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BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip Presiding Judge Hon. Justice V. N. Okobi Judge Hon. Justice F. I. Kola-Olalere Judge Hon. Justice O. A. Obaseki-Osaghae Judge Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu-Fishim Judge DATE: March 2, 2010 SUIT NO. NIC/LA/13/2009 BETWEEN Dr. I. A. Olaifa - Claimant AND 1. Lagos State Health Service Commission 2. Lagos State government 3. Attorney-General of Lagos State - Respondents REPRESENTATION Mrs. B. C. Anyanwu, for the claimant. Mrs. S. Y. Kolawole, Director Civil Litigation, and with her are Mrs. O. G. Adecleji, Adedoyin Ogunkoya, Mrs. K. A. Momoh-Ayokanmbi and A. O. Odukoya, for the respondents. RULING The claimant on 4th May 2009 filed a complaint against the respondents. The complaint is for- 1. A declaration that the purported dismissal of the claimant from the service of the respondents and its agents and or privies for acts of gross misconduct in accordance with the Public Service Rules 04401 and 04421 (i) c and d and the circular from the office of the Head of Service Ref. No. HOS/07/VOL.IV/160 dated 18th November 2008 on the ban on Press Interview and Broadcast by Public Servants is ultra vires, unconstitutional, unlawful, illegal, null, void and of no effect whatsoever. 2. A declaration that the Personnel Management Board which purportedly dismissed the claimant on the 30th of March 2009 from service for gross misconduct is unknown to law and incompetent to dismiss the claimant from the services of the 1st and 2nd respondents. 3. A declaration that the claimant is still in the service of the 1st and 2nd respondents as his appointment or employment has not been determined according to law. 4. A declaration that having regard to the surrounding circumstances the employment or appointment of the claimant was unlawfully determined in consequence of his trade union activities. 5. An order reinstating the claimant to his employment forthwith without loss of seniority and with payment of his full salaries, allowances and other entitlements from the 30th of March 2009 until the day judgment is delivered or he is fully restored to his position. The respondents reacted by filling a memorandum of appearance and a notice of preliminary objection. The preliminary objection is brought pursuant to section 6(6) of the 1999 Constitution and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The grounds of the preliminary objection are - 1. That, by virtue of the provisions of section 7(l)(a) - (c) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006, this court lacks the power to pronounce on all the declarations contained in the originating summons filed by the claimant as same relates to an administrative act of the State on termination of appointment of the claimant. 2. That by virtue of the sections stated above, this court has jurisdiction over specific matters which do not include dismissal from employment. 3. That by virtue of section 272 of the 1999 Constitution, the State High Court has unlimited power to hear and determine matters pertaining to any civil proceeding • which includes dismissal. 4. That by the reasons stated above, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this case. The respondents prayed for an order striking out the case for want of jurisdiction. The claimant did not file any written reaction to the preliminary objection. Both parties then agreed to orally argue the preliminary objection. The respondents commenced their arguments by referring the court to three cases, namely, Ministry for Works v. Tonas Nig. Ltd [2002] 2 NWLR (Pt. 752) 740 at 749, Tukur v. government of Gongola State [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517 at 520 and Progressive Insurance Co. Ltd v. Mrs. M. T. Adepoju [1991] 1 NWLR (Pt. 166) 248 at 249 and then submitted that the subject matter of the action brought by the claimant is not within the items listed in section 7(1) of the NIC Act. To the respondents, the claimant's claims emanate from his dismissal from service of the 1st and 2nd respondents by virtue of a letter addressed to him dated 16th April 2009. That based on this letter, the claimant formulated his claims, which are before the court. That the inclusion of the word 'labour' under section 7(1 )(a) of the NIC Act 2006 is to be read to include trade unions and industrial relations and matters incidental thereto. The respondents then referred the court to section 272 of the 1999 Constitution which gives jurisdiction to State High Courts and the case of Olonmtoba-Oju & ors v. Dopamu & ors [1008] 2 - 3 SC (Pt. 1) 95 at 124 paragraphs 5-25, submitting that the claims of the claimant do not come within the purview of section 7(1 )(a) of the NIC Act and so should not be entertained by this court. Furthermore that the State Civil Service Commission is independent under section 202 of the 1999 Constitution; and in this present matter it was acting in its administrative capacity and so its actions cannot be contemplated by section 7(1 )(a) of the NIC Act 2006 or by any of the meanings given to the words 'trade disputes' under the NIC Act. The respondents then referred the court to the ease of Adeyemi v. Opeyori [1976] 9-10 SC 18 at 149 where the Supreme Court held that it is the claims of the claimant that determine jurisdiction and then submitted that the claims of the claimant in this matter are based on simple contract of employment and so are not contemplated by section 7(l)(a) of the NIC.1 Act. The respondents then urged the court to grant the preliminary objection. In reaction, the claimant argued that the preliminary objection is predicated on 2 major grounds, namely — 1. That by virtue of section 7(1)(a) - (c) of the NIC Act 2006, this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claimant's claims. That the said section 7(1)(a) -(c) specifies matters which do not include dismissals. 2. By virtue of section 272 of the 1999 Constitution, the State High Court has general power to hear and determine matters pertaining to civil proceedings including dismissals from employment. To the claimant, however, the singular issue for the determination of this court in this application is whether or not this court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain labour disputes. 'Labour', according to the claimant, has been defined by the Blacks Law Dictionary 7 th Edition at p. 878 to mean "work of any type". That the dictionary goes on to say that the term usually refers to work for wages. That this means that labour disputes as envisaged by the NIC Act 2006 includes disputes between master and servant. The claimant continued that it is trite law that the subject matter of an action is what confers jurisdiction on the court. Referring to section 7(l)(a) of the NIC Act, the claimant argued that a look at the claimant's statement of facts and complaint simply shows that the dispute submitted to this court is a labour dispute. That the main issue in controversy is whether or not the termination or dismissal of the claimant's employment with his employer, the 1st respondent, was in accordance with the statutes governing his employment. The claimant then submitted that this is clearly a labour dispute which comes within the purview of section 7(l)(a) of the NIC Act. The claimant continued by urging the court to rely on its decision in Fadairo & ors v. Lagos Building Investment Co. Ltd unreported Suit No. NIC/28/2007 delivered on 2nd April 2009 where this court assumed jurisdiction to entertain the case. In Fadairo, the cause of action was the wrongful transfer of the applicants who were employees of the respondent, a mortgage banker, to the mainstream of Lagos State Civil service contrary to the contract of service between the applicants and the respondent. To the claimant, it is trite law that what determines the jurisdiction of the court is the subject matter/cause of action and not the parties. That the cause of action in this suit, being a labour matter , this court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain same by virtue of section 7(l)(a)(i) of the NIC Act 2006. That the law is well established that in the construction of statutes, where words of an enactment are clear and unambiguous, they should be given their literal interpretation, referring to Eze v. Okechukwu [1998] 5 NWLR (Pt. 584) 43 at 69B. The claimant then referred to the Supreme Court decision in Astra Industries Nig. Ltd v. The Nigerian hank for commerce and Industries [1998] 4 NWLR (Pt. 546) 357 at 375D where it was held that the word 'include' when used in an enactment must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. The claimant then submitted that the word 'labour' used in section 7(l)(a)(i) should be given its natural meaning; hence the argument of the respondent's counsel that the inclusion of the word 'labour' under section 7(l)(a)(i) should be read to relate to only trade unions, industrial relations and matters incidental thereto should be disregarded as this does not represent, the position of the law. The claimant submitted further that the jurisdiction vested in the High Court of a State by section 272 of the 1999 Constitution is general but limited and does not exclude the jurisdiction of any other court or tribunal from entertaining any civil cause or matter in which the existence or extent of a legal right, obligation or claim, etc relates, referring to Ekong v. (hide [2005] 9 NWLR (Pt. 929) 102 at 115 where the Court of Appeal in affirming the decision of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory to decline jurisdiction in a trade dispute matter explained that the jurisdiction of the NIC is intact by virtue of section 315 of the 1999 Constitution while noting that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court is now general but limited. That the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Ekong v. Oside is apposite to the instant case, urging the court to hold that section 272 of the 1999 Constitution does not rob the NIC of its exclusive jurisdiction to determine trade/labour disputes such as the present dispute between the claimant and the respondent. Continuing, the claimant submitted that the case of Olonmtoba-Oju v. Dopamit, supra, heavily relied upon by the respondent's counsel is clearly distinguishable from the present case. In the first place, that the cause of action in that suit was the unconstitutional removal of the 6th plaintiff from the position of Head of department of Linguistics of the University of Ilorin and replacing him with the 2nd defendant. Secondly, that there is the issue of the conduct of examination without appropriate examiners contrary to the University of Ilorin Act, referring the court to Oloruntoba-Oju as reported in [2008] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1085) 1 at 21, 23 and 24 - 25 H - B. To the claimant, the cause of action in Oloruntoba-Oju is clearly not a labour/trade dispute as in the present case, urging the court to hold that that case is not applicable to this suit. The claimant continued that under the Trade Disputes Act (TDA) Cap. T8 LFN 2004, disputes involving State Governments can come to this court, referring to section 40 of the TDA 2004. Consequently, that section 202 of the 1999 Constitution, which deals with the independence of the State Civil Service Commission in matters of appointment and exercise of disciplinary powers, cited by the respondents is not applicable in this suit as it does not oust the jurisdiction of the court to entertain claims brought against it by its employees for wrongful termination of employment. In conclusion, the claimant submitted that by section 24(2) of the NIC Act 2006, this court has no power to grant the reliefs sought by the respondents. The claimant then urged the court to dismiss the respondents' application with substantial cost as same lacks merit and is merely aimed at delaying the proceedings in this case. In reacting on points of law, the respondents submitted that the exclusive jurisdiction which the claimant relied on is further compounded by section.11 of the NIC Act 2006. That a reading of sections 7 and 11 of the NIC Act not only appear to input exclusive jurisdiction but also by virtue of section 11 of the NIC Act, it appears to oust the jurisdiction of all the High Courts which has been conferred on them by the relevant provisions of the 1909 Constitution, for instance, section 272 of the 1999 Constitution. To the respondents, to the extent that sections 7 and 11 purport to oust the general jurisdiction conferred on State High Courts by section 272 of the 1999 Constitution and to give to this court exclusive jurisdiction, sections 7 and 11 of the NIC Act are unconstitutional, ultra vires and, therefore, null and void, referring to Western Steel Works Ltd v. Iron and Steel Workers Union of Nig. (citation not supplied) and AG, Oyo State v, NIC [2003] 8 NWLR (Pt. 821) 1 at 32. That the jurisdiction of a State High Court under section 272 of the 1999 Constitution remains intact and cannot be ousted by the provisions of any statute that is not expressly provided for under the Constitution. That the only recognizable ouster to the general jurisdiction of the State High Court is that provided for in section 251 of the 1999 Constitution. That other than constitutional provisions, no other Act of the National assembly can oust the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear civil matters. The respondents continued that section 11 of the NIC Act belies or brings to nothing the decision in Ekong v. Oside, supra. The respondents then submitted that section 315 of the 1999 Constitution cannot avail to sustain the NIC Act 2006 because it was not in contemplation of section 315 when it was promulgated. That the NIC Act cannot, therefore, override the provisions of section 272 of the 1999 Constitution. On Oloruntoba-Oju, the respondents submitted that the case is apt and applies to the matter before this court because issues of employment and terms and conditions of employment which amounted to administrative decisions of the respondents in that matter are also present in the instant case. Indeed, that Oloruntoba-Oju has more of labour issues and yet the court still decided that it is the Federal High Court that has jurisdiction, referring to the dictum of His Lordship Oguntade, JSC in Oloruntoba-Oju in [2008] 2 - 3 SC (Pt. 1) 95 at 123 - 124. The respondents then prayed that their preliminary objection be upheld and the case struck out. A careful consideration of the issues raised by the respondents in their preliminary objection will reveal that their submissions in that regard are based on certain premises/assumptions, all of which can be faulted. The first assumption is that under the 1999 Constitution, State High Courts continue to enjoy unlimited jurisdiction in civil causes and matters today even when section 272 of the 1999 Constitution dropped the word 'unlimited' used under the 1979 constitutional dispensation. Secondly, despite the fact that the word 'exclusive' is not used in the whole of section 272 of the 1999 Constitution, the respondents posited that State High Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all civil causes and matters. In other words, State High Courts enjoy jurisdiction over civil causes and matters to the exclusion of all other courts except the Federal High Court as may be provided for under section 251 of the 1999 Constitution. This is the import of the submission of the respondents to the effect that section 251 of the 1999 Constitution is the only noticeable exception to section 272 of the 1999 Constitution. Lastly, there is also the assumption on the part of the respondents that State Government institutions are not covered and so cannot come under the jurisdictional scope of Federal Courts of first instance. This is the import of the argument of the respondents which is to the effect that the dismissal of the claimant by the respondents was an administrative act done by a State Government institution that is independent. In raising this argument, the respondents assumed that because the 1999 Constitution in section 251 gives the Federal High Court exclusive jurisdiction over issues pertaining to the administrative acts of the Federal Government and its institutions and agencies, the same must be read regarding State Government institutions and agencies. The fallacy of this last assumption has already been debunked by the claimant when his counsel cited section 40 of the Trade Disputes Act 2004, a provision that specifically enjoins State trade disputes to be resolved through the instrumentality of Federal institutions including this court. We agree with the respondents that the NIC Act 2006, an Act enacted after the coming into effect of the 1999 Constitution could not have been contemplated by section 315 of the 1999 Constitution. The question, however, remains whether the National Assembly was right in granting the NIC exclusive jurisdiction. The opening words of section 7 of the NIC Act are to the effect that the NIC 'shall have and exercise exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matters' relating to those items in which jurisdiction is granted within the said section 7. The respondents raised issues as to the constitutionality of having to grant the NIC exclusive jurisdiction in view of the provisions of section 272 of the 1999 Constitution. The respondents even went on to refer to section 251, the section granting the Federal High Court jurisdiction, as the only recognizable exception to section 272. To properly understand the issue at hand, it may be necessary to reiterate one or two points. In the first place, the items under section 7 of the NIC Act in respect of which exclusive jurisdiction is granted the NIC, namely, 'labour, including trade unions and industrial relations; and environment and conditions of work, health, safety and welfare of labour', etc, are all matters in item 34 of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Constitution dealing with the Exclusive Legislative List. This means that only the National Assembly can legislate on them; and a fortiori, the National Assembly retains the power to determine which court can adjudicate on the said items. It is perfectly within the competence of the National Assembly, therefore, to legislate that only a federal court has jurisdiction to determine issues arising from them. After all, by section 10(2) of the Interpretation Act Cap. 123 LFN 2004, "an enactment which confers power to do any act shall be construed as also conferring all such other powers as are reasonably necessary to enable that act to be done or are incidental to the doing of it". Secondly, and following from the argument of the respondents that section 251 of the 1999 Constitution is the only recognizable exception to section 272 of the 1999 Constitution, it must be noted that no where in section 251 are the matters in the said item 34 reflected. A cursory look at section 251 will reveal a concerted effort on the part of the lawmakers to grant jurisdiction in respect of the matters in the Exclusive Legislative List on the Federal High Court with the matters in item 34 conspicuously missing. The inference, therefore, is that the legislative intent is to confer jurisdiction on those matters on some other federal court other than the Federal High Court. When the Court of Appeal in Federal Government of Nigeria v. Adams Oshiomhole [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 2) 339 held that the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) was wrong to have heard a civil matter relating to whether the NLC was right in embarking on a protest action against the increase in the price of fuel and then ordered that the matter be heard by the Federal High Court, one of the grounds upon which the Court of Appeal made its decision is that the Federal High Court had national geographic jurisdiction as against the High Court of the FCT. Incidentally, the NIC, by section 21 of the NIC Act 2006, has national geographic jurisdiction. Thirdly, unlike under the 1979 Constitution where the jurisdiction of the State High Courts in respect of civil causes and matters was 'unlimited', this is not the case under the 1999 Constitution. The reference by the respondents in ground 3 to their preliminary objection that 'by virtue of section 272 of the 1999 Constitution, the State High Court has unlimited power to hear and determine matters pertaining to any civil proceeding which includes dismissal' must, therefore, be read as an erroneous statement of the current law as provided for under the 1999 Constitution. The jurisdiction of the State High Courts today is no longer unlimited. It may be general but certainly not unlimited. It is, contrary to the submission of the respondents, limited not only by section 251 of the 1999 Constitution, but also by other sections of the 1999 Constitution including, we may venture, section 4, which grants legislative powers to the National Assembly. This much we can glean from Ekong v. Oside, a case that recognized the nuances in the adjudication of labour disputes and the need to avoid the proliferation of labour/trade dispute cases in several High Courts. The Court of Appeal went on to hold in Ekong v. Oside, in relation to the High Court of (he Federal Capital Territory (FCT), that although the jurisdiction of the FCT High Court under section 257 of the 1999 Constitution is general, it is nevertheless limited and subject to section 251 of the Constitution and any other provisions of the Constitution such as section 315. To, therefore, argue, as the respondents did, that the civil causes and matters granted to State High Courts under section 272 is all encompassing as to preclude the jurisdiction granted the NIC is, in our opinion, stretching section 272 too far. As indicated earlier, the matters upon which the NIC can adjudicate are all matters within the exclusive legislative competence of the National Assembly. And if the National Assembly, in its wisdom and in line with the constitutional framework of federal causes and matters being heard by Federal Courts, legislates that exclusive jurisdiction be vested on the NIC as it did under the NIC Act 2006, how can the toga of unconstitutionality be branded on that legislative discretion'? We do not, therefore, think that section 7(l)(a) of the NIC 2006 is unconstitutional. And if section 7 of the NIC Act is not unconstitutional, then section 11 of the NIC Act cannot also be unconstitutional. Section 7(1 )(a) of the NIC Act 2006 and section 272 of the 1999 Constitution featured a great deal in the submissions of the parties in this matter. While the claimant asserts that his claim comes within the. purview of section 7(l)(a)(i) of the NIC Act, the respondents' case is that the effect of section 272 of the 1999 Constitution is to render null and void section 7(1 )(a) of the NIC Act. The substance of what section 7(l)(a) of the NIC Act provides has already been alluded to. It will be useful, therefore, to reproduce the provision of section 272(1) of the 1999 Constitution, which is relevant for present purposes. By the said section 272(1) - Subject to the provisions of section 251 and other provisions of this Constitution, the High Court of a State shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any person. From the opening words of section 272, it can be seen that the said section 272 is qualified by and subject to not only section 251 as argued by the respondents but also by other provisions of the Constitution. Secondly, no where in section 272 is exclusive jurisdiction granted the State High Court in respect of all civil causes and matters (the emphasis is ours). The argument of the respondents that section 272 of the 1999 Constitution renders section 7(1)(a) of the NIC Act null and void is hinged on section 1 of the 1999 Constitution, which provides for the supremacy of the Constitution over all else. Section 1 (3) of the 1999 Constitution then goes on to provide that - If any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of [the] Constitution, [the] Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void. See generally the cases of Fasakin Foods (Nig.) Ltd v. Shosanya [2006] 10 NWLR (Pt. 987) 126 at 148 - 149 SC, Tanko v. State [2009] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1131) 430 at 452 SC, Ainabebholo v. ESVWFMPCS Ltd [2007] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1017) 33 at 50 - 51 CA, Amaechi v. IN EC 9 NWLR (Pt. 1040) 504 at 533 and 540 CA, Ansa v. RTPCN [2008] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1086) 421 at 446 CA, Kwarra v. Innocent [2009] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1121) 179 at 218 CA, and Ac hit v. CSC, Cross River State [2009] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1129) 475 at 506 CA. A look at section 1(3) of the 1999 Constitution shows that a law which is inconsistent with the Constitution is only void to the extent of the inconsistency (the emphasis is ours). The subsection does not say that the law as a whole is null and void; only the inconsistent part of the law in question can be null and void. So, if the complaint of the respondents is that section 7(l)(a) of the NIC Act gives exclusive jurisdiction to this court, the effect of section 1(3) of the 1999 Constitution on section 7(1 )(a) of the NIC Act will at worst be the removal of the word 'exclusive' from the said section. Even this we doubt, however. The rule as to inconsistency provided for by section 1(3) of the 1999 Constitution cannot operate to render the whole of section 7(l)(a) of the NIC Act null and void. At worst it can only strike at the use of the word exclusive in the said section 7(l)(a). Since section 272 of the 1999 Constitution did not grant exclusive jurisdiction on the State High Court, and since it did not also grant jurisdiction in respect of all civil causes and matters, jurisdiction in respect of labour matters provided for under section 7(1 )(a) of the NIC Act cannot as a whole be null and void as argued by the respondents. At worst, only the use of the word exclusive can be declared null and void; in which event, the NIC still retains jurisdiction regarding the matters provided for in section 7 of the NIC Act. For the avoidance of doubt, we hold that given the exclusive power of the National Assembly to legislate on matters in the Exclusive Legislative List (section 4(1) - (3) of the 1999 Constitution) and a fortiori to determine which court to hear and determine disputes arising therefrom, section 7(l)(a) of the NIC Act 2006 is not unconstitutional. However, assuming this reasoning is wrong, the effect of section 1(3) of the 1999 Constitution does not render the whole of section 7(l)(a) of the NIC Act null and void. Only the use of the word 'exclusive' in the said section can be declared null and void; which means that the NIC still retains jurisdiction on labour matters even if the word 'exclusive' is removed from section 7 of the NIC Act. The present action cannot, therefore, be wrong. All the parties are agreed that it is the statement of claims of the claimant that is relevant in deciding whether this court has the jurisdiction to determine the case. In the recent case of Olonmtoba-Oju and ors v. Dopamu and ors [2008] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1085) 1 at 23, the Supreme Court reiterated this time-tested principle as espoused in the cases of Western Steel Works Ltd v. Iron and Steel Workers Union of Nig. & ors [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 49) 284 and Adeyemi and ors v. Oyeyori [1976] 1 FNLR 149 in the following words - It is fundamental that it is the claim of the plaintiff that determines the jurisdiction of the court which entertains the claim. The question would then naturally be what the claims of the claimant are. The claims of the claimant, which have been reproduced earlier, all deal with his dismissal from the service of the respondents and the need to reinstate him. The argument of the respondents here is that all the claims of the claimant deal with the administrative acts of the respondents and so cannot be entertained by this court. We do not agree with the respondents. In the first place we pointed out earlier that State High Courts do not have a corresponding provision in the nature of section 251 of the 1999 Constitution where they are charged with exclusive jurisdiction over administrative acts of State Government institutions and agencies. Secondly, the issue of dismissal and reinstatement which the claimant sues on are all labour related and so come within the purview of the jurisdiction of this court under section 7(l)(a) of the NIC Act. In Olonmtoba-Oju and ors v. Dopamu and ors [2008] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1085) 1 the Supreme Court, dealing with the question of the jurisdiction of this court under the TDA, held that where the main claim relates to the administration or management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies, or relates to the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal government or any of its agencies, section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution applies to grant jurisdiction on the Federal High Court. We note the fact that the Supreme Court did not consider the ambit of section 7 of the NIC Act 2006 as the cause of action in Olonmtoba-Oju arose in 2003 before the passage of the NIC Act. We also note the caveat of the Supreme Court as to the ambit of section 251(l)(p), (q) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution. His Lordship Oguntade, JSC, delivering the lead judgment had this to say at p. 30 - It seems to me too that to construe the interpretation clause in section 47 of Cap. 432, 11990], Laws of the Federation as conferring on the National Industrial Court the jurisdiction to adjudicate on all manner of disputes concerning employment matters could do a great violence to the provisions of [section 251(l)(p), (q) and (r)] of the 1999 Constitution. It would in my view take a more specific [provision] of Cap. 432 and not just an interpretation clause to have such a far reaching effect which overrides the clear provisions of [section 251(l)(p), (q) and (r)] of the 1999 Constitution...(\he emphasis is ours). We are of the opinion that section 7 of the NIC Act 2006 passed after the cause of action in Olonmtoba-Oju arose qualifies as such 'more specific provision' as espoused by His Lordship Oguntade, JSC. To conclude the ruling, we hereby hold that sections 7(1 )(a) and 11 of the NIC Act 2006 are not unconstitutional. The claims of the claimant are within the jurisdictional competence of this court to hear and determine. This court, therefore, has the jurisdiction to entertain the matter at hand. The matter shall proceed to hearing. Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip Presiding Judge Hon. Justice V. N. Okobi Hon. Justice F. I. Kola-Olalere Judge Judge Hon. Justice O A. Obaseki-Osaghae Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu-Fishim Judge Judge