Download PDF
IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE B. B. KANYIP, PHD DATE: APRIL 15, 2015 SUIT NO. NICN/LA/287/2013 BETWEEN Vincent Ikechukwu Okeke - Claimant AND West African Ventures Limited (WAV) - Defendant REPRESENTATION K. O. P. Odidika, and with him U. Nnamdi Ukamba and C. N. Omeke, for the claimant. E. I. Emmanuel, for the defendant. JUDGMENT The claimant filed this action against two defendants on 4th June 2013. By an order of this Court made on 27th March 2014, the claimant’s application praying to strike out the name of the 2nd defendant was granted. By the consequential claimant’s amended complaint and amended statement of facts, both dated and filed on 1st April 2014, the claimant is claiming against the defendant the following reliefs – a) A declaration that the termination of the claimant’s employment by the defendant was wrongful. b) The sum of $90,000 (Ninety Thousand US Dollars) being September, October and November 2012 salaries and N2,400,000.00 (Two Million, Four Hundred Thousand Naira) being October and November Living Allowances respectively. c) The sum of $30,000.00/month (Thirty Thousand US Dollars) from December 2012 till final judgment is delivered in this suit, being the claimant’s monthly salary. d) The sum of N1,200,000/month (One Million, Two Hundred Thousand Naira) from December 2012 till final judgment is delivered in this suit, being the claimant’s monthly living allowance. e) The sum of $30,000.00 (Thirty Thousand US Dollars) and N1,200,000.00 (One Million, Two Hundred Thousand Naira) representing the claimant’s 2012 Leave Allowance. f) The sum of $1,000,000.00 (One Million Dollars) being the claimant’s one year Bonus (covering the period January 2011 to January 2012). g) The sum of $1,000,000.00 (One Million Dollars) per annum till final judgment is delivered in this suit being the claimant’s Annual bonus. h) Interest rate on the judgment sums at the rate of 22% per annum till judgment is given and thereafter at the rate of 10% per cent per annum till judgment is fully liquidated. i) An order compelling the defendant to issue an apology to the claimant in two national newspapers in Nigeria for the humiliation and embarrassment suffered by the claimant due to the unjust Disclaimer published at the behest of the defendant. j) An injunction restraining the defendant, its servants, agents or otherwise from further harassment and intimidation of the claimant. k) The sum of N100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) being aggravated and exemplary damages for the wrongful termination of the claimant’s employment. Accompanying the amended complaint and amended statement of facts are the list of witnesses, written statement on oath of the claimant, list of documents and copies of the documents admitted and marked as Exhibits C1 – C11. In reaction, the defendant entered formal appearance and then filed its amended defence processes i.e. the amended statement of defence, list of witnesses, witness statement on oath, list of documents and copies of the documents admitted and marked as Exhibits D1 – D8. The claimant reacted by filing his reply to the amended statement of defence accompanied by the further witness statement on oath of the claimant, list of additional documents and copies of the additional documents admitted and marked as Exhibits C12 and C13. At the trial, the claimant testified on his own behalf as CW, while Stanley Onuosa, the Company Secretary of the defendant, testified for the defendant as DW. At the close of trial, parties, starting with the defendant, were asked to file and serve their respective written addresses. The defendant’s written address is dated 10th February 2015 but filed on 11th February 2015. The claimant’s is dated and filed on 24th February 2015. The defendant’s reply on pints of law is dated 3rd March 2015 but filed on 4th March 2015. CLAIMANT’S CASE The case of the claimant is that he was employed for an indefinite period by the defendant on 26th November 2010 as Commercial Director but with effect from 11th January 2011 on a salary of $30,000 per month, living allowance of N1,200,000.00 per month and yearly bonus including the first year of service. On 11th July 2011, the claimant’s appointment was confirmed. To the claimant, as per the contract of employment, he and Mr. Jacques Roomans mutually agreed that the claimant’s annual bonus would be the sum of $1,000,000.00. That sometime in July 2012, he broached the issue of bonus with Mr. Jacques Roomans demanding payment. That Mr. Jacques Roomans became evasive about it and adopted a subtle act of hostility towards the claimant. In the end, the defendant failed to pay the said sum for the period January 2011 to January 2012. The claimant went on that on 18th October 2012, while carrying out his lawful duties, he was arrested in his office by officers of the State Security Service (SSS) at the behest of the defendant and on a trumped up petition of the defendant. He was taken to the SSS Lagos office for interrogation. That the officer in charge of the operation was one Mr. Ayo Salami, the assistant Director, Operations. That while in detention, Mr. Jacques Roomans, the President/CEO of the defendant, started making inquiries about the whereabouts of the claimant’s wife. That on 19th October 2012, men of the SSS went to his house in Port Harcourt to harass and intimidate his wife and household as confirmed by Mr. Ayo Salami when the claimant confronted him. To the claimant, his arrest and detention at the behest of Mr. Jacques Roomans and the defendant was a grand design by the defendant to unlawfully determine his contract of employment and to avoid paying him his entitlements. That in consequence of this harassment, his counsel wrote a strongly worded letter to the defendant demanding a written apology and the payment of his entitlements. That while still in detention and in a bit to cover its tracks and give its actions the garb of legitimacy, the defendant issued him a query (an afterthought according to the claimant) dated 23rd October 2012. He responded vide a letter of 1st November 2012 but the defendant terminated his employment on 12th November 2012 vide a letter of that date; and he was asked to drop the keys to his official residence with the Maintenance Officer of the company. To the claimant, he was not in breach of the confidentiality clause in his appointment letter and that the defendant was groping for a convenient excuse to avoid meeting its obligation of paying the claimant’s annual bonus after it had taken benefit of the claimant’s diligence in growing the defendant’s business. Meanwhile, that the defendant refused to pay him his September, October and November 2012 salaries and October and November living allowances; and this is aside from harassment, arrest and detention that the claimant suffered in the hands of the SSS and the defendant consistently and in the absence of the claimant gaining access to the claimant’s apartment and carting away the claimant’s personal belongings. It is for these reasons that the claimant filed the present action claiming the reliefs as per his amended complaint and amended statement of facts. DEFENDANT’S CASE The case of the defendant is that on 4th October 2012, the claimant in his position as Commercial Director sent an email detailing the claimant’s Business Development and Performance Report to one Kevin Bernard who does not work for the defendant, but works for another company called OPI International Inc. That according to the claimant, this email was actually meant for only three senior officers of the defendant, but he sent the email to Kevin Bernard by mistake. However, the email was not tendered by any of the parties in evidence. On same day, when the mistake was brought to his attention, the claimant sent another email (Exhibit C13) to Mr. Kevin Bernard apologizing for the mistake, asking that the email be deleted as it was sent in error. The defendant went on that on 10th October 2012, it received an unsigned letter of same date from Concerned Staff of the defendant’s company addressed to the CEO of the defendant’s containing allegations of breach of confidentiality, economic sabotage and threat to life made against the claimant. The said letter is Exhibit D2. On 15th October 2012, the defendant forwarded Exhibit D2 to the SSS (vide Exhibit D3) for investigation of the serious allegations of economic sabotage and threat to life, following which the claimant was invited by the SSS for questioning. On 23rd October 2012, the claimant was issued a query (Exhibit D4) in which he was asked to give reasons why he should not be sanctioned for breach of the confidentiality clause contained in his contract of employment when he sent his business development activity to a Mr. Kevin Bernard who is not an employee of the defendant. That the claimant responded to the query by his letter of 1st November 2012 (Exhibit D5) in which he admitted sending the email in question to Mr. Kevin Bernard but went on to explain that the email was sent in error. The defendant did not find this explanation acceptable and so terminated the claimant’s appointment vide a letter dated 12th November 2012 (Exhibit D6). That is on account of all of this that the claimant filed the instant case seeking amongst other reliefs a declaration that termination of is employment was wrongful. Additionally, that the claimant filed another suit before the Federal High Court, Lagos (Suit No. FHC/L/CS/786/13) against the defendant and three others seeking to enforce his fundamental rights. The originating process of the said suit is Exhibit D7. In consequence, the argument of the defendant is that having regard to the nature of the relationship between the parties as well as the terms of the contract of employment between the claimant and the defendant, which document stipulates the rights and obligations of the parties there under, the termination of the claimant’s employment by the defendant was not wrongful but in accordance with the terms of his contract of employment. As such, the claimant is not entitled to any of the reliefs he seeks in this suit, which should accordingly be dismissed. DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS The defendant framed one issue for the determination of the Court, to wit: “whether the claimant is entitled to any of the reliefs sought for in this complaint”. The defendant proceeded to address this sole issue in terms of each of the reliefs the claimant seeks. Relief a): A declaration that the termination of the claimant’s employment by the defendant was wrongful. To the defendant, the relationship between it and the claimant is one of master and servant, which the defendant can terminate at anytime and for any reason or for no reason at all provided that terms of the contract between them are complied with. That this right of termination inures to both parties, citing Arinze v. First Bank of Nig. Ltd [2000] 1 NWLR (Pt. 639) 78. That in determining whether the termination of the claimant’s employment is wrongful or not, it is the document which forms the contract between the parties that the Court will look at, referring to Amodu v. Amode [1990] 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 3586 at 373. The defendant went on that the contract of service of the claimant, Exhibit D1, is the letter of appointment dated 26th November 2010, which provides in terms of termination as follows – TERMINATION 1. Both parties may terminate this agreement by giving three-month notice. Failing to do this, the party in default will be liable for the following costs [e.g. Balance of short notice period multiplied by salary and other direct cost the other party may suffer accordingly]. 2. If the contract is terminated due to misbehavior of the employee, the termination will be immediate. Examples of misbehavior, but not limited to: Excessive use of alcohol, drugs, submission of wrong information at signing of the Letter of Appointment, not following orders of superiors, stealing, gross negligence, insubordination, etc (emphasis is the defendants). 3. After termination, Employee is not allowed to take employment or consultancy type of agreement with a competitor of Seatrucks/WAV, which may damage the business of STG/WAV, for a period of 6 (six) months following this termination. The defendant continued that the onus is on the employee, who complains of wrongful termination, to place before the Court the terms of the contract of employment and to prove the manner in which the said terms were breached by the employer. That the onus of proof is not on the employer. The defendant then referred the Court to Amodu v. Amode (supra), Iwuchikwu v. Nwizu [1994] 7 NWLR (Pt. 357) 379 at 412 and Katto v. CBN [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 390 at 405. Next, the defendant referred to the fact that the claimant’s contract of service contains a clause on confidentiality, which is as follows – CONFIDENTIATY The company does not allow any discussion of company matters outside the office or indeed with other members of staff when the matter is no concern to them. All the information obtained while in the employment of the company will be used strictly in confidence and only for the benefit of the company even after you cease to be in the employment of the company. The company reserves to take appropriate legal action in case of breach of this clause. When the contract comes to its end the employee will return all company property e.g. computers, phones, files, etc to the company. It is the defendant’s argument that the claimant was in breach of the terms of his contract of employment relating to confidentiality when he sent an email on 4th October 2012 containing the claimant’s Business Development and Performance Report to one Mr. Kevin Bernard who does not work for the defendant, but works for another company, OPI International Inc. That although the said email was not put in evidence by any of the parties, the claimant did not deny this fact. On the contrary, the full details of this incident were admitted by the claimant both in the pleadings and evidence before the Court, referring to paragraphs 6 – 8 of the claimant’s reply to the amended statement of defence and paragraph 5(a) and (b) of the claimant’s further written statement on oath as well as Exhibit C13, the second email sent by the claimant to Mr. Kevin Bernard in which he requested that the earlier email be destroyed as it was sent in error. Also referred is Exhibit C5, which is the claimant’s response to the query issued to him by his employer in which he admitted this fact but sought to explain that it was sent in error. That facts admitted need no further proof, citing Adusei v. Adebayo [2012] 3 NWLT (Pt. 1288) 534 at 552. The defendant continued that the claimant’s act in his position as Commercial Director of the company in carelessly sending information containing his Business development and performance Report to a person who is not an employee of the defendant and who ought not to have access to such information is an example of misbehavior and or gross negligence expressly prohibited by his contract of employment. That the claimant having admitted the act, the defendant was legally and rightfully entitled to terminate his employment with immediate effect as provided for in his contract of employment, referring to paragraph 12 of the amended statement of defence and paragraph 15 of the defendant’s witness statement on oath as well as the termination clause of the contract of employment. The defendant went on that the claimant is relying essentially on two grounds as the basis for which the Court should find that the termination of his employment was wrongful. The first is that of motive as can be seen in paragraph 21 of the amended statement of facts and paragraph 16 of the written statement on oath of the claimant – the motive being that the termination was done as a convenient excuse to avoid the defendant’s contractual obligations to the claimant. To the defendant malice or improper motive cannot in law vitiate a validly exercised right of termination, referring to Ajayi v, Texaco [2011] SC (incomplete citation), Fakuade v. OAU [1993] 5 NWLR (Pt. 291) 47. The second ground is lack of fair hearing as can be found in paragraph 12 of the claimant’s reply to the amended statement of defence and paragraph 8 of the further written statement on oath of the claimant. To the defendant, this ground is not supported by law having regard to the pleadings and evidence before the Court. That fair hearing is opportunity to be heard, referring to Gukas v. Jos International Breweries Ltd [1991] 6 NWLR (Pt. 199) 614 and Imonikhe v. Unity Bank Plc [2011] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1262) 624 as well as Kayode Agbolade v. Ecobank Nigeria Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/34/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on October 30, 2013. On these authorities, the defendant submitted that the claimant’s employment was rightly terminated in accordance with the terms of his contract of employment. Relief b): The sum of $90,000 (Ninety Thousand US Dollars) being September, October and November 2012 salaries and N2,400,000.00 (Two Million, Four Hundred Thousand Naira) being October and November Living Allowances respectively. The defendant first noted that in claiming for living allowance for October and November, it is not clear why the claimant is not claiming for September given that this relief seeks for September salary as well as that of October and November. To the defendant, it gave evidence in terms of paragraph 18 of its amended statement of defence and paragraph 18 of its witness written statement on oath that the claimant was paid all his salary and allowances up to the end of October 2012 and then tendered Exhibit D8, a letter from the defendant to the claimant dated 15th February 2013 informing the claimant of the payment of his salary and other entitlements both in Dollars and in Naira and the period covered by the said payments. That the two attachments to the letter contain the relevant information and transaction details of the payment made by the defendant to the claimant. To the defendant, in the absence of any other evidence to the contrary, the Court should find that the claimant has been paid his salary and living allowance up to October 2012. It is also the submission of the defendant that if the Court finds that the claimant’s employment was rightly terminated, then the claimant cannot make a claim for his November salary and allowance, his appointment having been terminated on 12th November 2012. That the only allowance and salary he can lawfully claim is the salary and allowance from 1st to 12th November 2012 when his appointment was terminated, which sum can be prorated based on the amount stipulated in his contract of employment since the termination will be deemed to take effect from the date stated on the letter of termination, citing Udegbunam v. FCDA [1996] 5 NWLR (Pt. 449) 474 at 485. In any event, that having been terminated on 12th November 2012 (whether rightly or wrongly), the claimant cannot make any claim for unpaid wages beyond that date given that Olatunbosun v. NISER [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 25 held that a servant who has been unlawfully dismissed cannot claim wages for services he never rendered. That it follows form this that a servant whose appointment was rightly terminated cannot claim for wages beyond the date of termination of his employment, otherwise it will amount to making a claim for services which he never rendered. Reliefs c) and d): The sum of $30,000.00/month (Thirty Thousand US Dollars) from December 2012 till final judgment is delivered in this suit, being the claimant’s monthly salary. The sum of N1,200,000/month (One Million, Two Hundred Thousand Naira) from December 2012 till final judgment is delivered in this suit, being the claimant’s monthly living allowance. Here, the defendant first reiterated the arguments it advanced earlier as to the claimant not being entitled to anything beyond the termination date to also submit that the claimant is not entitled to reliefs c) and d). Thereafter, the defendant submitted that the termination being challenged is not on the basis of paragraph 1 of the termination clause but on paragraph 2 which gives the employer the immediate right to terminate the contract on grounds of gross negligence, and which right the defendant duly exercised after giving the claimant the opportunity to defend himself. That assuming without conceding that the termination was wrongful either because proper notice was not given or the termination was not in accordance with the terms of the contract, the position of the law is that the normal measure of damages is the amount the claimant would have earned under the contract for the period until the employer could have lawfully terminated it, less any amount he could reasonably be expected to earn in other employment; but where the employer has a right to terminate the contract before the expiry of the term, damages should be assessed only up to the earliest time at which the employer could validly have terminated the contract, referring to UBN Ltd v. Edet [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 287) 288, Ihezukwu v. University of Jos [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 598 and Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512. The defendant further submitted that an employee whose appointment has been terminated for breach of his contract of employment cannot choose to treat the contract as subsisting and sue for an account of profits which he would have earned to the end of the contractual period, referring to Jirgbagh v. UBN Plc [2001] 2 NWLR (Pt. 696) 11 at 23 – 24. In conclusion, that the claimant is not entitled to reliefs c) and d) and so they should be dismissed. Relief e): The sum of $30,000.00 (Thirty Thousand US Dollars) and N1,200,000.00 (One Million, Two Hundred Thousand Naira) representing the claimant’s 2012 Leave Allowance. To the defendant, there is nowhere in the pleadings filed by the claimant as well as the evidence given by the claimant that it will be found where this claim was either pleaded and or evidence led in support of it. Also that nowhere in Exhibit D1, which contains the terms and conditions of the claimant’s employment with the defendant, will it be found where it is stated that the claimant will be paid any of these sums as leave allowance. The defendant accordingly submitted that in the absence of any averment in the claimant’s pleadings to that effect, or evidence adduced in support of same, this Court should find that the claimant has failed to prove his entitlement to the above sums and relief e) should thereby be dismissed. Reliefs f) and g): The sum of $1,000,000.00 (One Million Dollars) being the claimant’s one year Bonus (covering the period January 2011 to January 2012). The sum of $1,000,000.00 (One Million Dollars) per annum till final judgment is delivered in this suit being the claimant’s Annual bonus. To the defendant, the contract of employment (Exhibit D1) contains the provision relating to bonus in the following terms – BONUS This subject will be discussed, once you have completed 12 (twelve) months of diligent service to the Company. That the claimant in paragraph 9 of his amended statement of facts and paragraph 7 of his witness statement on oath that after the 1st anniversary of his employment he discussed the issue of bonus with the defendant’s CEO (Mr. Roomans) who promised to pay One Million Dollars as bonus. The defendant denied this allegation in paragraph 5 of its amended statement of defence and in paragraph 13 of its witness statement on oath stated that the defendant did not at anytime agree with the claimant either orally or in writing that it will pay him the said sum. That under cross-examination, the claimant responded in the negative to the question whether between January 2012 and 12th November 2012 there is any document before the Court either in form of a letter, internal memo or note in which he reminded the defendant of its promise to pay. To the defendant, while there is no documentary evidence in this regard, there is equally no corroboration of the oral promise to pay One Million Dollars; and by section 131(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act the rule is he who alleges must prove. That the claimant was the only witness who testified for himself and so cannot be said to have proved this claim. The defendant went on that even on balance of probability, the claimant whose salary component in dollars was $30,000 per month and which sum was clearly so stated in his contract would want this Court to believe that the defendant promised to pay One Million Dollars as bonus, which sum is more than two and half years’ salary for his one service year to the company without documentation to that effect. That this claim smacks of nothing but profiteering on the part of the claimant, urging the Court to so hold. Additionally, the claimant claimed as per relief g) the same One Million Dollars as annual bonus for every succeeding year till judgment. That is there is any doubt as to the claimant’s intent at profiteering, this relief sought as annual bonus in respect of the years for which no service was rendered puts paid to any such doubt. That if the claimant cannot substantiate and or prove the claim for bonus in respect of his one year of service, then it cannot be seen how he can prove his entitlement to this relief, urging the Court to dismiss the relief. Relief h): Interest rate on the judgment sums at the rate of 22% per annum till judgment is given and thereafter at the rate of 10% per cent per annum till judgment is fully liquidated. The defendant submitted here if that the sums upon which this relief rests are dismissed, then the relief cannot stand. In any event, in Kurt Severinsen v. Emerging Markets Limited [2012] 27 NLLR (Pt. 78) 374 NIC, this Court held that pre-judgment interest is not recoverable, urging the Court to accordingly dismiss the relief. Relief i): An order compelling the defendant to issue an apology to the claimant in two national newspapers in Nigeria for the humiliation and embarrassment suffered by the claimant due to the unjust Disclaimer published at the behest of the defendant. To the defendant, the basis of this claim is not clear. Is it a claim for libel or defamation of character for which the claimant is asking for an apology to be issued? Does this Court even have jurisdiction over the relief? That whatever may be the case, this Court has severally declined jurisdiction in claims for defamation even when the defamatory imputation was said to have arisen from the workplace, referring to Mr. C. E. Okeke & 2 ors v. UBN Plc [2011] 22 NLLR (Pt. 61) 161 at 183 and Dr E. G. Ayo Akinyemi v. Crawford University [2011] 22 NLLR (Pt. 61) 90 at 110. That in these cases, this Court applied Agbo v. CBN [1996] 10 NWLR (Pt. 478) 370 CA. On the strength of these authorities, the defendant submitted that this Court has no jurisdiction to grant relief i) and same should accordingly be dismissed. Relief j): An injunction restraining the defendant, its servants, agents or otherwise from further harassment and intimidation of the claimant. To the defendant, from the pleadings and evidence of the claimant, the harassment and intimidation he complains of, and for which he is seeking an injunction against the defendant, were acts done by the SSS who is not a defendant in this case. That it was in recognition of this fact that the claimant instituted Suit No. FHC/L/CS/786/13 at the Federal High Court, Ikoyi, Lagos (Exhibit D7) against the defendant herein and the SSS as 2nd defendant and 3rd defendants respectively for the enforcement of his fundamental rights. That it is evident from Exhibit D7 that relief (2) sought in the motion paper is similar in nature and effect to relief j) sought for in this case, which relief amounts to an abuse of judicial process, urging the Court to so hold and dismiss the claimant’s relief j). Relief k): The sum of N100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) being aggravated and exemplary damages for the wrongful termination of the claimant’s employment. To the defendant, if the Court finds that the termination of the claimant’s employment was not wrongful then this relief will fail. However, that an award of damages is not to make a windfall or profit in this manner, referring to C & P Haulage v. Middleton [1983] 1 WLR 1461 and Cehave v. Bremer [1976] 1 QB 44. In any event that exemplary and aggravated damages are awarded as a punitive measure where malice or gross disregard for the law is proved, referring to GFKI (Nig.) Ltd v. NITEL Plc [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1164) 344 at 373; and they are awarded in very restricted and enumerated situations, none of which applies in the instant case, citing Chief Williams v. Daily Times of Nigeria [1990] 1 NWLR (Pt. 124) – the page is not supplied. The defendant then submitted that the claimant is not entitled to this relief and so it should be dismissed. In conclusion, the defendant urged the Court to find that the claimant is not entitled to any of the reliefs he seeks and so his case should be dismissed. CLAIMANT’S SUBMISSIONS The claimant in reaction framed five issues for the determination of the Court, namely – 1. Whether in the circumstances of the case the claimant could be said to have proved that the claimant’s employment was wrongfully terminated by the defendant. 2. Whether from the preponderance of evidence before the Court, the claimant is entitled to claim his annual bonus, leave allowance and all other entitlements accruable to him. 3. Whether the claimant’s action in erroneously copying Mr. Kevin Bernard in an email which was sent to key members of the defendant in which the claimant attached his business development and performance report could be said to be a breach of confidentiality. 4. What weight if any should be attached to the evidence of the defendant’s sole witness? 5. Whether the defendant is justified in relying on an unsigned petition in harassing, intimidating, arresting and detaining the claimant. Regarding issue 1, the claimant contended that he placed before the Court the terms of his employment (Exhibit C1) and the letter of confirmation (Exhibit C2). That the termination clause in the terms of his employment provides for a period of 3 months’ notice or 3 months’ salary in lieu of notice. That he also placed before the Court the query from the defendant (Exhibit C4) and his reply to the query (Exhibit C5) and the letter of termination (Exhibit C6). That there was no length of notice in the letter of termination; as such the termination of his employment was not within the four walls of the contract of employment as same provides for 3 months’ notice or salary in lieu of notice – none of which was given to him. That since he was not given notice or paid in lieu of notice, the measure of damages he is entitled to is what he would have earned over the period of notice required to lawfully terminate his employment, referring to Ajayi v. Texaco Nig. Ltd [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt. 62) 577, Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nig. Ltd [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 298) 512 and Nigerian Telecommunications Ltd v. Ugbe [2003] FWLR (Pt. 148) 1309. To the claimant then, since the defendant did not give 3 months’ notice or payment in lieu, he is entitled to his 3 months’ salary including his monthly living allowance for 3 months in lieu of notice. The claimant accordingly urged the Court to declare that the termination of his contract of employment is wrongful and, therefore, he is entitled to reliefs a), b), c) and d). On issue 2 i.e. whether from the preponderance of evidence before the Court, the claimant is entitled to claim his annual bonus, leave allowance and all other entitlements accruable to him, the claimant contended that it was his evidence in paragraphs 4 – 8, 16, 19 and 20 of his written statement on oath that his remuneration was $30,000 per month, living allowance was N1,200,000 per month, that he was entitled to leave allowance of one month gross pay and the sum of $1,000,000 as annual bonus after one year of service. That he worked for the defendant for about two years. That he also stated in evidence that he severally discussed the issue of payment of his bonus with the CEO of the defendant who took up an evasive attitude whenever the issue was raised. Despite all of this, that the CEO promised to formally write to him. To the claimant, the defendant did not lead any evidence to show that there was no agreement on the issue off bonus and the claimant’s entitlements. That the defendant’s witness under cross-examination stated that the issue of bonus was discussed after 12 months as he was told by the CEO and he was not informed of how many times the claimant and the CEO discussed the issue of the claimant’s bonus and they had not reached a figure. To the claimant, he has presented indisputable evidence in this Court (both oral and documentary evidence) in proof of his claims before this Court for him to be paid not just his salary in lieu of notice but his other legitimate entitlements as are due to him at the time his employment was brought to an end, referring to Nitel Plc v. Ocholi [2001] 10 NWLR (Pt. 720) 188 at 222. That his evidence in this case as to bonus and leave allowance was not contradicted and so it ought to be accepted as true and reliable evidence which the Court can act on, citing Egbuna v. Egbuna [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt. 106) 773, Okeke v. AG, Anambra State [1997] 9 NWLR (Pt. 519) 123 and Odiba v. Muemue [1999] 10 NWLR (Pt. 633) 174. The claimant then urged the Court to accordingly grant him reliefs e), f) and g) as the damages he is entitled to apart from his salary in lieu of notice include other entitlements which he would have earned over the period of notice, referring to Nigerian Produce Marketing Board v. Adewunmi [1972] 11 SC 111 at 117 and Osiyemi v. Societe Generale Bank Ltd [2001] 11 NWLR (Pt. 725) 563. Regarding issue 3 i.e. whether the claimant’s action in erroneously copying Mr. Kevin Bernard in an email which was sent to key members of the defendant in which the claimant attached his business development and performance report could be said to be a breach of confidentiality, the claimant first indicated that it is the defendant’s case that the termination of the claimant’s employment was not done under the termination clause but under the confidentiality clause. That the email upon which the defendant rests its case was never put in evidence before the Court. That the duty imposed on the defendant is that having adduced a reason for terminating the claimant’s employment it must establish the said reason, referring to Evans Brothers (Nig) Publishers v. Falaiye [2003] NWLR (Pt. 838) 564 and SPDC v. Olarewaju [2008] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118) 1. As such that having given the reason of breach of confidentiality, the onus is on the defendant to prove same. That the defendant has not furnished the Court with evidence that the Court can rely on in holding that the claimant’s employment was terminated because he breached the confidentiality clause. To the claimant, the defendant’s witness under cross-examination stated that the claimant’s employment was terminated based on the email of 4th October 2012 and when he was asked if he had the email, he answered in the negative. That he on his part testified that Mr. Kevin Bernard has been copied in several emails to key members of the defendant and as proof, the claimant tendered Exhibit C12, an 8-paged email trail exchanged between Mr. Kevin Bernard and key members of the defendant. Also tendered is Exhibit C13, the email sent by the claimant asking Mr. Bernard to destroy the offensive email. That he was meant to copy Mr. Kevin Wood the offensive email but erroneously copied Mr. Kevin Bernard. That this act was an honest genuine mistake and as soon as he took note of it, he met with the legal officer of the defendant to find out what steps should be taken to set it right. He then sent Exhibit C13 immediately. To the claimant, his employment was terminated for unestablished allegations. That he was not in breach of the confidentiality clause; and the defendant is merely groping for a convenient excuse to avoid meeting its obligation of paying the claimant’s annual bonus after it had taken benefit of the claimant’s diligence in growing the defendant’s business. The claimant went on that for an act of an employee to amount to breach of confidentiality, it must be an act that is prejudicial to the interest of the employer or outside the scope of the duties of the employee, referring to Uzondu v. UBN Plc [2008] All FWLR (Pt.443) 1389, NEPA v. Enyong [2003] FWLR (Pt. 457) 452 and UBN v. Ogboh [1995] 2 NWLR (Pt. 380) 647. That DW under cross-examination admitted that Mr. Kevin Bernard is not a stranger to the company and till date the defendant is still doing business with him. That the evidence of DW goes to show that the email sent to Mr. Bernard did not in any way affect the business of the of the defendant with Mr. Bernard’s company. In any case, that the email containing the Business Development and Performance Report is not a document that can be used to work against the deep interest of the defendant. That the email is not an act injurious to the business of the defendant neither did it cause the defendant loss of money or business. The claimant then urged the Court to hold that the defendant has wrongly terminated the employment of the claimant. On issue 4 i.e. the weight if any to be attached to the evidence of the defendant’s sole witness, the claimant contended that since DW was employed in March 2014 and was never present when the events that led to suit took place in 2012, and since DW’s evidence is based on information from all the “principal actors” in the company, DW was more or less acting out a script that was written by the CEO of the defendant. In any event, that the evidence of DW is hearsay, which is inadmissible and so should be ignored, referring to Judicial Service Commission v. Omo [1990] 6 NWLR (Pt. 157) 407, Ojo v. Gharoro [2006] 2 – 3 SC 105 and Suntai v. Tukur [2003] FWLR (Pt. 157) 1128 at 1144. The claimant went on that given that DW’s testimony is hearsay, the defendant’s pleadings must then be read as abandoned as they are not supported by oral evidence, referring to Dantata v. Dantata [2002] 4 NWLR (Pt. 756) 144 at 167 and FCDA v. Naibi [1990] 3 NWLR (Pt. 138) 270 at 281. The claimant then urged the Court to hold that the defendant having not supported its pleadings on the issue of the amount of bonus that should be paid to the claimant with oral evidence has abandoned its averments in the amended statement of defence on the issue of bonus. More so, that evidence which is not attached and contradicted remains credible and ought to be accepted as true and reliable evidence which a trial Court can act on, referring to Egbuna v. Egbuna [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt. 106) 773. That in the instant case, the evidence of the claimant having neither been challenged nor debunked should be regarded as credible and reliable evidence in determining whether the claimant’s relief seeking for the grant of $1,000,000 as his bonus should be paid. Regarding issue 5 i.e. whether the defendant is justified in relying on an unsigned petition in harassing, intimidating, arresting and detaining the claimant, the claimant contended that Exhibit D2 is not signed and Exhibit D3 which forwarded Exhibit D2 to the SSS has two dates on it. The claimant then submitted that both exhibits should be discountenanced; Exhibit D2 for being unsigned, citing Omega Bank Nigeria Plc v. OBC Limited [2005] 8 NWLR (Pt. 958) 547 at 576 and 581, and Exhibit D3 for having two dates one of which predates Exhibit D2. In conclusion, the claimant urged the Court to grant his reliefs. That from the exhibits tendered by the claimant, it is clear that his employment was wrongfully terminated and he is entitled to all his claims. The claimant finally urged the Court to uphold his case as having been proved as the defendant has failed to discharge the evidential burden placed on it to prove that the claimant’s employment was not wrongfully terminated and that the claimant is not entitled to his claims as contained in the amended complaint and amended statement of facts. DEFENDANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW The defendant reacted on points of law. On the onus of proof, the claimant had argued that the terms of the contract of employment were breached by the failure of the defendant to give the claimant 3 months’ notice or 3 months’ salary in lieu of notice. To the defendant this is a misconception of the nature of the complaint the claimant himself brought to the Court. That there is nowhere in the pleadings or evidence of the claimant will it be found where the claimant pleaded or gave evidence that the termination of his employment was wrongful because the defendant failed to give him 3 months’ notice or 3 months’ salary in lieu of notice. So bringing up this issue in the written address is wrong, citing Chabasaya v. Anwasi [2010] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1201) 163. The defendant proceeded to draw the Court’s attention to the concluding portion of the claimant’s final written address in which the claimant submitted as follows – …Finally, we urge the…Court to uphold the case of the claimant as having been proved as the defendant has failed to discharge the evidential burden placed on it to prove that the claimant’s employment was not wrongfully terminated… To the defendant, it is at a loss as to how the claimant’s counsel came to urge this conclusion on the Court after citing the case of Katto v. CBN [1999] 7 NWLR (Pt. 357) 379 on who has the onus of proof in termination of employment cases. That the claimant’s conclusion amounts to turning both law and logic on its head, urging the Court to hold that the claimant has failed to discharge the evidential burden placed on him to prove that his termination was wrongful. On the relevance of Exhibits D2 and D3, the defendant conceded that Exhibit D2 is worthless and Exhibit D3 has no probative value; and that that is why it made no reference to these exhibits in its written address in arguing the substantive claim. That exhibits D2 and D3 were pleaded and tendered to explain the facts and circumstances that surrounding the allegations of arrest, intimidation and harassment made by the claimant in his complaint, allegations that are in any case the before the Federal High Court. The defendant then asked that if Exhibits D2 and D3 were discountenanced, will the other documents duly admitted before the Court prove that the termination of the claimant’s employment was wrongful as urged by counsel to the claimant? That Exhibit D4, the query, made no reference to Exhibit D2 but made it clear that it was the event of 4th October 2012 (several days before Exhibit D2 was supposedly written) that the claimant was queried on; which event the claimant did not deny in his reply to the query (Exhibit C5), and through Exhibit D13, the claimant sought to retrieve or have deleted the offending email. It is accordingly the submission of the defendant that even if Exhibits D2 and D3 are discountenanced as they should be, the preponderance of evidence before the Court supports the defendant’s contention that the termination of the claimant’s employment was not wrongful but in accordance with his contract of employment. The defendant then urged the Court to reject the submission of the claimant’s counsel based on Exhibit D2. COURT’S DECISION I heard learned counsel and considered all the processes filed in this suit. Since both counsel agree that by law Exhibits D2 and D3 are worthless and have no evidential value for respectively being unsigned and possessing two dates, I shall discountenance both exhibits for purposes of this judgment. The simple issue, therefore, before the Court is whether the claimant has been able to prove the reliefs he seeks. In, therefore, considering the merit of this case, I intend to adopt the approach of the defendant by simply looking at the individual reliefs the claimant seeks; but first I need to note from the outset that there is something curious about the claimant’s submissions. Despite counsel to the claimant acknowledging that the law is that it is he who asserts that must prove, the claimant’s counsel assumed an approach in arguing its case with measured dubiety. For instance, in paragraph 4.4.6 of the claimant’s written address, counsel had urged the Court to hold that the defendant having not supported its pleadings on the issue of the amount of bonus that should be paid to the claimant with oral evidence has abandoned its averments in the amended statement of defence on the issue of bonus. Is it the defendant that has to prove the issue of the amount of bonus that should be paid to the claimant? Secondly, counsel to the claimant in paragraph 5 of the claimant’s written address had urged the Court to uphold the claimant’s case as having been proved as the defendant has failed to discharge the evidential burden placed on it to prove that the claimant’s employment was not wrongfully terminated and that the claimant is not entitled to his claims as contained in the amended complaint and amended statement of facts. Is it the defendant that is to prove that the claimant’s termination was not wrongfully terminated? Is it the defendant that is to prove that the claimant is not entitled to his claims as contained in the amended originating processes? Thirdly, the claimant had argued that the terms of the contract of employment were breached by the failure of the defendant to give the claimant 3 months’ notice or 3 months’ salary in lieu of notice. Now nowhere in the pleadings of the claimant did the claimant plead that the termination of his employment was wrongful because the defendant failed to give him 3 months’ notice or 3 months’ salary in lieu of notice. So bringing up this issue in the written address is not only wrong but dubious. At the risk of repetition, the law is that it is he who asserts that must prove. In relief a), the claimant is seeking for a declaration that the termination of his employment by the defendant was wrongful. Here, the claimant had indicated that it is the defendant’s case that the termination of the claimant’s employment was not done under the termination clause but under the confidentiality clause. I think this is a misconception on the part of the claimant. There are three provisions in the termination clause. The case of the defendant is that it terminated the employment of the claimant under the second provision and its justification for doing this is breach of the confidentiality clause. It is the claimant who is arguing that his termination is under the first provision of the termination clause. The defendant did not say it acted under the first provision. I looked through the letter of appointment (Exhibit C1, same as Exhibit D1), which is the contract of employment containing the terms and conditions of the claimant’s employment with the defendant. In provision 2 of the termination clause, “if the contract is terminated due to misbehavior of the employee, the termination will be immediate”. The provision then goes on to give examples of misbehavior, which examples are not, however, exhaustive. I agree with the claimant that where the employer, although not bound to, however, gives a reason for terminating the employment of an employee, then such an employer is duty bound to justify the termination. Exhibit D4 is the query issued to the claimant. It first referred to the confidentiality clause in Exhibit C1/D1 and then accuses the claimant of forwarding vide an email to Mr. Kevin Bernard, who is not an employee of the company, the claimant’s “report of 18 months business development activities for WAV in Nigeria”. The claimant was asked to explain within 3 days inter alia why the claimant should not be sanctioned. The claimant offered his explanation vide Exhibit D5 that the email sent to Mr. Kevin Bernard was sent in error, which error had been cured by another email sent to Mr. Bernard asking him to delete the offending email. The defendant did not accept this explanation, and so by Exhibit D6 dated 12th November 2012, the claimant’s employment was terminated with immediate effect for breach of the confidentiality clause. All of this satisfies the requirement of fair hearing as per the authorities of Gukas v. Jos International Breweries Ltd [1991] 6 NWLR (Pt. 199) 614 and the Supreme Court decision in Imonikhe v. Unity Bank Plc [2011] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1262) 624; and I so find and hold. Now the argument of the claimant is that his explanation for sending the offending email to Mr. Bernard is tenable and strong enough not to justify the termination of his employment contract. It is in this regard that the claimant contended that because DW under cross-examination admitted that Mr. Kevin Bernard is not a stranger to the company and till date the defendant is still doing business with him, there can be no talk of breach of confidentiality. But a closer look at the confidentiality clause will show that the provision is relatively strict in demanding for compliance e.g. it states: “All the information obtained while in the employment of the company will be used strictly in confidence and only for the benefit of the company even after you cease to be in the employment of the company”; and “the employer reserves the right to take appropriate legal action in case of breach of the clause”. It goes on to also state that there can be breach of confidentiality even for information passed on to a fellow staff so long as that staff has no business receiving the information. In this sense, the argument of the claimant that the email containing the Business Development and Performance Report is not a document that can be used to work against the deep interest of the defendant, and that the email is not an act injurious to the business of the defendant neither did it cause the defendant loss of money or business, is misconceived and so goes to nothing. The applicability of the confidentiality clause is not hinged on any injury being actually done to the interest of the defendant; it is simply to guard against such a possibility. The claimant made an issue of and submitted in the process that the defendant failed to prove the reason of the termination of his employment. It needs to be noted here that the Court of Appeal case of ACB Plc v. Nbisike [1995] 8 NWLR (Pt. 416) 725 has it that an employer, when dismissing his employee, need not allege any specific act of misconduct on the employee’s part as the ground for the dismissal. It is sufficient if such a ground did exist, whether or not the employer knew of it at the time of the dismissal. Therefore, it is not a requirement of the law that the nature or particulars of the gross misconduct are to be disclosed at the time of dismissal. I am satisfied that the defendant validly terminated the claimant’s employment for breach of confidentiality as per the terms of the claimant’s contract of employment. The termination of the claimant’s employment is accordingly legal and valid; and I so find and hold. And by Adams v. LSDPC [2000] 5 NWLR (Pt. 657) 291 CA, once it is shown that termination of an employment is in accordance with the terms of the employment, the issue of natural justice does not arise. The claimant is, therefore, not entitled to relief a); relief a) is accordingly dismissed. Reliefs b) – h) and k) are for monetary claims for salary, living and leave allowances, and annual bonus including interest and damages. These monetary claims are structured as follows: the claim for backlog of salary and living allowance (relief b), backlog of leave allowance (relief e), backlog of bonus (relief f); the claim for projected future earnings up to point of judgment as to salary (relief c), living allowance (relief d), annual bonus (relief g); the claim for interest (relief h); the claim for damages (relief k); the claim for apology for humiliation and embarrassment (relief i); and the claim for injunction against harassment and intimidation (relief j). As for the claim for backlog of salary and living allowance as per relief b), it is curious that the claimant prays for living allowance of N2,400,000.00 for October and November but did not indicate of which year. This is repeated in paragraph 2.1(m) of the claimant’s written address. In fact it was the defendant who replying to it asserted that the claim is for October and November 2012. Exhibit D8 indicates that the claimant had been paid salary and living allowance up to 26th October 2012. Since the effective date of the termination of the claimant’s employment is 12th November 2012, it means that the claimant must be paid for the period 27th October 2012 to 12th November 2012; and I so find and hold. Exhibit D8 itself indicates that October 2012 salary and living allowance were prorated for the period 1st – 26th October 2012 at $25,644 and N925,564.28 respectively. Exhibit C1/D1 indicates that the monthly salary of the claimant is $30,000 and the monthly living allowance is N1,200,000. Both parties are agreed on this. Since the claimant was paid salary and living allowance for the period 1st – 26th October 2012, the balance due to him for the month of October 2012 will be $30,000 minus $25,644, which comes to $4,356 for salary; and N1,200,000 minus N925,564.28, which comes to N274,435.72 for living allowance. As for November 2012, the claimant is entitled to be paid salary and living allowance for the period 1st – 12th November 2012. Since November has 30 days in the month, the claimant’s entitlements will be divided by 30 days and multiplied by the 12 days he is entitled to be paid for. $30,000 divided by 30 days comes to $1,000 per day; and when multiplied by 12 days what we have is $12,000, and this is what the claimant is entitled to as salary for 1st – 12th November 2012 – and I so hold. In terms of living allowance, if N1,200,000 is divided by 30 days what we have is N40,000 per day, which when multiplied by 12 days gives us N480,000, and this is what the claimant is entitled to as living allowance for the period 1st – 12th November 2012; and I so hold. In sum total, the claimant’s backlog of salary and living allowance for the period 27th October 2012 to 12th November 2012 is as follows: $4,356 plus $12,000 comes to $16,356 for salary; and N274,435.72 plus N480,000 comes to N754,435.72. The claimant is accordingly entitled to $16,356 as backlog of salary and N754,435.72 as backlog of living allowance; and I so find and hold. Relief b) accordingly succeeds only in part and to the extent stated. As for all the reliefs making claims for payments till judgment (reliefs c, d and g), not only did the claimant not prove any to the satisfaction of the Court, my finding and holding that the termination was legal and valid means that there is no duty on the part of the defendant to pay any sum beyond 12th November 2012. Reliefs c), d) and g) accordingly fail and are hereby dismissed. Relief e) is a claim for 2012 leave allowance at the sums of $30,000 and N1,200,000. There is no provision in Exhibit C1/D1 dealing with leave allowance. So I do not know how the claimant came about this as an entitlement. Relief e) accordingly fails and so is dismissed. Relief f) is for bonus at $1,000,000 covering the period January 2011 to January 2012. The clause on bonus in Exhibit C1/D1 provides as follows – This subject will be discussed, once you have completed 12 (twelve) months of diligent service to the Company. This clause on bonus does not state that bonus will be paid; of course it does not state the amount of the bonus to be paid. All it says is that the subject will be discussed once the claimant completes 12 months of diligent service. Agreed that from the evidence before the Court the claimant completed 12 months of service. Now the claimant had argued that there was an oral agreement between him and the CEO of the defendant company to pay bonus at $1,000,000 for one year’s service. The question is whether an oral agreement feeds the terms of the claimant’s contract of employment as to validate his claim for bonus of $1,000,000. The claimant’s letter of appointment (Exhibit C1/D1) in the last clause titled, “Entire Agreement”, states that – This agreement represents the entire agreement between the Employer and the Employee and therefore supersedes all prior negotiations, promises and agreements. If Exhibit C1, which is in writing, supersedes all prior negotiations, promises and agreements, does it suggest that subsequent negotiations, promises and agreements will be oral as the claimant seems to think with respect to his alleged oral agreement for the payment of $1,000,000 bonus? I do not think that the claimant is serious here to expect that based on his oral evidence that the defendant promised to pay to him $1,000,000 as bonus this Court will grant same without more when the defendant vehemently denied same. There is no documentary evidence as to this agreement or the evidence of a neutral witness as to the existence of the oral agreement between the parties. It is the word of the claimant against the defendant’s. On balance, the claimant has not proved the claim for relief f). The claim is accordingly dismissed. Relief h) is for interest. As pointed out by the defendant, this Court does not grant pre-judgment interest; as such the claim for 22% per annum for pre-judgment interest fails and is accordingly dismissed. Reliefs i) and j) are respectively for apology for humiliation and embarrassment, and for injunction against harassment and intimidation. The defendant rightly pointed out that this Court does not assume jurisdiction in matters such this, a submission that the claimant did not even border to react to. In any event, Agbo v. CBN [1996] 10 NWLR (Pt. 478) 370 CA held that where a master accuses a servant of misconduct, whether proved or not, but decides merely to terminate his appointment in accordance with the service agreement without reference to the fact of misconduct in the latter of termination, the servant cannot rely on wrongful termination of appointment as cause of action to clear his name for his future, among other purposes. His recourse in an appropriate case may be in an action for defamation; and by Baba v. Nigerian Civil Aviation Training Centre [1986] 5 NWLR (Pt. 42) 514, no compensation can be claimed for injury done to a servant’s feelings by his dismissal nor in respect of difficulty in finding an alternative work. Further still, Katto v. CBN [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 390 SC held that where an employment is determined in circumstances which may bring the employee into hatred, contempt or ridicule, but the employer had not used and published any defamatory words against the employee in terminating his employment, the employer cannot be held liable in defamation. Even where an employee is wrongfully dismissed from his employment, the damages awardable cannot include compensation for the manner of the dismissal. See Nig. Arab Bank Ltd v. Shuaibu [1991] 4 NWLR (Pt. 186) 450 CA. And by Onwuneme v. ACB Plc [1997] 12 NWLR (Pt. 513) 150 CA, damages for injury to reputation arising from wrongful dismissal are irrecoverable unless the injury results in pecuniary loss. Reliefs i) and j) accordingly fail and are hereby dismissed. The last relief, relief k), is for N100,000,000.00 as aggravated and exemplary damages. Since the termination of the claimant’s contract of employment has been declared legal and valid, and reliefs i) and j) dismissed, there is accordingly no entitlement to it; and in any case the claimant did not show any such entitlement. Relief k) accordingly fails and is dismissed. On the whole, and for the avoidance of doubt, the claimant’s case succeeds only in part and only in terms of the following orders – 1. The defendant is to pay to the claimant the sum of Sixteen Thousand, Three Hundred and Fifty-Six US Dollars ($16,356) only being salary for the period 27th October 2012 to 12th November 2012. 2. The defendant is to pay to the claimant the sum of Seven Hundred and Fifty-Four Thousand, Four Hundred and Thirty-Five Naira, Seventy-Two Kobo (N754,435.72) only being living allowance for the period 27th October 2012 to 12th November 2012. 3. All sums are to be paid within 30 days of this judgment, failing which they said shall attract 10% interest per annum. In concluding, I need to remark on the attitude of counsel simply claiming for the fun of it. The defendant called it profiteering especially in terms of the dollar components of the claims of the claimant. I cannot agree any less. The sad thing is that for all the sums of money claimed by the claimant, only N25,000 was charged as filing fees for the claim of the claimant. The sum of N25,000 is the maximum this Court can charge on claims in excess of N100,000,000 and above. Counsel are consequently finding it convenient to accordingly claim for extraordinarily huge sums knowing that the filing fees are mere pittance. This has the effect of encouraging very frivolous claims and what the defendant stated as profiteering claims since the filing fees do not discourage such claims. I think that actions such as the instant case ought to be subjected to a higher charge for filing fees than what was done; if not for anything to discourage profiteering in litigation as this case has shown. I do not think that legal practice should descend to this low ebb. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD