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BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip - Presiding Judge Hon. Justice V. N. Okobi - Judge Hon. Justice F.I. Kola-Olalere - Judge Hon. Justice O. A. Obaseki-Osaghae - Judge Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu-Fishim - Judge DATE: MARCH 2, 2010 SUIT NO. NIC/LA/34/2008 BETWEEN Senior Staff Association of Universities, Teaching Hospitals Research Institutes and Associated Institutions of Nigeria (SSAUTHRIAI) - Applicant AND (1) Academic Staff Union of Research Institutes (2) The Registrar of Trade Unions (3) Minister of Labour and Productivity - Respondents REPRESENTATION: Mr. Samuel Iroye, for the applicant. Mr. Chukwuyem Atewe, for the 1st respondent Mr. Taiwo Abidogun, Assistant Director, Federal Ministry of Justice, for the 2nd and 3rd respondents. RULING The applicant, a registered trade union, commenced this action against the respondents by an originating process dated 21st May, 2008 wherein it, inter alia, prayed the Court to determine whether the Academic Staff Union of Research Institutes merits being or ought to be registered by the Registrar of Trade Unions as a separate and distinctive trade union after having had her interests and rights guaranteed and protected by an existing trade union i.e. Senior Staff Association of Universities Teaching Hospitals, Research Institutes and Associated Institutions (SSAUTHRIAI) having regards to the following: the provision of section 3(2) of the Trade Unions Act 1973 as amended, Third Schedule, Part B of the Trade Unions Act, 1973 and Part A of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 1999 of the official Gazette dated the 6lh day of January, 1999. The applicant then prayed for the following orders: (1) An order of Court declaring the registration of Academic Staff Union of Research Institutes as a trade union as illegal and thus null and void. (2) An order of Court, ordering the cancellation of the registration of the Academic Staff Union of Research Institutes. The originating summons is supported by a seventeen-paragraphed affidavit sworn to by one Uzoalu Emmanuel Nzefili Chuks, of the Nigerian Institute of Oceanography am Marine Research, Lagos. In reaction to the suit, all the respondents have challenged the applicant's action by filling preliminary objections challenging the competency of the suit after filling their respective memorandum of appearance. The preliminary objection of the 1st respondent dated 14th July 2009 is brought pursuant to sections 5, 7, 8 and 54 of the Trade Unions Act Cap. T14 Laws of the Federation 2004 and under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. The notice of preliminary objection supported by a twelve-paragraphed affidavit sworn to by Maria Asiadiachi of counsel to the law firm of Bamidele Atum & Co., counsel to the 1st respondent. The grounds of the 1st respondent's preliminary objection are: (a) This Court lacks jurisdiction to try the suit as a court of first instance. (b) The applicant's action is statute barred. According to the 1st respondent, the background facts leading to this action is that, the 1strespondent is a trade union duly registered under the relevant laws whereas the 2nd and 3rd are public officers. That the 1st respondent was registered on the 7th March, 2007 by the 2nd respondent on the approval of the 3rd respondent after fulfilling all the legal requirements for registration and a certificate of registration issued to it by the 2nd respondent. The 1st respondent then raised two issues for determination. (i) Whether given the facts disclosed in the originating summons this court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. (ii) Whether (he applicant's action is not statute-barred. The first respondent's submission under issue one is that the Supreme Court has flexibly laid down the law in determining whether or not a court has jurisdiction to entertain a matter or adjudicate over the subject matter of a suit and that all that the court needs to do is to look at or examine the processes filed by the claimant, referring the court to AGF v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1999] 9 NWLR (Pt. 618) 187 at 233. That a look at the said originating process filed by the claimant, the suit discloses that the issue in controversy, being the cause of action, is whether or not the 1st respondent ought to have been registered as a union, in view of the fact that the interest of its members are allegedly protected and guaranteed by the applicant. The 1st respondent also contended that the applicant's suit is an inter-union dispute; that section 54 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 has defined inter-union dispute as a dispute between trade unions or Employers' Associations. That there is no doubt that the claimant is suing another trade union, which is the 1st respondent and requesting the Court to determine whether the Registrar of Trade Unions ought to have registered the 1st respondent as a trade union after it had fulfilled all the legal requirements for registration as a trade union. To the 1st respondent, the legal question that comes to mind in the determination of this suit is whether this court has the original jurisdiction to entertain an inter-union dispute as a court of 1st instance. The first respondent further submitted that this court Jacks jurisdiction to entertain the applicant's suit on the ground that the facts giving rise to the suit make the applicant's suit an inter-union dispute, referring the court to the applicant's originating summons and the supporting affidavit. That paragraphs 7-11 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons clearly show that the applicant's action is an inter-union dispute which must go through the procedure set out in Part I of the Trade Disputes Act (TDA) before the action can be entertained by this Court in its appellate jurisdiction. That the applicant has failed to comply with the provisions of Part I of the TDA which includes mediation, conciliation and arbitration at the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) before coming to this court. To the first respondent, the jurisdiction of this court in respect of an inter-union dispute is contingent upon the exhaustion of the processes prescribed in Part I of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. 432 LFN 1990, referring to the ruling of this Court in Association of Senior Staff of Bankers, Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) v. Union Bank of Nig. Plc & ors unreported Suit No. NIC/11/2007 delivered on 24th January, 2008. The first respondent also submitted that section 7(1 )(a) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, which confers exclusive jurisdiction on this Court in matters relating to trade unions, industrial relations among others and matters incidental thereto, is subject to the provisions of section 7(3) of the same Act which makes conciliation and arbitration mandatory before this court can assume jurisdiction in matters mentioned in section 7(1 )(a) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. That the present suit being an inter-union dispute ought to go through the procedure outlined in Part I of the Trade Disputes Act which has not been complied with before the institution of this case. That the law is trite that where there are statutory provisions on the resolution of a dispute before a party can embark on an action, an aggrieved party must exhaust all the prescribed steps before embarking on an action, referring to Owoseni v. Faloye & ors [2005] 14 NWLR (Pt. 946) 719. The 1st respondent also submitted that a court is said to be competent and has jurisdiction to try a matter only if the following conditions are fulfilled - (a) If the court is properly constituted. (b) The subject matter is within its jurisdiction. (c) The action is initiated by due process of law. (d) All conditions precedent to the exercise of its jurisdiction has been fulfilled. The court was then referred to Ndilim v. Akinsumade [2000] 8 NWLR (Pt. 668) 293 at 346. The 1st respondent then submitted that the conditions precedent to the exercise of the jurisdiction of this court have not been fulfilled before the present suit was commenced. Furthermore, that this court only has appellate jurisdiction in respect of inter and intra-union matters which have undergone the process of conciliation and arbitration at the 1AP as contained in sections 4 - 9 of Part I of the Trade Disputes Act before the right of appeal can he to this Court from the award of the IAP. The 1st respondent then urged the Court to hold that owing to the non-fulfillment of the condition precedent to the institution of this action, the court has no jurisdiction to entertain this matter. On issue two the 1st respondent submitted that this court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the applicant's suit on the ground that the action is statute-barred, referring the Court to section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41 Laws of the Federation, 2004, which limits the period to proceed against a public officer to three months of the act complained of Quoting the said section as follows:- Where any action, prosecution or other proceedings is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or law or of any public duty or authority, or default in the execution of any such Act, law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect, (a) the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof. To the first respondent, in determining whether an action is caught by the limitation law. what the court will consider is when the cause of action accrued and when the cause of action became statute-barred. That the trial court is enjoined to examine the originating process to see when the cause of action arose and compare that date with when the originating process was filed. And that if the time on the originating process is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, the action is statute-barred, referring to Sanni v Okene Local Government Traditional Council [2005] 14 NWLR (Pt. 944) 60 at 67. The first respondent further argued that the cause of action in this suit accrued on the 7th of March, 2007 when the 1st respondent was registered as a trade union and the certificate of registration issued to it by the 2nd respondent on the approval of the 3rd respondent after the 1st respondent had fulfilled all the legal requirements for being registered as trade union. That the 2nd and 3rd respondents are public officers within the meaning o section 4(1) of the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act. That the applicant did m file this action within the time specified in section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41 LFN 2004, which is three months; but rather, instituted this action a year after the accrual of the cause of action, referring the court to the originating summer tiled by the applicant and paragraph 7 of the supporting affidavit and submitted that trial court lacks the competence in a matter which is initiated outside the three month period envisaged by the provisions of section 2(a), supra. The court was also referred ' Ambode v. Min. of Foreign Affairs [2004] 14 NWLR (Pt. 894) 506 at 512 Ratio Mohammed v. Lawal [2006] 9 NWLR (Pt. 987) 400 at 408 Ratio 10, Alhaji Maisu Muhammed and 9 others v. Military Administrator, of Plateau State and & ors [2001] NWLR (Pt. 740) 524 at 554 F - G where the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision Egbe v. Adefarasin [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1 and held – The general principle of law is that where the law provides for bringing of action within a prescribed period, proceedings shall not be brought after the time prescribed by the statute. Any action that is commenced after the stipulated period is totally barred as the right of the injured person to commence the action has been extinguished by law. The first respondent submitted further that the court granting reliefs of the claimant must have the requisite competence and that the applicant having allowed its cause of action to be defeated by lapse of time, the right of the claimant to commence the action has become extinguished as was held in Muhammed v. Military Administrator of Plateau State, supra. And that in the instant case, the claimant's originating summons for the cancellation of the 1st respondent's registration was brought outside the three months period as provided by the limitation law, which has automatically ousted the power of the court to entertain the applicant's suit. Also that the law is trite that when there is a statutory provision for enforcement of a particular right or remedy, non-compliance with or departure from such procedure is fatal to the enforcement of the remedy, citing The Director-General State Security Services v. Ojukwu & ors [2006] 13 NWLR (Pt. 998) 575 at 578 Ratios 2. The first respondent's final submission was that the action brought outside the period prescribed in section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act is incompetent and cannot give rise to a cause of action in law, and urged the court to strike out the applicant's suit with substantial cost in the interest of justice. The 2nd and 3rd respondents through their counsel also filed a motion on notice dated 2ndNovember, 2009. The said motion was brought pursuant to Order 3 Rule 5 and Order 5 Rule 2(1) of the NIC Rules 2007, and under the inherent jurisdiction of this court. The motion is supported by an eight-paragraphed affidavit sworn to by Ibrahim Umar Kwasare of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity, Federal Secretariat Complex, Abuja. Attached to the sworn affidavit are two exhibits, Exhibit RTU "1" and Exhibits RTU "2". In the said motion, the 2nd and 3rd respondents raised a preliminary objection to challenge the competency of this action. The 2nd and 3rd respondents then raised one issue for the determination of this Court, that is - whether the claimant's claim against the 2nd and 3rd respondents is justifiablehaving regard to the circumstances of this case. The 2nd and 3rd respondents submitted that the applicant would have to show that it lit the locus standing or legal right to challenge the registration of the 1st respondent by the 2nd and 3rd respondents, who in any case are public officers recognized by extant trade union enactments, referring the Court to the applicant's "statement of facts" and "affidavit in support of their claims". That the law is clear that before a plaintiff or person can have legal standing or locus standing to sue, the following ingredients enabling such plaintiff to invoke the court's power must exist, namely – (a) The plaintiffs claims must reveal a legal justiceable right. (b) The plaintiffs claim must show sufficient or special interest adversely affected. The court was also referred to Owodunni v. Trustee of Celestial Church of Christ [2000] 10 NWLR (Pt. 675) 315 338 F - G, where Ogundare, JSC put the principle succinctly as follow: At common law, in the realm of public right, for a person to invoke judicial power to determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive action, he must show that either his personal interest will immediately be or has been adversely affected by the action or that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury to himself, and which interest or injury is over and above that of the general public. In other words, the plaintiff or claimant must show that he has some justice able interest which may be affected by the action or that he will suffer injury or damage as a result of the action. That following from the test outlined above, and upon the examination of the averments contained in the claimant's "facts in support" and "affidavit in support" respectively, nothing therein reveals that there is a justiceable interest or suffererance of injury or damage to the applicant as a result of the registration of the 1st respondent. Also that the applicant clearly has not disclosed what it stands to lose or have lost by the registration of the 1st respondent by the 2nd and 3rd respondents and so the applicant has not brought its action within the confines of the requirements enunciated in the locus classicus cited above. The 2nd and 3rd respondents also pointed out that they are public officers saddled with statutory functions under the Trade Unions Act (as variously amended), referring to the powers of the 2nd and 3rd respondents as contained in sections 3, 5 and 6 of the principal Trade Unions Act Cap. T14 LFN 2004. That by virtue of their status the 2nd and 3rd respondents are empowered by statute to exercise their functions without let or hindrance, citing Akunezeri v. Okenwa [2000] 15 NWLR (Pt. 691) 526 F - G. That assuming (without conceding) that the applicant can maintain this action against the respondents, their submission is that failure of the claimant to commence the action against the 2nd and 3rd respondents (who are public officers) within the limitation period provided under section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap P41 LFN 2004 is fatal to the applicant's case. Section 2(a) states as follows - where any action, prosecution or other proceedings is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution of any law or of any public duty or default or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority, the following provision shall have effect:- (a) The action prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or in the case of a continuance of damage or injury within three months next after ceasing thereof, That in the instant case, the 1st respondent was registered on 7th March, 2007 by the 2nd respondent upon approval by the 3rd respondent who are both public officers, after fulfilling all requirements for such registration; and the said certificate of registration has been exhibited in this proceedings through the applicant's 'additional list of document' on 8U July, 2009. That the applicant did not, however, file this action until the three months elapsed, thus foisting on the court a situation when the applicant's cause of action (even if it existed) can no longer be entertained because the right of action has become extinguished, referring to Egbe v. Adefarasin [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 43) \,Egne v. Yimif [1992] 6 NWLR (Pt. 245) 1, Ibrahim v. JSC [1998] 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1 and Offobuche v. Ogoja LGA [2001] 16 NWLR (Pt. 739) 458. The 2nd and 3rd respondents then submitted that non-compliance with the provisions of the statute of limitation is irredeemably fatal to the case of the applicant, referring the court to The Director General, State Security Service v. Ojukwu & ors [2006] 13 NWLR (Pt. 998) 575 at 578. Also that it is important to note that the applicant, having identified that the 1st respondent had been accorded recognition by the issuance of a certificate to it, foiled to employ the avenue upon it in challenging what is clearly an inter-union dispute between it and the 1st respondent. That by filing this suit before this court the claimant has violated section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 on what dispute amount to "disputes of right" that can be entertained by this court as a court of first instance and that this court being a court of appeal on all labour matters. Further, that fundamentally, Order 3 Rule 5 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 makes it mandatory that where the claimant is complaining against (amongst other things) "decisions of the Registrar of Trade Unions, then the applicant's process should include certified true copies of processes used or obtained at the lower tribunal (among other processes). That in the instant case, the applicant has not complied with this requirement and so, on the authority of Order 3 Rule 7, the applicant's entire process ought to have been rejected in toto. That the Supreme Court per Ogbuagu, JSC in Owners of the MVArebella v. NAIC [2008] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1097) 182 at 205 G - II had this to say in relation to failure to obey rules of Court - It is now firmly settled that rules of court are not mere rules but they partake of the nature of subsidiary legislation by virtue of section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act and, therefore, have the force of law. See Akinbi & ors v. Alao & anor [1989] 5 SCNJ 1 at 10. That is why rules of court must be obeyed. This is because and this is also settled, that when there is non-compliance with the rules of court the court should not remain passive and helpless. There must be a sanction; otherwise the purpose of enacting the rules will be defeated. The 2nd and 3rd respondents, therefore, submitted that failure of the applicant to fulfill all conditions precedent to the commencement of the suit before this court is fatal not only to the claimant's case, but detrimental to the competence of the court to hear and determine the case, citing again Madukolum v. Nkemdilim [1962] 2 NSCC 374 at 379 - 380. This Court was finally urged to uphold all (he grounds of this objection and dismiss the claimant's case in its entirety, with substantial cost. In reaction to both preliminary objections, the applicant raised two issues for the determination of this Court, viz - (1) Whether the claimant's suit has disclosed a reasonable cause of action. (2) Whether the court is competent enough to entertain the suit. The applicant began its argument, by submitting that the crux of its complain is that the 2nd and 3rd respondents exercised their power and discretion wrongfully, unlawfully, and illegally, when they by their action authorized the registration of the 1st respondent as a separate trade union when it was obvious that it has its interest already protected by an already existing trade union, which is the applicant herein; and so the suit of the complainant as filed and stated above by all standard is tantamount to a complaint against an irregular and unlawful official action of the 2nd and 3rd respondents which has occasioned an injury to the complainant and such action is an injustice which can only be remedied or addressed by a competent court of law. That it is trite law that, when a complaint arises from an injured person for a wrongful act, then there is a cause of action, referring to Arabambi v. Advanced Beverages Industries Ltd [2006] 3 MJSC 61 at 78 D — F, where the court held as follows:- A cause of action arises from circumstances containing different facts that give rise to a claim that can be enforced in court, and thus lead to the right to sue a person responsible for the existence of such circumstances. There must therefore be a wrongful act of a party, i.e. the party sued which has given the plaintiff a reason to complain in a court of consequent damage to him. From the above, the applicant submitted that its position has been justified, as the facts that gave rise to this claim can be legally enforced in a court of law, and so this suit gives rise to a cause of action which makes the claimant to have a locus standing to present this case before the court. To the applicant, the substantive issue raised for determination in the originating summons constitutes an issue of law and not academic or hypothetical question. That the wrong complained of is an act of illegality, which contravenes the express provision of section 3(2) of the Trade Unions Act which provides that - ...but no trade union shall be registered to represent workers or employers in a place where there already exist a trade union. That the wrong complained of by the complainant is the fact that the registration of the 1st respondent as a separate trade union contravenes the provisions of the law and so is a wrongful act; and when there is a wrong in law, it gives rise to a serious issue as it is in this case and this can be remedied if the case is presented before a competent court which settles the issue by a valid judgment there to. That it is the applicant's belief that this case presents a serious issue of law which can only be settled by a competent court of law. And so the applicant has the locus standing to prosecute this case and that this court should so hold. Furthermore, the applicant submitted that the substantive issue raised for determination by the claimant in its originating summons constitute an issue of law which pertains to an illegality occasioned by a Government Department and its officers on matters that pertains to labour law and practices, which the Nigerian Jaw has placed any dealings thereon solely within the jurisdiction of this court. On the issue of incompetence of this court to entertain this matter as canvassed by the 1st respondent, the applicant submitted that this court has jurisdiction over this matter because it is only this court that has power in Nigeria to entertain matters that relate to intra/inter-union matters or questions of illegality arising there from such as in this suit. That the power of this court is not subject to the impulse and administrative procedures of the TDA which recommends the IAP for mediating inter-union disputes, which cannot rob this court of its jurisdiction to sit as a court of first instance. That this court is empowered to entertain any matter relating to labour matters either in its original or appellate capacity as long as such matter is brought pursuant to and in compliance with the provisions of the rules of this court as it is in this case and is, therefore, deemed to be a proper action. The applicant then cited Order 3 Rules 1, 2 and 4 of the NIC Rules, which provide as follows — Any action for determination by the court shall be commenced by way of complaint and shall be filed and sealed...The complaint shall state specifically the relief or reliefs claimed either singly or in the alternative... The complaint shall be accompanied by— (i) Statement of fact establishing the cause of action. (ii) Copies of every document to be relied on at the trial. (iii) List of witnesses to be called. That the complainant has brought the complaint, stated its reliefs, stated its facts establishing a cause of action and has attached every necessary document thus ensuring compliance to the rule and so submitted that the action is properly brought before this court and so this court should assume jurisdiction. The applicant also submitted that this court has the power to assume jurisdiction over this matter as the National Industrial Court Act 2006 provides that the court can entertain any matter arising from trade union issues as it is in this case, referring to the provisions of section 7(a) of the NIC Act which states as follows - The Court shall have and exercise exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matters - (a) relating to- (i) labour, including trade unions and industrial relations. To the applicant, since the enabling Act provided for the power of the court to entertain matters relating to trade unions then it shall so exercise such power without any encumbrance thereto. 'That this position has been justified in the case of Rivers State Government v. Specialist Consult [2005] 5 MJSC 19 at 54 D - G, where the court in stating the conditions that warrant the competence of the court to entertain a suit held thus - A court is only competent to exercise jurisdiction where the following conditions are satisfied - (a) The court is properly constituted as regards members and qualifications of the members of the bench and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; (b) The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which presents the court from exercising its jurisdiction; and (c) The case comes before the court by due process of law and upon the fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. That as enunciated above, the applicant has fulfilled all conditions stated as this court is properly constituted and the case is within its jurisdiction and due process has been followed in bringing the matter and so this court is competent to entertain this suit. On the question whether the case at hand is statute-bared, the submission of the applicant is that this suit is not against a public officer in their personal capacity but an action against a wrongful official act which is only remediable by law, which according to the applicant does not fall within the coverage of the Public Officers Protection Act, and so the issue of limitation of action does not arise. That the issue in this suit falls within the provision of the Trade Unions Act which does not provide for a limitation as to the time of commencement of a court action arising thereto especially on a matter such as this. In all, the applicant submitted mat the motion seeking to strike out this matter should be discountenanced as the substantive action is properly instituted and is proper before this court. The applicant then urged this court to dismiss this application and direct that the matter proceed to trial. There was no reply on points of law. Before considering the merit of the preliminary objection, we wish to make two quick points. The 1st respondent in its submission made reference to section 4(1) of the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act. A careful search of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004 reveals that there is no Act so named. In fact, the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41 LFN 2004, which is in the statute book has only two sections, sections 1 and 2. It does not even have a subsidiary legislation. We are at a loss, therefore, where counsel to the 1st respondent got the legislation he cited from. This smacks of an attempt to mislead the court. This is unethical, unprofessional and unacceptable; and so must in strong terms be condemned. The second point is that counsel to the 2nd and 3rd respondents was also a counsel in PERESSA v. SSASCGOC & ors unreported Suit No. NIC/25/2007 delivered on March 3, 2008 where the issue of limitation of action as per the Public Officers protection Act were canvassed and ruled upon in this court. Specifically section 2(a) of the Act was raised and arguments proffered by the same counsel to the 2nd and 3rd respondents. Surprisingly, counsel to the 2nd and 3rd respondents decided to raise similar arguments in the instant case but did not deem it fit to cite the case of PERESSA v. SSASCGOC & ors, supra, a case he defended. This is also unprofessional and unacceptable; and so must be condemned in strong terms. These points made, we now turn to the merit of the preliminary objection. All the respondents argued that the matter before the court is an inter-union dispute for which this court has no original jurisdiction. The quick point to make in that regard is that the concept of inter-union dispute presupposes that on face value the disputing unions have been validly registered and so are existing according to law. Where the legality of one of two or more trade unions is challenged as is the instant case, the issue is no longer one of an inter-union dispute so to say. This is because, until a pronouncement of the court on the legality or otherwise of the trade union in question had been made, the trade union in issue cannot be said to be truly a valid/legally existing union. The case of the applicant is that the 1st respondent was unlawfully registered as a union. In other words, the legality as to the existence of the 1st respondent is challenged. Where this is the case, the issue of an inter-union dispute cannot arise given the uncertainty of the legal status of the trade union so challenged. In any event, and more importantly, section 8 of the Trade Unions Act (TUA) Cap. T14a LFN 2004 generally gives the jurisdiction to hear and determine matters of registration and cancellation of trade unions to the "appropriate court", which is defined under section 54 of the TUA as "the Industrial Arbitration Panel and the National Industrial Court as the case may be". The question then is, given the circumstances of this case, can the JAP be said to be the appropriate court? We do not think so. This is because the IAP can only act upon cases referred to it by the Minister of Labour, who incidentally is also a respondent in this suit. Until a matter is referred to the IAP by the Minister of Labour, the jurisdiction of the IAP cannot be activated. This means that only the NIC can in its original jurisdiction entertain matters as the instant case before the court. In any case, section 7 of the NIC Act 2006 gives jurisdiction to this court in respect of matters relating to trade unions. The argument of the respondents that the instant case was prematurely brought before this court, and so the case must go through the processes of Part I of the Trade Disputes Act as per section 7(3) of the NIC Act cannot, therefore, be tenable. The reference by the 2nd and the 3rd respondents to Order 3 Rule 5 in this context is, therefore, inapplicable. The issue of limitation of action was raised by all the respondents. The argument is that the instant case is statute-barred given the provision of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41 LFN 2004. As indicated earlier, this court had the opportunity to make pronouncements on issues similar to one at hand. For instance in PERESSA v. SSASCGOC & ors, supra, this court held as follows - The only issue that calls for determination is whether the present action is statute-barred given section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act...This provision simply gives a three month period of grace within which an action against a public officer must be brought within the contemplation of that Act. In this regard two things should be noted in terms of when an action can be brought. The first is that the action must be brought within three months after the act complained of. But, and this is the second, where the issue is one of a continuing damage or injury, then the action must be brought within three months after the ceasing of the damage or injury. The respondents argued that their objection does not fail within the purview of this second limb of the Public Officers Protection Act. It is here that we have our reservations. We do not see how the Act can be read in isolation. It must be construed holistically; in which event, the question becomes whether a party who complains that the change of name of another party which change of name consequently intrudes into its jurisdictional scope is not impliedly saying that the injury or damage on him is one that is continuing. In other words, is the injury complained of by the claimant against the respondents not one that is continuing? We think it is. This being the case, the injury has not ceased and so the application of the Public Officers Protection Act does not even arise. Following the reasoning in this case, therefore, the question that needs to be answered is whether the complaint of the applicant that the 1st respondent was unlawfully registered is one of a continuing injury in order to bring the matter within the second limb of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. We think so. If the applicant can establish its case that the 1st respondent was unlawfully registered, it means that the 1st respondent exists by virtue of an illegality, which in the present circumstance is a continuing illegality. Should this court be denied the opportunity of determining whether the existence of the lst respondent is legal or not? We do not think so. There is the further issue of whether the protection envisaged by the Public Officers Protection Act is available to individuals who acted in their official capacity or is it meant for institutional officers? Alternatively put, is the protection not one meant to guard against personal culpability of the officers regarding acts they did in their official capacities? In order words, is the protection extended to offices as against individuals? We agree with the submission of the applicant that the protection envisaged by the Public Officers Protection Act is one against a public officer in his/her personal capacity but not one against a statutory office. The cases cited by the respondents to support their contention regarding this issue were all cases whereby the defendants were sued in their personal capacities. We do not, therefore, think that the Public Officers Protection Act applies to oust the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the instant case. Besides the issues addressed above, there is the additional question whether the issue of: limitation of action is one of defence to an action or one of jurisdiction? In John Ovoh v. The Nigerian Westminster Dredging and Marine Ltd unreported Suit No. NIC/9/2002 delivered on April 1, 2008, this court held as follows - The case of the respondent is that the applicants filed their action out of time and so the matter was statute-barred for which this Court should set aside. A number of issues arise here. For instance, is the question of limitation of action one of jurisdiction or one of defence? Alternatively put, when a party says that a matter is statute-barred, should this be an issue as to the jurisdiction of the Court or should it be one that can only be raised as a defence to the action? The respondent seems to think that it is one that goes to the jurisdiction of the Court; and because issues of jurisdiction can be raised at anytime and stage of proceedings, that is why the respondent is raising it at this stage, We, however, do not think the issue of limitation of action is one that goes to jurisdiction. We think it is one that should be raised as a defence to an action — for a Court may have the jurisdiction to entertain a matter but may nevertheless rule in favour of the defence on the ground that the matter is statute-barred. In this sense, the question of limitation of action is simply one of disability. It is not that the claimant has no rightful claim, or that the Court has no jurisdiction; only that the claimant is disabled by time from pursuing the claim in issue. We are of the opinion, therefore, that even if the instant case were to be caught up by the Public Officers Protection Act, the issue should appropriately be raised as one of a defence to the action. It is not an issue to be raised as to the jurisdiction of this court. Lastly, arguments were raised as to the locus of the applicant to bring this action. The complaint of the applicant is that it appropriately covers the area of jurisdiction for which the 1st respondent was registered. If this is established, then it sufficiently gives the applicant the interest i.e. locus needed to maintain the present action. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the applicant has the locus to maintain the present action. For all the reasons stated above, we hold that this court has the jurisdiction to entertain, the instant case. The two preliminary objections are hereby struck out. The matter shall, therefore, proceed to hearing. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip Presiding Judge Hon. Justice V. N. Okobi Hon. Justice F. I. Kola-Olalere Judge Judge Hon. Justice O. A. Obaseki-Osaghae Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu-Fishim Judge Judge