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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE B. B. KANYIP, PHD DATE: FEBRUARY 12, 2015 SUIT NO. NICN/LA/581/2012 BETWEEN Bayo Akinsola - Claimant AND 1. Equitorial Trust Bank Plc 2. Basalt Enterprises Limited - Defendants REPRESENTATION Y. A. Bayero, and with him is F. I. T. Aliyu, for the claimant. Oluwatosin Anuodu, and with him is Miss Iretioluwa Layonu, for the defendants. RULING This is a transferred case from the High Court of Lagos State. The matter had been commenced vide a writ of summons dated 22nd July 2011 but sealed on 25th July 2011. By the writ of summons and the statement of claim, the claimant is praying for the following reliefs – (a) Against the 1st defendant i. An order of the Honourable Court directing the 1st defendant to cause a letter of apology, to be written to the claimant, for wrongful, false and malicious prosecution and imprisonment and the letter of which the 1st defendant should cause to be also published on a full page in daily editions of both the Nation and ThisDay Newspapers; and ii. The sum of N500,000.000.00 (Five Hundred Million Naira) in general and aggravated damages (b) Against the 2nd defendant i. An order of the Honourable Court directing the 2nd defendant to cause a letter of apology to be separately written to the claimant, for wrongful, false and malicious prosecution and imprisonment, and the letter of which the 2nd defendant should cause to be also published on a full page in a Daily Edition of the Guardian Newspaper; and ii. The sum of N100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) in general and aggravated damages. (c) Against the Defendants jointly and severally 1. A declaration of this Honourable Court that the claimant is still in the employment of the defendants. 2. An order of this Honourable Court directing the defendants to allow the claimant resume back to his duty post. 3. An order of this Honourable Court directing the defendants to pay to the claimants all the accrued salaries and allowances due to him from the month of April 2005 to date. 4. The cost of this action; and 5. Any further or other reliefs that the Court may deem fit to make in the claimant’s favour in the circumstance. At this Court’s sitting of 25th June 2013, this Court had noted that claims (a) and (b) in the claimant’s complaint and statement of claim hinged on false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, heads of liability that this Court has no jurisdiction over. Despite this, the defendants proceeded to file a preliminary objection pursuant to section 8(1)(a) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State 2003 and under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. By the preliminary objection, the defendants are praying for the following orders – 1. An order of this Court dismissing the claimant/respondent’s suit. 2. And for such further order or other orders as this Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The ground for the preliminary objection is that the claimant/respondent’s suit is statute-barred by virtue of the Limitation Law of Lagos State of Nigeria, 2003. In support of the preliminary objection is a written address. DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS To the defendants, though this case was transferred to this Court on 24th September 2012, even before the said transfer, the claimant/respondent’s action was already statute-barred. The defendants then framed one issue for the determination of the Court, namely: in the light of the statements of facts as contained in the claimant/respondent’s writ of summons and statement of claim both dated 22nd July 2011, whether this action is not statute-barred considering the time when the cause of action arose and/or accrued to the claimant/respondent. The defendants submitted that it is the law that whenever the jurisdiction of the Court is challenged, the Courts are enjoined to only look at writ of summons and/or the statement of claim filed by the claimant/plaintiff as the case maybe and not the statement of defence, referring to Elabanjo v. Dawodu [2006] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001) 76, Omnia Nigeria Limited v. Dyktrade Limited [2007] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1058) 576, Ndaba Nigeria Limited v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc & ors [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1158) 256 at 304 – 305 and Egbe v. Adefarasin [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 3) 549. The defendants then invited the Court to look at the writ of summons and statement of claim in this case in determining whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claimant/respondent’s case or not. It is further submission of the defendants that once the issue of jurisdiction is raised, the trial Court must settle or decide that issue so raised one way or the other before proceeding or delving into the substantive matter, referring to LLSPLA Ltd v. MIT Tuma [2011] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1271) 612, Nospecto Oil & Gas Ltd v. Olorunnimbe [2012] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1307) 115 and Ndaba Nigeria Limited v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc & ors (supra) at 299. That jurisdiction is very fundamental. It is the live wire of a case which should be determined at the earliest opportunity. If a Court has no jurisdiction to determine a case, the proceedings remain a nullity ab initio no matter how well conducted and decided. This is so since a defect in competence is not only intrinsic but extrinsic to the entire process, referring to NURTW v. RTEAN [2012] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1307) 170 and Seagull Oil Ltd v. Moni Pulo Ltd [2011] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1271) 525. The defendants proceeded to ask: if it is agreed as settled law that there must be a wrong done by one party to the other party before an action can be brought or commenced, then, which processes are the Courts enjoined to look at to determine when the cause of action accrued? In answer, the defendants submitted that Dr. Oladeinde Williams v. Olaitan Williams [2008] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 364 at 383 held that it is looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim that would disclose when the wrong was committed; which gave the claimant a cause of action against the other party. Also referred to are Min., FCT v. MH (Nig.) Ltd [2011] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1252) 272 and Gbadehan v. Kiladejo [2012] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1326) 392 at 413. As for what a cause of is, that CRU Tech v. Obetan [2011] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1271) 588 at 607 defined it as “... factual situation stated by the plaintiff, which if substantiated entitles him to a remedy against the defendant”, referring also to Mrs. O. Adekoya v. Federal Housing Authority [2008] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1099) 539, Peacegate Oil & Gas Ltd v. Hydrive (Nig.) Ltd [2012] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 391 and Ebo v. Anadi [2012] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1301) 69. The defendants then referred to paragraphs 17 and 25, which respectively provide as follows – 17. The claimant avers that thereafter he was placed on an indefinite suspension by the 1st defendant, without any payment of salary and with strict instructions to report to the Chief Inspector at the Head Office of the 1st defendant on daily basis. 25. The claimant further avers that while in detention, at the instigation of the defendants, the 1st defendant maliciously and without any reasonable cause, caused a letter dated 25/05/2005 to be written to him (claimant) placing him on indefinite suspension from his appointment. The claimant hereby plead the aforesaid letter of the 1 defendant dated 25/05/2005. To the defendants, going by the above quoted paragraphs which are the relevant excerpts from the pleadings of the claimant/respondent in its statement of claim and reliefs (a), (b) and (c) (which is now before the Court) there is no doubt that the purported claim of the claimant/respondent is for an alleged wrongful suspension of its appointment by the defendants/applicants on 25th May 2005 vide the 2nd defendant/applicant’s letter of suspension dated 25th May 2005 on the claimant/respondent. That it is trite that parties are bound by their pleadings and evidence cannot be led outside of it, citing Isheno v. Julius Berger [2008] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1084) 582 at 602. Consequently, it is clear that the cause of action arose/accrued on 10th June 2005 when the claimant/respondent received the 2nd defendant/applicant’s letter of suspension dated 25th May 2005 and same was admitted by the claimant/respondent as stated in paragraphs 17 and 25 of his statement of claim. It is on this premise that the defendants submitted that since the cause of action had accrued to the claimant/respondent on 10th June 2005, time to seek legal remedy against the defendants/applicants started to run from 10th June 2005. To the defendants, having submitted and in inviting this Court to determine that the nature of the claimant/respondent’s claims is rooted and founded on simple contract (of employment) the next question is to determine the relevant limitation period under the applicable law. That a contract which states the terms and conditions of employment between an employer and an employee and which need not be contract of record or contract made by deed is said to be a simple contract. However, subject to the contract of employment that existed between the claimant/respondent and the defendants/applicants vide the 2nd defendant/applicant’s letter of employment dated 19th February 1998, it is evident that the claimant/respondent was duly employed as an additional staff to render its services to the 1st defendant/applicant at its branch at Kano, Kano State and Kaduna, Kaduna State respectively. The defendants went on that it is trite that actions founded on simple contract under the Limitation Laws are commenced on the date on which the cause of action arose/accrued and not when the damage was suffered. Actions founded on simple contract must be commenced before the expiration of six (6) years from the date on which the cause of action arose/accrued; and when not commenced within the specified period after the cause of action accrued, the action becomes incompetent, referring to section 8(1)(a) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State of Nigeria 2003 and Egbe v. Adefarasin (supra) and Mrs. O. Adekoya v. Federal Housing Authority (supra). That it is the lawmaker’s intention that a party can only bring an action against the other party within six years after a cause of action might have accrued. The defendants continued that since the cause of action arose on 10th June 2005 and this suit commenced on 25th July 2011 when the originating processes were initially filed at the High Court of Lagos State before the said suit was transferred on 24th September 2012 to this Court, it means that this action was commenced outside the six (6) years allowed by law. That the action is accordingly statute-barred and so the claimant cannot come to Court, referring to Olora v. Adegbite [2013] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1334) 40 at 57, Ebo v. Anadi (supra), Aboyeji v. Lateju [2012] NWLR (Pt. 1288) 434 and NDIC v. Governing Council, ITF [2012] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1305) 252. It is the submission of the defendants that once the time has lapsed, sympathy cannot revive same, citing Abubakar v. Yar’Adua [2008] 19 NWLR (Pt. 1120) 1 at 151, Agbi v. Ogbeh [2006] 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 65 and Osakue v. Federal College of Education, Asaba [2010] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1201) 1. In any event, that the operation of the limitation law is one of strict liability, citing West African Portland Cement Plc v. Alhaja Muyinat Adeyeri [2003] 12 NWLR (Pt. 835) 517 at 535 – 536, ACB Plc v. NTS (Nig) Ltd (2007) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1016) 596 and Sulgrave Holdings Inc. v. FGN (citation not supplied). In other words, that a plaintiff may have a cause of action but lose the right to enforce that cause of action by judicial process where the time laid down by the limitation law for initiating such action has elapsed. That the claimant/respondent only has a bare and empty cause of action, which it cannot enforce, referring to Awokunle v. NEPA [2007] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1057) 340 and SPDCN Ltd v. Amadi [2010] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1210) 82. In conclusion, the defendants urged the Court to dismiss the claimant/respondent’s case accordingly for being statute-barred. CLAIMANT’S SUBMISSIONS The claimant in reaction framed one issue for the determination of the Court, namely – Whether, this suit is of such nature that this Honourable Court ought to entertain having regards to the circumstances of the claims and reliefs of the claimant in this suit before this Honourable Court. To the claimant, this suit as presently constituted is within the jurisdiction of this Court. That the first issue to be considered by our courts is the determination of jurisdiction at this stage, and this is to be discovered from the writ of summons and the statement of claim, referring to Chief Edjerode & ors v. Chief Ohwovwiogor & ors [2002] 2 MJSC 163 at 192, Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1976] ANLR 326 and Joshua B. Famidoh & anor v. Dominic E. Aboro & anor [1991) 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 210 and Aghaisi v. Ebikore [1997] 4 NWLR (Pt. 502) 603. That it is the writ of summons and statement of claim, not the statement of defence that the Court should look at, citing Chief Aliu Abu & ors v. Chief Abubakar Zibiri Odugbo [2001] 7 MJSC 87 at 126. The claimant then referred the Court to paragraphs 25 and 27 of the statement of claim. They provide as follows – 25. The claimant further avers that while in detention, at the instigation of the defendants, the 1st defendant maliciously and without any reasonable cause, caused a letter dated 25/05/2005 to be written to him (claimant) placing him on indefinite suspension from his appointment. 27. The claimant avers that consequent upon his detentions, instigated by the defendants, on the 17th day of February, 2006, the defendants maliciously and without any reasonable or probable cause, caused him (claimant) to be arraigned on a 2 count charge before the Chief Magistrate’s Court, Igbosere, Lagos State along with five other persons in Charge Number B/12/2006 and the claimant to be further remanded in prison. That he became free from Charge Number B/12/2006 on the 5th February 2007. This fact was contained at paragraph 28 of the statement of claim. The claimant submitted, therefore, that the appropriate date from which the claimant can pursue any legal rights became effective from 5th February 2007, the date the charge brought against him and 5 others was struck out by the Chief Magistrate’s Court, Ighosere, Lagos State and not on the 25/05/2005 when the defendant served him with letter of suspension, while in detention. Furthermore, that from the above averments of the claimant, it was evident that the claimant was detained and prosecuted at the instigation and instance of the defendants. That this “being the fact, it does therefore lay in the defendants’ mouth to argue as to the date upon which the cause of action of the claimant arose in this suit”. The claimant urged the Court not to allow the defendants to approbate and reprobate at the same time, citing Obasi Brother Company Limited v. Merchant Bank of Africa Securities Limited (citation not supplied) and Ude v. Nwoea [1993] 2 NWLR (Pt. 278) 638 at 662. That it is with the aim of preventing the occurrence of the issue of approbating and reprobating that the legislature in drafting the Limitation Law provided for sections 70, 7 and 34(c)(i) and (ii) of the Law. Section 70 of the Law provides – For the purpose of this Law, a cause of action to recover, in respect of the liability of a tortfeasor under paragraph (c) of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Law Report (Torts) Law, shall be deemed to accrue on the date on which judgment was obtained by the injured person against the tortfeasor. And section 7 provides as follows – This part of the Law shall have effect subject to the provisions of Part 3 (which provides for the extension of the periods of limitation in the case of disability, acknowledgement part payment, fraud and mistake) of the Law. Section 34(c)(i) and (ii) of the Law provides that – (i) In the case of an action for accounts to be construed as reference to the date on which the matter arose in respect of which an account is claimed. (ii) In the case of an action on a judgment to be construed as reference to the date on which the judgment became enforceable. That the issues involved in all these sections of the Law now require a broader approach of interpretation. The claimant then invited then Court to construe the entire Limitation Law as a guide to arriving at the true intents of the Law, as opposed to the isolated interpretation of section 8 as canvassed by the defendants/applicants, citing Opeola & ors v. Opadiran & anor [1994] 5 NWLR (Pt. 344) 368, Uwaifo v. Attorney-General [1982] 7 SC 124 at 185; [1983] 4 NCLR, Martin Schroder & Co. v Major & Co. (Nig.) Ltd [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt. 101) 1 at 12 and V. A. Adewunmi & ors v. The Attorney-General of Ekiti State [2002] 2 MJSC 1 at 30 on rules of interpretation of documents and statutes. To the claimant, section 7 of the Law which provides extension of the period of limitation for disability amongst others is a reference point in accommodating whatever delay, if any, on the part of the claimant. That the disability here was the detention and prosecution of the claimant at the instigation of the defendants/applicants as at the date the suspension letter was served on him while in detention, at the instigation of the defendants. These acts are contained in paragraphs 25 and 27 of the statement of claim. The claimant then urged the Court to hold that it is not practicable for the claimant to institute this action from detention and/or while under criminal prosecution. The claimant submitted further that section 70 of the Law specifically made the date of any judgment the determinant date of the accrual of right of action for liability with respect to an injured person. That this is action is to seek redress against the injuries sustained by the claimant. Consequently, that taking into consideration the facts of this case and the provisions of the above sections of the Limitation Law, the date in which the cause of action accrued in this suit ought to be 5th February 2007, urging the Court to hold that 5th February 2007, the date on which the Chief Magistrate’s Court of Lagos State struck out Charge B/12/2006, was the date of the accrual of right of action for liability, with respect to this suit. The claimant then urged the Court to resolve the sole issue raised herein in his favour and to hold that the defendants cannot now turn around and take benefit from the supposed delay occasioning the institution of this action by the claimant. Furthermore, that the grant of defendants’ notice of preliminary objection will constitute a denial of fair hearing to the claimant. That any law which deprives a party of fair hearing contrary to the provisions of the Constitution is void to that extent, citing Nongo v. Aku & ors [1983] 11 SC 129 at 153. That it is a trite law that whether there is evidence of arrest and detention of an applicant, which were done or instigated by the respondent in an action for the enforcement of fundamental rights application, it is for the defendant to show that the arrest and detention were lawful, citing Fajemirokun v. C. B. Nig. Ltd [2002] 10 NWLR (Pt. 774) 95 and Onagoruwa v. IGP [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt. 195) 593. That this position of the law though was on the enforcement of fundamental rights, is equally applicable to the present situation, in that the defendants/applicants, at the chief Magistrate’s Court, failed to justify the several arrests and prolonged detentions and prosecution of the claimant, resulting in the discharge and acquittal of the claimant, urging the Court to resolve the sole issue in favour of the claimant, as to prevent the denial of fair hearing to the claimant. In conclusion, the claimant urged the Court to hold that the parties and subject matter of this suit are within the jurisdiction of the Court. DEFENDANTS/APPLICANTS’ REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW Regarding the claimant’s argument that this suit as presently constituted is within the jurisdiction of this Court, the defendants submitted that it has been held in plethora of cases that jurisdiction is the pillar upon which the case before the Court stands, citing APGA v. Anyanwu [2014] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1407) 541 at 582, Elelu-Habeeb v. A-G., Fed. [2012] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1318) 423 at 542 – 543, African Petroleum Plc v. Akinnawo [2012] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1289) 100 and PDP v. Okorocha [2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1323) 205 at 256. To the defendants, section 254C(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 are the statutes created to vest this Court with the exclusive jurisdiction only on civil matters with respect to labour matters and not on criminal matters. That in African Petroleum Plc v. Akinnawo [2012] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1289) l00 at 116, the Court held that – By virtue of section 7(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 the Court (National Industrial Court) shall have and exercise exclusive jurisdiction in civil cases and matters relating to labour, including trade unions and industrial relations and environment and conditions of work, health, safety and welfare of labour, and matters incidental thereto. Also referred is NUT, Niger State v. COSST, Niger State [2012] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1307) 89. The defendants went on that taking into consideration the foregoing submissions, the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court which is fundamental to the just determination of this suit is limited to be exercised only on relief (c) of the claimant/respondent’s writ of summons and statement of claim whose cause of action is rooted and founded on simple contract and not on criminal matters as alleged by the learned counsel to the claimant/respondent, urging the Court to so hold. The defendants submitted further that the claimant/respondent cannot confer jurisdiction on this Court which this Court does not have as stipulated in section 254C(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and section 7(1) of the NIC Act 2006, urging the Court to so hold and referring to PDP v. Okorocha (supra) at 258, Elelu-Habeeb v. A-G., Fed. (supra) and African Newspapers of Nigeria Ltd v. Federal Republic of Nigeria [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 6) 137. On the claimant’s submission regarding sections 70, 7 and 34(c)(i) and (ii) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State 2003 that this Court can extend the period of limitation of this suit, the defendants contended that taking into consideration the provision of section 7 of the Limitation Law of Lagos State of Nigeria 2003, there is no averment in the claimant/respondent’s statement of claim alleging the fact that the claimant/respondent was at any point a person of unsound mind or an infant or a criminal lunatic as stipulated under section 35 of the Limitation Law of Lagos State of Nigeria 2003 which provides that (l) For the purpose of this Law, a person shall be under a disability while he is an infant, or of unsound mind. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section but without prejudice to the generality thereof, a person shall be conclusively assumed to be of unsound mind while he is detained in pursuance of any enactment authorizing the detention of persons of unsound mind or criminal lunatics. It is, therefore, the submission of the defendants that the learned counsel’s contention with respect to section 7 of the Limitation Law of Lagos State of Nigeria 2003 does not in any way apply to the claimant/respondent as the claimant/respondent did not fall under the categories of persons disabled as provided under section 35 of the Limitation Law of Lagos State of Nigeria 2003. The defendants submitted further that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation of the claimant/respondent’s cause of action which accrued/arose on 10th June 2005 when the claimant/respondent received the 2nd defendant/applicant’s letter of suspension dated 25th May 2005 as the claimant/respondent’s case is not that of disability as provided under sections 7, 35 and 36 of the Limitation Law of Lagos State of Nigeria 2003, urging the Court to so hold. With reference to the learned counsel’s contention on sections 70 and 34(c)(i) and (ii) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State of Nigeria 2003, the defendants submitted that the cause of action in the suit against the claimant/respondent and 5 (five) other persons at the Chief Magistrate Court in Charge No: B/12/2006 between the Commissioner of Police v. Bayo Akinsola & 5 ors was not that of an action to recover against the defendants/applicants but the cause of action which was criminal in nature was as a result of the claimant/respondent’s involvement along with 7 (seven) other ex-staff of the 1st defendant/applicant in relation to a fraud in the sum of N11,900,000.00 (Eleven Million, Nine Hundred Thousand Naira) only at the 1st defendant/applicant’s branch in Kano, Kano State. The defendants then submitted that the decision of the Magistrate 5th February 2007 in the claimant/respondent’s case at the lower Court was not a judgment but an order striking out the suit in Charge No: B/12/2006 for want of diligent prosecution on the part of the prosecution. The defendants continued that it is trite that when the provision of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court should give the statute its ordinary and natural meaning, citing PDP v. Okorocha (supra) 256 – 257, Abubakar v. Nasamu (No. 1) [2012] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1330) 407 and Shell Pet. Dev. Co. (Nig.) Ltd v. FBIR [1996] 8 NWLR (Pt. 466) 256. It is the submission of the defendants that the provision of section 8(1)(a) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State of Nigeria 2003, which is the law applicable to the instant case, is clear and ambiguous and this Court is not vested with the jurisdiction to import into the meaning thereof, urging the Court to so hold. The defendants submitted further that this action instituted by the claimant/respondent outside the prescribed period as provided under section 8(1)(a) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State of Nigeria 2003 was ill-tuned as same is clearly statute-barred and the right to institute this action within the time statutorily authorised had lapsed, referring to paragraph 5.5 of the defendants/applicants’ notice of preliminary objection. In conclusion, and as a summary of their submissions, the defendants – 1. urged the Court to discountenance the submissions of the claimant/respondent and hold that the claimant/respondent cannot confer jurisdiction on this Court contrary to section 254C(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and section 7(1) of the NIC Act 2006. 2. submitted that the claimant/respondent is not a disabled person to fall within the provisions of sections 7 and 35 of the Limitation Law of Lagos State of Nigeria 2003 and also that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation of the instant case in favour of the claimant/respondent as provided under section 36 of the Limitation Law of Lagos State of Nigeria 2003. 3. Submitted further that the claimant/respondent’s cause of action particularly with reference to relief © which this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over is founded on simple contract and not on a cause of action to recover and/or judgment as there was no judgment given by the Chief Magistrate Court but only an order for striking out. COURT’S DECISION I heard learned counsel and considered all the processes filed in this matter. The issue before the Court is whether this action is statute-barred. In the determination of this issue, only the originating processes of the claimant can be used; and here the key questions are: what is the cause of action in this suit and when did it arise? Once the answers are known, then the date the cause of action arose will be compared with the date the action was filed in Court. If the period exceeds that allowed by the limitation laws, then the matter can be held to be statute-barred. From the records, as I indicated at the start of this ruling, the case is a transferred case from the High Court of Lagos State. When it was filed at the High Court of Lagos State, it was sealed as such on 25th July 2011. This means that the action was filed on 25th July 2011; and I so find and hold. The next issue is determining what the cause of action is and when it arose. Once again, only the originating processes can be used in answering these questions. But first, what is cause of action? Cause of action is said to be the aggregate of facts giving rise to or upon which an enforceable claim is anchored. It is the fact(s) that establish or give rise to a right of action. Cause of action, therefore, consists of all those things necessary to give a right of action. The things so necessary must have happened and so includes every material thereof that entitles the plaintiff to succeed that the defendant has the right to traverse. See AG, Federation v. AG, Abia State & ors [2001] 11 NWLR (Pt. 725) 689 at 733. Accordingly, cause of action is said to have arisen when all that is required to go to Court by the claimant is in place and for which the claimant is thereby entitled in terms of the right to come to Court. The claimant in the instant case has three sets of claims but which fall into two broad heads: the claims in tort for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution; and the claims in employment law for salaries and allowances as well as the claim for orders to resume work as employee of the defendants. Now the case of the defendants is that when the claimant was suspended from office vide the letter of 25th May 2005 but which was received on 10th June 2005, his cause of action as regards this case thereby arose and for which having to file this action on 25th July 2011 means that the claimant is out of time thus making the case statute-barred. In reply, the claimant contended that at the time he was suspended and served the letter of indefinite suspension, he was in detention and answering to criminal charges in Court (see paragraphs 25 – 27 of the statement of claim) which charges were however struck out on 5th February 2007 (see paragraph 28 of the statement of claim). In other words, until the charges were struck out on 5th February 2007, the claimant was not in a position to go to Court. I agree with this submission of the claimant. The claimant could not have come to Court while criminal charges were still being pressed against him in respect of matters for which he was placed on indefinite suspension. The claimant’s right of action could not have arisen while the action at the Chief Magistrate Court lasted; and so it cannot be said that the claimant had any actionable cause of action. The claimant’s cause of action and hence right of action arose on 5th February 2007, when the charges against him were struck out. The defendants sought to make the distinction between a judgment and an order arguing that what the claimant had was not a judgment but an order. I do not think that the defendants’ counsel is serious here. A key requirement for a successful plea of malicious prosecution is that the prosecution ended in favour of the claimant; and favourable termination of prosecution has severally been held to be any verdict other than a conviction, and includes a discharge even on technical grounds. There is an issue however, which is what exactly the main claims of the claimant are. A look at the main claims of the claimant shows that claims (a) and (b) are hinged on false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. These are heads of liability that ordinarily do not fall within the jurisdictional mandate of this Court. It is only claim (c) that falls within the jurisdiction of this Court. Claim (c) consists of the reliefs for salaries and allowances, and for orders to resume work as employee of the defendants. The problem here is that throughout the statement of claim, the main complaint of the claimant relates to his detention, harassment in detention, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution of the claimant. See paragraphs 14 – 16, 19, 21 – 25, 27 – 29, 34 and 35 of the statement of claim. Paragraphs 34 and 35, which are the concluding paragraphs before the actual claims of the claimant are listed out state as follows – 34. By reason of the matters aforesaid, the claimant was wrongly imprisoned and deprived of his cherished liberty and he was greatly injured in his credit, character and reputation, and he suffered considerable mental and bodily pains and anguish, and he has been greatly injured in his reputation by the defendants and he has thereby suffered loss and damage. 35. In the premises, the claimant was wrongly, falsely and maliciously prosecuted, imprisoned and deprived of his liberty by the defendants and the defendants are therefore jointly and severally liable to the claimants in respect thereof. The claimant then proceeded to make his claims (a), (b) and (c) the first two which seek for written apology and damages for wrongful, false and malicious prosecution as well as false imprisonment. What all of this shows is that the main claims of the claimant are for the false imprisonment and malicious prosecution of the claimant by the defendants, not necessarily the suspension from work of the claimant. This latter claim is merely the icing on the cake. It is my finding and holding, therefore, that the main claims of the claimant are the claims for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, not the employment claims for salaries and resumption of work. This being the case, does this Court have jurisdiction over this case? Since this is a transferred matter from the High Court of Lagos State, I cannot rule on this question as doing so would mean sitting on appeal over the transfer order of the High Court of Lagos State. Section 24(5) of the NIC Act 2006, which provides that “where the court to which any cause or matter has been transferred, pursuant to subsection (2) or (3) of this section, is of the opinion that the cause or matter ought in law to be dealt with by the court which transferred the cause or matter, the first mentioned court shall, after hearing counsel on behalf of the parties, state a case on a point of law for the opinion of the Court of Appeal” enjoins that only the Court of Appeal on a case stated can make any ruling as to whether it is this Court or the High Court of Lagos State that has jurisdiction over this case; even at that, the parties are to first address this Court on whether or not the case stated should be made to the Court of Appeal. I must point out here that Comrade Joseph Faniwunmi & ors v. National Union of Chemical Footwear, Rubber, Leather and Non-Metallic Product Employee & ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/431/2013 the ruling of which was delivered on April 29, 2014, a case of malicious prosecution, was transferred to this Court by the High Court of Ogun State sitting at Ota. It is at the moment before the Court of Appeal on a case stated for the opinion of the Court of Appeal as to whether it is this Court or the High Court of Ogun State that has jurisdiction over the matter. On the whole, and in the circumstances of this case, therefore, it is my order that parties are to address this Court on the necessity of stating a case on a point of law for the opinion of the Court of Appeal as to whether it is this Court or the High Court of Lagos State that has jurisdiction over the instant case. Parties are to accordingly file and serve their written addresses starting with the claimant. Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD