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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE J. D. PETERS DATE: FEBRUARY 19, 2015 SUIT NO: NICN/LA/71/2013 BETWEEN Olapeju Amokeodo - Claimant AND First City Monument Bank Plc - Defendant REPRESENTATION I. O. Ajomo with Albert Imolode for the Claimant. Lanre Ogunlesi SAN with Mrs T. Taiwo for the Defendant. JUDGMENT In his writ of summons filed on 15/2/13, the Claimant approached the Court for the following reliefs - (i) A Declaration that the Claimant was no longer subject to dismissal from the Defendant Bank as from November 6, 2012. (ii) A Declaration that the Claimant was not affected by the dismissal from the Defendant Bank contained in the Defendant’s letter of November 8, 2012. (iii) An Order setting aside and nullifying the Claimant’s dismissal from the Defendant Bank. (iv) An Injunction restraining the Defendant from giving effect to the dismissal from the Defendant Bank contained in the Defendant’s letter of November 8, 2012 by: (without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing). (a) Announcing, circulating, publishing or reporting the dismissal. (b) Taking any steps or omitting to take any steps pertaining to or in connection with the Claimant arising out of or by reason of the dismissal. (v) Special damages for the de-facto dismissal contained in the Defendant’s letter of November 8, 2012 in the sum of N24,545.67 per day from November 10, 2012 until Judgment. (vi) Interest in the Judgment at the rate of 35% per annum until liquidation, pursuant to the provisions of Section 35A of the Supreme Court Act 1981 in England applicable by Order 15 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 or under the Court’s Equitable Jurisdiction. Claimant's writ was accompanied by all requisite processes as dictated by the Rules of this Court. The Defendant filed its statement of defence on 13/5/13. It was dated 10/5/13 and accompanied by Defendant's list of witness, Defendant's witness written deposition on oath, list and copies of documents to be relied on at trial. The facts of this case in brief as deducible from the pleadings filed are that the Claimant was employed by the Defendant Bank on July 11, 2003; he put in his letter of resignation – to take effect immediately – on November 6, 2012, even though, admittedly by his letter of employment he was meant to give one month's notice of disengagement or a month's salary in lieu. Subsequently, by a letter dated November 8, 2012, the Defendant Bank having written a letter rejecting the Claimant’s dismissal, purportedly dismissed the Claimant from its employment, effective November 9, 2012. Aggrieved by the action of the Defendant Bank, the Claimant instituted the suit, seeking declaratory reliefs to the effect that having resigned on November 6, 2012, he was no longer subject to or affected by the Defendant Bank’s dismissal carried out on November 8, 2012. The Claimant also claims Injunctive Relief against the Defendant Bank seeking to stop it from giving effect to the dismissal. Joined with this is a claim for special damages for wrongful dismissal. Prior to his purported dismissal, the Claimant had been invited to a Staff Disciplinary Committee Hearing by intranet mail dated November 5, 2012, to explain his role in Foreign exchange funds transfer at the Idumagbo Branch of the Defendant Bank. Rather than appear before the Committee at the Hearing scheduled for November 7, 2012 the Claimant resigned his appointment a day earlier. The trial of this case commenced on 4/2/14 when Claimant testified as CW1, adopted his written statement on oath dated 15/2/13 as his evidence in chief and tendered 7 documents as exhibits. The documents were admitted as exhibits and marked as Exh. C1 - Exh. C7. Witness urged the Court to grant all his claims. Under cross examination, witness testified that she was in Court because he had resigned from the Bank before he was dismissed; that he was a middle cadre officer with the Defendant; that when he resigned he packed his things and had no intention of returning to work for the Defendant; that when he resigned he did not give a month notice or a month salary in lieu and that he was at his desk on 5/11/12 when he received communications from his colleagues in the Bank through Intranet mail dated 5/11/12 to appear before a Disciplinary Committee. Witness stated further that he did not receive any letter inviting him to appear before Disciplinary Committee on 7/11/12; that he was the Head at Idumagbo branch of the Defendant; that he felt it was not necessary to clear allegations against him by the Defendant and hence decided to leave and that if his letter of resignation had been accepted he would still have claimed his gratuity. The Defendant opened its case on 4/2/14 and called one Emojevwe Eboh as its sole witness. DW1 adopted her witness statement on oath dated 13/5/13 as her evidence in chief and tendered 3 documents as exhibits. The documents were admitted and marked as Exh. D1-Exh. D3. Witness urged the Court to dismiss the claims of the Claimant. Under cross examination, DW1 testified that he was aware the Claimant was sent a letter of dismissal by the Defendant; that paragraphs 1 and 5 of the Claimant Statement of Oath are correct; that Exhibit D3 1-6 was signed the date the document was released; that the adjournment the last time was for the signed document to be presented that she was aware the Defendant Disciplinary Committee met in respect of the Claimant’s case; that the Committee submitted a report and that the Reports are confidential documents of the Defendant Bank. DW1 stated further that she was not present at the Staff Disciplinary Committee hearing; that she read the report of the Committee from the case file; that the Committee was composed of Divisional Heads; that one Micheal Fatunbi was not a member, Bukola Smith was not a member; that the case was not heard by 26/9/12 and that there were charges against the Claimant. Witness added that she was not a member of the Review Panel and that she could only answer questions in relation to the report on the basis of what she read. In reexamination DW1 stated that her understanding of charges in this case is accusation of not doing certain things in compliance with Bank rules. At the close of trial learned Counsel on either side were directed to file their final written addresses in accordance with the Rules of this Court. The final written addresses of Counsel filed were adopted on 2/12/14. In his 14-page final written address dated 9/4/14 and filed on 10/4/14, learned senior Counsel for the Defendant submitted the following three issues for determination - 1. Whether the Claimant's letter of resignation of his appointment Exh. D11 is valid having regard to Exh. C1&2 and Exh. D2 1-7 the Letter of Appointment and the terms in the Staff Policy of First City Monument Bank Plc. 2. If the answer to the question in issue 1 is in the negative whether the Defendant could dismiss the Claimant from its employment for the reasons stated in Exh. C5, the letter of dismissal. 3. Whether the Claimant could contend that he was denied fair hearing before the dismissal despite the receipt of the Intra mail dated 5th November, 2012 Exh. C8 and Letter of rejection of resignation dated November 6, 2012 Exh. D11. In arguing Issue 1, learned senior Counsel for the Defendant submitted that the resolution of this issue will finally determine the contest between the parties. Learned Counsel referred to Exh. C1 which required that either party may determine this contract by giving one month's notice or by effecting a corresponding payment in lieu. Counsel also referred to paragraph 8(b) of Exh. D2 which equally states that ''In the case of a confirmed staff below Senior Manager Grade, the notice period is one month or a similar payment in lieu of notice (unless otherwise stated in the contract of employment). Counsel submitted that the Claimant accepted these terms and hence is bound by them citing Katto v. CBN (1999)6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 390 at 405. According to learned senior Counsel, Claimant's letter of resignation Exh. C4 was with immediate effect and was not in compliance with Exh. D2. Counsel submitted, citing UBN v. Chinyere (2010)10 NWLR (Pt. 1203) 453 at 472 that where the contract of service provides for the procedure to be followed by the parties, that procedure must be followed or else any step taken contrary to the procedure stipulated will be wrongful, irregular, null and void. According to the learned silk, for the resignation of the Claimant to be valid and thus prevent the Defendant from having any disciplinary power over him, the Claimant ought to have simultaneously paid the one month's salary in lieu of notice on the same 6th November, 2012 along with his letter of resignation. Counsel cited Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited v. Francis Johnson Asuah (2001)16 NWLR (Pt. 740) 723 at 750 and Funsho Ologunde v. Carnaud Metal Box Toyo Glass Nigeria Limited Plc (2002)49 WRN 76. He urged the Court to hold that the Claimant has failed to fulfill the requirements in his letter of appointment. The second issue as raised by the Defendant is if the answer to the question raised in issue 1is in the negative, whether the Defendant could dismiss the Claimant from its employment for the reasons stated in Exhibit C5, the letter of dismissal. Learned senior Counsel submitted that following his argument on issue 1, the Defendant has the right and is perfectly in order to dismiss the Claimant for any act of misconduct. Learned Counsel referred to Exh. D2 - Defendant's Human Resources Policy Manual and in particular the Objectives and Policy of Dismissal as contained in it. Counsel pointed out that the Claimant ignored the invitation to Defendant's Disciplinary Committee - Exh. C8 and rather opted to resign with immediate effect. Learned silk cited Amokeodo v. IGP (1999)6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 467 where the Appellant elected to give a valid notice of retirement as opposed to payment of 3 months' salary in lieu of notice and the Supreme Court held that he could be disciplined within the period of his notice of retirement despite the fact that he had tendered notice of retirement. Counsel submitted that the Claimant was dismissed for gross misconduct as contained in Exh. D2 and urged the Court to find and hold that the Defendant could dismiss the Claimant from its employment for the reasons stated in Exh. C5 - the Letter of Dismissal. Issue 3 is whether the Claimant could contend that he was denied a fair hearing before the dismissal despite the receipt of the Intra mail dated 5th November, 2012 Exh. C8 and the Letter of rejection of resignation dated 6th November, 2012, Exh. D11. Arguing this issue, Counsel submitted that this issue did not form part of the Claimant's statement of facts but was raised by the Claimant in his Reply dated 11/11/13. He thus urged the Court to strike out the allegation of denial of fair hearing as same did not arise from the statement of defence. Counsel cited Akinsanya v. Soyemi (1998)8 NWLR (Pt. 560) 49 at 58 & Amoo v. Aderibigbe (1994)2 NWLR (Pt. 324) 92. Counsel argued in the alternative that should the Court consider the issue of fair hearing, that indeed the Claimant was accorded his right to fair hearing. Counsel submitted that the Claimant acknowledged receipt of Exh. C8 by which he was invited to Defendant's Disciplinary Committee; that the Claimant also acknowledged receipt of Exh. C9 which informed the Claimant of the necessity to appear at the Disciplinary Committee meeting and lastly that the Claimant was also served with Exh. D11 - letter of rejection of Claimant' resignation of appointment. Counsel submitted that from the facts as stated the Claimant was not denied his right to fair hearing citing NBA v. Ojoge Daniel (2013)12 NWLR (Pt. 1369) 625 at 631 & First Alstate Sec. Limited v. Adesoye 11 Limited (2013)16 NWLR (Pt. 1381) 470. Finally, learned silk urged the Court to dismiss the claims of the Claimant. The final written address of the Claimant was dated 9/6/14 and filed on the same day. Learned Counsel set down the following issues for determination - 1. Whether the Claimant, having resigned from his employment with immediate effect on 6/11/12, could still be validly dismissed by the Defendant Bank on November 8, 2012 notwithstanding the Defendant bank's rejection of his resignation. 2. Whether the dismissal of the Claimant by the Defendant was wrongful, null, void and of no effect whatsoever having regard to the events leading up to Staff Disciplinary Hearing, the Hearing itself and the decision of the Committee. 3. Whether the motive for the Claimant's resignation and his guilt or otherwise in respect of the allegations against him at the Staff Disciplinary Committee Hearing are material to the efficacy of his resignation. 4. Whether the Claimant has established his claim for special damages. On issue 1, learned Counsel argued that a major question be answered is what are the legal consequences of an employer or employee seeking to terminate a private contract of employment without complying with the stipulations in the underlying contract. Counsel submitted that there are preponderance of authorities which conclusively suggest that such a contract stands terminated leaving the party resisting the termination with a remedy only in damages against the failure of the terminating party to comply with the stipulations in the underlying contract of employment. Counsel cited and relied on Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum (1993)4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512, UBN v. Ogboh (1995)2 NWLR (Pt. 380) 647 at 664, Ilodibia v. NCC (1997)7 NWLR (Pt. 512) 174. According to learned Counsel, the Claimant in the instant case did not comply with his letter of employment by resigning immediately without giving one month's salary in lieu of notice; that his resignation was wrongful but not void and that the contract between the Claimant and the Defendant Bank no longer subsisted but the latter had a remedy in damages which is one month pay in lieu of notice, citing Nigerian Produce Marketing Board Limited v. Adewunmi (1972)1 ANLR (Reprint) 870 at 874. Counsel further submitted that resignation as a matter of law is not amenable to acceptance or rejection and that if the resignation is in accordance with the conditions of employment it is valid with the employer having no choice in the matter, citing Benson v. Onitiri (1960)NSCC 52 at 62. Learned Counsel submitted that the Claimant having resigned from employment with immediate effect on 6/11/12, he could not be validly dismissed by the Defendant on 8/11/12 notwithstanding the Defendant's rejection of his resignation. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. Issue 2 set down is whether the dismissal of the Claimant by the Defendant was wrongful, null, void and of no effect whatsoever having regard to the events leading up to Staff Disciplinary Committee Hearing, the hearing itself and the decision of the Committee. Counsel pointed out that arguments on this issue are in the alternative should the Court find in the unlikely event that the Claimant's employment was still subsisting after his resignation. Counsel submitted that contrary to Defendant's argument, the issue of fair hearing was brought up by the Defendant in its statement of defence. Counsel referred to paragraphs 5 and 8 of the statement of defence and paragraphs 10 and 13 of the Defendant's witness written deposition on oath to support his position. He submitted that these averments raised issue of fair hearing and that it was in reaction to those averments and the intranet mail of 5/11/12 that prompted the paragraph 3 of the Claimant's amended statement of facts and that it was in reaction to those averments that the Claimant brought the issue of fair hearing to the fore in his Reply to the statement of defence. Counsel submitted that the principle of fair hearing was not followed by the Disciplinary Committee set up by the Defendant in this case citing Aiyetan v. NIFOR (1987)3 NWLR (Pt. 59) 48 and stated that the Claimant was merely invited ''to explain your role in the various FX-funds transfer at Idumagbo Branch'' an invitation to which the Claimant was at liberty to honour or decline but rather chose to decline. Counsel submitted that there were no specific allegations or charge against the Claimant requiring him to give an answer to. He urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Claimant. With respect to issue 3, learned Counsel submitted that it has been settled by a long line of authorities that motive is irrelevant in determining the validity of any termination of employment by either the employer or the employee and that termination of employment or resignation from employment may have been done in bad faith but that this circumstance does not affect the validity of the act, relying on Katsina-Alu, JCA (as he then was) in NNPC v. Idoniboye-Obu (1996)1 NWLR (Pt. 427) 655 at 675; Taiwo v. Kingsway Stores (1950)19 NLR 122 and Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum (1993)4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512 at 535. Learned Counsel stated that for whatever reason the Claimant chose to resign, it is irrelevant to the efficacy of his resignation. He urged the Court to hold that the Claimant's motive for resignation and guilt or otherwise on the charges alleged in his letter of dismissal are completely irrelevant and immaterial and do not form issue for determination in this suit. On whether the Claimant has established his claim for special damages, Counsel stated that the Claimant has averred that by reason of his dismissal he has been seriously damaged in his employment prospects because he has been gainfully employed in the Banking industry all his working life and is not suited for any other profession. Secondly that because he has been dismissed for reasons of dishonesty he cannot be re-employed by any Bank in Nigeria by virtue of Section 48(4) of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act. Thirdly, that but for that fact he would have been able to secure an employment in another Bank at a similar or higher position and salary almost instantly but for his de-facto dismissal. Counsel further stated that the Claimant has given his pro rated terminal salary as =N=20,545.67 per day and requests for Special Damages in the sum of =N=20,545.67 per day from 10/11/12 until Judgment at the rate of ''35% per annum until liquidation pursuant to the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007''. Counsel also emphasised the fact that Claimant's averments were unchallenged and un-contradicted and neither was he cross examined on any of the issues pertaining to Special Damages and that by his pleadings and testimony, the Claimant has satisfied the recognised parameters for establishing special damages. Citing A.G. Oyo State v. Fairlakey Hotels (No. 2) (1989)5 NWLR (Pt. 121)255 at 280, learned Counsel submitted that Special Damages could be established by the 'Ipse dixit' of a Claimant. Counsel referred to the cases of Odulaja v. Hada (1973)11 SC 357 at 362 and Boshali v. Allied Commercial Exporters Limited (1961)ANLR Reprint 946 at 950 where the Courts, on the basis of unchallenged and un-contradicted ipse dixit of Plaintiffs, awarded Special Damages. Citing Arabambi v. Advance Beverages Industry Limited (2005)19 NWLR (Pt. 9591) 36, learned Counsel submitted that the fact that the ipse dixit of witness could easily lend itself to documentary corroboration is immaterial. In that case, according to the learned counsel, the Supreme Court said inter alia - ''... Where however, as in this case, a party claiming Special Damages gives evidence to support his claim for a specific amount, which evidence is unchallenged by the other party, the trial Judge would be entitled to accept the evidence as sufficient proof of the claim. This clearly means that the trial Court can validly rely on the ipse dixit of the plaintiff or his witnesses where the evidence is oral and establishes his claim against the defendant in the terms of his writ and the evidence is not rebutted''. Finally, learned Counsel urged the Court to award the Special Damages as sought and grant all the claims of the Claimant. On 12/11/14, the learned senior Counsel to the Defendant filed a Reply on Points of Law to the Claimant's final written address. It was a 3-page address dated 10/11/14. In this Reply, learned silk submitted that from the authorities cited by the Claimant it was abundantly clear that for a termination to be effective, it must be in accordance with the terms of the contract i.e the method agreed by the parties must be followed. According to Counsel, in all the cases the operative word is ''effectiveness of the termination''. Counsel cited Akintunde Eniola; Nigerian Labour Law, 2nd Edition and Dixon v. Stenor (1973) I.R.I.R 28. With respect to issue of fair hearing as canvassed in paragraph 24 of the Claimant's final written address Counsel cited Eze v. Spring Bank Plc (2011)18 NWLR (Pt. 1278)113, Benedict Hirki Joseph v. First Inland Bank Plc (2010) FWLR (Pt. 504) 2009, and Lasisi v. Allied Bank (Nig.) Plc (2002)7 NWLR (Pt. 767) 542 as his response to that. As relates to issue of motive, Counsel submitted that motive for termination of employment may not be relevant but motive for dismissal is. On issue of Special Damages, learned silk submitted that this requires specific proof and that since the Claimant did not prove same it would be a fruitless exercise to cross examine him on it, citing Agunwa v. Onukwe (1962)1 All NLR 537, Renolds v. Rokonoh (2005)10 MJSC 159 and Osuju & Anor. v. Isiocha (1989)6 SC (Pt. 11) 158. Counsel submitted that the Claimant did not tender evidence to show that he applied for a job as a Banker with any Bank and his application rejected because he was dismissed by the Defendant. Counsel thus submitted that the Claimant has not discharged the burden of proof required of him; that it is not for the Defendant to assist the Claimant prove his case and that the Court should dismiss the case of the Claimant. I have read all the processes filed by leaned Counsel on either side of this case and I understand same. I also did listen to the oral testimonies of witnesses called in this case, keenly watched their demeanor, reviewed and evaluated all the exhibits tendered and admitted as well as listened to the oral submissions of learned Counsel. Having done so, I have found some meeting points from and similarities in the diverse issues set down for determination by either side. In the circumstances therefore, I find 2 main issues as germane for the just determination of this case. They are as follows - 1. Whether the Claimant's letter of resignation of his appointment Exh. C4 is valid having regard to Exh. C1&2 and Exh. D2 1-7 the Letter of Appointment and the terms in the Staff Policy of First City Monument Bank Plc. 2. Whether the Claimant is entitled to a grant of any of the reliefs sought. In a Master/Servant relationship or any other of employment relationship for that matter, parties to same are bound by their contract and the terms and conditions as contained in it. Therefore in event of dispute between the parties and the intervention of the Court is sought, the contract document, where there is one, is the sole focus of the Court. See Angel Spinning and Dyeing Limited v. Ajah (2002)13 NWLR (Pt. 686) 532 & Fetuga v. University of Ibadan (2000)13 NWLR (Pt. 683) 118. Now in Master/Servant relationship it is expected that both sides will obey the terms and conditions of their relationship. In much the same vein either side may bring the relationship to an end in accordance with their contractual terms. It is also possible for either NOT to comply with their contractual terms and conditions in bringing the relationship to an end. I dare say that there is indeed nothing special or unheard of in this assertion. For all contractual terms even apart from Master/Servant relationship are meant to be obeyed. Where however a party fails, refuses or neglects to obey same, the other party's remedies are in either damages and/or specific performance. However with respect to Master/Servant relationship the only available remedy is in Damages. The rationale for this being that the Court will not as it cannot foist a willing employee on an unwilling employer and vice versa. See Adebayo Sunday Joseph & Ors v. Kwara State Polytechnic & Ors (2013) LPELR-21388(CA). A Master or Employer may bring existing relationship to an end by terminating the employment of the Servant with or without notice. Where though notice is required but not given, it does not render the termination null and void. But such a termination is wrongful and the Servant's only remedy lies in Damages for wrongful termination the measure of which is the monetary value of the length of notice which ought to be given, SPDC Limited v. Olanrewaju (2008)LPELR-3046(SC) & Organ & Ors. v Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (2013)LPELR-20942 (SC) The Master may also bring the relationship to an end by dismissal of the Servant. No notice is required to dismiss an employee. An Employee whose appointment is terminated or is dismissed cannot reject such step taken by his employer and regard his employment as still subsisting. In much the same vein, it is not open to an employer to reject a letter of resignation by an employee. Indeed, the position of the law is that a notice of resignation takes effect not from the date of the letter or from the date of any purported acceptance but from the date on which the letter was received by the employer, see WAEC v. Oshinebo (2006)12 NWLR (Pt. 994) 258. In other words, once a letter of resignation is tendered by an employee, the employer has no option than to accept same. There is an absolute power inherent in an employee or servant to resign from his employment. There is however no discretion in an employer or master to accept same. The fact of the matter is that resignation is not amenable or subject to rejection. See Adefemi v. Abegunde (2004)15 NWLR (Pt. 895) 1(CA) and Benson v. Onitiri (1960) NSCC 52 at 62. It may be that the termination of the contract of service by the Employee is in breach of contract, the remedy of the Employer is not in specific performance of the contract but rather for damages from breach. The rationale behind this being that the Court will not foist an unwilling employee on a willing employer, see Adebayo Sunday Joseph & Ors. v. Kwara State Polytechnic & ors. (2013) LPELR-21398(CA). In the instant case, the relationship between the parties is one of Master/Servant. The Claimant having tendered Exh. C4 - Resignation of Appointment to the Defendant which was received by the Defendant on 6/11/12 he has successfully and permanently brought the contractual relationship between them to an end. Some of the consequences of Exh. C4 are firstly that from the date that exhibit was received by the Defendant, the Claimant ceased to be an employee of the Defendant; secondly that the Claimant was no longer susceptible to any form of disciplinary control by the Defendant from the date that exhibit was received by the Defendant and thirdly that the letter of dismissal from service by the Defendant to the Claimant - Exh. C5 dated 8/11/12 two days after the Claimant ceased to be a staff of the Defendant is null, void and of no effect whatsoever. It is important to point out that although the Claimant was not obliged to offer reason for terminating his relationship with the Defendant he however stated in paragraph 2 of the said Exh. C4 that his ''... decision was based on health and personal reasons ... ''. Now, the learned Senior Advocate of Nigeria for the Defendant has strenuously canvassed a position that the Claimant was bound to comply with the terms of the contract of service for his letter of resignation to be ''effective''. Learned senior Counsel cited Exh. C1- Offer of Appointment as an Officer and Exh. D2- Defendant's Human Resources Policy Manual. That is not the position of the law on the subject matter. The right to enter and exit a master/servant relationship is a voluntary one. There is also free entry and free exit from same. Even where a party to such a relationship decides not to comply with the terms as agreed upon, no Court will compel compliance or order a specific performance of contract of personal service, See Katto v. CBN (1999)5 SCNJ 1 & Idoniboye-Obu v. NNPC (2003)1 SCNJ 87. Where a termination of contract of employment is not in compliance with the terms and conditions of same, it is wrongful but certainly not null and void. In such circumstances, the remedy available is in damages. I deem it imperative to even examine the portions of the two exhibits referred to by the learned senior Counsel. Counsel quoted from Exh. C1 as follows - ''This appointment is subject to twelve months probationary period, during which either party may determine this contract by giving one month's notice or by a corresponding payment in lieu; At confirmation of appointment, a one (1) month notice of disengagement will apply whilst you will be given an opportunity of joining Staff Pension Fund''. On page 6 of his final written address, learned silk also quoted from Exh D2 as follows - ''Should a staff member voluntarily choose to leave the services of the bank he/she will be required to give written notice to the Bank (as stated n his/her offer letter), or pay a sum equivalent to his/her salary for the same period (i.e payment in lieu of notice). In the case of a confirmed staff below senior Manager Grade, the notice period is one month or a similar payment in lieu of notice (unless otherwise stated in the contract of employment)...''. Even from the quoted portion of Exh. C1 and Exh. D2 there is nothing in them to the effect that the Claimant MUST by fire and by force give a month's notice in writing or pay a month's salary in lieu of same. The operative words used in the exhibits are may and will. Certainly the meanings these words convey are not the same as such words as must and shall. I do not find the old English cases of Beresford v. Royal Insurance Co. Limited (1938) AC 586 at 604 and South Nales Miner's Federation v. Glarmorgan Coal Co. (1905) AC 239 at 253 cited by the learned senior Counsel relevant and of assistance especially in the light of Judgments of the apex Court in Nigeria on the point already cited in this Judgment. I resolve the first issue in favor of the Claimant and hold that notwithstanding Exh. C1 and Exh. D2, Claimant's letter of resignation of appointment - Exh. C4 is valid. The second issue is whether the Claimant is entitled to any or all the reliefs sought. The first relief sought was a declaratory one. Having so resolved issue 1 as above, it is here declare that the Claimant was no longer subject to dismissal from the Defendant Bank as from November 6, 2012 the Claimant having resigned his appointment with the Defendant and ceased to be an employee of the Defendant. Consequent upon this and as a follow up to the earlier declaration, it is further declared that the Claimant was not affected by the dismissal from the Defendant Bank contained in the Defendant’s letter of November 8, 2012, the Claimant having resigned his appointment with the Defendant and ceased to be an employee of the Defendant effective from 6/11/12. Having made these declarations, the Claimant's dismissal from and by the Defendant Bank via the letter of dismissal dated 8/11/12 is here nullified and set aside accordingly. The Claimant also sought an Injunction restraining the Defendant from giving effect to his dismissal from the Defendant Bank contained in the Defendant’s letter of November 8, 2012 by: (without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing). a. Announcing, circulating, publishing or reporting the dismissal; and b. Taking any steps or omitting to take any steps pertaining to or in connection with the Claimant arising out of or by reason of the dismissal. The law is well settled that the essence of granting an order of injunction, as restated by His Lordship Karibi-Whyte JSC in Chief T.A.L. Akapo (Ojora of Lagos) v. Alhaji Hakeem-Habeeb & Ors. (1992) LPELR-325 (SC), is to protect the existing legal right of a person from unlawful invasion by another. Now, in a long line of judicial decisions, the appellate Courts have laid down the guiding principles for the grant of this relief. See for instance Onyesoh v. Nnebedun & Ors. (1992)LPELR-2742 (SC). See also Kotoye v. CBN (1989)1 NWLR (Pt. 98) 419. Having so resolved issue 1 as set down in favour of the Claimant, I find that the Claimant has a legal right to the protection of his name and his person from the negative consequences that are bound to result should the Defendant proceed to give effect to the said letter of dismissal of the Claimant which letter came into effect after the Claimant had ceased to be an employee of the Defendant. I have no evidence before me to the effect that the Defendant had taken the steps for which restraining order of Court is sought. In paragraph 10 of its statement of defence, the Defendant merely averred that it had a duty under Section 48(5) of Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act Cap. B3, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 to give effect to the dismissal. The same averment was repeated in paragraph 13(f) of the same statement of defence. Unfortunately, this point was not addressed at all in the final written address of the Defendant. This Court is thus entitled to hold that the status quo as at 2013 when the Claimant approached the Court remains and that the Defendant is yet to give effect to the said letter of dismissal. Consequently therefore, the Defendant is here restrained by an order of Injunction from giving effect to dismissal of the Claimant from the Defendant Bank as contained in the Defendant’s letter of November 8, 2012 by: (without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing). a. Announcing, circulating, publishing or reporting the dismissal; and b. Taking any steps or omitting to take any steps pertaining to or in connection with the Claimant arising out of or by reason of the dismissal. The Clamant also claimed for Special Damages for his de facto dismissal contained in the Defendant’s letter of November 8, 2012 in the sum of N24,545.67 per day from November 10, 2012 until Judgment. In paragraph 6(f) of his statement of claim, Claimant gave the particulars of special damage he claimed. He made the same claim in paragraph 8(v) of the same pleading. To back up his claim for special damages, Claimant in his witness statement on oath dated 15/2/13 which he adopted as his evidence in chief averred in paragraph 4 as follows - ''On November 6, 2012, I resigned from the Bank with immediate effect. My resignation was effected by a letter dated and received on the same date. As at the date of my resignation my annual salary was =N=7,499,166.67 amounting to =N=20,545.67 daily. This can be seen from the Bank's promotion letter to me dated May 4, 2011''. Exh. C3 is the Defendant's letter dated 4, May 2011 and addressed to the Claimant. The exhibit is headed Promotion. I also find further averments of the Claimant to the effect that but for the 'de-facto dismissal by the Bank he could have easily gotten another job in another Bank at the same level or higher level with similar or better financial remuneration. Learned Counsel to the Claimant has argued that on the basis of the principle of ipse dixit Claimant is entitled to the remedy sought. Now, what is meant by ipse dixit? It means simply unchallenged and un-contradicted evidence. The principle of law, the locus classicuss of which is Boshali v. Allied Commercial Exporters Limited (1961)1 All NLR 912 deals with when a trial Judge can rely on unchallenged and un-contradicted evidence of a claimant for special damages. The facts of that case are both straight forward and interesting. The Appellant in that case claimed, apart from the market value of the goods, the subject of the action, loss of profit at the rate of 6d. per yard. The only evidence adduced at the trial to support such loss of profit came from the Appellant, and he was not cross examined on the basis that this claim was excessive. In an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, their Lordships held, allowing the appeal, that when a party claiming special damages gives evidence to support his claim for specific amount, which evidence is unchallenged or un-contradicted by the other party, the trial Judge would be entitled to accept the evidence as sufficient proof of the claim. The same principle of law was restated, perhaps with more clarity, by Nnaemeka Agu, JSC in Kosile v. Folarin (1989) LPELR-1705 (SC) in the following words ''When the plaintiff pleads the special damage with particularity and gives some evidence of it and the defendant does not challenge or contradict the evidence given, he has discharged, his onus of proof and, unless the evidence is of such a quality that no reasonable tribunal can accept it, it ought to be accepted. This is because where evidence called by the plaintiff in a civil case is neither challenged nor contradicted, his onus of proof is discharged on a minimal of proof'''. In the instant case, the Claimant pleaded that he was entitled to =N=24,545.67 as special damages per day. Apart from his ipse dixit he also tendered Exh. C3 which the Defendant sent to him. Claimant's averments were not challenged or contradicted. Even under cross examination, the issues were left un-attacked. The Claimant having discharged the evidential burden of proof on him, it was up to the Defendant who had the opportunity to challenge the evidence, contradict same and put forward alternative evidence to the one tendered by the Claimant. The Defendant did not take of these steps. Yet the Defendant was bound to lose in the absence of any evidence in rebuttal. The position of the law is in favour of the Claimant in this case. I find and hold that the oral testimonies of the Claimant, his witness deposition on oath and his documentary evidence (Exh. C3) have clearly established his entitlement to special damages as claimed. I thus hold that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of =N=24,545.67 per day from 10/11/12 till the day of this Judgment as Special damages in this case.. Finally, the Claimant also sought interest on the Judgment at the rate of 35% per annum until liquidation, pursuant to the provisions of Section 35A of the Supreme Court Act 1981 in England as applicable by Order 15 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 or under the Court’s Equitable Jurisdiction. Learned Counsel to the Claimant has not told the Court the basis for a claim for 35% interest rate on this Judgment. However, by Order 21 Rule 4, National Industrial Court Rules, 2007, this Court may order an interest at a rate not less than 10% to be paid upon any Judgment. I therefore hold and order that the judgment sum awarded in this case shall attract 10% interest rate per annum from the date of this Judgment. Finally and for the avoidance of doubt from the reasons given in this Judgment i here make the following orders - 1. It is declared that the Claimant was no longer subject to dismissal from the Defendant Bank as from November 6, 2012. 2. It is declared that the Claimant was not affected by the dismissal from the Defendant Bank contained in the Defendant’s letter of November 8, 2012. 3. The Claimant's dismissal from the Defendant is here set aside and nullified 4. The Defendant is retrained by order of injunction from giving effect to the Claimant's dismissal from the Defendant Bank contained in the Defendant’s letter of November 8, 2012 by: (without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing) (a). Announcing, circulating, publishing or reporting the dismissal and (b). taking any steps or omitting to take any steps pertaining to or in connection with the Claimant arising out of or by reason of the dismissal. 5. The Claimant is here awarded Special Damages in the sum of =N=24,545.67 per day for the de-facto dismissal contained in the Defendant’s letter of November 8, 2012 from November 10, 2012 until Judgment. 6. Claimant is awarded post judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of this Judgment until liquidation, pursuant to the provisions of Order 21 Rule 4, National Industrial Court Rules, 2007. All sums due and payable under this Judgment shall be paid within 14days from today. I make no order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. ____________________ Hon. Justice J. D. Peters Presiding Judge