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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE B. B. KANYIP, PHD DATE: MARCH 18, 2015 SUIT NO. NICN/LA/449/2013 BETWEEN 1. Mr. Edwin Ejehu 2. Mr. David Iseberebiama (Suing on behalf of themselves and other 127 disengaged staff of Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry) - Claimants AND 1. Bank of Industry Limited 2. Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation 3. The Honourable Minister Federal Ministry of Trade and Investment - Defendants REPRESENTATION V. A. Nwakasi and Olushola Abiloye, for the claimant. Rotimi Adejoorin, for the 1st defendant. Pascal C. Obioha, for the 2nd defendant. No legal representation for the 3rd defendant. RULING By a General Form of Complaint and statement of complaint dated and filed on 21st August 2013, the claimants, in a representative capacity, instituted this action for themselves and on behalf of other disengaged staff of Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry seeking against the defendants the following reliefs – 1. Payment of the sum of N113,332,979.00 being the severance payment due to 40 persons as at 2007 calculated on the basis of condition of service as contained in the Inter Ministerial Report dated May 2007 and annexed to this claim. 2. Payment of the sum of N61,010,169.00 being the severance payment for 97 persons staff as at June 2003 calculated on the basis of condition of service as contained in the Inter Ministerial Report dated May 2007 and annexed to this claim. 3. Payment of the sum of N57,145,396.00 being Pension Arrears due to 40 persons at June 2007 calculated on the basis of condition of service as contained in the Inter Ministerial Report dated May 2007 and annexed to this claim. 4. Payment of the sum of N80,161,000.00 being arrears from Funding of FGN Pension Increases for retired Staff as at June 2007 calculated on the basis of condition of service as contained in the Inter Ministerial Report dated May 2007 and annexed to this claim. 5. Payment of the pension arrears for 99 staff from June 2003 till the commencement of the suit in the sum of N138,577,585.30 calculated on the basis of condition of service as contained in the Inter Ministerial Report dated May 2007 and annexed to this claim. 6. Payment of the sum of N74,799,766.14 being the interest on (1) above calculated at an interest of 11% per annum from 2007 till the commencement of this suit and thereafter at an interest of 11 % per annum till the determination of this suit. 7. Payment of the sum of N128,121,354.90 being the interest on (2) above calculated at the interest of 11 % pa from 2003 till date of this suit and thereafter, at an interest of 11 % per annum till the determination of the suit. 8. Payment of the sum of N37,715,961.36 being the interest on (3) above calculated at 11 % per annum from June 2007 to the commencement of this suit and an interest of 11 % per annum till the determination of the suit. 9. Payment of the sum of N52,906,260.00 being the interest on (4) above calculated at 11 % per annum from June 2007 to the commencement of this suit and an interest of 11 % per annum till the determination of the suit. 10. The cost of instituting this suit at N10 Million Naira. OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 11. An order declaring the acquisition of the role, assets and liabilities of NBCI by the 1st defendant without the repeal of the NBCI Act Cap. 296 Laws of the Federation as illegal, unconstitutional, void, and of no effect. 12. And or an order reinstating the affected staff as if their employment was never interrupted by the acquisition of the role, assets and liabilities of NBCI by the 1st defendant without the repeal of the NBCI Act Cap 296 Laws of Federation of Nigeria and payment of full benefits and entitlement from the period of the purported disengagement till date. The Court had at its sitting of 20th September 2013 noted that the reliefs sought by the claimants relate to severance payment which became due in 2007 yielding to the question whether the claims are not caught up by the statute of limitation. Parties were then asked to address the Court on this issue starting with the claimants. The claimants filed their written address on 23rd October 2013. The 1st defendant filed its own on 29th November 2013. On 4th December 2013, the claimants filed their reply on points of law to the 1st defendant’s written address. On 25th February 2014, what the 2nd defendant did instead was to file a notice of preliminary objection with an affidavit in support and a written address in support. The preliminary objection was filed pursuant to Order 11 Rule 1(3) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Rules 2007 and the National Industrial Court of Nigeria Practice Direction 2012; section 8 of the Limitation Law, Laws of Lagos State; section 2(A) of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41 LFN 2004; and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. By the preliminary objection, the 2nd defendant prayed for – 1. An order of the Court dismissing the entire suit for being statute-barred. 2. An order dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction. 3. And for such further order(s) as the Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance. The grounds of the objection are – a) The claimants filed the suit outside the three months period allowed by the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41 LFN 2004. b) The time within which the claimants could bring this action as stipulated by section 8 of the Limitation Law of Lagos State Cap. L67, 2003 had expired. c) The Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit as same is statute-barred. d) The claims against the 2nd defendant/objector are unenforceable. In reaction to the 2nd defendant’s preliminary objection, the claimants filed on 10th July 2014 a counter-affidavit and a reply written address. Since the issues raised in the 2nd defendant’s preliminary objection are similar to the issue raised by the Court, the submissions of the 2nd defendant will be considered alongside those of the claimants and the 1st defendant. Meanwhile, the 3rd defendant did not file any process in regards to the issue at hand. At the Court’s sitting of 11th November 2014, when the addresses were to be adopted, while both counsel to the 1st and 2nd defendants were in Court to adopt their written addresses, the claimants’ counsel was not. His processes were, however, accordingly deemed adopted. CLAIMANTS’ SUBMISSIONS The claimants were employed by the then Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBCI). They were disengaged from employment during the re-organization of NBCI and NERFUND and transfer of their assets and liabilities to the 1st defendant i.e. the Bank of Industry. The claimants were disengaged between June 2003 and 2007. They are One Hundred and Thirty (139) in number. The claimants are not challenging their disengagement. They only request for payment of pension and other severance emoluments. To the claimants, the summary of part of the severance benefits, pension arrears and other entitlements that have accrued to the claimants as a result of this disengagement are identified or contained in a ministerial report dated May 2007 and are as follows – 1. Severance payment for existing staff (those disengaged in 2007) at N113,332,979.00. 2. Severance payment for staff retired (those disengaged in 2003) at N 61,010,169.00. 3. Pension and Gratuity arrears for existing staff of NBCI at N 57,145,396.00. 4. Arrears from funding of FGN Pension increases for retired staff at N 80,161,000.00. That as at 2013, the sum of N139,577,585.30 remained outstanding as pension arrears for 99 staff. However, the consolidation process of the activities of its previous employer, NBCI is still ongoing, the process of the repeal of the Act setting it up having not been completed; but the administrative procedure was concluded by the transfer of assets and liabilities including the head office complex of NBCI to the 1st defendant. Very importantly is the fact that at all material times, the 1st defendant never disputed the claim of the claimants and in recognition of same, both parties explored mutual settlement. However, as result of the seemingly endless delay by the 1st defendant, the claimants by letter dated July 29, 2013 informed the 1st defendant of its intention to explore legal redress. The claimants then raised one issue for the determination of the Court, namely – Having regard to the fact that the 1st defendant never disputed the claimants’ reliefs until 2013 and the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, whether the claimants’ action is caught by the statute of limitation. It is the submission of the claimants that their action is not caught by the statute of limitation, the cause of action herein having arisen in 2013 when the claimants wrote the letter dated July 29, 2013 requesting payment of its entitlements. That in deciding whether an action is caught up by a statute of limitation, regard must be had to the time when the right or cause of action accrued to a party. A cause of action has been defined as the facts or set of facts which establish or give rise to a right of action. The cause of action would accrue when it becomes complete such that the aggrieved party can begin and maintain his claim, referring to ITF v. NRC [2007] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1020) 28. The poser here, according to the claimants, is what is the determinant of a cause of action? In other words, when can a cause of action be said to accrue? In determining whether a cause of action arises or not, the Court will look at the writ of summons, the averments of the plaintiff in his statement of claim, as well as the facts and other circumstances of the case. Thus, a cause of action accrues when the event giving rise to the plaintiff’s grouse occurs, referring to Matanmi v. Governor, Ogun State [2004] 4 NWLR (Pt. 866) 255 and NNPC v. Sele [2005] 5 NWLR (Pt. 866) 379. That the issue of when time begins to run is fixed by law, when time actually starts to run is a question of fact. In the instant case, that the totality of the factual circumstances reveal that the cause of action arose in 2013, when the 1st defendant, upon receipt of the claimants’ letter of demand, failed and refused to pay them their entitlements and severance benefits. To the claimants, it is not in dispute that their appointment or employments were terminated in 2003 and 2007. It is also not in dispute that when their employments were terminated their outstanding salaries and terminal benefits were to be paid after proper verification and auditing. This has no specific timeframe. That the general idea was that the claimants should hold on patiently until the 1st defendant, through the Nigerian Life and Pension Consultants completes the proper verification and auditing. The claimants then commended to the Court their termination letters pleaded in paragraph 12 of the statement of complaint. The claimant went on that having waited for some time, the claimants, naturally, wrote letters of enquiry cum appeal for the payment of their salaries and entitlements. That the 1st defendant orally assured the claimants that the verification and audit exercise was still on-going and receiving the Minister’s attention. The 1st defendant pleaded for more time to complete the verification and audit exercise, referring to the letters of appeal pleaded in paragraph 23 of the statement of complaint. That at that point, the claimants decided to pile pressure on the 1st defendant by talking to those they know at the National Assembly, State Governors and cronies of top government officers to “talk to” the Minister and the 1st defendant in ensuring that the verification and audit exercise are completed on time. Yet, the 1st defendant kept assuring the claimants through those the claimants sent that the exercise would soon be completed and the claimants’ entitlements would be paid. The claimants continued that with the assurances and genuine belief that their meager termination benefits would be paid soon, they went on exercising patience. The simmer got to a boil, when the claimants decided to employ the services of a legal practitioner for the recovery of their legitimate terminal benefits, entitlements and pension. On July 29, 2013, the claimants through their counsel, Olisa Agbakoba & Associates, demanded from the 1st and 2nd defendants the payment of their severance benefits with a threat to explore all available options to recover the claimants’ entitlement. The said letter is pleaded in paragraph 24 of the statement of complaint. Flowing from the above, the claimants submitted that the definite date when the cause of action in this matter arose was when the defendants failed, neglected and refused to pay the claimants their terminal benefits, entitlements and pension after receipt of the claimants’ counsel’s letter of demand. That at every point before the claimants brought this action, there was no dispute. The defendants did not say that they were not going to pay the claimants. The defendants only wanted the claimants to exercise patience for them to complete the verification and audit exercise. That the dispute and cause of action arose when the claimants ran out of patience, contracted the services of a legal practitioner to demand for their entitlements and the consequent neglect, failure and refusal of the defendants to meet the claimants’ demand, referring to paragraphs 7 – 25 of the statement of complaint. That it is the law that time starts to run when the cause of action arose. In any event, it is the further submission of the claimants that the denial of a right to pension is an injury of a continuous nature and as such cannot be stopped by the statute of limitation, citing A.G Rivers State v. A.G Bayelsa State [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123. The law has not left us in the dark as to the mode of determining whether an injury is of a continuous nature or not. In order to determine whether the injury is of continuous nature recourse must be had to the claimants’ reliefs. The reliefs of the claimants are clear. All the nine (9) reliefs endorsed on the statement of complaint borders on payment of pension, payment of arrears of pension, etc. The claimants then urged the Court to assume jurisdiction and proceed to determine this matter on its merits. 1ST DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS In reaction, the 1st defendant also raised one issue for the determination of the Court, namely – Whether the claimants’ claims arising from their allegedly disengagement by the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry between June 2003 and 2007 are not statute-barred having regard to the provisions of section 8(1)(a) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State. The 1st defendant contended that it is trite law that in determining whether or not a cause of action is statute-barred, it is the claimant’s originating process (in this case the statement of complaint) that must be looked at, referring to Egbe v. Adefarasin [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1 and Aboyeji v. Lateju [2012] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1288) 434 at 451. That a perusal of the statement of complaint of the claimants shows that the wrong doing was alleged to have arisen between June 2003 and 2007 when the claimants were allegedly disengaged. The claimants did not institute this action until 21st August 2013. This makes it more than six years after the cause of action arose. That under section 8(1)(a) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State 2003, the claimants had six years within which to bring their suit for the Court to be able to exercise its jurisdiction over the matter. It is further important to note that the claimants did not disclaim this timeline in their statement of complaint but instead attributed their failure to institute the action within the stipulated time to ongoing negotiations between parties. To the 1st defendant, when the time stipulated within which an action can be brought has elapsed, the action will be statute-barred, citing Egbe v. Adefarasin (supra) and Kolawole Ind. Co. Ltd. v. A.G Federation [2012] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1320) 221 at 243; and that ignorance of the limitation of time or time taken by negotiation between parties are no defences, referring to John Eboigbe v. NNPC [1994] 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 649. Furthermore, that once time begins to run, it remains unbroken and unaffected by any circumstance, such as negotiations except there is a clearly fresh acknowledgement. That there is nothing before the Court to show whether there was a prior acknowledgment or a fresh acknowledgment of the claims by the 1st defendant to the claimants. The 1st defendant then submitted that the claims endorsed in the originating complaint of the claimants dated 21st August 2013 are caught by section 8(1)(a) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State 2003. That to determine when the cause of action in this suit arose, the statement of complaint filed by the claimants is very clear particularly paragraphs 12, 1, 14, 17 and 28 which are fundamental and critical to the claimants’ case. Paragraph 12 of the statement of complaint states as follows – At the end of the restructure, staff audit and rationalization exercise, one Hundred and Thirty Nine staff of NBCI were disengagement between June 2003-2007. The disengaged persons are claimants in this action...” To the 1st defendant, to determine whether the claimants’ action is actually statute-barred, it is necessary to refer to the claimants’ claim against the 1st defendant and paragraphs 12 – 28 of the statement of complaint are very instructive for this purpose. The claims of the claimants among other things include – (a) Payment of the sum of N113,334,979.00 being the severance payment due to 40 persons as at 2007… (b) Payment of the sum ofN61,010,169.00 being the severance payment for 97 persons staff as at June 2003… (c) Payment of the sum of N57,145,396.00 being pension Arrears due to 40 persons as at June 2003… (d) Payment of the pension arrears from 99 staff from June 2003 till the commencement of the suit in the sum of N138,577,585.30... (e) Payment of the sum of N80,161,000.00 being arrears from funding of FGN Pension Increases for retired staff as at June 2007... The 1st defendant then submitted that the basis of this action as admitted by the claimants in paragraph 4.5 of the claimants’ written address is the alleged disengagement of the claimants from the service of Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry in June 2003 to 2007. That the argument of the claimants that the totality of the factual circumstances revealing that the cause of action arose in 2013 should be jettisoned as there is nothing before the Court showing any acknowledgment whatsoever by the 1st defendant since the cause of action arose in June 2003 to 2007. The 1st defendant went on that the action of the claimants is not maintainable in law by virtue of section 8(1)(a) of the Limitation Law Cap. 118, Laws of Lagos State, 1994 as it is statute-barred. That the Court of Appeal in National Bank of Nigeria v. Arison Trading & Engineering Company Ltd [2006] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1005) 210 at 223 – 224 paras. H – A held that a cause of action matures and arises on a date or from the time when a breach of any duty or act occurs, which warrants the person thereby injured or victim who is adversely affected by such breach to take a court action in assertion or protection of his legal right that has been breached. That it is trite law that where a statute of limitation prescribes a period within which an action should be brought legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Thus, an action instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period is said to be statute-barred, referring to British Airways Plc v. Akinyosoye [1995] 1 NWLR (Pt. 374) 722, Shell Pet. Dev. Co. (Nig) Ltd v. Farah [1995] 3 NWLR (Pt. 382) 148 at 156 and Asaboro v. Pan Ocean Oil (Nig) Ltd [2006] 4 NWLR (Pt. 971) 595. It is the further submission of the 1st defendant that the period of limitation in respect of any case runs from the date the cause of action accrued or from the moment the cause of action arose. The cause of action arose from the date on which the incident giving rise to the cause of action occurred. In the instant case, that the cause of action arose in June 2003/2007 when the claimants’ alleged that they were disengaged by the 1st defendant and are consequently claiming various entitlements and benefits from June 2003 till date. From that time until the date this action was filed is clearly more than six years. In response to the claimants’ assertion that the alleged injury is of a continuous nature and as such cannot be stopped by the statute of limitation, the 1st defendant submitted that the period of limitation in any limitation statute is determined by looking at the statement of complaint alleging when the wrong was committed which gave rise to the cause of action and by comparing the date with when the action was filed. The facts of a continuous nature of the alleged injury was not in any way raised by the claimants in the statement of complaint and, therefore, not before this Court for determination of the period of limitation. The Court is inclined to look into the statement of complaint of the claimants in determining the date when the cause action arose and the date the action was filed. That the legal authority, A.G Rivers State v. A.G Bayelsa State [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt 1340) 123, cited by the claimants in support of their argument is misconceived as they have failed to lay before the Court how the 1st defendant has continuously caused an injury to the claimants. Citing P. N Udoh Trading Co Ltd v. Abere [1996] 8 NWLR (Pt. 467) 479 at 492, the 1st defendant argued that one of the principles of the statute of limitation is that a person who sleeps on his right should not be assisted by the Courts in an action for the recovery of his rights or property. Therefore, that it is very clear that this suit was commenced almost ten years since the alleged disengagement of the claimants from the service of NBCI as averred in the statement of complaint of the claimants. Based on the foregoing, the 1st defendant contended that the action was commenced outside the period stipulated by law. It is, therefore, caught by the limitation of time provision under section 8(1)(a) of the Limitation Law, Lagos State 2003. This, without doubt, leaves the claimants with an action that is statute-barred. It is a barren cause of action that is not capable of being legally enforced. On the consequence of this, that the Supreme Court had decided in Egbe Adefarasin (supra) and Eboigbe v. NNPC (supra) that such actions must be dismissed for want of competence on the part of the courts to adjudicate on same. Also referred to the Court is UBA Limited v. Abimbolu [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt. 419) 371 at 383. The 1st defendant then submitted that the claimants in this matter have lost the right to institute this action because the period of time laid down by section 8(1)(a) of the Limitation Law of Lagos Sate for instituting this kind of action has elapsed and has consequently deprived the Court of the jurisdiction to hear this matter, referring to Ajayi v. Military Administrator Ondo State [1997] 5 NWLR (Pt. 604) 237 at 254 and Raleigh Industries (Nig) Limited v. Nwaiwu [1994] 4 NWLR (Pt. 341) 760 at 772. In conclusion, the 1st defendant urged the Court to dismiss the claimants’ suit having been commenced outside the period stipulated by law, and thus depriving this Court the jurisdiction to entertain this action. CLAIMANTS’ REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW TO 1ST DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS In their reply on points of law to the 1st defendant’s submissions, the claimants first pointed out what to them is a misrepresentation contained in the 1st defendant’s submissions. To the claimants, at paragraph 4.3 of the 1st defendant’s address, the 1st defendant stated as follows – It is further important to note that the Claimants did not disclaim this timeline in their statement of complaint but instead attributed their failure to institute the action within the stipulated time to ongoing negotiations between parties. This, according to the claimants, is not only incorrect, but also misleading. It gives the impression, albeit incorrect, that there were ongoing negotiation between the claimants and the 1st defendant or anyone at all in relation to the subject matter. This is not true. There was no dispute as to what the claimants are entitled to. There is also no dispute as to whether the termination of their employment was right or wrong. In fact, that as the complaint shows, at all material time to the claimants’ institution of this action there were no negotiations between parties. The letters of disengagement issued to the claimants stated that the claimants’ terminal benefits shall be paid to them “after proper verification and auditing”. At all material times to this suit, the claimants were only waiting for the conclusion of the defendants’ audit and verification exercise to be paid. The 1st defendant grossly misconstrued the claimants’ efforts in urging the defendants to hasten the process of their audit and verification exercise as negotiations. That it was based on this assurances and genuine belief that their termination benefits would be paid soon, “after proper verification and auditing” that the claimants continued to exercise patience. At this point, there was no dispute whatsoever and no cause of action. The cause of action arose when the claimants got tired of waiting and communicated same to the defendants. That the claimants actually set a date for the defendants to pay them their entitlements and pension arrears. On the expiration of that date, July 29, 2013, and upon the defendants’ refusal, neglect and failure to pay the cause of action finally arose. The claimants then proceeded to respond to the specific points of law arising from the 1st defendant’s written address. To the claimants, the plank of the 1st defendant’s written address is that the claimants’ action is caught by the Limitation Law of Lagos 2003. The 1st defendant argued strenuously that the claimants’ action arose in June 2003 and 2007 when the claimants were disengaged. In support of their position the 1st defendant cited the following cases: Egbe v. Adefarasin [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 549, Aboyeji v. Lateju [2012] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1288) 434 at 451, National Bank of Nigeria v. Arison Trading & Engineering [2006] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1005) 210 at 223, PN Udoh Trading Co. Ltd v. Abere [1996] 8 NWLR (Pt. 467) 479 at 492, UBA Limited v. Abimbolu [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt. 419) 371 at 383, Ajayi v. Mil Adm of Ondo State [1997] 5 NWLR (Pt. 604) 237 at 254 and Raleigh Industries (Nig) Ltd v. Nwaiwu [1994] 4 NWLR (Pt. 341) 760 at 772. It is the submission of the claimants that whilst the principle of law, reasoning and conclusions arrived at in all these cases are correct in law, the facts of the cases vis-à-vis the accrual of cause of the respective actions and the circumstances of their application are distinguishable from the instant case. The claimants then proceeded to address the first 5 of these cases as follows – 1. Egbe v. Adefarasin [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 549. The issues in this case are two-fold. It deals with the scope of immunity of judges of superior court and the protection of public officers under the Public Officers Protection Act. The appellant alleged that the 1st respondent (a judicial officer) acted in collusion with the 2nd respondent and thus abused his power as a judicial officer. Instructively, the wrong allegedly done by the 1st respondent against the appellant was admitted to be done on October 6, 1978 while the action was filed on August 3, 1981 outside the three months period permitted by the Public Officers Protection Act. Karibi Whyte JSC, whilst delivering the lead judgment restated the correct principle of law. At page 569 para G. he stated thus – The general principle of law is that where a law provides for the bringing of action within a prescribed period, in respect of a cause of action accruing to the Plaintiff, proceeding shall not be brought after the time prescribed by the statute. Clearly, in Egbe’s case, there was no dispute as to when the alleged cause of action arose – 6th October 1978. This is distinguishable from the instant case. Here, the claimants were disengaged by the defendant in 2003/2007. They are not challenging their disengagement within the said period. If this was the case, their cause of action could be said to have arisen within 2003 – 2007. The claimants herein were directed by the defendant to wait until auditing and verification. On July 29, 2013 they got tired of waiting and subsequently instructed their solicitor to make a demand for payment of their entitlements. It becomes even more obvious that the cause of action here arose on July 29, 2013 when the claimants through their solicitor issued a letter with a threat to go to Court. 2. Aboyeji v. Lateju [2012] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1288) 434 at 451. The respondent as plaintiff in the lower court brought this action in 2007 seeking declaration of title to land. The plank of the defendant/appellant’s preliminary objection was that the plaintiff lacks locus standi. The issue of statute-bar was merely ancillary. The lower court in its ruling held that since the act of trespass complained of has not ceased, the time has not ceased to run and that the suit was not statute-barred. On appeal, the Court of Appeal (Ilorin Division) per Abdullahi, JCA allowed the appellant’s appeal on the ground that the respondent lacks locus standi to institute the action. The Court of Appeal made pronouncement on the issue of limitation law and restated the trite law at page 451 that a cause of action arises on the date of occurrence, neglect or default complained of and not the consequence or result of occurrence, neglect or default. Again, this case cited by the 1st defendant is not applicable because statute-bar was determined in relation to a claim by the respondent that his signature was forged in 1977. The appeal was allowed on the ground that the respondent was aware of the forgery since 1977 but instituted this action in 2007. 3. National Bank of Nigeria v. Arison Trading & Engineering [2006] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1005) 210 at 223. Again, this case like the ones earlier cited restated the principle of law that in order to determine whether a cause of action is statute-barred, one has to look at the writ of summons and statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the plaintiff a cause of action and compare that with the date on the writ of summons. The defendant disputed the right of the plaintiff to increase the rate of interest without consultation or consent. He filed a counterclaim to the plaintiff’s action for recovery. The Court held that the defendant’s counterclaim filed out of time was caught by the statute of limitation. An evaluation of the state of pleading and evidence of parties showed that there was agreement that the loan granted the respondent was for one year, that is, from January – December 1981. The cause of action thus arose on December 31, 1981. The six year limitation period expired on 1/1/1988. The respondent filed its counterclaim on 22/1/1999. This case is also distinguishable because it is beyond cavil that the cause of action herein arose on December 31, 1981. The issue at hand here is when does the neglect or default complained of arise? Was it 2003/2007 when the claimants were disengaged or 2013 when they made a formal demand for payment which was neglected? It is submitted on behalf of the claimants that the cause of action arose in 2013 when they caused their solicitor to issue a letter. 4. PN Udoh Trading Co. Ltd v. Abere [1996] 8 NWLR (Pt. 467) 479 at 492. The facts in PN Udoh’s case are very simple, straight-forward and distinguishable from the instant case. A company was granted lease in 1958 over which it erected a building. The government of Rivers State cancelled the company’s lease in 1972. The cancellation was published in the Government Gazette dated 1/11/1972. The government subsequently sold the property to the respondent in 1978. The company’s action was instituted in 1988. Both the lower Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed the company’s claim. The Court of Appeal held that the cause of action of appellant arose in 1972 when the appellant’s lease was cancelled and not when the property was sold to the respondent. This case is even clearer and more distinguishable because the cancellation was published in the gazette, which was a notice to the whole world. The appellant did not go to Court until 1988, a time lag of 16 years, which was more than the 12 years limitation period for recovery of land in Rivers State. 5. UBA Ltd v. Abimbolu [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt. 419) 371 at 383. Interestingly, section 8(1) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State came up for determination in this case. UBA instituted this action for recovery of the balance of overdraft facilities granted the respondent on 20th June 1974. The first letter of demand was dated 13th July 1984 and the action was commenced thereafter, that is, over 10 years from grant of the loan. Like the above cited case of National Bank v Arison (supra), in this case both the lower Court and the Court of Appeal were unanimous in holding that a banker/customer relationship is based on simple contract and in reckoning the date of accrual of cause of action, the relevant date is the date or year on which the loan was granted, in this case 1974. The Court of Appeal went further to hold at page 384 that a demand is not necessary in law when a bank seeks to recover its loan unless there is an agreement to that effect, although in practice such demand is usually made. The claimants respectfully submit that this case is distinguishable. The relationship between the claimants and the defendants herein is not a banker/customer relationship. More so, the claimants are not contesting their disengagement from the employment of the defendant. The claimants continued that all the other cases are also distinguishable from the present case. That in all the cases cited by the defendants the dates of the accrual of the causes of actions in the cases were not in dispute; as such the cases are not applicable in the instant case. That the fundamental question which the defendants have failed to answer is, in this present case, when did the cause of action arise? To the claimants, they have answered the question that the cause of action arose on the 29th July 2013 when they got tired of waiting and set a timeline for the payment of their severance benefits and pension arrears and the consequent refusal, neglect and failure of the defendants to pay. At that point a cause of action arose which led to the institution of this suit. In conclusion, the claimants submitted that their action is not caught by the statute of limitation because the cause of action arose on the 29th July 2013. They then urged the Court to assume jurisdiction and proceed to determine this matter on its merits. 2ND DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS REGARDING ITS PRELIMINARY OBJECTION To the 2nd defendant, the claimants were disengaged staff of the defunct Nigeria Bank for Commerce and Industry who were disengaged in October 2003 and June 2007. That the 1st set of the claimants were disengaged in 2003, about 10 years before the institution of this action; while the 2nd set were disengaged on 29th June 2007. This action was accordingly filed six years, one month and 23 days after the disengagement of the 2007 set of the claimants. The 2nd defendant then framed two issues for the determination of the Court, namely – 1. Whether this matter is not statute-barred thereby striping the jurisdiction of the Court to hear and determine same. 2. Whether the claimants can rely on the report of the Inter Ministerial Committee to prove the reliefs. In respect of issue 1, it is the submission of the 2nd defendant the law is trite and settled. The position of the law is that before a Court can assume jurisdiction the Court must be properly constituted, the subject matter of the action must be initiated by due process of law and all conditions precedent to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction must have been fulfilled, referring to Madukolu v. Nkemsilim [1962] All NLR 357. That one of the conditions precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court is the “cause of action” which must be subsisting and alive. Cause of action is defined in Chartered Brains Limited & ors v. Intercity Bank Plc [2009] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1165) 445 at 457 – 458 as fact or combination of facts which gives rise to a right to sue and it consist of two elements, viz, the wrongful act of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint and the consequent damage. Therefore, where it is proved that the cause of action does not exist, the Count cannot legally assume jurisdiction. The action is accordingly statute-barred, referring to Chartered Brains Limited (supra) at 459. For the instant suit, the 2nd defendant referred to section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41 LFN 2004, which provides as follows – The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, negligence or default complained of or in case of a continence of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof. Also referred to the Court is paragraph 12 of the statement of complaint, which states thus – At the end of the restructure, staff audit and rationalization exercise, One Hundred and Thirty Nine (139) staff of NBCI were disengaged between 2003-2007. The disengaged persons are the Claimants in this action. The letters of disengagement of the affected staff are hereby attached and shall be relied on at the trial. To the 2nd defendant, a careful perusal of the letters of disengagement and other attachments show that the 1st set of the claimants were disengage in October 2003 and the 2nd set on 29th June 2007 and their terminal/severance benefits were paid immediately. It is clear that the period between the date the claimants were disengaged and the date of filing this suit is more than the 3 months limitation period specified by the Act. That the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry is a public institution created by an Act of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; therefore, it is qualified to benefit from the provision of the Public Officers Protection Act. That the two conditions for one to benefit from the Public Officers Protection Act (i.e. the person must be a public officer and the act done by the person in respect of which the action was commenced was an act done in pursuance or intended execution of a law or public duty or authority) stated in Alhaji Jibrin Bala Hassan v. Dr. Mu’azu Abaangida Aliyu & 2 ors [2010] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 547 at 621 have been met. It is the further submission of the 2nd defendant that even if the contract is termed a simple contract, the claimants’ action is statute-barred by virtue of section 8 of the Limitation Law Cap. L67 Laws of Lagos State 2003, which stipulates that actions founded on simple contract shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years. That from the averments and the annexure to be relied upon by the claimants it is very clear that even the 2007 set of disengaged staff of the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry’s cause of action accrued on 29th June 2007. The period between 29th June 2007 and 21st August 2013 when the action was instituted is 6 years, one month and 23 days. That it is, therefore, outside the limitation period as stipulated by the law, referring to National Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Arison Trading & Engineering Company Limited [2006] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1005) 210 at 221 – 222. Also referred to the Court is Akibu v. Azeez [2003] 1 SC (Pt. 11) 71 at 86, where Hon. Justice Ogundare, JSC stated thus – On the reading of the provision of the Limitation Laws of Lagos State as a whole, they do not merely deny the right of action. They completely extinguish an existing right at the expiration of the twelve year from the accrual of the right of action. That the twelve years referred to in the above case is in respect of recovery of land. In case of simple contract it is six years. Furthermore, that in the instant case, the claimants’ right of action having expired, caught by statute of limitation, is therefore statute-barred by operation of the law, urging the Court to so hold. On issue 2 i.e. whether the claimants can rely on the report of the Inter Ministerial Committee to prove the reliefs, the 2nd defendant restated that the claimants’ paragraph 13 of the statement of complaint is to the effect that at the end of the exercise by the Ministerial Committee, the Committee issued a report in May 2007. The report recommended the payment of severance benefits and other entitlements to the disengaged staff from the exercise of 2003/2007 and other retired staff accordingly. That since the report of the Committee was made no white paper was issued by the government in respect of the report. It is, therefore, the 2nd defendant’s view that the report of the inter-Ministerial Committee is not enforceable and cannot be relied upon. That it is trite that without a white paper or law on a recommendation made to government, such recommendation cannot give rise to a cause of action in favour of any person, referring to Dr Jonathan Cookey v. Mrs. Evangeline Fombo & anor [2005] 15 NWLR (Pt. 947) 182 at 207 and George Odon v. Chief Nimi Barigha Amange & anor [2010] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1207) 13, where Garba JCA Stated thus – The usual and known mode or manner of making the position of the State Governor on the recommendation contained in the report is by way of publishing a Government White Paper thereon. So until the State Governor makes his position on the recommendations known, they remain inchoate and incapable of being used as evidence in proof of the facts set out or recorded therein. Therefore, the 2nd defendant urged the Court to hold that reliefs having been based on the Inter-Ministerial Committee Report are not enforceable and cannot be relied upon by the claimants. In conclusion, the 2nd urged the Court to hold that the entire suit of the claimants is statue-barred and unenforceable against the 2nd defendant. CLAIMANTS’ REPLY TO THE 2ND DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS In reaction, the claimants framed one issue for the determination of the Court, namely, whether the claimants’ action is statute-barred by virtue of section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41 LFN 2004; and answered in the negative. Thereafter, the claimants proceeded to restate their case in terms of their submissions earlier recounted in this ruling to the effect that their cause of action arose on 29th July 2013; and with this suit filed on 21st August 2013, it means that they filed their action precisely 23 days after their demand and continued refusal by the 1st defendant to pay them their entitlements. The claimants went on to contend that the Public Officers Protection Act is not applicable to contract of employment. That their action is predicated on a claim for work done arising from their contract of employment, citing FGN v. Zebra Energy Ltd [2002] 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 196, NPA v. Construzioni Genrali [1974] 1 ANLR (Pt. 2) 463, Salako v. LEDB [1953] 20 NLR 169 and Ekpo Tom Inyang & anor v. NSPM Plc (citation is not supplied). That the 2nd defendant’s argument that this suit is statute-barred by virtue of section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act does not hold water as the claimants’ cause of action is not one covered by the Act. That the said law was intended by the legislature to apply to contracts. However, that assuming but without conceding that the Public Officers Protection Act applies to the claimants’ case, it admits of certain exceptions as judicially recognized in AG Rivers State v. AG Bayelsa State [2013] NWLR (Pt. 1340) 149. The exceptions are where there is continuance of injury and where the person relying on the Act acted outside the colour of his office or outside the statutory or constitutional duty. Regarding the first exception, the claimants submitted that the denial of severance benefits is a claim within the meaning of “cases of continuance of damage or injury”, for which an action could be commenced after the cessation of 3 months. To the claimants, their cause of action arose in 2013 when they instructed their counsel to demand from the 1st and 2nd defendants the payment of their severance benefits and pension arrears which request was denied. That they never slept on their rights as they only acted on the defendants’ promise and as directed, waited for computation to be concluded. Furthermore, that they were kept in the dark as to the position of the 1st and 2nd defendants as they were led to believe that verification and auditing were on going. The claimants then urged the Court to hold that the Public Officers protection Act does not apply to the instant case and as such their case is not caught up by the limitation law. In conclusion, the claimants urged the Court to dismiss the 2nd defendant’s preliminary objection with substantial cost. COURT’S DECISION I heard learned counsel and considered all the processes filed. In considering the merit of the issue at hand, I need to comment on a thing or two. The claimants commenced this action by way of a complaint, and accompanying the complaint is what they called a “statement of complaint”. The Rules of this Court talk of “statement of facts”, not “statement of complaint”. Where the claimants got their “statement of complaint” from, I do not know. Secondly, in their reply to the 2nd defendant’s submissions, the claimants referred to Ekpo Tom Inyang & anor v. NSPM Plc, a case which, according to them, was decided by the Honourable President of this Court. For one, the claimants did not even supply the suit number or citation of the case; nor did they supply a copy of the decision of the case as enjoined by Order 20 Rule 3 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Rules 2007, which provides that “…Where any unreported judgment is relied upon the Certified True Copy shall be submitted along the written address”. Thirdly, the “statement of complaint” of the claimants, the list of witnesses and the list of documents, all of which constitute the originating processes, were signed with two names of counsel underneath i.e. Victor Akazue Nwakasi, Olushola Abiloye. The problem is that it is not indicated who between Victor Akazue Nwakasi and Olushola Abiloye actually signed the said processes. The same thing (signing with the names of Victor Akazue Nwakasi and Olushola Abiloye underneath but without indicating who between the two signed) is also the case with the claimants’ written address of 23rd October 2013. The point to even note here is that the signature on the “statement of complaint” of the claimants, the list of witnesses and the list of documents on the one hand and that on the claimants’ written address of 23rd October 2013 on the other hand is different. On the other hand, regarding the claimants’ reply written address of 10th July 2014, two names are indicated i.e. Olushola Abiloye and Uche Ginigeme (Miss) but Olushola Abiloye is ticked as the signatory of the reply written address. Now, and this is where it becomes pretty interesting, the signature on the claimants’ “statement of complaint”, the list of witnesses and the list of documents is one and the same but differs from that on the written address of 23rd October 2013. Meanwhile both Victor Akazue Nwakasi and Olushola Abiloye are the names indicated as counsel in both these sets of processes. However, the signature on the reply written address where the name of Olushola Abiloye was indicated as the counsel who signed it is different from the other two sets of processes I talked of above. From all of this, Olushola Abiloye, who is indicated as having signed the reply written address of 10th July 2014 could not have then signed the “statement of complaint”, the list of witnesses and the list of documents on the one hand or the written address of 23rd October 2013 on the other. This leaves out Victor Akazue Nwakasi, who featured in both sets of processes i.e. the “statement of complaint”, the list of witnesses and the list of documents on the one hand and the written address of 23rd October 2013 on the other. But the problem is that even here the signatures on both sets of processes are different. So is it that Victor Akazue Nwakasi has two different signatures or is it that the “statement of complaint”, the list of witnesses and the list of documents on the one hand and the written address of 23rd October 2013 on the other were actually signed by other than counsel? Given the doubt as to the signature on the “statement of complaint”, the list of witnesses and the list of documents, I am of the opinion that there is no valid originating process before this Court as to activate a valid case before the Court. On this score alone, this case is incompetent and ought to be struck out. But assuming I am in error, I shall proceed to consider the merit of the issue whether the case is not statute-barred. The issue before the Court is simply the question whether the claimants’ case is statute-barred. While the 1st defendant argues that it is under the limitation law of Lagos State, the 2nd defendant argues that it is under both the limitation law of Lagos State and the Public Officers Protection Act. The claimants on their part argue that their cause of action arose in 2013 and so is not caught up by the limitation laws; but that even if the cause of action did not arise in 2013, their case is one for work done under a contract of employment, alternatively their case comes under the continuous damage or injury exception of the limitation laws. In determining whether an action is statute-barred, Courts are enjoined to look only at the originating processes of the claimant particularly the writ of summons/complaint and the statement of facts/claim. From these documents, the Court is to determine what the cause of action is, when it arose and then compare the date the cause of arose with the date the action was filed. If the period between these two dates exceeds the limitation period, then the matter is statute-barred. The question that arises presently is when the cause of action in the instant case can be said to have arisen. But first, what is even the cause of action? Cause of action is said to be the aggregate of facts giving rise to or upon which an enforceable claim is anchored. It is the fact(s) that establish or give rise to a right of action. Cause of action, therefore, consists of all those things necessary to give a right of action. The things so necessary must have happened and so includes every material thereof that entitles the plaintiff to succeed that the defendant has the right to traverse. See AG, Federation v. AG, Abia State & ors [2001] 11 NWLR (Pt. 725) 689 at 733. Accordingly, cause of action is said to have arisen when all that is required to go to Court by the claimant is in place and for which the claimant is thereby entitled in terms of the right to come to Court. The claimants in the instant case have two sets of claims: reliefs 1 – 10 relate to claims for monetary payments in terms of severance payment and pension arrears; while reliefs 11 and 12 relate the call to reverse their disengagement and reinstate them to their respective employments. The issue for present purposes is determining what the claimants’ cause of action is; and then ascertain when it arose. The claimants had in paragraph 2.3 of their reply on points of law to the 1st defendant’s submissions contended that – The letters of disengagement issued to the Claimants stated that the Claimants’ terminal benefits shall be paid to them “after proper verification and auditing”. At all material times to this suit, the Claimants were only waiting for the conclusion of the Defendants’ audit and verification exercise to be paid. The claimants in paragraph 2.4 went on to clarify their position as follows – It was based on this assurances and genuine belief that their termination benefits would be paid soon, “after proper verification and auditing” that the claimants continued to exercise patience. At this point, there was no dispute whatsoever and no cause of action. The cause of action arose when the claimants got tired of waiting and communicated same to the defendants. It should be noted in paragraph 4.9 of their written address of 23rd October 2013, the claimants had submitted that – The dispute and cause of action arose when the claimants ran out of patience, contracted the services of a legal practitioner to demand for their entitlements and the consequent neglect, failure and refusal of the defendants to meet the claimants’ demand (emphasis is the Court’s). By all of this, the claimants’ position is that their cause of arose did not arise until “proper verification and auditing” had been done. If this be the case, then this case is premature as there is no evidence before the Court that the said “proper verification and auditing” had been done. But this is not even the case of the claimants as a look at the reliefs they claim shows that their case is hinged, not on the said “proper verification and auditing” but on “the Inter Ministerial Report dated May 2007”. Sensing this may be a problem, the claimants went on to assert that their cause of arose only when they ran out of patience – for it was because they ran out of patience that they communicated same or had their counsel communicate same to the defendants. Now, I wonder, when has patience been an item to found a cause of action so that once a litigant runs out of it the right to come to Court thereby crystallizes? The claimants’ explanations in same paragraph 2.4 and as reiterated in paragraphs 3.5, 3.11 and 3.18 to the effect that they actually set a date for the defendants to pay them their entitlements and pension arrears, for which on the expiration of that date, July 29, 2013, and upon the defendants’ refusal, neglect and failure to pay the cause of action finally arose, is nothing but an afterthought, a mere embellishment, which goes nowhere. In any event, the claimants seem to have forgotten that they have alternative prayers in reliefs 11 and 12, namely – 11. An order declaring the acquisition of the role, assets and liabilities of NBCI by the 1st defendant without the repeal of the NBCI Act Cap. 296 Laws of the Federation as illegal, unconstitutional, void, and of no effect. 12. And or an order reinstating the affected staff as if their employment was never interrupted by the acquisition of the role, assets and liabilities of NBCI by the 1st defendant without the repeal of the NBCI Act Cap 296 Laws of Federation of Nigeria and payment of full benefits and entitlement from the period of the purported disengagement till date. These reliefs 11 and 12, as can be seen, have nothing to do with “proper verification and auditing”, patience of the claimants, their solicitor’s letter of demand and the July 29, 2013 date the claimants said their cause of action arose. In all their submissions, the claimants kept saying that they were not contesting their disengagement, yet reliefs 11 and 12 are actually a contest of their disengagement. I indicated earlier that the claims of the claimants are structured into two categories: the first (reliefs 1 – 10) relate to payment of severance benefits and pension arrears, while the second (reliefs 11 and 12) relate to reinstatement of the claimants. I also indicated that reliefs 1 – 10 are all hinged on the inter-Ministerial report of May 2007. Against these reliefs, it is necessary to ascertain what the cause of action is and when it arose. In paragraph 17 of their “statement of complaint”, the claimants asserted that the inter-Ministerial Report of May 2007 omitted the calculation of the pension arrears for the 99 staff disengaged in 2007. Now if a May 2007 report omitted the calculation of pension arrears of disengaged staff in same 2007, is the cause of action not one that arose in May 2007? I think so. Furthermore, in paragraph 18 of the “statement of complaint”, the claimants indicated that the acquisition of assets and liabilities of the NBCI by the 1st defendant, and the conclusion of the activities of the inter-Ministerial Committee on the winding up of NBCI and NERFUND marked the end of the administrative process of restructure. That, however, the recommendation as regards the payment of severance benefits to disengagement of affected staff was not carried out. The question is: if the administrative process of restructure had come to an end, but the payment of severance benefits to affected staff was not done, is this not tantamount to saying that the cause of action thereby arose? Once again I think so. And in paragraph 19 of the “statement of complaint”, the claimants stated that “despite the fact that the inter-Ministerial Committee observed and stated in their report that funds totaling N800 million was available and transferred to the 1st defendant for payment of the severance benefits, the claimants were not immediately paid as recommended and have not been paid till date”. The statement that they “were not immediately paid” presupposes that they were indeed paid though much later. Yet, according to the claimants in the next breath, they “have not been paid till date”. So which of these is the Court to take for purposes of determining the cause of action, and whether or not the claimants even have a competent case? In any event, once the inter-Ministerial Committee indicated in May 2007 vide its report that there are funds to pay the claimants, did the cause of action not thereby arise? Yet again I think so. My take on all this is that the cause of action in the instant case arose since May 2007; and I so find and hold. In any event, reliefs 11 and 12 praying for reinstatement when the last batch of the claimant to be disengaged were so disengaged in 2007, merely reinforce my finding and holding that the cause of action arose in May 2007. The present action was filed on 21st August 2013. This means that the action was filed more than six years after the cause of action arose. So whether it be the limitation law of Lagos State or the Public Officers Protection Act, the claimants’ case is statute-barred; and I so find and hold. The claimants variously argued that their action is not caught up by the limitation laws since their action was for work done under a contract of employment citing in the process relatively older authorities of the appellate Courts. However, more recent authorities indicate that termination of employment cases for instance have generally been held by the Courts to be capable of being caught up by the limitation laws. See the review of such cases in Mr. Iyede Onome Festus & anor v. Management Board of Delta State University Teaching Hospital & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/312/2013 the ruling of which was delivered on July 3, 2014. Moreover, in Akauve Moses Osoh & ors v. Unity Bank Plc [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1358) 1 at 48 and 50, the Supreme Court held that the action instituted by the claimants robbed the Court of its jurisdiction because as at the time the action was brought the claimants were no longer in employment of the defendant. It is my holding, therefore, that the limitation laws apply to the instant case. The claimants sought to rely on the “continuance of damage or injury” exception to the limitation laws. But I do not think that they understand fully what that phrase means. By case law authorities, the phrase means continuance of the “act which caused the injury” and not the injury itself. See Okafor v. AG, Anambra State [2001] FWLR (Pt. 58) 1127 at 1146 D – G relying on the English Court of Appeal case of Carrey v. Bermondsey Metropolitan Bourough Council [1903] 675 P. 447; 20 TLR 2, Amamiwe v. The Local School Board [1971] 2 NMLR 57 at 58 and Obiefuna v. Okoye [1961] All NLR 357. The claimants did not indicate to this Court the act that continually causes injury to them. I held that their cause of action arose in May 2007 when the inter-Ministerial Committee submitted its report. The complaint of the claimants like I pointed out relates to payment of severance benefits and pension arrears. The claimant did not show that they have a periodic right to these claims as to bring their case within the purview of AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 144 – 150. As held in the concurring judgment of His Lordship Chukwuma-Eneh, JSC in Sulgrave Holdings Inc v. FGN [2012] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 309 at 338, there can be no doubt that the claimants in the instant case slept on their rights and have only themselves to blame for being caught up by the provisions of both the limitation law of Lagos State and the Public Officers Protection Act. Even when the 2nd defendant argued that the claimants’ case is premature and so incompetent as the inter-Ministerial Committee recommendations have no Government White Paper approving hem, the claimants had no answer to that argument as they did not even react to it. On the whole, it is my finding and holding that the instant case is statute-barred. The case is accordingly struck out. Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD