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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE OWERRI JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT OWERRI BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE O. Y. ANUWE Dated: Apri 21, 2015 SUIT NO. NICN/OW/21/2013 Between 1. Dr. H. M. Iwuoha 2. Dr. T. U. Mbaeru 3. Dr. A. C. Okere 4. Prof. Paul Iheakaram 5. Mr. S. U. Opara 6. Prof. S. I Emenalo 7. Mr. B. E. Okere 8. Ven. E. E. Obilor 9. Mr. R. E. Ogbonna 10. Dr. V. B. C. Iwuji 11. Mr. A. C. Anene 12. Dr. N. M. Ozurumba 13. Dr. A. C. Onwumerobi 14. Dr. C. B. Ahumibe 15. Dr. B. O. Uzowunne 16. Dr. P. M. Mbaeyi 17. Eze T. M. Nwakanma Claimants/Applicants/Respondents 18. Mr. C. C. Oguledo 19. Dr. B. I. N. Osuagwu 20. Elder O. O. Igbokwe 21. Dr. U. W. Uche 22. Prof. U. A. Ogike 23. Dr. Sam N.B. Ojukwu 24. Mr. O. M. B Igwe 25. Dr. F. I. N. Ekeada 26. Dr. Max Anyanwu 27. Mr. E. Amaefula 28. Mr. Joe U. Echefu 29. Prof. B. E. C. Oguzie 30. Mrs. I. M. Ike 31. Mrs. C. E. Nwigwe 32. Mrs. A. C. Aguocha And 1. Alvan Ikoku Federal College of Education, Owerri 2. Provost, Alvan Ikoku Federal College of Education, Owerri Defendants/Respondents/Applicants 3. The Registrar, Alvan Ikoku Federal College of Education Owerri Representation: Ifeoma Ihesie (Miss) for the Claimants N. A. Nnawuchi (SAN); with him, I. P. Ananaba, N. A. Anike, J. A. Okereke and C. A. Nnawuchi; for the Defendants RULING/JUDGMENT This action was first commenced at the Federal High Court on the 17th day of August 2011. The suit was later transferred to this court by an order of the Federal High Court made on the 3rd day of May 2013. The case file was transmitted to this court vide a letter dated 12th July 2013, but the file was duly received at the registry of this court on the 29th day of October 2013. In compliance with the order of this court made on the 3rd day of December 2013 that parties should re-file their processes, the Claimants on the 10th day of March 2014, filed their Statement of Facts wherein they claimed against the defendants jointly and severally as follows: (i) A Declaration that the Claimants are entitled to occupy the 1st Defendant’s quarters at Shell Camp Owerri and Amakohia Owerri (occupied by the Claimants respectively) until the Claimants are paid their full retirement benefits by the Defendants. (ii) A Declaration that the Defendants cannot lawfully eject the claimants from the aforesaid quarters without adhering to the due process of law. (iii) A Declaration that the Claimants are entitled to hold and own the said quarters respectively occupied, renovated, maintained and repaired by them for many years, on owner-occupier basis in keeping the prevalent practice in the Country. (iv) A Declaration that in accordance with section 173 (1) &(2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria, the daily deductions of N2,000.00 (Two Thousand Naira) from the pensions of the Claimants in ultra vires, invalid, illegal, unconstitutional, null and void. (v) A Declaration that the Defendants are not vested with any powers in the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria or any other law to that effect, to deduct, withhold or alter the pensions of the Claimants. (vi) A Declaration that the deductions based or predicated on occupation of houses (official residences by the Claimants) the subject matter of Suit HOW/533/2006 between the claimants and Defendants pending at High Court of Imo State and which has not abated or concluded in unlawful, illegal and of no effect whatsoever. (vii) An order directing the Defendants to stop forthwith all or any deductions of N 2,000.00 (Two Thousand Naira) daily from the monthly pensions of Claimants. (viii) An order setting-aside the resolution, directives or decision of the Governing Council of 1st Defendant directing the deduction of the sum of N 2,000.00 (Two Thousand Naira) daily from the Claimants monthly pensions. (ix) An order nullifying the resolution, directives or decisions or the implementation of the resolution or directives or decision of the Governing council directing the deduction of N 2,000.00 (Two Thousand Naira) daily from the monthly pensions of Claimants. (x) An order directing/mandating the Defendants to repay or pay back all sums of money deducted from the pensions of the Claimants from June 2010 to date to the Claimants forthwith. (xi) An order of interest at the rate of 20% of the total sum deducted from the pensions of each of the Claimants from June 2010 until judgment is delivered and 10% interest from the date of judgment until final liquidation of judgment debt. (xii) Injunction restraining the defendants, their servants, agents and or hirelings from in whatsoever manner forcibly ejecting the Claimants from the said quarters. (xiii) Injunction restraining the Defendants, their servants, agents and or hirelings from or in whatsoever manner disturbing and or interfering with the Claimants occupation of the said quarters. By a motion on notice dated and filed on the 6th day of November 2014 and brought pursuant to Section 16(1) & (2) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 and the inherent jurisdiction of this court, the Claimants/Applicants pray this Court for an Interlocutory Injunction restraining the Defendants from ejecting them from their official quarters pending the determination of this suit and for such further order or orders as the Court may deem fit to make. The grounds upon which the application is brought are: 1. Reliefs (1), (2) and (3) of paragraph 22 of the statement of fact of claimants are praying this honourable court to declare that the claimants are entitled to occupy their official quarters until all their full retirement benefits are paid by the defendants; that they cannot be ejected unlawfully without due process of law; and they are entitled to hold the said quarters on owner/occupier basis. 2. The defendants, without regard to the existing suit have pounced on the claimants’ residence and in unlawful manner and adoption of self-help removing roofs and breaking into the premises with impunity. 3. That on 20/10/2014 the defendants filed notice to quit and subsequently served on the Claimants giving them 7 days to deliver up possession despite the fact that prior to 2006 and after 2006 the claimants pay monthly for the premises occupied by them. 4. That in Suit HOW/533/2006: Dr. H.M. Iwuoha & Ors vs. Alvam Ikoku College of Education, Owerri & Ors which was instituted at the High Court Owerri, the Presiding Judge had given an interim order that the claimants should not be ejected until the suit is determined. 5. That it is trite law that once a suit is pending in a court, parties should refrain from doing any act that will render nugatory any order the court would make or create a situation of fait accompli. In support of the motion is an 18 paragraph affidavit deposed to by the 1st Claimant, upon which the Claimants/Applicants placed reliance. In the accompanying written address, Counsel for the Claimants submitted that an interlocutory injunction is an order restraining the person named therein, especially a party to the action, from doing certain things or acts till the determination of the substantive action in court. He went on that in an action of this nature, the applicant must show or prove the existence of the following: Existence of a legal right to protect, preservation of status quo or Res, strength of applicants case, balance of convenience, damages (inadequacy), conduct of parties, real urgency and no delay in presenting the application. It is the submission of Counsel that an applicant must show the court that he has a legal right, the violation of which he seeks to prevent, before he can succeed for an order of injunction to be granted. He referred to paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the affidavit in support of the application, and submitted that these facts are proof that the applicants have a legal right which ought to be protected. The said rights of the applicants to their official quarters are about to be violated by the defendants and which violation cannot be adequately compensated by damages even if the applicants succeed in the main action. According to counsel, the defendants desire to evict/eject the claimants from the quarters and give the quarters to their faceless friends. Counsel stated that the applicants are living in the quarters as at the date of this application, and that the right they are seeking to protect is one enuring to them, and the court is called upon in the circumstances to protect the threatened wrong to the right of applicants which the defendants have engaged upon. From the totality of the affidavit evidence, the right in question applicants are seeking to protect are already existing and residing with them before the service of Exhibit A – A9. Adamu vs. Suemo (2008) AQ FWLR (Pt. 415) 1784 @ 1798. In Registered Trustees of Lagos State Taxi Drivers Association vs. Attorney General of Lagos State (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 141) 711; Inter-Bau Constr. Ltd vs. Ike (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 304) 151, the courts held that the essence of the grant of an interlocutory injunction is to protect the existing right or of recognizable right of a person from unlawful invasion by another. See Ladunni vs. Kukoyi & Ors. (1972) 1 All NLR (pt. 1) 133; Okechukwu vs. Okechukwu (1989) 5 NWLR (pt. 108) 234. The applicants submitted further that the need to protect the Res of the litigation (see paragraph 22 of the statement of fact reliefs, 1, 2 and 3 as well as the ground for this application as contained in the motion paper) and to maintain the status quo ante bellum are factors the court must consider in granting or refusing the application. The Res in the circumstance means not just “thing” but includes “any right which a person may exercise over such a Res”. This includes physical and metaphysical existences. Onyeso vs. Nnebedum (1992) 3 NWLR (pt. 229) 315; Comm. For Works Benue State vs. Devcon Ltd. (1988) 3 NWLR (pt. 83) 407 @ 422. The Res in the instant case is the official quarters of applicants which they live with their families and which is a subject – matter of this suit. The applicants have been in occupation of the quarters for over 20 years, paying rents, refurbishing, maintaining and rehabilitating at their own costs. The defendants had with impunity and adoption of self-help forcefully entered into these quarters without respecting the privacy of the applicants and with their thugs and workmen remove roofs and other appurtenances of the buildings. The essence of the eviction is to transfer possession from the applicants to faceless individuals and third parties. Where the defendants succeed if not restrained the applicants would not be able to regain possession. A.C.B. Ltd vs. Awogboro (1996) 2 SCNJ 233 @ 239. The circumstance of this case warrants a grant of interlocutory injunction to temporarily restrain the defendants from evicting the applicants. Gambari vs. Bukola (2003) FWLR (Pt. 158) 1198 and maintain the status quo. Adewale vs. Gov. Ekiti State (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 383) 130 @ 150; Akapo vs. Hakeem-Habeeb (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 247) 266; Ayorinde vs. AG. Oyo State (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 247) 266; Ayorinde vs. AG. Oyo State (1996) 2 SCNJ 198 @ 211; wherein the courts held that the status quo which the court, by granting of interlocutory injunction, can maintain is the restoration of the parties to the position they were before the commencement of the dispute between them.. The status quo means the position prevailing when the defendant embarked upon the activity sought to be restrained. See Ayorinde vs. Attorney General Oyo State Supra. The applicants have acted timeously in the challenge of the unlawful act of defendants. See NBM Bank Ltd. vs.Oasis Group Ltd. (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 239) 915; Ideozu vs. Ochoma (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 308) 1183. It is the submission of Counsel that the strength of the applicants’ case is not frivolous or vexatious but that there is a serious question to be tried. The applicants in this situation need not show a prima facie case or strong prima facie case in respect of the action they instituted against the defendants as contained in their statement of fact/claim. By paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the affidavit in support and paragraph 22 of the statement of fact, the applicants have shown that there is a serious question to be tried at the hearing of the suit. The issue raised in reliefs (1), (2), (3) of paragraph 22 of applicants claim in this suit amongst others touching on the official quarters occupied by the applicants especially as to whether they should be entitled to hold and own the quarters on owner/occupier basis, and whether they should also occupy the quarters until all their full retirement benefits are paid are all serious questions to be tried. See Obeya Memorial Specialist Hospital vs. AG. Federation (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) 325 @ 338 – 340; Adamu vs. Suemo (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 415) 1784 @ 1798. In the instant case there is a real dispute between the applicants and defendants. See American Cynamide Co. vs. Ethicon Ltd. (1975) AC 396. In Kotoye vs. CBN (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 89) 419 @ 441 the Supreme Court held that what the applicant needs to show is only a reasonable, probability of success at the trial and that there is a serious question to be tried. See Ogbonnaya vs. Adapalm Nigeria Ltd. (1993) 6 SCNJ (Pt. 1) 23 (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 292) 147. The Supreme Court also held that the applicant must amongst other things satisfy the court that there is a serious question to be tried at the hearing of the main suit, and that the facts disclose a reasonable probability that the applicant would be entitled to the relief sought. According to Counsel, the applicants in the instant case have shown and satisfied this requirement. Counsel submitted further that the question of balance of convenience tilts in favour of the applicants. The affidavit of the applicants is replete with facts showing that they would suffer more inconvenience or hardship if the application is not granted. He referred to paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the affidavit in support and submitted that the applicants will suffer greatly if the application is not granted. The defendants on the other hand would suffer no hardship whatsoever. See ACB Ltd. vs. Awogboro (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 176) 711; Comm. For Works Benue State vs. Devcon Ltd. (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 83) 407. In ACB Ltd. vs. Awogboro supra, the Supreme Court held that if the applicant shows clearly that his remedies at law are inadequate and that there is sufficient probability that the acts he is complaining of will take place to render it unjust and unreasonable if the court refuses to intervene, then the applicant is prima facie entitled to an interlocutory injunction. Therefore, in the present case, where the subject matter of the suit involves the official quarters of the applicants from which the defendants are threatening to evict/eject them despite the pendency of this suit wherein the applicants are claiming to be entitled to the houses on owner/occupier basis and have put in their sweat in the maintenance, refurbishment and rehabilitation of the houses without any aid from the defendants for over twenty years, it is necessary for the court to intervene to stop the defendants from allocating and/or transferring possession of the said houses to faceless individuals, and to arrest the impending hardship and inconvenience on the applicants. Counsel submitted that this is a proper case where the court must intervene and preserve the Res pending the final determination of the rights of the parties. See ACB Ltd. vs. Awogboro supra; Ochudo vs. Oseni (1988) 13 NWLR (Pt. 580) 103. It is Counsel’s submission on behalf of the Claimants that damages cannot be adequate compensation for the injury if the applicants succeed in the main case. Where the court fails to intervene in the instant case, the defendants will eject the applicants and put in place, third parties to occupy the premises. The defendants are withholding retirement benefits and pensions of applicants, and the massive rehabilitation carried out by applicants all these years to wit; maintenance, refurbishments etc at their own costs have not been refunded by the defendants. A displacement of the applicants from the aforesaid quarters amounts to irreparable loss on the part of the applicants. Counsel submitted that the issue of extraction of damages or undertaking to pay damages is left at the discretion and inherent powers of this court. Counsel referred to the case of Afro-Continental Ltd. vs. Ayantuyi (1995) 12 SCNJ 1, (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 420) 411, where the Supreme Court held that an order for interlocutory injunction should not be set aside merely because no undertaking as to damages was extracted from the applicant. In the instant case the defendants will not suffer any damage, and there is no need for the applicants to give any undertaking to pay damages should the application succeed and the applicants lose after the main hearing. Onyeso vs. Nebedum Supra. It was Counsel’s further submission that the applicants have shown real urgency in this matter and that there has been no delay in presenting this application. In the supporting affidavit and Exhibits A – A9, the applicants stated that upon service of these notices to quit on them, they brought this application. There is a subsisting action filed in the court by the applicants against the defendants, and in paragraph 22 (xii) and (xiii) of the statement of facts the applicants are seeking for an injunction restraining the defendants, their servants, agents or hirelings from forcibly ejecting them from the quarters or disturbing and interfering with their occupation of the said quarters. Counsel cited the case of Ita vs. Nyong (1994) 1 NWLR (Pt. 318) 56 where it was held that an order of interim (interlocutory) injunction which can be properly made must be one which has connection with the relief sought in the substantive suit. According to the Claimants, the conduct of the defendants is condemnable, in that parties have exchanged pleadings in the substantive suit. The defendants are aware that issues raised by the applicants in the substantive action includes amongst other questions, occupation, ownership and injunction restraining them from disturbing the occupation of the quarters by the applicants. It is trite that when parties have brought before the court for determination of issues or grievances or dispute, each party should refrain from doing any act that would render nugatory or constitute fait accompli or render order of the court useless. This is what the defendants are doing by their action and Exhibits A – A9. See FATB vs. Ezegbu (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt. 264) 132; the defendants should stop or terminate all acts of intimidation, adoption of self-help and should have respect for the court before which the suit is pending. Counsel urged the Court to grant this application in the interest of justice. In opposition to the Claimants/Applicants’ motion for interlocutory injunction, the Defendants on the 25th day of November 2014 vide a motion for extension of time, filed a Counter Affidavit of 11 paragraphs deposed to by one Charity Mezieobi (Mrs.), along with a written address. According to the defendants, in line with the Senior Staff conditions of service of the defendants as relating to renovation of quarters, it is the responsibility of the claimants as occupiers to renovate their apartments, and that the defendants never embarked on self-help. Rather, the 1st defendant caused Notices to quit to be served on the claimants in keeping with the law, and that the claimants have all been paid their gratuities and are not being owed by the 1st defendant. According to the defendants, what prompted the issuance of the said notices was that the claimants, after being paid their gratuities, and after enjoying the 6 months post payment grace period of the said gratuity, refused, failed and/or neglected to vacate the various premises they occupy. To the defendants, the foundation of the present application is tenancy of the applicants in the official quarters of the 1st defendant which subject does not fall within the jurisdiction of this court, and that the subject matter of this application is predicated on the main claim in the substantive suit. In the written address accompanying the defendants’ counter affidavit, Counsel identified the following three (3) issues for the court’s determination: a. Whether a substantive claim can be entertained at an interlocutory stage? b. Whether going by the Order sought by the claimants in this application and the supporting affidavit, the issue raised is not one of Tenancy? c. If the answer to (b) above is in the affirmative, whether the court has jurisdiction to entertain the same. In arguing issue one, it is the contention of the defendants/respondents that the claimants have not made out a case to warrant a grant of this application. Counsel for the defendants submitted that it is not part of the court’s function at an interlocutory stage of litigation to try to resolve conflicts of evidence in affidavits as facts on which the claims of either party may ultimately depend and not to decide difficult questions of law which call for detailed argument and mature consideration. These are matters to be dealt with at the trial. The attitude of the courts is that the trial court must warn itself not to delve into the substantive issues to be trashed during the trial at the interlocutory stage. See: Obeya Memorial Hospital vs. A.G. Federation (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) @ 326; Adamu vs. A.G. Nasarawa State (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1031) @ 488 – 489. It is an elementary principle of law that courts are to refrain and/or be wary from deciding substantive matters when considering application for interlocutory injunction. See Onyesoh vs. Nnebedum (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 229) @ pg. 315. The underlying reason for this principle of law is to guard against situations whereby courts may make pronouncements on the substantive matters which may prejudice the trial of the claim filed and still pending before the court. To do this, is to prejudice the matter in respect of which evidence is still to be led. The resultant effect is that the trial will be a mere formality, a mockery of special procedure. See: Adamu vs. A.G. Nasarawa State (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1031) @ 488. In the present case, the claimants/applicants have applied for “Interlocutory Injunction restraining the defendants from EJECTING them from their official quarters pending the determination of the suit”. This is as prayed on the face of their motion paper. Also by paragraph 22 of their statement of claim, they have sought: inter alia. ii. [a] Declaration that the defendants cannot forcefully eject the claimants from the aforesaid quarters without adhering to due process of law” and xii [an] Injunction restraining the defendants their several agents and/or hirelings from in whatsoever manner from forcibly ejecting the claimants from the said quarters” Counsel submitted that the Order sought vide this application touches the substance of the above enumerated claims of the claimants/applicants. The claimants/applicants also agree with this conclusion having deposed in paragraph 12 of the affidavit in support of this application that the reliefs in this claim touched on the question of these official quarters….” the subject matter of the injunction. Thus the grant of this application tantamounts to pronouncing on the substantive claims of the claimants/applicants when evidence has not been led on the claims. This may likely have the effect of prejudicing the trial of the substantive suit. See Globe Fishing Industries Ltd. vs. Coker (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 162) @ Pg. 265. He urged the Court to resolve the issue in favour of the defendants. In arguing issue two, it is the defendants’ submission that a community reading of paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14(b), 16 and 17 of the affidavit in support of the extant application will lead to no other conclusion than that of the claimants/applicants have applied for this injunction because of their fear of a threatened eviction form their quarters. In summary, the claimants/applicants have deposed to the facts that the said quarters was allocated to them by the 1st defendant/respondent and that they paid rent on a monthly basis that while living in it, they (claimants/applicants) have confirmed to repairing, maintaining, rehabilitating and reconstructing the buildings, however, that on several occasions, the defendants/respondents have tried to evict them for no reason. They also state that they have been served with Notice to quit the said quarters. Thus by this application, the claimants/applicants pray this Court to restrain the defendants/respondents from so ejecting them. Based on the foregoing, counsel for the defendants submitted that the Order of Injunction is sought to restrain the defendants/respondents, the landlord, from ejecting the claimants/applicants – The Tenants. To counsel, the subject matter to which the injunction relates is a landlord and tenant relationship and therefore a tenancy matter. He urged the Court to so hold and strike out the case. In arguing issue three, it is the submission of Counsel for the defendants on the issue of jurisdiction that it is trite law that the jurisdiction of a court to adjudicate on a matter is a threshold issue. The issue of jurisdiction is fundamental to any effective adjudication and once an objection is raised on the jurisdiction of a court to entertain a matter, the court should deal with that issue at the earliest opportunity. See Madukolu vs. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNR 341; Tiza vs. Begha (2005) 15 NWLR (Pt. 949) @ 625 S.C. It is trite also that if a court has no jurisdiction to hear a case, the proceedings are and remain a nullity however well conducted and brilliantly decided they might otherwise have been, as a defect in competence is not intrinsic but extrinsic to adjudication. W.R.P.C Ltd. vs. Agbuje (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 917) 860. In determining whether a court has jurisdiction in a matter or not, the court will examine or consider the nature of the plaintiff’s claim as disclosed in his Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim. Onuorah vs. K.R.P.C Ltd (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 393 SC. In the present suit, by their claim, the claimants’ claim is hinged on Tenancy and occupation of 1st defendant’s official quarters. Counsel therefore submitted that the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court does not admit matters of Tenancy and urged the court to so hold. A reading of the provisions of Section 254(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act 2010 leaves no one in doubt as to matters which fall under the jurisdiction of this court. Tenancy is clearly not one of them. Even if the ancillary reliefs are predicated upon matters related to pension and gratuity of which can be determined by this court, Counsel submitted that a court cannot adjudicate on an ancillary relief where it has no jurisdiction to entertain the main claim. See Nabore Properties Ltd. vs. Peace Cover Nig. Ltd. & Ors (2014) LPELR 22586. See also the ruling delivered on 30/6/2014 by this Honourable court in Chukwudire vs. Governor of Imo State & Ors Unreported in Suit NIC/OW/07/2013. Counsel urged the court to hold that it lacks the jurisdiction to entertain this application and to refuse this application in the interest justice. By a motion on Notice dated the 24th day of November and filed on the 25th day of November 2014, and brought pursuant to Order 11 Rule 1(1) of the Rules of this Court and under its inherent jurisdiction the Defendants are praying the Court for An Order striking out this suit in its entirety for want of jurisdiction and for such further order(s) as the court may deem fit to make. The grounds upon which this application is brought are: 1. The parties, subject matter and issues in this case are the same as in Suit No. HOW/533/2006 Dr. H.M. Iwuoha & Ors vs. Alvan Ikoku Federal College of Education Owerri & Ors, which suit is still pending at the High Court Owerri. 2. The subject matter of this suit is the Tenancy of the claimants in the official quarters of the 1st defendant which subject does not fall within the jurisdiction of this honourable court. The application is supported by a 5 paragraphed affidavit sworn to by Mrs. Charity Mezieobi, upon which the defendants placed reliance. In the accompanying written address, Counsel raised the following two issues for the court’s determination: a. Whether this action is not an abuse of the process of this court in view of the pendency of another action between the parties over the same subject matter and on the same issues in the High Court of Imo State? b. Whether this court has the requisite jurisdiction to determine this action. On Issue (a), it is the submission of counsel for the defendants that this present action is an abuse of court process, only intended to irritate and annoy the defendants. An abuse of court process may occur when a party improperly uses judicial process to the harassment, irritation and annoyance of his opponent and to interfere with the administration of justice. See Okafor vs. A.G. Anambra State (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 200), 659. It is also further submitted that when an action is pending and a similar action of the same nature is instituted against the same party, the court where the later action is brought would have no other cause than to strike out the later action for being an abuse. This is simply because the judicial power which is conferred on the court is only intended to be used in deciding genuine issues or cases or controversies, and is not meant or intended to be used for the purpose of annoying or intimidating an adversary or the judge or for causing multiplicity of proceedings in piecemeal and uncompleted as the claimants have done in the present case. See Tofi vs. U.B.A (1978) 3 NWLR (Pt. 62) 707; Ikomi vs. The State (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 28) 340. It is submitted by these authorities that in such cases, as in the instant case, the court has inherent power to strike out an action that is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of its process. In the instant case, the same claimants brought an action before the High Court of Imo State as shown in Exhibit ‘A’ to this application. Counsel submitted that the said action has the same subject which is occupation of the 1st defendant’s official quarters by the claimants. He went on that despite some other reliefs claimed in that action, the main claim is that for the occupation and alleged ejection of the claimants from their quarters. By filing the present action therefore, the claimants are forum shopping in that the former claim is still pending. The abuse in the present action stems from the fact that it is the same parties and the same subject matter and issues that are in contest in the two cases. In Kotoye vs. Saraki (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 264), 156, the Supreme Court held that instituting multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter against the same opponent on the same issue or multiplicity of actions on the matter between the same parties even where there is a right to begin the action, the abuse lies in the multiplicity and the manner of evidence of the right of the parties rather than the exercise of the right per se. See also Doma vs. Adamu (1999) 4 NWLR (Pt. 598) 311 @ 315. It is indeed an abuse for one to litigate in two courts simultaneously over an issue against an opponent. See Ede vs. Balogun (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt. 622) 214. In view of the above submissions, Counsel urged the court to strike out the present suit. On Issue (b), Counsel for the defendants submitted that it is trite law that the jurisdiction of a court to adjudicate on a matter is a threshold issue. The issue of jurisdiction is fundamental to any effective adjudication and once an objection is raised on the jurisdiction of a court to entertain a matter, the court should deal with that issue at the earliest opportunity. See Madukolu vs. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNR 341; Tiza vs. Begha (2005) 15 NWLR (Pt. 949) @ 625 S.C. It is trite also that if a court has no jurisdiction to hear a case, the proceedings are and remain a nullity however well conducted and brilliantly decided they might otherwise have been, as a defect in competence is not intrinsic but extrinsic to adjudication. W.R.P.C Ltd. vs. Agbuje (2005) 4 NWLR (Pt. 917) 860. In determining whether a court has jurisdiction in a matter or not, the court will examine or consider the nature of the plaintiff’s claim as disclosed in his Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim. Onuorah vs. K.R.P.C Ltd (2005) 6 NWLR pt. 921, 393 SC. In the present suit, by their claim, the claimants’ claim is hinged on Tenancy and occupation of 1st defendant’s official quarters. Counsel submitted therefore that the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court does not admit matters of Tenancy and urged the court to so hold. A reading of the provisions of Section 254(1) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act 2010 leaves no one in doubt as to matters which fall under the jurisdiction of this court. Tenancy is clearly not one of them. Even if the ancillary reliefs are predicated upon matters related to pension and gratuity of which can be determined by this court, the defendants submitted that a court cannot adjudicate on ancillary reliefs where it has no jurisdiction to entertain the main claim. See Nabore Properties Ltd. vs. Peace Cover Nig. Ltd. & Ors (2014) LPELR 22587. See also the ruling delivered on 30/6/2014 by this Court in Chukwudire vs. Governor of Imo State & Ors Unreported in suit No. NIC/OW/07/2013. (unreported) It is the submission of Counsel that the main reliefs sought in this action relate to the threatened eviction of the claimants from their official quarters which is a Tenancy issue and for which this court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine. According to Counsel, the proper order the court ought to make in the face of this finding is an Order Striking out the suit. He therefore urged the court to so hold, and to grant this application in the interest of justice. In opposition to the defendants’ preliminary objection, the Claimants on the 27th day of January 2015 filed a Counter-Affidavit of 15 paragraphs and a written address wherein counsel submitted that this suit was originally instituted at the Federal High Court Owerri before it was transferred to this court. The defendants on receipt of the claimants originating summons filed a preliminary objection that the suit is statute barred. This was struck out on the 12th day of November, 2014 by this court. The defendants abandoned the Preliminary Objection struck out on the 12/11/2014 and filed another preliminary objection asking this court to strike out this suit for want of jurisdiction and for being an abuse of process of court. The Claimants proceeded to adopt the following two issues for the determination of the court: 1. Whether this action is not an abuse of the process of this court in view of the pendency of another action between the parties over the same subject matter and on the same issues in the High Court of Imo State. 2. Whether this court has the requisite jurisdiction to determine this action. In arguing issue one, counsel cited the provisions of Section 11(1) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 which provides thus:- “In so far as jurisdiction is conferred upon the court in respect of the causes or matters mentioned in the foregoing provision of this Act, the Federal High Court, the High Court of the State, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja or any other court shall, to the extent of that exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon the court, cease matters. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) of this section shall affect the jurisdiction and powers of the Federal High Court, the High Court of a State, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, to continue to hear and determine cause and matters, which are part-heard before the commencement of this act and any proceedings in any such causes or matters; not determined or concluded at the expiration of one year after the commencement of this act, shall abate” Section 254(c)(1) (a), (b) and (k) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended by the Constitution (Third Alteration) (No. 3) of 2010 states:- “254(C)(1) Notwithstanding the provision of section 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters: (a) Relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade union, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith; (b) Relating to, connected or arising from Factories Act, Labour Act, Trade, Disputes Act, Trade Unions Act, Labour Act, Employees’ Compensation Act or any other Act or Law relating to labour, employment, industrial relations or any other enactment replacing the Acts of Laws; (k) relating to or connected with disputes arising from payment or non-payment of salaries, wages, pensions, gratuities, allowances, benefits and any other entitlement of any employee, worker, political or public office holder, judicial officer or any civil or public servant in any party of the Federation and matters incidental thereto”. No doubt, according to the Claimants, the provisions herein referred to was newly factored into the Constitution. The provision has pruned down the expansive jurisdiction of the High Court entrenched in Section 272 of the Constitution, as amended, by stripping it of its vires to entertain inter alia, civil causes and matters relating to or connected with labour and employment. Having regard to the opening word of Section 254 (C) (1) “Notwithstanding” which is an expression of exclusion and connotes; in spite of, irrespective or regarding whatever is contained in section 272 of the constitution as amended, it is indisputably clear that the provision of section 272 of the Constitution as amended must be read subject and subservient to the provision of new section 254(C) (1) (a) (b) and (k) of the Constitution as amended. See NDIC vs. Okem Ent. Ltd. (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt. 880) 107; NNPC vs. Lutin Investment Ltd. (2006) 2 NWLR (Pt. 965) 506. In the light of the above foregoing provisions of the Act and the Constitution, the action in this court cannot be an abuse of process of court. Assuming without conceding that the issues, subject matter and parties in this instant case are same as the Suit No. HOW/533/2006 pending in the High Court of Imo State, that Suit No. HOW/533/2006 has abated by virtue of Section 254 (C) (i) (a) (b) and (k) and Section 11(2) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 because trial has not commenced. Parties only exchanged pleadings and thereafter the defendants commenced their preliminary objections journeys to stultify the proceedings. In Obiuweubi vs. CBN (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 465 which is on all fours with the present situation i.e. had to do with Decree 107 which became operative on 17th November 1993, the Supreme Court held that the Federal High Court and not the State High Court. In that case, the appellant’s cause of action, termination of his appointment with the respondent arose on 30th October 1987. He sued in the High Court of Lagos State on 7th July 1988 the case suffered chequered history in the sense that several judges of that court handled it without conclusion. Subsequently, trial commenced in it on 15th December1992 before the second to the last judge, while Decree 107 had become operative on 17th November, 1993. The Supreme Court held that the Federal High Court, not the High Court of Lagos State, was clothed with the jurisdiction. See also Osakwe vs. FCE Asaba (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1201). In Goldmark Nig. Ltd. vs. Ibafo Co. Ltd. (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1308) 291, the plaintiffs commenced their action in the High Court of Lagos State in 1990, trial commenced in 1993 and was completed in May, 1993 and judgment reserved to 31st March, 1994. The Supreme Court held that since trial commenced before the Decree 107 came into force on 17th November 1993, the High Court had jurisdiction to hear the matter. Counsel for the Claimants submitted that flowing from the above decisions, if the matter was instituted in the High Court before the commencement of Decree 107 id est 17th November 1993, but trial never started therein until that date, the court lost its jurisdiction to hear it. Where the action was constituted and trial commenced in the High Court before the coming into life of Decree 107 of 1993 on 17th November 1993, the court would be imbued with the jurisdiction to entertain it to conclusion. In the instant case, Suit No. HOW/533/2006 trial was yet to commence as parties only exchanged pleadings before the defendants filed their preliminary objection on jurisdiction. Counsel further submitted stemming from the authorities i.e. OHMB vs. Garba (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 175; Goldmark Nig. Ltd. vs. Ibafo Co. Ltd supra; Olutola vs. Unilorin (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 416; Adah vs. NYSC (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 639; Osakwe vs. FCE Asaba Supra and Obiuweubi vs. CBN supra that the legal implication of part-heard status is that the High Court’s jurisdiction to entertain it was not denuded. Where trial had never commenced before 4th March 2011 when the Constitution (Third Alteration) Act which gave birth to Section 254(C) of the Constitution was assented to by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria then the National Industrial Court would be the Court to adjudicate over the matter. Suit No. HOW/533/2006 has abated or spent. It is the submission of Counsel for the Claimants that Suit No. HOW/533/2006 was instituted in 2006 the same year the National Industrial Act, 2006 came into effect, and up till date, it is pending in the High Court. The judge sitting in that High Court has retired and no other judge has been appointed. Another reason the said Suit No. HOW/533/2006 is still pending in the High Court is the unending frivolous preliminary objections filed by the defendants contending that the 1st defendant is a Federal Agency and as such, that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the case. The claimants instituted this action at the Federal High Court Owerri, the defendants equally filed another preliminary objection on the ground that the subject matter of the suit falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court, and hence the suit was transferred to this court. While this suit is still pending in this court, the defendants filed a preliminary objection that this suit is statute barred which was struck out on the 12/11/2014. The defendants abandoned their preliminary objection struck out on the 12/11/2014 and filed yet another preliminary objection asking this court to strike out this suit for being an abuse of court process. Having regard to Section 11(2) of the National Industrial Court, the trial had not commenced in Suit No. HOW/533/2006; therefore this court has the jurisdiction to entertain this suit. See Exhibit “A” It is a trite law that a counsel has a duty to avoid unnecessary delays and filing unnecessary preliminary objections. In the case of Amadi v. NNPC (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 670) Pg. 76 @ 100 para. G – H per Uwais CJN stated that:- “Counsel owes it as a duty to the court to help reduce the period of duty in determining cases in our courts by avoiding unnecessary preliminary objection so that the adage, justice delayed is justice denied can cease to apply in our courts”. Counsel further submitted that the primary aim of the defendants in their unnecessary preliminary objections ranging from the State High Court (Imo), Federal High Court Owerri to this court is to delay the determination of this suit so that they will continue to deduct N2000 daily from the claimants pension and withhold the claimants retirements benefits which are the main claim in this suit. He went further that it is not the law that once a party files a suit before another court on the same subject matter, there is an abuse of court process. An act can give rise to different suits. A subject matter may very well give rise to different rights. In other words, different suits can emanate from the same subject matter, but with different rights and reliefs. See Unifam Industries Ltd. vs. Oceanic Bank Int’l (Nig.) Ltd. (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt. 911)) 83. Counsel went on that although all the issues were from the same subject matter; they are not dealing with the same rights. In Suit No. HOW/533/2006, the main claim of the claimants bothers on the intended ejection of the claimants by the defendants. See paragraph 13 (a) - (e) of the claimants statement of claim in Suit No. HOW/533/2006 herein annexed as Exhibit (C). In Suit No. NICN/OW/21/2013, pending in this court, the main claim bothers on the illegal deduction of N2000 daily from the pension of the claimants and the illegal withholding of the claimants retirements benefits. See paragraph 22(i) – (xiii) of the claimants’ statement of fact in Suit No. NICN/OW/21/2013 already pending in this court. See also the respondents’ written address in support of the motion for preliminary objection marked Exhibit “A” at paragraph 3.4 where the respondent corroborated that the National Industrial Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit because the case is labour related and also touches on the pension matters. In the case of Saraki vs. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 2264) 156, It was held that abuse of court process means that the process of the court has not been used bona fide and properly. It is a term generally applied to a proceeding which is wanting in bona fide and is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. It is improper use of legal process. In the instant case, the defendant in their motion for preliminary objection and in their affidavit in support did not prove that the claimants instituted this suit to their irritation and vexation. Counsel stated that the instant suit in this court was originally instituted at the Federal High Court in Suit No. FHC/OW/CS/236/2011 before it was transferred to this court at the instance of the defendants’ preliminary objection contending that the subject matter of the suit at the Federal High Court falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court. The defendants cannot be allowed to complain now that the instant suit is an abuse of process of court, as that amounts to approbating and reprobating. According to Counsel, the defendants’ preliminary objections are abuse of process of court. The defendants filed their preliminary objection in this court alleging that this suit is statute barred. The said preliminary objection was struck out by this court on the 12th November, 2014 for want of diligent prosecution. The defendant did not file any motion for relisting the said motion and such was not relisted. The defendants abandoned their said preliminary objection and filed yet another preliminary objection praying this court to strike out this suit on the grounds of being an abuse of process of court and lack of jurisdiction. The defendants filed those series of preliminary objections ranging from the High Court, Federal High Court to this court to the oppression, vexation and irritation of the claimants. The defendants’ preliminary objections are born out of malice. See the case of Saraki vs. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 2264) 136. To counsel, the defendants were convinced that their preliminary objection on grounds of statute bar would suffer defeat, and therefore somersaulted to now base the objection on lack of jurisdiction i.e. abuse of process. The defendants cannot at this time raise or predicate their objections as it were on abuse of process and lack of jurisdiction because they are refrained from re-entertaining the complaint of abuse of process as a ground of lack of jurisdiction. They cannot be allowed to compartmentalize their objections and bring them in installments. Their objection is caught by issue estoppel as the Supreme Court pointed out in Standard Bank Nig. Ltd vs. Ikomi (1972) 7 NSCC 20 @ 26 “indeed if such a rule (estoppel) does not exist, litigation would be interminable..” Clearly the defendants’ motion/action is an affront to this settled legal position. Litigation must have a terminal point and no one should be allowed to nibble at his claims. It does not matter whether the previous objection was christened “statute bar” or “jurisdiction”, the only issue is whether this issue of “lack of jurisdiction” was available and open to the defendants to raise when they first raised their first objection on jurisdiction. The answer is YES and so they cannot raise it now. See Njokanma vs. Mowete (2002) FWLR (Pt. 108) 1536’ Ogbogu vs. Ugwuegbu (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt. 827) 189’ Ogbogu vs. Ndiribe (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 2545) 40, Aladegbemi vs. Fasanmade (1988) 3 NWLR (pt. 81) 129. The defendants cannot be allowed to nibble at their so-called objections to jurisdiction. To hold otherwise is to allow litigation to continue ad infinitum. There is no guarantee that even after dismissal of the present objections the defendants would not take another or even several more looks on the issue of statue bar or any other objection and come back a 3rd, 4th, 5th or more times to contest the same “issues of jurisdiction”. That is what the law of issue estoppel sets out to prevent. Counsel submitted that piecemeal litigation adopted by defendants is bad practice. Piecemeal litigation is a sure affront on the doctrine of estoppel: Akole vs. Alonge (2009) All FWLR (pt. 468) 295’ Olafunmise vs. Palana (1987) 1 NWLR (pt. 47) 64. In Arubo vs. Aiyelebu & Ors (1993) 3 NWLR (pt. 280) 126 @ 146 the Supreme Court held: “Finally it is our view and this view has been expressed many times in this court that there must be an end to litigation. To borrow the homely phases used by Spence-Bower & Turner, a plaintiff should not be allowed to take two bites at the same cherry. To allow the plaintiff in the instant case to do so…. is to connive, albeit unintentionally to a gross abuse of the process of the court…” See Udeze vs. Chidiebere (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 125) 141 @ 157. According to the Claimants, what the defendants are doing by these objections amount to forum shopping, and which is an abuse of court process. In arguing issue 2 whether this court has the requisite jurisdiction to determine this action, Counsel for the Claimants referred the Court to the provisions of Section 254 C(1) of 1999 Constitution 3rd Alteration Act 2010 which provides that: “The National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters”. (a) Relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade union, industrial relations, and matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, workers and matters incidental thereto or connected herein with. Further reference was made to Section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act which provides thus: “The court shall have and exercise exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matters: (a) Relating to – (i) Labour, including trade unions and industrial relations; and (ii) Environment and conditions of work, health, safety and welfare of labour and matters incidental thereto. In the light of the foregoing provisions, Counsel for the Claimants submitted that the main claim in this instant suit is the civil causes and matters arising from the labour rendered by the claimants to the 1st defendant, including civil causes and matters relating to the welfare of the claimants as the retired employees of the 1st defendant and matters incidental thereto. It is the submission of Counsel that the main claim in this instant suit is the illegal and unlawful withholding of the claimants retirement benefits and N2000 daily deduction from the claimants pension by the defendants. The claim of illegal eviction is an incidental and ancillary matter to the main claim. See Paragraph 22 (i) – (xiii) of the claimants statement of fact in this suit. In the case of Nnonye vs. Anyichie (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 251) 604 (2005) 8 WRN 1; N.D.I.C. vs. CBN (2002) FWLR (Pt. 99) 1021 (2002) 18 WRN 1, it was held that:- “In determining the jurisdiction, the process to be used is the pleadings of the plaintiff, which is the statement of claim. Where the action was commenced by originating summons, the court process to be used is the affidavit in support of the originating summons”. It is Counsel’s further submission that there is no tenancy relationship existing between the claimants and the 1st defendants. The claimants averred that they were employees of the 1st defendant before their retirement. The claimants occupied the quarters by virtue of their employment with the 1st defendant. The quarters by the claimants are among the benefits that ensue to the claimants from the contract of employment between the claimants and the 1st defendant. Annexed to the affidavit is a letter dated 06/10/95 Exhibit “D” where the 1st defendant had informed the claimants (who were on service or under its employment) of its Governing Council’s decision that if a retiring staff lives in College owned quarters he/she should be allowed six extra months to live in the quarters from the date he/she is paid full retirement benefits; and that at the expiration of the period, he/she must vacate the quarters. Tenancy is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as thus: 1. Possession or occupation of land under lease; (a) Leasehold interest in real estate. (b) Possession of real or personal property by right or title especially under a conveying instrument such as a deed or will”. The Claimants submitted that there is no tenancy relationship existing between the claimants and the defendants in the light of the definition of tenancy offered by the Black’s Law Dictionary. In the instant case, the claimants are asking the defendants to pay them their retirement benefits and to stop their illegal and unlawful deduction N2000 daily from their pension. The occupation of the quarters by the claimants did not arise from tenancy agreement but rather from the contract of employment between the claimants and the 1st defendant as one of the benefits that enures from the said contract. The occupation of the quarters are matters incidental to the contract of employment and labour done, therefore this court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain it. If the 1st defendant had paid the claimants all their retirement benefits, the claimants would not have been still occupying the quarters. According to Counsel, the whole gamut of the objection is deliberately and mischievously made to waste time and to give the defendants all the time in the world to continue with impunity their unconstitutional act and also the illegality and criminal act of invading the home of the claimants, breaking into them in their absence and removal of the roofs, doors and windows, the withholding of the retirement benefits, N2000 daily deduction from pension of the claimants. The objection is a gross abuse of judicial process and should be dismissed. Also, despite the interim injunctive order of this court, the defendants had forcefully ejected Prof. U.A. Ogike from his quarters. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the objection for lack of merit, frivolous, gross mischievous and abuse of court process. The defendants on the 25th day of February 2015, filed a further affidavit of 4 paragraphs and a reply on points of law wherein Counsel for the defendants reacted to the issues raised by the Claimants in their Counter Affidavit and Written Address in opposition to the Defendant’s preliminary objection. In reaction to the 1st issue for determination raised by the defendants/applicants in their application for striking the suit, the claimants/respondents relief on sections 11(1) & (2) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 and Section 254 (C) (1) (a), (b) and (k) of the constitution and submitted that Suit No. HOW/533/2006 had abated because ‘having regards to Section 11(2) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, the trial had not commenced in Suit No. HOW/533/2006 and this court has the jurisdiction to entertain this suit (see paragraph C4) of claimant’s written address. Counsel for the defendants submitted that in as much as the above argument of the claimants contradicts claimants’ relief (vi) of their claim, the claimants counsel’s argument is misconceived. That argument can only hold water and suffice where the National Industrial Court as well as the High Court could exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is submitted that the exclusive jurisdiction donated by the constitution in Section 254(C) did not include issues of tenancy which is the purport of the claimant’s claim in Suit No. HOW/533/2006. To counsel therefore, relying on Section 11(1) & (2) of the NIC Act to submit that this court can entertain this action is to say the least self-defeating to the case of the claimant. In that wise, the argument of claimant in paragraph C8 of their written address contradicts the earlier one in paragraph C4 and indeed in support of applicants’ contention. Again, in paragraph C10 of the claimants’ written address they submitted that the suit was transferred to this court at the instance of the applicants’ preliminary objection and therefore the applicants cannot be allowed to complain now that the instant suit is an abuse of process of court. The defendants submitted in reaction to this point, that parties have no right to cloth a court with jurisdiction where none exists. See the case of P.D.P vs. Okorocha (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1323) 205 @ 258, paras. D – E. In paragraph C.12, the claimants cited the case of Standard Bank Nig. Ltd vs. Ikomi and submitted that the applicants having raised an objection which was struck out on 12/11/2014 for want of diligent prosecution cannot and are estopped from raising another objection on another ground. In reaction, counsel for the defence submitted that a party can challenge the jurisdiction of the court at any time, even before the Supreme Court for the first time. All the cases cited by the claimants in paragraph C.12 of their argument do not apply in the instant case simply because that previous objection was not determined on the merit. The issue of estoppel can only apply when one party seeks to re-litigate an already decided issue or case. See Yoye vs. Olubode (1974) 9 N.S.C.C. 409 @ 414; Fadiora vs. Gbadebo (1978) 11 N.S.C.C 121 @ 126. On Issue No. 2 raised by claimants in their address, it was submitted on behalf of the claimants in paragraph C.19 that the occupation of the quarters by the claimants did not arise from tenancy agreement but rather from the contract of employment between the claimants and the 1st defendants. According to the defendants, this submission is totally misconceived and mischievous. The onus is on the claimants to prove that the occupation of such quarters forms part and parcel of their contract of employment Exhibit D i.e. letter of 06/10/95 being relied upon by the claimant was validly set aside by the defendants through a counter policy letter of 6/7/2006. See Exhibit D1 and D2. Counsel submitted that by refusing to exhibit before the court Exhibits D1 & D2 the claimants were suppressing facts which would be against them. Counsel urged the Court to place reliance on Exhibit D1 & D2 and indeed to strike out this suit for want of requisite jurisdiction. By a motion on Notice dated and filed on the 27th day of January 2015, and brought pursuant to Order 11 Rule 1 and 8 of the Rules of this Court, the Claimant prays for An Order of mandatory injunction of the Honourable Court mandating the defendants to reinstate/restore the 22nd claimant/applicant Prof. U.A. Ogike to his College Quarters, Plot No. B117 Shell Camp Owerri, which he was forcefully ejected from by the defendants on the 21st November, 2014 contrary and in disobedience to the order of this court made on 12th November 2014; and for such further order(s) as the Court may deem fit to make. In support of this application is a 9 paragraph affidavit deposed to by the 22nd Claimant, upon which Counsel placed reliance. Also in support is a written address wherein Counsel submitted that this court has jurisdiction to make the defendants restore the 22nd claimant to the College Quarters which they deliberately and without any respect for the court evicted. According to the Claimants, the defendants/respondents deliberately and mischievously evicted the 22nd claimant and transferred his official quarters to one Mrs. Mgborie Obasi, an employee of the 1st defendant despite the pendency of this suit, the motion on notice for injunction and indeed the interim injunctive order of this court touching and concerning the official quarters of the claimants including the 22nd claimant. This act of the defendants/respondent tends to create a situation of fait accompli and to render useless or nugatory whatever order the court may make in favour of the claimant/applicant. The essence of forcefully evicting the 22nd claimant and his family and destroying his properties from the College Quarters was to steal a match against the claimant/applicants. The motion for interlocutory injunction was pending, properly served on the defendants, and an order of the court to maintain status quo was in existence. Yet the defendants ignored it and went ahead to do what the interlocutory injunction was intending to prevent and what the order to maintain status quo had directed them not to do. The court has powers to restore the parties to the status quo antem which is the position of the parties as at date of institution of the suit and also the order of 12/11/2014. The claimants submitted that they had filed an application for interlocutory injunction restraining the defendants from committing or doing anything contrary to the terms of the injunctive application. The claimants came to court at the earliest opportunity seeking for the restraining order. The law is trite and the practice of court also demands of it that once an application of this nature i.e. prohibitory interlocutory injunction of 6/11/2014 filed by the claimants is filed and served, and the court is seised of it, the other party to the action should not take any pre-emptory action pending the determination of the application. Ezegbu vs. F.A.T.B. (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt. 251) 89; Ojukwu vs. Govt. Lagos State (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 10) 106; Mil Govt. Lagos vs. Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621; Chese vs. NICON Hotels Ltd. (1998) 12 NWLR (Pt. 576) 82. According to the Claimants, the action of the defendants is contemptuous. Contempt of court is generally viewed as any action calculated to undermine the powers of the court or to bring the court into disrepute. Disobedience of court order is simply tantamount to contempt of court and it is a matter to be viewed seriously. Contempt has to do with justice itself being flouted. Counsel cited the following authorities: Ezekiel vs. Ezekiel Hart (1990) 1 NWLR (pt. 126) 126 @ 297 where the SC held- “It is sad to observe that there is nothing on record to show that the appellant has obeyed any of the above orders of court. I would like to state that obedience to orders of court is fundamental to the good order, peace and stability of the Nigerian nation. The ugly alternative is a painful recrudescence of triumph of brute force or anarchy – a resort to our old system of settlement by means of bows and arrows, machetes and guns or, now, even more sophisticated weapons of war. Disobedience to an order of court should, therefore, be seen as an offence directed not against the personality of the judge who made the order, but as calculated act of subversion of peace, law, and order in the Nigeria society. Obedience to every order of court is therefore a duty which every citizen who believes in peace and stability of the Nigerian State owes to the nation. This court has made it abundantly clear that it will not lend its machinery in aid of a person who is, and continues, to be in contempt of an order of court by ordering a stay while the person is still in contempt. My learned brother, Eso, JSC epitomized the attitude of this court in such matters when he stated in the Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621 @ 637 thus: “I think it is a very serious matter for anyone to flout a positive order of a court and proceed to taunt the court further by seeking a remedy in a higher court while still in contempt of the Lower Court. Also OJUKWU vs. GOVERNOR OF LAGOS STATE (1985) 1 NWLR (PT. 10) 806 @ 826. “Indeed the case of G.A. Adesida v. Nimota Abebi (1978) 2 FCD 109, cited by the learned counsel on both sides at page 116 recognized the fact that even where self-help is available it is not a course to be encouraged by court. I should here repeat a portion of the judgment of Denning, M.R. in McPhail v. Persons (Unknown) etc. (1973) 3 All E.R.393, at p. 396 where he said: “Although the law thus enables the owner to take the remedy (i.e. self-help) into his own hands, that is not a course to be encouraged. In a civilized society, the courts should themselves provide a remedy which is speedy and effective; and thus make self-help unnecessary. The courts of common law have done this for centuries. The owner is entitled to go to court and obtain an order that the owner “do recover” the land, and to issue a writ of possession immediately. So it should have been in this case. In my judgment the right to self-help ended when the issues were turned over to the court. In Attorney General vs. Times Newspapers Ltd. (1974) AC 273, the House of Lords, while discussing the requirements of due administration of justice, per Diplock, L.J. at p. 309, said inter alia as follows: …”Once the dispute has been submitted to a court of law, they should be able to rely upon there being no usurpation by any other person of the function of that court to decide it according to law. Conduct which is calculated to prejudice any of these three requirements or to undermine the public confidence that they will be observed is contempt of court” I agree with this opinion. They ought not, while the matter was pending for determination by a court of law have resorted to self-help or acted without getting the necessary order of court”. According to Counsel for the Claimants, notwithstanding the pendency of the Claimants/applicants’ motion for interlocutory injunction and interim order granted by this Court on 12th November 2014, the defendants used their servants and thugs and in the company of Mrs. Obasi, stormed the premises of Prof. Oguike (22nd claimant/applicant) and forcefully ejected him out of the house. It is settled law, that parties to a suit are precluded/prevented from taking steps during the pendency of the suit which are capable of interfering with the outcome of the suit or create a situation of helplessness for the court and thereby rendering the powers and decision of the court nugatory and sterile. In other words, a party to a suit is not allowed to foist upon the court a situation of helplessness. The courts have deprecated such acts which interfere with the course of justice and have restated their inherent power to punish the offending party for contempt or removing such impediment or returning parties to status quo ante. See Ezegbu vs. F.A.T.B (1992) 1 NWLR (pt. 669) @ 725: “The Supreme Court clearly held in Governor of Lagos State vs. Chief Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (pt. 18) 621 that parties should not embark upon self-help when a matter is before a court of law. Since a successful act of self-help will certainly render a subsequent successful decision nugatory, parties must refrain from it at all times. Therefore once a party is aware of a pending court process, and whether the court has not given a specific injunctive order, parties are bound to maintain the status quo pending the determination of the court process. They should, on no account resort to self-help. Whenever such a situation arises, the court must invoke its disciplinary jurisdiction to curb the excesses of a recalcitrant party. That was the essence of the application made to this court by Chief Williams in the case of Chief Okoya and others vs. Santilli and others (1991) 7 NWLR (pt. 206) 753. In that case, this is what I said at page 766 in respect of the disciplinary jurisdiction of a court: “The jurisdiction inheres in the court as adjudicator quo judex. The power is designed for the maintenance of the dignity and integrity of the court. Unless the court exercises its disciplinary jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances, it will lose its dignity and intergrity in the judicial process. The institution of the court which the law has placed in an exalted and sacred position surrounded by all aura of legalism and sanctity, will be reduced to a toothless dog which can bark but cannot bite” See also Daniel v. Ferguson (1891) 2 CH.D.27; Von Joel v. Hornsey (1895) 2 CH.D. 774; J. Edward Jones vs. Securities and Exchange Commission 80 (1935) L.E.D. 1015 and Adetona vs. Attorney General of Ogun State and others, Appeal No. FCA/1/110/82 delivered on 24/8/83 (Unreported). It is rather sad that the learned trial judge did not see the necessity of invoking his inherent disciplinary jurisdiction in this matter”. Counsel further submitted that the defendants were aware of the motion for interlocutory injunction and the interim order of the court to maintain status quo pending the determination of the interlocutory injunction. The motion came up on the 12/11/2014 for hearing and the court made an interim injunction order and adjourned to 26/11/2014 for hearing of the substantive motion. On 26/11/2014, the defendants’ Counsel came with a motion for extension of time within which to file their Courter-Affidavit and Written Address in opposition to the claimants’ interlocutory injunction. The claimants’ counsel intimated the court on the fact that the defendants were still acting contrary to the interim order of the court for the parties to maintain status quo, but the defendants denied it. Having regard to their contemptuous and disregard to the positive order of the court, Counsel submitted that this is a situation wherein the court is called upon to invoke its disciplinary jurisdiction to curb the excesses of the recalcitrant defendants and grant the restorative mandatory injunction. See Daniel vs. Ferguson (1891) 2 Ch. 27 @ 30 Per Kay Ly: “The question to be decided at the trial may be of some nicety, but this is not the time to decide them. After the defendant had received notice on Saturday that an injunction was going to be applied for, he set a large number of men to work, worked all night and through nearly the whole of Sunday, and by Monday evening, at which time he received notice of an interim injunction, he had run up his wall to the height of thirty-nine feet. Whether he turns out at the trial to be right or wrong, a building which he has erected under such circumstances ought to be at once pulled down, on the ground that the erection of it was an attempt to anticipate the order of the court. To vary the order under appeal would hold out an encouragement to other people to hurry on their buildings in the hope that when they were once up the court might decline to order them to be pulled down think that this wall ought to be pulled down now without regard to what the result of the trial may be.” Also in Amachere vs. Isokariari (1995) 51 NWLR (Pt. 369) 457 @ 479 Katsina-Alu JCA (as he then was) said: “On the merits of the claim, it is particularly plain that the cantilever was constructed by the applicant during the pendency of the proceedings and against the stiff opposition of the respondent. It is well settled that after a defendant has been notified of the pendency of action seeking an injunction against him, even though a temporary injunction has not been granted, he acts at his peril and subject to the power of the court to restore the status quo wholly without regard to the ultimate rights of the parties. See Chief Odumegwu Ojukwu (1986) 2 NWLR (pt. 18) 621. The court will not allow any person to take advantage of his wrong. Green vs. Green (1987) 3 NWLR (pt. 61) 480. Having constructed the cantilever during the pendency of the action in the face of strong opposition by the respondent, the applicant cannot now complain about its removal. This application is clearly without substance”. Counsel referred further to the case of Vaswani Trading Co. vs. Savalakh & Co. (1972) 1 All NLR 483 at 487, where the Supreme Court made reference to the case of Sanni vs. Otesanya where it ordered the setting aside of the right of possession already executed and returned the parties to the status pending the determination of the substantive motion for stay of execution. Counsel called upon the Court to invoke its coercive/disciplinary jurisdiction to deal with the defendants whose act amounts to stealing a match on the claimants. At this situation the court is not concerned with the merit of the claimants’ case rather the court should be concerned with the invocation of its disciplinary jurisdiction to prevent its jurisdiction to try the case before it from being frustrated. He submitted that the state of affairs which the claimants especially the 22nd claimant complained of or about was such that the court would have granted the prohibitory interlocutory injunction. See paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the affidavit in support. Restoring the applicant to the official College Quarters is not a difficult issue, and any order to that effect would not be onerous or an impracticability to effect. It is not impossible for the defendants to restore the earlier position before they accord respect to the rule of law. This is not a case where damages are sufficiently compensated. See paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the affidavit in support of motion. See Abubakar vs. JMDB (1997) 10 NWLR (Pt. 524) 212. On when the injury to the plaintiff is so serious and material that the restoration of things to their former condition is the only method whereby justice can be adequately done, counsel submitted that the court may refer to paragraph 8(f) of the affidavit in support of the motion, wherein the applicant stated that the justice of the matter can be adequately done is to restore or the restoration of things to their former condition. As regards whether the defendants attempted to steal a match on the 22nd claimant/applicant, Counsel submitted that reference to paragraphs 8(C) of the affidavit in support of motion in which the applicant stated that there was an existing suit over the defendants intended eviction of the claimants, the illegal deduction of N2000 daily from the claimants’ pension and non-payment of the claimants’ retirement benefits; that the forceful eviction of the applicant from the College Quarters was to steal a match on the applicant. See CBN vs. UTB (Nig.) Ltd. (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt. 445) 674. On the 12th November 2014, this court made an interim order that the parties should maintain status quo in this dispute until the motion for interlocutory injunction is determined. Despite the court’s order to maintain the status quo the defendants went ahead and forcefully evicted the applicant. See CBN vs. Industrial Bank Ltd. (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 522). A.G. Anambra State vs. Okafor (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 224) 396. Counsel urged the court to grant the applicant an order of mandatory injunction against the defendants to restore the applicant to the official College Quarters. In opposition to the Claimant’s motion for mandatory injunction, the defendants/respondents on the 13th day of February 2015, filed an 7 paragraph Counter-Affidavit deposed to by Mrs. Charity Mezieobi, upon which they placed reliance. In the accompanying Written Address in support of the defendants’ argument in opposition of the application, Counsel formulated the following two issues for determination: (a) Whether in view of the pending application by the defendants challenging the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the substantive suit, the court can proceed to hear and make a pronouncement in the instant application without first determining its jurisdiction to hear the substantive suit; and (b) Whether, in view of the supporting evidence, this application does not lack merit. In arguing issue one, Counsel for the Claimant submitted that the position of the law is inviolate that where the jurisdiction of a court is challenged, the only jurisdiction left in the court is to determine whether or not it possesses jurisdiction to entertain the matter. He referred to the cases of: o Dangana vs. Usman (2003) 6 NWLR (pt. 1349) p. 50 pp @ pg. 76. o Afribank (Nig) Plc vs. Akwara (2006) 5 NWLR (pt. 974) pg. 619. o Onuorah vs. K.R.P.C. Ltd. (2005) 6 NWLR (921) pg. 393. The defendants/respondents had earlier on filed a preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the substantive suit, and the preliminary objection is still pending, having not been determined one way or the other before the claimants/applicants brought this extant application. According to counsel for the defence, the pertinent question which agitates the mind is that given the aforementioned position of the law, can this extant application be entertained and granted having regard to the pendency of the preliminary objection dated 24/11/2014. Counsel submitted that the answer to this poser is in the negative as jurisdiction is a threshold issue which when raised has to be quickly decided as any step taken in the proceeding without jurisdiction will be a nullity. See the cases of: Dangana vs. Usman (Supra) @ pg. 92 and Usman Dan Fodio University vs. Kraus Thompson Org. Ltd. (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt. 736) pg. 305. This being the case, according to the defendants, this court cannot entertain this extant application as presently constituted without determining one way or the other the preliminary objection dated 24/11/2014, still pending. Consequently, entertaining this application will be tantamount to overruling the preliminary objection without affording the defendants/respondents fair hearing. It is the law that the court has a duty to hear and determine all applications before it, however reckless or lacking in merit it may be, as failure to so do will amo8nt to the breach of the right to fair hearing. See the case of F.A.A.N. vs. W.E.S. (Nig.) Ltd. (2011) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1249) Pg. 210 @ 237. To counsel, this application by the applicant is premature and an invitation to this court to assume jurisdiction through the back door, which same invitation ought to be declined. Counsel urged the Court to strike out this application for the foregoing reasons and in view of the settled position of the law adumbrated above. In the event that Counsel is overruled on this point, he proceeded to proffer arguments on the second issue. On issue two, it is the submission of Counsel for the defendants that this application lacks merit as substantial materials are not before the Court in order to warrant the grant of the application. For starters, paragraph 8 of the Affidavit in Support of the motion runs foul of Section 115 (4) Evidence Act 2011 which provides that where a deponent avers to facts received from another person, time, places and particulars of the information have to be distinctly set out. Paragraph 8 referred to above contains no such particulars, thus rendering it incompetent and liable to be struck out. See the case of Edu vs. Commissioner for Agriculture (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 681) Pg. 316 @ 319. Counsel urged the Court to uphold the law by striking out this offensive paragraph. Counsel for the defendants submitted further that the grant of the injunction sought is not available to the applicant because the quarters in question was and has been vacant for a long time since the applicant vacated the same. The applicant neither had any properties in the quarters nor was any person evicted as alleged in the affidavit in support. The defendants/respondents merely retook possession of the unoccupied quarters in order to prevent a situation where hoodlums, miscreants and other undesirable characters will use the quarters for their nefarious activities. Please see paragraph 5 (b) – (i) of the Counter Affidavit. Furthermore, according to the defendants, the status quo existing as at 12th of November, 2014 when the interim order was made was that the applicant was not in occupation of the quarters and cannot be interpreted to put the applicant where he never was in the first place. All the judicial authorities cited by counsel to the claimant/applicant, as representing the position of the law, are inapplicable to the facts of this instant case. Counsel therefore urged the Court to refuse this application for lacking in merit, and that the issues raised therein do not fall under the matters under the exclusive jurisdiction of this court. On the 20th day of February 2015, the Claimants filed a 6 paragraph Further Affidavit deposed to by the 22nd Claimant along with a reply on points of Law wherein Counsel for the Claimant reacted to the issues raised by the defendants in their counter affidavit and written address which they filed in opposition to the Claimants’ motion for mandatory injunction. According to Counsel for the Claimants, the defendants in their written address contend that this Court does not possess the jurisdiction to entertain the application of claimants seeking relief of its equitable jurisdiction to reverse or undo what the defendants did vide the property/premises known as and called Plot B117 Shell Camp Owerri on 21st November, 2014 in disobedience to the order of this court made on 12/11/2014. Their ground for this innocuous position is because after the order was made they brought an application challenging the jurisdiction of the court to hear the substantive suit. In reaction to the above submission of the defendants, counsel for the Claimants submitted that the law is trite that a judgment or decision of a court of competent jurisdiction remains valid and binding unless and until it is set aside by an appeal court or by the Lower Court itself where it acted without jurisdiction and there is an unqualified obligation on every person against whom it is given to obey it unless and until it is set aside. This is because to hold otherwise is to clothe a party against whom that judgment/decision is given with the discretion to decide in his wisdom, that the judgment is invalid and not binding on him and this will amount to an invitation to anarchy. Rosek vs. ACB (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 312) 382 @ 389. In the instant case an interim order was issued by this Court on 12/11/2014. The defendants were aware of the order as they were served. They did not bring any application to set aside the order, rather they with impunity went ahead to do what the order frowned at and restrained them from doing pending the determination of the interlocutory injunction. It is preposterous and an exhibition of irresponsible boldness for the defendants to taunt the court with the “almighty phraseology called jurisdiction”. The question is does the issue of “jurisdiction” give the defendants the impetus and temerity to disobey the court. The answer is No. In ROSEK vs. ACB (Supra), the Supreme Court held further that “A party who knows of an order, whether valid or null, regular or irregular cannot be permitted to disobey it…..” In Abaye vs, Ofili (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 15) 134 @ 160 Nnamani JSC said:- “To ignore judgments and orders of courts is to lay a sure foundation for despotism and anarchy……” In Attorney General Ekiti State vs. Daramola (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt. 827) 104 at 162, Ogundare JSC said the proper approach in setting aside an act done in disobedience of order of court is by so applying to the court in the same proceedings and not by filing an entirely fresh suit. This is what the claimants have done in the circumstances by the application for mandatory injunctive order. According to the Claimants, the defendants’ submission in Issue No.1 of their written address is a calculated mischief and an abuse of process of the court. Disobedience to an interlocutory order brings the contemnor within the precincts of being a judgment debtor and against whom an order of committal can be made under Section 71 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law. An application of the nature brought by claimants which in essence is to make the defendants obey the order of the court is akin to an application for contempt of a court, and it must be entertained and decided first before any other thing, even if there exists another application challenging the court’s jurisdiction. See C.O.P vs. Omanukwue (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt. 590) 190. The rationale is the need to protect the integrity, dignity and authority of the court. See Omoijahe vs. Umoru (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt. 614) 178. The Court has inherent power to refuse to hear the defendants who disobeyed its order until they purge themselves of that contempt. Lawal – Osula vs. Lawal Osula (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt. 382) 128; FATB vs. Ezegbu (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 132. It is clear that any application by the defendants while still in disobedience of the order of 12/11/2014 cannot be entertained because it amounts to nothing but blatant abuse of court process. See Akpunonu vs. Beakart Overseas (2000) FWLR (Pt. 7) 1055 at 1063. See also Shugaba vs. Union Bank of Nig. Plc (1997) 4 NWLR (pt. 500) 483, the Supreme Court held:- “That courts do not exercise their discretionary power to aid those who flout its orders…….the conduct of the appellant in this case is not only a glaring abuse of court process and contempt of its lawful orders, but also most irresponsible and reprehensible ..” consequently, non-compliance with an order of court makes a subsequent matter or suit by the contemnor incompetent…..” See Esuku vs. Leko (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt. 340). In the light of the foregoing, to counsel, Issue No. 1 of the defendants holds no water. It is an abuse of process, and it is a very serious matter for anyone to flout a positive order of a court and proceed to taunt the court further by filing an application of this nature or seek a remedy in a Higher Court while still in contempt. Jim Nwobodo vs. John nwobodo (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 370) 206. It is one thing to raise the issue of jurisdiction. It is quite another thing to prove it. In Ojuwu vs. Onyeador (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 203) 286 @ 322, Tobi JCA (as he then was) held thus:- “The related argument is that once jurisdiction is raised in an interlocutory application, it must be granted no matter whether the applicant has complied with the rules of court or not. I also do not agree with that. Jurisdiction has no such saintly immunized character or content to diffuse the entire judicial system. Merely because an applicant has raised it, the heaven must fall on the judicial system. If that were to be the legal position, then an applicant who is in a tight corner in the litigation can couch his application in the best legal phraseology touching on jurisdiction an application which is riddled with patent and fundamental issues of non-compliance and taunt or lure the court into a jibe, all in the name of jurisdiction. In order words, the applicant gets his application through by a mere wave of a well phrased motion on jurisdiction, but is that the legal position? I hate to think so”. Counsel for the Claimants urged the Court to discountenance the submissions and authorities cited in Issue No. 1 of defendants’ written address as they are far from the issues encapsulated in the claimants’ motion for mandatory injunction. Counsel for the Claimants pointed out further that the defendants in their Issue No. 2 had made so much weather over or on paragraph 8 of the affidavit in support of claimants’ motion and straining Section 115(4) Evidence Act 2011 beyond its statutory bay. Paragraph 8 of the affidavit of claimants is very clear as who the informant is i.e. “His Counsel E.F.Njemanze, Esq.” The deponent stated the source of his information and consequently has substantially complied with Section 115(1), (2), (3) and (4). The counsel of the deponent referred to is identifiable. The information could be verified from its source. See Atayi Farms Ltd. vs. NACB Ltd. (2003) FWLR (Pt. 172) 1864. Assuming without conceding that there was any defect, it was cured by section 113 of the Evidence Act 2011. Even if paragraph 8 of the affidavit is expunged, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the affidavit are enough to sustain the application. See also Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Further Affidavit in support. To Counsel, it is incorrect to say that as at 12th November, 2014 the occupant i.e. Prof. Uche A. Ogike was not in occupation of the house. Prof. Ogike has been in occupation of the house since 1976 and has never moved out of the house or quarters. He was attending classes from the house to Imo State University as Adjunct Professor. The status quo as at 12th November, 2014 was that he was in occupation of the house. Reference to commence of the dispute between the claimants and defendants which started in 2006 is captured in the present suit. The 2006 suit was over threats and acts to eject the claimants for which the High Court of Imo State made similar interim injunctive order restraining the defendants from ejecting the claimants pending determination of the interlocutory injunction. The suit was frustrated by the defendants by their usual barrage and litany of objections. Counsel urged the Court to grant the prayers of the claimant seeking for mandatory injunction against the defendants over Plot B117 Shell Camp Owerri. In the course of adopting the various addresses, learned senior Counsel for the defendants sought and obtained leave of court to incorporate arguments on the public officers’ protection Act viva voce. In adumbrating, learned counsel for the Claimants submitted that the document dated 6th July 2006 which the defendants annexed to their further affidavit was made in anticipation of a suit, and therefore offends section 83(3) of the Evidence Act 2011. According to Counsel, the document was made when the parties were already in disagreement and in essence of correspondences with regard to entitlement of the Claimants in the same year (2006) when the Claimant sued the defendants in Suit No HOW/553/2006. Counsel went further that the maker of the said document was an interested party and a party in this suit. It is therefore inadmissible in evidence. Counsel referred the Court to Section 36(8) of the 1999 constitution (as amended) and submitted that the letter cannot retroactively invalidate a letter of 6/10/95, especially as the Claimants had retired when the later letter was made. To counsel, it can only be valid with regard to existing lecturers. Counsel submitted that it is contrary to Section 36(12), and that the letters should be discountenanced and should not be given any weight. In adumbrating, learned senior counsel for the defendants referred the court to the motion for mandatory injunction filed by the claimants on 27th January 2015, particularly Exhibit A to the motion. The said document is captioned “Total loss and damage to my furniture and personal effects in my residence B117 6th Avenue Shell Camp, Owerri following the removal of roof on 26th March 2014 and break into my house by persons purportedly sent by the provost and management of Alvan Ikoku Federal College of Education, Owerri.” The body of the document which is dated 22 September 2014 is an inventory catalogued into loss amounting to N10, 894, 000.00. Learned silk pointed out to the court that by the document, the roof was said to have been removed on 26th March 2014, and the report was being made on 22nd September. Yet, the motion for mandatory injunction seeks to restore the 22nd Claimant to his Shell camp quarters from where he was forcefully ejected on 21st November 2014, and the outcome of that ejection is what is catalogued in Exhibit A dated 22nd September 2014. Senior counsel pointed out further that the order of court the claimants say was disobeyed was made on 12th November 2014. From the foregoing according to counsel, it is clear that the claimants/applicants have deliberately fabricated facts or documents to mislead the court, yet they ask for a discretionary remedy with dirty hands. To counsel, any party who lies on a matter within his personal knowledge with respect to any issue before the court cannot be accredited any credibility in the entire proceedings. Learned senior counsel for the defendants urged the court to treat the applicant (22nd claimant) as such a person and dismiss the application with punitive costs to serve as deterrent to others. For the same reasons, counsel also urged the court to dismiss the claimants’ application for interlocutory injunction, also with punitive costs. Learned senior counsel proceeded to point draw the court’s attention to Exhibit D2 attached to the defendants’ further affidavit in support of the motion for striking out; precisely paragraph 10 thereof. The said document is a letter from the Claimants’ solicitor. By the said letter, the Claimants have admitted that they are fee paying tenants. See also paragraph 3(e) of the Claimants’ Further affidavit. He went further that in determining the status quo at the time the interim order was made, the question is: “is the court going to believe the applicant who says he was ejected in March, he wrote a report in September and the order was made in November?” Another question is: “was he in possession when the interim order was made?” He submitted that Status quo ante bellum is that situation which is uncontested at the time the action came to court. What then was the status quo when the claimants came to court? According to Counsel, the situation couldn’t have been that the applicant was still in occupation. By his own Exhibits, the said he was ejected in March. It was further pointed out that in all the affidavits of the 22nd Claimant, he admits that he has been a lecturer in Imo State University before this action came to court. There is therefore a presumption that he couldn’t have been occupying quarters in Alvan Ikoku. Counsel urged the court to grant the defendants’ application for striking out. Learned senior counsel then proceeded to make submissions to the effect that this action is statute barred. Counsel referred the court to paragraphs 19(a), 19(b) and 21(a) of the statement of facts. He observed that the facts pleaded in those paragraphs clearly show that the cause of action arose far more that 3 months before the institution of this action. All the facts necessary to ground the cause of action were present and ready as at July 2011. The action was filed on 10th March 2014. It was filed at the Federal High Court in January 2013, more than 18 months after the cause of action arose. He cited section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act Cap P41 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. He also relied on the authorities of Ibrahim vs. JSC Kaduna State (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) Pg. 1 @ 36; Rinco Construction Co. vs. B. P. Industries Ltd. (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 929) Pg. 85 @ 95; Humbe vs. A. G. Benue State (2000) 3 NWLR (Pt. 649) Pg. 419 @ 433 Para C-D and Pg. 439 Para G-E. It was the further submission of the learned silk for the defendants in reaction to the Claimants’ counsel’s submissions with regard to Exhibits D1 and D2, that Section 83(3) of the Evidence Act is inapplicable. The said section refers to a statement made by a person when proceedings were pending or anticipated. Exhibit D1 and D2 were documents made in 2006. This action was brought in 2013. They were not made in anticipation of this action, therefore the section is inapplicable. In reaction to the Claimants’ submission on section 36 (8) and (12) of the Constitution, Learned senior counsel submitted that the sections are grossly inapplicable as they deal with criminal trials and have no relevance to this suit. He urged the court to decline jurisdiction to hear this suit and grant the application to strike it out. In further response on law, learned counsel for the claimants referred the court to the authorities of Gwar vs. Adole (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt. 808) Pg. 516 CA and Omoju vs. FRN (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1085) Pg. 38, and urged the court to take note of the content of Exhibit A; and that ejection was on 21st November 2014 after the order of court was made on 12th November 2014. Counsel for the claimants went on that the action is not statute barred. According to Counsel, the Claimants filed the action at the High Court in 2006 November (HOW/533/2006), and that the case was still pending at the high court. The defendants brought a preliminary objection at the High Court, and ruling was yet to be delivered before the judge retired. The Claimants therefore filed a fresh action at the Federal High Court in 2011 (FHC/OW/CS/236/2011), which was subsequently transferred to this court. Counsel submitted in addition, that the High court suit is partly the same as this suit in terms of parties. She added that by virtue of section 123 of the Evidence act, Paragraph 3g of the defendant’s Counter Affidavit was an admission. She urged the court to so hold, and to grant the Claimants’ prayers. From the foregoing, three applications have been argued before this court on which the court is to now rule. The applications, in order of their presentation, are- 1. The claimants’ motion for Interlocutory Injunction restraining the Defendants from ejecting them from their official quarters pending the determination of this suit. 2. The Defendants’ motion for the striking out of this suit on the ground of want of jurisdiction. 3. The claimants’ motion for mandatory injunction mandating the defendants to reinstate/restore the 22nd claimant to his College Quarters. The 2nd application, which was filed by the defendants, challenges the jurisdiction of this court to hear and determine the suit. It is seeking an order that this suit be struck out. In that case, the application by the defendants also affects any pronouncement this court may make in respect of the 1st and 3rd applications which were filed by the claimants. The issue of jurisdiction is very fundamental in the administration of justice. Any pronouncement made by a court without jurisdiction is an exercise in futility. That is why once the issue of a court’s jurisdiction is raised, it must be settled first and timeously before any other step is taken in the matter. See AGBULE vs. W.R. & P. CO. LTD. (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 688) 829; BABALOLA vs. OBAOKU-OTE (2005) 5 W.R.N 179 at 194. This is because where a court lacks jurisdiction, the proceedings, no matter how well conducted, will be a nullity. See OSOH vs. UNITY BANK PLC (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 690) 1245 at 1271; AIGORO vs. C.L & H, KWARA STATE (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 663) 1998. It is therefore proper for this court to first consider and determine the defendants’ motion seeking for the striking out of this suit. If the application is not sustained, consideration will then be given to the other applications filed by the claimants. In their motion, the defendants raised two grounds for seeking the striking out of the suit. The grounds are that the parties, subject matter and issues in this case are the same as in Suit No. HOW/533/2006 Dr. H.M. Iwuoha & Ors vs. Alvan Ikoku Federal College of Education Owerri & Ors, which suit is still pending at the High Court Owerri and secondly that the subject matter of this suit is the tenancy of the claimants in the official quarters of the 1st defendant which subject does not fall within the jurisdiction of this honorable court. These two grounds of the defendants’ application are jurisdictional issues. In view of that, one issue is formulated in this ruling to determine the defendants’ application. The issue is: Whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit? The 1st ground of the defendants’ application is that this instant suit is an abuse of court process in view of suit HOW/533/2006 which is still pending before the Imo State High Court between the same parties and on the same issues. In the affidavit in support of the application, it is deposed on behalf of the defendants that the claimants had earlier filed suit HOW/533/2006 at the Imo State High Court against the defendants in respect of the same subject matter, same issues and between the same parties as this suit, and that that suit is still pending before the Owerri Division of the Imo State High Court. The claimants’ Statement of Claim in Suit HOW/533/2006 was exhibited by the defendants to the supporting affidavit as Exhibit A. Relying on these facts, the defendants’ counsel submitted that this present action is an abuse of court process as it is only intended to irritate and annoy the defendants. In their counter affidavit, the claimants deposed to several facts some of which are not relevant to the determination of the 1st ground of the defendants’ application. In respect of the defendants contention that this suit is an abuse of court process in view of suit HOW/533/2006, the claimants’ counter affidavit shows these facts: (1) The claimants filed suit HOW/533/2006 which suit has been stalled because of a preliminary objection raised by the defendants. (2) The suit before the High Court Owerri is different from this suit and the reliefs are different. The claimants’ counsel did argue in his address that this suit is not an abuse of court process. Abuse of Court process manifests either in the proper or improper use of the judicial process in litigation. The employment or use of judicial process is regarded generally as an abuse when a party improperly uses the issue of judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent, and the efficient and effective administration of justice. See OKAFOR vs. A.G. ANAMBRA STATE (1991) 6, NWLR (Pt. 200) 659. Actions which amount to abuse of the process of Court may vary but it ought to fall generally within the circumstances identified in plethora of cases as amounting to abuse of court process. The Supreme Court, in R-BENKAY (NIG.) LTD vs. CADBURY (NIG.) PLC (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 631) 1450 at 1466, set out various circumstances that will amount to abuse of court process. They include- i. Instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter against the same opponent on the same issues or multiplicity of actions on the same matter between the same parties even where there exists a right to begin the action. ii. Instituting different actions between the same parties simultaneously in different courts, even though on different grounds. iii. Where two similar processes are used in respect of the exercise of the same right, for example, a cross-appeal and a respondent’s notice. iv. Where an application for adjournment is sought by a party to an action to bring an application to court for leave to raise issues of fact already decided by the lower court. v. Where there is no law supporting a court process or where it is premised on frivolity or recklessness. vi. Where a party has adopted the system of forum-shopping in the enforcement of a conceived right. vii. It is an abuse of court process for an appellant to file application at the trial court in respect of a matter which is already subject to an earlier application by the respondent at the Court of Appeal when the appellant’s application has the effect of overreaching the respondent’s application. viii. Where two actions are commenced, the second asking for a relief which may have been obtained in the first, the second action is prima-facie vexatious and an abuse of court process. See also SARAKI vs. KOTOYE (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 156; OPEKUN vs. SADIQ (2003) FWLR (Pt. 150) 1654 at 1661. In SARAKI vs. KOTOYE (SUPRA) at 188, it was held that abuse of court process will arise “in instituting a multiplicity of action on the same subject matter against the same opponent on the same issue”. See also ACCORD PARTY vs. GOVERNOR OF KWARA STATE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 555) 220 at 296. These authorities are to the effect that to constitute an abuse of court process, a claimant must have instituted more than one suit on the same subject matter, the same set of facts, the same issues and between the same parties in the same or different courts. The defendants’ contention in their application is that since Suit HOW/533/2006 is still pending, this suit amounts to multiplicity of actions as it is on the same subject matter, between the same parties and on the same issues as in Suit HOW/533/2006. The duty of this court at this point is to examine both suits with a view to find if this suit constitutes an abuse of court process as contended by the defendants. It is common ground between the parties that Suit HOW/533/2006 was filed earlier than this suit and the suit is still pending before the Owerri High Court, even though the claimants counsel contends that Suit HOW/533/2006 has abated. I shall come to this issue later. The Statement of Claim in suit HOW/533/2006, annexed by the defendants as Exhibit A, discloses that the suit was filed in 2006 before the Imo State High Court, Owerri Division. This instant suit was filed in 2011 before the Federal High Court before it was transferred to this court. The point must also be made that the claimants did not deny that the parties in suit HOW/533/2006 and this suit are the same. The point maintained by the claimants in their counter affidavit is that the subject matter and reliefs in the two suits are different. Therefore, there is no dispute that the parties in the two actions are the same. The subject matter of this suit as disclosed in the Statement of Facts is the occupation of the claimants of the 1st defendants’ quarters at Shell Camp, Owerri and Amakohia. See paragraphs 4, 5 and 22 (i) of the Statement of Facts. I have looked at the Statement of Claim in Suit HOW/533/2006 and I find from the facts averred in paragraphs 3, 4 and 13 (a) thereof that it is the subject matter of this suit that is being contended in that suit also. From the facts of this case and the facts in Suit HOW/533/2006, the issues involved in the two cases are also the same. In fact, the averments in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12 in the Statement of Claim of Suit HOW/533/2006 are the same facts averred in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 13 of the Statement of Facts in this suit. The facts averred in these paragraphs are that the claimants are occupants of the 1st defendant’s quarters at Shell Camp Owerri and Amakohia by virtue of their employment and after their retirement, in accordance with the agreement had with the defendants, the claimants continued to occupy the quarters and have been paying rent to the 1st defendant. In paragraph 5 of the claimants’ statement of claim in Suit HOW/533/2006, the claimants pleaded that as agreed between the parties, the rent was deducted from the pension of the claimants. By a letter dated 6/10/95 exhibited to the counter affidavit by the claimants as exhibit B, the defendants informed the claimants that it was the decision of the Governing council that a retired staff has 6 months from the date the staff is paid full benefits to vacate the quarters. The claimants have not been paid their full retirement benefits but the defendants issued a circular directing the claimants to vacate the quarters. It is this directive and actions of the defendants to recover possession from the claimants that resulted to this suit wherein the claimants seek a declaration that they are entitled to occupy the quarters, and an injunction restraining the defendants from ejecting them from the quarters. From the facts of the two cases, it is clear that the issues involved are the same. The same set of facts and circumstances found the two actions. In respect of the reliefs sought upon the facts in the two suits, I have compared the reliefs and I see that the only reliefs in this suit not sought in suit HOW/533/2006 are reliefs (iv) to (x) which are in respect of the deductions made from the claimants pension by the defendants as rent for the occupation of the 1st defendant’s quarters by the claimants. However, the deduction from the pension is an issue in suit HOW/533/2006 when the claimants pleaded in paragraph 5 of the Statement of Claim that rent payable by them on the quarters was deducted from their pension. All other reliefs are the same. The reliefs that are different flow from the other reliefs and they arose from the same subject matter and cause. A critical look at the reliefs sought in the two cases and in view of the issues and facts in respect of which they are sought, it is not difficult to conclude that the reliefs sought in the two cases are substantially the same. From the facts of the parties in their respective affidavit evidence in respect of this application, the content of the Statement of Claim in Suit HOW/533/2006 and the facts disclosed in the claimants’ Statement of Facts in this suit, the following facts are clear to this court- i. The claimants instituted Suit HOW/533/2006 before the Owerri High Court. ii. Suit HOW/533/2006 is still pending and has not been disposed of when this suit was filed. iii. Both suits are between the same parties. iv. The subject matter and the issues involved in both suits are the same. v. The same or substantially the same reliefs are sought in both suits. It is obvious from the foregoing that the ingredients of abuse of court process are present in this case. But that is not the end of the matter. The claimants counsel, in his written address, cited Section 11(1) and (2) of the National Industrial Court Act and Section 254(C)(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) to argue that Suit HOW/533/2006 has abated by virtue of these provisions because trial has not commenced in the suit. If I understand counsel very well, what he appears to contend is that since it is this court that has jurisdiction on the subject matter of this suit, the suit in Owerri High Court will have automatically abated or fizzled out and be deemed not to be pending or subsisting. In that event, the claimants counsel seems to say that the only subsisting suit between the parties is this instant suit and the issue of abuse of process will therefore not arise. Perhaps the argument of counsel may have earned this Court’s consideration if this Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit such that it can be considered that the Suit before the Imo State High Court has become affected by the provision of Section 11 (2) of the NIC Act. At this point, it has become necessary to consider whether the subject matter of this suit falls within the subjects over which this court has exclusive jurisdiction. The 2nd ground of the defendants’ application has now cropped up for consideration. When a court is to determine whether it has jurisdiction in a matter or not, the court is to examine or consider the nature of the plaintiff or claimant’s claim as disclosed in the originating process and the statement of claim or facts. See ONUORAH vs. K.R.P.C LTD (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 393. The subject matter of this suit, as I have pointed out earlier in this ruling, is the occupation of the claimants of the 1st defendants’ quarters at Shell Camp. The facts in the claimants’ statement of facts show that the claimants were staff of the 1st defendant and they were allocated the quarters upon which they pay rent to the 1st defendant. On their retirement from the 1st defendants’ employment, they continued to occupy the quarters and pay rent on a monthly basis to the 1st defendant and by the defendants’ letter of 06/10/95, the claimants were given time within which to vacate the quarters upon payment of their retirement benefits. However, the defendants later issued a circular directing the claimants to vacate the quarters. On several occasions also, the defendants have tried to evict the claimant and has also served the claimants with quit notices. The reliefs sought by the claimants in paragraphs 22 (i), (ii) and (iii) of the statement of facts are very instructive on the case of the claimants. In these reliefs, the claimants seek to assert their right to peaceful occupation of the quarters. By their averments in the statement of facts and the claims in this suit, the claimants’ case is founded on their tenancy of the 1st defendant’s official quarters. This is even more so when the claimants averred that they have retired from the employment of the 1st defendant. That is to say, there was no longer a contract of employment between the parties. The facts disclose a relationship of landlord and tenant between the 1st defendant and the claimants or an issue of tenancy. The subject matters on which this court is conferred with exclusive jurisdiction in Section 254C (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) does not include matters on tenancy. It is quite clear to me that none of the provisions of Section 254C (1) cover tenancy matters. Clearly, this court does not have jurisdiction on matters relating to tenancy. This court may have been tempted to assume jurisdiction on the claims of the claimants if the Claimant had shown that their occupation of the staff quarters is a condition of their contract of employment. But I have read the claimants statement of facts and I find no such fact. The Claimants have not also relied on any document by which the said accommodation was allocated to them to enable this court tie the allocation of the quarters with the claimants’ contract of employment. In the absence of these material facts, the issue remains purely a tenancy matter between the claimants and the 1st defendant and this court’s jurisdiction does not extend to such matters. I am not oblivious of reliefs (iv) to (x) sought by the claimants. These reliefs relate to the deductions from the claimants pension for rent. In Paragraph 8 of the claimants counter affidavit, it is deposed that their claim in this suit borders on the deductions from the claimants pensions and withholding of their gratuities and pension. In his arguments, the claimants counsel submitted that this suit is not about tenancy of the 1st defendant’s quarters but about the claimants’ pension and withholding of the claimants retirement benefits which are the main claims in this suit. By Section 254C (1) (k) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), this court has jurisdiction on issues “relating to or connected with disputes arising from payment or non-payment of salaries, wages, pensions, gratuities, allowances, benefits and any other entitlement…”. But in the circumstance of this case, can this court proceed on the reliefs relating to the claimants pension? First of all, it is observed that the deductions complained of was done by the defendants as the claimants “rent” for the quarters occupied by them. See Paragraph 16 (b) of the Statement of Facts and Paragraph 5 of Exhibit A to the defendants application. The reliefs dealing with pension, particularly reliefs (iv) to (x), are not strictly for the payment or non-payment of the claimants’ pension or gratuity but the question whether the deduction from the claimants’ pension as rent is proper or lawful. It appears to me still that the pension issue, that is the deductions therefore, cannot be separated from the main issue of tenancy involved in this case. Therefore, the reliefs relating to the claimants pension are not one to be considered strictly in relation to Section 254C (1) k of CFRN 1999. Secondly, I do not agree with the claimants counsel that the claimants’ claims relating to their pension are the main claims in this suit. The gist of their case is the defendants attempt to evict the claimants from the 1st defendants’ quarters “contrary to the agreement between the claimants and the 1st defendant”. The principal reliefs of the Claimants as disclosed in Paragraph 22 of the Statement of Claim are the ones relating to that of threatened eviction of the Claimants from the quarters. These are reliefs (i), (ii), and (iii) wherein the claimants seek declarations to prevent the eviction. The claims relating to the deductions from their pension as rent for the quarters become only ancillary. The point must be made here that even if this court has jurisdiction on matters relating to pension and gratuity, this court cannot adjudicate on ancillary reliefs where it has no jurisdiction to entertain the main claims. It is trite that what determines jurisdiction of the court or competence to entertain a suit is the principal reliefs or claims of the claimants and not the consequential issues flowing from the main reliefs sought. See NWANGWU vs. OSEMENAM (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 376) 779. Therefore, a court cannot adjudicate on ancillary reliefs where it has no jurisdiction to entertain the main claims. This principle was espoused thus by the Court of Appeal in NABORE PROPERTIES LTD vs. PEACE-COVER NIGERIA LIMITED & ORS. (2014) LPELR 22586 (CA)- “The law is that a court cannot adjudicate on ancillary reliefs where it has no jurisdiction to entertain the main claim especially where the determination of the ancillary claim must necessarily involve consideration of the main claim.” See also TUKUR vs. GOVT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517; MRS. FOLUKE MUDASHIRU vs. PERSONS UNKNOWN & 5 ORS (2004) LPELR-7412. In effect, this court cannot separate the claims over which it has jurisdiction from the claims on which it lacks jurisdiction and try them separately. As I have said earlier, the issue of the claimants’ pension has foundation in the tenancy matter. If this court cannot try the main claims relating to issue of tenancy, it cannot separate the ancillary claim over which it has jurisdiction and try separately. Should this court attempt to do that, there is no way it will not sway into considering the issues on which the court does not have jurisdiction. In such a situation, the general rule is for the court to decline jurisdiction altogether. This court made the same observation in the ruling of this court on 30/6/2014 in a sister case to this one, that is Suit NIC/OW/07/2013 between Chukwudire vs. Governor of Imo State & Ors. Therefore, even though this court has jurisdiction to entertain the ancillary claims, it cannot adjudicate on it because it lacks jurisdiction in respect of the main claims. The cumulative effect is that this court has no jurisdiction to determine this suit. From the foregoing, it has become clear that the claimants’ occupation or tenancy of the 1st defendant’s quarters, which is the subject matter of this suit and also in suit HOW/533/2006, does not fall in the exclusive jurisdiction of this court. It thus means that the Owerri High Court will have jurisdiction on the matter. In that case, suit HOW/533/2006 before the Owerri High court cannot be said to have abated on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction on the claimants claims upon the coming into effect of the CFRN 1999 (as amended) as has been contended by the claimants counsel. Suit HOW/533/2006 is still subsisting. This fact is also clearly made by the claimants in relief (vi) sought by them in this suit which reads as follows- “Declaration that the deductions based or predicated on occupation of houses (official residences by the Claimants) the subject matter of Suit HOW/533/2006 between the claimants and Defendants pending at High Court of Imo State and which has not abated or concluded is unlawful, illegal and of no effect whatsoever”. Having come to the conclusion that Suit HOW/533/2006 has not abated and having found that the parties, subject matter, issues and reliefs sought in both suits are same, this suit is clearly an abuse of court process. Where two or more similar processes are issued by a party against the same party/parties in respect of the exercise of the same right and same subject matter, it will be regarded as an abuse of court process. See OKORODUDU vs. OKOROMADU (1977) 3 S.C 21; OKAFOR vs. A-G ANAMBRA STATE (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 200) 63 at 681; NNANA vs. NWANEBE (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 172) 181; OLUTINRIN vs. AGAKA (1998) 6 NWLR (Pt. 554) 366. In BEST WESTERN COMPANY LIMITED vs. UDORMISOR (2002) FWLR (Pt. 97) 744 at 761, it was held that a multiplicity of suits or proceedings by the same parties in respect of the same subject matter and issues whether in the same court or in different courts constitutes an abuse of court process. It does not matter whether the matter is on appeal or not for as long as the previous action has not been finally decided, the subsequent action would constitute an abuse of process of court. This was also the view of the Supreme Court in A.R.C vs. J.D.P CONSTRUCTION NIG. LTD. (2003) FWLR (Pt. 153) 251 at 270, where it was held that where a party duplicates a court process, the more current one which results in the duplication is regarded as an abuse of court process. Therefore, the claimants’ instant suit constitutes an abuse of court process. I find merit in the defendants’ application. The two grounds of the application are hereby sustained. During the hearing of the applications on the 2nd day of March 2015, the Learned senior counsel for the defendants had also argued that the claimants suit against the defendants is statute barred having not been filed within 3 months from the date the cause of action accrued as required by section 2 (a) of POPA. In response, the learned counsel for claimants contended that the action is not statute barred. Counsel for the Claimants tried to link this suit with suit HOW/533/2006 filed at the Owerri High Court in November 2006. What the claimants counsel appears to be saying is that the date of this present suit should be taken to be the date Suit HOW/533/2006 was filed. I shall come to that argument shortly. There is no doubt that the defendants to this suit are public officers. Section 2 (a) of POPA is to the effect that an action against a public officer in respect of any act done in pursuance or execution of any Act or law or of public duty or any default in respect of same must be commenced within 3 months from the accrual of the cause of action except in the case of continuance of the damage or injury in which the complainant must institute the action within 3 months after the cessation of the damage or injury. Where the suit is not commenced within 3 months from the date of the cause of action, the action will be statute barred. See IBRAHIM vs. JSC KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1 at 36; RINCO CONSTRUCTION CO. vs. B. P. INDUSTRIES LTD. (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 929) 85 at 95. When the object of the reliefs sought by the claimants is considered, it will be seen that the facts which gave rise to this suit are those averred in paragraphs 16(a), 16(b) and 21(a) and 21 (b) of the Statement of Facts. It is clear from the facts that as at July 2011, all the facts necessary to ground the claimants’ action against the defendants were present. The claimants were expected to take out an action against the defendants within 3 months from July 2011 but this action was not filed until January 2013 before the Federal High Court. This was a period of more than 17 months from the period the cause of action accrued. The claimants suit is clearly statute barred by virtue of section 2 (a) of POPA. The suit before the Owerri High Court was filed in 2006 meanwhile the statement of facts in this suit averred to facts which happened in 2011 and which facts found the claimants complaint in this case. These facts do not show any link in time between suit HOW/533/2006 and this suit. Furthermore, suit HOW/533/2006 is a different suit from this instant suit. As submitted by the claimants counsel, Suit HOW/533/2006 was still pending at the High Court when the claimants filed a fresh action at the Federal High Court in 2011, which suit was subsequently transferred to this court. It is thus clear that suit HOW/533/2006 and this suit are separate suits. The claimants counsel’s attempt to take the date of filing of this case to be the date of Suit HOW/533/2006 is feeble and futile. I find that this suit is statute barred. The effect is that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it and it is liable to be struck out. In view of the above order, the applications brought by the claimants are no longer of any moment. But before I draw the curtain on this ruling, there are one or two issues I wish to comment on in respect of the claimants’ applications. One of such application is the one for mandatory injunction seeking to restore the 22nd claimant to his quarters. In support of the motion is an affidavit wherein the 22nd Claimant deposed in paragraph 7 that “the total amount of my property destroyed by the Defendants and their agents is N10,894,000.00. Annexed is the copy of the estimated cost of my properties destroyed and marked Exhibit A.” The motion has annexed to it a document marked Exhibit A which was captioned “Total loss and damage to my furniture and personal effects in my residence B117 6th Avenue Shell Camp, Owerri following the removal of roof on 26th March 2014 and break into my house by persons purportedly sent by the provost and management of Alvan Ikoku Federal College of Education, Owerri.” In the body of the document, the roof allegedly removed by the defendants was done on 26th March 2014 but the exhibit was made on 22 September 2014. Curiously, the total figure in Exhibit A corresponds with the figure deposed to in paragraph 7 referred to above, which is N10,894,000.00. The order of court the claimants alleged the defendants to have disobeyed was made on 12th November 2014 and the motion was not filed until 27th January 2015. I do not find these facts to make up. I agree with the learned senior counsel to the defendants that there is a deliberate attempt to mislead the court. This is because, how can the claimants have alleged the defendants to have disobeyed an order made on 12/11/2014 when the act allegedly committed was done on 26/3/2014? That is several months before the order. Furthermore, if the 22nd claimant was truthful about the facts, why did he delay in bringing the application? It is clear to me that the motion for mandatory injunction was brought out of pure mischief. It is the duty of counsel to assist the court to dispense justice and not to mislead the court. I will advise Counsel to always remember and practice this solemn duty. On the whole, I find merit in the defendants’ application. The grounds of the application are hereby sustained. Besides the finding that this court does not have jurisdiction over the claims of the claimants, the institution of this suit notwithstanding Suit HOW/533/2006 which is on the same subject, makes this suit incompetent and this court lacks jurisdiction to continue to entertain it. In the circumstance of this suit, it is my view that the proper order to make is to strike it out. Accordingly, suit NICN/OW/21/2013 is hereby struck out. I make no order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge