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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE B. B. KANYIP, PHD DATE: APRIL 15, 2015 SUIT NO. NICN/LA/154/2014 BETWEEN Kola Olutomilayo - Claimant/Applicant AND 1. The Attorney-General of the Federation 2. The Honourable Minister of Labour and Productivity - Respondents REPRESENTATION Kola Olutomilayo represents himself. E. G. Okemini Esq., for the 2nd respondent. No legal representation for the 1st respondent. RULING The applicant took up an originating summons against the respondents dated and filed on 3rd April 2014. The originating summons is brought pursuant to the Trade Disputes Act (TDA), the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act, the NIC Rules and the 1999 Constitution (as amended). By the originating summons the Court is asked to determine the following question – Whether by virtue of sections 4, 6 and 7 of the Trade Disputes Act, 2004, the 2nd respondent ought not appoint a Conciliator or in the alternative cause a Referral Instrument to be issued in relation to the Notice of Dispute submitted by the Plaintiff/Applicant under the Trade Disputes Act and dated the 27th day of March, 2014. The applicant then prayed the Court for the following reliefs – 1. An order granting leave to the Plaintiff/Applicant to apply for judicial relief and to seek an order of mandamus directing and/or compelling the 2nd Defendant/Respondent whether by himself and/or his agents to exercise its statutory powers in accordance with the Trade Disputes Act. 2. An order of mandamus directing and/or compelling the 2nd Defendant/Respondent to exercise its powers as provided in the Trade Disputes Act in relation to the Notice of Dispute of the Plaintiff/Applicant dated 27th day of March, 2014. 3. And for such further or other orders as the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The grounds upon which the reliefs in the originating summons are sought are – 1. The Plaintiff/Applicant by a letter and a notice of dispute dated 27th day of March, 2014 submitted an intra union dispute to the 2nd Respondent in accordance with section 4 of the Trade Disputes Act, 2004 after the Plaintiff/Applicant’s attempt to settle same amicably failed. 2. The Minister of Labour and Productivity has statutory responsibilities under sections 4, 6 and 7 of the Trade Disputes Act 2004, in relation to notice of intra union dispute. 3. The Minister has refused/failed to carry out its statutory responsibility and/or act in accordance with the aforestated Act. 4. The refusal to act has resulted in serious prejudice; and has foisted uncertainty and frustration of the Plaintiff/Applicant. 5. This Court has inherent jurisdiction in matters relating to the application, enforcement compliance with the Trade Disputes Act and ancillary laws. 6. The 2nd Defendant/Respondent has no justifiable reason whatsoever to deny the Plaintiff/Applicant the right to justice and ventilate a dispute according to law. 7. The issues raised in the bundle of documents of fifty three pages (53-pages) annexed to the intra-union dispute and which is also annexed as the BUNDLE DOCUMENTS EXHIBIT 1 to this Originating Summons bothers (sic) on issues of dignity of labour, private and national interest, particularly the dignity of employees in paid employment; concerns about subversion of industrial democracy, social justice, good governance, rape on Nigerian laws and its human and material assets, transparency and accountability. In support of the originating summons is an affidavit, accompanying exhibits and a written address. In reaction, the 2nd respondent filed out of time a memorandum of appearance, counter-affidavit in opposition to the originating summons together with a written address. Also filed by the 2nd respondent is a motion on notice to regularize its defence processes, which has, however, not been moved. When the matter came up for mention, the Court noted that the applicant is seeking for reliefs as per the trade dispute he himself declared regarding an intra-union dispute between him and the “Registered Trustees of Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN)”. The Court went on that there is the issue whether the applicant, as an individual, can competently declare a trade dispute as to necessitate the orders he prays for against the Minister of Labour and Productivity. Secondly, there is the question whether there is even a body known as the “Registered Trustees of Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN)”. Parties were then asked to file and serve their respective written addresses in respect of these issues starting with the applicant. While the applicant filed his written address on 23rd December 2014, none of the respondents filed any. In arguing his case, the applicant stated that he exhausted all domestic remedies open to him in terms of the issues raised in the originating summons i.e. he sent a notice of intra-union dispute to PENGASSAN in accordance with the TDA and subsequently notified the Minister of Labour of same, coupled with a written request to the Minister to invoke his powers under the TDA by appointing a conciliator or take any of the alternative steps in accordance with the law. The applicant then adopted the two issues raised by the Court for his address. Regarding issue 1 i.e. whether the applicant can competently declare a trade dispute as an individual and seek the orders prayed for, the applicant submitted that by section 24 of the TDA, intra-union disputes are those arising from the running of a trade union as laid down in the union constitution. Therefore, such matters as the propriety or otherwise of political or other affiliation and complaints arising from election into union offices and other ancillary matters will certainly come within this sub-head, referring to Bamidele Aturu’s Law and Practice of the National Industrial Court at page 204. The applicant then referred to Olorunnimbe & ors v. NLC & ors (citation was supplied) where Rhodes Vivour J. (as he then was) held that “it seems tidier to give jurisdiction in all intra-union disputes to the NIC to ensure consistency in industrial jurisprudence”. The applicant went on that the law is clear that conditions imposed for the benefit only of a particular person or class of persons can be dispensed with by only that person or class of persons, referring to Graham v, Ingeleby (1848) 1 Exch. 651 which held that only an individual may renounce a law made for his special benefit. That by the combined effect of section 48 of the TDA and section 14 of the Interpretation Act, an individual can declare a trade dispute on the state of our laws as it currently stands, urging the Court to so hold. The applicant continued that while a right can be invoked as a group, any individual falling within that group, whose right has been infringed upon, can invoke such right without having to wait until the rights are infringed collectively. That this is the reason our laws allow a choice between individual or representative actions, minority actions, derivative actions and/or class/representative actions, provided there is a cause of action and locus standi. That for the Court to seek to construe narrowly the provisions of the TDA to mean that an individual cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Hon. Minister of Labour to declare an intra-union dispute is to interpret the law in a way that produces an inconvenient result contrary to the cases of Buhari v. Obasanjo [2005] 13 NWLR (Pt. 941) 1, Garba v. Federal Civil Service Commission [1988] 1 NSCC 306, Bronik Motors Ltd v. Wema Bank [1983] 1 SCNLR 296 and Ibrahim v, Sheriff [2004] 14 NWLR (Pt. 892) 43. The applicant then urged the Court to resolve issue 1 in his favour by holding that an individual can declare a trade dispute. On issue 2 i.e. whether there is a body known as Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN, the applicant submitted that as a matter of general principle, a personal action, subject of course to the rules as to survival of action, dies with the person. In same vein, a non-existing person, natural or legal, cannot institute an action or defend one, citing Agbonmagbe Bank Ltd v. General Manager GB Ollivant Ltd [1961] 1 All NLR 116, which held that an action cannot be maintained against s defendant, who, as sued, is not a legal person. The applicant proceeded to refer to Madam Grace Onyeike & anor v. National Union of Printing, Publishing and Paper Products Workers (Bel Papyrus/Bel Impex Ltd Unit Branch) unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/82/2011 the judgment of which was delivered on 25/04/2012, where this Court in considering the issue of juristic person of a trade union relied on AG Oyo v. NLC, Oyo State Chapter [2003] 8 NWLR 1 and held as follows – …I must dismiss this argument at once. In RTEAN Osogbo, Osun State v. NURTW Osogbo, Osun State [2009] 16 NLLR (Pt. 44) 286 at 309 – 310, this [Court] held as follows – We must dismiss out rightly the argument of the respondent that the parties before the court are wrong. This court has held time without number that branch unions or unit chapters of unions have the right of audience in this court. See Senior Staff Association of Nigerian Universities v. Federal Government of Nigeria, unreported Suit No. NIC/8/2004 decided on May 8, 2007 and Oyo State Government v. Alhaji Bashir Apapa and ors, unreported Suit No. NIC/36/2007 delivered on October 3, 2007. The peculiarity of the disputes that are addressed in this court make this imperative. It is foolhardy to expect that parent unions will at all times be made parties to a dispute when they are not in any way concerned with it. Branch unions or unit chapters negotiate with employers independent of the parent unions and so we do not see why they should not sue independently of the parent union if the need arises. The law reports are replete with cases where branch unions sued even before the regular courts and they were heard. See, for instance, the Court of Appeal decision in Attorney-General of Oyo State v. Nigeria Labour Congress, Oyo State Chapter [2003] 8 NWLR 1 where the Oyo State chapter of the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) was entertained as such. The argument of the respondent in this regard must, therefore, fail. To the applicant the statement of law in the cited case put beyond doubt the flexibility of this Court in terms of doctrine on juristic person when marched with the need to do substantial justice. That the issue whether PENGASSAN is addressed as Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN, Incorporated Trustees of PENGASSAN or simply as PENGASSAN will not have any vitiating effect as long as the party referred to has not complained and all concerned know what is intended. That this Court sits both as a court of law and equity and would not lend the instrumentality of its powers to be used for the oppression of the applicant, referring to Ezeze v. State [2004] 14 NWLR (Pt. 894) – the page is not supplied, and sections 36 and 37 of the TDA 2004 and sections 12 and 14 of the NIC Act 2006, which enjoins this Court to be flexible and less formal and to do all such things as are necessary to avoid multiplicity of suits. The applicant continued by referring to Article 14 of the 2013 constitution of PENGASSAN endorsed by the Registrar of Trade Unions on 5th May 2014 where PENGASSAN itself stated the names of its registered trustees and the obligation placed on them by law as per its Article 14.3. That by virtue of this documentary evidence before the Court, it is clear who the registered trustees of PENGASSAN are and by the fact of their existence, the applicant contended that only the registered trustees can be sued, since they are the only people vested with the assets of the association. As such that the applicant sued PENGASSAN in the name “Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN” since they themselves affirmed the appointment of Registered Trustees at page 21 of their 2013 constitution. That the implication is that only the Registered Trustees are the accredited representatives of PENGASSAN for any proceedings. The applicant, referring to sections 673 to 695 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) as examined by the Supreme Court in Akunwata Joe Anyaegbunam v. Pastor Okudili Osaka [2000] 5 NWLR (Pt. 657) 386, went on to submit that in so far as an unregistered association acts through appointed trustees the law will always recognize their existence. That as an association, PENGASSAN is not a legal association, stricto sensu, because there is no evidence before this Court that it was registered under CAMA and, therefore, not subject to the strict rule of being sued as Incorporated Trustees of PENGASSAN or even as PENGASSAN because only CAMA can confer juristic personality on any entity, other than an individual, citing section 673(1) of CAMA. The applicant then reiterated that there is no evidence before the Court that PENGASSAN is registered under section 673 of CAMA or that the “Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN” is not known to law. The applicant concluded on this issue by asserting that in virtue of Order 19 Rule 11 of the NIC Rules, this Court may on its own or upon the application of a party order any person to appear before it as a witness or to produce any document. That this power is inherent in all courts of superior record. In this regard, that issue 2 may not be competently resolved without the Court ordering the body in issue i.e. PENGASSAN to produce the instrument of its registration. In any event, that section 36 of the TDA provides that this Court has power to compel the production before it of books, papers, documents and other things for the purpose of enabling them to be examined or referred to so far as may be necessary in order to obtain information relevant to the determination of any matter before the Court. The applicant raised a third issue i.e. whether this Court is competent to raise the issues it raised suo moto. To the applicant, this Court can raise issues suo moto and that the parties must be heard on issues so raised suo moto, referring to Atanda v. Lakanmi [1974] 3 SC 109, Adegoke v. Adibi [1992] 5 NWLR (Pt. 242) 410, Okafor v. Nnaife [1973] 3 ECSLR 261, Ugo v. Obiekwe [1989] 1 NWLR (Pt. 99) 566 at 578 and Oje v. Babalola [1991] 4 NWLR (Pt. 185) 267 at 280. The applicant went on that it cannot be disputed that judgment in any court proceedings must be confined to the issues raised by the parties and it is not competent for the Curt to suo moto make a case for either of the parties and proceed to give judgment on the case so formulated contrary to the case of the parties before it. The applicant then submitted that the issue whether there is a body called “Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN” can only competently arise at the proceedings to be initiated at the instance of the Honourable Minister of Labour, which is the essence of the originating summons of the applicant in seeking for leave to apply for judicial review and for an order of mandamus. That it is after this Court has exercised its discretion in terms of the orders sought that the “Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN” or “PENGASSAN” can raise any objection based on juristic personality, if they so desire. The applicant continued by referring to Shitta Bey v. FPSC [2004] 1 NLL (Pt. 3) 489 where the Supreme Court emphasized some of the principles that ought to guide the Court in making an order of mandamus, which principles are – a) The applicant has a legal right; b) The respondent has a correlative duty; and c) There is no specific remedy or even though there is a specific remedy, that mode of redress is less convenient, beneficial and effective. In conclusion, the applicant submitted that he has the right to declare an intra-union dispute as an individual; that issue 2 is premature and/or that there is a body known as the “Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN” until the contrary is shown, or in the alternative that the issue of whether there is a body known as “Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN” can only arise after this Court has pronounced on the applicant’s originating summons and after the Honourable Minister of Labour has invoked his statutory powers as dictated by the TDA. COURT’S DECISION I heard learned counsel and considered all the processes filed in this matter. In considering the merit of the issues at hand, I need to clarify a number of issues as appear in the submissions of the applicant. First, in paragraph 3.2 of his written address, the applicant referred to and relied on section 24 of the TDA 2004. I do not know whether the applicant is aware that section 24 of the TDA has been repealed. See section 53(1) of the NIC Act 2006 which repealed the provisions of Part II of the TDA under which would be found section 24 of the TDA. I do not know the kind of advocacy of counsel where a repealed law is relied upon. That counsel does not even know that section 24 of the TDA has been repealed is bad enough. Worse is the insistence of counsel on arguing its case on the basis of the need to develop the law. I shall continually return to this issue as this ruling progress. Secondly, the applicant cited Olorunnimbe & ors v. NLC & ors without giving the citation except for reference to page 204 of Bamidele Aturu’s Law and Practice of the National Industrial Court, where Rhodes Vivour J. (as he then was) held that “it seems tidier to give jurisdiction in all intra-union disputes to the NIC to ensure consistency in industrial jurisprudence”. Now the relevance of this case to the issues at hand was not disclosed to the Court. While Olorunnimbe talked of the NIC being preferable to the High court in resolving intra-union disputes, the applicant in the instant case did not file a complaint in this Court as to the dispute he has with PENGASSAN; instead he filed for judicial review praying that the Minister of Labour be compelled to act on the trade dispute he declared. Even when during his oral adumbration of his written address the Court pointed out that as an individual he has the right to sue directly in this Court and not through the processes of Part I of the TDA, all he could tell the Court is that he is interested in developing the law. Thirdly, it is the argument of the applicant that the issue whether PENGASSAN is addressed as Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN, Incorporated Trustees of PENGASSAN or simply as PENGASSAN will not have any vitiating effect as long as the party referred to has not complained and all concerned know what is intended. I do not know how to place this argument. For one, PENGASSAN is not the party presently sued. It is the party against whom the trade dispute was declared. The issue raised by the Court in its regard is simply whether the Minister of Labour can by mandamus be ordered to act in respect of a trade dispute declared against a party not known to law. In the second place, I do not know when and how the fact that a party knows what is intended is a factor to be taken into account in the consideration of issues of juristic personality. In any event, the general tenor of the applicant’s argument appears to be guided by the question: what is in a name? Of course, there is always something in a name. As Belgore, JSC (as he then was) put it in Esenowo v. Ukpong [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt. 608) 611: “There is a world of difference between ‘J. E. Esenowo’ and ‘E. J. Esenowo’”. Even the argument of the applicant as to this Court being flexible is simply further perplexing. If a non-juristic person is sued, how can flexibility cure such a defect? Fourthly, the argument of the applicant that because of Order 19 Rule 11 of the NIC Rules 2007 or even section 36 of the TDA issue 2 may not be competently resolved without the Court ordering the body in issue i.e. PENGASSAN to produce the instrument of its registration appears to take this Court for granted. An applicant who files an incompetent suit and then turn around to argue that Order 19 Rule 11 of the NIC Rules 2007 and section 36 of the TDA can be used to rectify his incompetence, I think, is taking the legal process for granted. Are the provisions of Order 19 Rule 11 of the NIC Rules 2007 and section 36 of the TDA meant to cure an otherwise incompetent suit, or are they meant to rectify anomalies in an otherwise competent suit? The question whether there is a body known as “Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN” goes to the root, the competence, of the declaration of trade dispute itself upon which this suit is hinged. How can Order 19 Rule 11 of the NIC Rules 2007 and section 36 of the TDA cure such? I really do not know. The applicant would proceed to argue that the question whether there is a body known as “Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN” is premature; and even if it is not, there is a body known as such until the contrary is shown. Who will show the contrary – the applicant or the respondent? If the latter, is the applicant trying to shift the onus of proof from himself? As if this is not enough, the applicant continued that the question whether there is a body known as “Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN” can only arise after the Court pronounces on the merit of the originating summons and after the Minister of Labour invokes his statutory powers under the TDA. Here is an applicant who entreated the Court during his oral argument that his concern is developing the law. With the workloads that courts today have, counsel wants the Court to go through the rigours of hearing in an otherwise incompetent suit. If counsel has time to waste, this Court has no such time. The applicant did not seem to understand that once the party against whom he declared the trade dispute is described as “Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN”, it conjures up bodies registered under Part C of CAMA and so raises the issue whether the body against whom the applicant declared a trade dispute is a trade union or not for which the order of mandamus against the Minister of Labour can validly be made. This is not an issue that the applicant can wish away by simply saying it is premature, or the Court will have to wait until the contrary is shown, or that it should await a pronouncement of the Court on the merit of the originating summons before it can be raised. Why go through litigation only to be met with a worthless court order? For if there is no trade union called “Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN” leave to issue and the order of mandamus so issued will all be worthless, no better than the paper upon which it was made. Fifthly, if there is a complete misconception of the law it is the applicant’s reliance on CAMA. When this Court posed the question whether there is a body known as Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN, it was precisely because only bodies registered under Part C of CAMA that can take the equivalent of that name. Specifically, in relation to CAMA, the name is often prefaced by the phrase “Incorporated Trustees of…”, “Registered Trustees of…” as is the case in the instant suit. It was the repealed Land Perpetual Succession Act 1924 Cap. 48 Laws of the Federation and Lagos 1958 that had the requirement of “Registered Trustees of…” So even when the applicant declared a trade dispute against “Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN, the living law of the applicant was surely of the 1958 era. But this is not even the main problem. In his argument, the applicant assumed the applicability of CAMA to trade unions hence his reliance on sections 673 – 695 of CAMA and his argument that as an association PENGASSAN is not a legal association because it is not registered under CAMA as only CAMA can confer juristic personality on an entity. From this applicant’s submission, three wrong assumptions and statements of law are evident: that CAMA applies to trade unions; that PENGASSAN is not even a legal association; and that only CAMA can confer legal personality on an entity other than an individual. On whether CAMA applies to trade unions, section 45 of the Trade Unions Act (TUA) Cap. T14 LFN 2004, as amended in 2005, is headed “Companies etc., Act not to apply to bodies registerable under this Act”, and provides that “the Companies and Allied Matters Act shall not apply to any trade union or to any Federation of Trade Unions; and the registration of any such body under that Act shall be void”. By this provision, CAMA is not applicable to trade unions; as such the argument of the applicant as to applicability of CAMA goes to no issue. To underscore this point, for instance, the company law rule as to minority rights upheld as the rule in Foss v. Harbottle is inapplicable to trade unions for purposes of section 19(1) of the TUA. See Elufioye v. Halilu [1990] 2 NWLR (Pt. 130) 1. On whether PENGASSAN is a legal association, I must first point out that Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria as a trade union is listed as item 10 of Part C of the Third Schedule to the TUA. The fact that a trade union is listed under the Third Schedule to the TUA as such has always been accepted by this Court as proof of the incidence of legal personality of trade unions. See Senior Staff Association of Nigerian Universities v. Federal Government of Nigeria [2008] 12 NLLR (Pt. 33) 407. On this score, the answer to the question whether PENGASSAN is a legal association must be answered in the affirmative. That an Act of the National Assembly specifically names a body with a particular name such as “Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria” can only mean that the statute recognizes it as such and in that name. For trade union purposes, that is sufficient to grant legal personality to such a body in the name so stated. In any event, since the Taff Vale case (Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] AC 426 HL; [1901] UKHL 1) the common law has recognized the legal personality of trade unions even in the absence of normal incorporation. In this regard, the Nigerian case of Ifekwe v. Madu [2001] FWLR (Pt. 38) 1252 held that a registered trade union can sue in its registered name but if unregistered, it can sue or be sued by representative members. See also Dr O. Odusote & anor v. Lagos State Government & ors [2012] 28 NLLR (Pt. 80) 225 NIC where this Court recounted the historical antecedents of legal personality of trade unions and then concluded as follows – In all of this, the general tenor of the Trade Unions Act may also be useful. For instance, bodies seeking to be registered as trade unions are permitted by section 2(1) of the Trade Unions Act to do such things as are necessary to have them registered as trade unions. While they do not thereby become trade unions, I think that they nonetheless can contest in their assumed name the fact of non-registration in court. As to whether it is only CAMA that can confer legal personality, the answer is of course in the negative. I have indicated how the TUA named PENGASSAN by name and how the common law, long before CAMA, granted legal personality on trade unions. This is of course without prejudice to the countless statutes that litter our statute books wherein the statutory bodies created thereby are bestowed with legal personality with capacity sue and be sued, and to own property and enter into contracts in their names. Sixthly, the applicant in concluding his submissions had alluded to the Supreme Court decision in Shitta Bey v. FPSC (supra) and then listed out the principles this Court should be guided by in making an order of mandamus. By this, I think that the applicant was jumping ship and delving in the merit of the case. I shall accordingly discountenance the argument of the applicant in that regard. Lastly, the applicant insinuated that this Court cannot raise the issues it did suo moto in the manner it did. Victino Fixed Odds Ltd v. Ojo [2010] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1197) 486 is said to be authority for the proposition that a judge is only at liberty to raise suo motu matters it could take judicial notice under the provisions of the Evidence Act. I ask the question: are judges not required to take judicial notice of statutory provisions? If the TUA recognizes “Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria” as such, not as “Registered Trustees of Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria”, should this Court not raise questions in that regard knowing that statutory provisions can be judicially noticed? I think so. In any event, the law by Abbas v. Solomon [2001] FWLR (Pt. 67) 847, Adegoke v. Adibi [1992] 5 NWLR (Pt. 242) 410 at 420, Oje v. Babalole [1991] 4 NWLR (Pt. 185) 676, Odiase v. Agho [1972] 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 170 and Ejowhomu v. Etok-Eter Mandilas [1986] 5 NWLR (Pt. 39) 1 is that when a Court raises a point suo motu, the parties must be given an opportunity to be heard on the issue particularly the party that may be adversely affected as a result of the point raised suo motu and thus avoid any breach of the parties’ right to fair hearing. And this I did by asking parties to address me on the issues raised by the Court. I now proceed to the merit of the case. The first issue at hand is whether the applicant can, as an individual, declare a trade dispute for which leave for judicial review can then be issued; for if the applicant cannot, then there is no basis for the instant suit in the first place. Case law authorities over time have recognized the collective/individual labour dispute categorization. In this sense, prior to 2006 when the NIC Act of that year was promulgated, this Court consistently held that its jurisdiction over trade disputes meant that its jurisdiction was over collective labour disputes, not individual labour disputes. See, for instance, Chemical & Non-Metallic Products Senior Staff Association v. Benue Cement Co. Plc [2005] 2 NLLR (Pt. 6) 446 at especially pp. 470 – 475. The reasoning by this Court was hinged on the fact that the jurisdiction conferred on this Court was principally in respect of settling ‘trade disputes’, which term was defined by section 48(1) of the TDA as any dispute between employers and employees or between workers and workers. This Court reasoned that because the definition referred to workers in the plural, it must be read as excluding an individual worker. But even at this, the Court in deserving cases permitted exceptions now and then especially when its interpretation jurisdiction was raised. This posture of the Court, of course, did not go down well with especially academic commentators. For instance, Prof. E. Uvieghara in his book, Labour Law in Nigeria (Malthouse Ltd: Lagos), 2001 at 431 is quite emphatic on the view that even under the TDA set-up, individuals can access this Court arguing that section 14(b) of the Interpretation Act states that in construing statutes, the singular includes the plural and vice versa. Despite this view point, this Court stuck to its view that individuals generally could not access this Court. The position, however, changed regarding access to this Court by individuals since the enactment of the NIC Act 2006. In Mr. Godwin Tosanwumi v. Gulf Agency Shipping Nigeria Limited unreported Suit No. NIC/18/2006 the ruling of which was delivered on 14th June 2007, this Court reviewed the situation and upheld the right of individuals to access this Court directly without having to go through the processes of Part I of the TDA as the applicant in the instant suit presently wants to do. However, despite acknowledging that individuals can come directly to this Court to ventilate their grievances, this Court still retained the rule that once it is a trade dispute, recourse for redress has to be through the processes of Part I of the TDA. In other words, this Court does not have original jurisdiction over trade disputes although it has over individual labour/employment disputes. This being the case, the law has always and accordingly been that individuals cannot declare trade disputes since they cannot approach the processes of the TDA as individuals. Those processes are accessible only in terms of the collective dispute categorization. This is the state of the law that the applicant in the instant case does not seem to understand. The reference by the applicant to the Interpretation Act is stale argument; that has been advanced before this Court and rejected. The TDA talks of trade dispute (a term of art for that matter) in the group or collective sense of a dispute involving workers or employees. The specificity of this usage does not warrant the general assumption of the singular including the plural or the plural including the singular; as it must be noted that section 1 of the Interpretation Act dealing with “Application of [the] Act” provides that “this Act shall apply to the provisions of any enactment except in so far as the contrary intention appears in this Act or the enactment in question”. In other words, the Interpretation Act is not sacrosanct and absolute in its application. Since an individual cannot access the processes of Part I of the TDA, it means that an individual cannot declare a trade dispute. This being the case, the applicant in the instant suit cannot declare a trade dispute; and I so find and hold. I accordingly answer issue 1 in the negative – the applicant, as an individual, cannot declare a trade dispute. This being so, the applicant cannot pray this Court for leave to apply for, and the order of, mandamus against the Minister of Labour; and I so hold. On this score alone, the instant suit is incompetent and accordingly stands dismissed. The second issue is whether there is body known as “The Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN” as to justify the reliefs sought in this suit. Once again, I will answer the question in the negative. Clearly, the applicant used the phrased “The Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN” on the assumption that other than CAMA, no other law applies to this body. I have indicated the error in this assumption. Once again, since there is no body known as “The Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN” in the manner couched by the applicant, there is no valid declaration of any trade dispute against it for which the reliefs in this suit are sought. On this score, there is no way that leave could have been granted for mandamus as prayed for by the applicant. Once more, the instant suit fails on that score and so is dismissed. On the issue raised by the applicant himself as to whether this Court is competent to raise the issues it did, I answer in the affirmative. Today’s litigation has no time for time wasting especially for busy body counsel eager to develop the law, not to litigate their grievances. I made it clear to the applicant that whatever his actual grievance is, he has the right vide the General Form of Complaint to access this Court as an individual; but the applicant was adamant, keen on wasting the time of the Court in the name of developing the law. I explained to the applicant that this Court has severally held that individuals cannot declare trade disputes but this fell on the deaf ears of the applicant. It does appear that this desire to develop the law was so enveloping of the applicant that he initially robed fully as counsel to argue his case even when he is the applicant in the matter. I had to direct that he un-robe and address the Court from outside of the Bar. Now that the law has been developed by this ruling, I hope the applicant is satisfied. For the avoidance of doubt, I find and hold that this suit is incompetent and is accordingly dismissed. This is one case that cost ought to be awarded; and this will be so despite that the respondents did not file any reaction to the issues raised by the Court; at least the 2nd respondent has made attempts at regularizing its appearance and processes in this suit. In consequence, cost of this suit is put at One Hundred Thousand Naira only (N100,000) payable by the applicant to the respondents within 30 days of this ruling. Ruling is entered accordingly. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD