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BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS Hon Justice B.B Kanyip - Presiding Judge Hon. Justice V.N Okobi - Judge Hon Justice O. A Obaseki-Osaghae - Judge DATE: July 20, 2010 Suit No. NIC/LA/04/2009 BETWEEN 1. National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) 2. The Registered Trustees of Motorcycle Operators Association of Lagos State - Applicants AND 1. Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria (RTEAN) 2. The Registered Trustees of All Nigeria Autobike Commercial Owners (ANACOWA) 3 The Registered Trustees of Amalgamated Commercial Motorcycle Riders Association 4. The Registered trustees of Motorcycle Transport Union of Nigeria 5. The Registered Trustees of National Amalgamated Commercial Motorcycle Riders Association (NACOMORA) 6. The Registered Trustees of Okada Welfare Association of Nigeria 7. The Registered Trustees of Akwa Cross 8. The Commissioner of Police 9. The Attorney-General & Commissioner of Justice, Lagos State 10. The Governor of Lagos State 11. Agege Local Government Council, Lagos 12. Ajeromi-Ifelodun Local Government Council, Lagos State 13. Alirnosho Local Government Council, Lagos State 14. Amuwo-Odofin Local Government Council, Lagos State 15. Apapa Local Government Council 16. Badagry Local Government Council, Lagos State 17. Epe Local Government Council, Lagos State 18. Eti-osa local Government Council, Lagos State 19. Ibeju-Lekki Local Government Council, Lagos State 20. Ifako Local Government Council, Lagos Snare 21. Ikeja Local Government Council, Lagos State 22. Ikorodu Local Government Council, Lagos Snare 23. Oshodi-isolo Local Government Council, Lagos State 24. Kosofe Local Government Council, Lagos State 25. Lagos Mainland Local Government Council, Lagos State 26. Lagos Island Local Government Council, Lagos State 27. Mushin Local Government Council, Lagos State 28. Ojo Local Government Council, Lagos State 29. Shomolu Local Government Council, LagosState 30. Surulere Local Government Council, Lagos State - Respondents REPRESENTATION Adejare Kembi and with him are Ms. Adedoyin Ogunyipe and Gani Bello, for the applicants Fred Agbaje and with him are Kennedy Osunwa, Tayo Olusanya, Adeniyi Pokanu and Miss Faith Lawani for the 1St respondent Tande Abioje, for the 3 respondent Chirna Uzoagba, for the 4th respondent Francis Ogunbowale, for the 6th respondent Adebayo Haroun, Principal State Counsel, Lagos State Ministry of Justice, and with are U. S. Danboyi and O.O. Onadeinde, for 9th and l0th respondents A. B. Bello, for the 1 l and 23 respondents Miss Mary Oluwaferni Amidu, for the l3 respondent Alhaji M. B. O. Ibraheem, for the l4 respondent H. O. Kareem, for the l5 respondent Francis Ogunbowale, for the l6 respondent Mrs K. O. Tijani with her is Mrs F. A. Ijaodola, for the 18th respondent. Ishaq Ahmed Abdulmutolib, for the 21st respondent King Wilson, for the 26th respondent Afolabi Kalejaiye, for the 27th respondent A. B. Yusuf-Eshilokun, for the 28th respondent Tolulope Abayomi Williams, for the 30th respondent RULING The applicants took out an originating summons dated 25th of November 2008 and filed 15th of January 2009, supported by a 45-paragraphed affidavit; the list of witnesses and list of exhibits were also attached. The applicants sought for the determination of the following questions: 1. Whether the directive of the Lagos State Government formally recognizing only two unions, the 1st applicant and 1st respondent herein contained in their letter reference number dated the day of … is ultra vires the powers of the Lagos State Government and is in breach of section….of the 1999 Constitution ( the reference number and date of the said letter , and the relevant section of the 1999 constitution are not disclosed). 2. Whether by virtue of section 7 of the 1999 constitution and the Schedule made pursuant thereto, the various Local Governments in the federation, particularly the local governments in the Lagos State of Nigeria are not effectively empowered to create, manage and control motor parks within their areas of jurisdiction. 3. Pursuant to the resolution of 2 above whether the said local government in exercise of the powers conferred on them in the Constitution can grant recognition and licenses to other persons and/or associations for the effective management of these parks 4. Whether the licenses granted by the 1lth to the 30th respondents to the applicants are in breach of the fundamental right of freedom of association of the 1st to the 7th respondents. 5. Whether associations registered under the Companies and Allied Matters Act can without affiliation and fulfillment of other conditions engage in union activities within the Federation of Nigeria 6. Whether the arrest, detention and prosecution of members of the respondent associations for acting without recognition is not a statutory responsibility of the Nigeria Police and is thus a breach of the fundamental rights of the said members. The applicants are, therefore, seeking the following reliefs: 1. A declaration that the directives of the Lagos State Government, formally recognizing only the applicants and the 1st respondent and recommending same to her local governments is a directive ‘validly and properly issued and is thus within her competence for the protection of peace, order and good governance. 2. A declaration that the licenses and permits granted by the local governments and developments area of the Lagos State are valid, subsisting and within their competence and is thus not in breach of section 40 of the 1999 Constitution. 3. Order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1st to 7th respondents from further interfering in the management and control of the parks licensed to the applicants. 4. An order that the respondents pay to the applicants the sum of N100,000,000.O0 (One Hundred Million Naira only) being damages for the interfering conducts of the said respondents. 5. An order that the 8th respondent, her agents, servants and officers be thus refrained from arresting, intimidating or coercing the applicants in any way from the lawful performance of their duties within the parks licensed to them. Attached as part of the originating processes are the list of witnesses and the list of exhibits to be relied on in the suit. We need to first point out that the 24th respondent i.e. Kosofe Local Government Council of Lagos State, filed a process dated May 4, 2010 but filed on May 6, 2010 and titled, “A Declaration of Non-Participation by the 24th Respondent” intimating the court that the 24th respondent will not be present or represented in court throughout the hearing of the matter but will abide by any decision arrived at by the court regarding the case. Secondly, the court at its sitting of February 11, 2010 upheld the oral application of counsel to the applicants that the names of the 2nd and 7th respondent be struck off this suit. In consequence the court ordered that the 2nd and 7th respondents, namely, the Registered Trustees of All Nigeria Autobike Commercial Ownen (ANACOWA) and the Registered Trustees of Akwa Cross, should be struck out from this suit. They were accordingly struck off the suit and so should be disregarded for present purposes On the 6th of March 2009 the court suo inotu raised the issue of jurisdiction and requested all parties to file written addresses on whether this court is seized of jurisdiction to determine the questions as formulated in the originating summons. The 3rd respondent applicant and the 9th & 10th respondents also filed preliminary objections claiming that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the subject matter of this case. They claimed that the 3rd respondent/applicant is an association registered under Part C of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 and not a union. They filed an affidavit in support with a written address in respect of her notice of preliminary objection. The 3rd respondent/applicant filed a written address in respect of its notice of preliminary objection filed on the 29th October 2009. They argued that the applicants filed originating summons in this court asking amongst other Things for declaratory reliefs as to the validity or otherwise of the directive of Lagos State Government in one of its letters formally recognizing only two unions in the State. That they also want the court to make pronouncement on the provision of section 7 of the 1999 Constitution as to whether or not it is constitutional for the applicants to create, manage and control motor parks and whether associations like the 3rd respondent which is registered under Part C of Companies and Allied Matters Acts 1990 should not affiliate to a registered and recognized union like the 1st plaintiff. The 3rd respondent/applicant’s notice of preliminary objection dated 29th of October 2009 and brought pursuant to section 7(l)(a) and (b) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 is challenging the jurisdiction of this court to hear, determine and adjudicate on this matter and is praying this court to strike out or dismiss this case in its entirely with heavy and substantial cost for being incompetent. The application is supported by an eight paragraph affidavit deposed to by Taiwo Dada a litigation clerk in the law firm of the 3rd respondent/applicant firm of solicitor and they relied on all the depositions in the said affidavit in support of the application. That going through the applicants’ processes filed before this court, it is clear on its face and at a glance that this court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to hear, determine and or adjudicate on this matter; that the subject matter of the applicants’ action falls outside the jurisdiction of this court in that it is not a labour or trade union matter. That the applicants’ action falls outside the provisions of section 7(l)(a) and (b) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. That the applicants’ action does not fall on any of the provisions as it is not a labour matter or strike or lockout issue, and that since the applicants’ action is not predicated on any of those things envisaged by section 7(l)(a) and(b) the 3rd respondent submitted that this court lacks jurisdiction. That the applicants’ action is incompetent and should, therefore, be struck out or dismissed 1toether. That the 3d respondent/applicant herein is not a trade union but an associati9i registered under Part C of Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 whose operation and running is being regulated by Federal En Court as the only court that has exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to its operation and running. On the issue of how jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction like this is being determined the respondent referred the court to mi case of Attorney-General of the Federation v. Guardian Newspaper [1999] 5 SC (Pt. 3) 59 at 99 where the case of Madukolum v. Nkemdilim [1962] 1 All NLR 587 was cited with approval In that case the four principles of determining jurisdiction of a court were enunciated as follows: (i) Was the court properly constituted with respect to the number and qualification of its members? (ii) Is the subject-matter of the action within its jurisdiction? (iii) Was the action initiated by due process of law? (iv) Has any condition to the exercise of its jurisdiction been fulfilled? The 3rd respondent further submitted that from the elementary principles of law of determining how jurisdiction of a court is being determined as cited above, that the applicants are said to have crossed the 1st and 3rd hurdles but failed to cross the 2nd and the 4th hurdles and that the presence of the four principles cited above in determining the jurisdiction of any court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction are not cumulative and the absence of one or more of it will rob the court of its requisite jurisdiction. In other words since the applicants’ action does not fall within the matters or purview thereof, this court lacks jurisdiction as contemplated by the above. In conclusion the 3rd respondent submitted that in view of the above cited cases and the provision of section 7(a) and (b) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 the Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to hear, determine and adjudicate on this matter and they urged the court to strike out or dismiss the applicants’ action in its entirety and that if the court should proceed and later discover that the court lacks jurisdiction it would have amounted to an exercise in futility; that the rule is that you cannot put anything on nothing and expect it to stay, it will collapse. On this principle of law the respondent referred to the case of Macfoy v. UAC Ltd [1962] AC 152 and that the case of the applicants must collapse and accordingly fail. They prayed the court in the final analysis to grant the preliminary objection in the interest of justice and strike out or dismiss the applicants’ action in its entirety with heavy and substantial cost. The applicants filed a written address dated 6th day of November 2009 in which they raised one issue for determination and reiterated that by an originating summons dated the 15th January 2009, they sought to invoke the interpretative jurisdiction of this court seeking the interpretation of the directive of the 10th respondent, the Governor of Lagos State, and section 7 of the 1999 Constitution and thus claiming the reliefs contained in the originating summons. That the court, suo motu raised the issue of jurisdiction and requested learned counsel to file written addresses on whether this court is seized of jurisdiction to determine the questions as formulated in the originating summons. In addition, the 3rd respondent and the 9th & 10th respondents also filed preliminary objections together with written addresses in this court claiming that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear, determine and adjudicate. On the subject matter of this case. That the 3rd, 9th an4 10th respondents claimed that the C respondent is an association registered under Part C of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 and not a trade union. That the sole issue for determination is whether or not this court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit. The applicants argued that it is trite that jurisdiction implies the power or authority of a court to adjudicate over a particular subject matter; that a court must have jurisdiction to exercise judicial powers over a dispute before it can adjudicate on such a suit They referred the court to the cases of Kalu v. Victor Odili [1992] 5 NWLR (Pt. 240) 130, Oloba v Akereja [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt. 84) 508 at 527. That in determining whether a court has jurisdiction in a matter, the court will examine or consider the nature of summons and statement of claim, citing Abdul—Raheem v. Oloruntoba— Oju [2007] 2 WRN 1 and that it is equally a fundamental principle that jurisdiction is determined by the plaintiffs claim That it is the claim before the court that has to be looked at or examined to ascertain whether it comes within the jurisdiction conferred on the court, citing Tukur v. Govt of Gongola State [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt 177) 517 at 561 where the Supreme Court said: The jurisdiction of a court can be limited or unlimited either by amount or value of the property in litigation or as to the type of subject matter it can handle. And in Aribisala v. Ogunye [2005] 11 WRN 2$ where the court held that Jurisdiction is the blood that gives life to the survival of an action in a court of law. Without jurisdiction the action will be likened to an animal that has been drained of its blood. It will cease to have life and any attempt to resuscitate it without infusing blood in it would be an abortive exercise. Finally, the applicants argued that one of the indicia of jurissdiction as held by the Supreme Court in the locus classicus case of Madukolum v. Nkemdilin [2001] 46 WRN 1 is that the subject matter of the case must be within the jurisdiction of the court; and applying the above principles to this case, the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court is determined by section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. Section 7(1)(a)(i) grants exclusive jurisdiction to the National industrial Court in civil causes relating to labour, including trade unions and industrial relations. The question then for determination is whether the claims of the applicants and the parties herein fall within the subject matter of the National Industrial Court as provided for by the statute creating this court. The applicants submitted that the 1st applicant and the 1st respondent are trade unions within the contemplation of the statute creating this court. That the 2nd applicant is an affiliate of the applicant arid by that affiliation it is effectively brought under the jurisdiction of this court. Similarly that the 2nd respondent is an affiliate of the 1st respondent and is also brought under the jurisdiction of this court and that the operations being contested herein are the operation and control of motorcycle union, which is clear from the averments in the affidavit in support and that the court can only look at the originating summons and the affidavit in support to determine the issue of jurisdiction. That by the averments contained in the said affidavit, it is clear that the respondents axe involved in one way or the other with the operations of unionism as it affects road transportation of motorcycle operators within Lagos State and that, having been so involved, the parties are effectively brought under the control of the National Industrial Court. The applicants further submitted in relation to the dispute between the parties the position by Ikongbeh, JCA held in Kalango v. Dokubo [2003] 15 WKN page 66, that a dispute is an inter- union dispute if it is between one union and or its members. Ogebe, JCA (as he then was), in the same case held that it is a dispute involving or among two unions. No other court in Nigeria apart from the National Industrial Court can entertain such claims. The applicants submitted to this court that determination of seven questions as contained in their originating summons and that the claims before this court fall within the interpretative function of all courts and this court especially. That in Nigeria, all courts are coated with powers to grant both statutory and equitable reliefs. That the reliefs listed are interpretative and have to do with operations of trade union which qualifies as an inter-union dispute and the applicants then aligned themselves with the views of the learned Justice of the Court of Appeal, Ogebe, JCA (as be then was). The applicants submitted that in accordance with section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, the claims before this court relate to labour including trade unions and industrial relations That this court has jurisdiction to bear this suit and they urged the court to so hold. Counsel to the 28th respondent filed a written address dated 17th November 2009. The written address is in conformity with the order of the Court wherein all the counsel in the matter were asked to file written addresses on the issue of jurisdiction. The 28th respondent raised two issues for determination: i. Whether the matter before the court as it is in the originating summons is within the jurisdiction of the court. ii. Whether a local government in Lagos State can be sued without being served with pre-action notice. Counsel for the 28th respondent argued that on the first issue, section 7(l)(a)(i) — (ii) and (b) do not cover the subject matter of the grievance of the applicant. That what section 7 of National Industrial Act provides for is the litigation on labour, trade unions and industrial relations and from the look and content of the originating summons of the applicants, there is nothing in it that shows any issue of labour, trade unions and industrial relations dispute. That the subject matter of the grievance of the applicants is the issue of violation of constitutional right of the applicants’ freedom of association, which the applicants ought to take to the Federal High Court or High Court and that there is no issue of trade dispute, which is the sole aim of establishment of this Court, in the originating summons of the applicants. Furthermore, that the issue of trade dispute must be the one that connects employer and employee together and that in the originating summons of the applicant there is no area where there is dispute between employees, referring the court to the cases of Larkin v. Long [1915] AC 814 and the case of Conway v. Wade [1909] AC 506. Besides, that an issue of trade dispute falls on the following terms (i) Employment dispute. (ii) Dispute on term of employment. (iii) Dispute on condition of work. (iy) Dispute between employer and employee That, the originating summons of the applicants fails to show all these terms and, therefore, urged the Court to strike out this suit in its entirety. The respondents referred the court to the case of NURTW v. Ogbodo [1998] 2 NWLR. (Pt. 527) 189 in which the issue of what is a trade dispute in accordance with section 47 of the Trade Disputes Act was clearly resolved. On the second issue of whether a local government council can be sued in Lagos State in any court without being served with pre-action notice, the respondent submitted that under no circumstance can a local government council in Lagos State be sued in any court without being served with pre-action notice. In other words, section 168 of Edict No. 16 of 1976 provides for a month pre-action notice to be given to a Local Government Council in Lagos State before such a local government council can be sued. The respondent referred the court to the decisions of the Court of Appeal in the case of Shomolu Local Government v. Agbede [1996] 4 NWLR (Pt. 441) 174 and Reckitt & Colman v. Gongoni [2001] 7 NWLR (Pt. 716) 592 where it was held that service of pie-action notice is not a denial of access to court but a condition precedent which must be fulfilled. This same decision was held in the cases of Eze v. Okechukwu [2002] 18 NWLR (Pt. 799) 2 and Mobil Producing (Nig.) Ltd v. LASEPA & ors [2002] SC (Pt 11)26 and Katsina Local Authority. Makuderwa [1971] 7 NSCC 119. The respondent concluded by urging the court to strike out the suit before this court. Counsel to the 6th respondent intimated the court that they did not file any written address but they are aligning themselves with the submissions of the 3rd respondent and urged the court to dismiss the suit with heavy cost. The 9th and 10th respondents filed their written Address on 14th of January 2010 and reiterated that the applicants commenced this suit by originating summons dated 25th November 2008 Seeking for certain reliefs. The 9th and 10th respondents equally filed a notice of preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the Court, The Court directed parties to file and exchange written addresses on the said question of jurisdiction. That the applicants/respondents filed an address dated 6th November 2009 while the 3 and 28th respondents filed written addresses dated 29th October 2009 and l7 November 2009 respectively. The 9th and 10th respondents brought out two issues distilled from the processes filed before this Court for determination and the issues are: 1. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the suit as presently constituted. 2.Whether the applicants have fulfilled the condition precedent before instituting this suit. In arguing both issues the 9th and 10th respondents submitted that jurisdiction of a court is a matter of law and it is vested on a Court by the Constitution and the statute establishing the court. That jurisdiction is the foundation and life wire necessary to invoke the judicial power of a court. They referred the court to the case of Ogunmokun v. Milad, Ogun State [1999] 3 NWLR (Pt. 594) 261 at 265, it was stated that— Jurisdiction of the Court is the basis, foundation and life wire of access to court in adjudication under Nigerian Civil process. As courts are set up under the Constitution, Decrees, Acts, Laws and Edicts, they cloak the courts with the powers and jurisdiction of adjudication. If the Constitution, Decrees, Laws and Edicts do not grant jurisdiction to a court or tribunal, the court and the parties cannot by agreement endow it with jurisdiction as no matter how well intentioned and properly conducted the proceedings, once it is incompetent, it is a nullity and an exercise in futility. And also the case of Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited v. Isaiah [2001] 5 NWLR (Pt. 11) 1, where Mohammed, JSC cited with approval the views expressed by the lead author of Halsbury Laws of England and observed that — Jurisdiction of a Court has also been judicially defined as very fundamental and priceless “Commodity” in the judicial process. It is the fulcrum, centre pin or the main pillar upon which the validity of any decision of any court stands and around which other issues rotate. It cannot be assumed or implied, it cannot also be also be conferred by consent or acquiescence of parties. That the jurisdiction of this court is as provided for in section 7 of the National Industrial Act, 2006. Section 7(1) must be read along with section 2(1) of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. T8 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 to the effect that ‘. . .No person shall commence an action, the subject matter of a trade dispute or any inter or intro union dispute in a court of law and accordingly, any action which, prior to the commencement of this section is pending in any court shall abate and be null and void” (emphasis is the 9th and 10th respondents’). The 9th and 10th respondents submitted further that for this court to exercise jurisdiction, the subject matter must be a trade dispute or any inter or intra-union dispute. They referred the court to the case of National Union of Road Transport Workers v. Nweke Ogbodo & ors [1998] 2 NWLR (Pt. 537) 189 at 199 where Niki Tobi, JCA (as he then was) held that — …the word “any” means, one indefinitely, no matter which. In the context, the word covers all actions without exception. The word extends and expands all possible on the part of a plaintiff. The list of actions is without end or the list of action is endless. While the word “inter” means among or between, the word “intra” means near or within.... That for this Court to exercise jurisdiction the dispute must be an “inter” union dispute. That in the above case of National Union of Road Transport Workers v. Nweke Ogbodo & ors (supra) at 199 the Court held that the definition of a union is as defined in the Trade Unions Act. That by section 1 of the Trade Unions Act (TDA) Cap. T14 Laws of the Federation 2004, ‘trade union’ means “any combination of workers or employers, whether temporary or permanent, the purpose of which is to regulate the terms and conditions of employment of workers, whether the combination in question would or would not, apart from this Act, be an unlawful combination by reason of any of its purposes being in restraint of trade, arid whether its purposes do or do not include the provisions of benefits for its members”. That in as much as one concedes the fact that the 1st applicant and the 1st respondents are registered trade unions under the TUA, one cannot say the same for the 2nd applicant or the 2nd to the 30th respondents. The 2nd applicant and the 2nd to 7th respondents are no more than associations of people while the remaining respondents are institutions recognized by the Constitution. The 9th and 10th respondents urged the court to rescind jurisdiction in respect of this matter as presently constituted as the parties before the court are not registered unions, and as the subject matter of this suit is not a dispute between the 1st applicant and the 1st respondent but mainly between the 2nd applicant and the 2nd — 7th respondents. That in the case of NEPA v. Edegboro [2002] 12 SC (Pt. 11) 119 Niki Tobi, JSC in his concurring judgment opined that in considering jurisdiction of a court the parties as well as the subject matter are two important areas the court must consider. In National Union of Road Transport Workers v. Nweke Ogbodo & ors (supra) at 198 the Court also held that one of the ingredients to determine dispute is subject matter. The 9th and 10th respondent further submitted that the subject matter of this suit is not between the two registered trade unions mentioned above but a challenge to the administrative decision taken a Ministry of Lagos State Government. That assuming without conceding, that the court has jurisdiction, the conditions precedent for instituting this type of action before the NIC have not been fulfilled by the applicants. Section 2(1) of the Trade Disputes Act Cap T8 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 200e4 provide that, “ no person shall commence an action, the subject matter of a trade dispute or any inter or intra union dispute in court of law and accordingly, any action which, prior to the commencement of this section is pending in any court shall abate and be null and void”. And also section 4 of the Trade Disputes Act provides for the procedure before a dispute is reported. Section 4(1) states that if there exist an agreed means for settlement of the dispute apart from the Act, whether by virtue of any agreement between organizations representing the interest of employers and organization of workers, the parties to the dispute shall first attempt to settle it by that means. By section 4(2), if the attempt to settle the dispute as provided in subsection (1) fails, or if no such agreed means of settlement exists, the par-ties shall within days of the failure (or, if no such means exists, within, seven days of the date on which the dispute arises or is first apprehended) meet together by themselves or their representatives under the presidency of a mediator with a view to amicable settlement of the dispute. Section 6 of the Act provides that if the dispute is unsettled by the mediator within seven days the dispute shall be reported to the Minister by or on behalf of the parties within three days. While section 8 gives the Minister power to appoint a conciliator for the purpose of effecting settlement, section 9 provides that the Minister upon report under section 6 shall refer the dispute to the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP), The 9th and 10th respondents concluded by submitting that where a statute (as in the instant case, the Trade Disputes Act) required the fulfillment of a condition precedent in respect of a cause or matter before commencement of an action, non-fulfillment of the condition will deprive the court of its jurisdiction to entertain the matter. That an aggrieved party must exhaust all the remedies in the statute before going to court. They referred the court to the case of Amaghizenwen v. Eguamwemse (1993) 11 SCNJ 27 at 45. The 14th respondent’s written address is dated and filed on February 11, 2010. The submission and authorities relied on by the l4 respondent are similar to those of the 28th respondent although only one issue was framed by the 14th respondent for the determination of this court, which is whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain the case at hand. To the 14th respondent, by the provisions of the 1999 Constitution (the provision(s) is not indicated) and section 7 of the NIC Act 2006, this court lacks jurisdiction in this matter. That there is no issue of trade dispute in the originating summons, which is the sole aim of establishing this court, reiterating the arguments and authorities of the 28th respondent in this regard and urging the court to strike out or even dismiss the applicants’ action in its entirety. Counsel to the 1st respondent submitted that they did not file any written address but they align themselves with the submissions of the 9 and 10th respondents. The 3rd respondent submitted a further and better the address dated 2nd February 2010 in rp.ect of the applicants’ written address and their further affidavit in support both dated 6th and 11th November, 2009 respectively. It will be recalled that the 3rd respondent filed a notice of preliminary objection to the applicants’ suit to the effect that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear, determine and adjudicate on this matter. The said respondent’s notice of preliminary objection and the accompanying written address were both dated 29th October, 2009. However, when this case came up on 12th November 2009, the applicant served the 3rd respondent a written address with further affidavit wherein the applicants exhibited a letter from the Lagos State Government, Ministry of Transportation dated 24/08/2009. The said letter which borders on recognition was addressed to Motorcycle Operators Association of Lagos State (MOALS) which will be addressed later. The 3rd respondent raised two (2) issues for determination, namely 1. Whether the 3rd respondent is a union who can be brought to this Court by the applicants. 2. Whether an individual, whether corporate or otherwise like a State Government, has a right to tamper with or to determine the constitutional right of freedom association of either an individual or an association like the 3rd respondent in this case. On the first issue of whether the 3rd respondent is a union who can be brought to this Court by the applicants, the 3rd respondent argued that as vigorously canvassed in their address to the notice of preliminary objection, by virtue of section 7(a) amid (b) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, the applicants’ action does not fall under any of the subject matters specified therein which this court has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon. The said section 7(a) and (b) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, provides that The Court shall have and exercise exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matters (a) relating to - (i) labour, including trade unions and industrial relations, and (ii) environment and conditions of works, health, safety and welfare of labour, and matters incidental thereto; and (b) relating to the grant of arty order to restrain any person or body from taking part in any strike, lock-out or any industrial action, or any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a strike, lock-out or any industrial action. That in view of the above provision of section 7(d) and (b), the action of the applicants is incompetent as this court lacks the pre-requisite jurisdiction to entertain this matter and same should be dismissed with heavy and substantial cost. Furthermore, that the 3rd respondent is not a trade union but an association registered under Part C of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990. On the issue of determination of jurisdiction of a court the 3rd respondent referred the court to the case of Attorney-General of the Federation v. Guardian Newspaper [1999] 5 SC (Pt. 3) 59 at 99 where Madokolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] All NLR 587 was cited with approval. That with regard to the applicants’ written submission in paragraph 3.4, the learned counsel for the applicants agreed that jurisdiction is determined by the applicants’ claim which is tantamount to cause of action. That with this admission on the part of the applicants and going by their claims, none of which falls under the subject matters which this court can adjudicate upon as contained in section 7(a) and (b), it goes to show that the applicants themselves have admitted that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear, determine and adjudicate on this matter; and any fact admitted need no further proof. They referred the court to the case of section 75 of the Evidence Act 1990. That similarly in paragraph 3.14 of the applicants’ written address, the learned counsel relying on the pronouncement of Ikhongbe, JCA in Kalango v. Dokubo [2003] 15 WRN 66 agreed that a dispute is an inter-union dispute if it is between one union and or members thereof an another union and or its members. That the legal status of the 3rd respondent as at today is that she is not a trade union but an association registered under Part C of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 which this court has no jurisdiction upon. The 3rd respondent argued that in as much as the 3rd respondent is not an affiliate of the applicants, it cannot be said to be a union for the purpose of clothing the court with jurisdiction to entertain this suit. That the applicants’ counsel in para. 3.10 of their written submission agreed that the 1st applicant and the 1st respondent are trade unions but that the 3rd respondent is not and assuming but not conceding that the 3rd respondent is an affiliate of the applicants to make her a trade union. The next question will be whether there is any trade dispute, and whether same has been and whether same has been referred to the IAP before coming to this court. That the answer is in the negative. The 3rd respondent then urged the court to dismiss the applicants’ suit with heavy and substantial cost. On the 2nd issue as to whether an individual, whether corporate or otherwise like a State Government, has a right to tamper with or to determine the constitutional right of freedom of association of either an individual or an association like the 3rd respondent in this case. The 3rd respondent argued that in paragraph 3.16(e) of the written address of the applicants, the applicants raised the issue though failed to expatiate on it, as to whether an association registered under CAMA can suo motu and without affiliation engage in trade union activities within the Federation of Nigeria. In response to this, the 3rd respondent reiterated the position that the 3rd respondent is not a trade union but an association and does not need to affiliate with any other trade union before she can operate in any part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria because the 3rd respondent just like a natural person having been registered has legal status of a natural person with freedom of association and it is wrong for the Lagos State Government to have written a letter dated 24/8/09 that is Exhibit TAI attached to the Further Affidavit of the applicants to the effect that she only recognizes Motorcycle Operators Association of Lagos State (MOALS) and ANACOWA, the two having affiliated to NURTW and RTEAN respectively. That Lagos State with this letter is trying to create unnecessary friction in the industry of motorcycle riders in Lagos State which should not be so. That the 3rd respondent is made up of peace loving and law abiding citizens of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and who have been contributing their quota to the economic growth and development of this country especially Lagos State and that similarly just like the MOALS and ANACOWA, the 3d respondent’s role in the transportation industry cannot be quantified. The 3 respondent continued that Lagos State Government in her letter under reference has failed to tell the whole world the certain circumstances and various factors militating against smooth transport union activities in the state and the prevailing policy framework of the State Government to have warranted the illegal and unconstitutional recognition of only two motorcycle riders namely MOALS and ANACOWA who were forced to affiliate with NURTW and RTEAN respectively That the 3rd respondent doesn’t need affiliation before she can be recognized by Lagos State Government. The 3rd respondent and her members have freedom of association which cannot be forced on them by any government and ever since its registration she and her members have not been found wanting. That they contribute to smooth transport activities in all the States of the Federation including Lagos and was accorded recognition in all the States of the federation except Lagos State. The respondent then argued that they wonder why Lagos state wants to force affiliation on the respondent by virtue of Exhibit TAI attached to the applicants’ further affidavit in support of their originating summons/application. The 3rd respondents concluded that, given their submissions above and the judicial and statutory authorities cited, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear, entertain and adjudicate on this matter and same should be dismissed with heavy and substantial cost and that Lagos State should not consider illegal the operation of the 3rd respondent by virtue of her failure to affiliate with either NURTW or RTEAN. That Lagos State is called upon to give recognition to the 3rd respondent just like other States of the Federation have done. That also Lagos State Government should not recognize only MOALS and ANACOWA more so that members of the 3rd respondent contribute greatly towards easing transportation problems in Lagos State and also help in poverty alleviation by virtue of her members being self employed. Lagos State Government should also not forget that she recommended trustees of the 3rd respondent to Corporate Affairs Commission during her registration exercise as Incorporated Trustees under Part C of CAMA 1990 and that furthermore, Lagos State Government under section 7 of the 1999 Constitution should call to order her Local Governments especially Ajeromi/Ifelodun Local Government from disallowing the 3rd respondent from operating in the Local Governments. Similarly, Lagos State Government should know that the issue of affiliation is a constitutional matter wherein the 3rd respondent’s freedom of association is guaranteed under section 40 of the 1999 Constitution, which cannot be eroded by anybody or any government. In view of all the above the 3rd respondent urged the court to dismiss the Applicants’ suit as being incompetent because it has not vested this court with the requisite jurisdiction to hear, determine and adjudicate on it as canvassed above. The 14th respondent filed its written address 11th February 2010 and reiterated that its written address is premised on the order of this Court to file written addresses on the issue of jurisdiction. The 14th respondent framed one sole issue for determination, which is whether or not this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit. They argued that by virtue of the provisions of the 1999 Constitution and section 7(1)(a)(c) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, this court lacks jurisdiction on question 1,2, and 3 contained in the originating summons filed by the applicants as same relate to an administrative act of the Lagos State Government and Local Government Councils. That there is no issue of trade dispute, which is the sole aim of establishing this Court, in the originating summons of the applicants. That the issue of trade dispute must be the one that connects employer and employee together. That from all that is in the originating summons of the applicants, there is nothing to show that there is a dispute between an employer and an employee, referring the court to the case of NURTW v. Ogbodo [1998] 2 NWLR (Pt. 527) at 189 where the issue of what is trade dispute in accordance with section 47 of the Trade Disputes Act was clearly resolved. The respondents concluded that in view of the above cited authorities together with the provisions of the 1999 Constitution and section 7(1)(a) – (c) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, this Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to hear, determine and adjudicate on the matter and urged the court to strike out or even dismiss the applicants’ action in its entirety. After a careful consideration of the processes filed in this matter, the sole issue for the determination of this court is whether the court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter at hand. The court had suo motu raised the issue of jurisdiction and asked parties to address it on it although some of the respondents later filled preliminary objections challenging the jurisdiction of the court. A look at the submissions of the parties will reveal certain misconceptions regarding the principles of law pertaining to the jurisdiction of this court. For instance, the applicants submitted that their originating summons invoked the interpretation jurisdiction of this court seeking the interpretation of the directive of the 10th respondent, the Lagos State Government, and section 7 of the 1999 constitution. A look at section 7 of the NEC Act 2006 will reveal that the interpretation jurisdiction of the court relates to the listed documents therein, which are: collective agreements, memoranda of agreement for the settlement of labour disputes, awards of the IAP, awards of the NIC and trade union constitutions. Although the court in the exercise of jurisdiction over other matters stipulated in section 7 of the NEC Act has power to interpret laws as may be necessary, this is possible only if the subject matter actually falls within the jurisdiction of the court. So for this court to be able to interpret the directive of the 10th respondent and section 7 of the 1999 Constitution as argued by the applicants, the subject matter/cause of action must first of all come within the jurisdictional competence of the court. The respondents on their part made submissions that are questionable. In the first place, they made submissions on the assumption and indeed concluded that the sole jurisdiction of the NIC is settling trade disputes. This submission may be true of the Trade Disputes Act dispensation; but under the NEC Act 2006, the jurisdiction of this court is way beyond what is contemplated under the Trade Disputes Act. References to Part I of the Trade Disputes Act by the respondents as a condition precedent before the jurisdiction if this court can be activated are all ill-placed and irrelevant. Jurisdiction under the NIC Act is subject based; and so matters relating to labour, including trade unions and industrial relations, and environment and conditions of work, health, safety, arid welfare of labour and matters incidental thereto will properly come within the jurisdiction of the court. Because jurisdiction is subject-matter based, the capacity of the parties is not really the determinant of jurisdiction under section 7 of the NIC Act. What this means is that simply because two trade unions have a dispute does not automatically lead to the conclusion that it is this court that has jurisdiction. Just because this court has jurisdiction over trade unions does not mean that all disputes between them would be entertained by this court. Other than first, the reference to the directive of the Lagos State Government formally recognizing only two unions (the 1st applicant and the 1st respondent) in the first question and secondly, the reference to whether associations registered under the Companies and Allied Matters Act can without affiliation and fulfillment of other conditions engage in union activities its question 5, both posed in the originating summons for the determination of this court, there is nothing else in the originating summons suggesting that the issue(s) in dispute relates to trade unionism or labour. All this court is asked to do by the applicants is to determine the validity or otherwise of the administrative acts of Lagos State Government/Local Governments. The issues the applicants want this court to determine are not in the main issues of unionism or labour disputes within the purview of section 7 of the NIC Act to warrant this court assuming jurisdiction. We have no choice than to decline jurisdiction. And we so decline. For all the reasons given, we hereby decline jurisdiction and hold that this court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine this matter as filed by the applicants. Consequently, the case is accordingly dismissed for want of jurisdiction. We make no order as to cost. By this ruling, the motion for joinder dated February 4, 2010 but filed on February 5, 2010 cannot be entertained for want of jurisdiction. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice B B Kanyip- Presiding Judge Hon. Justice V N Okobi- Judge Hon. Justice O A obaseki-Osagbae- Judge