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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE OWERRI JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT OWERRI BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE O. Y. ANUWE Dated: 29th September, 2014 SUIT NO. NICN/OW/24/2013 Between Mr. Obineche Reginald Chijioke - Claimant And 1. Vice Chancellor Federal University of Technology Owerri (FUTO) 2. The Council Federal University of Technology Owerri (FUTO) Defendants 3. Mr. Orje Isegh-Nor (Registrar) Federal University of Technology Owerri (FUTO) Representation B. M. Mbata for the Claimant D. O. Nosike, with him, E. C. Nnani, I. K. Ujah and H. C. Mbachu for the Defendants RULING This action was first commenced at the Federal High Court on the 23rd day of May 2012. By a Complaint filed by order of this court on the 28th day of February 2014, the Claimant claims against the Defendants jointly and severally as follows: a. An order of court setting aside the purported suspension of the Claimant dated 2nd February 2011 for being null and void and of no effect. b. An order of court directing the defendants to pay the Claimant his full emoluments dropped as a result of the purported suspension from 2nd February 2012 till date. c. An order of court setting aside the compulsory retirement of the claimant and his immediate re-instatement. d. An order of court directing the immediate promotion of the claimant due to him since 1st October 2011. e. An order of court against the defendants jointly and severally to pay the claimant the sum of Thirty Million Naira (N30m) for defaming his character and reputation as a result of the purported suspension, compulsory retirement and barring him from entering into any part of the University. By a Notice of preliminary objection dated the 11th day of March 2014 and filed on the 14th day of March 2014, the defendants objected to the competency of this suit on the following grounds: a. That the suit is statute barred in that it was brought outside the time prescribed by section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act (CAP P41), LFN 2004. b. That there is no reasonable cause of action. The defendant raised a sole issue for the determination of the court, which is: “Whether this action is statute barred.” In arguing the lone issue, Counsel to the defendant/applicant submitted that the law is sufficiently settled that when a Notice of preliminary Objection is raised, what the applicant/objector is challenging is the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the action of the plaintiff. To determine whether the court has jurisdiction, the only process the court would look at is the Statement of Claim and the reliefs of the Claimant. In EGBE vs. ADEFARASIN (NO. 2) (1987) 1 NWLR (PT. 47) 1, the Supreme Court held that the two documents which the court will look at in determining whether an action is Statute Barred are the Statement of Claim and the Writ Summons. Counsel went further that the above position of the Supreme Court which has not changed presupposes that once the time upon which the cause of action can be discernible from the Statement of Claim, there is no further need for further proof. This position of the law was further reinforced by the Supreme Court in the case of TEXACO PANAMA INC. vs. SHELL PETROLUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LTD. (2002) 5 NWLR (Pt. 759) 209 at 234, paragraphs. A – D. Counsel submitted that in this instant case, whether or not the action is Statute Barred can easily be gleaned from the face of the Statement of Claim. Counsel referred the court to paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 20 and 25 of the Statement of Claim thus:- (17) “Surprisingly, the 1st defendant on his own volition placed claimant on voluntary retirement and thus compulsorily retired him and published it in the FUTO Newsletter of Vol. 31 No. 3 July – September, 2011 particularly at page 30, the said FUTO Newsletter of Vol. 31 No. 3 July – September, 2011 is hereby pleaded and shall be founded upon during trial”. (18) “The Claimant further avers that surprisingly his name was sandwiched between Anyim Chibuzo O. of Agric. Extension who served for 12 years and was retired with effective dated 11/8/2002 and Unamba Opara SFC under Administration who served for 11 years and whose effective date of retirement was July 30th, 2004.” (19) “The Claimant avers that he never in any way at all material times asked or applied for any voluntary retirement.” (20) “That the 1st defendant out of malice and in his avid desire to intimidate him, arbitrarily retired him because of his Knighthood Relationship in Catholic Church with Mr. Okere John Kennedy.” (25) “The Claimant vehemently states that both his purported suspension and that of voluntary retirement by the 1st defendant were actuated by malice and nothing more as he has done nothing to warrant the suspension and the voluntary retirement because since 28 years of service with the University, he had not been queried for any misconduct in office.” It was the submission of Counsel that the suit became ripe for litigation on the day the Claimant saw his name on FUTO manual of July – September 2011 as one of those that have been compulsorily retired. That was the period of time all the set of facts constituting his right to approach the court came into existence. See RINCO CONST. COM. vs. VEEPEE IND. LTD. (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 929) 85 at 95. It was Counsel’s submission that by the 28th of February 2014 when the claimant filed this suit, the cause of action had been extinguished by the operation of S. 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. This Honourable Court therefore lacks the jurisdiction to look into the merit or otherwise of the claimant’s case. Counsel submitted finally that where there exists a law on limitation of time within which all actions and matters should be taken or where a law exists prescribing a period of time within which an action may be instituted, time begins to run automatically from the date of the accrual of cause of action. See HUME vs. A.G. BENUE STATE (2000) 3 NWLR (Pt.649) 419 at 433. Paras. C –D, 439, E – G. The Court was urged to resolve this lone issue in favour of the applicant and hold that the claims of the claimant is Statute barred and ought to be dismissed. In opposition to the preliminary objection of the defendants, the claimant filed a Counter-Affidavit of 11 paragraphs and a written address wherein Counsel to the Claimant raised the following three (3) issues for determination: 1. Whether the notice of preliminary objection does not offend the rule against demurrer? Where it does, what is the proper order to be made in the circumstances? 2. In determining the issue of statute barred when does cause of action accrue and time begins to run? 3. Whether public officers protection Act will operate to protect a public officer who abuses his office or act malafide? In arguing Issue one as to Whether the notice of preliminary objection does not offend the rule against demurrer, and where it does, what is the proper order to be made in the circumstance, Counsel to the Claimant submitted that the National Industrial Court is a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction with the High Court and as a general rule, demurrer has been abolished. Order 22 Rule 2 of the Imo State High Court (Civil Procedures) Rules 2008 provides that: “Any party may by his pleading raise any point of law and the judge may dispose of the point so raised before or at the trial.” An objection raised in the notice of preliminary objection on the competence of this suit is a point of law which ought to be raised by the pleadings. It is thus submitted that the procedure adopted by the defendants is an invocation of a demurrer proceedings which has been abolished. My lord, we submit that it is a well-established principle of law that a defendant who challenges the competence of a suit in limine is deemed to accept all the averments contained in the plaintiff statement of claim. See Ahaji Silifat Ajilowura vs. Taofic Disu (2006) 10 MJSC 78 at 81 Ratio 4 (p. 104) para. G. To the Claimant, the defendants counsel ought to have, in compliance with the rule against demurrer, filed his Statement of Defence by which he would have raised any point of law which then will be set down for hearing. More importantly, the issue raised by the notice of preliminary objection is a special defence. Special defenses by their nature are usually raised and pleaded as a shield and not as a sword as the defendants/applicants have sought to do by the present application. Counsel therefore submitted that the present application having been filed in breach and utter disregard to the rule against demurrer is irregular and should be discountenanced. If a law or rule of practice prescribes that proceedings in respect of a particular cause of action should be commenced by one method, a litigant would be wrong to commence the proceedings in respect of that particular action by another method. See the case of Orakul Resources Ltd. vs. N.C.C. (2007) 16 NWLR pt. 1060. The rules of court must prima facie be obeyed, and the court has an inherent jurisdiction to ensure litigants’ compliance with its rules. The court accordingly can strike out any process not filed in compliance with the relevant rules. Counsel urged the court to strike out the application. In arguing Issue two, as to when does the cause of action accrue, and when time begins to run in determining of the issue of statute barred, Counsel submitted that it is settled by judicial authorities that time begins to run for purposes of limitation law, from the date of the accrual of the cause of action. In other words, time begins when there is in existence, a person who can sue and another who can be sued, and all facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. See Fadare vs. Attorney General of Oyo State (1982) 4 SC1. Counsel went further that it has also been held that the period of limitation of action is determined by looking at the writ of summons and statement of claim. This is to ascertain the date of which the wrong complained of, giving rights to the Plaintiff’s claim was committed or when the rights sought to be enforced accrued and to compare the date with the date on which the Writ of Summons was taken out or filed. If the date pleaded by the plaintiff in his Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim as when the right to sue accrued is beyond the limitation period enacted by applicable statute, the action is statute barred and is incompetent. See; Woherem vs. Emeruwa (2004) 13 NWLR (398). See also; Francis Ofili vs. Civil Service Commission (2008) All FWLR (Pt.343) Pg.1620 at 1622 Ratio 3. He went on that the date of accrual of action in this suit was on 27th February, 2012 as pleaded in paragraph 12 of the amended Statement of Facts which is the date the claimant got notice of his said purported suspension, and this action was filed on 23rd May 2012 a period within the three months statutory period. In Paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 18, 19 and 21, the claimant avers that the said letter of suspension was neither sent to him nor did he sign for any, nor was he invited to any meeting at all that sat over any decision to suspend him nor did the defendants, particularly the 1st defendant, take any steps to draw his attention to any letter or publication which contained adverse report on him, except as pleaded in paragraph 12 of the amended Statement of Facts. To the Claimant, time will not begin to run for him until he gets notice of his suspension or that of his voluntary retirement. It was also submitted that it is the duty of the retiring or suspending authority, in this case, the defendants to bring to the notice of the claimant, their decision to suspend or retire him. The defendants cannot purport to suspend or retire the claimant and lock up the suspension letter and the retirement notice in their drawers without bringing it to the notice of the claimant who was affected by their decision. Counsel submitted that unless and until the claimant gets notice of their act of suspension or retirement, nothing has been done. Equity will not permit them to ambush the claimant in a gambit of suspension or retirement. In the case of Nigeria Ports Authority vs. Abu Airadion Ajobi (2006) Vol. 9 M.J.S.C. p. 183 Ratio 1 and particularly page 185, the Supreme Court held that any action instituted before the acquittal and discharge of the plaintiff who was facing trial for corruption amounts to mere speculation. The court equally held that time will not begin to run for the plaintiff who was dismissed while his trial for corruption was still pending at the magistrate court; but rather, time will begin to run after his acquittal and discharge. Counsel urged the court to hold that for purposes of computation of time in this suit, time begins to run for the claimant on 27th February 2012 when he got notice of his suspension by chance and not any other date unknown to the claimant. In arguing Issue three, as to whether the Public Officers Protection Act will operate to protect a public officer who abuses his office or acts malafide, counsel recalled the provision of Section 2(a) of Public Officers Protection Act: “Where any action, prosecution or other proceedings is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such act, law, duty or authority, the following shall have effect – under sub para. (A), it went on: The action prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commence within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance or damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.” . Assuming, but without conceding that this action is statute barred, counsel to the defendants is contending that the suspension and or voluntary retirement was in exercise of a public duty by the 1st defendant and being so is protected by the Public Officers Protection Act and that the claimant’s failure to commence this action within the limitation time approved by the Act was therefore barred. Counsel to the Claimant submitted that the above view of the defendants’ counsel is not only erroneous but totally misconceived. The Public Officers Protection Act as the name implies, is an act designed for the protection of public officers from liability of acts or omission done in the execution of their duties. The question is this: “Could it be said that the reckless, arbitrary and high handed manner the 1st defendant purported to have suspended and or retired the claimant without as much as given him an ear and the concealment of the suspension or the blatant, vindictive arrogance in which the 1st defendant purported to have voluntary retired the claimant who never sought or applied for voluntary retirement be said to be an act done in furtherance of public duty? Counsel submitted that the Public Officers Protection Act is designed to protect the officers who act in good faith and does not apply to acts done in abuse of the office and with no semblance of legal justification. In other words, the law will not apply to protect a person who had abused his position for the purpose of acting maliciously. The law will not avail a person who egregiously abused his office for the purpose of doing wrong. See the case of IBETO CEMENT CO. LTD. vs. A.G. FEDERATION (2008) 1 NWLR Pt. 1069 page 40 ratio 9. To the Claimant, it follows that section 2(a) of the public officers’ protection Act will only operate to protect public officers who genuinely act bonafide in the execution of furtherance of public duty without malice or ill-will. Thus where malice is alleged to have actuated the action of the public officer, the protection offered by section 2(a) of the Act will be lost, and only a full trial was necessary to determine whether or not the public office Protection Act would avail the respondents. See Egbe v. Belgore (2004) 8 NWLR (pt. 875) 336; Nwankwere v. Adewunmi (1966) 1 SCNLR 358; Offoboche v. Ogoja L.G. (2001) 16 NWLR (pt. 739) 458; Lagos City Council v. Ogunbiyi (1969) 1 All NWLR 297. It is trite that it is the writ of summons and statement of claim that the court looks at to determine whether the action is statute barred or not. In paragraph 12 of the Statement of Facts, the claimant averred that the earliest notice of his purported suspension was 27/2/2012. In paragraphs 18 &19 of the Statement of Facts, the claimant averred how he became aware of the FUTO News Letter which contained publication of his voluntary retirement. In paragraphs 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 30, 31, 32, the claimant pleaded copious particulars of malice in aid of his claim and belief that the acts of the defendants particularly the 1st defendant, were actuated by malice. By Section 15 (1)&(2) of the Federal University of Technology Act Cap F23, Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2004 provisions thereof safeguarding the Claimant’s right to fair hearing as enshrined under section 36 of the Constitution Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) 1999 as amended were utterly disregarded. By section 21(1) of the Pension Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004 an intending public officer wishing to go on voluntary retirement must give the minister three months’ notice of his retirement or forfeit his three months’ salary in lieu of notice. The claimant gave no such notice. The 1st defendant thus had no basis for his voluntary retirement only that he was malicious. See: Rufus Femi Amokeodo vs. Inspector General of Police & ors. (2001) FWLR Pt. 33 Pg. 344 at 346 Ratio 3. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the application. I have carefully considered the submissions of counsel with respect to this application. The brief fact of this case is that the claimant in this suit, a staff of the Federal University of Technology Owerri (FUTO), Health Services Department, on Monday 27th February 2012 stumbled into on his desk what seemed like a purported letter of suspension from duty when he came as usual to work that day. That was the first signal of this discord between him and the defendants. The dispatch which carried the said letter of suspension from the office of the 3rd defendant to the general office of the Health Service Department was said to have come in on 23rd February 2012 and was never brought to notice of claimant neither did he sign the said dispatch book for purposes of collecting his mail hereinafter exhibited as Exhibit “A” in our counter affidavit. The rude discovery of Exhibit “A” on claimant desk created ripples which led to the discovery of a FUTO News Letter in which the 1st defendant purportedly retired the claimant on voluntary retirement. It was on the basis of these anomalies that the claimant sought judicial intervention. The claimant/respondent instituted this action at the Federal High Court Owerri in suit No. FHC/OW/CS/75/2012 which suit dated 21st May 2012 was filed 23rd May 2012. The suit was transferred to this court and named Suit No. NICN/OW/24/2013 and subsequently came up for mention on 3rd Dec. 2013. This court ordered parties to re-file their processes to bring them in compliance with the rules of this court, and ordered that the said re-filing shall be without prejudice to the date of commencement of the action at the Federal High Court. It was in compliance with the order of court made on 3rd December 2013 that the Claimant re-filed his originating processes on the 28th day of February 2014. It was upon service on the defendants, the originating processes of this suit which was filed in compliance with the order of this court, that the Defendants/Applicants filed this notice of preliminary objection. In determining this preliminary objection, I have identified a sole and simple issue for determination. Which is, whether or not the suit is statute barred? Before I proceed to consider the issue for determination, there is the need to first resolve an issue raised by the claimant’s counsel in his written address. In his issue one, counsel submitted that the preliminary objection is incompetent because it was not raised by way of pleading and as such it offends against the rule against demurrer which has been abolished. Counsel cited and relied on Order 22 Rule 2 of the Imo State High Court (Civil Procedures) Rules 2008 in support of his contention. The claimant’s counsel consequently prayed that the notice of preliminary objection should be discountenanced. With respect to Learned Counsel for the claimant, the Rules of the High Court of Imo State do not apply to this court. By Section 254F of the 1999 constitution (as amended), the applicable Rule of this Court is one as made by the President of this court pursuant to the section. I may have been persuaded to consider the contention of counsel if there was a similar provision in the NIC Rules 2007. Since there is no such corresponding provision in the Rules of this Court, the defendants are not prevented from raising the preliminary objection in this court even when they have not filed a defence. Besides, the preliminary objection by the defendants touches on the jurisdiction of this court to continue to hear and determine the suit. Jurisdictional issue as to statutory limitation has been raised. The issue affects the very foundation of this action. In that circumstance, the objection ought to be taken at the earliest opportunity before any other step in the proceedings is taken. See T.O.M.C NIG. LTD. vs. U.T.C PLC (2003) FWLR (Pt. 173) 130 AT 151 where it was held that issues of jurisdiction can be raised even by way of motion by a defendant without first filing a statement of defence. This is because if there is no jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are a nullity no matter how well they may have been conducted. The issue of jurisdiction of a court is very fundamental and the defendants are permitted to raise it peremptorily without first filing a statement of defence. See ELABANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 328) 604 at 650-651; IKINE vs. EDJERODO (2002) FWLR (Pt. 92) 1775 at 1811 In view of the foregoing, the objection of the claimant counsel to the Preliminary Objection on the ground that it amounts to demurrer has no merit and it is consequently discountenanced. I shall now go on to look at the issue I have identified to be determined in this preliminary objection. The preliminary objection is on the ground that the claimant’s suit is statute barred by reason of the Public Officers’ Protection Act. The defendants counsel has submitted that the suit was filed outside three months of the accrual of cause of action and that by the 28th of February, 2014, when the claimant filed this suit; the cause of action had been extinguished by the operation of S. 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. He concluded that this Court lacks the jurisdiction to determine case. Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act, Chapter P41, Laws of the Federation, 2004 Provides- 2. “Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect- a. the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.” This provision is to the effect that actions against public officers must be filed within 3 months of the accrual of the cause of action otherwise, the right to enforce the action will be barred and the court will no longer have jurisdiction to entertain the action. For the provision of section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act to be applicable to cover the defendants in this case, it has to be determined whether- 1. The defendants are public officers or persons acting in the execution of public duties within the meaning of that law. 2. The act done by the defendants in respect of which the action is commenced is an act done in pursuance or execution of any law, public duty or authority or in respect of an alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority. See IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1 at 32 The meaning of the term “public officer” or “any person” as used in section 2 of Public Officers Protection Act has been defined extensively by the Supreme Court in IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C KADUNA STATE (SUPRA) to mean not only natural persons invested with performance of duties of a public nature but extends to public bodies created by statutes, artificial persons, institutions or persons sued in their official names or titles. From the submissions of counsels to the parties in this suit in their written addresses, there is no dispute on the fact that any of the defendants is not a public officer or that the cause of action arose from the execution of the public duties of the defendants. It is particularly clear from the averments in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the claimant’s amended statement of facts that the defendants are public officers and the act complained of were done in execution of their public duties. Having resolved that the defendants are public officers and the acts done by the defendants that resulted to the complaint before this court, is the execution of their public duty, the next task is to determine whether this suit is barred. By the provision of section 2 (a) of POPA, an action must be commenced against a public officer within 3 months of the accrual of the cause of action. In determining whether the action is statute barred, it is pertinent to determine when the cause of action arose and when the claimant filed this action. These facts can only be determined from the Complaint and the Statement of Facts. In BANK OF THE NORTH vs. GANA 2006 All FWLR Pt. 296 862 at 881, it was held that “the period of limitation is determined by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the plaintiff a cause of action and comparing that date with the date on which the writ was filed” …”if the time on the writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute barred”. Thus, in determining whether this action is statute, the following must be determined- i. when the cause of action arose ii. when the plaintiff filed the action It is essential when dealing with limitation of action, to determine the precise date on which the cause of action arose because that is when time will start to run. Cause of action arises on the date or time when a breach or any act that will warrant the person who is adversely affected by the act to take action in court. See BANK OF THE NORTH vs. GANA (SUPRA) at 881. When did the claimant’s cause of action arise in this suit? From the reliefs sought on the complaint and the facts of the claimant’s case as stated in his amended statement of facts, amended by order of this court on 10th July 2014, it is obvious that the dispute arose from his suspension and voluntary retirement by the defendants. In paragraphs 12 to 19 of the amended statement of facts, the claimant pleaded as follows- “12. The claimant avers that it was so curious and surprising to him that he was confronted with a suspension letter at the instance of the 1st defendant which he stumbled into on his desk on Monday 27th day of February, 2012, when he came to the office as usual. The said letter dated 2nd February, 2011 and headed “Suspension from duty” is hereby pleaded and shall be founded upon at the trial. The claimant pleads the dispatch book from the 3rd defendant’s office to the Health Centre which carried the suspension letter of the claimant on 23/2/2012. Notice to produce is hereby given to the 3rd defendant. 13. The claimant states that in the said letter that he was accused of misconduct as a reason for his suspension which is to take effect from Feb. 2nd 2012. 14. The claimant states that prior to this said letter of suspension on him at the instance of the 1st defendant he did not receive any query from the 1st defendant accusing him of misconduct so that he can defend himself, neither did he face any investigative panel for misconduct against him but rather like a wide fire in the harmatan the news of his suspension suddenly spread throughout the University Community. 15. The claimant further states that he has also not received any letter of admonition or confirmation or review of his said suspension letter by the 1st defendant, from the 2nd defendant even at the point of filing this suit. 16. The claimant avers that what baffles him so much about the said letter of suspension is that it was dated Feb. 2nd 2011 for a suspension that will take effect on 2nd Feb. 2012 and that he was neither invited, nor written about the said management meeting where decision to suspend him was taken as contained in the body of his letter of suspension. 17. Surprisingly, the 1st defendant on his own volition placed claimant on voluntary retirement and thus compulsorily retired him and published it in the FUTO Newsletter of Vol. 31, No. 3, July – September, 2011 particularly at page 30. The FUTO Newsletter of Vol. 31 No. 3 July – September 2011, is hereby pleaded and shall be founded upon during trial. 18. The claimant avers that the defendants never brought to his notice the existence of the said FUTO Newsletter of Vol. 31 N0. 3 July – September 2011 in which decision of his voluntary retirement was published nor was he given a copy virtue of his cadre as a senior FUTO Staff. 19. The claimant avers that he became aware of the said FUTO Newsletter of Vol. 31 N0. 3 July – September 2011 in March 2012 when the ripples of his suspension filled the air courtesy of a FUTO Staff who pleaded anonymity drew his attention to it. From the above facts, particularly paragraphs 18, 19 and 12, it is the claimant’s case that the defendants never communicated his retirement to him until he read of it in March 2012 in the FUTO Newsletter Vol.13, No.3 of July 2011-September 2011. Also his suspension letter, dated 2nd Feb 2011 was delivered to his office on 23rd February 2012 but he read it on 27th Feb 2012. In my view, with regard to the retirement of the claimant, his time stated running when he saw his name of the newsletter as one of those retired by the defendants. The defendants counsel has the same view when he submitted as follows in paragraphs 3.11 of his written address – “The dispute became ripe for litigation on the day he saw his name on FUTO manual of July – September 2011 as one of those that have been compulsorily retired. That was the period or time all the set of facts constituting his right to approach the court came into existence”. Counsel cited the case of RINCO CONST. COM. vs. VEEPEE IND. LTD in support of this view. The claimant has averred in paragraph 18 of the amended Statement of Fact that the defendants did not bring the newsletter to his attention neither was he given a copy which he is entitled to as a senior staff. This pleaded fact indicates that the defendants did not inform the claimant of his retirement and clearly, the claimant is saying the fact of his retirement was concealed from him. In such a situation, it was held in JALLCO LTD vs. OWONIBOYS TECH. SERVICES LTD (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 391) 534 at 547 that time begins to run when the claimant became aware of the wrong done to him by the defendants. Also in N.P.A PLC vs. LOTUS PLASTICS LTD (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 297) 1023 at 1038, the Supreme Court, when determining when the cause of action arose in that case held thus- “the facts or combination of facts which gave rise to the right to sue accrued to the 1st respondent on 26/5/93 when it became fully aware of the extent of the damages to the bus …” In this instant case by virtue of the claimant’s pleading in paragraphs 17 to 19, it is my view that time began to run, in respect of his retirement, from March 2012 when he saw his name on the FUTO newsletter. With regards to the claimant’s suspension, the suspension letter, though dated 2nd February 2011, was to the effect that the suspension takes effect from 2nd February 2012. From the facts in paragraphs 12 of the amended statement of facts, the letter was delivered to the claimant’s office on 23rd February and he read it on 27th February 2012. I am of the view that the claimant’s time started running the day after the suspension letter was delivered to his office, as that is the day he is deemed to have been informed of the suspension, which is on 23rd February 2012. I hold this view in reliance on the authority of SANDA vs. KUKAWA LOCAL GOVT 1991 2 NWLR (Pt. 174) 379 AT 388 where it was determined that time started running against the appellant on the day after he received the letter terminating his employment. It was held thus- “The appellant was dismissed from the service by the 1st respondent from 12th December 1983, the date exhibit A was written as it stated that the termination was with immediate effect. The time would therefore start running against the appellant the day after exhibit A was written and received by the appellant”. See also IKINE vs. EDJERODO (SUPRA) at 1796 From the dates pleaded by the claimant as to when he became aware of the acts of the defendants, the date of the suspension is earlier in time. Therefore, the claimant’s cause of action arose when the letter of suspension was delivered to his office, which was on 23rd February 2012 and the time started to count for the purpose of determining the limitation period from the following day. When calculating the period of limitation, as a general rule, the date of the event from which the calculation is to commence is normally to be excluded from the reckoning. See Section 15(2)a of the Interpretation Act 2004. See also CHIME vs. A.G FEDERATION (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 439) 550; AUTO IMPORT EXPORT vs. ADEBAYO 2003 FWLR Pt. 140 1686 at 1700. Order 25 Rule 1 (a) NIC Rules 2007 is also instructive on this point. Thus, the period started counting from 24th February 2012. This suit was commenced in the Federal High Court before it was transferred to this court. The Writ of summons was filed on 23rd May 2012. Upon the transfer of the matter to this court, on 3rd December 2013, I ordered the parties to re-file their processes before this court but without prejudice to the date of commencement of the suit at the Federal High Court. What that means is that the date of filing of the writ at the Federal High Court is reckoned with, in determining when this suit was commenced. Therefore, this suit was filed on 23rd May 2012. By section 2(a) of POPA, the claimant has 3 months starting from 24th February 2012 to file this action against the defendant otherwise, the suit would have been statute barred. The suit was filed on 23rd May 2012. Time started counting against the claimant on 24th February 2012 and 3 months from that day ended on 23rd May 2012. Clearly but quite narrowly, the Claimant filed this suit within 3 months of the accrual of the cause of action. He filed the suit on the last day of the 3 months period. From the averments in paragraphs 12 to 19 of the claimant’s amended Statement of Facts, the date of filing of the writ in this suit and the authorities I have referred to in this ruling, I have no difficulty in coming to a conclusion that this suit is not statute barred. The preliminary objection fails and it is hereby dismissed. The case will now proceed to hearing. I make no order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge