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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE OWERRI JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT OWERRI BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE O. Y. ANUWE Dated: February 11, 2015 SUIT NO. NICN/PHC/115/2013 Between 1. Chief Monday Eleazer (JP) (for himself and as representing the motor and motor cycle sections of Nigeria Union of Road Transport Workers, Rivers State Chapter) Claimants/Respondents 2. The Nigeria Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) And 1. Mr. Obulor Onwugbonu 2. Mr. Ogranya A. Adiela 3. Mr. Oyemachi Ojadi 4. Mr. Benneth Onyeocha Defendants/Applicants (for themselves and on behalf of the Registered Trustees of Association of Tri-cycle and motor cycle operators Port Harcourt (ASSOTRICMOP) Representation R. M. Ubaka for the Claimants Mark-Nath E. Ahiakwor for the Defendants RULING The claimants took up a complaint dated and filed on the 19th day of July 2013 claiming against the defendants as follows – (a) A Declaration that the claimants is not only the registered National Trade Union vested with the responsibility to organize, regulate manage and protect all workers engaged in road transportation in Nigeria including motor-cycle riders, but is also recognized by both the Rivers State Government and the Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni Local Govt. Council and therefore entitled to collect and receive dues, levies, contribution etc from its members operating in the Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni Local Govt. Area (ONELGA) of Rivers State. (b) A declaration that after the incorporation of the defendants that its right to operate in Omoku, the Headquarter of the Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni Local Govt. Area or any place in Rivers State is subject to the permission and authority of the appropriate authority which are the Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni Local Govt. Council and the Rivers State Govt. and that the permission and authority of the said appropriate authority have not been obtained by the defendants and therefore cannot operate. (c) A declaration that the act of the defendants, through their task force, in stopping, beating and wounding the members of the claimants on the streets of Omoku and forcing and compelling them to pay dues, levies and contributions to the defendants is not only illegal and unlawful but also unconstitutional. (d) An Order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants either by themselves, their agents, privies etc from further operating in Omoku until the permission and authority of the appropriate authority have been sought and obtained. (e) And Order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants either by themselves, their agents, privies, servant or howsoever called from further, harassing, intimidating, stopping, beating and or wounding the members of the claimants in the street of Omoku and compelling or forcing them to pay dues, levies, contributions etc to the defendants. (f) The sum of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) as general damages. By a Motion on Notice brought pursuant to Order 11 Rule 8 (1); Order 15 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007 and under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, the Defendant/Applicant brought a preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of this court and praying the court for an order striking out the suit on the following grounds: (i) The Defendant/Applicants are not proper parties before this Honourable Court and as such this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit. (ii) The Claimants/Respondents have no reasonable cause of action and as such lacks locus standi to institute this action for themselves and on behalf of Ogba – Egbema – Ndoni Local Govt. Council. Attached to the application is a fourteen (14) paragraph affidavit deposed to by the 1st Defendant/Applicant and a written address wherein counsel raised the following two (2) issues for determination: (i) Whether the fact that the defendants/applicants are not legally bound to be members of the 2nd claimant, the claimants/respondents can sustain this action against the defendants/applicants by virtue of reliefs 1, 3 and 5 as contained in the claimants/respondents claim. (ii) Whether reliefs 2 and 4 as contained in the claimants/respondents claim discloses reasonable cause of action in favour of the claimants/respondents to clothe them with the requisite locus standi to institute this action. In arguing issue one, Counsel for the applicants submitted that the defendants/applicants are not members and are not qualified as members of 2nd claimants/respondent and as such have no business with the 1st claimant. It is counsel’s submission on this issue that this is the position of the law by virtue of the provisions of 3rd schedule, Part B number 16 of the Trade Union Act Cap T14 LFN, 2004 where members of the 2nd claimant/respondent are defined as “all workers engaged in Transportation of passengers and goods by road; excluding the transportation of petroleum by road and transportation undertaken by self-employed persons”, and that is to say that by the above provisions the claimants/respondents are not entitled to reliefs 1, 3 and 5 as contained in the claimants/respondents claim wherein the claimants/respondents sought the declaration of this Court to control the affairs of the defendants/applicants in this suit. By virtue of the above argument, counsel stated that it is trite to say that the defendants/applicants are not proper parties before this Court and as such this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit. In the case of OFIA vs. EJEM (2006) 3 FWLR (Pt. 331) at page 5485 ratio 1, the Supreme Court held that: “where an action is not competent or properly constituted, it robs the court of the jurisdiction to entertain same. In other words such a complaint raises the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court and ought to be dealt with first and foremost since a judgment delivered in action outside the jurisdiction of the court amounts in law to a nullity irrespective of how well the proceeding was conducted by the trial judge. Jurisdiction is said to be a peripheral issue in any adjudication where it is raised”. However, the defendants/applicants like the motor-cycle riders, fall within the ambit of self-employed persons which the Trade Union Act in the afore-mentioned provisions excluded from the meaning of members of the 2nd claimant/respondent. In GBAGEDE vs. N.U.R.T.W, TARABA STATE (2006) 2 FWLR (Pt. 316) page 3134 at ratio 2, the court defined Trade Union by virtue of section 1(1) of the Trade Union Act, Cap T14, LFN 2004 thus: “a trade Union is defined as any combination of workers or employees whether temporary or permanent, the purpose of which is to regulate the terms and conditions of employment of workers, whether the combination is question will or will not, a part from this act be an unlawful combination by reason of any f its purposes being in restraint of trade and whether its purposes do or do not include the provision of benefits for its members”. Thus, the defendants/applicants as self-employed persons whom for common good operate as an association under the Umbrella of the Registered Trustees of Association of Tri-cycle and motor cycle operators, Port Harcourt (ASSOTRICMOP) are not by virtue of the above definition of a Trade Union, members of the 2nd claimant and as such, do not by virtue of the suit before this Court, fall within the meaning of proper parties before this Court. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal described the fundamental nature of jurisdiction in GBAGEDE vs. N.U.R.T.W, TARABA STATE (supra) at ratio 1 thus: “Jurisdiction is the life wire of every suit filed before a court of law. A court of law is competent to entertain and adjudicate in a matter only if the subject matter of such suit is within its jurisdiction and also if there is no any feature in the case which prevents it from exercising its jurisdiction, and also whether the suit before it is/was initiated by due process of law upon fulfillment of any conditions precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. Issue of jurisdiction is therefore very important and indeed fundamental to any proceedings”. The jurisdiction of this Court on Trade Union as contained in Section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 states thus: “The court shall have and exercise exclusive jurisdiction in civil cause and matters: (a) Relating to (i) Labour, including trade union and industrial relations (ii) Environment and conditions of work, health, safety and welfare of labour, and matters incidental thereto; and (b) Relating to the grant of any order to restrain any person or body from taking part in any strike, lock or any industrial action or as any conduct in contemplation or as furtherance of a strike, lock out or any industrial action. (c) Relating to the determination of any question as to the interpretation of: (i) Any collective agreement, (ii) Any award made by an arbitral tribunal in respect of a labour dispute or an organizational dispute (iii) The term of settlement of any labour dispute, organizational dispute as may recorded in any memorandum of settlement, (iv) Any trade union constitution, and (v) Any award or judgment of the court. It is not in doubt that the claimants/respondents filed this suit as a Trade Union and by virtue of the provisions of section 7(1)(a)(i) and (c)(iv) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 as cited and underlined above, Counsel’s contention is that the Defendants/Applicants are not Trade Union members as provided in Section 1(1) of the Trade Union Act, Cap T14 LFN, 2004 and 3rd schedule part B number 16 of the same Trade Union Act as earlier stated in this argument. Rather they fall under the category of self-employed persons of which the above Trade Union Act excluded. It is the submission of Counsel for the applicants that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this suit considering the provisions of section 7(1) (a)(i) and (c)(iv) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 and the provisions of Section 1, 3rd schedule part B number 16 of the Trade Union Act. He therefore urged the Court to decline jurisdiction and strike out this suit on the grounds that the Defendants/Applicants are not proper parties before it, based on the provisions of Trade Union Act on the meaning and members of a Trade Union. As regards issue (2) two whether reliefs 2 and 4 as contained in the Claimants/Respondents claim discloses reasonable cause of action in favour of the claimants/respondents to clothe them with the requisite locus standi to institute this action, Counsel submitted that the claimants/respondents are neither the Corporate Affairs Commission nor Ogba – Egbema – Ndoni Local Govt. Area Council of Rivers State to question the modus operandi of the Defendants/Applicants on record. This argument is in view of reliefs 2 and 4 sought by the claimants/respondents as regards the appropriate authority from which the defendants/applicants are meant to take permission before operating within the named Local Government Area. The claimants/respondents through reliefs 2 and 4 as contained in their claims sought to claim or obtain the above reliefs for and on behalf of Ogba – Egbema – Ndoni Local Govt. Area Council. To Counsel, it would be quite astonishing if this Court should assume jurisdiction to entertain a suit of this nature, which tends to protect the interest of a party who is not privy to this suit and has not in any form or manner shown interest in this suit and who do not constitute a proper party before this Court. To the defendants, by virtue of the above argument derivable from reliefs 2 and 4, it is trite to say that the claimants/respondents on record in the instant suit have no reasonable cause of action to institute this suit against the defendants/applicants on record. In ADZUANA vs. OSAKWE (2007) 4 FWLR (Pt. 391) pg. 6221 at ratio 3. The court defined cause of action thus: “A Cause of Action means a combination of facts and circumstances giving rise to the right to file a claim in Court for remedy. It includes all things which are necessary to have given a right of action and every material fact which has to be proved to entitle the plaintiff/claimant to succeed.” However, in the instant suit before this Court, the claimants/respondents did not in any way show reasonable cause of action in their favour as regards reliefs 2 and 4. Hence there is no material fact that shows that the defendants/applicants owe any obligation whatsoever to the claimants/respondents to entitle them to reliefs 2 and 4. Counsel cited the cases of THADANT vs. NBN (1972) 1 SC 105; UDOB TRAD. CO. LTD. vs. ABERE (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 723) 114 BELLO vs. A.G. OYO STATE (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 828. The issue of cause of action was extensively expatiated by the Supreme Court in A.G Federation vs. ATIKU ABUBAKAR (2007) 3 FWLR (Pt. 386) Pg. 5396 at Ratio 1. Where the Supreme Court stated thus: “A lis or cause of action is constituted by a bundle of facts which the law will recognize as giving the plaintiff a right of action. It is a situation or state of facts which would entitle a party to sustain action and give him a right to seek judicial remedy or redress. Such facts or combination of facts which give rise to a right to sue may consist of two elements namely: (i) The wrongful act of the Defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause or action; and (ii) The consequential damage.” Counsel submitted that the claimants/respondents have not established that the facts in support of reliefs 2 and 4 constituted any wrongful action by the defendants/applicants to entitle them to those reliefs, neither did the facts as presented by the claimants/respondents on record established any consequential damage against the claimants/respondents by the defendants/applicants on record. The claimants/respondents could not in their claims establish any specific damages caused by the defendants/respondents. They only applied through the sixth limb of their claims for general damages of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira only). Counsel added that this court is not a Father Christmas to grant remedies that are not cogent and compellable; more so, when it is obvious that the court lacks jurisdiction. On the other hand, for the claimants/respondents to be entitled to institute this suit based on reliefs 2 and 4, it is necessary for the claimants/respondents to show that either their personal interest will immediately be affected by the action or that they had sustained injury to themselves and which interest is over and above the interest of the general public. Counsel submitted that the claimants/respondents could not establish the fact that they suffered any extra-ordinary damage that is above the interest of the general public to entitle them to the reliefs sought in the instant suit. See also THOMAS vs. OLUFOSOYE (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669; AYOOLA vs. BARUWA (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt. 628) 535 as referred to by the Supreme Court in A.G. Federation vs. ATIKU (supra). In the case of UBA PLC vs. B.T.L. INDUSTRIES LTD. (2007) 2 FWLR (Pt. 360) at Pg. 1647 Ratio 4, the Supreme Court reiterated that Locus standi denotes legal capacity to institute proceeding in a Court of Law. The claimants are not the agents, privies or personal representatives of Ogba – Egbema – Ndoni Local Govt Area Council and do not have any authority whatsoever to institute or maintain a claim of this nature against the defendants/applicants on behalf of the said Local Govt. that will entitle them to the reliefs sought as contained in reliefs 2 and 4 of the claimants/respondents claim. It was therefore Counsel’s contention that the claimants/respondents lack such legal capacity to institute this suit against the defendants/applicants, owing to the fact that the claimants/respondents are neither the Corporate Affairs Commission nor Ogba – Egbema – Ndoni Local Govt. Area Council under whose authority and permission the defendants/applicants operate. Thus, the claimants/respondents lack the necessary legal capacity to seek reliefs as sought in the 2nd and 4th claims contained in the claimants/respondents Statement Claims against the defendants/applicants; more so, when there are proofs through the various exhibits attached to the defendants/applicants processes showing that the necessary permissions were duly and religiously obtained from the said Local Government where the defendants/applicants operate. He therefore urged the Court to uphold the applicants’ submissions and resolve the issues in favour of the applicants as prayed. Concluding, counsel for the applicants stated that that the action brought before this Court by the claimants/respondents is not only frivolous but also calculated to disrupt the activities of the defendants/applicants. This is because the defendants/applicants are not members of the 2nd claimant as provided under the THIRD SCHEDULE, part B number 16 of the Trade Union Act, where National Union of Road Transport Workers is said to comprise of “All workers engaged in Transportation of passengers and goods by road, excluding the transportation of petroleum by road and transportation undertaken by self-employed persons”. Thus the defendants/applicants in paragraph 4 of their Statement of Defence as well as paragraph 4 of the affidavit in support of this application averred that as self-employed tricycle operators, they fall under the category of self-employed persons which the above provisions of the Trade Union Act excluded as members of the 2nd claimants/respondent on record. Section 40 of the constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) provides for right to peaceful assembly and association, which is a fundamental Right provision and restrains persons from compelling others to mandatorily join associations or Trade Unions which ordinarily they are not meant to join or belong to. Thus, the first limb of the claimants/respondents claim shows that the claimants/respondents ran to this court to seek the Court’s authority to legalize an act that is ab initio unconstitutional and illegal in all ramifications. He urged the Court to grant this application and strike out this suit. In opposition to this application, the Claimants filed a reply on points of law wherein Counsel proposed a lone issue for the court’s determination. “Whether the claimants/respondents have no locus standi in this case and also that this case did not disclose any reasonably cause of action to cloth this Honourable Court with the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this case”. In arguing the sole issue, Counsel pointed out that the issue of jurisdiction of a court is very important as it is the life wire of a case. It is jurisdiction that gives the court the competence to determine a case before it. If a court lacks jurisdiction to hear a case, it lacks competence to determine that case. He submitted that where a court has no jurisdiction, it cannot do anything and that is where the matter ends. See RIRUWAI vs. SHEKARAU (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 461) 975 @ 989 – 990, paras. G – A. A court is competent when: (a) It is properly constituted as regard members and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and (b) The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction; and (c) The case comes before the court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. See: MADUKOLU & ORS. vs. NKEMDILIM (2001) 46 WRN 1; (1962) 1 All NLR (Pt. 4) 587 @ 594; NWABUEZE vs. OKOYE (2002) 10 WRN 123 @ 155; SKEN CONSULT NIG. LTD. vs. UKEY (1981) 1 S.C 6 at 26. It was counsel’s further submission that it is a fundamental principle that jurisdiction is determined by the plaintiff’s claim. It is the claim before the court that has to be looked at or examined to ascertain whether it comes within the jurisdiction conferred on the court. See ADEYEMI vs. OPEYORI (1976) 10. S.C 31 @ 51; A – G. FEDERATION vs. A –G ABIA STATE & ORS (2001) 40 WRN 1. A perusal of the various paragraphs of the statement of fact will clearly show that the claimants have the locus standi to initiate this suit and that there is reasonable cause of action. The 1st claimant is the second state vice chairman of the Rivers State Chapter of the National Union of Road Transport workers (NURTW) which is the 2nd Claimant in this case. The Claimants area of jurisdiction covers all workers engaged in transportation of passengers and goods by road but excluding the transportation of petroleum by road. The members of the claimants pay dues, levies and contribution to it. The defendants who are recently and conditionally registered as an association to operate tri-cycle and motor cycle transportation, which is part of claimants jurisdiction, did not only encroach on the operational area of the claimants but also formed a task force that started beating, harassing, intimidating and compelling members of the claimants to pay dues, levies, contribution, etc to the defendants. The defendants were doing this without complying with its conditional registration. To the Claimants, it is not the Rules of court that vests jurisdiction in this Court but rather the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). See SECTION 254 C (I) OF THE 1999 CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (THIRD ALTERATION) ACT, 2010 that came into operation on 4th day of March 2011 and also SECTION 7 OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT ACT, 2006. Counsel submitted that by the above sections of the law, this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this case. The defendants/applicants have failed woefully to refer the Court to any statute that ousts the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine this suit. It was therefore the submission of counsel that the law presumes against construing statutes so as to oust or restrict the jurisdiction of a superior court of record such as this Court, unless there is explicit expression to that effect in the legislation. See SHODEINDE vs. THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF AHMADDIYA MOVEMENT IN ISLAM (1980) 1 – 2 SC 225 @ 229; ADISA vs. OYINWOLA (2000) 6 SCN 290 @ 315 – 316. It is only this Court that has jurisdiction to hear and resolve the dispute between two trade unions. The Supreme Court had in the case of OKORO vs. EGBUOH (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 332) 1569 at 1588 PARAS. A – C advised that the issue of jurisdiction should not be abused and that it should not be a subject of speculation or gossip by counsel by merely raising it as a gamble when they know that their client’s case is bad. Concluding, Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the application with substantial cost of N250,000.00 (Two hundred and fifty thousand Naira) as the application is brought for the sole purpose of delaying this case. Before I proceed to determine this application, I shall first comment on the approach adopted by the applicants in this application. In the 2 grounds of the objection, the applicants grouped the reliefs sought by the claimant in the complaint into the two grounds and contended that going by the reliefs, the court has no jurisdiction to determine the suit because the reliefs are not grantable. The arguments of their counsel in his written address made it even clearer the extent the applicants have taken this application. In his argument on issue 1 formulated by him, the applicants counsel in paragraph 4.2 of his written address, submitted thus: “…that is to say that by the above provision, the claimants/respondents are not entitled to reliefs 1, 3 and 5 as contained in the claimants/respondents claim…”. It was further contended that the defendants are self-employed as such they do not fall under the meaning of trade union. Also, in paragraph 4.18 of his issue two, the learned counsel for the applicants submitted: “we submit with respect that the claimants/respondents have not established that the facts in support of reliefs 2 and 4 constituted any wrongful action by the defendants/applicants against the claimants/respondents…” The effect of Counsels arguments is for this court to pronounce on the merits of these reliefs at this stage. Throughout his written address, the applicants counsel treated this case as if it is concluded and he is making his final submissions. His submissions, as well as the application itself, focused on the merits of each of the reliefs sought by the claimant as to whether they are grantable. I am quite aware that what we are dealing with at the moment is an interlocutory application and no evidence has yet been taken in this matter. But most of the issues raised in this application are matters which should be taken during the hearing of the main case. Should I proceed in this application in the manner the applicants have directed it, the substantive suit may as well be determined here and now. But it is trite that while determining an interlocutory application, courts should desist from making any finding or doing anything which may prejudice or compromise the substantive suit. See NIGERIAN UNION OF TEACHERS vs. CONFERENCE OF SECONDARY SCHOOL TUTORS, NIGERIA (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 295) 656 at 678. It is in view of this observation and upon a careful examination of the application that I have limited the issues raised therein to only one. This is done to avoid encroaching or inadvertently resolving some of issues in the substantive suit, that is if we eventually get to that stage, as this application will determine. The simple issue in this application is whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain and determine this suit? In their affidavit in support of the preliminary objection, it is deposed that the applicants do not have any business with the 2nd respondent. The applicants are self-employed and are members of the Association of Tri-Cycle and Motor Cycle Operators, Port Harcourt, which was duly registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission. As such, they do not participate in trade union activities. The applicants operate under Ogba-Egbema-Ndoni Local Government Area of Rivers State and pay their bills and dues to the said LGA by way of permit. As self-employed persons, the applicants are not members of the 2nd respondent. It is on these facts the applicants contend that they are not proper parties to this suit and this court consequently lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The respondents filed no counter affidavit but filed a reply on points of law. The respondents counsel submitted in paragraph 3.3 thereof that it is not affidavit evidence the court looks at to determine whether it has jurisdiction or not but on the plaintiffs’ claims as disclosed on the statement of claim before the court. I agree totally with this submission. Although, the respondents did not file any counter affidavit, which has the effect of admission of the facts deposed in the affidavit in support of the application, this court will nonetheless determine this application on the strength of the processes before the court. The contention of the applicants, as I see it from the affidavit and the written address of their counsel, is that this court does not have jurisdiction to determine this suit for the following reasons- 1. They are not a trade union as defined in Section 1 (1) TUA and as such they are not proper parties to this suit 2. Being self-employed persons, they are not covered in the area of jurisdiction of the claimants as defined in 3rd Schedule, Part B at item 16 of the Trade Unions Act. 3. The effect of the above is that the jurisdiction of this court in Section 7 NIC Act does extend to this dispute/matter. It is settled law that a court is competent to hear a matter when- i. It is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and ii. The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction: and iii. The case comes before the court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. See MADUKOLU vs. NKEMDILIM [1962] ANLR 581; OCHEJA EMMANUEL DANGANA vs. HON. ATTAI AIDOKO ALI USMAN LER [2012] SC 480/2011. The quarrel of the applicants is not with the 1st and 3rd ingredients of jurisdiction set out above but with the 2nd. That is the subject matter of the case is not within the jurisdiction of this court and there is a feature in the case which prevents this court from exercising its jurisdiction. What are the subject matters within the competence of this court? The applicants’ Counsel cited section 7 of NIC Act 2006 and set out the subject matters there under which this court is competent to entertain. Counsel argued that this matter falls into none, as even the mention of trade union in the section in not applicable to this case. According to counsel, in view of the section, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this matter. The court concedes that the said section 7 of the NIC Act spelt out the jurisdiction of this court, but it must be stated that the jurisdiction of this court has been expanded in section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) as the section covers variety of matters not mentioned in Section 7 of NIC Act. Therefore, the more superior and broad law on the jurisdiction of this court is the 1999 constitution. Among the several matters on which the court may exercise jurisdiction in Section 254 C, I shall cite only the portion relevant to the determination of the issue in this application. Section 254C-(1) 1999 constitution (as amended) provides- “Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters- (a) relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the condition of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith” The next task is to examine what the subject matter of this suit is, with a view to determining whether it is accommodated in the matters enumerated in the above provision. The answer lies in the statement of facts and the reliefs sought by the respondents in this suit. The facts of the respondents’ case contain thus: The 2nd claimant is a registered Trade Union and operates in all states of the Federation and Local Government Areas including Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni LGA of Rivers State. The claimants control the operation of road transport workers, which include motor cycle riders, in the said LGA. The defendants are members/trustees of ASSOTRICMOP which association was registered by CAC and its operation was to be subject to appropriate authority. But without obtaining the requisite permissions from the Rivers State Government and the Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni LGA, started operating by constituting a taskforce of persons who stop all commercial motor cycle riders; members of the 2nd claimant; and force them to pay dues to the defendants and any member of the 2nd claimant who refused was beaten up and his motor cycle seized by the defendants with the view to forcing the members to comply. Notwithstanding the intervention of the Police and the Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni LG council, the defendants continued in the act. This dispute led the Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni LG Council and the Rivers State government to advice the defendants to merger with the claimants union but the defendants refused to do so. It is consequent on these facts the claimants sought, among others, reliefs 1, 3 and 5 challenged by the applicants in this preliminary objection, which are- “1. A declaration that the claimants are the registered national union with responsibility to organise and regulate workers engaged in road transportation in Nigeria, including motor cycle riders and it is also recognised by both Rivers State Government and Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni LGA and it is thus entitled to collect dues and levies from members operating in Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni LGA of Rivers state. 3. A declaration that the acts of the defendants through their taskforce in stopping, beating and wounding members of the claimants on the street of Omoku and forcing and compelling them to pay dues, levies and contributions to the defendants is not only illegal and unlawful but also unconstitutional. 5. An Order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from further harassing, intimidating, stopping, beating and or wounding member of the claimants in the streets of Omoku and compelling or forcing them to pay dues, levies, contributions etc to the defendants.” From the above, it is not difficult to observe that the dispute between the parties has to do with trade unionism and membership thereof. That is the subject matter of this suit. Does this court have jurisdiction in issues pertaining to trade union? The relevant words of section 254C (1)a, reads-“relating to or connected with any … trade unions … and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith.” The facts of the claimants’ case and the relief set out above, it is clear that the subject matter of this suit is connected or related with trade union. It is a matter this court can entertain. But I think I understand the angle of the applicants on this point very well. The applicants’ contention is that theirs is a registered association of self-employed persons and not a trade union. They are therefore not members of the claimants’ trade union. Their self-employed status excludes them from the membership of the 2nd respondent as prescribed in the 3rd Schedule, Part B, Item 16 of Trade Unions Act which provides that membership of NURTW include “All workers engaged in transportation of passengers and goods by road, excluding the transportation of petroleum by road and transportation undertaken by self-employed persons.” Therefore, they are excluded from the jurisdiction of this court over trade unions they not being a trade union nor member of the 2nd respondent. According to their counsel, his argument is that since the applicants are not a registered trade union, they are not proper parties to this suit and it takes this suit out of contemplation in the jurisdictional competence of this court. It should be noted that whether the applicants are self-employed or are members of the 2nd respondent or ought to be members of the 2nd respondent are issues which will be touched in the substantive suit, therefore I will refrain from going into it. However, it will be in place to state here that there is nothing in Section 254C (1) a of the 1999 constitution, which gave this court jurisdiction in matters connected with trade unions, indicating that both parties must be trade unions before the court can entertain the suit. The provision of the section confers what can be called subject matter jurisdiction on this court. Once the subject matter is connected with or relates to trade union, it is a matter this court is competent to hear and determine. As for the applicants objection to reliefs 2 and 4 on the ground that the claimants has no locus standi and has not shown reasonable cause of action in respect of the reliefs, it is my view that the issue should best be left till after evidence has been taken on the matter. This suit will proceed to hearing and the applicants have the right to still address me on this point in the final address. In the final judgment, this court will consider which of the reliefs to grant, dismiss or strike depending on the evidence and issues of law involved. In the final result, I hold that this court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit. Accordingly, this application is refused and it is hereby dismissed. This suit will proceed to hearing. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge