Download PDF
IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT ABUJA Before His Lordship: HON. JUSTICE O. A. SHOGBOLA JUDGE Date:14Th OCTOBER, 2014 Suit No. NICN/ABJ/333/2013 BETWEEN YUSHAU SHUAIB CLAIMANT AND 1. FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 2. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION DEFENDANTS 3. DR. NGOZI OKONJO-IWEALA REPRESENTATION Ode Abah Esq for the Claimant. Bashir Olatunde Esq for the 2nd Defendant. Munachiso Micheal Esq and Oluwafeyi Okupe for the 3rd Defendant. RULING The claimant filed a complaint dated 10th December, 2013 in this court claiming against the defendants as follows:- a. A DECLARATION that the Public Service Rules (2008 edition) is applicable for the purposes of determining the employment of the claimant and other matters relating to his employment in the Civil Service of the Federation. b. A DECLARATION that the letter of the 1st Defendant dated the 26th day of June 2013 with Reference No. FC/6138/S.1/69/220 received by the claimant on the 4th of October, 2013 which purports to retire the claimant, a statutory employee, from the Civil Service Federation from the 26th of June, 2013 has no force of law and is therefore illegal, unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whatsoever being in flagrant violation of Rules 030302, 030303, 030304, 030305, 030306 and 030601 of the Public Service Rules (2008 Edition). c. A DECLARATION that the decision of the 1st Defendant to retire the claimant at its meeting held on the 26th of June, 2013 with effect from the same date without conducting any investigation, without giving the claimant an opportunity to defend himself and without complying with the conditions precedent for retirement is contrary to Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended, Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, cap A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 and the Public Service Rules 030305 and 030601 (2008 Edition) and is therefore illegal, unlawful, unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. d. A DECLARATION that the 3rd Defendant unduly instigated the 1st Defendant to unlawfully retire the claimant in violation of his freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, cap A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. e. AN ORDER directing the 1st Defendant to reinstate the claimant to the Civil Service of the Federation and to his post at the Chief Information Officer in 2nd Defendant forthwith without any loss as to seniority, salaries, position and other emoluments. f. AN ORDER directing the 1st and 2nd Defendants to compute and pay to the claimant all his salaries, allowances and other emoluments due to him from the month of July 2013 up to the date of Judgment. g. INTEREST at the prevailing commercial banks’ rates on the sum arrived at in relief (e) above. Accompanying the complaint are the claimant’s statement of facts, witness statement on Oath, lists of witnesses, documents to be relied upon and list of authorities cited. The three defendants in this suit raised preliminary objection against the claimant’s action. On the 9th of April, 2014 the 1st defendant filed a preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the court to hear and determine this suit to wit:- For an order dismissing this suit on the ground that the Hon. Court lack the jurisdiction to entertain the suit as it is statute barred. The ground upon which the objection is raised is that the action is statute barred, having been caught by Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act 2014. The preliminary objection is supported by a 9 paragraph affidavit sworn to by Mr. Oyebola Lanre Philip a Litigation Secretary in the Legal Department in Federal Civil Service Commission, Headquarters, Abuja. The 1st defendant/applicant further submitted that the section is clear and unambiguous for an action to be minted against a public officer such action must be brought within 3 months next from the accrual of the cause of action. Relying on the case of Forestry Research Institute of Nigeria V Gold (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1044) at Pg. 24. The 1st defendant/applicant argued that the letter of retirement the claimant is challenging before the court which gives the claimant the cause of action is dated and served on the claimant on the 26th June, 2013. While the claimant did not file the suit until the 10th December, 2013, which is over 3 months after the cause of action had accrued. The 1st defendant placed reliance of the cases of Aremu V Adekola (2004) Vol. 1219 LRCN Page 4853 at 4872 where the court held as follows:- When a statute of limitation prescribes a period which an action must be commenced, legal proceeding cannot be properly or legally instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. The action is therefore, said to be statute barred, a plaintiff who might otherwise have had a cause of action loses the right to enforce it by judicial process because the period of time laid down by the limitation law for instituting such an action has lapsed. NEPA V Olagunju (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt. 913) Pg. 602 where Court of Appeal held thus:- A defence which is founded on the statute of limitation is a defence that the plaintiff has no cause of action. It is a defence of law which can be raised in limine and without any evidence in support. It is sufficient if prima facie date of taking the course outside the prescribed period is disclosed in the writ of summons and the statement of claim. To the 1st defendant/applicant argued that the parties need not join issues by filing statement of defence. What the court is to consider is the cause of action as disclosed vis-à-vis the date the suit was filed in court. Once it establishes that the plaintiff file his suit outside the limitation period that is the end of the matter, the court lacks the jurisdiction to proceed from there the action is to be dismissed. The 1st defendant/applicant urged the court to dismiss the action as it is caught by the statute of limitation and the court lacks jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. The claimant reacted to the 1st defendant/applicant preliminary objection raising an issue for determination:- Which is whether in all the circumstances of this case, the claimant action is statute barred. In his submission the claimant submitted that the originating process before the court stated that he received the purported letter of retirement dated 16th June, 2013 on the 4th October, 2013, in that he acknowledged the receipt of same on the 4th October, 2013 at 12p.m. and he accordingly signed same. He referred the court to paragraph 29 of his statement of facts and paragraph 32 of witness statement on Oath. He urged the court to have a cursory look at the claimant’s letter of retirement 26th of June, 2013 with Reference No. FC/6318/S.1/69/220 will show that the claimant acknowledged the receipt of same on the 4th October, 2013 precisely at 12pm and accordingly signed same. That the cause of action arose on the 4th of October, 2013 when he was served with the letter of retirement dated 26th of June, 2013. The claimant further submitted that it is trite that where the wrongful act of a defendant has been fraudulently concealed, the right of action in respect of that act accrues only when the claimant becomes aware of the wrongful act of the defendant. Relying on the case of UBA PLC V BTL IND. LTD (2006) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1013) at 61 Pp. 111 paras C – F. AROWOLO V IFABAIYI (2002) 4 NWLR (PT. 757) 356 AND AKIBU V AZEEZ (2003) 5 NWLR (PT. 814) 643. The claimant claimed he was never given notice of the meeting held on 26th October, 2013 and he submitted the cause of action arose on the day he became or received the 1st defendant/applicant’s letter dated 26th June, 2013 which was 4th October, 2013. The claimant submitted that he cannot come to court to institute an action prior to 4th October, 2013 because to do so would amount to putting the cat before the horse. That prior to 4th October, 2013 no cause of action had arisen in respect of the said purported retirement of the claimant by the defendant. The claimant filing this suit on the 10th December, 2013 is not caught by Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act. The claimant then submitted that in determining whether or not an action is statute barred the court is restricted to the writ of summons and statement of claim where the issue is raised by preliminary objection as in the instant case. That an examination of the claimant’s originating summons and statement of facts shows that the claimant filed this suit on the 10th December, 2013. Also the examination of the 1st defendant letter of retirement dated 6th June, 2013 was acknowledged by the claimant on the 4th October, 2013. The claimant then submitted that the claimant’s suit filed on the 10th of December, 2013 is not caught by the limitation provision under Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act because the period from October 2013 to 10th December, 2013 is within the 3 months and therefore the action is not statute barred. The claimant further submitted that the 1st defendant grossly abused its office by retiring the claimant contract to the provisions of Public Service Rules 2008 and thus cannot claim the protection under the Public Officers Protection Act. That abuse of office and bad faith are factors that deprive a party who would otherwise have been entitled to the Protection of the Act. He urged the court to discountenance the arguments as contained in the 1st defendant preliminary objection and dismiss the preliminary objection with substantial cost for waste of precious litigation time. The 2nd defendant/applicant on 20th January, 2013 filed its memo of appearance, statement of defence and notice of preliminary objection. The 2nd defendant in its preliminary objection prays the court for the following orders:- 1. To strike out the name of the 2nd defendant for not being a juristic person. 2. To strike out the name of the 2nd defendant for not being a proper party in this suit and for the court to decline jurisdiction. 3. And for such order(s) and further orders the court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The grounds of objection are as follows:- The 2nd defendant is not a statutory creation. Its existence is by the presidential executive fiat and so cannot be sued in that name. The 2nd defendant acting through the Permanent Secretary was not the one that employed and fired the claimant. The 2nd defendant then formulated the following issues for determination:- 1. Whether the purported 2nd defendant not being a juristic person or a legal entity can be made a party in this case and be sued in the name on record? 2. Whether the purported 2nd defendant on record was the organ of Government that employed the claimant and also retired him? 3. When the two above questions (a & b) are answered in the negative whether the proper order to make by this Hon. Court is an order for dismissal of this case? On issue 1 posed for determination to wit: whether the purported 2nd defendant not being a juristic personality or a legal can be made a party in this suit in the name on record. The learned counsel for the 2nd defendant/applicant submitted that naming a non-juristic person as a plaintiff is not a misnomer and cannot be amended to substitute a juristic person. Relying on the case of Agnes Amecheta V Alphonses Oguen & 2 Ors (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 447) 229 Para 2. That court held that the law is settled that generally a non-juristic person cannot sue or be sued. The counsel urged the court to dismiss the case against the defendant on the strength of this authority. The learned counsel also referred to Sections 6(6) of the 1999 Constitution as amended and submitted that the Section does not cover both juristic personality and non-juristic personality. He argued that the 2nd defendant is not clothed with legal personality but the Minister or Permanent Secretary who acts for and on behalf of the Ministry are the ones according to Sections 147(2) and 171 (2) (d) of the 1999 Constitution as amended that have legal personality to sue or be sued. He urged the court to dismiss the action against the defendant on the strength of the authority. The 2nd defendant also referred to paragraphs 10, 29, 30 and 33 of the statement of facts of the claimant submitting that it was the 1st defendant that employed the claimant and statutorily retired him. That by this assertions by the claimant which were not denied by the 2nd defendant show that the claimant has no cause of action against the purported 2nd defendant submitting that “a party against whom there is no cause of action cannot be made a defendant as decided in the case of Afolayan V Ogunrinde (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 127) 369 and Ladoke V Olabayo (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 147) 746 at 769. The learned counsel urged the court to hold that: i. The defendant is not a juristic person that can sue or be sued. ii. That the defendant/applicant in this case is not a proper party. iii. That there is no cause of action against the defendant/applicant and finally iv. That the plaintiff cannot build something on nothing and expect it to stand, it will certainly collapse. The 2nd defendant concluded stating that the court is prayed to dismiss the suit in its entirety against the purported 2nd defendant. In reaction the claimant formulated a sole issue for determination whether in all the circumstances of this case, the 2nd defendant is a necessary party and can be sued on its name on record. The claimant countered the submission of the 2nd defendant/applicant submission arguing that the law is clear that a Ministry such as the 2nd defendant/applicant is a legal personality when its functions are enormous and indeed complex that 3rd parties are bound to be affected by the running of its affairs pursuant to the rules of natural justice and equity such bodies are accorded legal personality. He relied on the case of Uzoho V NNPC (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) at Pg. 320. That the claimant has been affected with the activities and affairs of the 2nd defendant on record relating to the circumstances leading to his retirement. The claimant further submitted that the 2nd defendant is a proper party for the proceedings herein relying on the documents produced by the 2nd defendant to justify his claim that he was unlawfully retired after the 2nd defendant issued him queries when he responded to. That the 2nd defendant presence is necessary to clarify issues that led to the retirement of the claimant, in that the claimed clearly stated that he received two letters from 2nd defendant relating to the issues that led to his premature retirement. Claimant also submitted that the only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is that he should be bound by the result of the action and that the question to be settled therefore cannot be effectively and completely settled must be question in an action which unless he is a party. Thus a necessary party is someone whose presence is necessary as a party. The claimant concluded that the 2nd defendant is a necessary party in the suit and urged the court to hold that the suit discloses a reasonable cause of action against the 2nd defendant. That the court should strike out the preliminary objection with substantial cost for waste of precious litigation time. The 3rd defendant/applicant in its preliminary objection prayed the court for the following orders:- 1. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court striking out the name of DR. NGOZI OKONJO IWEALA sued as 3rd defendant in this suit for non-disclosure of reasonable cause of action in this suit and lack of jurisdiction. 2. AND FOR SUCH OTHER ORDERS as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance. The grounds upon which this application is brought are as follows:- a. The entire statement of facts discloses no reasonable cause of action against the 3rd defendant and the claimant has no conceivable legal right whatsoever against the 3rd defendant. b. The court therefore lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit against the 3rd defendant. c. The relief sought by the claimant against the 3rd defendant is fundamentally defective and unsustainable in law as the 1st defendant & 2nd defendants do not report or take instructions directly or otherwise from the 3rd defendant in the performance of their duties. The Notice of the preliminary objection is supported by a 10 paragraph affidavit sworn to by Oluwafeyi Okupe a legal practitioner in the employment of Streamsowers & Kohn counsel for the 3rd defendant. In support of the preliminary objection the 3rd defendant filed a written address submitting a single issue for determination by this court viz:- Whether consideration the general form of complaint statement of facts and other processes, a cause of action has been disclosed against the 3rd defendant. The 3rd defendant/applicant submitted that the fulcrum of this application is whether the claimant has the legal right to being this suit against the 3rd defendant. The contention of the 3rd defendant is that the entire circumstances of this suit and the facts pleaded in the statement of facts do not justify the joinder of the 3rd defendant to the suit. In that the claimant’s processes have not disclosed any cause of action against the 3rd defendant and that the non-disclosure of such a cause of action robs the court of the jurisdiction to entertain the suit against the 3rd defendant relying on the case of Dada V Aina (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt 1084) Pg. 549 at 562 paras F – H. To the 3rd defendant the claimant has not in his general form of complaint or statement of facts shown the wrongful act committed by the 3rd defendant, neither has he shown the consequential damages he has suffered as a result of any such wrongful act. That in the absence of such facts, the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction against the 3rd defendant as there is no cause of action against her. Citing the case of Oni V Igbalajobi (2006) 9 NWLR (Pt. 984) Pg. 180 at 187 that the absence of cause of action robs the claimant of the right to sue against the 3rd defendant by extension denied the court the jurisdiction over the 3rd defendant/applicant. Continuing, the 3rd defendant referred to the portions of the claimant’s statement of facts in which the 3rd defendant was mentioned include paragraphs 9,14, 15, 16, 22, 47 and 50. That these paragraphs reveal that there is no single paragraph therein that the claimant avers any act of wrong doing on the part of the 3rd defendant. The 3rd defendant further submitted that the claimant wants the court to hold that the 3rd defendant unduly instigated the 1st defendant to retire him, but he failed to show in his pleadings and his front loaded processes the active steps taken by the 3rd defendant to directly and unduly instigate the 1st defendant to retire the claimant. But that the claimant however, failed to show in his pleadings and his front loaded processes the active steps taken by the 3rd defendant to directly unduly instigate the 1st defendant to retire the claimant. Continuing, the 3rd defendant/applicant then submitted that it is not firmly established that the absence of cause of action robs the court of the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Referring to the case of Orji V Ugochukwu (2009) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1161). He therefore, urged the court to strike out the name of the 3rd applicant with substantial cost, as there is no wrongful act of the 3rd applicant shown in the statement of facts which gives rise to be the complaint. Concluding, the 3rd defendant/applicant submitted that the 3rd defendant was not directly involved in the employment of the claimant and not equally involved in the transfer, deployment, discipline or disciplinary process of the claimant. That the 1st & 2nd defendants jointly or severally are not answerable to the 3rd defendant in the discharge of their various duties and responsibilities. He therefore, urged the court to grant this application. In reaction to the 3rd defendant preliminary objection the claimant adopted the sole issue as formulated by the 3rd defendant/applicant for determination:- In his argument the claimant urged the court to strike out the following paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of the affidavit in support of the 3rd defendant notice of preliminary objection for being incompetent and violation of section 115 (2) of the Evidence Act 2011, since they contain extraneous by way of prayer, objections, legal argument or conclusion. That once the paragraphs referred to above are struck out the notice of preliminary objection must collapse as those are the main dispositions in the affidavit. But if the court refuses to strike out the preliminary objection the claimant contended that he has pleaded sufficient materials linking the 3rd defendant to his claim in paragraph 50 (1) of his statement of facts, contrary to the submission of the 3rd defendant. It is also the contention of the claimant that it is not for the 3rd defendant and her counsel to take decision for the court as to whether or not the legal practicability of such undue investigation. That this can be done by way of evidence and that it is only when evidence has been taken and the claimant has not established any evidence has been taken and the claimant has not established any evidence in proof of his allegations against the 3rd defendant. That it is then the court can reach a conclusion that the claimant has no case against the 3rd defendant. That the court cannot determine the involvement of the 3rd defendant at this stage. The claimant therefore, urged the court not to be persuaded by this application but allow parties call their respective witnesses. That it is law that it is the duly of the plaintiff/claimant to bring to the court a party were presence is crucial to the resolution of his case. In order words the claimant has the monopoly of deciding who to sue to the proceedings. That the 3rd defendant presence is crucial to the resolution of the claimant’s suit for the following reasons:- i. That the claimant was unlawfully retired because of his writing which the 3rd defendant perceived to be offensive against her (Paragraph 14 of the statement of facts). ii. The 3rd defendant demanded apologies from the claimant which the claimant refused (Paragraphs 14 & 15). iii. The claimant was later informed that he defamed the 3rd defendant (Paragraph 22 of the statement of facts). iv. The 3rd defendant stated wrongly that the claimant was retired after being taken to a disciplinary panel (Paragraph 48 of the statement of facts). He urged the court to refuse the application of the 3rd defendant as same is either premature as evidence needs to be taken or incompetent. On points of law the 3rd defendant/applicant raised three issues in response to the claimant’s written address to wit:- 1. Whether the 3rd defendant’s affidavit in support of her preliminary objection is competent, submitting that the claimant’s position is grossly erroneous and misconceived relying on the provisions of Section 115 (1) - (4) of the Evidence Act. On the 3rd defendant/applicant submitted that non of the allegations raised has been substantiated against the 3rd defendant or shown a cause of action against the 3rd defendant. The 3rd defendant also submitted that it is trite that in deciding the reasonable cause of action against the defendant the court needs only to peruse the writ of summons and statement of claim, which must clearly shown the wrongful act of the defendant which in effect gives the claimant his cause of complaint. That the absence of wrong or nexus with the 3rd defendant is fatal to the claimant’s case against the 3rd defendant. On this basis the 3rd defendant submitted that the claimant has no locus standi to sustain the suit against the 3rd defendant. Further the defendant submitted that the claimant was wrong to have sued the 3rd in her personal capacity as Dr. Ngozi Okonjo Iweala which is different from the office of the Minister of Finance and Coordinating Minister of the Economy. That the two are different person as the rights, duties and obligations of a Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are not one and the same with a citizen who does not hold such an office. While the 3rd issue which is whether the 3rd defendant influenced the compulsory retirement of the claimant. On this the 3rd defendant reiterated his earlier stand that the 3rd defendant was not and never influenced the disciplinary act on taken against the claimant by the Federal Civil Service Commission in contention with the Federal Ministry of Information. The 3rd defendant/applicant concluded urging the court to dismiss the instant case as presently constituted against the 3rd defendant in the interest of justice. I have carefully considered the submissions of the parties the issues for the court to determine are:- 1. Whether the claimant’s cause of action is statute barred. 2. Whether the 2nd defendant is a necessary party to be sued in the name on record or a juristic personality. 3. Whether the claimant’s case discloses a cause of action against the 3rd defendant. Whether the claimant’s cause of action is statute barred. In this suit, the 1st defendant/applicant urged the court to hold that the claimant’s action is statute barred by the virtue of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act and for this the action should be dismissed, for having been caught by the Act. An action is said to be statute barred when no proceedings can be brought in respect of it because the period laid down by the limitation Act had lapsed, pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. In other words, a cause of action will be statute barred when the originating process is issued beyond the period allowed by the limitation law applicable to the particular period. The position of law is that in determining the period of limitation the proper thing to be done is for the court to look at the originating processes alleging when the wrong was committed which gave rise to the cause of action and compared same with the date on which the suit was filed. If the date on the originating summons is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, the suit is automatically statute barred and therefore not maintainable and robs the court of the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. A careful perusal of the claimant’s claim reveals that the cause of action arose on the 4th of October, 2013 when the claimant received the letter of retirement dated 16th June, 2013. Although the letter was dated 16th June, 2013, the letter of retirement was only brought to the claimant’s knowledge and for which he acknowledged the same on 4th October, 2013. The claimant filed the suit on the 10th December, 2013, within the three months accrue by law. His suit is therefore not statute barred. The next issue to tackle is whether the 2nd defendant is a necessary party to be sued in the name on record or a juristic personality. It is a fundamental and established rule of law that any person natural or artificial may sue and be sued. No action can therefore, be brought by or against any party other than a natural or artificial person or person expressly or implied, unless such a party has been given by statute, rules of court or by common law either a legal person or under a name or a right to sue or be sued by that name. The 2nd defendant/applicant contention is that the 2nd defendant is not a legal person that can sue or be sued. In this case the 2nd defendant is the Federal Ministry of Information which is one of the Ministries the President is empowered to establish under Section 147 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). Section 147 (1) states thus:- There shall be such offices of Ministries of the Government as may be established by the President. Furthermore, by the provision of Section 148 (1) of the same Constitution the President is empowered to assigned responsibilities to the Ministries created under Section 147 (1) above. The provision of Section 148 (1) provides thus:- The President may in his discretion assign to the Vice-President or any Minister of the Government of the Federation responsibility for any business of the Government of the Federation including the Administration of any department of Government. The Ministries established including the Federal Ministry of Information are established in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). These ministries are created as an extension of the Executive arm of the Federal Government to carryout Executive functions of the President as vested on the President by Section 5(1) (a) & (b) of the Constitution. Its then follows that Ministries and indeed Federal Ministry of Information are creation of the Constitution. This being the case the Federal Ministry of Information is a Legal person capable of suing and being sued as a creation of statute. The 2nd defendant is carryout some functions, duties and responsibilities that will necessary affect the right of the 3rd parties including the claimant in this case. It will amount to injustice if this 3rd parties including the claimant herein are precluded from seeking redress for any wrong done to them by the 2nd defendant/applicant. The combined effect of the provisions of Sections 147 (1) and 148 (1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) has conferred on the Federal Ministry of Information a juristic personality who can sue and be sued. The Federal Ministry of Information is therefore a necessary party to the suit as the question in controversy cannot be effectually and completely adjudicated upon and settled unless the 2nd defendant is made a party. For this reason the name of the 2nd party cannot be struck out, the 2nd defendant is a necessary party in this suit. Finally, the issue to decide next is whether or not the claimant’s action discloses a cause of action against the 3rd defendant. The question whether or not a reasonable cause of action existed in the claimant’s action against the 3rd defendant is a question of fact. This is based on the circumstances of the case and what happened between the claimant and the defendant. The law is settled that when objection is raised that the statement of claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action, it is the statement of claim that has to be examined and not the statement of defence to ascertain whether there is a reasonable cause of action before the court. What the statement of claim must contain to disclose a cause of action are:- 1. Set out the legal right to the claimant and the obligation of the defendant. 2. It must then go on to set out facts constituting infraction of claimant legal right or failure of the defendant to fulfill his obligation in such a way that if there is no proper defence. 3. The claimant will succeed in the relief or remedy he seeks. A careful perusal of the claimant’s statement of fact reveals that the claimant wants worked for the 3rd defendant as personal assistant/press secretary to the Honourable Minister of Finance and not for Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala in her individual personal capacity. It can also be seen that the statement of facts contained no wrong alleged to have been committed by Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, in her personal capacity. In this suit the claimant has sued Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala the 3rd defendant/applicant in her personal capacity and not in her capacity as the Minister of finance and coordinating Minister for the economy as duly instigating the 1st defendant to unlawfully retire him. The argument of the learned counsel for the 3rd defendant counsel is that Dr. Ngozi Okonjo Iweala is distinct and different from her office as Minister of Finance and coordinating Minister for the economy is correct. It is very clear that Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala is not the employer of the claimant and she cannot be held liable in her personal capacity for any wrong if any committed by the Minister of Finance and Coordinating Minister. For these reasons the name of Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala is struck out. Flowing from the submissions of parties, the preliminary objection raised by the 1st & 2nd defendants fail while the name of the 3rd defendant is struck out as a party to this suit. The case will proceed to hearing. Ruling is entered accordingly. _______________________________ HON. JUSTICE O. A. SHOGBOLA JUDGE