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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE B. B. KANYIP, PHD DATE: APRIL 15, 2015 SUIT NO. NICN/LA/120/2012 BETWEEN Academic Staff Union of Research Institutions - Claimant AND 1. Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development 2. Cocoa Research Institute of Nigeria 3. Lake Chad Research Institute 4. National Root Crop Research Institute 5. National cereal Research Institute 6. Head of Civil Service of the Federation 7. Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria (Joined by Order of Court made on 30th October 2012) - Defendants REPRESENTATION Chukwuyem Atewe, for the claimant. John Madaki, for the 1st – 5th defendants. I. P. Hamman and P. M. Okongwu, for the 6th defendant. Shehu Aliyu, and with him is Yakubu Ibrahim, for the 7th defendant. JUDGMENT The claimant on 2nd April 2012 filed a complaint against the defendants. By an amended complaint, the claimant’s claim is for the interpretation and application of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions made on 1st January 2004 and specifically for – 1. A declaration that the 1st and 6th defendants or any other person for that matter cannot lawfully appoint persons who have never been Directors (Research) in any of the 2nd – 5th Institutes as Executive Directors/Chief Executive Officers or Directors of the said Institutes in flagrant violation of paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions and paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap. A12 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 2. A declaration that any person who has never been a Director (Research) in any of the 2nd – 5th Institutes is not qualified to be appointed as Executive Director/Chief Executive Officer or Director of any of the said Institutes in breach of paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions and paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap. A12 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 3. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants whether by themselves or their agents, servants, officers and or privies whomsoever howsoever from appointing persons who have never been Directors (Research) in any of the 2nd – 5th Institutes as Executive Directors/Chief Executive Officers or Directors of the said Institutes in flagrant violation of paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions and paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap. A12 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. Accompanying the complaint are the amended statement of facts, amended list of witness, amended list of documents, copies of the documents and the claimant’s witness deposition on oath. Also filed by the claimant is its reply to the 1st – 5th defendant’s statement of defence and reply to the 6th defendant’s statement of defence. Further filed by the claimant is its reply to the 7th defendant’s statement of defence, witness further statement on oath to the 7th defendant’s statement of defence; witness further statement on oath to the 1st – 5th defendants’ statement of facts; and witness further statement on oath to the 6th defendant’s statement of defence. The 1st – 5th defendant entered joint appearance and filed their joint statement of defence, list of documents and a copy of the sole document listed. The 6th defendant also entered appearance and filed its statement of defence, and later its witness statement on oath. No documents were filed by the 6th defendant. By order of Court made on 30th October 2012, the 7th defendant was joined as a defendant in this suit. The 7th defendant accordingly filed its statement of defence, list of witness and 7th defendant’s statement of witness on oath; but no documents were filed. At the Court’s sitting of 13th February 2014, all the parties agreed to argue the case on record by dispensing with oral evidence and relying on the processes and documents they filed. In consequence of the agreement, parties were then asked to file and serve their respective written addresses as per Order 19 Rule 13 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Rules 2007 starting with the claimant. The claimant’s final written address is dated 2nd May 2014 but filed on 7th May 2014, the 6th defendant’s is dated 30th June 2014 but filed on 1st July 2014, the 7th defendant’s is dated 3rd July 2014 but filed on 4th July 2014, and the claimant’s joint reply on points of law to the 6th and 7th defendants’ final written addresses is dated 8th February 2015 but filed on 10th February 2015. The 1st – 5th defendants did not file any written address. CLAIMANT’S SUBMISSIONS The case of the claimant is that it is a duly registered trade union under the Trade Unions Act (TUA) Cap. 437 LFN 1990. That by law, it has the jurisdiction to organize all academic staff in Research Institutes and Allied Institutions and in particular Academic Staff of the 2nd – 5th defendants. In this regard, members of the claimant include Directors (Research) in Research Institutes and particularly in the 2nd – 5th defendants who are qualified to be appointed as Executive Directors/Chief Executive Officers or Directors of the 2nd – 5th defendants. In other words, that the claimant has a stake in seeing to it that qualified persons are appointed as heads of the 2nd – 5th defendants. The claimant went on that it was one of the trade unions that negotiated and agreed on the terms and conditions of service for Research Institutes on 1st January 2004 known as the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions. The negotiation is referred to in clause 18.1 of the said Conditions of Service. It is the case of the claimant that contrary to the express provisions of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, College of Agriculture and Allied Institutions and relevant statutes, the 7th defendant acting as agent to the Federal Government of Nigeria placed advertisement in the Nigerian Tribune of 20th September 2011 (page 8) and Daily Trust of May 23, 2011 (page 66) respectively seeking for persons to fill the post of Executive Directors/ Chief Executive Officers or Directors of the 2nd – 5th defendants without complying with the requirement of the relevant sections or paragraphs of the conditions of service and paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap. A12 LFN 2004 for qualification into the said offices. It is also the case of the claimant that the 7th defendant clearly jettisoned the fundamental requirement contained in relevant statutes and in the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, College of Agriculture and Allied Institutions that candidates must have been Directors (Research) in any of the Institutes for at least three years and due adherence particularly to paragraph 4(2)(c) of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap. A12 LFN 2004. That on the basis of these violations of the relevant statutes in appointing a person suitable and qualified persons in to the post of Executive Directors/Chief Executive Officers or Directors of the 2nd – 5th defendants that the claimant has sought the intervention of this Court against the defendants from further violating the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, College of Agriculture and Allied Institutions and other statutes by appointing or reappointing persons not qualified to act as Executive Directors/Chief Executive Officers or Directors or Director-General as the case may be. To the claimant, it is the case of the 1st – 5th defendants that the appointment of Executive Directors/Chief Executive Officers or Directors of the 2nd – 5th defendants is not only by being a Director (Research). More so, that the claimant is not on the Board of the 2nd – 5th defendants and so cannot reasonably claim to have a stake in the appointment of Executive Directors/Chief Executive Officers or Directors of the 2nd – 5th defendants. That the 1st – 5th defendants contended also that the advertisement in the Nigerian Tribune of 20th September 2011 (page 8) and Daily Trust of May 23, 2011 (page 66) of vacancies for Executive Directors/Chief Executive Officers is in compliance with the express and mandatory provisions of paragraph 2.1.3(c) of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions of Nigeria. The claimant continued that the 1st – 5th defendants contended further that by the said provisions of paragraph 2.1.3(c) of the Conditions of Service the external and internal advertisement was met and exhausted. The 1st – 5th defendants also alleged that paragraph 3 of' the Conditions of Service is only a guide to persons authorized in paragraph 2.1.3(c) of the Conditions of Service. More so, that the Conditions of Service has not divested those charged with the duties of appointing Executive Directors/Provosts, neither has the said paragraph conferred on the claimant any right under any law whatsoever to interfere, dictate or determine who is appointed as the Executive Directors/Provosts of the 2nd – 5th defendants. That the 1st – 5th defendants also stated that the Act establishing the 7th defendant did not confer any enforceable right on the claimant on appointment of Executive Directors/Provosts of the 2nd – 5th defendants to enable it seek the reliefs in the present suit. The 1st – 5th defendants also pleaded that the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, College of Agriculture and Allied Institutions was approved to regulate the activities of the 2nd – 5th defendants and not the activities of the claimant and the 2nd – 5th defendants are in agreement with the advertisement as it was made in their favour. The 1st – 5th defendants contended also in their case that by passing of Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc.) Act 2008 the Executive Directors/Provosts of the 2nd – 5th defendants became political office holders by reason of inclusion. The claimant went on that the 1st – 5th defendants while seeking the Court to dismiss the claimant’s suit contended in paragraph 16 of their pleadings that the appointment of Executive Directors/Provost of the 2nd – 5th defendants are not strictly guided by the Conditions of Service but rather guided by the competitive nature of appointment to such offices consistent with paragraph 2.1.3(c) of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions of Nigeria. As regards the 6th defendant, the claimant stated that it is the case of the 6th defendant that the appointment of Executive Directors/Provosts of the 2nd – 5th defendants as advertised in the Nigerian Tribune of 20th September 2011 and Daily Trust of May 23, 2011 respectively was in order and proper and in compliance with paragraph 2.1.3(c) of the Conditions of Service of the Federal Research Institutes, College of Agriculture and Allied Institution. It is also the defence of the 6th defendant that the claimant is not on the Board of 2nd – 5th defendants and cannot validly assume the responsibilities conferred by the Conditions of Service and extant laws on the supervising Minister and that the claimant is not recognized or given decisive role on the appointment of the Executive Director/Provosts of 2nd – 5th defendants. That the 6th defendant further alleged that the Conditions of Service did not divest those charged with the duties of appointing Executive Directors/Provosts their powers. The 6th defendant also contended that it being a public office, this suit ought to have been commenced within 3 months of the said advertisement being act or omission allegedly done in the course of duty. The 6th defendant further stated that this Court does not make injunctive order to restrain a completed Executive act. More so, that this Court does not restrain the discharge of “statutory executive” just for the mere asking, when the claimant in the suit has not established the legal right allegedly being threatened by the Executive. That none of the claimant’s rights known to law will be breached when the Government discharges its statutory duties to appoint Executive Directors/Provosts. That the claimant’s case has not disclosed any credible and admissible legal right recognized by any law to be protected by injunctive order. In respect of the 7th defendant, the claimant stated that from a cumulative reading of the pleadings as filed by 7th defendant, it is its contention that the advertisement in the Nigerian Tribune 20th September 2011 and Daily Trust of May 23, 2011 respectively was in order and proper and in compliance with paragraph 2.1.3(c) of the Conditions of Service of the Federal Research Institutes, College of Agriculture and Allied Institution. That the 7th defendant also contended that that the claimant is not on the Board of 2nd – 5th defendants and so cannot validly assume the responsibilities conferred by the Conditions of Service and extant laws on the supervising Minister concerning the appointment of the Executive Directors/Provosts of the 2nd – 5th defendants and that the claimant has no role to play in the appointment of the Executive Directors/Provosts of 2nd – 5th defendants. The 7th defendant also pleaded that the claimant has no authority under any law to exercise the power of the Board of the 2nd – 5th defendants. And that the Conditions of Service has not divested those charged with the duties of appointing Executive Directors/Provosts, neither has the said paragraph conferred on the claimant any right under any law whatsoever to interfere, dictate or determine who is appointed as the Executive Directors/Provosts of the 2nd – 5th defendants. That the 7th defendant also stated that the Act establishing the 7th defendant did not confer any enforceable right on the claimant in the appointment of Executive Directors/Provosts of the 2nd – 5th defendants to give validity to the claims of the claimant. More so, that its duties to place advert on the appointment of Executive Directors/Provosts for the 2nd – 5th defendants are not subject to direction, dictate or control of the claimant. The 7th defendant further claimed that the suit was filed beyond 3 months after the publication complained of was made and that this Court cannot make injunctive orders, urging the Court to dismiss the suit of the claimant. The claimant proceeded to frame two issues for the determination of the Court, namely – 1. Whether the advertisements placed in the Nigerian Tribune of 20th September 2011 and Daily Trust of May 23, 2011 respectively by the 7th defendant in respect of the post of Executive Directors/Chief Executive Officers or Directors of the 2nd – 5th defendants met the required qualification as stipulated in paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions and in compliance with paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap. A12 LFN 2004. 2. Whether the advertisements placed in the Nigerian Tribune of 20th September 2011 and Daily Trust of May 23, 2011 respectively by the 7th defendant in respect of the post of Executive Directors/Chief Executive Officers or Directors of the 2nd – 5th defendants is not a continuous breach of paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions and paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap. A12 LFN 2004. Regarding issue 1, the claimant contended that the Conditions of Service of the 2nd – 5th defendants provides clearly how the Office of the Executive Director/Provost of the 2nd – 5th defendants shall be occupied and the requisite qualification of a person seeking to occupy such a position. To the claimant, the requisite qualification was not met by the 7th defendant in advertising placement for such offices. For instance, paragraph 2.1.3(c) of the Conditions of Service provides thus – The position of the Executive Director or Provost shall be advertised internally and externally. Governing Board shall upon the conclusion of an interview recommend through the Honourable Minister of the supervising ministry the best three (3) candidates to Mr. President for approval. In the absence of the Governing Board the President shall appoint the Executive Director or Provost upon the recommendation of the Honourable Minister. The Governing Board shall recommend the removal of the Executive Director/Provost to the Honourable Minister if found incompetent. The appointment shall be for a non-renewable tenure of five (5) years only. Paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service provides thus – In addition to the qualifications of a Director (Research) (AS STATED BELOW), which includes extensive research experience as evidenced by Scientific Publication. Candidates should also have served for at least three (3) years as a Director (Research) and also experienced in the Management of a research organization. He shall be responsible through the Governing Board to Government for the attainment of the goals of the Institute and the execution of Institute’s programmes. Relevant industrial experience will be an advantage. He should also possess the ability to attract funds to the Institute from within and outside the country. The claimant proceeded to reproduce paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap. A12 LFN 2004. To the claimant, the qualifications required from interested candidates in the advert publications placed in the Nigerian Tribune of 20th September 2011 and Daily Trust of May 23, 2011 respectively by the 7th defendant in respect of the post of Executive Directors/Chief Executive Officers or Directors of the 2nd – 5th defendants states thus – QUALIFICATION: Candidates must be holders of PhD in relevant discipline, have extensive research experience as evidenced by scientific publications with a minimum of Ten (10) years cognate experience in a Research Institute or related organization. In addition, candidates must have ability to provide research/administrative leadership and also have clear and articulated vision for the development of the Institutes. It is the contention of the claimant that the qualification required from interested candidates in the advert publications placed in the Nigerian Tribune of 20th September 2011 and Daily Trust of May 23, 2011 respectively by the 7th defendant in respect of the post of Executive Directors/Chief Executive Officers or Directors of the 2nd – 5th defendant is materially different from the qualification required in the Conditions of Service of the Institutions of the 2nd – 5th defendants. It is the claimant’s contention that as stakeholders in the various Institutions that its members who have met the qualifications as required in the Conditions of Service are being systematically left out from competing for the said positions by the adverts of the 7th defendant requiring a materially different qualification for the same position from the Conditions of Service. The claimant contends further that the implications of this material difference in qualification requirement is that persons or interested candidates who met the adverts qualification requirement and who did not meet the qualification required under the Conditions of Service can be made to occupy the said position, thereby violating the law. We submit in the circumstances that as the requirement in the Conditions of Service have been flouted in the advertisement, the interview, recommendation and appointment for the filling of the statutory vacancies is a nullity. As the law is well settled that one cannot put something upon nothing and expects it to stand. It will surely fall and crumble, citing Macfoy v. UAC Ltd [1962] AC 152. It is this material difference that the claimant submits is a clear violation of paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service of the Institutions and Paragraph 4(c) of the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap. A12 LFN 2004, urging the Court to interpret and give force to it in the appointment of the post of Executive Director/Chief Executive Officer or Director (Research) in the 2nd – 5th defendants’ Institutions. That the law is trite that when statutes lay down a procedure or requirement for the doing of an act, the said procedure or requirement shall be followed accordingly, referring to Marwa v. Nyako [2012] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1296) 199 at 360 where the Supreme Court held thus: “Where the law prescribes a mode for doing a thing only that method and no other must be adopted and followed”. The claimant went on that the requirement as provided in the Conditions of Service of the 2nd – 5th defendants was jettisoned by the 7th defendant in the adverts placement for the offices of Director (Research) in the Institutions. That paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service clearly provides that “Candidates should also have served for at least three (3) years as Director (Research) and also experienced in the Management of a research organization”. That the fact that a candidate, eligible for the Office of Executive Director/Chief Executive Officer or Director in the 2nd – 5th Defendants, should also have served for at least three (3) years as Director (Research) was not reflected in the advert placements. The advert placement states that a candidate for such an office should have “a minimum of Ten (10) years cognate experience in a Research Institute or related organization”; this to the claimant is not the intendment of the framers of the Conditions of Service which has clearly stated that a candidate of the said office should have served for at least three (3) years as Director (Research). That in this regard, there is the tendency of candidates with cognate experience in related organization to compete for the said Offices. That this is not the intendment of the framers of the Conditions of Service. As the Conditions of Service specifically stated “Candidates should also have served for at least three (3) years as Director (Research) and also experienced in the Management of a research organization”. That the said paragraph in the Conditions of Service is simple, direct, and unambiguous, hence it should be given it ordinary meaning, urging the Court to so hold. More so, to drive the point home, that paragraph 4(2)(c) of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap. A12 LFN 2004 has clearly stated that such appointment must be in accordance with the regulations and Conditions of Service as approved by the Council. Paragraph 4(2)(c) states: “Appointed in accordance with the regulations and conditions of service approved by the Council”. The claimant continued that the failure of the advert placements in the Nigerian Tribune of 20th September 2011 and Daily Trust of May 23, 2011 respectively by the 7th defendant in respect of the post of Executive Directors/Chief Executive Officer or Director of the 2nd – 5th defendants to state the required qualification for the said offices and not being in accordance with the regulations and Conditions of Service approved by the Council makes the act of the 7th defendant unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whatsoever, urging the Court to so hold and direct that all persons occupying the said offices without the requisite qualification under the Conditions of Service should vacate same. As stated earlier, that the mismatch in the qualification requirement as provided in the Conditions of Service and the advert placements is capable of barring candidates who meet the required qualification in the Conditions of Service and did not meet the advert qualification from competing for the said positions, while candidates who meet the advert qualification requirement but did not meet the Conditions of Service requirement can occupy the said positions. It is on the basis of these mismatched qualifications that the claimant is in Court urging this Court to interpret the same and give force to the ordinary meaning of the relevant provisions in the Conditions of Service and paragraph 4(2)(c) of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap A12 LFN 2004. To the claimant, the defendants or any other person for that matter cannot lawfully appoint persons who have never been Directors (Research) in any of the 2nd – 5th defendants Institutes as Executive Director/Chief Executive Officer or Director of the said Institutes in flagrant violation of paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions and paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap. A12 LFN 2004. The claimant then moved the Court to hold that any person who has never been a Director (Research) in any of the 2nd – 5th defendants is not qualified to be appointed as Executive Director/Chief Executive Officer or Director of any of the said defendants in breach of paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions and paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap. A12 LFN 2004. The claimant also urged the Court to make an Order restraining the defendants whether by themselves or their agents, servants, officers and or privies whomsoever howsoever from appointing persons who have never been Directors (Research) in any of the 2nd – 5th Institutes as Executive Directors/Chief Executive Officers or Directors of the said Institutes in flagrant violation of paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions and paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap. A12 LFN 2004. On issue 2 i.e. whether the newspaper advertisements placed is not a continuous breach of paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions and paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act 2004, the claimant contended that the 6th and 7th defendants have made heavy weather that the claimant complained of the advert placement after three (3) months the advert placement was made by the 7th defendant. That it must be noted, however, that the 6th and 7th defendants have not referred to this Court or reflected in their pleadings which law the claimant has breached by their complaint that the claimant filed its suit beyond three months of the advert placements. That the Supreme Court has inflexibly laid down the law that in determining whether or not a Court has jurisdiction to entertain a matter or adjudicate over the subject matter of a suit, all that the Court needs to examine or look at are the processes filed by the claimant, citing AGF v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1999] 9 NWLR (Pt. 618) 187 at 233. It is the claimant’s submission that a cursory examination of the claims of the claimant as contained in its complaint and the statement of facts will show that the claimant is not challenging the advert placements as to be caught by the three months limitation, rather the illegal appointment of persons as Directors contrary to the Conditions of Service of the 2nd – 5th defendants. The claimant went on that a look at the reliefs will show that the claimant is asking this Court to make a declaration that the defendants cannot legally appoint persons who have never been Directors (Research) in any of the 2nd – 5th defendants. And more so, persons who has never been Director (Research) in any of the 2nd – 5th defendants is not qualified to be appointed as Executive Directors/Chief Executive or Director of the 2nd – 5th defendants; and an order from the Court to restrain such acts. That the claimant has not made a case that persons have been appointed as Executive Directors of the Institutes. The advert placements relied on by the claimant is to draw Court’s attention as to the qualification required by the advert. The claimant is not challenging the advert placements as to be caught by the limitation of action Act against Public Officers. The claimant continued that assuming without conceding by any means that the claimant challenges the advert placement itself, it is its submission that the Public Officers Protection Act is inapplicable in this suit. That the gravamen of the claimant’s submission is that the publication in the placement of adverts in Nigerian Tribune of 20th September 2011 and Daily Trust of May 23, 2011 respectively in respect of the post of Executive Directors/Chief Executive Officers or Directors of the 2nd – 5th Defendants and the occupation of the said offices by persons not statutorily qualified is a continuous breach of paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions and paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act 2004 and as such an action therein cannot be caught by the limitation period of not bringing this suit within three months of the publications complained of by the claimant. To the claimant, up till date the effects of the said publications are still continuing as the persons who came into the office via the publication are occupying the said offices. It is the claimant’s submission, therefore, that this suit is not caught by the three month limitation period as envisaged under the Public Officers Protection Act. That the law is trite that legal principles are not always inflexible. Sometimes they admit certain exceptions. The law of limitation of action recognizes some exceptions. Thus, where there has been a continuance of damage, a fresh cause of action arises from time to time as often as damage is caused. That In the case of Abiodun v. AG. Federation [2007] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1057) 359 at 412 – 413 and 426 – 427, the Court of Appeal held that “where the injury complained of is a continuing one, time does not begin to run for the purpose of application of a limitation law until the cessation of the event leading to the cause of action”. The claimant then urged the Court to hold that this is one of the exceptions to the general principle of limitation of actions. The claimant then submitted that the reliefs it seeks are not reliefs that can be curtailed by the limitation law as the reliefs are simply declarations for the Court to make that appointments of persons not qualified into the offices of the Executive Director/Chief Executive Officer of the 2nd – 5th defendants is a violation of the relevant statute regulating qualifications of persons into the said offices; and for an order restraining the defendants from further violating the regulations. That these reliefs cannot be overtaken by limitation laws, urging the Court to so hold. In conclusion, the claimant urged the Court to hold that the qualifications required under the advert placement do not meet the qualifications as required under the Conditions of Service and that this suit is not caught by the limitation laws. 6TH DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS The 6th defendant in reaction framed three issues for the determination of the Court, namely – a) Whether this suit commenced by the claimant against the defendants who are public officers in law on 2nd April 2012 to enforce an alleged cause of action that arose between 23rd May 2011 and 20th September 2011 when the advertisements were placed is not statute-barred and unenforceable in law. b) Whether the claimant’s suit as presently constituted discloses any reasonable cause of action against the 6th defendant to make the 6th defendant a necessary party to this suit. c) Whether the claimant has proved its case and is entitled to judgment in this matter. Regarding issue a), the 6th defendant submitted that the claimant’s suit is statute-barred and, therefore, not actionable in any court of law having been commenced after three months contrary to the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41 LFN 2004. That the 6th defendant and all the other defendants are public officers in law and, therefore, any suit commenced against any of the defendants in any court of law must be commenced within the time allowed by the limitation laws, referring to Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Commission [1998] 12 SCNJ 255 at 279. For ease of reference, that section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41 LFN 2004 provides as follows – Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect: (a) The action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof. To the 6th defendant, the position of the law is trite that in determining the period of limitation, the proper thing to be done is for the Court to look at the originating process alleging when the wrong was committed which gave rise to the cause of action and comparing same with the date on which the suit or case was filed. If the time on the originating process is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the suit is automatically statute-barred and, therefore, non-maintainable. It also robs the Court of the jurisdiction to entertain the said suit, referring to Mr. Popoola Elabanjo & anor v. Chief (Mrs.) Ganiat Dowodu [2006] 27 NSCQR 318 at 353 and Mrs. Mary Nkemdilim Oranyeli v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc [2001] 6 NWLR (Pt. 710) 572 at 578. To the 6th defendant, by the averments in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the claimant’s amended statement of facts filed in this action, the claimant’s alleged cause of action arose between 23rd May 2011 and 20th September 2011 when the advertisements for vacant positions in the 2nd – 5th defendants were placed in some newspapers; and by the complaint/originating processes filed in this matter, the claimant commenced this action on 2nd April 2012, after the expiration of more than 7 months from the time the cause of action allegedly arose. That by Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Commission (supra), the 6th defendant and all the other defendants are public officers in law and civil suits against them for acts or omissions allegedly done in the course of duty commenced outside three (3) months from the date the cause of action arose is statute-barred and not maintainable before this Court. The 6th defendant further submitted that when a matter is statute-barred, as the present case is, four (4) fundamental events have occurred in the suit. These are: i. The claimant has lost the right to action; ii. The claimant has equally lost the right of enforcement; iii. The claimant has irretrievably lost the right to judicial relief; and iv. He has an empty cause of action which no court will assist him to enforce. That these mentioned four (4) fundamental elements of a statute-barred case were laid down in Egbe v. Adefarasin [1987] 1 NWLR [Part 47] page 1 at 4. The 6th defendant also referred the Court to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Lafia Local Government v. The Government of Nasarawa State and 35 ors [2012] 51 NSCQR 537 at 570 – 571, where the apex Court stated the justification for the limitation law especially in favour of public officers as follows – …The main purpose of the limitation period is to protect a defendant from the injustice of having to face a stale claim. If a claim is brought a long time after the events in question, there is a strong likelihood that evidence which was available earlier may have been lost and memories of witnesses may have faded. It would be unfair to allow a defendant face such a claim where proof and defence would be almost impossible. Where actions are brought against public officials, they must be brought quickly, that is, within three months after cause of action accrues. This is designed to protect public officials who are very busy people from being distracted or submerged in a sea of litigation at times at the instance of professional litigants. The 6th defendant concluded by urging the Court to hold on this issue that this matter being statute-barred, the claimant has lost the right to action, has lost the right to enforcement, has lost the right to judicial relief and has an empty cause of action that is not maintainable before this Court. On issue b) i.e. whether the claimant’s suit as presently constituted discloses any reasonable cause of action against the 6th defendant to make the 6th defendant a necessary party to this suit, the 6th defendant submitted that the claimant’s case has not disclosed any reasonable cause of action against the 6th defendant as required by law to make the 6th defendant a necessary party to this suit. Referring to Alhaji Aminu Ibrahim v. Felix Osim [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt. 82) 257 at 260, the 6th defendant submitted that a reasonable cause of action consists of two fundamental elements which the law expects the claimant’s case to establish simultaneously, side by side. These elements are – (i) The wrongful acts of the defendant(s) sued; and (ii) The consequent damage arising from the wrongful act. The 6th defendant submitted further that the disclosure of the requisite reasonable cause of action is a condition precedent to the Court assuming jurisdiction over a matter and, therefore, the non-disclosure of a reasonable cause of action robs the Court of jurisdiction to entertain the matter submitted to it for adjudication. The 6th defendant also referred to Dim Chukwu Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu v. Alh. Umaru Musa Yar’Adua & 4 ors [2009] 28 NSCQR (Pt. 1) 492 at 565, where the Supreme Court held thus – A cause of action consists of every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his claim for judgment. Thus the accrual of a cause of action is the event whereby a cause of action becomes complete so that the aggrieved party can begin and maintain his cause of action (Adimora v. Ajufo and others [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 1). A cause of action is the entire set of circumstances giving rise to enforceable claim. It is in effect, the fact or combination of facts which gives rise to a right to sue and it consists of two elements: (a) The wrongful act of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint; and, (b) The consequent damage. The Court was also AG of the Federation and 2 ors v. Alhaji Atiku Abubakar and 3 ors [2007] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 1 at 121, where the apex Court held thus – It is settled law that there must exist a matter in actual controversy between the parties to a suit in which the court of law is called upon to determine and that once there is no such live issue between the parties, a court will lack the jurisdiction to entertain the matter. In other words, there must exist a cause of action between the parties which term may be described as a civil right or obligation for the determination by a court of law or dispute in respect of which a court of law is entitled to invoke its judicial powers to determine – see Chief Afolayan v. Oba Ogunrinde [1990] 1 NWLR (Pt. 127) 369 at 371. Also referred is Mobil Producing Unlimited v. Lagos State Environmental Protection Agency and 3 ors [2002] 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 1 at 38. The 6th defendant went on that from the totality of the claimant’s amended statement of facts filed in this matter and the documents filed before this Court, there is no wrongful act of the 6th defendant shown, and the claimant’s pleadings have not equally shown any damage arising from any wrongful act of the 6th defendant. That there is, therefore, no controversy or live issues between the claimant and the 6th defendant in this matter to warrant the presence of the 6th defendant. That the general position of the law is that parties are bound by their pleadings, referring to Chief O. N. Nsirim v. E. A. Nsirim [l990] 3 NWLR (Pt. 138) 285 at 299. That from the claimant’s pleadings before this Court, there is nowhere an allegation was raised against the 6th defendant. In paragraphs 9 and 10 of the amended statement of facts, the claimant clearly stated who placed the advertisements in the various newspapers. Nowhere in the entire amended statement of facts did the claimant mention the name of the 6th defendant as being responsible for either the placement of the advertisements for vacant positions in the 2nd – 5th defendants or denied the members of the claimant the opportunity of being appointed Executive Directors of the 2nd to 5th defendants. That all the copies of the newspaper advertisements frontloaded by the claimant in its originating process in this suit indicate clearly who placed them and nowhere in all the advertisements was the name of the 6th defendant mentioned in connection to the subject matter of this suit. To the 6th defendant, the 2nd – 5th defendants and the 7th defendant are all legal entities in law and so this matter can be tried and concluded without the necessity of the presence of the 6th defendant whom no wrong has been alleged against by the claimant. That the law is trite and established that for a person to be joined as a defendant in a suit, it must be established that the following vital issues are answered – (a) Is it possible for the trial court to adjudicate upon the cause of action set up by the plaintiff unless the person is added as a defendant? (b) Is the person someone who ought to have been joined as a defendant in the first instance? (c) As an alternative, is the person someone whose presence before the court as defendant will be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause? That in Lagos State Bulk Purchase Corporation v. Purification Techniques (Nig) Ltd [20l2] 52 NSCQR 274 at 304 – 305, the Supreme Court defined a necessary party to a suit as: “A necessary party is someone whose presence is essential for the effectual and complete determination of the issues before the court. It is a party, in the absence of whom the whole claim cannot be effectually and completely determined”. To the 6th defendant, paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act 2004 gives the 1st defendant the powers to appointed Directors for each Research Institute upon the advice of the 7th defendant. Nowhere in the said Act is the name of the 6th defendant mentioned as having any role in the appointments into the 2nd to 5th defendants. Also, that paragraph 2.1.3(c) of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions which provides for the appointment of Executive Director/Provost clearly mentions the authorities involved in such appointments and nowhere in the said Conditions of Service is the name of the 6th defendant mentioned as having any role to play in making such appointments. It is, therefore, the submission of the 6th defendant that this suit can be effectually and effectively determined without the presence of the 6th defendant as it was neither the 6th defendant that advertised for the vacant positions in the 2nd to 5th defendants nor was it the 6th defendant that allegedly denied members of the claimant any opportunity of being appointed Executive Directors in the 2nd to 5th defendants. The 6th defendant then urged the Court to hold that the 6th defendant is not a proper party in this suit. Regarding issue c) i.e. whether the claimant has proved its case and is entitled to judgment in this matter, the 6th defendant submitted that the claimant has not proved its claims to be entitled to the reliefs being sought from this Court. That the law is trite that he who asserts must prove and that the onus is on the claimant to prove that the advertisements for vacant positions in the 2nd to 5th defendants did not follow due process of the law and it has woefully failed to discharge the onus placed on it, referring to sections 131, 132 and 133 of the Evidence Act, Alhaji Abubakar Dakingari v. Ward & Green [2001] 5 NWLR (Pt. 707) 718 at 729, Alhaji Isah T. Sokwo v. Joseph Dakukpongbo & 3 ors [2008] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1086) 342 at 362, Elias v. Disu [1962] 1 SCNLR 361; [1962] 1 All NLR 214, Arase v. Arase [1981] 5 SC 33, Elias v. Omo-Bare [1982] 5 SC 25 and Woluchem v. Gudi [1981] 5 SC 291. To the 6th defendant, in a suit by a claimant challenging appointment of officers, the law places on such a claimant the burden of proving and establishing how the rules governing the said appointments were violated to his detriment and this the claimant herein has woefully failed to do in the instant case. That the law is trite that the responsibility of evaluating evidence rests squarely with the trial court and in doing that the trial judge is expected to carefully examine all the evidence placed before him before arriving at its decision on the matter, referring to Samuel Adeleke & 4 ors v. Chief Adegbenro Balogun & 4 ors [2000] 4 NWLR (Pt. 651) 113 at 126, Dr. Kevin Ochin & 15 ors v. Prof. Onuora Louis Victor Ekpechi [2000] 5 NWLR (Pt. 656) 225 at 242, Mustafa Ogunleye & 2 ors v. Raimi Akande Oyewole & anor [2000] 4 NWLR (Pt. 687) 290 at 302 and Anyaegbusi Ozuruoke & 3 ors v. John Okolie & 3 ors [2000] 1 NWLR (Pt. 642) 569 at 575. That applying the principle of evaluation of evidence to this matter, it is clear that the claimant’s case has failed the test as the claimant has not been able to discharge the onus placed on it to establish its case, urging the Court to so hold. The 6th defendant continued that the grievance of the claimant is the advertisements placed by the 7th defendant in some newspapers which they allege do not comply with the provisions of the relevant laws and the Conditions of Service of the 2nd to 5th defendants relating to the appointment of Executive Directors for the 2nd to 5th defendants. That in considering the issues in contention, it is imperative to look at the provisions of the laws relating to the issues in controversy. The provisions are: section 2(4) of the Nigerian Research Institutes Act Cap. N132 LFN 2004 (which is the law that established Research Institutes in Nigeria including the 2nd to 5th defendants) and paragraph 4(1) and (2) of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act, Cap. A12 LFN 2004, which deals with the appointment of a Director for each Research Institute. It is the submission of the 6th defendant that the only requirement for the appointment of the Director for any Research Institute as provided for in the Nigerian Research Institutes Act Cap. N132 LFN 2004 is for the person to have “wide experience of the matters with which the relevant Institute is concerned”. That the provisions of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap. A12 LFN 2004 seems to have adopted the provisions of the Nigerian Research Institutes Act Cap. N132 LFN 2004 thereby making the provisions of the two Acts pari materia. The 6th defendant then went on to consider the provisions of paragraphs 2.1.3(c) and 3 of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions which the claimant is heavily relying on in this matter. To the 6th defendant, nowhere in all the statutes quoted above and the Conditions of Service is it required that only serving officers of the Research Institutes are to be appointed Executive Directors as being erroneously canvassed by the claimant in this matter. That the main requirement for such appointment is for the person to be so appointed to have wide experience regarding the mandates of the Research Institute concerned and for the vacancies to be widely advertised internally and externally. That it is therefore in fulfillment of these requirements that the 7th defendant published the vacancies in the national dailies for wide and vast circulation so that competent and qualified candidates could apply including the members of the claimant if they felt they were qualified enough to be so appointed. The 6th defendant went on that it is also important to point out that the post of the Executive Director is not a career position where officers are expected to rise through the ranks but rather a tenured appointment to be statutorily appointed by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or any officer in the public service of the Federation acting on the authority of the President in the exercise of the executive powers of the President as provided for in section 5 and section 171 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). It is the submission of the 6th defendant that a combined reading of the provisions of section 2(4) of the Nigerian Research Institutes Act Cap. N132 LFN 2004, paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap. A12 LFN 2004, paragraph 2.1.3(c) of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions and section 171(l)(d), will clearly show that all such appointments to the post of Executive Directors of Research Institutes who are Heads of Extra Ministerial Departments of the Government of the Federation are solely at the prerogative, preserve and pleasure of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The 6th defendant further submitted that the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions which derives its authority and legitimacy from the statutes establishing Research Institutes cannot override the provisions of the said statutes or even the Constitution and where there is such conflict the law is settled that the statutory provisions shall prevail. It is the further submission of the 6th defendant that the newspaper advertisements did not in any way violate the rights of the claimant or any of its members as the vacancies were widely publicized as required by law to enable government get the most competent candidates from within and outside the Research Institutes and no officer of the Research Institutes was excluded from the exercise. That the law is settled that in interpreting statutes the courts are not to supply any perceived omission to the law but rather to construe the statute as it is, referring to Rt. Hon. Rotimi Chibuike Amaechi v. INEC and 2 ors [2008] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1080) 227 at 437 and Governor of Zamfara State and 3 ors v. Alhaji Suleiman Mohammed Gyalange and 12 ors [2012] 51 NSCQR 1 at 18. Finally, the 6th defendant urged the Court to resolve this issue in its favour and hold that the claimant has woefully failed to discharge the onus of proof placed on it and it is, therefore, not entitled to any of the reliefs being sought before this Court. 7TH DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS The 7th defendant framed three issues for the determination of the Court, namely – 1. Whether the advertisement placed in the Nigerian Tribune of 20th September 2011 page 8 and Daily Trust of May 23, 2011 respectively by the 7th defendant in respect of the posts of Executive Directors/Chief Executive Officers of the 2nd – 5th defendants’ Institutes are in compliance with paragraphs 2.1.3(c) and 3 of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institution as well as paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap. A12 LFN 2004. 2. Whether the appointment of the Executive Directors of the 2nd – 5th defendants’ Institutes by the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria was proper and in accordance with the law. 3. Whether the case of the claimant in this suit is statute-barred by operation of law. Regarding issue 1, the 7th defendant submitted that the core issue is the interpretation/application of paragraphs 2.1.3(c) and 3 of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institution as well as paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap A12 LFN 2004 to the advertisement placed in the Nigerian Tribune of 20th September, 2011 page 8 and Daily Trust of May 23, 2011 page 66 respectively by the 7th defendant in respect of the posts of Executive Directors/Chief Executive Officers of the 2nd – 5th defendants’ Institutes. The 7th defendant proceeded to reproduce produce paragraphs 2.1.3(c) and 3 of the Conditions of Service as well as paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to ARCN Act, Cap A12. These provisions have been quoted earlier. To the 7th defendant, the whole exercise starting from advertisement interview, recommendation and appointment of the Executive Directors of the 2nd – 5th defendants’ Institutes was done properly and in accordance with the relevant laws. That the provision of paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service is clear and unambiguous where it stated the qualification of a Director (Research) to wit: extensive research experience as evidenced by Scientific Publications. That in addition to this qualification of a Director (Research) the provision further provides that the candidate should have served for at least three (3) years as a Director (Research), experienced in the management of a research organization, shall be responsible through the Governing Board for the attainment of the goals of the Institute and the execution of Institute’s programmers, should possess the ability to attract funds to the Institute from within and outside the Country and a very good overall rating is required over his career as a whole. That nowhere in paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service is it provided that the Director (Research) must be from any of the 2nd – 5th defendants’ Institutes before appointing as Executive Director to the Institutes as contended by the claimant. It is the submission of the 7th defendant that there are many Research Institutes all over the Federation of Nigeria in which there are many Directors (Research) with relevant qualification mentioned in paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service i.e. who served for at least three (3) years as Director (Research) and not mandatory that they served in the 2nd – 5th defendants’ Institutes. The 7th defendant then pointed out that the provision of paragraph 2.1.3(c) of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions provides that: “The position of the Executive Director or Provost shall be advertised internally and externally…” That in compliance with paragraph 2.1.3(c) of the Conditions of Service, the 7th defendant placed the advertisement inviting all qualified candidates internally and externally. In other words, that the 7th defendant complied fully with paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service by stating clearly and unambiguous the qualification of a Director that will apply to wit: extension research experience as evidenced by scientific publications. Also that it complied with the provision of paragraph 2.1.3(c) of the same Conditions of Service by advertising internally and externally to enable those who qualify to apply. The 7th defendant then urged the Court to note that in paragraphs 2.18, 2.19 and 2.20 of claimant’s final written address, the claimant admitted that it is not challenging the advertisements which show that it was done properly and in accordance with the relevant laws. On issue 2 i.e. whether the appointment of the Executive Directors of the 2nd – 5th defendants’ Institutes by the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria was proper and in accordance with the law, the 7th defendant submitted that by the clear provision of paragraph 2.1.3(c) of the Conditions of Service, the President of the country is the sole appointer of the Executive Director/Provost of the 2nd – 5th defendants’ Institutes; and that advertising the post of Executive Director/Provost internally and externally is to enable the government get the best for the position. The 7th defendant went on that paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service is a guide to those authorized in paragraph 2.1.3(c) to appoint the Executive Director/Provost of the 2nd – 5th defendants’ Institutes. That the said paragraph 3 has not divested those charged with the duty of appointing Executive Director/Provost of their powers; neither has the said paragraph conferred on the claimant any right under any law whatsoever to interfere, dictate or determine who is appointed as executive Director/Provost of the 2nd – 5th defendants’ Institutes. On this issue, the 7th defendant concluded by submitting that there is no law or paragraph of the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act 2004 that confers on the claimant any enforceable right regarding the appointment of Executive Directors/Provost of the 2nd – 5th defendants’ Institutes to give validity to any of the claims of the claimant in this matter. Regarding issue 3 i.e. whether the case of the claimant in this suit is statute-barred by operation of law, the 7th defendant submitted that it is. To the 7th defendant, the submissions from interested applicants in the Institutes of the 4th and 5th defendants closed on 4th July 2011, while that of the 2nd and 3rd defendants closed on 1st November 2011, five (5) to nine (9) months respectively, before the claimant commenced this suit on 2nd April 2012 contrary to the statutory three (3) months stipulated by law. To the 7th defendant, this suit against the 7th defendant, for act(s) allegedly done in the course of duty, is required by the provision of section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41 LFN 2004 to be commenced within three (3) months from the date the cause of action arose, falling which the matter becomes statute-barred by operation of law, referring to NDIC v. Governing Council, ITF [2012] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1305) 252. That for the 7th defendant, the whole exercise (starting from the advertisement, interview, recommendation for the best candidate and the appointment of the Executive Directors of the 2nd – 5th defendants’ Institutes) was concluded before the claimant commenced this suit on 2nd April 2012 contrary to the statutory three (3) months stipulated by law. In conclusion, the 7th defendant urged the Court to resolve all the issues in this case in its favour. CLAIMANT’S JOINT REPLY ON POINTS The claimant reacted on points of law regarding the submissions of the 6th and 7th defendants. To the claimant, a reading of the issues framed by the 6th and 7th defendants show that issue 1 of the 6th defendant and issue 3 of the 7th defendant are same as they border on the sustainability of the claimant’s suit on grounds that the suit of the claimant is statute-barred. The claimant urged that it will argue these issues as one issue from both written addresses of the 6th and 7th defendants and canvass the other issues as argued in the written addresses which are somewhat not related on the merit. However, that before going into the merits of the issues canvassed by the 6th and 7th defendants, it is instructive to note that the 6th and 7th defendants did not address or join issues with the claimant on the issues and or arguments canvassed by the claimant in its written address. In the circumstance, the claimant urged the Court to resolve all the arguments canvassed by the claimant in its favour as it was not challenged or controverted. The 6th and 7th defendants had contended that the claimant’s suit is statute-barred. Both defendants relied on the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41 LFN 2004. The main plank of their argument is that the claimant’s cause of action arose between 23rd May 2011 and 20th September 2011 when the advertisements for the vacant positions in the 2nd – 5th defendants were placed in some Newspapers; and by the complaint/originating processes filed in this matter, the claimant commenced this action on 2nd April 2012 more than 7 seven months from the time the cause of action allegedly arose. To the claimant, a deep perusal of the arguments canvassed by the 6th and 7th defendants vis-à-vis the case of the claimant shows clearly that the defendants are in misapprehension of the case of the claimant. It is the claimant’s submission that a critical examination of its claims as contained in its amended complaint and the statement of facts will show that the claimant is not challenging the advert placements as to be caught by the three (3) months limitation period to file an action against public officers, rather the act of the illegal appointment(s) of persons as Directors contrary to the Conditions of Service of the 2nd – 5th defendants which is still subsisting and continuing till date. The claimant went on that a look at the reliefs will show that the claimant is asking this Court to make a declaration that the defendants cannot legally appoint persons who have never been Directors (Research) in any of the 2nd – 5th defendants to occupy the said offices. And more so, persons who has never been Director (Research) in any of the 2nd – 5th defendants is not qualified to be appointed as Executive Directors/Chief Executive or Director of the 2nd – 5th defendants; and an order from the Court to restrain such illegal acts in violation of the Conditions of Service. That the claimant has not made a case that persons have been appointed as Executive Directors of the Institutes. The advert placements relied on by the claimant is to draw the Court’s attention as to the qualifications stated in the Advert which is in material contradiction from the requirement in the Conditions of Service. The claimant is not challenging the advert placements as to be caught by the limitation of action Act against Public Officers. The claimant continued that, assuming without conceding by any means that it challenges the advert placement itself, the Public Officers Protection Act is still inapplicable in this suit. The gravamen of the claimant’s submission is that the act of the publication in the placement of adverts in Nigerian Tribune of 20th September 2011 and Daily Trust of May 23rd 2011 respectively in respect of the post of Executive Director/Chief Executive Officers or Directors of the 2nd – 5th defendants and the occupation of the said offices by persons not statutorily qualified is a continuous breach of paragraph 4 of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions and paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act 2004 and as such an action therein cannot be caught by the limitation period of not bringing this suit within three months of the publications complained of by the claimant. That up till date the effects of the said publications are still continuing as the persons who came into the office(s) via the publication are occupying the said offices. Consequently, that the suit of the claimant is not caught by the three months limitation period as envisaged under the Public Officers Protection Act. The claimant then submitted that the reliefs it seeks are not such as can be curtailed by the limitation law as the reliefs are simply declarations for the Court to make that appointments of persons not qualified into the offices of the Executive Director/Chief Executive Officers of the 2nd – 5th defendants is a violation of the relevant statute regulating qualifications of persons into the said offices; and for an order restraining the defendants from further violating the regulations. That these reliefs cannot be overtaken by the limitation law, urging the Court to so hold. To the claimant, the question now is can we be talking about limitation of action when the default or injury giving rise to the claimant’s cause of action has not ceased. Section 2(a) of the Public Officer Protection Act under which the 6th and 7th defendants relied on has even settled the position in respect of a continuing damage or injury by making it clear that there must have been a cessation of a continuing breach before this provision can be invoked. Furthermore, the claimant cited AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 148 – 150 and then submitted that the limitation law as argued by the 6th and 7th defendants does not avail them. That the limitation law does not cover acts done contrary to any Act, Law and or Regulation, referring to Offoboche v. Ogoja LG [2001] 16 NWLR (Pt. 739) 458 at 485 and Aremo II v. Adekanye [2004] 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 572 at 593 and urging the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the claimant. As to the issue whether the claimant’s suit as presently constituted discloses any reasonable cause of action against the 6th defendant as to make the 6th defendant a necessary party to this suit, the claimant contended that the 6th defendant’s argument here though inviting does not sail water. That it is instructive to note that the 6th defendant is raising the issue of not being a necessary party for the first time in its written address. That the 6th defendant filed its memorandum of appearance, statement of defence and other relevant processes in defence of this action and defended this action vigorously. That it now suddenly occurred to the 6th defendant that it is not a necessary party to the determination of this suit. The simple question to ask the 6th defendant is what then has it exactly been defending in this suit and joining issues with the claimant in all ramifications as to the complaint of the claimant if there is no nexus between the case of the claimant and the 6th defendant. To the claimant, the truth of the facts in this matter is that the office of the 6th defendant supervised and coordinated the negotiation that culminated into the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, College of Agriculture and Allied Institutions. It is this said Conditions of Service that is being wantonly violated. It is only proper and right that such an Institution of the Federal Government that supervised and coordinated a negotiation that culminated in a binding agreement be made a necessary party, at least a proper party to a suit that is challenging the violation of the said Conditions of Service. The claimant continued that a cause of action need not be necessarily established against all the parties to a suit. Proper parties to a suit have been pronounced on as those who, though not actually interested in the claim, are joined as parties for some good reasons. Desirable parties are those who have an interest in the suit or may be affected by the result thereof. Necessary parties are those who not only have interest in the matter, but also who in their absence, the proceedings could not be fairly dealt with. That is, the issue or question to be determined in a matter between the existing parties should be one which cannot be properly settled unless they are parties to the action, referring to Gani-Tarzan Marine Enterprises Limited v. Caravelle Resources and Investment Ltd [2011] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1266) 125 at 145 – 146 where the Court of Appeal stated who are proper parties to a suit. In this regard, the claimant submitted that a party who had participated and played an all important role to the culmination of Conditions of Service, a binding document, be made a party to the suit challenging the violation of the said Conditions of Service, hence the 6th defendant is a proper party to this suit. To the claimant, it is also instructive to note that the said Conditions of Service of Federal Research Institutes, College of Agriculture and Allied Institutions became binding, reliable and enforceable by the endorsement of the 6th defendant. That the Conditions of Service is listed as documents relied upon in the hearing of this suit. A look at the Conditions of service shows that every single page of the said document was duly stamped as the approved Conditions and schemes for the Federal Research Institutes, College of Agriculture and Allied Institutions by the official stamp of the 6th defendant’s office. In other words, that it is the approval of the said document by the 6th defendant that actually authenticated the use of the said document. The 6th is the purveyor, supervisor, authority and endorser of the Conditions of Service of the Research Institutes without whose aegis no cast, review and or commission of the document can be envisaged. That for the 6th defendant to have joined issues with the claimant and defended this suit shows that the 6th defendant has an interest to be protected in this suit, hence for the 6th defendant to turn around to start querying its propriety in the suit is only a misadventure of its own position in the relationship of the parties. The claimant then submitted and urged the Court to hold that the 6th defendant is a proper and necessary party to the determination of this suit. As to whether the claimant has proved its case and so entitled to judgment, an issue raised by the 6th defendant, the claimant contended that the arguments of the 6th defendant here do not hold water. That an intense reading of the 6th defendant’s arguments shows that it is either the 6th defendant is in misapprehension of the claimant’s case or failed to appreciate the entire case of the claimant. Two issues arise from the claimant’s case as per the appointments, qualifications and advert placement for posts of Directors (Research) of the 2nd – 5th defendants’ Institutes which the 6th defendant failed to appreciate. The two issues are Mode or Procedure of Appointments and the Qualifications persons seeking that office must possess. That the provisions of these two issues are spelt out in paragraphs 2.1.3(c) and paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service for the Institutes. The 6th defendant has strongly maintained that none of the provisions of the Conditions of Service of the Institutes was breached in the appointment of persons into the said offices and the procedure was followed from advert placement to appointment by Mr. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. To the claimant, the point needs to be made that it has no problem as to the mode or procedure for the appointments to be made in those offices. That the claimant’s cause of action is as to the qualifications of persons into those offices in violation of the Conditions of Service that provided the level of qualifications to be attained before appointment into those offices. That the 6th defendant failed to give meaning or effect of the provisions of paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service which clearly provides that “Candidates should also have served for at least three (3) years as Director (Research) and also experienced in the management of a research organization”. That the continuous breach of these particular provisions is the main grouse of the claimant’s case, which the 6th defendant failed to address this Court on. That the claimant has been able to prove this point in its case by documentary evidence before this Court vis-à-vis the relevant provisions of the Conditions of Service of the Institutes as to be entitled to judgment in this matter, urging the Court to grant the claimant’s reliefs. In any event, that parties by themselves agreed that this suit be argued on record relying on the processes and documents frontloaded by the parties. That the 6th defendant’s argument that the claimant has not proved its case to be entitled to judgment in this matter fails, urging the Court to so hold. The claimant then proceeded to address jointly issues 1 and 2 raised by the 7th defendant. Both issue deal with whether the adverts are in compliance with the Conditions of Service and the law, and whether the appointments made there under are in accordance with the law. To the claimant, a close look at the arguments canvassed by the 7th defendant on these issues shows that the 7th defendant is either in misapprehension of the claimant’s case or failed to appreciate the same. That the arguments canvassed by the 7th defendant are to the effect that the procedures followed from the advert placement to appointment by Mr. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria were in compliance with the law. That this point is not the brawl of the claimant; the claimant’s case is entirely on the qualifications of the persons seeking the said offices. To the claimant, the Conditions of Service of the Institutes has clearly provided for the relevant qualifications that a person to be appointed into such an office of the Executive Director of the Institutes should possess. But a look at the Newspapers advert placement for the vacant positions of the offices clearly shows that the qualifications stated that a person seeking to be appointed into the said offices is materially different from what is provided for in the Conditions of Service of the 2nd – 5th Institutes. That it is the act of this violation that the claimant is challenging and urging the Court to make an order stopping persons who have not met the criteria on the qualifications provided under the Rules to be appointed into the positions in the 2nd – 5th defendants’ Institutes. The claimant concluded by urging the Court to grant the reliefs it seeks in the statement of facts. COURT’S DECISION I heard learned counsel and considered all the processes filed in this matter. In addressing the merit of the case, I must state that issues as to the competence of this suit, whether or not the case is statute-barred, whether or not the 6th defendant is appropriately sued, and hence whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this matter were respectively raised in the written addresses of the 6th and 7th defendants. I shall endeavour to address these issues as I address the key issue that brought the claimant to Court, which is that the qualification stipulated in two newspaper advertisements for filing the vacancies as to Headship of the 2nd – 5th defendants is not in accordance with the relevant Conditions of Service and the law. Now, by its amended complaint, the claimant’s claim is for “the interpretation and application of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions made on 1st January 2004…” In Association of Food, Beverage and Tobacco Employers (AFBTE) v. Food, Beverage and Tobacco Senior Staff Association (FOBTOB) unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/285/2014 the judgment of which was delivered on February 2, 2015, the issue arose “whether the interpretation jurisdiction of this Court can be activated independent of the existence of a live dispute”. After reviewing the authorities, this is what this Court said – The thing with all of these authorities is that the interpretation jurisdiction of the Court was activated on the basis of an existing and live dispute necessitating the interpretation of the document in issue. So…a live and existing dispute is needed before the interpretation jurisdiction of this Court can be activated...This is not the case in the instant case. The dispute in issue has been resolved. There is accordingly no live and existing dispute necessitation the interpretation of the Procedural Agreement made on 8th February 1980. The applicant simply wants an interpretation so as to forestall future occurrences. This is not good enough especially if it is noted that when the dispute actually existed, the applicant did not deem it necessary to come to Court until the dispute was resolved by the parties. I agree with the respondent that the instant suit is a mere academic exercise. Its outcome would neither confer a benefit nor injure any of the parties; it would merely expound on the law... In the instant case, the first question needing to be resolved is whether there is even a live dispute before the Court. The 7th defendant had actually reminded the Court to note that in paragraphs 2.18, 2.19 and 2.20 of the claimant’s final written address, the claimant itself admitted that it is not challenging the advertisements in issue; and to the 7th defendant this shows that the advertisements were done properly and in accordance with the relevant laws. For present purposes, the point is that if the claimant is not challenging the advertisements themselves, can it be said that there is a live dispute before the Court? I do not think so. This is because, if the claimant is challenging the advertisements, then the issue of limitation of action raised by the defendants becomes pertinent and relevant as the challenge would be coming way out of the three months allowed by the Public Officers Protection Act. The claimant knows of this, hence its argument that it is not challenging the advertisements. This most likely explains why the claimant in its final written address would urge the Court to hold and direct that all persons occupying the said offices without the requisite qualification under the Conditions of Service should be asked to vacate same. Even here, the claimant seems to forget that this prayer is not reflected in the reliefs it specifically seeks as per its amended complaint and statement of facts. By University of Jos v. Dr M. C. Ikegwuoha [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1360) 478, courts are not Father Christmas and so are enjoined not to give that which was not asked. This of course means that the claimant cannot be granted its prayer that this Court should order that all persons occupying the said offices without the requisite qualification under the Conditions of Service should vacate same. On the other hand, if the claimant’s case is that it is not challenging the advertisement but seeking to forestall future similar infractions by the defendants, then this is speculative and of course futuristic; in which event, there is actually no live dispute but an attempt by the claimants to engage in a speculative and a mere academic exercise. Either way, there is no competent case before the Court; and I so find and hold. On this score alone, this case ought to be struck out for want of competence; but, there are other issues raised even as to the competence of the suit. The 6th defendant had argued that it should not have been sued as a defendant in this suit. To the claimant, because the office of the 6th defendant supervised and coordinated the negotiation that culminated into the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions, and it is this said Conditions of Service that is being wantonly violated, then it is only proper and right that such an institution of the Federal Government that supervised and coordinated a negotiation that culminated in a binding agreement be made a necessary party, at least a proper party, to this suit that is challenging the violation of the said Conditions of Service. To the claimant, a party who had participated and played an all important role to the culmination of Conditions of Service, a binding document, needs to be made a party to the suit challenging the violation of the said Conditions of Service; as such the 6th defendant is a proper party to this suit. I am yet to be convinced that simply because a party was instrumental and participated in the negotiations that gave rise to Conditions of Service, then that alone is enough reason for it to be made a party in a suit where the said Conditions of Service is in issue. The Ministry of Labour and Productivity has been instrumental to the adoption of several collective agreements and conditions of service. Should this then mean that each time any of these instruments is being litigated upon, the Ministry of Labour should be made a party to the suit? I really do not see where the claimant is coming from with this warped reasoning. In reliefs 1 and 3, the claimant is praying for a declaratory and injunctive order restraining the 6th defendant amongst others from appointing anyone who has not been Director (Research) in any of the 2nd – 5th defendant from being appointed as Executive Director/Chief Executive Officer or Director of the 2nd – 5th defendants. The claimant did not show to this Court that the 6th defendant by law is the appointing authority to any of these offices. So how can the 6th defendant be a proper party for purposes of granting these reliefs? I actually do not see what use the 6th defendant is in this case. No reasonable cause of action has been established against the 6th defendant; and I so find and hold. In consequence, I agree with the submissions of the 6th defendant that it is not a proper party in this suit. The name of the 6th defendant is accordingly struck out and the claims against it are thereby dismissed. It was the argument of the defendants that this case is statute-barred. In answer, the claimant had argued that it is not challenging the advert placements as to be caught by the three (3) months limitation period to file an action against public officers; rather the act of the illegal appointment(s) of persons as Directors contrary to the Conditions of Service of the 2nd – 5th defendants which is still subsisting and continuing till date. The questions that arise here are: is “the act of the illegal appointment(s) of the persons as Directors contrary to the Conditions of Service…” not then the cause of action? If yes, when did this occur? Now throughout the originating processes, the fact as to when the illegal appointments were made is not disclosed by the claimant. I indicated earlier that though the claimant prayed in its written address that those illegally appointed be asked to vacate the offices, this prayer is actually not part of the reliefs claimed and so cannot even be considered, not to talk of being granted. So what do we have here? In one breath the claimant is not attacking the adverts (for if it were, it will be caught up by the Public Officers Protection Act), in another breath, the case of the claimant is the act of the illegal appointment of persons as Directors, yet there is no relief sought in this regard; and of course there is no disclosure of when this illegal act occurred just so that the question of limitation law will not be raised. Additionally, in the words of the claimant in paragraph 1.22.17 of its reply on points of law, “a look at the Newspapers advert placement for the vacant positions of the offices clearly shows that the qualifications stated that a person seeking to be appointed into the said offices is materially different from what is provided for in the Conditions of Service of the 2nd – 5th Institutes. It is the act of this violation that the claimant is challenging”. What act of violation is the claimant talking of here when it all along has been saying that it is not challenging the newspaper adverts? The claimant is here asking the Court to compare the newspaper adverts and the Conditions of Service in order to see the violation it is complaining of; yet the claimant is not challenging the newspaper adverts. In another sense, the claimant is complaining of an act of violation, yet the claimant says that this act is continuous. So far, there is only one set of newspaper adverts complained of: that of the Nigerian Tribune of 20th September 2011 and that of the Daily Trust of 23rd May 2011. Both advertisements although dealing with different Institutes had as qualification for the posts in issue similarly worded requirements, which qualification the claimant says is what it is complaining of. If I get the claimants right, it is complaining about the qualification stated in the advertisements, not in respect of those already appointed to the respective offices, but just so as to forestall future appointments using this same qualification. Like I pointed out earlier, if this be the case, then there is no live issue before the Court. The claimant will just have to wait until there is another infraction; then it can complain, but ensure in the process that it complains within the time allowed by the limitation law. In all of this, there is a measured double speak on the part of the claimant. The claimant itself does not seem to know exactly what its cause of action is. In one breath it is the act of the illegal appointment(s) of persons as Directors; in another it is an act of violation. The claimant may argue that they are one and the same, but that is really not the case if the case of the claimant is factored in. “The act of illegal appointment” is a one-off event; and so it cannot be continuous as the claimant had sought to argue in opposition to the defence of the Pubic Officers Protection Act. “An act of violation” may be of anything, and also a one-off act. If, as the claimant argued, the effect of the violation continues and so the limitation law does not thereby apply then the claimant itself does not understand what the continuing injury exception to the limitation law itself stand for or means. The effect of a violation differs from the violation itself. There has to be another violation for one to talk of a second violation in terms of numbers. The claimant was emphatic in its line of argument in reiterating that up till date the effects of the advert publications are still continuing as the persons who came into the office via the publications are occupying the said offices; as such the suit of the claimant is not caught by the three months limitation period as envisaged under the Public officers Protection Act. To the claimant, where there has been a continuance of damage, a fresh cause of action arises from time to time as often as damage is caused, referring to Abiodun v. AG. Federation [2007] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1057) 359 at 412 – 413 and 426 – 427, where the Court of Appeal held that “where the injury complained of is a continuing one, time does not begin to run for the purpose of application of a limitation law until the cessation of the event leading to the cause of action”. A similar line of argument of the claimant in the instant case was raised in Hon. Runyi Kanu (JP) & ors v. The Attorney-General & Commissioner for Justice Cross River State & ors [2013] 32 NLLR (Pt. 91) 63 NIC where counsel in that case sought to transport into the limitation law the principles of the tort of trespass. This is what this Court said – In pursuing the “continuity of subject matter or injury” argument, the claimants cited Obueke & ors v. Nnamchi & ors [2012] 5 – 7 MJSC (Pt. 11) 1 at 4 where the Supreme Court held that where there is continuity of acts of trespass (subject matter), successive actions can be maintained by a plaintiff in respect of the continuance of trespass for which a plea of limitation of time cannot be raised. The argument of counsel to the claimants here looses sight of the fact that trespass by definition implies, and indeed includes, continuing trespass. The act of trespass itself is the injury (even in cases of continuing trespass, each act of continuing trespass is not just the injury but is independent and can found an action on its own capable of being awarded separate damages); and so the question of the limitation laws applying does not even arise. The point is that in its argument, the claimant is relying on the “continuance of damage or injury” exception to the limitation laws. But like I indicated earlier, I do not think that it understands what that phrase means. By case law authorities, the phrase means continuance of the “act which caused the injury” and not the injury itself. See Okafor v. AG, Anambra State [2001] FWLR (Pt. 58) 1127 at 1146 D – G relying on the English Court of Appeal case of Carrey v. Bermondsey Metropolitan Bourough Council [1903] 675 P. 447; 20 TLR 2, Amamiwe v. The Local School Board [1971] 2 NMLR 57 at 58 and Obiefuna v. Okoye [1961] All NLR 357. To the claimant itself, its complaint (hence cause of action) relates to “the act of the illegal appointment(s) of the persons as Directors contrary to the Conditions of Service…” How is this “act of illegal appointment” a continuing injury? Is it not a one-off act? The claimant had argued that the effect of the violation or the effect of the act of illegal appointment continues. The law is that it is the act which cause the injury, not the injury itself (or to use the language of the claimant, the effect of the violation), that must be continuing for the continuing injury exception of the limitation law to apply. If it were otherwise, then the victim of an act of a public officer which results in the amputation of say a limb can claim continuing injury forever as the amputated limb can never be restored. Even when the claimant cited copiously from AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 148 – 150, it did not show that the periodicity of the breach as to activate the continuing injury exception to the limitation law. The plain truth is that, contrary to the fact that the claimant argued otherwise, until the advertisements were placed, the claimant had no issue whatsoever with the defendants. So the cause of action here has to be the publication of the offending advertisements, the latter of the two being that of the Nigerian Tribune of 20th September 2011; and I so find and hold. The act of the illegal appointment(s) or the act of violation cannot be the cause of action; for if it were why is it that the claimant did not reveal those appointed and when they were appointed? If it is the effect of the act of illegal appointment or the effect of the violation that is the cause of action, then there is no claim in that regard for this Court to entertain. So I repeat, it is the offending advertisements that constitute the cause of action in the instant suit. The instant case was filed on 2nd April 2012 i.e. over 5 months since the publication of the last offending advertisement. This being the case, it is my holding that this case was filed way out of the 3 months allowed by the Public Officers Protection Act and so it is statute-barred. The fact that the effect of the publication of the offending advertisements is continuing does not bring into effect the continuing injury exception of the limitation law. For these reasons, this case is statute-barred and so stands struck out. Assuming all I have said and held amounts to an error, I will proceed to the substance of the claimant’s case, which is that the offending advertisements placed in two newspapers by the 7th defendant calling for applicants to apply for the office of Executive Director/Chief Executive Officer/Director/Provost of the 2nd – 5th defendants do not conform with the requirements of the relevant Conditions of Service and the law for those offices. Here, the argument of the claimant is that a look at the reliefs will show that it is asking this Court to make a declaration that the defendants cannot legally appoint persons who have never been Directors (Research) in any of the headship offices of the 2nd – 5th defendants i.e. persons who has never been Director (Research) in any of the 2nd – 5th defendants are not qualified to be appointed as Executive Directors/Chief Executive or Director of the 2nd – 5th defendants. The claimant then prayed for an order restraining such illegal acts in violation of the Conditions of Service. The claimant acknowledged that it did not make a case that persons have been appointed as Executive Directors of the Institutes. That the advert placements relied on by the claimant is to draw the Court’s attention as to the qualifications stated in the advert which is in material contradiction from the requirement in the Conditions of Service. To reiterate its case, the claimant posited that the defendants or any other person for that matter cannot lawfully appoint persons who have never been Directors (Research) in any of the 2nd – 5th defendants Institutes as Executive Director/Chief Executive Officer or Director of the said Institutes in flagrant violation of paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service for Federal Research Institutes, Colleges of Agriculture and Allied Institutions and paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act Cap. A12 LFN 2004. The question that presently arises, therefore, is whether the defendants actually breached any law in terms of the qualification stated in the advert placements. In this regard, it may be useful to reproduce the relevant provisions relied upon by the claimant. Paragraph 2.1.3 of the Conditions of Service deals with “Authority for Appointment, Promotion and Discipline”; and in paragraph 2.1.3(c), for instance, it is provided that – Executive Director/Provost The position of the Executive Director or Provost shall be advertised internally and externally. Governing Board shall upon the conclusion of an interview recommend through the Honourable Minister of the supervising Ministry the best three (3) candidates to Mr. President for approval. In the absence of the Governing Board the President shall appoint the Executive Director or Provost upon the recommendation of the Honourable Minister. The Governing Board shall recommend the removal of the Executive Director/Provost to the Honourable Minister if found incompetent. The appointment shall be for a non-renewable tenure of five (5) years only (the emphasis is the Court’s). Paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service dealing with “Method of Entry and Advancement” goes on to provide as follows – Paragraph 3: METHOD OF ENTRY AND ADVANCEMENT. In addition to the qualification of a Director (Research) (AS STATED BELOW), which includes extensive research experience as evidenced by scientific publications. Candidates should also have served for at least three (3) years as a Director (Research) and also experienced in the Management of a research organisation. He shall be responsible through the governing board to government for the attainment of the goal of the institute and the execution of the institute’s programmes. Relevant industrial experience will be an advantage. He should also possess the ability to attract fund to the institute from within and outside the country (emphasis is the Court’s). For the post of Executive Director, at least a “Very Good” overall rating is required over his career as a whole, including a considerable research output, and evidence of the experience and capacity to give effective overall leadership to all activities in the institute. Computer literacy would be an added advantage. Then we have paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act, Cap. A12 LFN 2004 (this Act came into effect on 26th May 1999), which deals with the appointment of a Director for each Research Institute. It states that – 4(1) There shall be for each Institute a Director to be appointed by the Minister on the advice of the Council. (2) The Director shall be – (a) a person with wide experience of the matter with which the Institute is concerned; (b) charged with the day to day management of the affairs of the institute in accordance with such instruction as may from time to time be given to him by the Governing Board of the Institute; and (c) appointed in accordance with the regulation and conditions of service approved by the Council. It was the 6th defendant that referred the Court to section 2(4) of the Nigerian Research Institutes Act Cap. N132 LFN 2004 (this Act came into effect on 1st December 1964), which deals with the appointment of heads of the Research Institutes, in order to show how similar it is with paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule to the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria Act 2004. The said section 2(4) provides as follows – 2(4) There shall be a Director for each Institute, who shall be appointed by the Minister on the advice of the Council and shall be a person with wide experience of the matters with which the relevant Institute is concerned; and the Director shall – (a) Be charged with the day-to-day management of the affairs of the Institute in accordance with such instructions as may, from time to time, be given to him by the Council; and (b) Hold office, subject to the provisions of section 5 of this Act, in accordance with the terms of the instrument by which he is appointed (including terms as to the payment of his remuneration by the Council). The argument of the claimant is that the advert placements in terms of the stipulation as to qualification did not comply with these laws. By the advert placements of the 7th defendant in the Nigerian Tribune of 20th September 2011 and the Daily Trust of 23rd May 2011, the qualification required from interested candidates in respect of the post of Executive Directors/Chief Executive Officers or Directors of the 2nd – 5th defendants state thus – QUALIFICATIONS: Candidates must be holders of PhD in relevant discipline, have extensive research experience as evidenced by scientific publications with a minimum of Ten (10) years cognate experience in a Research Institute or related organization. In addition, candidates must have ability to provide research/administrative leadership and also have clear and articulated vision for the development of the Institutes (emphasis is the Court’s). To the claimant, the fact is that a candidate, eligible for the Office of Executive Director/Chief Executive Officer or Director in the 2nd – 5th Defendants, should also have served for at least three (3) years as Director (Research) was not reflected in the advert placements. That the advert placement states that a candidate for such an office should have “a minimum of Ten (10) years cognate experience in a Research Institute or related organization”. This to the claimant is not the intendment of the framers of the Conditions of Service which has clearly stated that a candidate of the said office should have served for at least three (3) years as Director (Research). That in this regard, there is the tendency of candidates with cognate experience in related organization to compete for the said Offices. That this is not the intendment of the framers of the Conditions of Service. As the Conditions of Service specifically stated “Candidates should also have served for at least three (3) years as a Director (Research) and also experienced in the management of a research organization”. The question, therefore, is whether the advert placements in anyway can be said to have offended the Conditions of service and the enabling laws. In the first place, that paragraph 2.1.3(c) of the Conditions of service requires that “the position of the Executive Director or Provost shall be advertised internally and externally” means that not only staff of the 2nd to 5th defendants qualify but even non-staff, so long as the non-staff has the other requisite qualifications for the job in issue. Secondly, while paragraph 3 of the Conditions of service talk of “relevant industrial experience will be an advantage”, the advert placements talk of “a minimum of Ten (10) years cognate experience in a Research Institute or related organization” Relevant industrial experience and cognate experience are one and the same. Thirdly, the case of the claimant is that the avert placements did not indicate that applicants should have been a Director (Research) in the 2nd – 5th defendants’ Institutes before they can qualify to apply. In other words, the positions advertised are meant for only those who have served or are serving in the 2nd – 5th defendants’ Institutes. Here, the claimant cannot be serious. Why would the Conditions of Service call for internal and external advertisements if the idea was that only internal staff can apply for the relevant posts? In any event, a careful reading of paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service will show that even when it referred to “Director (Research)” it uses the phrase “a Director (Research)”. For emphasis, paragraph 3 of the Conditions of Service states – In addition to the qualification of a Director (Research)…which includes extensive research experience as evidenced by scientific publications. Candidates should also have served for at least three (3) years as a Director (Research) and also experienced in the Management of a research organisation… By this provision, candidates are required to have served as “a Director (Research) and also experienced in the Management of a research organisation”. Here none of the 2nd – 5th defendant was referred to by name. The requirement is simply to be a Director (Research) with experience in the management of a research organization. For the claimant to argue that only internal staff of the 2nd – 5th defendants can apply for the advertised posts is preposterous and taking the argument too far. On the whole, I find no merit whatsoever in the case of the claimant. The claimant’s case is accordingly dismissed. Judgment is entered accordingly. Cost is assessed at One Hundred Thousand Naira (N100,000) only payable by the claimant to the 6th and 7th defendants within 30 days of this judgment. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD