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BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS Hon. Justice B. A. Adejumo - Presiding Judge Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip - Judge Hon. Justice O. A. Obaseki-Osaghae - Judge DATE: JULY 27, 2010 SUIT NO. NIC/LA/1M/2009 IN THE MATTER OF TRADE UNIONS ACT IN THE MATTER OF INTRA-UNION DISPUTE IN THE MATTER OF NATIONAL UNION OF ROAD TRANSPORT WORKERS IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER ORDERS 11 AND 22 OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT RULES 2007. BETWEEN: 1. Alhaji Lateef Olanrewaju (Branch Chairman, Lagelu Mini Bus) of NURTW Oyo State Chapter 2. Alhaji Rafiu Agboola (Branch Chairman, Ibadan North East 2 Inter-State) of NURTW Oyo State Chapter 3. Alhaji Abass Adigun (Egbeda Inter-State) of NURTW Oyo State Chapter 4. Alhaji Azeez Fakunle (Ibadan North Inter State) of NURTW Oyo State Chapter 5. Alhaji Jimoh Oladokun (Chairman Egbeda Taxi) of NURTW Oyo State Chapter 6. Alhaji Isiaka Atanda (Secretary Ibadan North Mini Bus) of NURTW Oyo State Chapter 7. Pastor Joseph Odeyemi (Secretary North Easti Inter-State) of NURTW Applicants Oyo State Chapter 8 Mr. Mustapha Falade (Secretary Akinyele Mini-Bus) of NURTW Oyo State Chapter 9. Taofeek Oyerinde (Chairman South East Mini Bus) of NURTW Oyo State Chapter 10. Michael Aregwaga (Secretary Akinyele Taxi) of NURTW Oyo State Chapter 11. Azeez Mogaji (Chairman, Oyo task Inter-State) of NURTW Oyo State Chapter. 12. Wasiu Arogundade (Chairman North West Inter-State) of NURTW Oyo State Chapter 13. Alhaji Rasheed Oladele (Branch Secretary Lagelu Inter -State) of NURTW Oyo State Chapter - Applicants AND: Alhaji Lateef Salako a.k.a. Eleweomo National Union of Road Transport Workers - Defendants REPRESENTATION Michael F. Lana, with him are A, M. Adeyemo and B. S. Akinola, for the applicants. . O. Sanni, with him is T. A. Asudemade, for the 1st defendant. . T. Ologunorisa, for the 2nd defendant. JUDGMENT This is application for judicial review. By a motion on notice dated and filed on 13th October, 2009, theic applicants are praying for the following orders - 1. AN ORDER of judicial review for an injunction restraining a person from acting in any office which he is not entitled to act. 2. A Declaration that the purported meeting of so-called State Executive Council purportedly held on 22" June, 2009 without the knowledge, consent or authority of the State Chairman, State Secretary and the complainants who are officers of the union is ultra vires, unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect. 3. A Declaration that the purported vote of no confidence purportedly passed by the so-called State Executive Council without affording the State Chairman the opportunity of defending himself is a breach of the constitution of the union and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 4. A Declaration that the purported removal of Alhaji Lateef Akinsola as Chairman of the Oyo State Executive Council leading to the inability of the claimants to continue acting in their positions is ultra vires, unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect. 5. A Declaration that the appointment of the 1st defendant as the Acting Chairman of the State Executive Council of the union on the purported meeting and vote of no confidence by the 2nd defendant without affording the complainants or Alhaji Lateef Akinsola a hearing is a breach of their fundamental human rights, illegal, unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect. 6. A Declaration that the complainants and the officers mentioned in paragraph 2 of the statement of facts are the authentic members of the Oyo State Executive Council of the union having the rights to run the affairs of the union for a period of four years beginning from 18l1 June, 2008. 7. An Order of injunction restraining the 1st defendant from parading himself as the acting Chairman of the Oyo State Executive Council of the union. 8. An Order of injunction restraining the 2nd defendant from recognizing or in any way dealing with the 1st defendant as the Acting Chairman of the union in Oyo State. 9. An Order of mandamus directing the 1st defendant to hand over the secretariat of the union in Oyo State to the elected Executive Council aforesaid immediately. 10. An Order of mandamus compelling the 2nd defendant to reinstate the complainants and other members of the Executive Council aforesaid into the positions held by them prior to 30th May, 2009. 11. AND for such further orders. companying the motion is an affidavit in support sworn to by Comrade Lekan Aleshinloye, the cretary of NURTW, Oyo state Council. The affidavit in support is in terms similar to the statement facts filed by the applicants. In the statement of facts, the applicants asserted as follows - STATEMENT OF FACTS 1. The [applicants] are Branch Chairmen and Secretaries of the National Union of Road Transport Workers (union) and along with the following constitute the State Executive Council in Oyo State. 2. On 18th June, 2008, the Oyo State Executive Council of the NURTW was sworn in and among them were the following : i. Alhaji Lateef Akinsola.............................Chairman ii. Alhaji Bawa Tijani..................................Deputy Chairman iii. Alhaji Lateef Salako.................................1s Vice Chairman iv. Alhaji Abideen Olajide..............................2ND Vice Chairman v. Comrade Lekan Aleshinloye.......................Secretary vi. Alhaji Lateef Bello...................................Treasurer The swearing in ceremony was conducted at Mapo hall Ibadan by all the members of the National Executive Council of the 2nd defendant led by its President Alhaji Gidado Hamman. 3. Thereafter the [applicants] and their counter-parts in other branches within the State were sworn in by the Chairman, Alhaji Lateef Akinsola in accordance with the union's constitution. 4. The 2nd defendant is a duly registered trade union governed by its constitution, as amended. The constitution is pleaded. 5. The complainants and the defendants are all members of the 2nd defendant. 6. The State Executive Council is composed as follows — i. State Chairman ii. Deputy State Chairman iii. State Vice Chairman iv. 2nd State Vice Chairman v. 3rd State Vice Chairman vi. State Secretary vii. Assistant State Secretary viii. State Treasurer ix. Deputy Treasurer x. State Financial Secretary xi. State Auditor xii. Assistant State Auditor xiii. Two State Trustees xiv. Chairmen, Secretaries and Treasurers of all branches within the State. 7................(There is no paragraph 7.) 8. Under the union's constitution, the State Secretary is the head of the State Secretariat and he is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the State Council. He is the only one entitled after consultation with the Chairman to summon a meeting of the State Council. 9. The union's constitution has laid down the procedure for discipline. 10. Sometimes in June 2009, the 1st defendant reported a case of murder against the State Chairman, Alhaji Lateef Akinsola and other people which allegation has not been heard by any court. 11. Consequently the 1st defendant without any authority called a meeting of the State Council without giving such notice to any of the members of the Executive Council mentioned in paragraph 4 above except himself. 12. Prior to the said meeting some members were made to pass a purported vote-of-no-confidence on the Chairman, Alhaji Lateef Akinsola without giving any notice of any allegation or giving him the opportunity of defending himself. 13. Thereafter all other members of the State Executive Council including the [applicants] were driven away from their positions while the 1st defendant approached the National Secretariat of the 2nd defendant for approval to constitute a new Executive with him as the Chairman. 14. The 2nd defendant relying on the said representation approved the request and made the 1st defendant the Acting Chairman of the State Council in Oyo State. 15. No allegation was levied against the [applicants] or any member of the Executive Council ~ including the said Alhaji Lateef Akinsola and they were never called upon to defend any allegation. 16. Under the union's constitution, if the Chairman [is] suspended or removed only the Deputy Chairman can act as Chairman. 17. The 1st defendant has driven away those alleged to be loyal to Alhaji Lateef Akinsola from office and the garages thereby depriving them of their livelihood. 18. The [applicants'] tenure is four years. 19. Alhaji Lateef Akinsola acting for himself and all appealed to the 2nd defendant who in its reply dated 8th September, 2009 claimed reliance on the "Unanimous decision of the Oyo State Executive Council (SEC) at the meeting held on the 22nd June, 2009" as reasons for not acceding to Alhaji Akinsola's request to rescind the approval given to the 1st defendant to act as Chairman of the union in the State. A copy of the letter is pleaded. 20. The Secretary of the union never summoned any meeting of the Oyo State Executive Council (SEC) nor served any notice of such meeting on any member of the Executive Council of any meeting purportedly held on 22nd June, 2009. 21. The 1st defendant caused the Police to arrest and detain the Chairman, Alhaji Lateef Akinsola and it was in his absence that he took all the steps stated above. 22. There was a publication alleging that it was the 1st defendant that masterminded the killing of his guards and to frame Alhaji Akinsola in order to topple the latter. A copy of the publication is pleaded. 23. The Director of Public Prosecution, Oyo State has directed that the 1st defendant be arrested. A copy of the advice is attached and pleaded. 24. The President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria by letter dated 30th June, 2009 has directed the Inspector General of Police to investigate the allegation contained- The DPP's advice when the Police refused to honour the DPP's directive. A copy of the letter is pleaded. The applicants then claimed the same reliefs enumerated in the motion on notice except the first relief, which was left out. The grounds upon which the reliefs are sought were then set out in the statement of facts in the following terms - 1. The applicants are affected by the unlawful removal of Alhaji Lateef Akinsola as Chairman, NURTW Oyo State Chapter. 2. The applicants and the said Alhaji Lateef Akinsola and his Deputy Alhaji Bawa Tijani were not heard before they were removed. 3. The applicants were denied a hearing before they were prevented from continuing holding their offices. 4. The constitution of the NURTW was breached in the appointment of 1st defendant as Acting Chairman of the union in Oyo State thereby breaching the rights of the applicants to be governed by an elected Chairman or to be allowed the right to participate in the election/ selection of the Acting Chairman. 5. The appointment of the 1st defendant as Acting Chairman of the union over the applicants is ultra vires the 2nd defendant and thereby null, void and of no effect. The applicants went on to file what they call 'Affidavit Verifying Facts' deposed to by Comrade Lekan Aleshinloye in the following terms - 1. That I am the deponent in the affidavit in support of the motion on notice for judicial review of an injunction to restrain the 1st respondent from acting in any office which he is not entitled to act. 2. To the best of my knowledge and belief all the facts contained in the said affidavit in support are true. 3. That I depose to this affidavit in good faith and in accordance with Oaths Law. The 1st defendant in reaction first filed a counter-affidavit and then a preliminary objection. The counter-affidavit was deposed to by Moses Dahunsi, Assistant Financial Secretary of the NURTW, Oyo State Council, and is in the following terms — 1. That I am the Assistant Financial Secretary of the National Union of Road Workers, Oyo State Council. 2. That by virtue of my position I am familiar with the facts of this case. 3. That I have the authority and consent of the 1st defendant to swear to this affidavit. 4. That the 1st defendant became the acting state chairman of the Oyo State Council of the 2nd defendant on 22nd June 2009. 5. That the 2nd defendant is the umbrella body of our union which exercises control and supervision over all state councils. 6. That paragraph 1 of the affidavit in support of motion is admitted to the extent that the said Lekan Aleshinloye was the Secretary of the Oyo State Council until the 22nd June, 2009. 7. That the said Lekan Aleshinloye has since abandoned his duty post since 22nd June 2009 and has not returned up till date. 8. That contrary to paragraph 2 of the affidavit in support of motion, the deponent does not have the authority of the Oyo State Executive Council to swear to the said affidavit. 9. That the said Lekan Aleshinloye is not a party to this case. 10. That the 2nd defendant has since appointed another Secretary for the Oyo State Council i.e. Sunday Yeye 11. That with reference to paragraph 6 of the affidavit in support of motion, we are also governed by all relevant laws of the land. 12. That with reference to paragraph 8 of the affidavit in support of motion, in the absence of the Secretary, meetings could be summoned by any member of the State Executive Council. 13. That contrary to paragraph 10 of the affidavit in support of motion, the said Alhaji Lateef Akinsola, the erstwhile State Chairman, was arrested by the Police in connection with the gruesome murder of the two security guards of the 1st defendant and attempt to wipe out the entire family of the 1st defendant. 14. That contrary to the assertion contained in the said paragraph 10, the arrest of Alhaji Lateef Akinsola was based on commission of a criminal offence. 15. That the said Alhaji Lateef Akinsola was soon after the killing of the two security men invited by the police. 16. That the said Alhaji Lateef Akinsola failed to honour the invitation until he was declared wanted and eventually arrested by the police. 17. That the said Alhaji Lateef Akinsola was later arraigned at the Chief Magistrate Court Ibadan. 18. That the said Alhaji Lateef Akinsola is now on bail. 19. That the murder charge is still pending and hanging on Alhaji Lateef Akinsola. 20. That contrary to paragraph 11 of the affidavit in support of the motion on notice, all the claimants herein signed the document passing vote of no confidence on the said Alhaji Lateef Akinsola. 21. That the vote of no confidence was passed after the said Alhaji Lateef Akinsola was arrested for murder. 22. That contrary to paragraph 13 of the affidavit in support of motion, the deponent herein and all other members of the State Executive Council except the 1st defendant absconded. 23. That the 1st defendant was the only one left behind together with other loyal members of the union. 24. That the deponent to the affidavit in support of the motion and others absconded to avoid Police arrest. 25. That contrary to paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the affidavit in support of motion, the [applicants] and all other loyalists of the said Alhaji Lateef Akinsola voluntarily left the State Headquarters and have not returned up till date. 26. That the 1st defendant did not drive away anybody. 27. That we are all members of the same union. 28. That the positions hitherto occupied by the [applicants] have all been filled. 29. That I know as a fact that the fact leading to the suspension of the said Alhaji Lateef Akinsola was not due to intra-union dispute. 30. That the said Alhaji Lateef Akinsola was suspended as a result of the murder charge now hanging on him. 31. That the [applicants] chose to abandon their duty posts and the State Headquarters. 32. That with reference to paragraph 19 of the affidavit in support of the motion, the said Alhaji Lateef Akinsola wrote to the 2nd defendant to remove the 1st defendant from office after his arraignment in the court for murder and his bail. 33. That the 2nd defendant took their decision in the best interest of the union to allow the law to take its normal course. 34. That contrary to paragraphs 21 and 22 of the affidavit in support of motion, the Police in performing their duty arrested the said Alhaji Lateef Akinsola. 35. That contrary to paragraph 23 and the exhibit attached thereto, the 1st defendant was never a wanted person and did not commit the offence alleged. 36. That the 1st defendant has always been available in Ibadan since the purported legal advice attached as Exhibit D. 37. That on the contrary it was Alhaji Lateef Akinsola that was arrested and taken to Abuja for prosecution over the matter. 38. That persons that are connected with the alleged offence are presently facing different charges in court. 39. That both Exhibits D and Dl procured from official source have nothing to do with intra-union dispute. 40. That the issue of the purported advice to prosecute lsl defendant does not relate to the issue at hand. 41. That contrary to paragraph 26 of the affidavit in support of the motion on notice, no criminal charge of whatever description is hanging over the 1st defendant. 42. That both the deponent to the affidavit in support of motion and the said Alhaji Lateef Akinsola are meddlesome interlopers in this suit. 43. That Alhaji Lateef Akinsola is on suspension pending the determination of the criminal charges against him. 44. That all the [applicants] have absconded from their duty post and have since been replaced. 45. That there is no intra-union dispute in the Oyo State Council of the 2nd defendant. 46.....................(There is no paragraph 46.) 47. That the change of baton was due to the criminal allegation and ongoing trial of the said Alhaji Lateef Akinsola. 48. That it is in the interest of justice to refuse the originating motion of the [applicants]. 49. That I swear to this counter-affidavit in good faith. The 1st defendant, as we indicated earlier, filed a preliminary objection praying the court to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction. The grounds upon which the preliminary objection is based are — 1) The [applicants] lack the locus standi to bring this action. 2) There is no industrial dispute to clothe this Court with jurisdiction. 3) The [applicants] are no longer members of the State Executive Council of the National Union of Roads Transport Workers (Oyo State Council) having been replaced. 4) The action is not properly constituted. 5) The [applicants] are mere unit officers and therefore not covered by Trade Unions Act. 6) All the [applicants] signed vote of no confidence against the former chairman i.e. Alhaji Lateef Akinsola (TOKYO). The 1st defendant then urged that he will be relying on all the originating processes filed in arguing the preliminary objection. The 2nd defendant also filed a preliminary objection praying for the following - 1. AN ORDER dismissing this action on the ground that this Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain same. 2. AN ORDER dismissing this action on the ground that it is an abuse of the process of this Court. The grounds upon which the preliminary objection is based are (a) The [applicants] lacks the locus standi to institute this action. (b) The subject matter of the [applicants'] action is a subject of litigation before this Court in Suit No. NIC/LA/22/2009. (c) The claim of the [applicants] does not relate to any dispute personal to them or arising between them and the 2nd defendant. (d) The claim of the [applicants] is statute-barred. (e) The suit is not initiated under the due process of law. Hereafter, parties agreed to argue the case on record and so filed written addresses. The applicants' en address is dated 26th October 2009 but filed on 27th October, 2009. APPLICANTS' WRITTEN ADDRESS The applicants commenced their written addresses by first reiterating the orders they are praying for, each order orders have been enumerated earlier. Thereafter, the applicants reiterated the facts relevant to affidavit in support of their motion on notice. To the applicants, the relevant facts to the affidavit 1. The applicants as Branch Chairmen and Branch Secretaries alongside (i) Alhaji Lateef Akinsola (Chairman) (ii) Alhaji Bawa Tijani (Deputy Chairman) (iii) Alhaji Lateef Salako (1st defendant) and (1st Vice Chairman) (iv) Alhaji Abideen Olajide (2nd Vice Chairman) (v) Comrade Lekan Aleshinloye (Secretary) (vi) Alhaji Lateef Bello (Treasurer) were sworn in as Oyo State Executive Council of the union on 18th June, 2008 by the National President of the union. 2. The members of State Executive Council are to hold office for a term of four (4) years and are eligible for re-election. 3. The 1st Vice-Chairman who is also the 1st defendant herein reported to the Police that his security guards were murdered and he suspected the Chairman, Alhaji Lateef Akinsola (a.k.a. Tokyo). 4. Based on the allegation, Alhaji Akinsola (hereafter called the Chairman) was arrested and detained. 5. Before the conclusion of investigation, the 1st defendant, as the accuser, purportedly convened a meeting of the State Executive Council (SEC) and forwarded a purported "Vote of No Confidence" to the National Secretariat of the union on 2nd June, 2009. The National Secretariat of the 2nd defendant, without affording the said Chairman and members of his Executive Council an opportunity to be heard, took a decision to appoint the 1st defendant as Acting Chairman, Oyo State Council on 29th July, 2009 and this was approved by the National Executive Council (NEC). See Exhibit B. 6. Everything between the fracas that led to the 1st defendant's allegation of murder and the appointment of 1st defendant as Acting Chairman happened between 4th June and 29*' July, 2009. 7. The said Chairman was in prison custody while the applicants and all members of the State _ Executive Council had been driven away into hiding by the 1st defendant when the purported meeting, appointment and approval took place. 8. The said Chairman was granted bail by the High Court without any opposition by the State. See Exhibit E. No information has been filed till today by the State in any High Court charging the Chairman for any offence. The applicants then framed the following four issues for the determination of the court. They are - i. Whether any meeting of the State Executive Council, notice of which was not issued by the State Secretary, is valid and if not whether any decision made thereat is valid. ii. Whether the removal of the Chairman and other members of the State Executive Council, in the circumstances of this case, is valid under the union's constitution. iii. Whether the 2nd defendant is bound by the rule of natural justice. iv. Whether the appointment of the 1st defendant is constitutional. Issue (i) The applicants commenced their submissions regarding issue (i) by first citing Article 7(a) of the ion's constitution (Exhibit A), which provides that 'the union shall be governed by this constitution'. To the applicants, the word "shall" in this context is said to be imperative. In Lion ink (Nig) Plc v. Amaikom [2008] All FWLR (Pt. 417) 85 at 113 where the Court of Appeal said – "The word 'shall' has been interpreted by this Court in the case of Alhaji Titilayo Anibi v. Jimoh Sotimehin (supra) at page 473 paragraph B where the Court of Appeal states thus:-The use of mandatory words such as 'must' and 'shall' in a statute is naturally prima facie imperative and admits no discretion. Thus if an absolute enactment is contravened or neglected, a court of law will treat the thing which has been done contrary to the enactment as invalid and altogether void (emphasis is the applicants'). The applicants continued that the guiding principles on governance of the union are contained in its constitution and anything done contrary to the provisions of that constitution is invalid and together void. To the applicants, the said constitution in Article 7 creates the organs that will run its affairs, starting, at the apex, with the Quadrennial National Delegates Conference and ending at the bottom with the units. Other articles provide for the composition of each organ, the qualification of those to serve in each organ, the powers and duties of each organ, the meetings of each organ and its quorum and finally the powers and duties of specific officers of each organ. The applicants then submitted that the cardinal rule of interpretation is that a statute must be read as a whole in order to get the correct meaning of any particular expression, referring to Aw use v. Odili [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 212) 1611 at 1640 B - C. It is in the light of the above that we have to look at the whole Constitution and the powers of each organ and officer and the relationship between them. The applicants continued that this case borders on two interrelated actions by two different organs, namely - (i) the purported meeting of the State Executive Council purportedly passing a vote of no confidence and removing the Chairman; and (ii) the "appointment" of the 1st defendant as Acting Chairman by the National Secretariat of the union and National Executive Council respectively based on the purported removal of the incumbent chairman by a vote of no confidence. The applicants then referred the court to Article 17, which creates the State Executive Council; Article 17(1), which states its composition; Article 17(2), which states its powers and Article 17(3), which refers to meetings. That Article 27 provides for the powers and duties of State officers. Articles 27(3) states as follows - The State Secretary shall be appointed by the National Executive Council. He shall be the head of the State Secretariat and shall be responsible for the day-to-day administration of the State Council. He shall be responsible for the performance of the following duties'. (vi) issuing out notice of meetings of the State Council and the State Administrative Council in consultation with the State Chairman (emphasis is the applicants'). That the only other provision relating to meetings of the State Executive Council is Article 18(2)(v) which confers the power to convene the meeting of the State Council on the State Administrative council. In other words, the State Administrative Council has the power to convene the meeting of the State Executive Council while the State Secretary has the duty of issuing notices of meetings of the State Executive Council and the State Administrative Council after consultation with the state Chairman. By Article 18(1), the State Chairman is also the Chairman of the State administrative Council. A combined reading of the two Articles show that no meeting of either State Executive Meeting or State Administrative Council could be held without a notice issued by the ate Secretary in consultation with the Chairman. No other person is given that power or duty. akoju v. Adeleke [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 353) 3 at 88 G - H, Tobi, JSC said - It is good law that where the Constitution or a statute provides for a pre-condition to the attainment of a particular situation, the pre-condition must be fulfilled or satisfied before the particular situation will be said to have been attained or reached. Our common and popular pet expression is 'condition precedent' which must be fulfilled before the completion of the journey, which is the terminus. The applicants continued that Article 17(3) states that "the State Council shall meet once every month and the quorum shall be 60% of all the branches in the State", while Article 27(3)(vi) makes :he sole duty of the State Secretary to issue notices of meetings. The notices are to be issued to the officers mentioned in Article 17(1). That any meeting held without such notice is invalid and void. Continuing, the applicants submitted that the 2nd defendant in Exhibit 13 wrote inter-alia that - ...the National Secretariat of the Union took the decision to appoint Alhaji Abdullateef Salako as the Acting Chairman, Oyo State Council based on Vote of No Confidence passed on you which was duly signed by seventy one (71) branches of the Union in Oyo State. Your request to withdraw the letter authorizing Alhaji Abdullateef Salako as the State Chairman and reinstate you would not be entertained as it was the unanimous decision of the Oyo State Executive Council (SEC) at the meeting held on the 22nd June, 2009 where all members were in attendance and approved at the National Executive Council (NEC) meeting held on 29th July, 2009 at Chida Hotel Abuja (emphasis is the applicants'). Anakoju v. Adeleke (supra) at 96 paragraphs D - E, Tobi, JSC posed some questions thus - Relating to the above is the service of the notice of allegation on each member of the House. Was the provision complied with in the absence of the Speaker? Again, who served the notice and when was it served? Was section 188(3) complied with? If so, who conducted the proceedings leading to the motion that the allegation against the Government be investigated .or not? the State Secretary did not issue any notice of any meeting to any member of the State .ve Council. Applicants continued that it follows that whoever convened that meeting or issued notice of that I and whoever presided over that meeting acted ultra vires his position and the meeting so 'held at all) unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect. That since one cannot build anything ling (Mcfoy v. VAC Ltd [1962] AC 152 at 160) any decision or action at that meeting is ultra unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect, urging to so hold. The applicants referred the D page 727 of the book, Administrative Law by Bradley and Ewing (14n edition) where the I authors wrote as follows - The ultra vires doctrine cannot be used to question the validity of an Act of Parliament; but serves to control those who exceed the powers which an Act has given. The simplest instance of the rule is where a local council whose capacity to act and to regulate private activities derived from statute acts outside the scope of that authority. See R v. Richmond Upon Thames Council ex parte McCarthy and Stone Ltd [1992] 2 AC 48. (ii), (iii) and (iv) The applicants agued issues (ii), (iii) and (iv) together. Firstly, that it is clear from the facts on record paragraph 2 of Exhibit B or part thereof is not true. It claimed that the letter authorizing the 1st claimant as the State Chairman was "unanimous decision of the Oyo State Executive Council SEC meeting held on 22nd June, 2009 where all members were in attendance". At least the applicants herein were not in attendance. So also was the Chairman, Alhaji Akinsola not in attendance; the Secretary did not issue any notice, how then did "all the members" get invited to the assuming Exhibit B is true, the questions that arise are - (i) Does the State Executive Council have power to appoint any person as State Chairman? (ii) Does the National Secretariat of the union have power to appoint any person as Acting State Chairman? (iii) Does the State Executive Council have power to appoint any person as State Chairman? (iv) Does the National Executive Council possess the power to approve the acts of the State Executive Council? Counsel to the applicants then took up the second question first. To him, paragraph 1 of Exhibit argues that - I wish to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of complaint dated August 31, 2009. Captioned above and to informed you that the National Secretariat of the Union took the decision to appoint Alhaji Abdullateef Salako as the Acting State Chairman, Oyo State Council based on Vote of No Confidence passed on you, which was duly signed by Seventy one (71) branch of the Union in Oyo State. Counsel, the clear and unambiguous meaning of the above was that it was the National Secretariat; union that took the decision to appoint the 1st defendant as Acting State Chairman and that …ion to appoint was based on the passage of Vote of No Confidence by the SEC. That Article 21 of the union's constitution provided for the composition and functions of the National Secretariat of union, which are two and none of them relates to the appointment of an Acting State Chairman for Chairman. In fact, that apart from the Secretary, all other officers of the State Executive Council are elected. Article 27(1) states that the State Chairman "shall be elected by the State Delegates Conference" while Article 16 creating the States Delegates Conference states it shall: (v) Elect officers of the State Council. The State Administrative Council shall have the power to convene a special State Conference as and when the occasion demands, provided 2/3 majority of the branches in the State vote in favour of a motion to that effect. Furthermore, that Article 17 states that "the State Council shall be under the control of the Zonal Council in which they are grouped." In other words, they are not under the control of the National Secretariat of the union. The said appointment is, therefore, ultra vires, unconstitutional, null and void. On the first question, counsel submitted that it is not clear whether the second paragraph of Exhibit B says that it was the Oyo State Executive Council that unanimously took the decision to authorize the 1st defendant to be the State Chairman at its meeting held on 22nd June, 2009 or whether the authorization came from the NEC after approving the unanimous decision of the State Executive Council. That if the letter of authority emanated From the SEC, then it is invalid because it is obvious that the State Secretary did not call or attend the meeting and therefore did not write the letter. If it was the NEC, the question is who wrote informing the NEC of what transpired at the meeting? Who recorded the minutes of the meeting? Article 27(3)(ii) and (iii) of the union's constitution provides inter alia in respect of the State Secretary as follows — He shall be responsible for the performance of the following duties - ii. The writing up of the minutes of meetings of all the State Council and Administrative Council. iii. Keeping all the documents of the union and all records of the activities of the State Council. To counsel, it is obvious however that the whole thing was stage-managed by the 1st defendant who was the 1st Vice-Chairman of the SEC. That after perusing the constitution of the union, the applicants do not see any duty or power assigned to the 1st - 3rd Vice-Chairmen other that being members of the SEC; they can participate in SEC meetings but cannot call meetings, write letters or minutes of meetings or correspond with any of the organs of the union or outsiders. In other words, the procedure leading to...approval by NEC is unknown to the constitution. This is another flagrant violation of the constitution. The approval is, therefore, null and void. Counsel then submitted that it is not within the functions and powers of the NEC to approve the actions of the SEC. Article 17 of the constitution specifically provided that the SEC "shall be under the control of the Zonal Council in which they are grouped." Article 14(2)(i) (iii) and (iv) of the Constitution provides that - (i) The Zonal Councils shall have the power to coordinate the activities of all State Councils within its jurisdiction. (ii).................................................................. (iii) The Zonal Council shall have the powers to discipline any of the State Councils which fail to abide by their decision(s) in compliance to section (2) subsection (1) above. Reports(s) of such action(s) taken shall be notified to the National Secretariat for confirmation. (iv) No State Council under the Zonal Council shall bye-pass it to deal directly with the National Secretariat on matters of complaints, etc except it is complex in nature. Counsel then submitted that where there was a proper and valid decision of the SEC (made at a meeting held compulsorily under the chairmanship of the State Chairman) it is the Zonal Council under section (2)(i) that it could be reported to and not NEC; it is the Zonal Council that could -discipline the State Council and not the State Council itself and it is the decision of the Zonal council that could go to the National Secretarial for confirmation, not the decision of the State council. There is nothing in Exhibit B to say the action of the SEC, which it claimed was unanimous", was complex in nature to warrant direct reference to the NEC. Even then, there is no answer of confirmation of the acts of SEC vested in the National Secretariat. By-passing the Zonal council, therefore, makes the decision or authorization or approval by NEC invalid. In Abubakar v.attorney-General of the Federation [2008] All FWLR (Pt. 441) 870 at 908 A - D Abdullahi PCA held that - In any case, the Supreme Court in the case of CCB (Nig) Plc v. Attorney-General, Anambra State [1992] 8 NWLR (Pt. 261) 528 at 556 stated the law on method of performing a duty imposed by statutory provision to the effect that it is the method that must be complied with as follows: Now it is the law that where a statute provides for a particular method of performing a duty regulated by the statute, that method and no other must have to be adopted. And in Nuhu Sani Ibrahim v. INEC [1999] 8 NWLR (Pt. 614) 334 at 352, this Court per Salami JCA reiterated the law as follows - It is settled law that where a legislation lays down a procedure for doing a thing, there should be no other method of doubt. The wordings of section 306 of the Constitution are clear, plain and unambiguous; therefore, there should be no other procedure for removal of the plaintiff, the Vice-President, other than what is prescribed by the Constitution. Counsel then submitted that it is not even within the power or functions of the National Secretariat of the union or NEC under Articles 21 and 10(3) to appoint or approve the appointment of an Acting Chairman or substantive Chairman. What is not provided for is excluded (Awuse v. Odili, supra). In the written address, the applicants proceeded with their submissions in a section titled, 'Removal'. Removal To counsel to the applicants, they have perused the whole constitution and do not find where it is provided that a State Chairman could be removed by the State Executive Council barely passing a Vote of No Confidence. But that assuming, without conceding, that the removal was a sort of disciplinary action, then it has to be considered: who could take the action, on what basis could it be taken and what should be the procedure. Article 17(2)(xv) provides: The State Council shall have the power to discipline any officer(s) or member(s) of the State Council, branch or unit who commits the following offences: Embezzlement of union funds, printing and selling of illegal receipts, stickers and membership ID cards to unsuspecting members, disobeying lawful instructions, fighting on duty, carrying destructive propaganda by way of writing false and frivolous petition against officer(s) or members of the union, drinking alcohol beverages while on duty, taking of narcotics or dangerous drugs while on duty and any other act(s) which may be considered prejudicial to the interest of the union. (There should be limitation of fine and suspension.) To counsel, firstly, it is clear that (i) unless an officer of SEC commits any of the offences stated above, he cannot be disciplined and (ii) the punishment could only be a limited fine or suspension but not removal from office. Secondly, that there is nowhere in the constitution where any organ or officer is given the power to remove a State Chairman. The only way he can be removed, indirectly or constructively, is - a) If he is expelled totally from the union, Article 42(5) and (6)(v) - even then, he must have been found guilty of any of the offences stated therein; or b) If the State Council is dissolved, Article 42(6)(vi). In fact, that Article 42(4)(vi) provides - All elective offices of the union and committees of men/women shall he elected for a period of four (4) years and they shall be eligible for re-election. Article 16 also provides inter alia that "the State elected officers shall remain in the offices until next election. To counsel, it follows, therefore, that unless expelled from the union under Article 42(5) and (6)(v) or the SEC is dissolved under Article 42(6)(vi), the Chairman and other members of the SEC including the applicants herein shall remain in office for four years and cannot be removed until the next election. Counsel continued that even where the State Chairman is expelled and by implication ceases to be the Chairman, neither the SEC nor the NEC has the power to appoint a person to act in his position, for Article 27(2)(u) has made express provision for such event. It states: The State Deputy Chairman shall - (ii) Act for the position and full responsibilities of the State Chairman for the unexpired tenure of office in the event of the Chairman's resignation, removal from office, incapacitation or death. That there is no power of appointment vested in any one; the position will be filled by operation of law. That the appointment of the 1st defendant either by the SEC or NEC or National Secretariat of the union is, therefore, unconstitutional, null, void and should be set aside. That in Registered Trustees, C & S Movement v. Ijaodola [2008] All FWLR (Pt. 408) 271 at 307 - 308 H-A, Agube, JCA held that - I am not oblivious of the provisions of section 29 of the Constitution, which states that the administration of each branch be carried out by the officers who shall form the executive. However, this is a question of non-compliance with due process. In Federal Government of Nigeria v. Zebra Energy Ltd [2002] FWLR (Pt. 92) 1749; [2002] 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 162 at 200, it was held that the law is trite that where a duty is clearly spelt out in a statute and the procedure for carrying out such duty is laid down a party has no other choice than to adhere strictly and fully to the provisions of that statute. The constitution of the Cherubim and Seraphim Church is the foundation upon which the activities and the rights and obligations of each member are anchored. It is the guiding principle to whatever steps the respondent too in their so-called establishment of another branch from the existent church at Esa-Oyan. Not having complied with the constitution, they acted on their own. Counsel then submitted that from the totality of the above, the removal of the State Chairman is ultra vires, against due process and procedure, unconstitutional, null and void. That the appointment of the 1st defendant is unconstitutional, ultra vires and, therefore, null and void and a registered member of the union, apart from members of the Executive Council, has the right to bring an action to challenge any act done in violation of the constitution, citing Enelama & anor v. Anok\vuru [1978 - 200 DJNIC 390 and Article 46(4) of the union's constitution. Counsel continued that it should be pointed out that the applicants are members of the State Executive Council and they have a right to be given notice of meetings and participate in the deliberations and decisions of SEC. But that in this case, they were not given any opportunity participation. Not only that, they were constructively removed from office without following the provisions of the constitution. In their own case, that the NEC did not approve or disapprove. Counsel proceeded next to a section titled, 'Fair Hearing'. Fair Hearing To counsel, from the contents of paragraphs 12, 15, 17, 18 and 19 of the affidavit in support of the motion, it is clear that the State Chairman and other members of the SEC except the 1st defend; were removed and driven away from office without being given notice of any allegation or a opportunity to defend themselves. It is also clear that the accuser is the 1st defendant who a presided, wrongly, at a purported meeting where a purported Vote of No Confidence was passed the Chairman. No such vote was passed on any other member of the SEC including the applicants. That even the union's constitution in Article 46 (4)(ii) provides for fair hearing in the following words — Each member should have the right to fair treatment in the application of the union rules i constitution. Trade union disciplinary procedures should contain all the elements of fair p and the rules of natural justice that is, notice, hearing and judgment on the basis of evidence should be observed.... Counsel continued that a Vote of No Confidence cannot come out of the blues; it must be predicated on some allegations which must have been proved to be true and a verdict of guilt must have been passed on the offender. In this case, Exhibit B did not state the offence committed by the State Chairman or any violation of the constitution on his part; it did not state whether such offence violation comes under any of those stated in Article 17(2)(xv) or 42(5)(i) - (xi) of the union constitution and it is clear that no notice of such allegation (if any) was given to the State Chairman or any of the applicants nor were they given any opportunity to defend themselves. That in Oloruntoba-Oju v. Abdul-Raheem [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 83 at 142 F - H, the Supreme Court said that – The nature of fair hearing to be observed in this context is as entrenched in section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as it encompasses the twin pillars of justice namely - (a) Audi alter an par tern - (Hear the other party) (b) Nemo Judex in Causa Sita - (no one should be a judge in his own cause). Counsel then submitted that even an employee deserves the right to be heard before he is dismissed, Yissa v. BSJSC [20..] FWLR (Pt. 277) 856 at 891 A - C. In this case, the 1st defendant is the chair; he presided over the meeting and was a judge in his own matter. That any action taken in of fair hearing is a nullity, referring to Daewoo Nig Ltd v. Uzoh [2008] All FWLR (Pt. 399) 477 E-H. Concluding his submissions, counsel referred to Iderima v. RSCSC [2005] All FWLR (Pt. 285) 450D where the Supreme Court said that - It is well settled that if any disciplinary action is to be taken pursuant to any statute, law or rule there must be full compliance with them or any of them as required before such disciplinary action can be properly based or justified There has been no such compliance in this case and therefore the dismissal of the appellant based on the Board of Inquiry report alone cannot stand. Furthermore, that it is clear that there is no power conferred on any officer of the SEC to convene and or issue notice of meetings except the State Secretary who must act after consultation with airman. Any meeting not so convened is not a meeting recognized by the constitution of the union. That it is also clear that the SEC could not validly meet and take decision without the State chairman being present and presiding. This does not mean that he cannot be disciplined at that meeting but he must preside. Counsel, Vote of No Confidence is not recognized as a method of removing a validly elected chairman or officer of SEC. That his removal can only come about if he is expelled or the SEC dissolved. He cannot be expelled unless (i) he commits any of the offences stipulated in the constitution and is given a fair hearing, in fact those offences cannot be tried in-house but only by a if law, citing Garba v. University of Maiduguri [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550. That a State 1 also cannot be dissolved without observing the rule of fair hearing. In this case, the only ion made against the State Chairman was murder which is not one of the offences for which disciplinary action could be taken against him under the union's constitution (even under the 1999 union of Nigeria); that is a State Government matter. Even then it is clear that the allegation of misconduct is a ruse hence, the State Government did not oppose bail or file a formal information before the High Court. On this premise, counsel urged the court to grant all the prayers of the applicants. DEFENDANT'S WRITTEN ADDRESS The defendant in reaction filed his written address. In the written address, the 1st defendant gave termed the summary of facts. To the 1st defendant, the applicants were Branch Chairmen and; Secretaries of the 2nd defendant's Oyo State Council who abandoned their duty posts since June 2009 after the arrest of the erstwhile Oyo State Chairman, Alhaji Lateef Akinsola for the offence of murder. That the erstwhile Chairman of the 2nd defendant's Oyo State Council was arrested alongside others for the gruesome murder of two Security Guards of the 1st defendant. They were later arraigned before the Chief Magistrate Court Ibadan and are presently on bail granted before the High Court No. 16, Ibadan, Oyo State. The 1st defendant continued that the other State Executive Officers, except the 1st defendant who was then the 1st State Vice-Chairman, absconded from duty and abandoned the State Secretariat of the union soon after the arrest of the erstwhile State Chairman, Alhaji Lateef Akinsola. That some of the State Executive members have gone into hiding to avoid Police arrest as a result of their complicity in the murder charge for which the State Chairman is still standing trial. That the 1st defendant as the 1st Vice Chairman and some of the applicants herein summoned a meeting wherein it was discussed that a vote of no confidence be passed on Alhaji Lateef Akinsola who was before his arrest the State Chairman. It was then resolved that the said Alhaji Lateef Akinsola be placed on suspension while the 1st defendant was appointed by the 2nd defendant as the Acting State Chairman of the union. Thai the 2nd defendant then appointed one Sunday Yeye as the State Secretary because the former Secretary, one Comrade Lekan Aleshinloye, also abandoned his duties and has not returned to the State Headquarters up till date. To the 1st defendant, the 2nd defendant has the responsibility of appointing Secretaries for all its State Councils. That the post of State Secretary is non-elective. The 1st defendant continued that the present applicants have since the arrest of the erstwhile State Chairman, Alhaji Lateef Akinsola (alias Tokyo), gone into hiding and abandoned their positions and the lot fell on the incumbent to fill the vacant positions in acting capacity. That the present applicants who have since abandoned their various positions did so in sympathy with the said Alhaji Lateef Akinsola (alias Tokyo). That contrary to the various depositions of the applicants, all the posts, apart from the post of the Secretary, are in acting capacity until the issues relating to the culpability of the erstwhile Chairman is resolved by a court of law. Continuing, the 1st defendant asserted that it will be a sad day for justice to allow a murder suspect and his cohorts and/or accomplices to continue in office while standing criminal trial before the court for murder. That the standard practice all over the world is for any suspect to stand suspended until judgment is delivered. That the erstwhile Chairman and indeed the applicants herein are entitled to their various rights under the Constitution which is however subject to other laws preserved by the Constitution and in this case the Criminal Code. The 1st defendant then went on to address the issues formulated by the applicants. Issues Formulated by the Applicants To the 1st defendant, the issues formulated on behalf of the applicants do not relate to the issue before the Court. That the applicants formulated 4 issues, which are questioning the removal of the erstwhile Chairman of the NURTW Oyo State who is not a party to this case. That the applicants have formulated issues concerning the alleged removal of the State Chairman who is now standing trial for a murder case. To the 1st defendant, it is trite law that rights and privileges of any person standing trial for a capital offence must be withdrawn, though the law presumes that he is innocent until proven otherwise. The point to note, according to the 1st defendant, is not what the constitution of the union provides but the circumstances surrounding the suspension of the erstwhile Chairman and the absconding claimants. That the incumbent is ready and willing to work with all members with a view to uniting them and make NURTW Oyo State Council a stronger and more peaceful Council. That the constitution of the union did not make provision for an absconding Secretary to call a meeting outside the secretariat of the union. Upon the arrest of the erstwhile Chairman, the then Secretary abandoned his duties and because there should not be a vacuum, the 2nd defendant appointed another Secretary to oversee the affairs of the union in Oyo State. The position of Secretary is non-elective but appointive by the 2nd defendant. This statement was, however, not substantiated. That the 2nd defendant has since appointed another Secretary for the union. That the applicants and the former Secretary abandoned their duties for fear of being arrested alongside with the erstwhile Chairman. The 1st defendant continued that no election has taken place in the Oyo State Chapter of the NURTW. The incumbent chairman is on acting capacity pending the outcome of the criminal trial against the suspended Chairman. That the reliefs being sought by the applicants in their written address are not grantable since the constitution of the union will not be applicable where crime is involved. This assertion of principle was not substantiated. The 1st defendant then submitted that a civil servant or any employee who is standing trial for a simple case of stealing would have to be interdicted, not to talk of a man standing trial for murder. Counsel to the 1st defendant then referred to one case of State v. Hon. Justice Ikoms, which according to him involved a Judge of the High Court who was charged for murder and was suspended pending the hearing of his case, without giving the citation of the said case. Counsel then submitted that any person(s) who has been suspected to have committed a criminal offence will have his rights under the Constitution suspended while the trial lasted; the only right he may be entitled to is that of fair hearing which he should be afforded by Magistrate and the High Courts. The said Chairman is now on bail, but still has criminal charges pending against him. This court was not referred to the relevant section(s) of the Constitution to substantiate the submission of counsel. That the issues raised and the authorities cited will only be apposite in normal situations and circumstances, referring to Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] 2 SCNR 341 as authority for the proposition that the issue of fair hearing does not arise where crime is involved. Counsel to the 1st defendant then went on to frame what he considers to be the main issues for determination in this case. Issues for Determination To counsel, the main issues for determination in this application are – 1. Whether the applicants have locus standi to bring this application. 2. Whether the application for judicial review as presently constituted is not statute-barred having not been brought within 3 months of the occurrence of the event complained of. 3. Whether the State Chapter of the union should be left in vacua upon the arraignment of the erstwhile Chairman and some of the applicants in court for murder. 4. Whether it was right for the 2nd defendant to appoint another Secretary when the incumbent absconded with the suspended Chairman of the Oyo State Chapter of NURTW. Issue 1 Whether the applicants have locus standi to bring this application Counsel adopted his argument in the preliminary objection in respect of Ground 1 but added the four authorities without stating what proposition of law they stand for. The authorities are –(1)Ladejobi v. Oguntayo [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 231) 1209. 2) Taiwo v. Adugbode [2004] All NWLR (the Volume, the Part and the page are not indicated). 3) Niger Insurance v. Chase Insurance Brokers Ltd [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 233) 1730. 4) Arowolo v. Akapo [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 218) 208. Issue 2 Whether the application for judicial review as presently constituted is not statute barred having not been brought within 3 months of the occurrence of the event complained of. To counsel, by Order 22 Rule 3(1) of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007, an applicant for judicial review must bring his application within 3 months of the date of the occurrence of the subject of the application. That the event which is the subject matter of this application occurred on the 22nd June 2009 but the applicants did not approach this Court until 23rd September 2009 which was outside the 3 months period supported by the rules of this Court. Counsel then submitted that in view of the foregoing the application is statute-barred having been brought outside the 3 months period. The court was then referred to the cases of Nigerian Ports Authority v. Ajobi [2006] All FWLR (Pt. 330) 1006, Ede v. Rent Court Tribunal 4 [2004] FWLR (Pt. 189) 1191 CA and Elebanjo v Dawodu [2006] All FWLR (Pt. 334) 604. Issue 3 Whether the State Chapter of the union should be left in vacua upon the arraignment of the erstwhile Chairman and some of the applicants in court for murder. Counsel submitted on behalf of the 1st defendant that the State Council cannot be left in vacua, the applicants having deliberately abandoned their duty posts. That the union positions represented by the applicants are vacant and had to be filled up in acting capacity by the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant for harmony and peace to reign supreme. Counsel further submitted that the applicants have not shown up till the date of filing this action and have not shown that they have been removed from office by either of the defendants. That having abandoned their duty posts in solidarity with the erstwhile chairman and after their refusal to come back, their positions have been filled by other persons loyal to the incumbent acting Chairman of NURTW, Oyo State Chapter. To counsel, it is trite law that the Court will not act in vain or restrain a completed act. Issue 4 Whether it was right for the 2nd defendant to appoint another Secretary when the incumbent absconded with the suspended Chairman of Oyo State Chapter of the NURTW. To counsel, the post of a Secretary for each State Council and the National Office within the National Union of Road and Transport Workers of Nigeria (NURTW) is not an elective post. It is an appointive post. As such, and according to the constitution of the union, only the national body of the union appoints Secretaries for State Chapters. That under Article 27 of the union's constitution titled "State officers and their duties" and under "the State Secretary" thereof, it is stated that - The State Secretary shall be appointed by the National Executive Council. He shall be the head of the State Secretariat and shall be responsible for the day to day administration of the State Council I. That it is by the power vested in the National Executive Council by the union's constitution that it appointed another secretary for the Oyo State Chapter when the incumbent absconded from his duty post in the aftermath of the arrest of Alhaji Lateef Akinsola, the erstwhile Chairman for murder. Counsel continued that the 1st defendant shall also at the hearing of this Suit adopt the issues formulated by the applicants' solicitor in addition to the issues formulated above. That the effect of the authorities cited above is to enjoin the court to determine the standing of the applicants and determine whether they have interest which is greater than that of the entire members of the union to clothe this Court with jurisdiction to entertain their complaints. Counsel then submitted that in view of the authorities cited above this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the claims of the applicants as the applicants lack locus standi to bring the action. Counsel then proceeded with arguments regarding the preliminary objection he raised earlier. Argument on Preliminary Objection In arguing the preliminary objection, counsel first reiterated the grounds upon which the preliminary objection is predicated on and which have been earlier listed out. But for the sake of repetition, the said grounds are - i) That the applicants herein lack the necessary locus standi to bring this action. ii) There is no industrial dispute to clothe this Court with jurisdiction. iii) The applicants are no longer members of the State Executive Council of the National Union of Roads Transport Workers (Oyo State Council) having absconded and been replaced. iv) The action is not properly constituted. v) The applicants are mere unit officers and, therefore, not covered by the Trade Unions Act. vi) All the applicants passed vote of no confidence on the former chairman of the union i.e. Alhaji Lateef Akinsola (Tokyo). Counsel to the 1st defendant, however, abandoned grounds 2, 3, 5 and 6 of the preliminary objection and so argued only grounds 1 and 4. Ground 1 That the applicants herein lack the necessary locus standi to bring this action. To counsel, it is trite law that before a party can invoke the jurisdiction of any court in his/her favour, he or she must have locus standi. That a plaintiff will have standing to sue in a matter only if he has a special interest in the performance of the duty sought to be, referring to the cases of Ovie-Whiskey v. Olawoyin [1985] 6 NCLR 156, Oyewole v. Las is i [2000] FWLR (Pt. 10) 1606 at 1619 . for certioniri is to bring a proceeding by a lower tribunal or an administrative decision before the court for the purpose of being quashed while prohibition is to prevent the lower tribunal from further entertaining a complaint pending before it for either likelihood of bias or lack of jurisdiction. That the originating application filed by the applicants is seeking to quash the decision of the 2" defendant which appointed the 1st defendant as the acting Chairman of the Oyo State Council of National Union of Road Transport Workers. Counsel then submitted that the application was not property couched. That 'the application ought to ask for an order removing a particular proceedings or decision from this face of the motion paper should be reflected on the statement of fact as reliefs sought and the grounds must also be stated'. Counsel continued that the decision, proceedings or any minutes complained of must be attached to the affidavit in support of both the motion ex-parte for leave and the motion on notice. To counsel, although the rules of this Court are not exhaustive as to the steps to be taken while applying for judicial review, judicial authorities have laid down the procedures which must be followed to wit - i) Leave of Court must be sought and obtained before an order of certiorari, prohibition or judicial review can be granted on notice, ii) The application must be supported by verifying affidavit. iii) The application must also be supported by a statement of fact and grounds upon which the reliefs are sought. iv) The proceedings to be quashed must be attached to the affidavit in support of both the ex-parte application for leave and the motion on notice for judicial review. Counsel then referred the court to the cases of Azokwn v. Nwokanma [2005] All FWLR (Pt. 271) 46 at 59, Bamaiyi v. Bamaiyi [2005] All FWLR (Pt. 288) 1142 at 1157 - 1158, Oyo State v. Fudayan [1995] 8 NWLR (Pt. 413) 292 and Oduwole v. Famakimva [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 143) 239. Counsel continued that an application for judicial review presupposes that a decision has been taken which the court is being called upon to review. In the present application the decision taken by the public body must be attached. That unlike in certiorari or prohibition, in an application for judicial review, the court is concerned with the legality and not the merits of the proceedings, decision or acts of the inferior court, referring to Bamaiyi v. Bamaiyi at 1157 and Oduwole v. Famakinwa, all supra. To counsel, the record of proceedings sought to be quashed and/or reviewed must be attached, referring to Bamaiyi v. Bamaiyi at 1162. Counsel continued that obtaining leave of court is a condition precedent for bringing an application for judicial review, citing fyoho v. Effiong [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 374) 204 at 224 - 225 and Odu v. Fawehinmi [2006] All FWLR (Pt. 30'l) 1848 at 1861. We submit also that an order of judicial review or certiorari will lie only aga