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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL OF NIGERIA IN THE ENUGU JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT ENUGU BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP, HON. JUSTICE A. IBRAHIM DATE: 4th June, 2015 SUIT NO. NICN/EN/33/2014 BETWEEN: MR. LAWRENCE AGWU==============CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT AND FEDERAL RADIO CORPORATION OF NIGERIA=========================DEFENDANT/APPLICANT REPRESENTATION: C. O. Njoku Esq. appeared for the Claimant/Respondent. K. I. Ugwu Esq. appeared for the Defendant/Applicant. RULING The Claimant in his Complaint dated and filed on the 28th day of February, 2014 and paragraph 28 of his Statement of Facts Establishing Cause of Action prayed the court for the following reliefs against the Defendant: 28. WHEREFORE, the claimant claims against the defendant as follows: (i) A declaration that his purported termination without a hearing by an independent and unbiased body is a gross and cumulative violation and infringement of his Fundamental Rights as enshrined in the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria and African Charter on Human and People’s Right. (ii) A declaration that the aforesaid allegations brought against the claimant being of a criminal nature, ought to have been reported to the police to enable an unbiased and detailed investigation and prosecution (if necessary) be concluded by same to determine the guilt of the claimant. (iii) A declaration that the claimant’s appointment cannot be terminated by the defendant based on the aforesaid allegations until a pronouncement of the claimant’s guilt in respect thereof is achieved by a Court of competent jurisdiction or an independent panel after the claimant must have been given a hearing on the matter. (iv) An order setting aside the alleged termination of the claimant’s appointment based on the aforesaid allegations for which he is yet to be given a fair hearing on. (v) A further declaration that the purported gratuity and subsequent pension allegedly paid to the claimant does not represent what is due to him. (vi) An order directing the respondents to properly determine and pay claimant his due legitimate gratuity and pensions uptill date. (vii) A perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, its agents, servants or privies howsoever constituted from in whatever manner interfering with the claimant’s discharge of his duties to the defendant or the receipt by him of his salaries, emoluments, allowances and/or benefits in respect thereof on account of any of the allegations aforesaid. (viii) (a) N30,000,000.00 special damages. (b) N50,000,000.00 general damages and compensation for losses occasioned by the premature termination of the claimant’s appointment which incidentally affected his health. (ix) A Public Apology in any of the National Dailies. Accompanying the Complaint are the Statement of facts establishing cause of action, list of witnesses, list of documents to be relied upon, copies of documents to be relied upon, and Statement on oath of the witness. Upon receipt of the originating processes of the Claimant, the Defendant entered appeanace dated 4th July, 2014 on 4th of July 2014. The Defendant filed a Statement of Defence and Counterclaim accompanied with the relevant processes. Thereafter the defendant on 3rd of September, 2014 filed a notice of preliminary objection dated 3rd day of September, 2014 praying the Honourable Court for the following reliefs: 1. The Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the claimants suit and as such, the Honourable Court should dismiss the claimant’s suit for want of jurisdiction. 2. There is no cause of action before the court which the Honourable court can adjudicate upon at the instance of the claimant/respondent. 3. The claimant’s suit before the Court is not competent as it is not properly initiated as to activate the jurisdiction of the Court to hear and determine the claimant’s suit. The grounds of the objection are as follows: a. That the suit of the claimant/respondent is statute barred having been filed outside the mandatory twelve months period from the time his cause of action accrued by virtue of his letter of termination of his employment dated 17th June 2004, as clearly prescribed by S.25(1) of the Federal Radio Corporation of (Nigeria Act Cap. F.18 Laws of the Federation 2004. b. that assuming without conceding that the claimant’s suit is not caught c. by the provisions of S.25(l) of FRCN Act cap. F.18 Laws of the Federation 2004, the claimant’s suit is still statute barred having filed same outside the six-year period from the time his cause of action accrued by virtue of the letter of termination of his employment dated 1 7th June 2004, being an action based on contract of employment between the claimant and the defendant. d. The defendant/applicant shall rely on all processes filed in this suit in arguing this notice of preliminary objection. Learned counsel accompanied the said preliminary objection with a written address. Upon being served with the Defendant’s preliminary objection the learned counsel for the Claimant filed a reply address dated 20th September, 2014 on the 26th of September, 2014. The learned defendant’s counsel did not file any reply on points of law. Counsel adopted their respective written addresses. In his written address in support of the preliminary objection, learned counsel for the Defendant/Applicant went on to argue the sole issue determination which is whether the suit is statute barred or not. He stated that he was raising preliminary objection to the court entertaining this suit on the ground that the suit is statute-barred, which goes to the jurisdiction of the court. He submitted that the issue of jurisdiction is a threshold one which the court in ELUGBE v OMOKIIAFE (2010) 32 WRN 149; (2004) 12 SCNJ 106, has held must not be treated lightly. It is trite law that jurisdiction of a court is firstly determined by reference to the claim endorsed in the writ of summons and/or statement of claim. Other factors to be considered by the court before assuming jurisdiction are: (a) Whether the claim discloses a cause of action. (b) Whether the subject matter of the action is within the jurisdiction of the court. (c) Whether the plaintiff is competent to bring the action. (d) Whether the court is not otherwise disqualified either in its membership or enabling statute to adjudicate. He referred to INT’L NIGER BUILD CONST. CO. LTD v. GIWA (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt.836) 69 at 97; and MCLAREN v. JENNINGS (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt. 808) 470. He continued that the crucial question then is whether this suit is statute barred taking into consideration the time the cause of action accrued and the time this action was filed, judging from the claimant/respondent’s writ of summons and statement of claim. That before a plea of limitation law can be sustained, it is necessary first to establish what the cause of action is and when it accrued. A cause of action is determined by reference to the plaintiff’s statement of claim i. e. the materials and averments in the statement of claim. He cited HON. GOODLUCK NANA OPIA v. INEC & ANOR (2014) S.C Furthermore, that Oputa J.S.C (of the blessed memory) in EGBE v. ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1 at 20 held thus: “Now let us look at the meaning of cause of action. It is admittedly an expression that defies precise definition. But it can safely be defined as the fact or facts which establish or give rise to a right to judicial relief. A cause of action is to be distinguished from a right of action. A right of action is the right to enforce presently a cause of action. In other words, a cause of action is the operative fact to a right of action which itself is a remedial right.” Furthermore, in SANDA v. KUKAWA LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 174) 379 Per Wali J.S.C at 388, the Supreme Court said: “In actions for breach of contract, the cause of action accrues for the plaintiff’s benefit from the time the breach of the contract is committed and not when the damage is suffered. The period of limitation will begin to run from the date the cause of action accrues.” Counsel gave the facts of the above case are as follows: The appellant was dismissed from service by the first respondent by a letter dated 12th December, 1983 which dismissal was to have immediate effect. The plaintiff commenced proceedings on 23rd October, 1984. The local Government Law of Borno State under which the appellant was employed by its section 175 provided that any suit “against any local government for any action done in pursuance or intended examination (sic) of any law or of any public duty or authority shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commercial (sic) within 6 months after the act, neglect or default complained of....” The court therefore held that the applicant’s case was statute-barred. To the learned counsel, the cause of action in the instant suit accrued on the 17th June, 2004 when the claimant’s employment was terminated. These facts are clearly stated in the writ of summons and statement of claim. He referred to paragraph 19 of statement of claim. This paragraph shows clearly that the claimant’s purported cause of action is founded on the contract of employment between the claimant and the defendant which contract was duly terminated on 17th June 2004. In paragraph 19 of the statement claim stated it clearly thus; “19 The defendant thereafter by their letter of June 17, 2004 to the claimant alleged that his services were no longer needed hence his appointment was thereby terminated based on the above unsubstantiated allegations and in respect of which he was not given an opportunity to defend himself.... (underlying supplied)” That the claimant also in paragraph 23 of the statement of claim confirmed that his gratuity was paid to him in 2004/2005 in the sum of N800, 000.00 (Eight Hundred Thousand Naira) along with his pension arrears of N110, 000.00 (One Hundred and Ten Thousand Naira). These facts are clearly contained in the claimant’s statement of claim, yet he filed this action after about ten (10) years after the accrual of his cause of action. From the foregoing pleadings of the claimant, it is obvious that: (a) The claimant’s action arose from a contract of employment between the claimant and the defendant. (b) The contract of employment was terminated on 17th June, 2004. (d) The claimant’s gratuity and pension arrears were paid to him in 2004/2005 and he collected same. (d) The claimant’s suit was filed in this court on 28th April 2014 about ten years from the accrual of the purported cause of action, and well outside the limitation periods imposed by statutes. Learned counsel cited and relied on the case of DR. TOSIN AJAYI v. PRINCESS OLAJUMOKE ADEBIYI (2013) 3 WRN 1 at 29. Furthermore, he stated that firstly, Section 25(1) of the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria Act, Cap F18 Laws of the Federation 2004 provide thus: “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other enactment, no suit against the Corporation, a member or any employee of the Corporation for any act done in pursuance or execution of any enactment or law, or of any public duties or authority, or in respect of any alleged negligence or default in the execution of such enactment or law, duties or authority, shall lie or be instituted in any court unless it is commenced within twelve months next after the act, negligence or default complained or, in the case of a continuance of damage or injury, within twelve months next after the ceasing thereof”. That in AJAYI v ADEBIYI (2013) 3 ERN 1 at 20, the court held on the need (for) limitation Law to be expressly pleaded in a statement of defence as follows: “The Supreme Court had put its stamp of authority on what should apply in the case of ISHOLA BALOGUN v. CHIEF WAHABI ONIKORO (1984) 10 S.C 265 at 267 — 268 anchored by Obaseki JSC thus: ‘it is a cardinal rule of pleading that such a specific matter as limitation Law must be expressly set out or pleaded in the statement of defence. Once it is not pleaded, the defendant cannot be granted the protection of that Law.” Counsel stated that the defendant in this suit has expressly and explicitly pleaded the facts of the limitation Laws relied upon in paragraphs 39 and 40 of the statement of defence dated 4th July 2014. It is therefore counsel’s submission that in determining this issue, the court can only look at the date the cause of action accrued (17th June 2004) and also look the date the suit was filed (28th April 2014) and decide whether it was outside the six-year or in the alternative twelve months limitation period, and if it was, the claimant’s suit is liable to be dismissed and he so urged the court. Continuing he added that even if the limitation period was not provided for in the FRGN Act it is trite law that action founded on simple contract or tort must be brought within six (6) years of accrual of cause of action. And the claimant’s suit which was filed about ten years of the accrual of the cause of action is still liable to be dismissed on that ground. It is also the legal position that the applicable law to a cause of action is the law prevailing at the time the cause of action accrued notwithstanding that the law had been revoked at the time the action is being tried. See AREMO II v. ADEKANYE (2004) 7 S.C (Pt II) 28 at 37; ISAAC OBIUWEUBI v. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (2001) 2-3 S.C (Pt. 1) 46. The court made it clear that the law in force at the time a cause of action accrued govern determination of the suit. That in OBIEFUNA v. OKOYE (1961) 1 ALL NLR 257, the court held that where a law provides for bringing an action within the prescribed period, in respect of a cause of action accruing to the plaintiff, proceedings shall not be brought after the time prescribed by the statute. The position of the law has been clearly stated by the courts in a number of court cases. He referred the court to the case of DENCA SERVICE LIMITED v. IFEANYI CHUKWU (OSONDU) COMPANY LIMITED AND OTHERS (2014) 20 WRN page 159 at 180 where the court made it clear that: “An action instituted after the expiration of the period prescribed by the law is said to be statute barred. This is because time begins to run for the purpose of the limitation law, from the date the cause of action accrues, See Ogunko v. Sheila (2014) 6 NWCR (Pt.868) 17, Asaboro v. Pan Ocean Oil (Nig) (2006) 4 NWCR (pt972) 595 and SPDC Ltd v. Sarah (1993) 3 (pt382)148.” In AREMOH II v. ADEKANYE (2004) 42 WRN1; (2004) 7SCNJ 218; (2004) 7SC. (Pt. II) 28; (2004) ALL FWLR (Pt 224) 2113; (2004) 11 MJSC 17; (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt 891) 572, the Supreme Court, per Edozie JSC, put it this way: “Where a statute of limitation prescribes period within(sic) proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted action is statute barred, a plaintiff who might otherwise have had a cause of action loses the right to enforce it by judicial process because the period of instituting such an action has elapsed.” Since the Claimant’s purported cause of action accrued in 2004 when his appointment was terminated in writing as pleaded in his claim, he cannot maintain this action, filed well over ten years after the accrual of the cause of action, contrary to the limitation period in both the FRCN Act (which is a specific law on the matter) and the limitation law on contracts (which is a general law on such limitation periods). Counsel therefore urged the court to dismiss the claimant’s suit as it is clearly statute-barred. The issue of an action being statute-barred goes to the jurisdiction of the court. As such it can be raised at any time. He referred to DENCA SERVICE LIMITED v. IFEANYI CHUKWU (OSONDU) COMPANY LIMITED AND OTHERS (supra) at page 186 where the court held that: “The issue of an action being statute barred goes to jurisdiction. Where the time stipulated within which an action can be brought has elapsed, the action can be statute-barred. Egbe v. Adefarasin (2002) 14 WRN 52; (198 7)NSCC (ptl) (voLl8)1; (1987), SCNJ. In other words, a party will be denied the right to institute an action, once the action is statute- barred” (per Pemu JCA). Learned counsel then submitted that action brought outside the prescribed period (as in the instant case) is contrary to the provision of the Law and does not give rise to a cause of action, being statute barred. He cited OFILI v. C.S.C (2007) 31 WRN11 at42. The position of the Law is that in determining the issue of whether the action is statute-barred, the court only looks at the writ of summons and statement of claim relying on DENCA SERVICE LIMITED v. IFEANYI CHUKWU (OSONDU) COMPANY LIMITED (supra) at page 10, the court made it clear that: “In order to ascertain the time when the cause of action accrued for the purpose of the limitation law, the courts only looks at the writ of summons and the statement of claim which ordinarily ought to contain averments of facts relating to when the committed by the unit of summons was filed”. Learned counsel then prayed that the matter be dismissed for being statute-barred. In conclusion, based on the foregoing arguments and authorities cited, he urged the court to dismiss the claimant’s suit, as any trial conducted without jurisdiction would be a nullity, no matter how well conducted. In his own reply the learned claimant’s counsel stated that the facts of the case are as clearly set out in the statement of facts establishing cause of action. However, for purposes of emphasis, he re-stated it that the claimant’s appointment was purportedly terminated following alleged indictment over the burglary incident that took place at the defendant’s Enugu National Station. The alleged indictment was made by a panel set up by the defendant and headed by Mr. Emma Anyamelohor (the then Manager FM station of the defendant) despite the claimant’s insistence that the incident be reported officially to the police by the defendant for a proper investigation, or an investigation initiated by the police by the defendant to enable a prosecution and a determination of the claimant’s guilt be demonstrated and achieved in a court of competent jurisdiction. Unfortunately, till date the defendant has not done so. He referred to paragraphs 1—20 of statement of facts establishing claimant’s case. Learned counsel then formulated the issue for determination as follows: Whether the application before the court has any merit in Jaw for any proper consideration or sustenance? Arguing the issue learned claimant’s counsel submitted that the application before the court lacks merit whatsoever in law. This is in view of the fact that the applicant/defendant has expended much of its energy and time in relying on judicial authorities which facts are not in pari materia with the claimant’s case. The law is well settled that in deciding whether an action is statute barred, the courts should have regards to the facts and be guided by the observation of the apex court, Supreme Court in Fadare & Ors v. Attorney General of Oyo State (1982) Vol. 13 NSCC 62 at 80; (1982) 4 SC1 6 at 7 to the effect that time begins to run when all there is in existence, a person who can sue and another who can be sued and when all the facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. Counsel therefore submitted in this case that time will begin to run only after proper investigation by the police, possible prosecution and determination by a court of competent jurisdiction. This is in view of the fact of allegation of crime upon which the purported termination of claimant’s employment was predicated. This is clearly the position of the Supreme Court in Nigeria Ports Authority vs. Abu Airadion Alobi SC.402/2001 lead judgment delivered on Friday 7th July 2006 by Kutigi JSC (as he then was). In that case the question for determination was whether the plaintiff/respondent’s suit was indeed statute barred having regard to the provisions of S.97(1) Ports Ordinance Cap 155 LFN 1958 which said provision is on all fours with S.25(1) of the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria Act Cap F.18 LFN 2004. The Supreme Court held that time started to run when the plaintiff was discharged and acquitted on 23/12/85. It is therefore contended on behalf of the claimant that applying the foregoing principles of law enunciated by the Apex Court, to the present case, time will start to run after proper investigation by the police, arraignment, prosecution, discharge and acquittal. This is in view of the fact that at the time of the purported termination of the claimant’s appointment, the allegation of crime against him has not been established by a competent authority. It is further submitted that the act complained against the claimant is burglary, a criminal offence which carries with it a conviction if proved, and by virtue of Section l38 of the Evidence Act, Cap 112 LFN 1990 must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It therefore beholve on the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria, the defendant applicant to invite the police for a proper investigation and too to await police investigation. Consequently, the time prescribed in the above law would start to run not from the date panel’s report was put or the date the claimant received the letter of termination since criminal allegation was the root of the termination of claimant’s employment. This was clearly the position of the Supreme Court particularly Mukhtar JSC (as he then was) in Nigeria Ports Authority v. Abu Airadian Ajobi (supra), see also Thomas v. Olusorsoye (1986) 1 All NLR (pt.1) p.215. That clearly the imposition of penalty of termination for burglary solely on the basis of indictment for this offence by an administrative panel set up by the applicant/defendant implies a presumption of guilt, contrary to section 36(5) Constitution of Federal Republic Nigeria 1999. Conviction of offences and imposition of penalties and punishment are matters appertaining to and exclusively vested on the judiciary. See Sokefun v. Akinyemi (1981) 1 NCLR 135. He urged the court to discountenance the application. Counsel further submitted that the instant application was in the words Oguntade JSC in Amaechi v. INEC (2008) 10 WRN 1 meant to kill the claimant’s case on the misconceived notion that it was statue barred. It is forcefully contended that in matters of this nature, this court will not allow technicalities to prevent it from substantial justice, relying on AG Bendel v. AG Federation (1982) 3 NCLR (Vol.3) 1; Magit v. University of Agriculture Makurdi & Ors (2005) 24 NSCOR 143. He further referred the court to the well-established principle wherein the court has attained such a stature in the pursuit of justice to the effect “that a claimant who has established a recognized injury cannot be turned back on the ground that the relief or remedy has been taken by events or that it is statute barred.” He also referred to Bello v. AG Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR (p.45) 828. That most importantly, it is further submitted that none of the authorities cited by the applicant/defendant was the question/issue of allegation of crime raised. Consequently they cannot be a valid authority in determining whether this suit is statue barred or not. We refer to the admonition in Okafor v. Nnaife (1987) 9 - 10 SCNJ 63 at 70 where the court per Oputa JSC (of the blessed memory) depreciated (sic) the tendency of applying the authority of one matter to another without giving heed to the characteristics or circumstances of the other cases as follows: “the ratio of any case should not be pulled by the hair of the head and made willy nilly to apply to cases where surrounding circumstances are different.” In view of the foregoing counsel urged the court to refuse the application. The next issue which counsel considered pertinent is whether limitation law or statue barred applies to contracts and claims for work done. It is submitted humbly that such protection does not extend to contracts and claims for work done. He referred to Emi Ltd v. Ministry of Federal Capital Territory (2011) 14 WRN 174. Furthermore, that in Tolorunleke v. Armti (2011) 10 WRN 39 the court was of the firm view that no statute (including the Federal Radio Corporation Act) can violate the sanctify of contracts. The court went further to hold that: “No statute can violate the sanctity of a contract by acting or presuming to oust the right of the parties to stipulate the conditions of an agreement which parties voluntarily elect to enter into or to be bound by.” It is therefore contended that since claimant’s case is predicated on contract, no statute can purport to violate that contract. He therefore urged the court discountenance the applicants preliminary objection. He further submitted that the question of limitation or statute bar does not apply where the injury complained of or forming the subject of the suit is a continuing occurrence which leaves the party suing with a freehand to commence the same at any point the wrongdoing as intolerable or objectionable In CBN v. Amao (2007) 4 FWLR pt.351) 1490 at 1528 it was held thus: “Consequently, I am in agreement with the learned counsel for the Respondents and the court below that payment of pensions to the Respondent being monthly or on monthly basis, is recurrent and so no fixed date can be reasonably and properly used for the purpose of calculating the 3 months limitation period.., indeed I venture to say that the limitation period in the section on the continuous damage or injury would not apply because up to the time the Respondents initiated their action in the court below, the injury from the refusal or failure of the appellant to pay the Respondent the harmonized pensions had not ceased. Rather, it continued and presumably still continued up to today. In the circumstances, it is my form view that the Appellant could not hide under the Public Officers Protection Act (or any other statute of limitation) to deny the Respondents rights to claim the payment of the harmonized pensions contained in the circulars issued by the Federal Government because their damage or injury are continuous and continuing, their action in respect of such damage or injury cannot be said to be outside or beyond 3 months period. The action in the court below cannot, which led to this appeal was and is not statute barred. See also Oduko v. Government of Ebonyi State (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 891)487. He then referred to paragraphs 11, 16, 22, 24 and 26 of claimant’s statement of fact establishing cause of action. The next pertinent issue for counsel is whether it is merely enough for a party (like the applicant) to rely on the date of termination of appointment only and still want the court to reach a determination. To further demonstrate the hollowness and lack of merit in this application, counsel relied on part of the decision in Chief Woherem J.P. v. Emereuwa (2004) 3 WRN23 where the court that: I think I ought to stress that the law is well established that it is not permissible, indeed it would be wrong, for a defendant relying on the defence of limitation of action, to compute time from the date pleaded in his statement of defence. That following the decision in Savanah Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. PAN Atlantic Shipping Trans Agency Ltd (1987) 1 NWLR (pt.49) 212 at 259 as well as Jimo Odubeko v. Victor Fowler (1993) 15 WRN 141 at 164 to the effect that “Limitation begins to run from when the act complained of completed as to give the applicant cause of is action to complain”. In this case however, the defendant/applicant has only relied on the date put on the said purported termination letter without any attempt whatsoever to show when the letter was delivered or brought to the knowledge of the claimant, but still invites the court to reach a decision on what it has abstained from disclosing in that regard. In N.I.IA v. Ayanfalu (2007) 2 NWLR (pt.1 018) 270 it was held that: It is incumbent on the Appellant who contends that the action, by effusion of time was statute barred to adduce the evidence manifestly showing that the action was filed outside three months from the receipt of the letter, that is the day the action accrued, in the absence of any other provision in the contract of service. Notice of dismissal cannot take effect before it is given.., until evidence of the time the respondent received her letter of termination is known, it can never be established her action is statute barred. The crux of the special defence sought to be raised is predicated on the day the cause of action accrued. See also the Ruling of this Honourable Court in Suit No.NICN/EN/16/2011, S.A.N Emordi vs. Enugu State University of Science of Technology (ESUT) delivered on 24th April, 2012 by Honourable Justice A. Ibrahim. The defendant/applicant has not shown either from its statement of defence or from the Notice of Preliminary objection filed when the termination letter was indeed received by the claimant. Consequently, and counsel urged the court to dismiss the application as being unmeritorious, speculative and predicated on technicality. Finally, counsel concluded that in view of the arguments canvassed herein and the peculiar circumstances and facts of the case, this case can only be said or deemed to be statute barred or caught up by statute of limitation after it has been duly established that there was a formal report of the alleged burglary to the police, investigation duly and property undertaken and conducted by the police, trial and pronouncement of guilt or otherwise of the claimant by a court of competent jurisdiction and the suit thereafter commenced after the period provided by the statute. Consequently, unless and until there is a pronouncement one way or the other on the allegation of burglary against the claimant by a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction, the question of limitation will not arise. In the absence of this and other requirements of the law as put forward in this reply, we urge the court to hold that this application lacks merit whatsoever in law and consequently should be dismissed with substantial cost. Therefore, counsel urged the court to uphold his submissions and hold that this case is not statute barred. I have carefully considered the processes filed, the arguments and submissions of counsel on the application before the court. The sole issue for determination is whether or not the suit is statute barred and therefore the court lacks the competence to entertain it. I have to say that both parties have stated the trite position now that in determining the issue of statute bar the appropriate processes that the court should look at are the Statement of Facts and the accompanying processes, which in this case constitute the originating processes. In doing that the Court should also consider the date that the cause of action accrued and then the date on which the claimant came to court. If the date on which the claimant came to court is beyond that set by statute, then the suit must be declared statute barred, subject of course to the recognized exceptions provided by the law. See A-G Rivers State vs A-G Bayelsa & Ors (2012) 7 SC (Pt. II) p. 110 at 119-120. In the instant case, from the statement of facts establishing his cause of action, the claimant is challenging the termination of his appointment by a letter dated June 17, 2004 by the defendant. See paragraph 19 of the Statement of facts establishing the cause of action. The claimant then instituted this suit on the 28th of April, 2014. The limitation law being relied upon is the provisions of Section 25 (1) of the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria Act, Cap. F18, Laws of the Federation, 2004, which stipulates that the claimant must bring his action to court within twelve months from date of the accrual of the cause of action. This means that from the 17th of June 2004 the Claimant had twelve months, up to about the 17th of June 2005, to institute the action, otherwise it would be caught up by the limitation provided in the law setting up the defendant. This he did not do. He only filed this action in 2014, about ten years after. This suit is therefore clearly out of time and statute barred. However, the learned claimant’s counsel has argued that the defence of the claimant is that he was alleged to have committed a crime, namely burglary, and therefore he should have been taken to the Police, prosecuted if necessary, before any decision to terminate his appointment is made. I have considered the submissions of counsel as well as all the authorities relied upon. Learned counsel has referred to the cases of Nigeria Ports Authority vs Abu Airadion Ajobi, supra, and that of Thomas Olusorsoye (1986), supra. Here I have to say that from his letter of termination there is nothing that says the claimant was being terminated for burglary. From his frontloaded documents, the claimant did have disciplinary process against him over the burglary that was committed relating to the 255KVA Generator at the Broadcasting House, Enugu on Sunday 22nd June 2003 as well as for unauthorized removal of Engineering Spare Parts suspected to be Corporation’s property. Now even though the disciplinary process was carried out, the termination letter said he was only relieved of his appointment by a payment in lieu of notice. The point here is that the court cannot even enquire into all this simply because the claimant did not come to court within time. Furthermore the claimant is asserting that the Police must investigate and prosecute him where necessary, before the cause of action can be said to have accrued. But the problem here is that there is no Police case in the matter. The defendant had done its own part by investigating him and taking a decision on him as his employer. I think the claimant should have reported the matter to the Police himself so that there would then have been a Police case before the court whose outcome might have to be awaited before a decision to terminate him could be taken; or that a cause of action of action would only arise where an acquittal is obtained, as demonstrated in the case of NPA vs Ajobi, supra, cited and relied upon by the claimant himself. But as things are now, the claimant cannot rely on the fact that the issue being relied upon amounts to a crime, even though no prosecution is involved, to urge the court to hold that his cause of action had not arisen to refuse the protection granted by section 25(1) of Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria Act, Cap F18, LFN, 2004, to the defendant. In any event, the position of the law now is that it is lawful to even summarily dismiss an employ for acts of gross misconduct even though border on criminality, without having to wait for the decision of a court of law. See Maliki vs Micahel Imodu Institute for Labour Studies (2008) LPELR-8467 (CA) pp. 43-44, paras E-F and A-G Kwara State vs Ojulari (2006) LPELR-6151 (CA) pp. 21-27 paras F-B. I must point out though that the propriety or otherwise of the action of the defendant in terminating him for burglary or other misconduct in the instant case cannot even be entertained by the court. This is because he has not come to court within time. Learned counsel has further submitted that his case touches on labour and work done and is not therefore affected by the statute of limitation. He referred to Emi Ltd vs Ministry of FCT (2011), supra, and Tolorunke vs ARMTI(2011), supra. Having considered the submissions of counsel, I find no merit in same. This is because the law is settled that cases for work and labour done or contracts of employment are indeed covered by statute of limitation. See Adebiyi & Ors vs National Institute (2013) LPELR-22628 pp. 16-18, Egbele vs The Post Master General (NIPOST) (2009) LPELR-8870(CA)pp. 21-22 paras A-B. I therefore hold that the case of the claimant being predicated on contract of employment comes within the purview of limitation as stipulated in the defendant’s law. I also have considered the point made by the claimant that his case has to do with the claim for pension and gratuity wherein he relied on the decision in the case of CBN va Amao (2007), supra, the dictum of which he quoted at a great length. The point is that the claimant’s claim is primarily that he was wrongly terminated. This is his main claim. Any other one is ancillary. Even at that the grievance is related to payment made in 2004. See paragraph 23 of the Statement of Facts. I do not think the submission of learned counsel has merit. In the circumstance and for all the reasons given I find and hold that there is merit in the preliminary objection of the defendants. The suit of the claimant is statute barred and this court cannot entertain it. It is hereby struck out. I make no order as to costs. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice A. Ibrahim Presiding Judge