing the Defendant to Nigeria. The CW proceeded to state the particulars of damages being claimed by the Claimant. The case was therefore adjourned to 17/01/14 to enable the Defendant to cross examine the Claimant. An order was made for the issuance and service of hearing notice on the Defendant at his last known address by pasting same thereon while proof of service should be kept in the case file. When the case came up on 14th January, 2014, the Court expressed concern on whether the Defendant was served as ordered at his last known address. Consequently, the case was further adjourned to 27/03/14 for cross examination. The Court ordered that hearing notice be issued and served on the Defendant by pasting same at his last known address of Plot 416, Idu Industrial Area, Phase 1, Abuja. The Court also gave an order directing the bailiff to put the proof of service which shall be a photograph of the hearing notice as pasted at the last known address of the Defendant. When the matter came up on 30th April, 2014, before the Court there was no proof that the Defendant was served with hearing notice in compliance with the order made at the last adjourned date. Consequently, the case was adjourned to 04/06/14 for the Defendant to open his defence. The Court made an order directing the bailiff to issue and serve hearing notice on the Defendant by pasting same at his last known address, and that proof of service should be kept in the case file. At the next adjourned date of 04/06/14, the Court was satisfied that the Defendant had been duly served with the hearing notice as ordered by the Court. The Court was of the firm view that the Defendant was not interested in cross examining the sole witness for the Claimant. Consequently, the Court made an order foreclosing the Defendant from cross examining the sole witness for the Claimant, Emmanuel Akinyemi. The case was adjourned for the Defendant to open his defence. The Defendant was further foreclosed from entering a defence to the suit on 12/11/14. This was upon an application by learned counsel for the Claimant who brought to the attention of the Court a letter written by the former employer of the Defendant, Cubic Contractors Limited informing the Court that the Defendant had left its employment and had also left Nigeria. Consequently, the parties were ordered to file their final written addresses. At this juncture, it is apt to state that up till the 15th day of April slated for adoption of final written addresses, the Defendant did not file any final written address. In consequence, the Claimant was granted leave to adopt its final written address dated 14/01/15 and filed on 11/02/15, whereupon, learned counsel for the Claimant adopted the written address as argument in the case. Learned counsel urged the Court to grant the claims of the Claimant. I will now consider the final written address of the Claimant dated 14th January, 2015 and filed on 11th February, 2015. It was settled by Damilola Ajeyalemi (Miss). Learned counsel for the Claimant distilled 2 issues for determination as follows: 1) Whether with regard to the provisions of the contract of service as between the parties and the evidence adduced before this Honourable Court, was the Claimant in breach of the contractual agreement between the parties? 2) Having regard to the relevant provisions of the contract of service and the evidence adduced in Court, is the Claimant entitled to damages as a result of breach of contract? ISSUE NO. 1 Learned counsel for the Claimant submitted that the law provides remedies for breach of contract. In support of this proposition learned counsel for the Claimant cited the case of U.B.N. Plc v. Soares (2012) NWLR (Pt. 1312) 550 CA where it was held that contract of service regulates the relationship between an employer and an employee, and that the parties are bound by its clear and unambiguous terms. It was contended by learned counsel for the Claimant that Paragraph 17: 1 of Exhibit CW 4 - 10 (Contract of Service Agreement) requires the Defendant to give 3 months' notice to the Claimant. Learned counsel also referred to section 7 (e) of the Labour Act Cap L1 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 which requires a contract of employment to state the length of notice to be given by a party wishing to terminate the contract. It was contended by learned counsel for the Claimant that the Defendant breached the term of Exhibit CW 4-10 when he disengaged from the employment of the Claimant without giving the required notice nor payment in lieu of notice. It was posited by learned counsel that the duty of the court is to enforce the contract between the parties and that a court cannot make contract for the parties. In support of this proposition learned counsel for the Claimant cited the case of Best (Nig.) Ltd. v. B.H. (Nig.) Ltd. (2011) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1239) 95 SC where the Court, per Adekeye JSC (as he then was) held that: "A contract may be defined as a legally binding agreement between two or more persons by which rights are acquired by one party in return for acts or forbearances on the part of the other. In effect, a contract is a bilateral affair which needs the ad idem of the parties." Learned counsel for the Claimant also cited the case of Calabar Cement Co. Ltd. v Daniel (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 188) 750 CA in support of the principle that parties to a contract are bound by its plain and unambiguous terms. Furthermore, Learned counsel for the Claimant referred to Paragraph 17: 11 of Exhibit CW 4 -10 which states as follows: "If any employee resigns within one year of the contract in force, he will have to repay the air ticket and the visa expenses and any other expenses which have been incurred by the employer for him and his family in bringing them to Nigeria. The employer will not pay for the air ticket for the employee and his family to return to his country..." In line with the foregoing, learned counsel for the Claimant submitted that the contract of service came into force on 22nd November, 2011 while the Defendant left the employment of the Claimant on 12th August, 2012. Learned counsel posited that the Defendant disengaged from the employment of the Claimant within one year and that the Claimant can therefore invoke the provision of the relevant portions of Exhibit CW 4-10. Learned counsel for the Claimant submitted that Exhibits CLW12, CLW13, CLW14 and CLW 15 are evidence of expenses incurred by the Claimant in bringing the Defendant to its employment, and that the Claimant is entitled to a full refund of the expenses incurred in employing the Defendant. In support of this position, learned counsel cited the case of Ejitagha v. N.U.T. (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 376) 189 CA. Learned counsel for the Claimant drew the attention of the Court to the fact the evidence given by the Claimant remains unchallenged as the Defendant failed and/or neglected to defend the suit despite the ample opportunity given to him by the Court. Learned counsel urged the Court to accept and act on the evidence adduced by the Claimant. On this point, learned counsel for the Claimant cited the case of M.W.T. (Nig.) Ltd. v. P.T.F. (2007) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1058), where the Court, per Coomassie JCA, (as he then was) held as follows: "The law is that where a piece or parcel of evidence is elicited by a party and such is neither challenged nor controverted, the court is duty bound to ascribe credibility to it..." ISSUE NO. 2 Learned counsel for the Claimant submitted that as it stands, the Defendant has breached the terms of his contract of service with the Claimant which he was bound to observe. Learned counsel for the Claimant further submitted that the Defendant who has failed to give the 3 months' notice as stipulated in the contract of service is liable in damages to the Claimant. In support of this proposition learned counsel cited the case of Iyese v U.B.T.H.M.B. (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt. 643) 45 CA. On how to determine the measure of damages to be awarded for breach of contract of service, learned counsel for the Claimant referred to Evans Bros (Nig) Pub. Ltd. v. Falaiye (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 838) 564 CA, where the Court held as follows: "...where in a contract of service provision is made for the termination of contract and the said provision is breached,.... the amount of damages recoverable, if any is limited to the amount of the employee (employer in this case) would have earned over the period of notice." In view of the above principle of law, learned counsel for the Claimant submitted that the Claimant's unchallenged evidence is to the effect that it suffered huge losses due to the fact that its project that was being supervised by the Defendant was abandoned for over 3 months. Learned counsel urged the Court to award to the Claimants the damages being claimed. Before proceeding to determine this case on the basis of the issues formulated for determination by the Claimant, it is important to reiterate that this case was adjourned several times at the instance of the Court to enable the Defendant take appropriate steps. Every opportunity given to the Defendant to either file necessary processes or cross examine the lone witness for the Claimant, or open his defence was ignored by the Defendant. The situation came to a head when the counsel representing Defendant withdrew his appearance. As it is, repeated efforts given to the Defendant to defend the suit did not elicit any positive response from the Defendant. The principle of hearing connotes that all the parties to an action are heard or given opportunity to be heard. Thus, where one of the parties is not heard or not given an opportunity to be heard, the hearing cannot be regarded as fair hearing. See the case of Alhaji Chief Yekini Otapo v. Chief R. O. Sunmonu& Ors (1987) LPELR-2822 (SC), p. 31-32, paras. F-D. However, a party who chose to disregard the rules of this Court or who neglected or refused to attend court after been served with hearing notices cannot be heard to allege denial of fair hearing. On this point, I rely on the case of The Nigerian Navy & Ors v. Navy Captain D. O. Labinjo (2012) LPELR-7868 (SC) PP. 27-28, paras. G-D. See also Ofoegbu v. Iheanacho (2001) 4 NWLR (Pt. 703) 219. In the instant case, the Defendant was given several opportunities vide adjournments and served hearing notices, yet, he spurned every such opportunity to respond to the case against him. Thus, a party in the situation of the Defendant in the instant case cannot complain that he has not been given fair hearing. I am therefore of the considered view that the requirement of fair hearing was satisfied. Be that as it may, it is long established, and it has assumed the character of elementary principle that in civil cases, the onus lies on the plaintiff to satisfy the court that he is entitled on the basis of the evidence adduced to the remedy he seeks. In doing this, the plaintiff is to rely on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the defendant because if this burden is not discharged, the weakness of the defendant's case may not help him. On this principle of law see the case of Lasisi Adegbesan Abimbola v. Saka Abatan (2001) LPELR-38 (SC), p. 11, paras. D-F. It should be noted that the creation and formation of contract of employment is subject to the general rules of contract. This was the principle of law reaffirmed in the case of NWOBOSI V. A.C.B. (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 404) 658. By the same token, every contract of employment is regulated by agreed terms and the Court that is called upon to interpret the terms of the contract considers the intention of the parties by examining the words used since the words express the intentions of the parties. On this point see the case of LONGE V. FBN (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1189) 1. Issue No. 1 formulated on behalf of the Claimant enquires whether the Defendant is in breach of the terms of the contract of service between him and the Claimant. It is trite law that a contract can be discharged by breach. It simply means that the party in breach has acted contrary to the terms of the contract either in the form of non-performance or by performing the contract not in accordance with its terms or by a wrongful repudiation of the contract. A party to a valid contract is entitled to bring an action for damages against the defaulting party. On this point, see the case of Nwaolisah v. Nwabufoh (2011) LPELR-2115 (SC)p. 39, paras. D-E. At paragraph 7 of the Statement of Facts, the Claimant avers as follows: "It is averred that the Defendant without notice disengaged his services from the Claimant when he applied for leave to get married in India." Furthermore, the evidence of the CW (the sole witness for the Claimant) is that the Defendant breached the contract of service agreement by disengaging from the employment of the Claimant without giving 3 months' notice as required under Paragraph 17: 1 of Exhibit CLW4-10. A careful perusal of the said Paragraph of Exhibit CLW 4-10 executed by the parties shows clearly that the employee, if he desires to resign will have to give 3 months notice to the employer. The contract of service between the Claimant and Defendant was executed on 22nd November, 2011. The CW testified that Defendant left the employment of the Claimant on the 21st of August, 2012 without giving the required notice. The Court is left with no option than to believe the evidence of the CW which remains unchallenged. There is nothing to suggest that the Defendant was not aware of his obligation under the terms of Exhibit CLW 4-10 to give his employer 3 months notice of his intention to disengage from the employment relationship. He accepted to be bound by the terms of the contract of service when he executed same. He cannot be allowed to flagrantly disregard a term or terms of the contract. It is needless for me to emphasize that the Defendant breached the contract of service by failing or neglecting to give the 3 months notice as required by the contract of employment.He is duty bound to observe the terms of the contract entered into. May the day never come when a party will feel at liberty to walk away from the contract in violation of the terms of the contract. Courts have a sacred duty to enforce a contract freely executed by the parties thereto. Thus, in the case of BEST (NIG) LTD. V. BLACKWOOD HODGE (NIG) LTD. & 2 ORS (2011) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1239) 95 at 117, Para. D, the Supreme Court, per Fabiyi, JSC held that: “Parties are bound by the terms agreed to in a contract. If the conditions for the formation of a contract are fulfilled by the parties thereto, they will be bound. It is not the function of the court to make contract for the parties or rewrite the one which they have made. See UBN v. Ozigi (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 333) pg. 385 at 404; Oyenuga v. Provisional Council of the University of Ife (1965) NMLR 9.” In view of the foregoing reasons and authorities cited, I resolve Issue No. 1 against the Defendant. I hold that the Defendant breached the contract of service between him and the Claimant by failing to give 3 months notice to the latter as required under the contract of employment. The Claimant in paragraph 15 of the Statement of Fact averred as follows: "15. The Claimant averred that it incurred a lot of expenses in bringing the Defendant to Nigeria." In support of the above averment, the CW further testified that the Claimant incurred huge expenses in trying to secure the services of the Defendant. The witness tendered Exhibits CLW12, CLW13, CLW14 and CLW15 which according to him are evidence of the expenses incurred by the Claimant in securing the services of the Defendant. It was therefore submitted by learned counsel for the Claimant that by virtue of Paragraph 17: 11 of Exhibit CLW 4-10, the Claimant is entitled to be fully reimbursed the expenses incurred in bringing the Defendant to its employment. I have examined the said Exhibits CLW12, CLW13, CLW14 and CLW15, and there is nothing precluding me from attaching considerable evidential weight to them. To my mind, the credibility of these Exhibits has not been impugned in any way. I therefore find the pieces of evidence credible and weighty. It is settled law that what is required of a party is to adduce credible and acceptable evidence to establish the facts of his case. This is what the Claimant herein has done. He has by evidence established that he incurred expenses in bringing the Defendant to its employment. The case of Fawehinmi v. Akinlaja (2010) LPELR-8963 (CA), p. 18, paras. C-F. Is the Claimant entitled to a full reimbursement of the amount or expenses incurred in bringing the Defendant to its employment? For purposes of clarity, I will reproduce the provision of Paragraph 17: 11 of Exhibit CLW 4-10 which states as follows: "If any employee resigns within one year of the contract in force, he will have to repay the air ticket and the visa expenses and any other expenses which have been incurred by the employer for him and his family in bringing them to Nigeria. The employer will not pay for the air ticket for the employee and his family to return to his country..." The intendment of the parties is very clear: should any employee such as the Defendant leaves the employment of the Claimant within one year of the coming into force of the contract of service, he will have to repay all the expenses incurred by the Claimant in bringing the employee and his family to Nigeria. There is uncontroverted evidence before the Court that the contract of employment commenced on the 22nd of November, 2011 while the Defendant disengaged from the said contract on 21st August, 2012. Thus, it is as clear as daylight that the Defendant left the employment of the Claimant within one year of the commencement of the contract of service. In effect, the Claimant is entitled to repay the air ticket, visa expenses and any other expenses which have been incurred by the Claimant in connection with bringing the Defendant and his family to Nigeria. I so hold. Let me now proceed to Issue No. 2 for determination. This Issue enquires whether in the circumstances of this case the Claimant is entitled to damages. In an earlier part of this judgment, I have stated that a party to a valid contract can bring an action for damages for breach of the contract against the defaulting party. This view is in tandem with established principles of law. Thus, a party who sustains loss arising from breach of contract is as far as money can do entitled to be placed in the same situation with respect to damages as if the contract had been performed. See ROBINSON V. HARMAN (1848) 1 Ex. 850 at 855. Learned counsel also referred to the succinct statement of law espoused by Alderson in HADLEY V. BAXENDALE (1854) 9 Exch 341 thus: “Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such a breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered as either arising naturally, i.e., according to the natural course of things from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract as the probable result of the breach. If special circumstances under which the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract which would reasonably contemplate would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from such a breach of contract under the special circumstances so known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances are wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach of contract.” However, it is for the party claiming damages to take steps to mitigate the loss arising from the alleged breach. This position was affirmed in the case of CBN V. BECKITI CONSTRUCTION LIMITED (2011) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1240) 203 at 208 where the Court held as follows: “A party claiming damages has an onerous duty of taking reasonable steps to mitigate the loss consequent upon the breach and debars him from claiming any damages which is due to his negligence.” Thus, the question is not whether the Claimant can claim damages against the Defendant but the quantum of damages to be awarded in the circumstance of the instant case. Without much ado, having established that the Defendant is in breach of the contract of service, I hold that the Claimant is entitled to damages for breach of contract. It is apt to observe here that a long line of cases has decided that in ordinary contract of employment the amount of damages due to an employee whose employment has been wrongfully terminated is the award of salary for the period of notice and other legitimate entitlements at the time the employment was determined. The Supreme Court case of GABRIEL ATIVIE VS. KABELMETAL NIG. LTD. (2008) LPELR – 591 (SC) is an authority on this principle of law. See also the Supreme Court decision in the case of P. C. IMOLOAME VS. WEST AFRICAN EXAMINATION COUNCIL (1992) LPELR – 1500 (SC). Furthermore, it is settled law that courts do not award general damages in actions founded on breach of contract of employment. See UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED V. T. A. HAMMOND supra. In the case of Wilbros Nig. Ltd. &Anor v. V. Macaulay (2009) LPELR-8507 (CA), the Court of Appeal while refusing the plaintiff's claim for a lump sum of N300.000 in an action for breach of contract of employment said the claim was in the nature of general damages. The Court held that: "...a plaintiff in an action for wrongful or unlawful dismissal is not entitled to general damages because such general damages belong to the realm of claims in tort, while actions for wrongful or unlawful dismissal are based on contract... a matter in which the plaintiff brought a claim for wrongful dismissal, the Court held that in the consideration of an award in consequence of a breach of contract of employment the measure of damages is the loss flowing naturally from the breach and is incurred in direct consequence of the violation. It held further that the damages recoverable are the losses reasonably foreseeable by the parties and foreseen by them at the time of the contract as inevitably arising if one of them broke faith with the other. That in the contemplation of such a loss, there can be no room for claims which are merely speculative or sentimental unless these are specially provided for by the terms of contract." Effectively, a plaintiff in an action for damages for breach of contract of employment cannot claim general or speculative damages but can only claim for losses flowing naturally from the breach or those losses incurred in direct consequence of the breach, or such losses as specifically provided for in the contract. Applying the above principles to the case in hand, it is noteworthy that Paragraph 17:11 specifically provides that the Defendant is obliged to refund the following expenses incurred by the Claimant in securing his services: 1. His air ticket; 2. Expenses incurred by the Claimant in procuring his visa; and 3. Any other expenses incurred in bringing him to Nigeria. The Defendant herein knew or ought to know that his unannounced departure from the employment of the Claimant would definitely create a vacuum to be filled by the Claimant. I am also of the candid view that judging by his own experience, he knew that the Claimant would most likely incur cost in securing the services of another employee to fill the gap created by his sudden departure. Thus, expenses incurred by the Claimant in securing the services of another employee could be safely regarded as expenses reasonably foreseeable by the parties herein at the time of making the contract of service of employment taking in to account the principle established by the Court of Appeal in the case of Wilbros Nig. Ltd. & Anor v. V. Macaulay (2009) LPELR-8507 (CA). At this stage, it is important to observe that a head of the Claimant's claims, which is claim (iii) indicated on the originating process (Complaint) is expressed in foreign currency. Under that head, the Claimant is claiming the sum of $5, 100 (Five Thousand Dollars). This naturally raises the questions whether Nigerian courts can discretionally give judgment in foreign currency. My answer is in the affirmative, and I am gratified that this position has been authoritatively decided by the apex court. When considering the question whether a Nigerian court can in appropriate cases award judgment sums in foreign currency, the Supreme Court in the case of Salzgitter Stahl GMBH v Tunji Dosumu Industries Ltd. (2010) LPELR-29999 (SC), pp. 50-51, paras. F - C, had this to say: "Before concluding this Judgment, it is no longer in doubt and this is settled that parties can make an agreement or enter into a contract to pay in foreign currency and a Nigerian court, can in its discretion, award same accordingly. See the cases of Metroonex (Nig) Ltd. v. Griffin George Ltd. (1991) 1 NWLR) Pt. 169) 651 at 659; Olaoyin Enterprises Ltd. v. S.J. & M (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 235) 361 at 385..." Similarly, the Supreme Court, per Adekeye, JSC, in the subsequent case of Harka Air Services (Nig.) Limited v. Keazor Esq. (2011) LPELR-1363 (SC), pp. 44-46, paras. D-A, had this to say: "In the case of Koya v. U.B.A. (1997) 1 NWLR (pt. 481) pg. 251 the Supreme Court per M. E. Ogundare, JSC of blessed memory had this to say - "It is my respectful view that courts in this country can claim jurisdiction to entertain and determine cases where sums in foreign currency are claimed. The old rule in England, as well as in Nigeria, is judge-made and in the light of present day circumstances of extensive international commercial relationships that rule should give way to a new rule as now in England more so that the difficulties hitherto experienced in enforcing such judgments no longer apply..." The principle established by the above two cases and more is that in appropriate cases, Nigerian court can in the exercise of its discretion give judgment in foreign currency. It is the more shocking that the Defendant who was given leave to travel to India for his wedding was later discovered to have taken up employment with another company, Cubic Contractors Limited. It is an understatement to say that the conduct of the Defendant is reprehensible. In view of all that I have said above, and having regard to my holding that the Defendant flagrantly breached the terms of his contract of service with the Claimant, it is appropriate for me to proceed to grant the reliefs sought against the Defendant. I am persuaded that the Claimant has placed before me credible evidence in prove of his case. Consequently, I hereby declare and order as follows: 1. That the Defendant is in breach of his contract of service with the Claimant when he disengaged from its employment without giving 3 months’ notice as required under the terms of the contract. 2. The Defendant shall pay to the Claimant the sum of N315,000.00(Three Hundred and Fifteen Thousand Naira) being three (3) months salary in lieu of notice. 3. The Defendant shall pay to the Claimant the sum of $5, 100 (Five Thousand One 100 Dollars) being three (3) months' salary paid off shore in lieu of notice. 4. The Defendant is hereby ordered to refund to the Claimant the sums in paragraphs 16(c) - (f) of the Statement of Facts being the expenses incurred by the Claimant in the employment of the Defendant. I decline to grant general damages claimed by the Claimant following the principle restated in the case of UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED V. T. A. HAMMOND (supra). Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice, B. A. Adejumo, OFR, MCI.Arb, GFSMN, CFIAR, FCIArb, FNILS President, National Industrial Court of Nigeria.