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BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS Hon. Justice B. B. kanyip Presiding Judge Hon. Justice F.I. kola-Olalere Judge Hon. Justice. J.I. Agbadu-Fishim Judge DATE: 21st April, 2010 SUIT NO. NIC/LA/20/2009 BETWEEN National union of Petroleum & Natural gas Workers - Claimant And Oil & Industrial Services Limited - Respondent REPRESENTATION M.E. Edah, for the claimant. Chief Andrew Oru, with him is K.N. Nwoke, for the respondent. RULING On 22nd of June, 2009, the claimant commenced this action in this Court by complaint seeking the following reliefs: 1. A DECLARATION that the claimant as a duly and validly registered trade union can accept as members workers of the respondent who freely, voluntarily and willingly applied to become members of the claimant union in virtue of section 40 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and section 12(4) of the Trade Unions Act Cap. T 14 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 2. A DECLARATION that the respondent cannot force or compel members of the claimant union in the employment of the respondent to join a union other than the claimant union. 3. A DECLARATION that the threats by the respondent to victimize, sack, terminate or dismiss from the employment of respondent members of the claimant union for their refusal to he lurched or compelled to join a union other than the claimant union is unlawful, illegal, unconstitutional, null and void for contravening section 40 of the 1999 Constitution relating to freedom of association. 4. A DECLARATION that the respondent cannot visit any form of or manner of disadvantage or punishment on members of the claimant union in the employment of respondent brings their refusal to (be forced or compelled to) join a union other than the claimant union. 5. A DECLARATION that the respondent’s employees who had applied to join and become members of the claimant union are deemed to be such members upon their several and joint applications without more. 6. A I)ECLARATION that the respondent is duty and legally bound to make deductions from her workers wages for the purpose of paying contributions (check-off dues) to claimant union in so far as such workers are members of the claimant union in virtue of Section 40 of the I 999 Constitution and section of the federation of Nigeria 2004. 7. AN ORDER OI PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the respondent from interlarding or intermeddling with the claimant union’s right to accept as members, workers of the respondent who freely, voluntarily and willingly applied to become members of the claimant union. 8. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUCTION restraining the respondent from forcing or compelling members of the claimant union in the employment of the respondent to join a union other than the claimant union and from further threatening to victimize, sack, terminate or dismiss from the employment of the respondent members of the claimant union their refusal to be forced or compelled to join a union other than the claimant Union. 9. AN ORDER OF MANDATORY INJUCTION directing the respondent to make deductions horn her workers’ wages for the purpose of paying contributions (check-off dues) to claimant union so far as such workers are members of the claimant union. 10 AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUCTION restraining the respondent either by herself, her agents, privies, assigns, servants, police officers or other security agencies 1mm harassing intimidating, threatening, dismissing, terminating or howsoever bringing to an end the several employment of the claimant union members with the respondent or visiting any form or manner of disadvantage or punishment on members of the claimant union in the employment of the respondent for their refusal to (be forced or compelled to) join a union other than the claimant union. 11 Any OTHER suitable relief or consequential order(s). The claimant filed its statement of facts together with the complaint in which it enunciated the facts of this ease it relied on. According to the statement of facts, the claimant is a registered trade union in Nigeria with membership from junior workers in the Oil and Gas Industry while the respondent is a company duly incorporated in Nigeria and it carries out services in the Oil and Gas industry including oil and gas services given by companies such as Chevron Nigeria Limited. It is also slated that the respondent employs different categories of workers for its services. The claimant stated that junior workers of the respondent jointly and severally applied to become members of the claimant union on the 4th of October, 2007 and with the application authorized the respondent to deduct checkable’ dues from their salaries and remit same to the claimant. The claimant affirmed further that it accepted the application and declaration and took additional steps by forming a branch of its union in the respondent’s industry on the 15th November, 2007. The branch elected its officials and communicated same to the respondent in writing indicating its intention to meet with the Management of the respondent. On receiving this information, the respondent wrote to the Federal Ministry of Labour seeking clarification of jurisdictional scope of the claimant. The respondent’s letter in question is dated 29th November, 2007 and it was copied to the claimant. The claimant responded to the letter by maintaining that its members in the respondent company are at liberty to join any union of their choice. The statement of facts explained further that the Ministry of Labour acted on the respondent’s letter by calling a meeting of the parties on the issue hut that the meeting could not hold because the respondent failed to attend for reasons which sounded moist convincing to the claimant. The claimant, therefore, wrote to the respondent expressing its doubt on the said reason. This letter is dated 7th March, 2008. That another meeting was fixed by the Ministry and the date was communicated to both parties. The claimant in addition wrote a reminder of the meeting to the respondent. The reminder letter is dated 16th April, 2008. The respondent did not respond or attend the meeting convened by the Ministry to resolve the dispute. The respondent refused to recognize the claimant’s members in its industry and persistently refused to deduct and remit check—off dues to the claimant from the salaries of the claimant’s members in the respondent’s industry. On the 16th of July, 2009, the respondent entered a conditional appearance through its counsel Chief Andrew Oru and also lilted by Motion on Notice, a notice of preliminary objection. The respondent brought this application pursuant to section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court (N1C) Act 2006, sections 12(4) and 17 of the Trade Unions Act Cap. T14 LFN 2004, the 3rd Schedule (Parts A and b) to the Trade Unions Act I FN 2004, Order 4 Rules 1, 4, 5 and 10 of the Court Appeal Rules 2007, and under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. The preliminary objection is on the following grounds: (1) That this suit constitutes a gross abuse of the judicial process in that the surrounding facts, issues/circumstances/parties are already before the Court of Appeal Benin-city. (2) That there is no reasonable cause of action disclosed against the respondent. (3) That the claimant lacks the locus standing to institute this suit. (4) Non—disclosure of material facts. (5) That the prayers sought vide this suit are not justiceable by this court. (6) That there is Rio disclosed trade dispute between the claimant and the respondent to warrant the intervention/adjudication of this Court. (7) That this suit is speculative, spurious and vexatious, and brought in bad faith. The respondent then prayed for (1) AN ORDER OF COURT wholly dismissing/striking out this suit for lack of jurisdiction to entertain same. In the alternative, an order (2) Staying further proceedings in this matter pending the hearing/final determination of Suit No. FHC/B/CS/67/2008 now pending on appeal before the Court of Appeal Benin-city. The preliminary objection is supported by a 13-paragraphed affidavit deposed to by one Stanley Iwuala, a legal practitioner in the Law firm of Messrs A. O. Oru & Company, the respondent’s counsel. That both parties and counsel in the two cases are the same. He deposed that Suit No. FHIC/B/CS/67/2008 was ordered inter alia to he transferred to the National Industrial Court Calabar Division on the 10th of February, 2009 based on the respondent’s preliminary objection. That the respondent was dissatisfied with the ruling of the Federal High Court Benin-City and so filed a notice of appeal against the ruling; the notice of appeal is dated 20th February, 2009 and it is still pending at the Court of Appeal Benin. He averred that all the surrounding background facts, issues and circumstances in the two cases/suits, together with all the dramatis personae are the same. Again, that the facts, issues for determination/consideration between the parties in the case before the court are directly connected with the facts/issues awaiting consideration determination at the Court of Appeal. He deposed that the jurisdiction of this court on this case depends on the outcome of the appeal. On the 21st of July 2009, the respondent filed a further and better affidavit in support of its preliminary objection. It is deposed to by the same deponent to the supporting affidavit. It is an 11 -paragraphed affidavit. A certified true copy of the order of transfer of the original case at the federal High Court, Benin City to the National Industrial Court, Calabar Division was attached. The deponent averred that the respondents in that suit are the claimant before this Court on the same facts, issues and circumstances and against the same opponent. Certified true copies of the respondent’s notice of appeal, summons to parties to settle record of appeal dated 17th July, 2009 are also attached to this further and better affidavit together with the certified true copy of the originating summons with annexure filed in Suit No. FHC/B/CS/67/2008. Again, it was averred that the respondent is interested in pursuing the appeal and that further adjudication of the matter by this court will rob the Court of Appeal its jurisdiction to make its findings/pronouncements on the subject neater of the appeal. That it is, therefore, in the interest of justice to grant the application. The claimant filed a 14-paragraphed counter-affidavit in this case. It is dated and filed 23rd July, 2009 and deposed to by one Onyeka Akabuike, a paralegal engaged in the law firm of Marlin Ene Edah & Company, the law firm of the claimant’s solicitor. Conversant with the facts deposed to, he averred that the litchis, circumstances, dramatis personae and reliefs claimed in Suit No. FHC/H/CS/67/2008 are not the same with those in the present case before this court. That the facts/issues for consideration/determination in this case are not directly connected with those referred to in the action in the Federal I ugh Court. He deposed that there is no action before the Court of Appeal known as Suit No. FHC/B/CS/67/2008 nor any appeal pending on the transferred case and that the jurisdiction of this Court is not dependent on the outcome of the appeal in Suit No. FIIC/B/CS/67/2008. Onyeka deposed that the ruling of the Federal high Court, Benin-City on the case before it which was delivered on the I 0’ February, 2009 did not finally determine the right of the parties in that action. He deposed that the reliefs that the claimant is seeking here are radically different from those the respondent sought for in the Federal High Court and that the claimant here did not file any counter-claim in that case. He concluded his averment that the parties before this court have “industrial relations’’ relationship. At the hearing of this preliminary objection, parties agreed with the approval of the Court to argue the matter on record. Both parties then filed and exchanged written addresses. The respondent filed a reply on points of law in addition to the written address. The respondent raised some issues for the determination of this Court. Regarding the 1st issue, the respondent submitted that the original jurisdiction of this Court in this case cannot h appropriately activated without first of all complying with Part I of the Trade Dispute Act, referring to sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 17 and 21 of the Trade Disputes Act. it submitted that the following principles apply in determining the Court’s original jurisdiction under the Trade Disputes Act: 1. In inter and intra-union disputes, the Court’s jurisdiction is appellate because Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act must first of all be followed. 2. On collective agreement or by reference from the Minister of Labour the Court’s jurisdiction is original. 3. This Court’s original jurisdiction could be activated through the claimant’s statement of facts and that if this jurisdiction is challenged then, the court’s jurisdiction will he activated by the statement of defense. The respondent pointed out that the claimant deposed that amicable resolution of the dispute between the parties was stalled by the respondent’s failure/refusal to attend the meeting called by the TV minister of Labour for the settlement. It then asked the question whether the claimant could bring the mailer to this Court under the present circumstance. The respondent pointed out that the claimant is suing on behalf of its purported members in the respondent’s establishment believing that the dispute between the parties here could not be amicably settled even though there is no collective agreement. it submitted that the claimant has not shown that it has exhausted all laid down processes for amicable settlement neither did the claimant show than this matter is within the exceptions anticipated by law. The respondent further submitted that it is only the Minister of Labour that can refer such matter as the present one to the National Industrial Court (NIC) under section 17 of the Trade Disputes Act. It pointed out that this action is not for interpretation of the claimant’s constitution. Therefore, the institution of this matter before ibis court by the claimant is premature and misconceived. The respondent urged the court to so hold and dismiss the case with cost. The 2nd issue raised in the respondent’s address is that this suit constitutes a gross abuse of judicial process. The respondent referred the court to NIMB Ltd. v. Union Bank Ltd [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 209) 1126 at 1133 Ratio 3, where the Supreme Court declared that it is an abuse of court process to institute multiplicity of action between the same parties over the same subject matter. That this is vexatious and an abuse of court process. The respondent submitted that the facts of this case as presented by both parties show that it is an abuse of court process. The respondent then drew the following conclusions on this issue: i) That an expose of the real or actual dramatis personae (or parties in this suit are the same because the claimant sued on behalf of the respondent’s workers purported to be its members. See the claimant’s letter of 4th of October, 2007. That in that letter, the persons named as numbers 27, 18, 2, 26, 23, 19 and 1 are the 1st to 7th respondents in the case at the Federal High Court while the claimant is the 8th respondent. The respondent further pointed out that all the other persons listed as Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 22, 24 and 25 respectively are the same persons listed under paragraph 5 of its affidavit in support of its originating summons at the Federal High Court. ii) The 2nd conclusion is the pendency of similar suits: Suit No. FHC/B/CS/67/2008 at the National Industrial Court, Calabar and at the Court of Appeal, Benin City, referring to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of its further and better affidavit 0f 21st July, 2009. The respondent’s position is that a cursory look at the prayers in the two suits show a fall-out or an extension of the other one to annoy or irritate the respondent. iii) The 3rd conclusion is that the reliefs sought have no nexus with the statement of facts submitted; that the only conclusion from comparing the reliefs sought here with the statement of facts is that those reliefs are out of imagination and certainly not, form the facts stated. It is, therefore, an abuse of court process. Issue three raised in the respondent’s address is that there is no reasonable cause of action in the claimant’s case before the court. The respondent’s position is that reasonable cause of action is defined as a cause of action with some chances of success. The cause of action must be valid and sustainable in law, referring to Sodipo v. Lamminkainen O. Y. [1992] 8 NWLR (Pt. 258) 229 at 242 CA Ratio 9, Rinco Construction Ltd v. Veepee Industrial Limited [1992] 5 NW1R (P1. 240) 248 at 256 CA. The respondent submitted that the reliefs and the statement of facts show no credible charges against the respondent. The respondent contended that relief one presupposes that the unnamed staff of the respondent who joined the claimant are workers and constitute the entire junior work-force of the respondent. To the claimant, the respondent is an oil company as defined by law; therefore it has jurisdictional scope over the respondent’s workers, hut the respondent prevented its workers from joining the claimant. The respondent submitted that there is flow credible evidence to substantiate that position because the said members are not listed alphabetically as indicated. That each letter even it’ authentic is not enough to confirm the stains of respondent’s staff. That since those listed are not parties to this suit neither are they listed as witnesses, the claimant cannot establish their status because the status of the charred workers is still being vigorously challenged in the other referred suit and that the jurisdictional scope of the claimant is being challenged at the Court of Appeal Benin. Therefore, the National Industrial Court cannot consider the issue. The respondent submitted that reliefs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the claimant are misconceived spurious and stand no chance of success because nothing in the statement of facts indicates any attempt by the respondent to compel its staff to join any other union or any threat to its workers. The respondent pointed out that relief 9 of the claimant is in part material with reliefs 1, 5 and 7. The respondent then adopted its earlier submissions on them. That relief 10 is the summary of all the reliefs; and so the respondent adopted its submissions earlier made on them. Issue four according to the respondent is the non-disclosure of material facts. It pointed out that the claimant did not disclose the pending appeal between the parties because that wills not he in its interest in this matter. This in essence means that the claimant acted in had faith and ought to be stiffly condemned by the court. The respondent urged the court to dismiss the suit. In the alternative, the respondent submitted that if the court is minded to hear the suit then it is urging the court to consider ‘subjugating the action to Suit No. FHC/B/CS/67/2008 which is now pending before the National Industrial Court, Calabar’. In the claimant’s written address opposing the preliminary objection, the claimant contended that the respondent’s application is dilatory, ill-conceived, frivolous, vexatious and absolutely devoid of any merit whatsoever. The claimant raised some issues while arguing against the preliminary objection. Its lst issue is whether the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction on this case. The claimant submitted that it is trite that in determining such issue, it is the writ of summons and the statement of claims that the court looks at. That from its complaint and statement of facts it is shown that the subject matter of this case is the recognition of the claimant union by the respondent and the rights that accrue to the claimant in virtue of such recognition; for instance, the claimant’s right to check off dues from its members in the respondent’s company. The claimant opined that in order to determine its locus standing and that it discloses reasonable cause of action, it is its complaint/claims and statement of facts that are relevant and not the respondent’s dispositions. See Federal Ministry of Commerce and Tourism v. Chief Benedict Eze [2006] All FWLR (Pt. 323) 1704 at 1723 E - F and Inegbedion v. Selo-Ojeman [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 221) 1445. The claimant submitted that the subject matter of this action is within the jurisdiction of this court. That this court has jurisdiction, according to the decision in Federal Ministry of Commerce and Tourism v. Chief Eze, supra, if— a) It is properly constituted with respect to number and qualification of its membership. b) The subject matter of the action is within its jurisdiction. c) The action is initiated by due process of law. d) Any condition precedent to the exercise of its jurisdiction has been fulfilled. That the claimant’s case revolves around trade dispute and industrial relations dispute. See Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria and manor v. National Union of Road Transport Workers and 5 ors [2005] ALL FWLR (Pt. 254) 920 at 930. The claimant contended that a trade dispute is one between employers and workers or between workers and workers connected with employment, non-employment aid physical condition of work of any person. See also the Court of Appeal decision in Attorney General of Oyo State v. Nigerian Labour Congress Oyo State chapter and 4 ors [2003] 8 NWLR (Pt. 821) 1 at 23 B — D Also section 47 now section 48 of the Trade Dispute Act defines a trade dispute as any dispute between an employer and workers or between workers and workers connected with the employment or non—employment and physical condition of work of any person. The claimant pointed out those ingredients of trade dispute in Attorney General v. Nigerian Labour Congress Oyo State chapter, supra, are - a) There must be a dispute; h) The dispute must involve a trade; c) The dispute must he between i) Employer and worker ii) Worker and worker; and the dispute must be connected with: 1. The employment or non—employment, or 2. the terms of employment, or 3. Physical conditions of work of any person. The claimant then urged the court to assume jurisdiction and strike out the preliminary objection. The 2nd issue in the claimant’s address is whether the claimant has locus standi to institute this suit. it is the claimant’s contention that it has the required locus standing to institute and maintain this action because it is a validly recognized trade union in Nigeria with legal capacity to sue and he sued; and also because junior workers in the respondent are covered by the jurisdictional scope of the claimant union. The claimant, by such status is entitled to collect check-off dues from its members. The claimant submitted that locus standing denotes legal capacity to institute proceedings for the reliefs sought in the court. See AG Akwa Ibom State v. Essien [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 233) 1730 at 1760 A-B and Ayome v. Obasanjo [2006] All FWLLR (Pt. 333) 1967 at 1979 C. The claimant submitted that it is the statement of claims/facts that the court scrutinizes in determining the claimant’s locus, and that locus exist where the claimant has sufficient interest which has been or in danger of being violated by an act of the respondent. The claimant contended that how to determine locus standi in a case is by looking out for the following issues: a) Is the action justiceable’? b) Is there a dispute between the parties It submitted that the issue in this case are justiceable and that there is a dispute between the parties here. The claimant has locus and, therefore, urged the court to dismiss the preliminary objection. Issue 3 is whether the claimant’s action discloses reasonable cause of action. The claimant submitted that a cause of action is constituted by the bundle of aggregate of facts which the law recognizes as giving the claimant a substantive right to make a claim for relief in the statement of claims/facts and not in the statement of defense. That the two elements that give rise to a right to sue are the respondent’s wrongful act which gives the claimant his cause of complaint and the subsequent damage. See Nwokedi v. Egbe [2004] AII FWLR (Pt. 216) 546 at 560 E – F and UBN Plc v. Umeoduagu[2004] AII FWLR (Pt. 221) 1552 at 1560 – 1561 G – F. The claimant went further to state that this has nothing to do with the success of the action. The claimant then submitted that in paragraph 11 of its statement of facts, the reliefs it is seeking do not presuppose that the entire work three of the respondent has •joined the claimant union hut only those ‘who freely voluntarily and willingly applied to become members of the claimant union”. The claimant’s position is that it is not bound to list out names of its members because membership of its union is not in issue. That by its letter of November 29, 2007 attached to its statement of facts, the respondent admitted having workers employed and whose services were engaged for a specific ongoing Chevron contract No. OPR 2005-40040-778. The claimant referred to section 91 of the Labour Act which defines “worker” as follows: any person who has entered into or works under a contract with an employer whether the contract is for manual labour, clerical work or is expressed or implied or oral or written and whether ii is a contract of service or contract personally to execute any work or labour. See also section 48 of the Trade Disputes Act and section 54 of the Trade Unions Act for the same definition of a worker. The claimant submitted that the respondent has such workers in its establishment and so will not be allowed to submit otherwise. It contended that the claimant was not aware of any appeal up till 23 May, 2009 when that right to appeal lapsed. it went further to state that because the court’s ruling, which transferred the case was not a final order that gave right to the parties, the respondent needs to first obtain leave of the Federal High Court before appealing against the ruling. See section 24(la) of the Court of Appeal Act Cap. C36 LFN 2004 which said leave must be obtained within 14 days of the interlocutory ruling. The claimant stated that the respondent did not obtain this leave hence the said appeal is incompetent and invalids It does not exist in law. The claimant submitted that non-compilation, non-service and non-transmission of the record of appeal within 90 days from the date of filing the appeal renders the appeal non-existent. See Order 8 Rules 4, 5 and 18 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2007 and by section 24(4) of the NIC Act 2006, where such ruling is not appealable. The claimant urged the court to hold that there is no appeal and to further hold that there is a reasonable cause of action in the case and hence dismiss the preliminary objection. Issue four is whether this action amounts to an abuse of court process. The claimant submitted that the contention of the respondent on this issue is frivolous and vexatious in the respondent’s obvious determination ‘to dilate and filibuster’. The claimant’s position is that the respondent’s mischief is brought to bear by its own definition and concept of abuse. It submitted further that in its entire gamut of all processes filed, the respondent has not shown that neither the claimant nor its members instituted any previous action against the respondent seeking same reliefs as in the present action. That the one at the Federal High Court was instituted by the respondent. That even if that action is still pending, this is not an abuse. See Ogoejefo v. Ogoejefo [2006] All FWLR (Pt 301) 1792 at 1802 3 I F, 1804 5 13 C and 11— F, Christian Outreach Ministry Inc. v Cobham, supra; and in particular Fasakin Foods (Nigeria,.) Company Limited v. Shosunya [2003] 17 NWI R (Pt. 849) 237 and African Reinsurance Corporation v. .JDP construction Nigeria Ltd, supra at 230 B I), a Supreme Court decision. The claimant’s position is that the question of recognition of a trade union or deduction of checkoff dues is one connected with the employment or non-employment or terms of employment or condition of work of any person. See Corporate Affairs Commission v. Amalgamated Union of Public Corporation, Service Technical and recreational Service employers [1978 — 2006] DJNIC 454 at 460 paragraph 6, 461 paragraphs 11 and 12. See also NUJ v. Fadugba [1978 - 2006] DJNIC at 376 paragraph 4. The claimant submitted that in addition to its submission on the issue of pendency of a case, since the respondent did not comply with Orders 3 and 28 of the NIC Rules 2007, there is no case pending in Calabar Division of the National Industrial Court. Issue 5 is whether the claimant failed to disclose all facts material to this action. The claimant submitted that the fact that an appeal is pending or that the case was transferred to Calabar Division of the National Industrial Court is not material to its claim of non—recognition and non— remittance of check-off dues by the respondent. That even if the claimant is expected to disclose the other case or the appeal, its non-disclosure of same is not a ground for dismissal of its present action. The claimant then urged the court to hold that claimant had disclosed the required facts necessary for proving its case. This Court suo motu raised the issue whether it is seized of original jurisdiction to adjudicate over this dispute and/or whether the condition precedent to the commencement of this action has been duly satisfied especially in view of the court’s earlier decisions on similar matters like in PMAN and JO ors V. Lasode and 4 ors [1978 —2006] DJNIC 530 at 531 paragraphs 1 and 2, where the court held inter alia that the jurisdiction of National Industrial Court in inter or intra-union disputes is appellate not original. The claimant submitted that the decision in the above case was taken when the jurisdiction of National Industrial Court was under section 20 of the Trade Disputes Act. It further submitted that it is no longer apposite when the National Industrial Court is now covered by the NIC Act 2006 because now the Court can grant injunction and declaratory reliefs which it could not grant under the Trade Disputes Act. The claimant’s position is that the NIC is a specialized court and not a court of law as envisaged by the amendment to the Trade Disputes Act. That the amendment to the TDA sought to check the mischief of having so many labour related and trade disputes in several regular high Courts and its enactment was t restrict such matters to the specialized court, which the NIC is. See Ekong v. Oside [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 216) 562 at 571. See AG 0yo State v. NLC Oyo State Chapter, supra. It submitted that the combined effect of sections 2 and 20 of the Trade Disputes Act is to oust the jurisdiction of regular courts in trade dispute matters and vest it exclusively on the National Industrial Court. See also Udoh v. 011MB [1993] 7 NWLR (Pt. 303) 139 at 149, a Supreme Court decision. The claimant urged the court to depart from its earlier decision as AG Oyo State v. NLC Oyo State Chapter has finally laid to rest and buried that position. It submitted that Part I of the Trade 1) disputes Act is not a condition precedent for the activation of the jurisdiction of this court on this matter. This is (a) Parties could not settle by themselves (b) Parties could not meet and discuss. (c) The Minister has not apprehended the dispute. The claimant then submitted that section 7(3) of the NIC Act 2006 has put Part I of the Trade disputes Act in abeyance until the National Assembly enacts an appropriate law to take care of what was covered by Part I of the Trade Disputes Act if and whenever it so desires and urged the court to so hold. It further urged the court to look at section 24(3) and (4) of the NIC Act 2006, Order 28 Rules 3 and Order 3 Rule 9 of the NIC Rules 2007 on the commencement of action before this court and in particular the transfer of cases from the Federal High Court, etc to National Industrial Court and not to the Industrial Arbitration Panel. The claimant opined that assuming its submission here is wrong, which it is not conceding to, it urged the court not to dismiss the action but to order compliance with Part I of the Trade Disputes Act. The claimant submitted that it is its claims that determine jurisdiction. That its claims are for injunctive and declarative reliefs which are maintainable under sections 16 and 19(a) and (h) of the NIC Act. That these were not maintainable under section 20 of the Trade Disputes Act. See also AG Oyo State v. NLC Oyo State Chapter. That since its reliefs are not covered by Part I of the Trade Disputes Act, the processes of Part I of the TDA are not the appropriate fora to litigate the said reliefs. The claimant pointed out that it did not institute this action because the respondent refused to attend reconciliatory meeting but because the respondent refused to recognize the claimant union and also failed to remit check-off dues of its members with the respondent to the claimant. The respondent filed a reply on points of law against the claimant’s written address. The respondent submitted that by section 251 of 1999 Constitution, the Federal High Court has power. to determine matters on interpretation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA). The respondent’s view is that it should he determined first that the respondent is not an oil company. The description of some persons as workers does not automatically imply that they are indeed in law and in fact workers as claimed. It further contended that the court must be sure of the status of the people the claimant is representing before assuming jurisdiction. It submitted that its contention is that the respondent is not an oil company under CAMA hence this court has no jurisdiction over it. See Ladoke Akintola University of Technology v. Senior Staff Association of Nigerian Universities’ and 3 ors unreported Suit No. NIC/2 1/2008 delivered on 5th February, 2009. The respondent urged the court to consider the submission of the claimant as mere academic and diversionary, lacking in merit and substance and without any compelling reason to engender a decision. The respondent submitted that refusing this application will be tantamount to a denial of fair hearing. It, there fore, urged the court to grant its application. We have carefully considered all the arguments for and against this preliminary objection. We, however, need to correct the impression of the claimant that this court being a specialized court is not a court of law. This impression is false as this court for all intents and purposes is a court of law recognized as such under the laws of the country. Not only does the court exercise powers of a superior court like those of the I ugh Courts hut it has similar rules and also applies the law of Evidence. The leverage the court has, however, is that unlike other courts, this court can depart from the rules of evidence if the interest of justice demands. This point made, the sole issue for the determination of this court is whether this court has original jurisdiction to entertain the matter at hand. The claimant variously submitted that its claim against the respondent is one of non-recognition and non-remittance of check-off dues. This court has in previous decisions held that disputes as to non-recognition and non-remittance of check-off dues qualify as trade disputes for which the processes of Part I of the TDA must be exhausted before this court can assume jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdiction of this court in such disputes is appellate, not original. See Corporate Affairs Commission v. Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations, Civil Service Technical and Recreational Service Employees [2004) 1 NLLR (Pt. 1) I and Mix and Bake Floor Mills Industries Ltd. v. National Union of Food, Beverage and Tobacco Employees [2004] 1 NILR (Pt. 2) 247. This position of the court is even reinforced by section 7(3) of the NIC Act 2006, which provision has been considered in greater details in the cases of Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc and ors unreported Suit No. NIC/11/2007 delivered on January 24, 2008; Peter Okafor and ors v. Anthony C. Egozor and ors unreported Suit No. NIC/6/2007 delivered on March 11, 2008; and Comrade Ideagalanva Anthony and ors v. Comrade Francis Iloduba and ors unreported Suit No. NIC/36/2008 delivered on January 20, 2009. The argument of the respondent on section 7(3) of the NIC Act cannot, therefore, be sustained as Part I of the TDA qualifies as the legislation talked of under the said section. This means that in the instant case, the processes of Part I of the TDA must he exhausted before recourse can be had to this court. The fact that a matter is transferred to this court from a high Court is not enough to dispense with the processes of Part I of the TDA ii the matter ought to appropriately go through those processes. In such a situation, this court will decline jurisdiction so that the parties can first exhaust the processes of Part I of the TDA. Arguments were raised that there is a pending appeal at the Court of Appeal. We searched through the case file and all we saw is a notice of appeal filed at the Federal High Court, which at best qualifies as a statement of intent to appeal. We were not shown the Court of Appeal suit number to indicate that the Court of Appeal has accepted to hear the appeal. We cannot, therefore, hold that there is a pending appeal in respect of this matter. In any event, our earlier holding that this matter is prematurely before this court signifies that this court does not have original jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter as filed by the claimant. For all the reasons we gave, we hold that this matter is prematurely before this court. We hereby decline jurisdiction. The matter is accordingly dismissed. We make no order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. _____________________________ Hon. Justice B.B. Kanyip ______________________ _____________________ Ion. Justice F.I. Kola-Olalere Hon. Justice J.T. Agbadu-Fishim