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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIA COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE ENUGUJUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT ENUGU BEFORE HIS LORSDHIP, HON. JUSTICE A. IBRAHIM DATE: 11th June, 2015 SUIT No.: NIC/EN/97/2012 BETWEEN: KINGSLEY ONYEKACHI==================JUDGEMENT CREDITOR AND MTN NIG. COMM. LTTD=====================JUDGMENT DEBTOR REPRESENTATION: B. U. Iwuala Esq. appeared for the Judgment Creditor. A. J. Ekechi Esq. appeared for the Judgment Debtor. RULING This is a post-judgment proceeding instituted by the Judgment Creditor in a motion dated 15th day of December, 2014 which was filed on the same day. In the said motion the Applicant prays the court for the following reliefs: a. An order of court to award/include in the judgment of this Honourable Court delivered on the 25th day of November 2013, in the above suit, automatic interest of ten per cent to be calculated and paid on the judgment debt with effect from 26th day of December, 2013, until judgment debt is liquidated. b. An order of Court directing the respondent to pay the sum of N1, 573, 989.08 (One Million, five hundred and seventy-three thousand, nine hundred and eighty-nine naira and eight kobo) inclusive of the ten per cent post-judgment interest into court in favour of the applicant being the total sum of one month (March 2009) arrear of salary and one month salary in lieu of notice cum all other entitlements to wit: bonuses entitled by the applicant as directed by the court in its judgment delivered on 25th day of November 2013. c. An order of Court that the entitlements to wit: basic salary; bonuses etc, of the claimant be calculated with effect from March 2009, the termination of the applicant’s employment having been declared illegal by the Honourable Court pursuant to the judgment delivered on the 25th day of November 2013. d. An order subject to the granting of relief “c”, directing the respondent to pay all the arrears of the monthly salary owed the applicant with effect from May 2009 till the delivery of the judgment on the 25th day of November 2013, a total of 56 months. And for such further order(s) as the honourable court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The grounds for the reliefs sought are as follows: i. The honourable court on 25th day of November 2013 delivered judgment in this suit in favour of the applicant. ii. The honourable court in its judgment omitted to award/include the mandatory post-judgment interest payable on the judgment debt until the debt is liquidated as provided under Order 21 Rule 4 of National Industrial Court Rules 2007. iii. The claimant in this suit claimed areas (sic) of salary, entitlements, allowances, medical aids, bonuses etc as contained in his relief c of the amended complaint as well as fifty million naira general damages. iv. The honourable court found in favour of the claimant and declared that the termination of the claimant’s employment was wrongful and illegal. v. The honourable court in its judgment also, held that the claimant is entitled to the amount he would have earned during the one month period of notice and any other entitlements that would have accrued to him as at that time. iv. The honourable court also made an order that the claimant be paid all said entitlements within the next thirty (30) days as awarded N50, 000.00 costs in favour of the claimant. vii. There was an omission in the said judgment of the court regarding the monetary value/quantum of the said entitlements of the claimant, which omission will render the enforcement of the judgment impossible. viii. Following the declaration of the court that the termination of the claimant’s employment is illegal, the calculation of the entitlements of the claimant to wit: basic salary and bonuses, therefore, ought to commence from March 2009, up to the day of judgment and thereafter as judgment debt. The application is supported by an affidavit of four paragraphs deposed to by one Miss Chinenye Oduagwu, a litigation clerk in the chambers of the learned counsel to the applicant. There is also a written address in support of the application. In his written address the learned counsel for the Claimant formulated and argued a lone issue for determination as follows: Whether the Honourable Court is empowered to re-open its judgment to correct palpable slips in the said judgment? Arguing the sole issue, learned counsel stated that it is settled that pursuant to sections 6(6)(a) and 272(1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, the honourable court who delivered a judgment or another judge of co-ordinate jurisdiction can correct any slips in the said judgment. He referred to Berliet Nigeria Ltd vs Alhaji Mustapha Kacahalla (1995) LPELR-775(SC) p. 30 paras D-E. That in Hatton vs Harris (1892) AC 547, relied upon by the Supreme Court in the case of Berliet Nigeria Ltd vs Alhaji Mustapha Kachallah (1995) LPELR-775 (SC), supra, it was held that when an error of non-award of interest in the judgment has been committed, it is always within the competency of the court to correct the Record in order to bring it into harmony with the order which the judge obviously meant to pronounce. The correction ought to be made upon motion to that effect and is not a matter either for appeal or for re-hearing. That the court in Berliet’s case, supra, at pages 50-51 paragraphs G-D it was held that: The failure of the learned trial Chief Judge to make an Order as to payment of interest is to my mind an accidental omission. That issue was not adjudicated by the learned trial Chief Judge. He had jurisdiction to make the order that 10% interest be paid on the judgment debt from the date of judgment and the application was properly before him. The mistake ought to have been corrected as a matter of course, clerical mistakes in judgments and Orders or errors arising therein from accidental slip or omission, may at any time be corrected by the court on a motion without appeal…(underlining provided by counsel). Counsel continued that in the instant case, the honourable court omitted to award interest on the judgment debt/entitlements as enshrined under Order 21 Rule 4 of the Rules, supra. Going by the directive of the court fixing the time frame within which the respondent will comply with the judgment of the court, left no one in doubt that the honourable court meant or intended that interest should be awarded. Therefore, this application is to bring the intention of the court into harmony with the order which the judge obviously meant to pronounce. He referred to page 14 of the judgment. He further stated that it is also settled and general law that the court has no power under any application in the action to alter or vary a judgment or order after delivery except : (a) so far as is necessary to correct errors in expressing the intention of the court or (b) to correct clerical mistake or some error arising from any accidental slip or omission. He referred to Eleazor vs Innocent Ibero & Anor (1994) LPELR-2180 (SC), p. 16, paragraphs B-F. According to counsel, in the instant case there is omission in calculating/stating in monetary terms, the salary and other entitlements of the applicant as directed by the court to be paid to the applicant by the respondent. He referred to page 14 of the Judgment. That, the error/omission in stating the monetary value of the salary/other entitlements of the applicant is obviously the mistake of the counsel who settled the pleadings of the claimant. He added that it is an age long settled law that sins of counsel cannot be visited on the innocent litigants. He continued that the honourable court having granted the reliefs of the claimant vide its said judgment, the omission therefore, to state the money equivalent of the said applicant’s salary/entitlements cannot be a ground to deprive him his right to enjoy the fruit of his said judgment. To deprive the applicant the enjoyment of the fruit of the said judgment on ground of the said omission, will occasion a grave injustice against him. It is the law that every civil cause or matter commenced in the court, law and equity shall be administered by the court concurrently, and where there is conflict or variance between the rules of equity and the rules of common law with reference to the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail in the court. He referred to sections 13 and 15 of Part 2 of the National Industrial Act (sic) 2006. He also referred to Section14 of Part 2 of the National Industrial Act(sic), 2006. Learned counsel continued that it has been held that the primary duty of any court of law, is to decide the rights of the parties on the merit of the cases presented by them and not to punish them for mistakes made either by them or their counsel in the presentation of such cases before the court by deciding otherwise than in accordance with such rights. He referred to Eluwa vs Eluwa (2013) LPELR-22120 (CA), pages 57-58 paragraphs D-E. On close scrutiny of the judgment, it is obvious that the honourable court declared the termination of applicant’s employment illegal. He referred to page 9 (issue 1) and page 13 of the Judgment. The honourable court as per the judgment resolved issue 1 raised by the applicant’s counsel in favour of the applicant. The said issue 1 raised the question as to, “whether the termination of the employment and/or dismissal of the Claimant by the Defendant vide a letter dated 19th March 2009, with effect from 20th March, 2009 is wrongful, illegal and constituted a breach of the terms of the letter of offer of employment dated 28th day of June, 2014.” That it is settled that a declaration that termination of an employment is illegal, has the implication that such termination never existed and as such the salary and entitlements of the employee keeps running, until the employment is legally terminated. Learned counsel contended further that it is tenable in law for the court via the slip rule to amend its said judgment to bring it in line with its said declaration and include as a result in its judgment that the salary and other entitlements of the applicant should commence from March, 2009 until the employment is lawfully terminated. In conclusion counsel urged the court to grant the application. Upon the service of the Applicant’s process on it, the Respondent filed a notice of preliminary objection on 3/3/2015 challenging the court’s jurisdiction to hear the application of the Judgment Creditor on the ground that the court has become functus officio. The Respondent stated further that the grounds are that: i) That this honourable court on 25/11/2013 delivered its judgment in the above suit wherein the court held unequivocally as follows: In the circumstance therefore, he reliefs of the claimant in relation to general damages are hereby refused. The claimant is only entitled to the amount he would have earned during the one month period of notice and any other entitlements that have accrued to him at that time. With the finding that the Claimant was not paid his one month entitlements as at the time of termination, it is the order of court that he shall be so paid within the next thirty days. ii) The court’s order where clear and unambiguous as to what the Claimant is entitled from the Defendant and when the Defendant is expected to carry out the judgment of the court. iii) That the Defendant/Respondent in fulfillment of the court judgment/order has on 16/122013 carried the court’s order vide Exhibit A filed in this court on 21/1/2014 and annexed hereto. The learned counsel for the Respondent in his written address in support of the preliminary objection stated that the Applicant brought this application pursuant to the Provisions of S.6(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria as amended, section 19 of part 11 of the National Industrial Act 2006 and Order 21 Rule 4 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007, praying this Honourable Court for the 4 prayers stated in the motion paper. Before going into the argument proper learned counsel took a look at the laws the applicant prayers are predicated upon. Counsel stated that S.6(6)(a) of the constitution is asking for the inherent powers of this honourable court. He stated further that he has cross checked the laws of the Federation and cannot find any law that is called the National Industrial Court Act 2006. However, that Order 21 Rule 4 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 provides as follows:- The court at the time of delivering the judgment or making the order may direct the time within which payment is to be made or other act is to be done, and may order interest at a rate not less than 10 percent per annum to be paid upon any judgment. He submitted that by this provision it is not compulsory for the court to be specific with respect to time or interest rate in respect of a judgment debt as it is at the discretion of the court to fix a time for the payment of the judgment debt or act or the interest rate to be charged on the judgment debt which shall be not less than 10 percent. The court is merely enjoined to do so if it so desires to do so. The story however would have been different if the Rules has used the word “shall”. But in the instant case the rule used the word “May”. Counsel stated that there is no need to belabor the court with authorities on the effect of the use of the word “Shall or “May” in our legal lexicon but be that as it may the court is enjoined to look at the case of ORAKUL RESOURCES LTD & ANO V NIGERIAN COMMUNICATION & ANOR (2007) ALL FWLR pt 390 1482 at 1510-1511 as to the meaning of the word “May”. He then formulated the following issue for determination: Whether this present court is functus officio in this matter? Arguing this issue counsel submitted that as far as the issues being canvassed in this matter are concerned this honourable court is functus officio. This contention is predicated on the following facts. 1. Pleadings were filed and exchanged in this matter. 2. Parties gave evidence and were duly and were duly cross-examined. 3. Parties filed their respective addresses at the conclusion of trial and at the end of the day the court in a well considered judgment made a final order in the matter. 4. The Claimant being dissatisfied with the final order of this court on 11/12/2013 filed a motion for leave to appeal against the judgment of this honourable court at the Court of Appeal. In the case of Etinyin J.L.E. duke V Chief E.O. Ephraim & anor (2010) ALL FWLR pt 549 1015 at 1024 the Court of Appeal held thus:- functus officio means tasked performed, it means a judge cannot give a decision or make an order on a matter twice. In other words, once a judge gives a decision or makes an order on a matter, he no longer has the competence or jurisdiction to give another decision or order in the same matter. In FBNPLC V TSA Industries Ltd (2010) ALL FWLR pt. 537 633 at 671 the Supreme Court held thus: The phrase functus officio means a task performed fulfilling the function, discharging the offices or accomplishing the purpose and thereby becoming of no further force and authority. The court went further at pg 671 to 672 to hold that: A court is said to be functus officio in respect of a matter if the court has fulfilled or accomplished its function in respect of that matter and it lacks potency to review, reopen or revisit the matter. Once a court delivers its judgment on a matter, it cannot revisit or review the said judgment except under certain conditions more importantly a court lacks jurisdiction to determine an issue when it is functus officio in respect of the issue or where the proceedings relating to the issues is an abuse of court process. In the case of Ama v Nwankwo (2008) ALL FWLR pt 411 879 at 895 the Court of Appeal held thus:- “Once the Court of Appeal or a court of competent Jurisdiction gives judgment, ruling or order, it becomes “Functus Officio”. Consequently, a panel of the Court of Appeal under whatever guise cannot alter the order, ruling or judgment of another panel except to correct Clerical mistakes or some errors arising from an accidental slip or omission. The only remedy available to an aggrieved party is to appeal (underling is learned counsel’s). Also in the case of Usman V Kaduna State House of Assembly (2008) ALL FWLR pt 397, 78 at 107 where the Court of Appeal held thus: “once a court delivers its final judgment or ruling it becomes functus officio and ceases to be seized with the matter except for making ancillary orders such as stay of execution etc. nevertheless the trial court has inherent powers to interfere with its judgment in order to correct accidental omission or mathematical error”. From the foregoing authorities it is quite clear that there is no accidental omission, slip or mathematical error in the judgment of this Honourable Court that this Honourable Court can be called upon again to correct. Counsel therefore urged this Honourable Court to hold that it is functus officio in this matter and decline jurisdiction to hear the present Application. It is further our argument that in the instant case that the Honourable Court was specific as to when the order in its judgment shall be carried out when it held thus:- The claimant is only entitled to the amount he would have earned during the one month of notice period and any other entitlement that have accrued to him at that time………….it is the court order that he shall be so paid within the next thirty days. This Honourable Court was explicit as to when the order it gives must be carried out. This the defendant did on 16/12/2013 less than 30 days from the judgment of the court (compliance of court order). This was brought to the notice of this Honourable Court on 21/1/2014. By this act of the defendant on 16/12/2013 everything about the case and the judgment thereto has been complied with and counsel calls on the Honourable Court to decline jurisdiction to hear this matter as it is functus office in the case and its order has been carried out to the letters. Learned counsel further commended to this Honourable court the Supreme Court decision in the case of Dakolo V Rewane (2011) ALL FWLR pt 592 1610 at 163 where the supreme court held thus: “The court is not allowed to alter the effect of its own decision on an issue that has been previously decided by it in the course of the same proceedings. The reversal of such decision is only in appeal the principle is aimed at bringing an end to litigation as unsuccessful litigant are likely to reopen issues decided at later period”. Counsel therefore prayed this Honourable Court to decline jurisdiction to hear this application and hold that it is functus office. The learned counsel for the Judgment Creditor filed a process on 12th day of March, 2015 titled “WRITTEN SUBMISSION IN REPLY TO THE NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION” in which he responded to the preliminary objection of the Judgment Debtor. In his introduction the Judgment Creditor’s counsel stated that the Claimant/respondent in reaction to the notice of preliminary objection filed on the 3rd day of March 2015 filed a written reply. He added that the letter written by the defence counsel after judgment was delivered in this suit now attached to his preliminary objection was promptly replied to by the claimant’s counsel vide his letter dated 23rd day of December, 2013 and same is now part of the record of this court in this suit. He continued that of truth, the claimant filed an application for leave to file an appeal against the judgment of this court, but on different grounds from what the claimant is now seeking from this court by way of the pending motion. That both the defence and claimant’s counsel by mutual consent withdrew the said application filed at the Court of Appeal after discovering that Court of Appeal has no appellate jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Industrial Court except on ground of breach of fundamental rights. According counsel this Honourable Court will take judicial notice of the subsistence of National Industrial Court Act, 2006, that fact that “Court” was erroneously omitted in the citation of the Act, never misled the counsel for the defendant as to the particular Act being relied upon by the counsel for the claimant. Furthermore on a document attached to the Notice of Preliminary objection and marked Exhibit A, counsel stated that he was objecting to the use of same by the court, contending that the notice of preliminary objection presupposes that the objector would rely on point of law. This presumption, according to counsel, is further fortified by non-filing of affidavit in support of the objection. When once the notice of preliminary objection is not supported by affidavit, it then means that the objector cannot rely on facts. It is therefore absurd for the learned counsel for the defendant to attach an exhibit to the notice of preliminary objection when there is no affidavit in support. That the purported Exhibit A, going by the date inserted on the face of it, i.e., 22 April, 2009, shows that the document was in existence prior to and during pendency of the substantive suit. He stated further that if the said document which is considered vital to the defendant and which raised a number of contentious issues such as indebtedness of the claimant, truly existed as at the date written on the face of it, why then the defendant failed to produce it before the court during the trial of the substantive suit. The fact of the purported indebtedness of the claimant was never pleaded by the claimant nor was it given in evidence during the substantive suit. Counsel stated further that this court in its judgment made it clear that the defendant did not pay the salary in lieu of notice entitled by the claimant, referring to page 12 of the judgment delivered on 25th November, 2013. The said findings of the court was(sic) hinged on the premise that the defendant failed to place any hard evidence to support the assertion that it has paid the said salary in lieu of notice. Counsel added that the defendant cannot be allowed to do through the back door, what he failed to do during the substantive suit. The court cannot consider the purported Exhibit A at this stage, in that it has been overtaken by event and it will amount to infraction of the principle of functus officio, which the learned counsel unequivocally subscribes unalloyed allegiance to. That attaching any weight to the said document will work grave injustice against the claimant and will also amount to a flagrant breach of fair hearing as enshrined under section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria as amended. Thereafter learned counsel for the Judgment Creditor formulated and argued the following issue: Whether the Honourable Court is functus officio to re-open its judgment to correct palpable slips in the said judgment? The arguments and submissions of counsel as well as authorities relied upon by him are not dissimilar to the ones made in support of the main application now before the court which I have earlier reproduced in this Ruling. The only additional submissions made by the learned counsel for the Judgment Creditor is in the following words: The law is also trite that the principle of slip-rule can appropriately be applied to amend the judgment so as to correct and bring the judgment in line with the meaning which the court intended. See Balewa vs Mu’azu & Ors (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt. 609) 124. The counsel for the defendant/applicant cited the case of Amah vs Nwankwo (2008) All FWLR Pt. 411, 879 at 895, which decision in the case supported the respondent’s case that it does not amount to functus officio for a court to alter its order, ruling or judgment to correct clerical mistakes or some errors arising from any accidental slip or omission. The respondent hereby adopts the above case cited by the applicant in his written submission. In the case of Usman v Kaduna State House of Assembly (2008) Supra., cited and relied (sic) by the defendant/applicant, it was also held that court has inherent powers to review its judgment to correct accidental omission or mathematical error. It is our submission that the omission to award 10% interest on the judgment granted in favour of the claimant in the instant case, amounts to accidental error, while the omission to state/calculate in exact monetary value/term the judgment awarded in favour of the claimant amounts to mathematical error. It is very clear form the record of this court/judgment, that the issue of the actual mathematical monetary relief claimed by the claimant was never canvassed in the substantive case nor was it determined by this court in its judgment. Also, the issue of 10% statutory interest to be awarded in favour of the claimant was never raised during the substantive case and was never determined by the court without running foul of the principle of “functus officio”. The Claimant by his application did not raise any issue that has been decided by this court in the substantive suit…. 4. CONCLUSION: We urge your lordship to dismiss the preliminary objection and grant the application of the claimant in the interest of justice and fairness… I have carefully considered the processes filed, arguments and submissions made by the parties in this matter. The Judgment Creditor by his application asked the court for the reliefs earlier set out in this Ruling. The judgment debtor’s counsel on his part filed a notice of preliminary objection to the said application. I shall start by dealing with the preliminary objection of the learned judgment debtor’s counsel. But let me take off by saying that the learned counsel in his objection stated that he had looked at the laws of the Federation and he could not see the National Industrial Court Act, 2006. This statement of learned counsel is most unfortunate. There is no way that a law clearly made in 2006 can be found in the Laws of the Federation published in 2004! It is illogical to begin to look for a 2006 Act in volumes of 2004 laws. However, a more critical point is that learned counsel cannot with all due respect be heard to say that the National Industrial Act 2006 is not in existence. That is the law that re-established this Honourable Court before the Constitutional Amendment of 2011, the Third Alteration Act, 2010. He is supposed to be a lawyer, called to the Nigerian Bar. His responsibilities include the duty to know where to find any law that has been cited before the court using all the available research tools that are now everywhere, including, for God’s sake, the mobile phones with internet connection! A look at Google Search tool on any internet platform would have led him to the National Industrial Court, 2006. I have to state that learned counsel must stand up to his responsibilities, and be more careful with what he puts down on paper as representing his submissions. As to the substance of the objection, the learned judgment debtor’s contention is that the court is functus officio in this matter and therefore cannot entertain the application of the learned counsel for the Claimant. But before then the learned judgment creditor’s counsel has pointed to the fact that the learned counsel for the judgment debtor has attached some exhibits to his notice of preliminary objection, which this court should disregard. The learned judgment creditor’s submission is on the ground that a notice of preliminary objection is supposed to be predicated on law alone, without any reference to facts. The learned judgment creditor’s counsel did not cite any authority to back up his submission. I have carefully considered the point raised by the learned counsel for the judgment creditor. The provisions of the National Industrial Court Rules that govern the filing of preliminary objections has an answer to the point. The provisions Order 11 Rule 1 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007, as amended by Paragraph 5 of the 2012 amending Practice Direction of the Honourable President of the Court states that: 5. Replace existing Order 11 Rule 1 with the following provision: Order 11 Rule 1 1(1) Where by these Rules any application is authorized to be made to the Court, such application may be by motion or notice and shall state under what rule of court or Law it is brought. (2) Every motion shall be accompanied with an Affidavit in Support and a Written Address and shall be served within 5 days of filing. (3) Every notice (e.g. Notice of Preliminary Objection) shall be accompanied with a Written Address, and shall similarly be served within 5 days of filing. (4) Where the other party intends to oppose the application, such party shall within 7 days of the service file a counter-affidavit (if necessary) and a Written Address in opposition to the application. (5) Where a counter affidavit together with a Written Address is served on the Applicant, the Applicant may file a Written Address on points of law within 7 days of service. These provisions are quite clear on what a party seeking to raise a preliminary objection should do. Where he is relying on facts he should file a motion on notice supported by affidavit. But where he is just relying on points of law, he files a notice of preliminary objection with a written address. Therefore going by these provisions there is no justification for the Judgment Debtor’s counsel who filed a notice of preliminary objection to attach exhibits to that notice of preliminary objection. He should have filed a motion on notice supported by affidavit to which the exhibit could have been attached. I therefore agree with the submission of the learned judgment creditor’s counsel that the attached Exhibit was wrongly attached. See also the decisions of this court in the case of Stephen Adebowale Eyiolawi vs Maersk M. Agency Nigeria Ltd (Unreported) Suit No. NIC/LA/32/2009 Ruling of which was delivered on 15th June, 2010 and John Muir vs B. Global Services Ltd (Unreported) Suit No. NIC/LA/48/2009 Ruling of which was delivered on 18th of October, 2009 wherein the court re-stated the principle that a notice of preliminary objection is to be accompanied with a written address of counsel only. Therefore, in the instant case, the court accordingly hereby disregards the Exhibit A attached to the Judgment Debtor’s notice of preliminary objection, for being in breach of the provisions of Order 11 Rule 1(3) of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007 as amended. I now move to the substance of the preliminary objection. The case of the learned judgment debtor’s counsel is that this Court is functus officio. The learned counsel relied on the cases of Etinyin J.L.E Duke vs Chief Ephriam & Anor (2010), supra, and FBN PLC vs TSA Industries Ltd (2010), supra, on the meaning of functus officio which is basically that the court has performed its function in a case where it gives judgment and cannot therefore look into the same matter twice. Furthermore, that the court cannot review or revisit the suit once it has given its final decision on it. Let me also refer to the decision relied upon by counsel in the case of Usman vs Kaduna State House of Assembly (2008), supra, where the Court of Appeal held that: Once a court delivers its final judgment or ruling it becomes functus officio and ceases to be seized with the matter except for making ancillary orders such as stay of execution etc. nevertheless the trial court has inherent powers to interfere with its judgment in order to correct accidental omission or mathematical error. It is therefore clear that with the final decision of this court in this case given on 25th day of November, 2013, the court has become functus officio. However, going by the decision of the Court of Appeal cited above, there are instances in which this court can make certain orders in relation to the said judgment. These are in relation to ancillary orders such as stay of execution, as well as the inherent power to correct accidental slips, errors or omissions. See Ogwuegbu vs Agomuo (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt. 609) 148. It is the case of the learned counsel for the judgment debtor that with the judgment of the Honourable Court delivered on 25th day of November, 2013 and a letter written by the learned counsel to the Judgment Creditor’s counsel dated 16th December, 2013 (in the court’s file), everything in relation to the suit had been completed and therefore the court cannot re-open the case. He asked the court to decline the jurisdiction to hear the matter. On his own part however, the learned counsel for the Judgment Creditor submitted that the court does have the power to look into this matter since it is trite that under the slip rule, the court can appropriately be moved to amend a judgment so as to correct and bring it in line with the meaning which the court intended and he relied on the decision in the case of Balewa vs Muazu (1999), supra. Having considered the submissions of both counsel in relation to the objection of the judgment debtor in this matter, it is clear to me that the objection of the learned counsel for the judgment debtor is misconceived and lacks merit. This is because he seems to be saying that the court cannot look into the application of the judgment creditor because a final decision has been given and the judgment debtor has complied with the said judgment by writing to the judgment creditor on the 16th of December, 2013, following the court’s judgment on 25th of November, 2013. From the authorities cited and relied upon the court has the power to look into the allegations of accidental slip or omissions after judgment has been given in a case. See the case of Anyasinti Umunna & 5 Ors vs Animudu Okwuraiwe & 3 Ors (1978) 6-7 SC p. 1. In the application in this matter, the judgment creditor is alleging that there was an accidental omission on the part of the court for which he wants remedy from the court. I hold that he is entitled to move the court to hear the application on its merit. The preliminary objection against same is therefore hereby dismissed. I now move to the substance of the application itself. I have earlier on set out the prayers of the judgment creditor (the Applicant) in this matter. From the application made and the reliefs sought, the issue for determination is whether or not the judgment creditor is entitled to the reliefs sought? The first relief is couched in the following words: a. An order of court to award/include in the judgment of this Honourable Court delivered on the 25th day of November, 2013, in the above suit, automatic interest of ten per cent to be calculated and paid on the judgment debt with effect from 26th day of December, 2013, until the judgment debt is liquidated? In support of the relief the learned counsel for the Applicant relied on the provisions of Order 21 Rule 4 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 as amended and the decision in the case of Berliet Nig. Ltd vs Alhaji Mustapha Kachalla (1995), supra. I have carefully considered the submissions of counsel as well as the authorities relied upon. The provisions of Order 21 Rule 4 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 state that: 4. The court at the time of delivering the judgment or making the order may direct the time within which payment is to be made or other act is to be done, and may order interest at a rate not less than 10 percent per annum to be paid upon any judgment. This provision of the Rules of this Honourable Court is quite clear enough and should be given its plain ordinary meaning. See Nigerian Ports Authority PLC vs Lotus Plastics Limited & Anor (2005) LPELR-2028 (SC) p. 19; (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 158. The learned counsel for the Applicant has asked the court for the inclusion of an automatic interest to be paid by the Judgment debtor on the Judgment Debt. The provisions of the Rules of court do not provide for automatic interest on judgment debts. The operative word there is “may” which indicates discretion on the part of the court to order for the payment of the interest. Here I am further emboldened on this view when the decision relied upon by counsel in Berliet’s case, supra, is closely examined. In that case the decision to order for payment of automatic interest was based on the interpretation given to the provisions of Order 27 Rule 8 of the High Court (Civil Procedure Rules), 1976 of Kano State. The said Rules state as follows: 8. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, interest shall be paid on outstanding judgment debts at the rate of 10% from the date of judgment whether or not the judgment debtor is allowed time to pay or to pay by instalments. Ogundare JSC in Berliet’s case, supra, (the 9 NWLR (Pt. 420) p. 478 report) held at p. 500, paras G-A as follows: It is not difficult to resolve the main issue in this appeal which is the construction to be placed on Order 27 rule 8 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1976 of Kano State. The rule is very clear and unambiguous. Unless the court otherwise orders; a judgment debt carries 10 per centum per annum interest from the date of judgment until it is liquidated by the judgment-debtor. The principle behind the rule seems to me to provide incentive to judgment debtors for the speedy payment of judgment debts. The wording of the rule clearly shows that the judgment automatically carries interest at 10 per centum per annum until it is satisfied. The rule however, gives the court a discretion to order otherwise. In my respectful view, this discretion is a veto which the trial court may exercise to direct that no interest be paid on a judgment debt, or to order that a lesser interest be paid. Where he does not give any direction or where the judgment is silent as to payment of interest on the judgment, the judgment debt automatically carries interest at the rate fixed by the rule, that is, 10 per centum from the date of the judgment. It is quite clear from the above that the provisions of Order 27 Rule 8 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1976 of Kano State interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court in the case of Berliet, supra, relied upon by Applicant’s counsel is not on all fours with the provisions of Order 21 Rule 4 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007. Therefore the decision in Berliet’s case cannot be applicable in this case to hold that the claimant is entitled to automatic interest or that this Honourable Court omitted to give interest and therefore same can be corrected. In the circumstance I find and hold that the court cannot grant the said relief. The second relief is as follows: b. An Order of court directing the respondent to pay the sum of N1, 573, 989.08 (One million, five hundred and seventy-three thousand, nine hundred and eighty-nine naira and eight kobo) inclusive of the ten percent post-judgment interest into court in favour of the applicant being the sum total of the one month (March 2009) arrear of salary and one month salary in lieu of notice cum all other entitlements to wit: bonuses entitled by the applicant as directed by the court in its judgment delivered on the 25th day of November 2013. Here the Applicant is asking the court for an order for payment into court of the amount he calculated and attached to his affidavit in support of the application as Exhibit A. I have considered the relief and all the documents in support. Although the respondent/judgment debtor did not react to the said calculation of the Applicant, the Applicant has the onus of satisfactorily putting before the court the facts of what he was earning immediately before the purported termination. For example, he was terminated in March, 2009. What did he actually earn in February, 2009 and therefore would have been paid in March, 2009? This would have been the clear basis for any reasonable calculation that would have done justice to both parties in the matter. In the absence of such information the court is unable to determine and grant this relief. The 3rd and 4th reliefs are couched as follows: c. An order of court that the entitlements to wit: basic salary; bonuses etc, of the Claimant be calculated with effect from March 2009, the termination of the