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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE B. B. KANYIP DATE: FEBRUARY 2, 2014 SUIT NO. NICN/LA/285/2014 BETWEEN Association of Food, Beverage and tobacco Employers (AFBTE) - Applicant AND Food, Beverage and Tobacco Senior Staff Association (FOBTOB) - Respondent REPRESENTATION Kehinde and Fagbemi and Dayo Akinlemibola, for the applicant. Ayo A. Adebosin, for the respondent. JUDGMENT The applicant took up an originating summons against the respondent dated 2nd June 2014 but filed on 24th June 2014. The originating summons was brought pursuant to section 254C(1)(j) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, section 4 of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. T8 LFN 2004, Order 15 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. By the originating summons, the applicant claims – 1. Whether or not the Procedural Agreement made the 8th day of February, 1980 between the Association of Food, Beverage and Tobacco Employers (AFBTE) and the Food, Beverage and Tobacco Senior Staff Association (FOBTOB) is the valid and subsisting agreement that regulates the affairs relating to the terms and conditions of employment of their respective members. 2. Whether or not by virtue of the Procedural Agreement, members of the Food, Beverage and Tobacco Senior Staff Association (FOBTOB) are bound by the provisions of the Memorandum of Agreement and whether they can resort to any type of industrial action without first and foremost exhausting the internal mechanism for the resolution of any dispute arising from the Memorandum of Agreement. If the above is answered in the affirmative, the following questions arise for determination – a) Whether the members of the Food, Beverage and Tobacco Senior Staff Association of Nigerian Bottling Company Limited Branch can validly embark on any industrial action/strike without recourse to the provision of Article 7(ix) of the Procedural Agreement. b) Whether the FOBTOB members’ action of embarking on the said industrial action, which held for 4 days, is not in contravention of the Memorandum of Agreement reached by the respective parties. c) Whether, going by Article 10 the Memorandum of Agreement which states that no form of unauthorized action shall take place on any matter until such constitutional methods including the machinery of the National Joint Industrial Council hereinafter referred to as the Council, had been exhausted. d) Whether FOBTOB satisfied the machinery for resolution of conflicts as agreed in the Memorandum of Agreement which states that the Council must sit and look at issues before they can embark on any industrial action. e) Whether the refusal of FOBTOB to call off the industrial action in Nigerian Bottling Company Limited despite the emergency NJIC meeting called to that effect on the 16th of August 2013 is a complete violation of the Procedural Agreement which they signed with AFBTE. Accompanying the originating summons is a 17-paragrpahed affidavit in support with Exhibits AA001 – AA005 attached and a written address. In reaction, the respondent filed its counter-affidavit of 4 paragraphs with Exhibits KA1 – KA4 as well as the written address. The applicant did not file a reply on points of law. The case of the applicant is that it seeks the determination and interpretation of Article 7(ix) of the Procedural Agreement of members of AFBTE and FOBTOB. That as a result of the strike action of FOBTOB branch of Nigerian Bottling Company Limited (NBC), a member company of AFBTE, the company suffered severe economic loss and in order to set such precedent in the industry, the applicant has approached this Court for the determination and interpretation of the Procedural Agreement. To the applicant, on 12th August 2013, members of FOBTOB in NBC embarked on an industrial action which culminated in the disruption of the operations of NBC, a member of AFBTE. That the industrial action was premised on the fact that negotiation was ongoing in respect of Appendix B items of the Memorandum of Agreement. That whilst parties were negotiating, the respondent without any regard for laid down rules and procedure as settled by the Procedural Agreement embarked on an industrial action in all NBC branch offices nationwide thereby causing the NBC to suffer economic losses. The applicant then framed one issue for the determination of the Court, namely – Whether or not FOBTOB can embark on an industrial action without having recourse to the provisions of the Memorandum of Agreement in the resolution of the dispute that may arise there from. To the applicant, by section 245C(1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, only this Court has the jurisdiction to hear and determine all labour related matters; and in the instant case, that the matter at hand comes within section 245C(1)(j), which bestows on this Court interpretation jurisdiction over certain named documents including collective agreement and memorandum of settlement of any trade dispute. The applicant then asked (without answering the question) whether the respondent is a party within the meaning of section 1 of the Trade Unions Act (TUA) which defines a trade union. That the procedural agreement, which is binding on both parties, has established a dispute resolution mechanism with laid down rules and procedure that parties must first and foremost explore and exhaust such dispute mechanism as prescribed by the memorandum of agreement. The applicant continued that it indicated in paragraph 9 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons steps it took towards an amicable resolution of the dispute. The applicant then referred the Court to section 4(2) of the Trade Disputes Act (TDA) Cap. T8 LFN 2004. That in paragraph 13 of the affidavit in support, the applicant stated efforts made by the National Joint Industrial Council (NJIC) as a mediator in the face-off between the parties. That the AFBTE NJIC team advised the National body of FOBTOB to call off its strike. That in paragraph 11 of the affidavit in support, the Ministry of Labour had written through its Lagos office that parties should maintain the status quo, whilst the Minster takes steps as enshrined in under section 5(2) of the TDA. That the respondent flagrantly and flatly discountenanced the directives of the Ministry of Labour and Productivity and still embarked on the industrial action. It was further submitted by the applicant that facts which are germane to this case have been enumerated in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the affidavit in support. The applicant then urged the Court to hold that the strike action which was embarked upon by the FOBTOB branch union in NBC is illegal and a contravention of the laid down rules and provisions of the memorandum of agreement. In conclusion, the applicant urged the Court to determine and interpret the provision of the memorandum of agreement in order to forestall illegal strike actions and prevent further cessation of work in any form either by strike actions or downing tools in the future. That the declaration of the Court will promote industrial peace and social order in the industry. The case of the respondent is that NBC is a member of the applicant, while the respondent has a unit of its association amongst the senior staff of NBC. That the respondent’s unit in NBC (referred to as NBC FOBTOB) was in negotiation with the management of NBC (simply referred to as management) on issues “contained in appendix B of the Memorandum of Agreement”, which relate to residual matters that fall squarely within the negotiation ambit of individual companies and their local branch unions. That rather than for NBC management to express and exhibit their best endeavour as stipulated in Article 10 of the memorandum of agreement to ensure that the industrial peace and tranquility was in no way jeopardized, it set out on a series of actions that further aggravated and compounded the conflict. That NBC management intentionally sabotaged different meetings and series of letters aimed at resolving this crisis, not bothering to involve the applicant as envisaged in the 1980 memorandum of agreement so that it can become a full, all-encompassing conflict that would demand the attention of the applicant and the subsequent invocation of all necessary conflict resolution processes. That because of the sabotaging stance of the NBC management who were bent on localizing the conflict, it ultimately degenerated into a strike after which the applicant was now notified by the NBC management. That 4 days later, parties were able to sit down at a round table to address all the issues and a memorandum was fully executed by all parties signaling the full resolution of all issues instigating the strike action. That till date, the agreement reached is being honoured by all the parties without duress or rancor in an atmosphere of full industrial peace and harmony. The respondent then framed two issues for the determination of the Court, namely – 1. Whether, after the parties have amicably resolved the matter with the execution of a memorandum signaling the end of the conflict, this application does not amount to an abuse of process by involving the Court in a mere academic exercise on a concluded matter that robs the Court of jurisdiction. 2. Should the Court hold that this action is not a mere academic exercise, whether the parties satisfied the provisions of the memorandum of agreement in addressing the industrial unrest that had occurred. Regarding issue 1, the respondent submitted that Courts recognize the innate and inherent powers of parties in any dispute to settle down and resolve conflicts as may be necessary. That the outcome in terms of resolutions is clothed with the garment of a voluntary agreement, which parties cannot rescind from; and if this outcome is presented in the face of litigation, it will be accorded the force of a competent judgment. To the respondent, the jurisdiction of the Court is not to be invoked in matters where the parties have reasonably and amicably resolved their conflicts and even reduced same to writing; and where parties settle their dispute, the dispute is thereby disposed of and may not be re-opened in another subsequent action. That in the instant case, parties have been able to sit down and resolve their conflict, reducing same into writing and executing it (Exhibit KA4). That this amounts to a concluded act of settlement of conflict and it serves no purpose for this Court to go into the issues of the appropriate mode of resolution that the parties have used. The respondent referred to AGN v. ANPP [2004] 1 MJSC 1 at 18 – 19 and then asked: what would be achieved by going on to interpret retrospectively whether or not FOBTOB can embark on an industrial action without having recourse to the provisions of the memorandum of agreement when in fact there is no evidence of the existence of any dispute presently before the Court, while the only dispute on record that has been presented before this Court had actually been fully resolved and documented by the parties as evidenced by Exhibit KA4, more so when such interpretation will not affect the present positions of the parties as the parties have been observing the resolution agreement without any rancor? The respondent then submitted that asking the Court whether the procedure followed was the envisaged procedure in a matter already concluded amounts to taking the Court on an academic exercise that achieves no aim. That opportunities may or may not arise to further test the potency of the memorandum of agreement as desired by the applicant; but until that comes, this matter is closed and the Court cannot look into it, urging the Court to decline jurisdiction as the matter does not exhibit any concrete cause of action and recognizable remedy in law. Also referred to the Court is Dodo Dabo v. Alhaji Ikira Abdullahi [2005] 5 MJSC 57 at 81 where the Supreme Court declined to consider issues it termed would amount to an academic exercise the outcome of which would neither confer any benefit on or injure any of the parties other than merely expose and expound the law. On issue 2 i.e. should the Court hold that this action is not a mere academic exercise, whether the parties satisfied the provisions of the memorandum of agreement in addressing the industrial unrest that had occurred, the respondent contended that it is appropriate to consider the provisions of the memorandum in full before one can understand the full purport rather than just concentrating on a particular section to throw light on the intendment of the agreement to the parties’ responsibilities there under. The respondent then reproduced Articles 9, 3(4) and (5) and 10 of the Procedural Agreement of 8th February 1980 and submitted that FOBTOB NBC branch Executive was in negotiations with the NBC management (Head of Personnel or designated official) on issues contained in Appendix B of the collective agreement, very much in line with Article 9(i), when it became apparent that NBC was not willing to exercise their best endeavour as stipulated by Article 10 and so the FOBTOB Executive Secretary became involved as stipulated by Article 9(ii). The respondent continued that despite adequate emphasis through letters and informal meetings on the need for NBC management to take the conflict resolution serious, their lackadaisical attitude, in clear breach of Article 10, can be inferred from the laxity with which they were responding, as particularly in one instance, NBC did not deem it prudent to reply to the respondent’s letter of 12th July 2013 until 23rd July 2013 (eleven clear days after the letter from the respondent was received) and which letter was now received by the respondent on 29th July 2013 (a further six days delay from its date of issue) inviting the branch union to a meeting for Friday 26th July 2013 (a date which had already passed by 3 days before the NBC management deemed it fit to deliver the letter to the respondent), referring to Exhibits KA1 and KA2. The respondent went on that while all these were going on, NBC management was apparently invoking the provision of Article 3(5) with an intention to handle the dispute strictly on its own in presumed privacy as it was apparent they had not notified, informed or carried along the applicant or that they were ready to invoke or explore the provisions of the memorandum of agreement to resolve the impasse. That it was not until after the strike was unfortunately on that the NBC management through Exhibit AA003 informed the applicant by a copy of the said letter which was actually addressed to the respondent, that an industrial dispute which needed the attention of the applicant was on. That this can be gathered from the opening statement of the only letter of the applicant to the respondent (Exhibit AA002), which reads: Report reaching us indicates that your union ordered its branch officers and members in our member-company….” The respondent then referred to Article 7(vi)(a) of the memorandum of agreement which provides that meetings of the NJIC shall be called at the instance of either the union or the association at a mutually agreed venue and date. To the respondent, clearly the memorandum of agreement laid an equal responsibility on both parties as regards the calling of a meeting. That the latter part of Article 10, which used the word ‘and’ conjunctively to separate the early portion from the latter, indicates that instances of a strike occurring is recognized and not illegal. That Article 7(vi)(a) lays a responsibility on both parties and it cannot be a reason for one party to accuse the other of not doing what it should do. That if the applicant had called a meeting of the NJIC but the respondent refused to attend, there and then a breach can be said to have occurred. That when a meeting was called, the respondent attended. That if the NBC management or the applicant did not call the meeting in view of the industrial unrest that was threatening and which they were fully aware of, then it cannot lie in their mouth that the respondent did not do what they should have done. They clearly encouraged or at least condoned the state of affairs they complained about by not doing what the agreement demanded of them. In any event, that it was not intended for the NBC management to call the NJIC meeting as they were apparently insisting on safeguarding their privacy and independence. The argument of the respondent is that the agreement of 8th February 1980 did not place the onus to call a meeting of the NJIC on the respondent exclusively or in isolation of any responsibility on the part of the applicant. That NBC had the responsibility to inform its umbrella body of the industrial relations happenings in its domain just like the respondent’s branch in the company reported to the respondent. To the respondent, by the various meetings held and the several letters written to the NBC management on the matter, the respondent followed the agreement for dispute resolution and was not in contravention of the same in any manner whatsoever; and that the failure of the applicant’s member to inform the applicant or of the NBC management not calling the NJIC meeting unilaterally should not be blamed on the respondent, urging the Court to so rule. On the letter dated 14th August 2013 from the Federal Ministry of Labour & Productivity (Lagos State office), which came 3 days into the strike action (Exhibit AA004), the respondent submitted that it followed the directive of the letter which stated that “all parties are enjoined to maintain status quo while the issues are being handled”. To the respondent, the active phrase is “status quo” defined by Webster’s New World Law Dictionary as “the situation as it currently exists” in contrast to “status quo ante”, which is “the situation as it existed before, as things were before whatever happened or is being discussed took place. For example, status quo ante bellum is the situation as it existed before the war”. That the situation being discussed here is the strike action. So when the respondent was enjoined to maintain the status quo, it was taken to mean “the situation as it currently exists”. The respondent accordingly urged the Court to declare that the respondent did no wrong by continuing with the strike action on the basis of the letter received from the Federal Ministry of Labour & Productivity (Lagos State office). On NBC management finally involving the applicant in the goings-on after the strike had commenced, that the applicant invited the respondent (Exhibit AA002) to a meeting for the intervention of the industry’s NJIC, which the respondent attended. That at the meeting, both parties could not agree. To the respondent, there is no provision in the agreement that both parties must agree. On the contrary, that Article 7(ix) of the Procedural Agreement gives room for steps to be taken when both parties fail to agree. The steps are: an adjournment for 14 day to enable parties consider the matter further; and if within 7 days of resumption parties still cannot agree, then recourse to the TDA processes or the processes of any other legislation that may be relevant. That on 17th August 2013, the respondent and NBC management met and were able to amicably resolve all the issues and an agreement was signed (Exhibit KA4). The respondent then urged the Court to resolve issue 2 in the interest of the respondent and declare that the respondent satisfied the laid down process stipulated in the memorandum of agreement between AFBTE and FOBTOB dated 8th February 1980 for resolving conflicts and was not in contravention by the action its members took on 12th August 2013. The respondent also urged the Court to declare that the applicant and its members are also bound to follow the provisions of the Procedural Agreement of 8th February 1980 but that they never followed any of its internal resolution mechanism nor did they invoke NJIC clause until it suited them to do so and even at that the respondent attended the NJIC meeting and participated as expected and that the fact that an agreement could not be reached is not an indication that the respondent did not follow or had subverted the provisions of the agreement. In conclusion, the respondent urged the Court to dismiss this application with substantial cost for disclosing no cause of action being incompetent and an abuse of process. The applicant did not file any reply on points of law. I heard learned counsel and considered all the processes filed in this suit. The first issue before the Court is whether the applicant has made out an appropriate case for interpretation of Procedural Agreement made on 8th February 1980 between AFBTE and FOBTOB. It is in addressing this issue that the respondent submitted that the case before the Court is a mere academic exercise for which the Court should decline jurisdiction. The interpretation jurisdiction of the Court as relates to the interpretation of collective agreements is regulated by section 16 of the TDA, section 7(1)(c) of the NIC Act 2006 and section 254C(1)(j) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. To start with, the applicant also came under section 4(1) of the TDA as well as Order 15 of the NIC Rules 2007. Section 4 of the TDA dealing with procedure before dispute is reported, states in subsection (1) that “if there exists agreed means for settlement of the dispute apart from this Act, whether by virtue of the provisions of any agreement between organisations representing the interests of employers and organisation of workers or any other agreement, the parties to the dispute shall first attempt to settle it by that means”. This provision is a prelude to activating the dispute resolutions processes of Part I of the TDA. It cannot stand alone as to found an action as the applicant seems to think. In any event, if the applicant can appropriately come under section 4(1) of the TDA, then what it has is not an interpretation issue but a trade dispute in the real sense of the word; and for which he would have to exhaust the other processes of mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication (since utilizing an agreed means of settlement of a trade dispute is merely a prelude to all these processes). In coming under section 4(1) of the TDA, therefore, the applicant has no valid case before this Court; and I so find and hold. The applicant also came under Order 15 of the NIC Rules 2007, which provides that “where no provision is made in these Rules as to practice and procedure or where the provisions are inadequate, the Court may adopt such procedure as will in its view do substantial justice to the parties”. This cannot be a valid provision to activate the interpretation jurisdiction of this Court since there are more appropriate provisions dealing with that. In accordingly coming under Order 15 of the NIC Rules 2007, the applicant has no valid case before the Court; and I so find and hold. This leaves out section 254C(1)(j) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, under which the applicant also came. By section 254C(1)(j), the NIC shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters relating to the determination of question as to the interpretation and application of (amongst other documents) any collective agreement, terms of settlement of any trade dispute, or trade union dispute or employment dispute as may be recorded in a memorandum of settlement. This is the provision under which the applicant came to this Court. However, the provision talks of the jurisdiction of this Court being as to “interpretation and application” of any of the named documents. The argument of the respondent is that the trade dispute over which the applicant seeks the interpretation intervention of this Court is no longer an issue as it has been resolved; as such, this suit is a mere academic exercise. The applicant did not challenge the fact that the trade dispute that gave rise to this suit has been resolved. I accordingly find in that regard – that there is actually no live trade dispute before this Court. The question that arises, therefore, is whether the interpretation jurisdiction of this Court can be activated independent of the existence of a live dispute. The other provisions granting interpretation jurisdiction on this Court (under which the applicant did not, however, come) seem to suggest that the interpretation jurisdiction of this Court can be activated independent of the existence of a live dispute. For instance section 16(1) of the TDA dealing with interpretation of agreements provides that “notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Act, the Minister or any party to a collective agreement may make an application to the National Industrial Court for a decision of that Court as to the interpretation of any term or provision of the collective agreement”. And by section 7(1)(c)(i) and (iii) of the NIC Act 2006 this Court shall have and exercise exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matters relating to the determination of any question as to the interpretation of any collective agreement; and the terms of settlement of any labour dispute, organizational dispute as may be recorded in any memorandum of settlement. Both of these provisions precede that under section 254C(1)(j) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. They, however, both simply talk of “interpretation” of the documents in issue; while section 254C(1)(j) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, talks of “interpretation and application” of the documents in issue. The question still remains whether the interpretation jurisdiction of this Court can be activated independent of the existence of a live issue. Even when sections 16(1) of the TDA and 7(1)(c)(i) and (iii) of the NIC Act 2006 simply talk of “interpretation” of the documents in issue, is it contemplated that the interpretation would be devoid of a live dispute? In Mr. Kurt Severinsen v. Emerging Markets Telecommunication Services Limited [2012] 27 NLLR (Pt. 78) 374, this Court relying on the decision of the Supreme Court of India in NTF Mills Ltd v. The 2nd Punjab Tribunal, AIR 1957 SC 329, held that the essence of adjudication in this Court is – …to adjudicate on the disputes between employers and their workmen, etc. and in the course of such adjudication…determine the ‘rights’ and ‘wrong’ of the claim made, and in so doing [the Court is] undoubtedly free to apply the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, keeping in view the further principle that [its] jurisdiction is invoked not for the enforcement of mere contractual rights but for preventing labour practices regarded as unfair and for restoring industrial peace on the basis of collective bargaining. The process does not cease to be judicial by reason of that elasticity or by reason of the application of the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. This quotation presupposes that there is a live dispute before the Court. In the instant case, there is no such live dispute before the Court. To support its stance, the respondent had referred to AGN v. ANPP [2004] 1 MJSC 1 at 18 – 19, where the Supreme Court refused to retrospectively interpret section 182(1)(b) of the Constitution given that the office for which it was to be interpreted has already been occupied thus making the interpretation a mere academic exercise. I indicated earlier that sections 16(1) of the TDA and 7(1)(c)(i) and (iii) of the NIC Act 2006 simply talk of “interpretation” of the documents in issue, while section 254C(1)(j) talks of “interpretation and application” of the said documents. When section 254C(1)(j) talks of “interpretation and application”, what is contemplated is that there must be a live dispute before the Court; for otherwise, there would be no basis for the requirement of “application” as envisaged by section 254C(1)(j). The question is: if the Court interprets the document in issue, in respect of what would that interpretation be applied? It is my holding, therefore, that a live dispute is contemplated before the interpretation jurisdiction of this Court is activated under section 254C(1)(j) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. We are still left with sections 16(1) of the TDA and 7(1)(c)(i) and (iii) of the NIC Act 2006, which simply talk of “interpretation” of the documents in issue. By section 18(3) of the TDA – It is hereby declared that where a dispute is settled under the foregoing provisions of this Act either by agreement or by the acceptance of an award made by an arbitration tribunal under section 13 of this Act, that dispute shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to have ended; and accordingly any further trade dispute involving the same matters (including a trade dispute as to the interpretation of an award made as aforesaid by which the original dispute was settled) shall be treated for the purposes of this section as a different trade dispute. It is not in doubt that the interpretation required of this Court relates to “the interpretation of an award made as aforesaid by which the original dispute was settled” meaning the award made by an arbitration tribunal under section 13 of the TDA. However, relying on this section 18(3) of the TDA, this Court in Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations, Civil Service Technical and Recreational Services Employees v. Agricultural and Allied Workers Union of Nigeria [2009] 17 NLLR (Pt. 46) 26 held the interpretation of its judgment to be equally a fresh dispute. To the Court – …in an interpretation action the cause of action is fresh and so can be decided on the law as at the date it was filed…The truth of the matter is that all actions seeking to activate the interpretation jurisdiction of this court are fresh actions and so are ordinarily treated on the basis of applicable laws as at the time they were filed. This stance of the Court was reinforced in Comrade Olusolademi & ors v. Comrade E. C. Edeji & ors Suit No. NIC/12M/2003 the ruling of which was delivered on July 6, 2009 in the following words – Although interpretation disputes are usually treated as fresh disputes (see section 17(3) of the TDA 1990 and the case of Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations, Civil Service Technical and Recreational Services Employees v. Agricultural and Allied Workers Union of Nigeria unreported Suit No. NIC/17M/1995 the ruling of which was delivered on April 8, 2009), they are not required to go through the dispute resolution processes of Part I of the TDA as argued by the respondents. This is because they are statutorily caught up under the original jurisdiction of this court as can be seen under sections 14 and 20 of the TDA 1990. The argument of the respondents that the instant case is one of an intra-union dispute and so must go through mediation, conciliation and arbitration under Part I of the TDA is not sustainable here. And in Lagos Sheraton Hotel & Towers v. Hotel & Personal Services Senior Staff Association [2010] 22 NLLR (Pt. 61) 161, this Court applied Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations, Civil Service Technical and Recreational Services Employees v. Agricultural and Allied Workers Union of Nigeria and Comrade Olusolademi & ors v. Comrade E. C. Edeji & ors and held that – An action for interpretation of this court’s judgment is a fresh action because the parties are bound by the judgment already delivered…. A summons on notice for interpretation must, therefore, bear a new suit number with the parties properly referred to as applicant and respondent. It is an originating action and cannot be listed or referred to using the earlier Suit No. NIC/9/2008 in which the parties were referred to as appellant/respondent and respondent/cross appellant/applicant…. The thing with all of these authorities is that the interpretation jurisdiction of the Court was activated on the basis of an existing and live dispute necessitating the interpretation of the document in issue. So even under sections 16(1) of the TDA and 7(1)(c)(i) and (iii) of the NIC Act 2006, a live and existing dispute is needed before the interpretation jurisdiction of this Court can be activated; and I so hold. This is not the case in the instant case. The dispute in issue has been resolved. There is accordingly no live and existing dispute necessitation the interpretation of the Procedural Agreement made on 8th February 1980. The applicant simply wants an interpretation so as to forestall future occurrences. This is not good enough especially if it is noted that when the dispute actually existed, the applicant did not deem it necessary to come to Court until the dispute was resolved by the parties. I agree with the respondent that the instant suit is a mere academic exercise. Its outcome would neither confer a benefit nor injure any of the parties; it would merely expound on the law (see Dodo Dabo v. Alhaji Ikira Abdullahi as cited by the respondent). Aside from the case being a mere academic exercise, it is difficult to grant the ‘claims’ of the applicant in the manner they are even couched. By the originating summons, the claims of the applicant are two, namely – 1. Whether or not the Procedural Agreement made the 8th day of February, 1980 between the Association of Food, Beverage and Tobacco Employers (AFBTE) and the Food, Beverage and Tobacco Senior Staff Association (FOBTOB) is the valid and subsisting agreement that regulates the affairs relating to the terms and conditions of employment of their respective members. 2. Whether or not by virtue of the Procedural Agreement, members of the Food, Beverage and Tobacco Senior Staff Association (FOBTOB) are bound by the provisions of the Memorandum of Agreement and whether they can resort to any type of industrial action without first and foremost exhausting the internal mechanism for the resolution of any dispute arising from the Memorandum of Agreement. It is when these two claims are answered in the affirmative that the remaining questions are to be determined. To take claim 1, the applicant claims from this Court whether the Procedural Agreement of 8th February 1980 is “the valid and subsisting agreement that regulates the affairs relating to the terms and conditions of employment of their respective members”. Throughout the submissions of the applicant, this claim was not addressed at all. The applicant assumed it to be the case given the sole issue it framed for the determination of this Court, which is: “whether or not FOBTOB can embark on an industrial action without having recourse to the provisions of the Memorandum of Agreement in the resolution of the dispute that may arise there from”. By this issue, the applicant assumes the validity and subsistence of the Procedural Agreement and its applicability to the respective members. Having so assumed, there is no claim for the Court to consider and award. Since arguments were not made as to validity and subsistence (and hence applicability) of the Procedural Agreement, it is idle for this Court to consequently assume its validity and existence, consider it as such and make an award based on it. Claim 2 is dependent on claim 1. It seeks from this Court whether members of the respondent are bound by the Memorandum of Agreement and whether they can resort to any type of industrial action without first and foremost exhausting the internal mechanism for the resolution of any dispute arising from the Memorandum of Agreement. Unless claim 1 is considered and granted, claim 2 cannot even be addressed. Since claims 1 and 2 cannot be considered, the questions raised as questions a) – e) cannot accordingly be considered for in the words of the applicant, “if the above is answered in the affirmative, the following questions arise for determination….” Question c) as couched i.e. “whether, going by Article 10 the Memorandum of Agreement which states that no form of unauthorized action shall take place on any matter until such constitutional methods including the machinery of the National Joint Industrial Council hereinafter referred to as the Council, had been exhausted”, appears incomplete and so makes no meaning in terms of a claim. As for the rest of the questions, questions a), b), d) and e), they are questions without claim. After the Court answers all the questions, then what next? The originating summons of the applicant is silent on this. The applicant is not even seeking any declaratory relief in their regard; all of which reinforce the argument of the respondent that this suit is a mere academic exercise and hence an abuse of process. Since Courts are enjoined to grant only claims prayed for, where no claim is made, then a fortiori no claim can be awarded. For all the reasons given I hold that there is no merit in this case. The case is a mere academic exercise and hence an abuse of process. There is no live and existing dispute upon which it is founded. Even if there were, the claims as couched by the applicant pray for nothing; the applicant is not even praying for any relief. The action accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed. Judgment is entered accordingly. Cost is put at Fifty Thousand Naira (N50,000) only payable by the applicant to the respondent within 30 days of this judgment. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip