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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE B. B. KANYIP, PHD DATE: MARCH 16, 2015 SUIT NO. NIC/LA/111/2014 BETWEEN Kayode Ajani Jokosenumi - Claimant AND Nigeria Customs Service - Defendant REPRESENTATION Mrs. S. O. Awulonu, for the claimant. Victor Dirisu, for the defendant. RULING This is a transferred case from the Federal High Court sitting in Lagos. The claimant had taken up on 9th February 2007 a writ of summons and a statement of claim against the defendant praying for the following reliefs – 1. A declaration that the purported suspension and/or dismissal of the plaintiff is unlawful, irregular, void and of no effect whatsoever. 2. A declaration that the plaintiff’s employment remained extant up till March 1998 when his retirement should have commenced. 3. A declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to salaries and entitlements from 1 December 1996 till 31 March 1998, and to full terminal benefits and pensions running from 1 April 1998. 4. A declaration that the defendant’s word published of an concerning the plaintiff published in The Guardian on Saturday, December 7, 1996 on the dismissal of the plaintiff on the grounds of “forgery of bank receipts and fake pay-slips” under the headline ‘Custom dismisses six officers over alleged fraud’ is libellous. 5. An order directing the defendant to reinstate the plaintiff to his position as Deputy Comptroller of Customs (Accounts). 6. An order directing the defendant to release the results of promotion interview conducted for the plaintiff. 7. An order mandating the defendant to pay pensions and gratuity due to the plaintiff from April 1998. 8. The sum of N86,478.00 (Eighty-Six Thousand, Four Hundred and Seventy-Eight Naira) as plaintiff’s salaries and entitlements from 1 December 1996 till 31st December 2006. 9. Interest at the rate of 21% on N86,478.00 (Eighty-Six Thousand, Four Hundred and Seventy-Eight Naira) from 31 March 1998 till the day judgment is given. 10. The sum of N2,000,000.00 (two Million Naira) as general damages against the defendant for its libellous statements against the plaintiff that he was involved in “forgery of bank receipts and fake pay-slips” published in The Guardian on Saturday, December 7, 1996, under the headline ‘Customs dismisses six officers over alleged fraud’. 11. Interest at the rate of 111/2 per annum of the judgment sum from the date judgment is given till the final liquidation of the judgment sum. In reaction, the defendant had filed a preliminary objection as to the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to hear and determine the case on the following grounds – 1. That this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit in that the subject matter is a trade dispute, an industrial matter exclusively covered by the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court as stipulated in section 254C(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration Act) 2010. 2. The action is incompetent in that the defendant as purportedly sued has no legal/juristic personality capable of suing and/or being sued. 3. This suit is statute-barred by virtue of the provision of section 6(1) of the Nigerian Customs Service Board Act Cap. N100 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 4. The suit is incompetent by reason of the plaintiff’s failure to serve a pre-action notice, a mandatory condition precedent to instituting this action as prescribed in section 6(2)(a) – (d) of the Nigerian Customs Service Board Act Cap. N100 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. In support of the preliminary objection is a written address. The claimant reacted to the preliminary objection by filing his counter-affidavit together with the supporting written address. The defendant reacted by filing a reply on points of law. In adopting its written address, the defendant abandoned ground 1 of its preliminary objection given that the matter is now before this Court. In consequence, the issues framed by the defendant for the determination of this Court are – a) Whether this suit is competent vis-à-vis the fact that the defendant as presently sued has no legal/juristic personality. b) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit despite that the same is statute-barred by the express provision of section 6(1) of the Nigerian Customs Service Board Act Cap. N100 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. c) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit in view of the plaintiff’s failure to serve a pre-action notice, a mandatory condition precedent to instituting this action as prescribed by section 6(2)(a) – (d) of the Nigerian Customs Service Board Act Cap. N100 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. Regarding issue a), the defendant referred the Court to the originating processes in this suit. That the name “Nigeria Customs Service” is unknown and unrecognized by any law. Relying on The Administrators/Executors of the Estate of general Sani Anacha (Deceased) v. Samuel David Eke Spiff [2009] 2 – 3 SC (Pt. II) at 124 – 126, the defendant submitted that only legal person are capable of suing and being sued; and the defendant as described and sued in the instant case does not have the attributes of a juristic personality and as such cannot be clothed with any legal rights and obligations. The defendant went on that a non-existent person, which is what the defendant is, cannot be sued; as such the resent suit is not maintainable against the defendant. On issue b), the defendant maintained that this action is statute-barred given section 6(1) of the Nigerian Customs Service Board Act 2004. That going by paragraph 18 of the statement of claim, the cause of action in this suit arose on 7th December 1996 when the defendant caused a publication to be carried out by The Guardian Newspaper stating that the claimant and five others were dismissed following accusation of fraud. That the present writ of summons was/is dated 9th March 2007, approximately 11 years after the dismissal complained of. Section 6(1) of the Nigerian Customs Service Board Act 2004 provides as follows – Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in other law, no action shall be instituted against the Board in respect of any act, neglect, or default done or omitted to be done by any officer, servant or agent of the Board in his capacity as an officer, servant or agent of the Board with regard to the regulations made pursuant to section 9(1)(b) of this Act unless it is commenced within three months next after the act or negligence complained of, or in the case of a continuing damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof. That given this provision when juxtaposed with the date the cause of action in this suit vis-à-vis the date of the writ of summons in the case, one is inevitably confronted with naked reality consequent upon the plaintiff’s obvious delay, to wit: the plaintiff’s case is spent and statute-barred and as such cannot be entertained by this Court, referring to William O. Olagunju & anor v. Power Holding Company of Nigeria Plc [2011] 4 SC (Pt. I) 165 which dealt with section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. That in the instant case, the claimant filed his writ about eleven years after the cause of action arose in contravention of the statutory of section 6(1) of the Nigerian Customs Service Board Act 2004. The defendant accordingly submitted that the plaintiff’s action is not maintainable in law, urging the Court to strike out same. Regarding issue c) i.e. whether this Court has jurisdiction over this case given that the plaintiff did not serve a pre-action notice as enjoined by section 6(2)(a) – (d) of the Nigerian Customs Service Board Act 2004, the defendant submitted that from paragraph 11 of the statement of claim, a creation of a statute is to be guided by the provision of such statute. That one of such statutory provisions relevant in this case is that in respect of pre-action notice, relying on Dominic E. Ntiero v. Nigeria Ports Authority [2008] 5 – 6 SC (Pt. II) at 18. That unfortunately, the plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirement of pre-action notice as enjoined by section 6(2) of the Nigerian Customs Service Board Act 2004, which provides that – No suit shall be commenced against the Board before the expiration of a period of one month of intention to commence the suit shall have been served on the Board by the intending plaintiff or his authorised agent and the notice shall clearly and explicitly state– (a) the cause of action; (b) the particulars of the claim; (c) the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff; and (d) the relief which he claims. To the defendant, each and every one of these requirements is indispensable and must all be clearly and explicitly present for any communication/correspondence to pass as a pre-action notice, citing Dominic E. Ntiero v. Nigeria Ports Authority, which held pre-action notice to be mandatory. The defendant accordingly submitted that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the statutory condition precedent as stipulated in section 6(2)(a) – (d) of the Nigerian Customs Service Board Act 2004 and, therefore, this suit should be struck out. In conclusion, the defendant referred the Court to Attorney-General of Kano v. Attorney-General of the Federation [2007] 3 SC (Pt. I) at 68 and Madukolum & ors v. Nkemdilim & ors [1962] 1 All NLR 587, and then submitted that this suit is incompetent and this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain same. The defendant then urged the Court to strike out the suit in limine as it is trite that jurisdiction is a threshold matter. The claimant in reaction framed two issues for the determination of the Court, namely – 1. Whether the plaintiff’s action against the defendant is statute-barred as to deprive the Court of the jurisdiction to entertain this action. 2. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit in view of the plaintiff’s failure to serve pre-action notice on the defendant. Regarding issue 1, the clamant contended that the general principle of law is that where the law provides for the bringing of an action within a prescribed period in respect of a cause of action accruing to the plaintiff, the proceedings should not be brought after the time provided by statute, referring to Goodwill Co. Ltd v. Calabar Cement Co. Ltd [2010] All FWLR (Pt. 544) 34 and Agbai v. Kabiru [2010] FWLR (Pt. 544) 132. However, that legal principles are not always inflexible. Sometimes they admit of certain exceptions. In the same vein, the law of limitation of action recognizes some exceptions. Thus where there has been a continuance of damage, a fresh cause of action arises from the time, as often as the damage is caused, citing Battishill v. Reed (1856) 18 CS 698 at 714. The claimant went on that the phrase “unless it is commenced within three months next after the act or negligence complained of, or in the case of a continuing damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof” in section 6(1) of the Nigerian Customs Service Board Act 2004 is peculiar to his situation. That in the instant case, the claimant was arraigned before the Miscellaneous Offences Tribunal (MOT) for alleged offence of fraud. The matter was thereafter transferred to the Federal High Court after the abrogation of the MOT. The plaintiff and six officers were discharged and acquitted of all the alleged offence of fraud. The plaintiff then wrote to the defendant via letters dated 13th June 2002 and 13th August 2004 for his reinstatement. That the major question that comes into play is: what was the continuing damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff? To the claimant, the answer seems to be the failure of reinstatement. The injury which is refusal to reinstate the plaintiff is on-going even up to this present year as the plaintiff has not been reinstated, referring to Hassan v. Aliyu [2010] All FWLR (Pt. 539) 10007 at 1015, which held that for the purpose of limitation of action, time begins to run from the moment the cause of action accrues. That in determining whether or not an action is statute-barred, it is pertinent to ask when time begins to run, that time begins to run when there is in existence a person who can be sued and all facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. In the instant case, that all facts have not happened as the plaintiff is yet to be reinstated. That there is still the continuance of the damage and injury which is failure of reinstatement of the plaintiff. On issue 2 i.e. whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit given the plaintiff’s failure to serve a pre-action notice on the defendant, the claimant contended that it is trite law that it is not in all instances where the plaintiff fails to serve pre-action notice on the defendant that the failure to so serve will be fatal to the plaintiff’s case, citing Aro v. Lagos Island LGC [2002] 4 NWLR (Pt. 757) 385 at 421 where Onnoghen, JCA (as he then was) held that pre-action notice does not take away the constitutional right to access the courts from the litigant. It only provides the procedure to be followed when you desire to seek redress in the court. It does not in any way take away the right of access to court in appropriate cases. The claimant went on that he really suffered in the hands of the defendant by being denied his rights and benefits after working for so long in the defendant’s establishment. That his letters were not being responded to and after he was acquitted of the criminal charges, he was not reinstated till date. Also that a letter was written to the defendant in lieu of pre-action notice dated 31st August 2006 by the plaintiff’s counsel. In conclusion, the claimant urged the Court to discountenance the preliminary objection and exercise its discretion in line with the justice of this case so that the case can be tried on its merit. The defendant filed a reply on points of law in reaction to the written submissions of the claimant; but in terming its reaction as reply on points of law, the defendant went on to reproduce the three issues it earlier framed in its written address for the determination of this Court. In doing this, the defendant seized the opportunity, in the name of replying on points of law, to advance fresh arguments that it did not advance in its earlier written address. I shall endeavour in this ruling to discountenance such new arguments. One such argument, for instance, is the argument of the defendant that the claimant gave the erroneous impression that the legal right to institute an action is perpetual. I did not see and so get that impression from the arguments of the claimant. I think the defendant mere conjured that up just so that he can advance fresh arguments in that regard. The thrust of the defendant’s argument is that regarding its issue a), the claimant did not challenge it all and so the Court should resolve that issue in favour of the defendant, citing Institute of Health Ahmadu Bello University Hospital management Board v. Mrs. Jumma R. I. Anyip (citation not supplied). That since section 6(1) of the Nigerian Customs Service Board Act 2004 is specific in providing for institution of actions against “the board” and not “Nigeria Customs Service”, the instant action must fail. On the question whether the instant case is statute-barred, the defendant contended that Battishill v. Reed (1856) 18 CS 696 at 714 cited by the claimant was misconstrued. That in this case, there is the issue of “fresh subsidence” resulting in the working of the mine; but in the instant case, the plaintiff is challenging his dismissal as can be seen in his writ of summons and statement of claim. That it must be noted that there is no continuity of damage in dismissal, which is clearly an act of finality. Even when the claimant asserted that in line 2 of paragraph 4.5 of his written address that “the answer seems to be the failure of reinstatement”, the defendant contended that this only goes to show that there was actually no answer to the question posed by the claimant. On Hassan v, Aliyu [2010] All FWLR (Pt. 539) 1007 cited by the claimant, the defendant asked whether there has always been in existence ‘a person to be sued’ and whether all material facts have happened; and answered in the affirmative given that the claimant had never been at a loss as to who to sue and the cause of action was his dismissal published to his knowledge since 7th December 1996. Approximately 11 years before the date of commencement of this action, citing Adekoya v. FHA [2008] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1099) 539 at 557 which held that in matters of limitation of action, the Court has no discretion whatsoever. On the argument of the claimant failure to reinstate caused his delay in commencing legal action, the defendant cited John Egboigbe v. NNPC [1994] 5 NWLR (Pt. 346) 649 at 653, which held that negotiation does not stop the period of limitation form running. Regarding Aro v. Lagos Island LGC [2002] 4 NWLR (Pt. 757) 385 at 421 cited by the claimant, the defendant referred to Alhaji Kashim Shetima & 23 ors v. Alhaji Mohammed Goni & 6 ors [2011] 10 SC 92 at 99 which held that the provision of section 6(2)(a) – (d) of the Nigerian Customs Service Board Act 2004 is mandatory and not permissive as they admit of no discretion. Also referred to the Court is Bernard Ojeifo Longe v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc [2010] 2 – 3 SC (Pt. III) 61 at 94. That on the authority of Bernard Ojeifo Longe v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc, the defendant is vested with a right to be served with the mandatory pre-action notice as strictly and specifically provided for in section6(2)(a) – (d) of the Nigerian Customs Service Board Act 2004 before the commencement of this suit. In conclusion, the defendant reiterated in urging the Court to dismiss this suit with substantial cost as it is an attempt to overreach the defendant. I heard learned counsel and considered all the processes filed in this matter. In considering the merit of the preliminary objection of the defendant, I must point out that in filing its objection, the defendant did not file any supporting affidavit since it based its objection only on points of law. Surprisingly, however, the claimant in reacting to the objection filed a counter-affidavit. I dare ask: a counter-affidavit to what affidavit? Even looking at the counter-affidavit, except for paragraph 10, all the other paragraphs are essentially repetitive of what has already been pleaded in the statement of claim, which raises the question whether counsel to the claimant actually knows what she is doing. In paragraph 10, the deponent avers that the claimant’s injury is continuous; that the instant preliminary objection is merely a ploy to unduly delay proceedings in this suit; that it is in the interest of justice that the preliminary objection be dismissed; and that none of the reasons adduced for the existence of the statute of limitation avails the respondent. Are the averments in paragraph 10 not offensive to section 115(2) of the Evidence Act 2011, which provides that “an affidavit shall not contain extraneous matter, by way of objection, prayer or legal argument or conclusion”? I think so. Even if the counter-affidavit were to be validly before the Court, the test laid down in AG, Adamawa State & ors v. AG, Federation & ors [2005] 18 NWLR (Pt. 958) 581 at 625 and 657 – 658 is that where depositions in an affidavit offend the basic law, the offending paragraphs of such an affidavit must be struck out. On this score paragraph 10 could not have stood. A second related point is that in considering the issue whether an action is statute-barred, only the originating processes of the claimant can be considered, in the instant case the writ of summons and the statement of claim. So for counsel to the claimant to now be filing a counter-affidavit hoping that the Court would refer to same in determining the issue at hand really raises concerns as to whether counsel to claimant knows what she is doing. As it is, the claimant’s counter-affidavit is incompetent for purposes of this preliminary objection; it will be discountenanced for purposes of this ruling. The case at hand is simply whether this action is competently before this Court in terms of three issues: whether there is a proper defendant; whether the action is statute-barred and whether the action fails for want of pre-action notice on the part of the claimant. To take the first issue i.e. whether there is a proper defendant before the Court, I agree with the defendant that the claimant did not address this issue in his written address. Section 6(1) of the Nigerian Customs Service Board Act 2004 in providing that “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in other law, no action shall be instituted against the Board in respect of any act, neglect, or default done or omitted to be done by any officer, servant or agent of the Board in his capacity as an officer, servant or agent of the Board…”, is pretty clear that the proper defendant in an action such as this is the Board itself. Since the claimant did not sue the Board in the instant case, it is tempting to come to the conclusion, as did the defendant, that the case is thereby incompetent. However, Pfizer Incorporated & anor v, Prof. Idris Mohammed [2013] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1379) 155 held that party incorrectly named can be corrected by an amendment, but not when the mistake is one of identity. The claimant in this case sued “Nigeria Customs Service” instead of “Nigerian Customs Service Board”. To my mind the error here is not one of identity but simply that of an incorrectly spelt name which is correctable by an amendment; and I so find and hold. That being the case, the argument of the defendant in that regards goes to no issue and so is dismissed. As for the second issue i.e. whether this case is statute-barred, only the originating processes of the claimant can be considered. In determining whether an action is statute-barred, Courts are enjoined to determine what the cause of action is, when it arose and when the action was ultimately filed by the claimant. A cause of has been defined as the aggregate of facts giving rise to or upon which an enforceable claim is anchored. It is the fact(s) that establish or give rise to a right of action. Cause of action, therefore, consists of all those things necessary to give a right of action. The things so necessary must have happened and so includes every material thereof that entitles the plaintiff to succeed that the defendant has the right to traverse. See AG, Federation v. AG, Abia State & ors [2001] 11 NWLR (Pt. 725) 689 at 733. What then is the cause of action in the instant case; and when did it arise? By paragraph 18 of the statement of claim, the claimant pleaded his dismissal was published in The Guardian Newspaper of December 7, 1996. This to the defendant is the date the cause of action arose given that the claimant is suing against his dismissal. However, to the claimant, going by paragraphs 7 – 10 of the statement of claim, he was charged to Court in respect of the issues for which he was dismissed. As such, the cause of action could not have arisen earlier than the disposal of the criminal charges against him. The claimant went on to state that when the criminal charge was eventually dismissed on 12 March 2002 he wrote severally to be reinstated but to no avail; as such his cause of action is alive as his damage or injury, failure of reinstatement, is continuing. In terms of the relief prayed for by the claimant, the claimant wants his suspension and/or dismissal declared null and void; he wants his employment to be declared extant up till March 1998 when his retirement should have commenced; he wants his salary for the period 1st December 1996 – 31st March 1998. All of these reliefs put the claimant’s cause of action as accruing in March 1998. However, since he was being charged for fraud and there was no way he would have been paid while the charge subsisted, his cause of action and right to go to court did not arise until the dismissal of the criminal charge on 12th March 2002. It is my finding, therefore, that the cause of action in the instant case did not arise until 12th March 2002. It is the argument of the claimant that he wrote severally to the defendant, and that kept alive his cause of action. I agree with the defendant here that intervening acts do not suspend the running of time for purposes of the limitation law. The claimant did not come to Court until 9th February 2007. This means that the claimant allowed a period of over 4 years to elapse (12th March 2002 to 9th February 2007) before coming to Court. This is way out of the 3 months allowed by section 6(1) of the Nigerian Customs Service Board Act 2004; and I so find and hold. The action is accordingly statute-barred. See Mahmoud Bello & ors v. Nigeria Customs Service Board unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/664/2013 the ruling of which was delivered on September 25, 2014 where this Court applied section 6(1) of the Nigerian Customs Service Board Act 2004 and held the action statute-barred. However, the claimant also argued that his case comes within the “continuing damage or injury” exception of the limitation rule; and that in his case the continuing damage or injury is the refusal to reinstate him to his work. As rightly stated by counsel to the claimant in paragraph 4.5 of the claimant’s written address, the law is that “for the purpose of limitation of action, time begins to run from the moment the cause of action accrues”. Again, the claimant went on to state, rightly so, that “in determining whether or not an action is statute-barred, it is pertinent to ask when time begins to run”; and that “time begins to run when there is in existence a person who can be sued and all facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed”. Now, up to this point, counsel to the claimant was on course in her restatement of the law. What followed after that, however, beats all sense of imagination. I cannot explain the warped reasoning that followed on the part of counsel to the claimant. Hear her in same paragraph 4.5 – In the instant case, that all facts have not happened as the plaintiff is yet to be reinstated. There is still the continuance of the damage and injury which is failure of reinstatement of the plaintiff. If reinstatement is what the claimant needs to be able to sue, and assuming the reinstatement was actually given to the claimant, would there even be the need for the claimant to come to Court in the first place given that by relief 5 the claimant seeks reinstatement? In branding reinstatement as the claimant’s continuing damage or injury, it appears that counsel to the claimant does not even know the meaning of continuing damage or injury as defined by case law. It must be noted that the definition of the phrase “continuance of the injury” by case law authorities means continuance of the “act which caused the injury” and not the injury itself. See Okafor v. AG, Anambra State [2001] FWLR (Pt. 58) 1127 at 1146 D – G relying on the English Court of Appeal case of Carrey v. Bermondsey Metropolitan Bourough Council [1903] 675 P. 447; 20 TLR 2, Amamiwe v. The Local School Board [1971] 2 NMLR 57 at 58, Obiefuna v. Okoye [1961] All NLR 357, AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 144 – 150, Hon. Runyi Kanu (JP) & ors v. The Attorney-General & Commissioner for Justice Cross River State & ors [2013] 32 NLLR (Pt. 91) 63 NIC and Mr. Iyede Onome Festus & anor v. Management Board of Delta State University Teaching Hospital & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/312/2013 the ruling of which was delivered on July 3, 2014. In the instant case, the failure to reinstate cannot be the act which caused the injury, it is the injury itself. As the injury, it cannot justify the application of the “continuing damage or injury” exception of the limitation rule as the counsel to the claimant argues. The argument of counsel to the claimant in that regard has no merit whatsoever and is accordingly dismissed. The third issue on pre-action notice was also advanced by the defendant. I did not see any pre-action notice as part of the originating processes frontloaded in this case; instead what I saw was a letter from a counsel to the claimant threatening that if within 7 days the claimant is not reinstated then they will be seeking judicial redress in Court. Accordingly, the defendant had argued that even if there was any form of communication by the claimant to the intended defendant, such communications or correspondences cannot suffice unless they completely and perfectly fit into the four walls of the pre-action notice specifically provided for in section 6(2)(a) – (d) of the Nigerian Customs Service Board Act 2004. The case of Amadi v. NNPC [2000] FWLR (Pt. 9) 1527; [2000] 5 WRN 47 had dealt with a similar pre-action notice provision i.e. section 11 of the Nigerian National Petroleum Act 1977, where the argument was that the requirements of pre-action notice have not been met and so the appellant should not be given a hearing. His Lordship Uwais, CJN took a swipe at this argument and held that – While issuance of the notice by a prospective plaintiff is mandatory, the particulars to be included in the notice, which are – cause of action, particulars of claim, name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief to be claimed – appear to me to be directory. His Lordship reasoned that the purpose of the pre-action notice is not to put hazards in the way of bringing litigation against a defendant. The pre-action notice in issue was consequently held to be valid. See also Mahmoud Bello & ors v. Nigeria Customs Service Board (supra). Like I indicated, I did not see any pre-action notice in the case file. This means that the mandatory requirement of issuance of pre-action notice was not met by the claimant; and I so find and hold. The argument of the defendant as to whether the particulars are also mandatory goes to no issue especially if it is noted that Amadi v. NNPC held them to be only directory. On the whole, the preliminary objection has merit and succeeds on the grounds that this action is statute-barred and the claimant did not serve any pre-action notice. The instant case is accordingly struck out for want of jurisdiction. Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD