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BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip — Presiding Judge Hon. Justice F. I. Kola—Olalere — Judge Hon. Justice J.T Agbadu—Fishim — Judge DATED May 7, 2010 SUIT NO. NlC/LA/27/2009 BETWEEN James Okpeta — Claimant AND Nigerdock Nigeria Plc. — Respondent REPRESENTATION: Samuel Etaifo, for the claimant Michael Akhigbe, for the respondent RULING The complaint against the respondent claiming for the following reliefs 1. A declaration that the summary dismissal of the claimant vide the letter dated 11/5/09 is wrongful and unlawful whatsoever. 2. The sum of N4,82 1,047.73k (four million, eight hundred and twenty one thousand, forty seven naira and seventy three kobo only) being the full and final entitlements of the claimant as a result of the purported termination of his employment vide the letter of dismissal dated 11/5/09 by the [respondent] company. Accompanying the complaint is the statement of claim, the list of witnesses to he called at the trial and the list of (and) the documents to he relied on. The respondent reacted by filing its memorandum of appearance, the statement of defence, the list of the witness to be called at the trial and the list of the documents to he relied on, which the respondent indicated would be the documents pleaded by the claimant. In addition, the respondent filed a notice of preliminary objection dated 22 October, 2009 but filed on 23rd October, 2009. The preliminary objection is filed pursuant to section 21(1) of the Trade Disputes Act (TDA) 1990, section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court, fly the preliminary objection, the respondent is praying for an order sinking out this suit in its entirety on the ground that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain same. The ground of the objection is that the claims/reliefs as sought by the claimant do not constitute matters that fall under the jurisdiction of this court as specified by section 21(1) of the Trade Disputes Act 1990 and section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. The respondent then prayed for such order or further orders as the court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of the case. Accompanying the preliminary objection is the respondent’s written address. In reaction to the respondent’s preliminary objection, the claimant filed his written address dated 23rd November, 2009 and flied on same day. The respondent did not tile any reply on points of law. Both parties finally adopted their respective written address. In its written address, the respondent framed one issue for the determination of the court, which is, whether having regard to section 21(1) of the Trade Disputes Act 1990 and section 7(1) of’ the National industrial Court Act 2006, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claims/reliefs as sought by the claimant in this suit. To the respondent, it is trite law that when the issue of jurisdiction is raised, it is determined by the claimant’s claim or relief. In other words, it is the claim or relief before the court that has to be looked at or examined to ascertain whether the court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit, referring to Abdulhamid v. Akar [2006] All FWLR (Pt. 321) 1191 at 1204. The respondent then went on to reproduce the claims of the claimant, which has been highlighted above, submitting that the said claims do not constitute matters that full within the jurisdiction of this court as specified by section 21(1) of the Trade Disputes Act 1990 and section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. To the respondent, it is pertinent to note that the National Industrial Court was established by the Trade Disputes Act 1990, which in section 20(l) states as follows — Section 20 Establishment of National Industrial Court (1) There shall be a National Industrial Court for Nigeria (in this Part of this Act referred to as “the Court”) which shall have such jurisdiction and powers as are conferred on ii by this or any other Act with respect to the settlement of trade disputes, the interpretation of collective agreements and matters connected herewith. The respondent then reproduced section 21(1) of the Trade Disputes Act 1990, which states as follows- Section 21 Jurisdiction of Court (1) The Court shall, to the exclusion of any court, have jurisdiction — (a) to make award for the purpose of settling trade disputes. and; (b) to determine questions as to the interpretation of— (i) any collective agreement; (ii) any award made by an arbitration tribunal or by the Court under Part I of this Act; (iii) the terms of settlement of any trade dispute as recorded in any memorandum under section 8 of this Act. Continuing, the respondent reproduced section 7(l) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, which states as follows: The Court shall have and exercise exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matters - (a) relating to — (i) labour, including trade unions and industrial relations; and (ii) environment and conditions of work, health, safety and welfare of labour, and matters incidental thereto; and (b) relating to the grant of any order to restrain any person or body from taking part in any strike, lock—out or any industrial action or any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a strike, lock—out or any industrial action; (c) relating to the determination of any question as to the interpretation of i) any collective agreement, (ii) any award made by an arbitral tribunal in respect of a labour dispute or an organisational dispute, (iii) the terms of settlement of any labour dispute, organizational dispute as may he recorded in any memorandum of settlement, (iv) any trade union constitution, and (v) any award or judgment of the Court. The respondent then submitted that the provisions of section 21 of the Trade Disputes Act 1990 and section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 respectively are very clear and unambiguous. That these sections confer jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court, which jurisdiction clearly does not include entertaining claims in respect of wrongful or unlawful dismissal of an employee as disclosed by the claimant’s claim before this court. The respondent then referred the court to Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] 2 SCNLR 341 and Mwana v. UBN Plc [2003] 16 NWLR (Pt. 846) 218, where the Xupreme Court and the Court of Appeal respectively held that a court is only competent and has jurisdiction in a case if and only if— (a) it is properly constituted as regards members and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; (b) the subject imitator of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction; and (c) the case comes before the court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of’ any condition to the exercise of jurisdiction (the emphasis is the respondent’s). The respondent then submitted that based on the arguments above, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this case as the subject matter of the case is not within its jurisdiction and, in the circumstance, the case should be struck out, urging the court to grant its prayers as contained in the notice of preliminary objection. The claimant in his written address adopted the sole issue framed by the respondent for the determination of the court. Quoting section 21(1) of the Trade Disputes Act and section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, the claimant submitted that it is trite law that (he interpretation of an Act must be given its natural and literal meaning; and where such interpretation is intended to confer or oust the jurisdiction of any particular court, such interpretation of the Act must he strictly and scrupulously considered. That a careful perusal of the above two sections shows clearly that the National Industrial Court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain this case. That Section 48 of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. T8 LFN 2004 declines trade dispute as “any dispute between employers and workers or between workers and workers which is connected with the employment or non—employment or the terms of employment and physical conditions of work of any person”. The claimant referred the court to Michelin (Nig) Ltd v. footwear, Leather and Rubber Products senior Staff Association DJNIC at page 90 Ratio 2 and submitted that a trade dispute, properly so called, must contain two basic ingredients namely: a) a dispute or disagreement between the two parties mentioned must be shown to he in existence, and b) the dispute must he connected with the employment or non—employment or the terms of employment etc of any person. The court was then referred to Management of Femstar and Company Ltd v. National Union a/hood, Beverages and Tobacco Employees DJN1C at page 171 Ratio 1. The claimant continued that where the procedure of the termination of appointment is challenged or contrary to the terms of employment/service, it is a trade dispute within the provisions of the Trade Disputes Act, referring to Nigerian Tobacco Company Ltd v. National Union of Food, Beverages and Tobacco Employees DJNIC at page 111 Ratios 1 and 2 even though there is a general misconception that the National Industrial Court will only exercise jurisdiction or entertain a case if the dismissal of a worker is related to Trade union activities, To the claimant, labour as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary is “work, toil, service, mental or physical exertion. Term normally refers to work for wages as opposed to work for profit…” In order words, that by virtue of section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction to entertain any dispute relating to master-servant relationship. The claimant went on to submit that the jurisdiction of any court is determined by the reliefs/prayers of the claimant. That a critical scrutiny of the claimant’s compliant (writ of summons) and statement of claim shows that the dispute between the parties is connected with the terms of employment (wrongful dismissal) and hence a dispute between a master and a servant. Moreover, that section 11(1) and particularly subsection (2) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 in respect of master-servant disputes whereby all master-servant cases in any other court shall abate within 1 year after the commencement date of the National Industrial Court Act in 2006. Consequently, that this case in every ramification is a trade dispute and sounding in labour. In conclusion, the claimant urged the court to dismiss the respondent’s preliminary objection as being unmeritorious, misconceived and mischievous given that this court has jurisdiction to entertain the case at hand since it is rooted in labour and also a trade dispute as a result of the wrongful dismissal of the claimant by the respondent. As indicated earlier, the respondent did not react on points of law. In considering the merit or otherwise of the submissions of the parties, we must make the point that the reference by the respondent to section 20 of the Trade Disputes Act and references by both parties to section 21 of the Trade Disputes Act did not take account of the fact that both sections are now repealed. The said sections come within Part 11 of the Trade Disputes Act, which by Section 5(1) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 is now repealed. So, it is unfortunate that both parties would choose to refer to repealed provisions in arguing their respective positions. The sole issue for determination is whether the claims of the claimant come within the jurisdiction of this court. As argued by the respondent and by the authority of Madukolu v. Nkemdilin, supra, and Mwana v. URN Plc, supra, a court is competent and has jurisdiction in a case if inter alia the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction. The question then is whether a claim in relation to a dismissal from work and that for a sum of money in relation to a termination all come within the purview of section 7(1 )(a) of the NIC Act 2006. In other words, are they claims in relation to labour or matters incidental to labour’? While the respondent argues that they arc not, the claimant argues that they are. In several eases, the position of this court is that issues of dismissal/termination are matters of labour or at worst are matters incidental to labour as provided for under section 7(1)(a) of the NIC Act 2006; and that this position is reinforced by the In Nigerian Union of Pharmacists, Medical Technologists and Professions Allied to Medicine v. Obafemi Awolowo university Teaching Hospital Complex Management Board, In re: Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria and Nigerian Medical Association, unreported Suit No. NIC/8/2006 delivered on May 22, 2007, for instance, this court held that ‘under the NIC Act 2006, jurisdiction is subject based’. This court then went further to hold in (Godwin Tosanwumi v. Gulf Agency and Shipping Nigeria Limited unreported Suit No. NIC/18/2006 delivered on 14th June 2007, that any matter that qualifies as ‘labour’ or incidental to it will qualify as such and so would confer jurisdiction on this court. In Aloysius v. Alan Dick & Co and ors unreported Suit No. NIC/58/2007 delivered on November 28, 2008, this court in reviewing the authorities held as follows — The argument of the 1 and 2nd respondents that this court’s jurisdiction is limited to ‘labour, including trade unions and industrial relations’ and does not extend to termination of employment is in our view not correct. We agree with the claimant that labour relations means the relationship between workers and employers which this court has jurisdiction to entertain. Section 7(1) (a) of the NIC Act 2006 provides that this court shall have and exercise exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matters relating to labour, including trade unions and industrial relations and environment and conditions of work, health, safety and welfare of labour, and matters incidental there to. Without necessarily defining all words used in this provision, it may, however, he ideal to define the words, “labour” and “industrial relations”. The Blacks dictionary defines “labour” as the term usually used in referring to work for wages as opposed to profit. And “industrial relations” is defined in the Blacks Law Dictionary as ‘all dealings and relationships between an employer and its employees, including collective bargaining about issues such as salty and benefits’. It, therefore, goes without saying that the grievances of the claimants are properly within the jurisdiction of this court. This court held in Godwin Tosanwumi v. Gulf Agency and Shipping Nigeria Limited unreported Suit No. NIC/l8/2006, the ruling of which was delivered on June 14, 2007, and reiterated in Mrs. G.I. Oyeleke and ors v. NICON Insurance Plc and anor unreported Suit No. NIC/ 14/2006 delivered on November 14, 2007 that the analysis of section 7 of the NIC Act 2006 reveals the wide ambit of matters that kill within the meaning of the term ‘labour’. The court continued that this means that any matter which qualifies as labour or incidental to it will qualify as such and so would confer jurisdiction on this court. We therefore hold that this court has jurisdiction to entertain [these] grievances. The claimants in this suit are complaining about their disengagement from employment by respondents and asking for re—instatement and payment of their entitlements. All of this deals with conditions and terms of employment and so come within the purview of labour under section 7 of the NIC Act. We have not been shown any reason/authority to warrant our departing form this reasoning and the authorities cited above. We consequently hold that the claims of the claimant come within the jurisdiction of this court. The preliminary objection of the respondent consequently kills and is hereby dismissed. The matter shall, therefore, proceed to heating. We make no order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. _____________________________ Hon. Justice B.B. Kanyip Presiding Judge ______________________ _____________________ Hon. Justice F.I. Kola-Olalere Hon. Justice J.T. Agbadu-Fishim Judge Judge