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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE OWERRI JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT OWERRI BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE O. Y. ANUWE Dated: July 03, 2014 SUIT NO. NIC/OW/14/2014 Between Boniface Ibeh - Claimant And 1. Dr. Benneth O. Uwakwem 2. Dr. (Mrs.) Angela Uwakwem (Medical Director Federal Medical Centre Owerri) 3. Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria Defendants/Applicants 4. Federal Ministry of Health Representation: E.C. Ekechukwu with the brief of U. M. Okwara for the Claimant F. C. Ekueme for the 1st and 2nd Defendants; also holds the brief of Adetola Kazeem SAN for the 3rd Defendant A. A. Shamaki for the 4th Defendant JUDGMENT The Claimant commenced this suit at the Federal High Court by way of writ of summons filed on the 29th day of November 2012, seeking the following reliefs against the defendants: 1. A declaration by this Honourable court that the 1st Defendant is not qualified for registration, employment, appointment or practice as a dental surgeon in Nigeria. 2. An order of this Honourable court on the 3rd defendant to uphold and give full effect to the de-registration of the 1st defendant as a dental surgeon on the 10th day of March 2005 by striking out the 1st defendant’s name off the relevant register of the Council. 3. An order of this Honourable Court on the 3rd Defendant to further investigate the purported registration of the 1st Defendant as a dental surgeon. 4. An order of this Honourable Court setting aside the employment/appointment of the 1st Defendant as a dental surgeon with the Federal Medical Centre Owerri. 5. An Order of this Honourable Court on the 2nd and 4th Defendants to recover all monies paid to the 1st Defendant by the Federal Medical Centre Owerri by virtue of his erroneous employment/appointment as a dental surgeon. 6. An injunction restraining the 1st defendant from parading or holding out himself as a registered dental surgeon. The writ was accompanied with Statement of Claim, list of witnesses and Witnesses’ written Statements on oath. By an order of transfer dated the 3rd day of February 2014, the suit was transferred to this court By a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 5th February 2013 and filed on 7th February 2013, the 1st and 2nd defendants sought for an order striking out the suit for being incompetent, on the following grounds: a. The Plaintiff lacks the Locus Standi to institute this action. b. The cause of action in this suit is statute-barred by virtue of the Public Officers Protection Act, Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2004. c. The service of processes on the 1st and 2nd defendants is not in accordance with the law. d. The suit did not disclose any cause of action or reasonable cause of action against the 2nd defendant. In support of the objection is a 15 paragraph affidavit deposed to by the 1st Plaintiff, and a written address wherein the following four issues were raised for the determination of the court: (a) Whether the plaintiff have the locus standi to constitute this action. (b) Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not Statute – Barred by virtue of the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (c) Whether the originating processes in this suit were properly served on the 1st and 2nd defendants. (d) Whether any cause of action or reasonable cause of action arose in this suit against the 2nd defendant. In arguing Issue One, It was counsel’s submission that it is the statement of claim that is looked at, to determine the locus standi of a plaintiff, and that the issue of locus standi is not dependent on the success or merit of a case but on whether the plaintiff has sufficient interest in the subject matter of the dispute. On this, he cited the case of LAWANI ADESOKA & 3 ORS. vs. PRINCE MICHAEL ADEGOROLU & 3ORS. (1977) 48 LRCN 579JJ at 598 & 599JJ. Citing the case of ADESANYA vs. PRESIDENT OF NIGERIA (1981) 2 NCLR 338, he stated that it is an established principle of law that a party making a claim or bringing an application before the court must have locus standi. He submitted that the plaintiff did not raise or plead in his statement of claim facts establishing his civil rights and obligations in respect of the subject matter. See OROGUN V. SOREMEKUN (1986) 5 NWLR 688; that in the statement of claim, the plaintiff did not disclose his interest with the 3rd defendant, 4th defendant and the Federal Medical Centre Owerri; that the plaintiff has not shown how the employment of the 1st defendant by the 4th defendant and how the registration or de-registration of the 1st defendant by the 3rd defendant would affect him; and that the plaintiff has not also shown how his personal interest was immediately affected and would be affected in the future. Counsel to the 1st and 2nd defendants submitted that the plaintiff has no interest, therefore he has no competent cause or action to activate the jurisdiction of the court; and that this case was not initiated with due process of law and upon fulfillment of a condition precedent to the excise of jurisdiction. See MADUKOLU vs. NKEMDILIM (1962) 1 All NLR Pt. 4 Pg. 587. Furthermore, in the Statement of Claim, the plaintiff did not state where he was wronged, or how he was wronged. It is trite law that plaintiff can only redress a wrong, and where none has been alleged, there will be nothing to redress. See THOMAS vs. OLUFOSOYE (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669. Besides, the plaintiff has not shown that he has an interest in the subject matter greater than what other ordinary members of the society have. In paragraph 18 of the Statement of Claim, plaintiff averred that “the plaintiff has brought this action to protect the integrity of the Federal Medical Centre Owerri and for the overall protection of members of the public from the unwholesome practice of the 1st and 2nd defendant. It is worthy of note that the Federal Medical Centre Owerri which the plaintiff purports to protect is not party to this suit neither is the plaintiff himself a Staff of the Federal Medical Centre Owerri; and indeed, the plaintiff in his originating processes did not indicate that the action is on a representative capacity. It is trite law that where a community is entitled to benefit, it is only the community as a whole, or through its proper representative, that can sue. See BADEDJO vs. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 143) 254 at 264 – 265 F – A. The plaintiff on the face of his statement of claim did not state how the Federal Medical Centre and the public would benefit by this action. The law is that, for a particular purpose to qualify as a public purpose or interest it must not be vague and the way it benefits the public at large must be stated and capable of proof. See ALHAJI BELLO vs. THE DIOCESAN SYNOD OF LAGOS & ORS (1960) WNLR, cited with approval in GOLDMARK NIG. LTD. & 3ORS vs. IBAFON CO. LTD & 4ORS (2012) MRSCJ VOL. 11 69 at 111 B – C. The test is whether or not the purpose is meant to benefit the public and not just to aid the plaintiff or a group of people for his or their own purpose, as deposed in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the affidavit in support of this preliminary objection. See ALHAJI BELLO vs. THE DIOCESAN SYNOD OF LAGOS & ORS (Supra); GOLDMARK NIG. LTD. & 3ORS vs. IBAFON CO. LTD & 4ORS (Supra). He urged the court to dismiss the case of the plaintiff, because the facts on the statement of claim have not satisfied the requirement of being a person aggrieved, or a person who has suffered a legal grievance, or a person who has an interest in the issues/subject matter of the action, which has wrongfully refused the plaintiff something or wrongfully affected his title to something. See SOCIETY GENERAL BANK LTD. vs. AFOKORO (1999) 11 NWLR (PT. 628) 521 at 537 – 358. Finally on this issue, Counsel referred to Paragraph 19 of the Statement of Claim and submitted that the relief of the plaintiff in this suit is declaratory in nature. It is trite law that in a declaratory action where the plaintiff does not allege that any of his rights has been infringed, it would be contrary to principle to make a declaration, discretionary as it is, in vacuo. See OLAWOYIN vs. A.G OF NORTHAN REGION (1961) 1 ALL NLR (Pt. 2) 269 at 271; BEDENJO V. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1996) 43 LRCN (2100) at 2133. He therefore urged the court to dismiss this suit and to hold that the plaintiff is a “busybody” and a meddlesome interloper. In arguing Issue No 2, Counsel submitted that the cause of action in this suit is Statute – Barred. Under section 2 (a) of the Limitation Act CAP 41 Laws of the Federation 2004, the plaintiff has the period of three (3) months within which to institute this action. The plaintiff/respondent has averred in paragraphs 10 and 19 (b) of the Statement of Claim that the act of de-registration complained of took place in March 2005. Section 2 (a) of the Act reads as follows:- “Where any action, prosecution, or proceedings commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any act or Law or any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such ACT, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect”. “the action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or incase of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof”. Counsel submitted that the defendants are creation of statutes as averred in paragraphs 2, 3 and 6 of the Statement of Claim. In other words, the defendants are public officers and therefore can avail themselves of the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act, CAP 41 Laws of Federation of Nigeria. See IBRAHIM vs. JSC & ANOR (1998) 14 NWLR (pt. 584) 1. He submitted further that if the honourable court should look at the date this process was filed in court and the date in paragraph 10 of the statement of claim (which shows when the cause of action arose), the honourable court would come to an irresistible conclusion that this suit was filed outside the mandatory three months as required by the statute of limitation and therefore the suit is consequently statute – barred. See IBRAHIM vs. JSC & ANOR (Supra) at 13. See also ELABANJO & ORS vs. DAWODU (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001) 76 and NASIR vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & ORS (2010) 1-2 S.C 65 at 87 – 90. He therefore urged the court to strike out this suit as the claimant’s right of action to the court (if any at all) is totally Statute-Barred. In arguing Issue No 3, It is submitted most humbly that the existence of service of originating processes (writ of summons, statement of claim and other processes) on the defendant(s) is to enable the defendant know the case against him and prepare to defend it. The 1st and 2nd defendants have in the affidavit in this case raised that the originating process in this case where served on them by a 3rd party. Section 6(2) of the Federal High Court Rules (2009) of this court provides that: “An originating process shall be served personally by delivering to the person to be served a copy of the document, duly certified by the Registrar as being a true copy of the originating process filed without exhibiting the original thereof.” Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution as amended gives the defendants the opportunity to be heard in any matter to which he has been sued. He cited the following cases: (1) DAHIRU MOHAMMED vs. TAJU MUSTAPHA (1993) 5 NWLR (PT 292) 40 (2) SKEN CONSULT NIG. V. UKEY (1981) 1 SC 6; (3) N.B.N. LTD. V. GUTHRIC NIG. LTD (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 284) (4) ALHAJI A. ODUTOLA vs. INSPECTOR KAYODE (1994)2 NWLR (324) 1 at 22 (5) KALU MARK vs. EKE (2004) 5 NWLR (PT. 865) 54; and submitted that the service of the originating process on the 1st and 2nd defendants in this suit is not in compliance with the mandatory provision of Section 6(2) of the Rules of the Federal High Court (2004); and that a breach of the said provision is an illegality and therefore the process is an abnormality. See ALHAJI A. ODUTOLA vs. INSPECTOR KAYODE (Supra); KALU MARK vs. EKE (Supra), and SKEN CONSULT NIG. vs. UKEY (supra) The court was therefore urged to declare the service of the Originating processes of this suit null and void. In arguing Issue No 4, Counsel submitted that a cursory look at the entire statement of claim would indicate that the 2nd defendant was not in any way linked or associated with any of the purported wrong complained of. Apart from the 2nd defendant being the Medical Director of Federal Medical Centre Owerri and wife of the 1st defendant, there is no other paragraph of the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim that links or associates her with the subject matter of this suit. The 2nd defendant neither employed the 1st defendant nor the Registrar of the Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria responsible for de-registering the 1st defendant. See paragraphs 3 and 4 of the statement of claim. Furthermore, the Federal Medical Centre Owerri is not a party to this suit. This action against the 2nd defendant is therefore brought out of malice and calculated to embarrass the 2nd defendant. It is trite law that where there is no cause or good cause of action against a party to a suit, it is proper for the court to strike out the name of the party or the suit. See LASISI FADARE & ORS vs. A.G. OF OYO STATE (1982) 4 SC 1 at 67. Counsel urged the court to so do because there is no fact averred on the Statement of Claim which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove against the 2nd defendant. In reaction to the 1st and 2nd defendants’ notice of preliminary objection, the plaintiff on the 18th day of February 2012, filed a 14 paragraph Counter-Affidavit and a written address wherein he raised a preliminary point of law urging the court to strike out this Notice of Preliminary Objection for non-compliance with Order 7, rule 1 (1); Order 13 rule 2(1) and Order 16 rules 1 and 2 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009. The said provisions when read together, enjoins the defendants to file their Memorandum of Appearance along with the Statement of Defence which may include any preliminary objection they wish to raise to the plaintiff’s action. There is no provision in the rules for the filing of a notice of preliminary objection before the statement of defence. Order 7 rule 1 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 provides thus: “A defendant served with an originating process shall within thirty days file in the Registry, along with the processes mentioned in order 12 rule 2 (1) the original and copy of a duly completed and signed memorandum of appearance as in Form II with such modifications or variations as circumstances may require.” Order 12, rule 2 provides thus: “Subject to sub-rule (2) of this rule, a defendant who enters an appearance and intends to defend the action shall, unless the court gives leave to the contrary serve (a) A statement of defence which may include any preliminary objection he wishes to raise to the plaintiff’s action; (b) List of witnesses to be called at the trial; (c) Written statement on oath of the witnesses; (d) Copies of every document to be relied on at the trial; and (e) List of non-documentary exhibits at the time he files this Memorandum of Appearance. Order 16, Rules 1 and 2(1) provides thus: “No demurrer shall be allowed A party shall be entitled to raise by his pleading any point of law, and any point so raised shall be disposed of by the Judge who tries the cause at or after the trial. He submitted that rules of court must be complied with strictly as it forms part of the Nigerian Law, and failure to comply with the Rules will vitiate the proceedings of the Court. The Court of Appeal in IBRAHIM vs. HABU (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 295) 570 at 581 held thus: “This duty on the Lower Court of ensuring compliance with the rules of court is fundamental having regard to the fact that the rules form part of our laws which must be complied with strictly”. In AROMOLARAN vs. OLADELE (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 162) 359 at 371 the Court of Appeal also held thus: “The rules of court to which I have referred are made to be obeyed and complied with. When there is non-compliance with the Rules, the court should not remain passive and helpless, there must be a sanction otherwise the purpose of enacting the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules 1984 will be defeated The word “SHALL” is used throughout the above cited rules of court to connote mandatory, imperative or peremptory, not permissive or directory. See the Supreme Court decision in NNONYE vs. ANYICHIE (2005) 2 NWLR (Pt. 910) 623 at 649. The Supreme Court in EKECHI vs. OKAH (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 267) 34 at 47 held that it is obligatory for any party to an action to comply with statutory Provisions of any enactment relevant to his cause. The Supreme Court, per Iguh J.S.C. in GAMU YARE vs. ALHAJI ADAMU NUNKU & ORS (1995) NWLR (Pt. 395) 129 at 148 held thus: “The function of the court being jus dicare and not jus dare, if the language of the legislature is clear, explicit and unambiguous the court must give effect to it for in that case, the express words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature and must not be over turned.” None of the defendants in this suit filed a statement of defence within the time allowed by the rules. They are in breach of the clear provisions of the above cited rules of this honourable court. He urged the court to strike out the 1st and 2nd defendants’ notice of preliminary objection for being incompetent. In the alternative, Counsel proferred the following arguments in reply to the issues raised by the 1st and 2nd defendants’ in their objection: On LOCUS STANDI, it was the submission of Counsel to the Plaintiff that it is now trite law that in order to determine the locus standi of a plaintiff, the court will only look at the writ of summons and the statement of claim. ADESANOYE vs. ADEWOLE (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1000) 242 SEHINDEMI vs. GOV. LAGOS STATE (2006) 10 NWLR (Pt. 987) 1. He submitted that the plaintiff in this suit has sufficient legal interest to vest him with the locus standi to maintain this action. A careful look at the reliefs sought by the plaintiff at paragraph 19 of the Statement of Claim, particularly paragraphs 19 (a) (d) (e) and paragraphs 1 and 17 of the statement of claim shows that this cause falls within the realm of public interest litigation on a constitutional issue. The question of locus standi in such matters has been carefully separated by the court over the years from the issue of locus standi in other causes. In other words, when infraction of the provisions of the law is involved, the courts adopt a more liberal view on the issue of locus standi. The plaintiff in paragraph 1 of his statement of claim stated that he is a Nigerian Citizen. At paragraph 17 of the same statement of claim the status of the plaintiff as a former employee of the Federal Medical Centre Owerri was highlighted. Counsel urged the court to take judicial notice of the fact that deductions are made from Civil Servants’ salaries as tax. Part of the plaintiff’s claim deals with the breach of the law by the 1st defendant. Paragraph 10 of the statement of claim shows that the 1st defendant is not a qualified Dental Surgeon and has thereby breached the law by engaging in the practice of dental surgery and receiving salary from the 4th defendant through the Federal Medical Centre Owerri. See also paragraphs 5, 8 and 9 of the Plaintiff’s Counter Affidavit. It is submitted that the salary illegally received by the 1st defendant is partly from the plaintiffs’ tax money. The plaintiff reliefs are seeking to stop the illegal payment of his and other tax payers money to the 1st defendant and to stop him from impersonating as a dental surgeon. Section 18(1) of the Medical and Dental Practitioners Act provides thus: “A person shall not hold an appointment or practice as a medical practitioner or dental surgeon in Nigeria unless he is registered with the Council under the provisions of this Act.” Section 6(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria vests judicial powers in the courts. Sub-section 6(b), thereof provides thus: “The judicial power vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section. (a) ………………………………………………………………. (b) Shall extend to all matters between persons, or between government or authority and to any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person. From the foregoing, it is clear that this case involves an infraction of the provisions of the law, and the courts have continued to adopt a liberal approach to the issue of locus standi. The Court of Appeal in conferring Chief Gani Fawehinmi with locus standi in FAWEHINMI vs. PRESIDENT FRN (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1054) 275 at 299 held thus: “It will definitely be a source of concern to any tax payer who watched the funds he contributed or is contributing towards the running of the affairs of the State being wasted when such funds could have been channeled into jobs. Such an individual has sufficient interest of coming to court to enforce the law to ensure that his tax money is utilized prudently.” The court further held thus: “In this country, where we have a written Constitution which establishes a constitutional structure involving a tripartite allocation of the powers to the Judiciary, Executive and Legislature as the co-ordinate organs of Government, judicial function must primarily aim at preserving legal order by confining the legislative and the executive within their powers in the interests of the public and since the dominant objective of the rule of law is to ensure the observance of the law, it can best be achieved by permitting any person to put the judicial machinery in motion in Nigeria whereby a citizen could bring an action in respect of a public derelict. Thus, the requirement of locus standi becomes unnecessary in constitutional issues as it will merely impede judicial functions.” It was further submitted that a Nigerian’s right to know how his or their public funds is spent is a civil duty of that Nigerian and as such will have locus standi in an action brought in his name to challenge such spending. The current position of the law is that locus standi cannot be divorced from the provisions of Section 6 (6) b of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Court of Appeal in SHELL PET. DEV. CORP. vs. NWAWKA (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt. 720) 64 at 70 held thus: “the time has come for the Appellate courts to take a bold view of the law on locus standi and strive not to shut out a litigant from agitating for a special interest or rights on the bogus question of locus standi. Thus is because in our society, we are each our brothers’ keepers and we cannot hide under the hydra-headed cocoon of locus standi to demolish a case which disclosed a justifiable cause of action.” Counsel submitted that the concept of locus standi and its application has gone beyond the postulations of the 1st and 2nd defendants in their written argument. The Supreme Court in FAWEHINMI V. AKILU (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 797 held thus: “in this instant appeal before this court, I think, with respect that the lead judgment of my learned brother Obaseki JSC is an advancement on the position hitherto held in this court on “Locus Standi”. I think, again with respect, that it is a departure from the former narrow attitude of this court in the Abraham Adesanya’s case and subsequent decisions” My humble view, and this court should accept it as such, is that the present decision of my learned brother, Obaseki JSC, in this appeal has gone beyond the Abraham Adesanya’s case. I am in complete agreement with the new trend, and with respect, my agreement with the judgment is my belief that it has gone beyond the Abraham Adesanya’s case. As I have said, I accept our present decision as a happy development and advancement on what, with utmost respect to your Lordship, I have always considered a narrow path being trodden hitherto by this court on locus standi.” Counsel urged the court to be persuaded to follow the above decisions on the present position of the law on the issue of locus standi and allow the plaintiff to challenge this infraction of the law by the defendants. On LIMITATION OF ACTION PURSUANT TO THE PUBLIC OFFICERS PROTECTION ACT, It was the submission of counsel to the Plaintiff that statute of limitation is a matter which must be specifically pleaded by the defendant. Order 13 rule 6(1) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 provides thus: “6 – (1) A party shall plead specifically any matter (for example, performance, release, any relevant statute of limitation, fraud or any fact allowing illegality) which if not specifically pleaded might take the opposite party by surprise. The defence that an action has been brought outside the time prescribed by statute must be pleaded in the statement of defence. LEVENTIS TECH. LTD. vs. PETRO JESSICA ENT. LTD. (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 224) 459. The complaint of the plaintiff in this action is against the continued payment of salary from his tax money by the 4th defendant to the 1st defendant, who is not qualified to receive such salary. The 1st defendant is not a registered Dental Surgeon but continues to parade himself as such and receives salary as a dental surgeon at the Federal Medical Centre, Owerri. He referred the court to paragraphs 10 and 13 of the Statement of Claim and paragraphs 5 and 11 of the Plaintiff’s Counter Affidavit. Section 2(a) of the Public Officers protection Act seeks to protect individual public officer for act done by him in pursuance or execution of any law or of any public duty. Counsel submitted that the defendants in this suit were not sued for acts done in pursuance of execution of any law or of any public duty. Rather they were sued for breaching the law by allowing the 4th defendant to benefit illegally from the plaintiff’s tax money. The Court of Appeal in FAKOLADE vs. POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 271) 639 at 643 – 644 held thus; “in my opinion in order that a party may be protected by the Provision of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, It has to be established that the party against whom the action was commenced was a public officer and that the act done by him in respect of which the action was commenced was an act done in pursuance or execution of any law or of any public duty. See Ekeogu v. Aliri (1990) 1 NWLR (pt. 126) 345. That is not all. Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act protects only individual public officers in the discharge of public duties.” It was further submitted that section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act is not available to Public Officers who acted maliciously in abuse of office or in gross violation of the law. The Court of Appeal in BENDEL NEWSPAPERS CORP. vs. OKAFOR (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 617 at 632 held thus: “The provision has been subjected to judicial interpretations on many occasions. The stand of the courts is that the protection will not be available to public officers who have acted maliciously and that the law was enacted only to protect public officers who have acted in good faith and not those who acted in gross violation of the law.” It was again submitted by counsel to the plaintiff that the cause of action in this suit as pleaded in paragraph 13 of the Statement has not ceased. This is because, the 1st and 2nd defendants have continued to waste tax payers money on the 1st defendant by way of salary even when he has been declared unqualified vide exhibit ‘A’. He referred the court to the second arm of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act which provides that “in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof”, and urged the court to hold that this action is not statute barred and that Public Officers Protection Act is not available to the defendants. On SERVICE OF THE ORGINATING PROCESSES ON THE 1ST AND 2ND DEFENDANTS, it was the submission of counsel on this issue that where a party to an action was not personally served by the bailiff of court but receives a process from a third party who had earlier been served with the process by a bailiff, such service by the third party is still deemed to be personal service notwithstanding the absence of direct service from a bailiff. The Court of Appeal in PANACHE COMM. LTD. vs. AIKHOMU (1994) 2 NWLR (Pt. 327) 420 at 431 held as follows: “In this particular case, the bailiff served the writs of summons on the 1st appellant by giving the writs to the lady who ultimately delivered the processes to those who were directly concerned, which action, in my view, means that the people who were directly concerned have been served personally ………… In any case, the ends of justice would be better met by accepting that services had been properly effected since the purpose of service of processes is to bring the matter of the processes to the attention of the person against whom the writ has been issued and or pending”. Counsel therefore urged the court to hold that service of the originating processes on the 1st and 2nd defendants amounted to sufficient compliance with the rules court regarding service of processes. On CAUSE OF ACTION, Counsel submitted as to what amounts to reasonable cause of action, that the judgment of the Supreme Court in THOMAS V. OLUFOSOYE (1986) 1 NWLR (pt. 18) 669 is very instructive and some meanings have been given to it. The phrase “reasonable cause of action” comprises every fact which is material to be proved to enable the plaintiff to succeed. It means the factual situation, the existence of which entitles the plaintiff to obtain from the court a remedy against the defendant when only the allegations in the pleadings are considered, notwithstanding the fact that the case may be weak or unlikely to succeed. A careful reading of the plaintiff’s statement of claim will reveal the cause of action in this suit. Paragraphs 1 and 17 of the Statement of Claim discloses the legal right of the plaintiff. See also paragraphs 7 and 8 of the plaintiff’s counter affidavit. Paragraphs 13 and 17 of the statement of claim contain facts constituting and infraction of the plaintiff’s right or the failure of the defendants to fulfill their obligation. See also paragraphs 8, 9 and 11 of the plaintiff’s counter affidavit. He stated that the Federal Medical Centre Owerri was not made a party to this suit because it is not a juristic person but merely a parastatal under the 4th defendant. He therefore urged the court to hold that the matter in this case is triable and that a cause of action has been sufficiently disclosed. He urged the court to dismiss this preliminary objection. Counsel to the 1st and 2nd Defendants on the 9th day of April 2013, filed a reply on points of law wherein as a preliminary point, he submitted that paragraphs 5, 9, 10 and 11 of the plaintiff’s affidavit in opposition to the 1st and 2nd defendants’ preliminary objection are inherently defective because they are legal arguments and also hearsay evidence. The plaintiff did not disclose his source of information in those paragraphs of the counter affidavit. In paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit, the plaintiff is not a member of the Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria. He is rather a Medical Laboratory Scientist in private practice. (See the preamble of the plaintiff’s counter affidavit) and so would not know whether or not the 1st defendant is registered or de-registered by the 3rd defendant. The plaintiff ought to have disclosed the source of his information since the fact which he deposed to is not within his personal knowledge. More so, Exhibit “A” of the plaintiff which is supposed to be a public document is not certified by the maker as to disclose its origin. In paragraph 9 of the plaintiffs counter affidavit, he deposed to the fact that 1st defendant is still on the payroll of Federal Medical Centre Owerri. By virtue of Exhibit “C” of the Plaintiff’s counter affidavit, the Plaintiff ceased to be a Staff of Federal Medical Centre Owerri since 2009 and therefore was not giving information that is within his personal knowledge. The plaintiff is bound by law to disclose his source of information on paragraph 9 of his counter affidavit. The same argument goes to paragraph 10, where the plaintiff failed to disclose the names and particulars of the alleged Doctors mentioned therein. Counsel submitted that the above paragraphs of the plaintiffs counter affidavit are hearsay evidence; and Paragraph 11 is a legal argument. It is trite law that every affidavit used in court shall contain only statements of facts and the circumstance to which the witness deposes, either of his own personal knowledge or from information which he believed to be true. See section 86 of the Evidence Act. He therefore submitted that paragraphs 5, 9, 10 and 11 of the plaintiffs counter affidavit offends sections 86, 87, 89, 109 and 112 of the Evidence Act; and urged the court to expunge them. Counsel to the 1st and 2nd Defendants proceeded to draw the court’s attention to the fact that the plaintiff, in response to the 1st and 2nd defendant’s preliminary objections on the question of jurisdiction, by way of a preliminary objection, has urged the court to strike out the 1st and 2nd defendants’ objection on ground of non-compliance with the Rules of court. In reply Counsel submitted that the plaintiff cannot use a preliminary objection to reply a preliminary objection. The law is that in any event of non-compliance to the Rules of Court the party challenging such, shall approach the court by way of summons or motion on notice and the grounds of such objections shall be stated in the Summons or Motion on Notice, and not by raising a preliminary objection in response to a preliminary objection such as in this application. See Order 51 Rule 2 (2) of the Federal High Court Rules. He therefore urged the court to hold that the objection of the plaintiff within this preliminary objection is incompetent. Counsel for the plaintiff in further response to the preliminary objection urged that for a preliminary objection on ground of jurisdiction to succeed, the defendant must file the notice of preliminary objection along side with the Memorandum of Appearance and the Statement of Defendant and should be taken after filing of the Statement of Defence. In reaction to this, Counsel to the 1st and 2nd defendants submitted that the argument is a misconception. The law is that an argument based on the jurisdiction of the court can be raised at any time, before, during or after; even on appeal. The superior courts are of the view that such objection should be raised early enough, so as to save time, cost and to avoid a trial in nullity. The contention of the plaintiff herein is in all fours with the case of MR. ELABANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) 6 -7 SC 24 at 31 – 38 wherein the Supreme Court extensively dealt with and held that an objection on issue of jurisdiction is fundamental and cannot be dictated by the Rules of Court and when and how it can be raised. The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned that it is now beyond argument that because issues of jurisdiction is regarded as a threshold and a lifeline for continuing any proceedings, objection to it ought to be taken at the earliest opportunity before any other step in the proceedings is taken, because if there is no jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are a nullity no matter how well conducted. See ELABANJO vs. DAWODU (supra); ARABELLA V. NIGERIA AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (2008) 4 – 5 SC (pt. 2) 189 at 213 – 215; (2008) 12 SC (pt. 2) 240 at 271 – 276. He submitted further that the plaintiff’s argument that Objection on jurisdiction of the court can only be taken after filing of the statement of defence, is grossly misconceived. The law is that objection to jurisdiction could be taken on the basis of Statement of Claim as in KASKWA FARMS LTD. vs. A.G. BENDEL STATE (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 19) 695. It could be taken on the evidence received as was the case or even on the face of the writ of summons before filling statement of claim. See A.G. KWARA STATE vs. OLAWALE (1993) NWLR (Pt. 272) 645 at 674-675 and also ARJAY LTD. vs. AIRLINE MANAGEMENT SUPPORT LTD. (2003) 2-3 SC 1; (2003) 7 NWLR (pt. 820) 557 at 601 where the Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of raising preliminary objection on jurisdiction before filing a statement of claim as required by the Rules of the Federal High Court, had to say that there is a difference between an objection for jurisdiction and a demurrer and that an objection to the jurisdiction of the court can be raised at any time even when there is no pleadings filed and that a party raising such an objection need not bring application under any rule of court, it could be made viva voce. Finally on this ground, Counsel submitted that the issue raise by the learned counsel for the plaintiff hinges on non-compliance with the Rules of court, which is discretionary. Assuming but without conceding that the 1st and 2nd defendants erred in compliance with the rules of this court, Counsel submitted that the court is empowered by Order 51 Rule 1 of the Federal High Court Rules to treat the failure as a mere irregularity and to uphold the objection. He urged the court to exercise its discretion in favour of the preliminary objection on jurisdiction. The counsel for the plaintiff in his argument in reply to the issue of Locus Standi submitted that the plaintiff is a tax payer which constitutes his interest and qualifies him to institute this action. He cites as his locus classicus and relied heavily on the case of FAWEHINMI vs. PRESIDENT FRN (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1054) 275 at 299. In reaction to this, the 1st and 2nd defendants submit that the case of FAWEHINMI vs. PRESIDENT (Supra) is in applicable to this suit. In FAWEHINMI vs. PRESIDENT, the Court of Appeal took into consideration the fact that Chief Gani Fawehinmi is a tax payer because he showed the court that he is a tax payer by exhibiting his Tax Receipts. In the present case, the plaintiff did not exhibit any evidence of being a Tax Payer. This court cannot therefore speculate. In the instance case, the plaintiff has shown the court in his Exhibit “C” of his counter affidavit that he is a retired civil servant since 2009. This court should take judicial notice of the fact that retired civil servants do not pay tax in this country. The plaintiff is not an exception. The plaintiff cannot avail himself with the privileges and rights the court of appeal granted to tax payers like Chief Fawehinmi. Be that as it may, Exhibit “C” upon which the plaintiff attaches heavy weigh to buttress his interest in this matter is just but an annexure to an affidavit, which is not yet evidence or proposed evidence in this suit. It would have been different if Exhibit “C” was ab – initio listed as part of the documents to be relied upon and filed together with the originating processes in this case as mandatorily required by Order 3 Rule 1 (3) b of the rules of court. See also Order 20 Rule 3 of the rules of this court which forbids this court from having reliance on any document not filed along with the pleadings. He urged the court to hold that Exhibit “C”, is an after-thought. We submitted in our preliminary objection that the cause of action in this suit is Statute Barred and proceedings cannot be brought because the period laid down by the Limitation Act had elapsed. We urged the court to look at the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the plaintiff a cause of action and to compare same with the date when the writ of summons was filed. Counsel for the plaintiff rather submitted in response that statute of limitation is a matter of defence which must first be pleaded and not an issue of preliminary objection and made reference to Order 13 Rule 6 (1q) of the rules of this court. On Limitation of Action, it was the submission of Counsel to the 1st and 2nd defendants that is firmly settled in a string of decided authorities that jurisdiction is determined on the plaintiff’s demand and not on the defendant’s answer. That is why the issue of jurisdiction, is decided when a point is taken. See ADANI vs. IGWE (1995) 2 FSC 87 at 88 cited with approval in ELABANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) 6-7 SC 24 at 58 – 67; (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001) 76 at 134 – 143 where the Supreme Court categorically stated that a party raising and objection in limine on jurisdiction must not file his statement of defence or raise it in his pleadings before he can raise such point of law. If the plaintiff’s submission to the effect that the defendants are not sued for acts done in pursuance or execution of any law or any public duty, and that they are rather sued for breaching the law by allowing the 1st defendant to benefit illegally from the plaintiff’s tax money is to be given any consideration, Counsel submitted that in that circumstance, it means that the plaintiff is here alleging theft or fraud, an imputation of crime which is a subject of criminal adjudication that requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. He went on that the cause of this action precisely is that the 3rd defendant (A public officer) in the cause of its duty registered the 1st defendant in error and that the 2nd and 4th defendants who are also public officers in the cause of their duties also employed the 1st defendant in error. See paragraphs 2, 8 -10 of the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim. It is contended that all the defendants herein are public officers within the confines of the law and the said act of registration or de-registration of the 1st defendant, including his employment and emoluments were done by the defendants in pursuance of their public duties or in execution of the law, which are within the ambit of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. On the issue of non-personal service of the originating processes, 1st and 2nd defendants submitted that the law on personal service of originating processes is as contained in Order 6(2) of the rules of the Federal High Court, which is mandatory and fundamental. Furthermore, the plaintiff in paragraph 3 of his counter affidavit deposed that the originating processes in this suit were served on the 3rd and 4th defendants at their Lagos and Abuja offices respectively. He stated that Lagos and Abuja are outside the jurisdiction of this court, for which leave must first be sought and obtained. More so, the writ in this suit is CONCURRENT for which leave must also first be sought and obtained before issuance thereof. See Section 97 of the sheriff and Civil Process Act Laws of the Federation which law is applicable to this court. See M.V ARABELLA vs. NIG. AGRIC. INSURANCE CORP (2008) 4-5 SC (pt. 2) 189 at 204 – 209; (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1097) 182; DREXEL ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES LTD. vs. TRANS INT. BANK LTD. (2008) 12 SC (Pt. 2) 240 at 260 – 266 and pp. 272 – 280. In urging the court to uphold the preliminary objection, Counsel submitted that the plaintiff did not fulfill the conditions precedent to the commencement of this action, for it is a well settled principle of law that a court is said to have jurisdiction and therefore competent to determine a suit when the case comes before it, initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. See MADUKOLU V. NKEMDILIM (1962) 3 SCNLR 34; APADI V. BENUSO (2008) 13 NWLR (pt. 1103) 204 at 219. The 4th defendant on the 24th day of May 2013 filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection on the following grounds: a) The Originating Process in this suit was not properly initiated i.e. the Plaintiff did not first seek leave of the Honourable Court before the issuance of the writ. b) The Plaintiff/respondent did not also seek leave of the Honourable Court to serve the Originating Writ on the 3rd and 4th Defendants/Respondents. c) The Plaintiff/respondents did not comply with section 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act Cap 407, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. d) The cause of action in this suit is Statute – Barred by virtue of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap 41, LFN, 2004. e) The 4th Defendant herein is Non – Juristic person and therefore cannot sue and be sued. Counsel raised only one issue for the determination of the court; that is “whether the jurisdiction of this court has been properly invoked by the Plaintiff so as to enable the court hear and determine this suit.” In arguing the sole issue, it is the submission of counsel to the 4th defendant that before a Plaintiff takes a writ against a defendant who resides outside the jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiff must first seek and obtain leave of the court before he can issue a valid writ against the defendant; also, that before the plaintiff serves the writ of Summons on the defendant who resides outside the jurisdiction of the court, he must first seek leave of the court. Having not sought leave of court to issue the writ and having not also sought leave of court to serve the writ on the 3rd and 4th defendants outside jurisdiction, there was non-compliance with section 97 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act Cap 407, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 which makes the process mandatory. See owners of M.V “ARABELLA” vs. NIGERIA AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (2008) 4 – 5 SC (Pt. 2) 189 at 204 – 209; (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1097) 182; DREXEL ENERGY & NATURAL RESOURCES LTD. ORS vs. TRANS INTERNATIONAL BANK LTD. ORS (2008) 12 S.C. (Pt. 2) 240 at 260 – 266 & PP 272 – 280. On Cause of Action, it was the submission of the 4th defendant that the cause of action in this suit is Statute–barred. Under Section 2(a) of the Limitation Act CAP P41, Laws of the Federation 2004, the Plaintiff has a period of three (3) months to institute this action. The Plaintiff/Respondent has averred in paragraphs 10 & 19(b) of the Statement of Claim that the act of deregistration complained of took place in March, 2005 section 2(a) of the limitation act provides thus: “Where any actions, prosecution or proceedings commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any act of law or any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such act, law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect.” “The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three (3) months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three (3) months next after the ceasing thereof”. The defendants are creation of statues as averred in paragraphs 2, 3 and 6 of the Statement of Claim. In other words, the defendants are Public Officers and therefore can avail themselves of the provision of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap 41, Laws of Federation of Nigeria. See IBRAHIM vs. JSC & ANOR (1998) NWLR (Pt. 584) 1. Counsel submitted that if the Court should look at the date this process was filed in the Court and the date in paragraph 10 of the Statement of Claim (which shows when the cause of action arose), the Honourable Court would come to an irresistible conclusion that this suit was filed outside the mandatory three (3) months required by the Statute of Limitation and therefore the suit is consequently Statute – barred. See ELABANJO & ORS vs. DAWODU (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001) 76 and NASIR vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMI8SSION & ORS (2010) 1 – 2 S. C at 87 – 90. On legal personality, it was submitted that the 4th defendant on record is not a Juristic person or a Legal personality. It is not established by the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999 as amended), nor by any Statute or Subsidiary legislation. It cannot sue or be sued. The competence of the court on this point cannot be waived by the 4th defendant herein. He cited the authorities of MADUKOLU & ORS. vs. NKEMDIRIM (1962); ALL NLR 589; ARIORI vs. ELE MO (1973) 5 S.C. (Reprint) 82; (1973) ALL NRL 449, and NJOKU vs. U.A.C FOODS (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 632) 557; FAWEHINMI vs. NIGERIA BAR ASSOCIATION (No. 2)(1989) 4 S.C (prt1) 63; (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 105) 558 at 595; THE ADMINISTRATORS/EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF GENERAL SANI ABACHA (DECEASED) vs. SAMUEL DAVID EKE – SPIFF & 3ORS. (2009) 2 – 3 S.C (Pt. 2) 93 at 138; and AGBONMAGBE BANK LTD. vs. GENERAL MANAGER G.B OLIVANT LTD. & ANOR (1961) All NLR 116 and urged the Court to strike out the suit for lack of jurisdiction. In opposition to the 4th Defendant’s preliminary objection, the Plaintiff’s Counsel on the 20th day of June 2013, filed a 10 paragraph Counter-affidavit and a written address. As apparent from the writ of summons in this suit, the 3rd and 4th Defendants’ addresses for service are shown to be in Lagos and Abuja respectively which are all within Nigeria. The requirement of leave to serve outside the jurisdiction of the Court, Counsel submitted, does not apply to this case. This is because, Order 6 Rule 31 of the Federal High Court Rules 2009 defines “out of jurisdiction” to mean “out of the Federal Republic of Nigeria”. He submitted further that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria unlike the State High Court which has its territorial jurisdiction limited to that State. The cases cited by the 4th defendant/Applicant’s counsel in support of his argument on this issue do not apply to the present case because those cases deal with matters that arose from the State High Court. The case of DREXEL ENERGY & NATURAL RESOURCES LTD. vs. TRANS INTERNATIONAL BANK LTD (Supra) cited by the 4th defendant/Applicant’s Counsel for instance, arose from the Oyo State High Court and involved the interpretation of the Oyo State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 1988. On Cause of Action, Plaintiff’s Counsel submitted that the 4th defendant in its statement of defence or 9 paragraphs did not plead the statute of limitation as a defence; that statute of limitation is a matter which must be specifically pleaded by the defendant. Order 13 rule 6(1) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 provides thus: “6 – (1) A party shall plead specifically any matter (for example, performance, release, any relevant statute of limitation, fraud or any fact showing illegality) which if not specifically pleaded might take the opposite party by surprise.” The defence that an action has been brought outside the time prescribed by statute must be pleaded in the statement of defence. LEVENTIS TECH. LTD. vs. PETRO JESSICA ENT. LTD. (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt 224) 459. The complaint of the Plaintiff in this action is against the continued payment of salary from his tax money by the 4th defendant to the 1st defendant, who is not qualified to receive such salary. Referring the Court to paragraphs 10 and 13 of the Statement of Claim and paragraphs 7 and 8 of the plaintiff’s counter affidavit, Counsel submitted that the 1st defendant is not a registered Dental Surgeon but continues to parade himself as such and receives salary as a dental surgeon at the Federal Medical Centre Owerri. Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act seeks to protect individual public officer for act done by him in pursuance or execution of any law or of any public duty. Counsel submitted that the defendants in this suit were not sued for acts done in pursuance or execution of any law or of any public duty. Rather they were sued for breaching the law by allowing the 1st defendant to benefit illegally from the plaintiff’s tax money. The Court Appeal in FAKOLADE vs. POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 271) 639 at 643 – 644 held thus: “In my opinion in order that a party may be protected by the Provision of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, it has to be established that the party against whom the action was commenced was a public officer and that the act done by him in respect of which the action was commenced was an act done in pursuance or execution of any law or of any public duty. See Ekeogu v. Aliri (1990) 1 NWLR (pt. 126) 345. That is not all. Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act protects only individual public officers in the discharge Of public duties.” It was further submitted that Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act is not available to public officers who acted maliciously in abuse of office or in gross violation of the law. The Court of Appeal in BENDEL NEWSPAPERS CORP. vs. OKAFOR (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 617 at 632 held thus: “The provision has been subjected to judicial interpretations on many occasions. The stand of the courts is that the protection will not be available to public officers who have acted maliciously and that the law was enacted only to protect public officers who have acted in good faith and not those who acted in gross violation of the law”. Referring the court to the 2nd arm of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act which provides that “in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof,” it was submitted that the cause of action in this suit as pleaded in paragraph 13 of the Statement of Claim has not ceased. This is because; the 1st and 2nd defendants have continued to waste tax payers’ money on the 1st defendant by way of salary even when he has been declared unqualified. He therefore urged the Court to hold that this action is not statute barred and that the Public Officers Protection Act is not available to the defendants. On legal personality, it was submitted that the Federal Ministry of Health which is joined in this suit as the 4th defendant is one of the Ministries set up by the Federal Republic of Nigeria, charged with the responsibility of establishment, management and control of Federal Medical Centre in Nigeria. See paragraph 6 of the Plaintiff’s statement of claim, which is admitted by the 4th defendant in paragraph 1 of its statement of defence. The office of Ministers of the Government of the Federation is established by Section 147 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). The 4th defendant is joined as a Defendant in this suit because they are the employers of the 1st and 2nd defendants and their presence in this suit is necessary, crucial and fundamental to the resolution of this matter concerning the employment of the 1st defendant and his qualification for such employment. See ALFA vs. ATANDA (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 296) 729 at 740; GREEN vs. GREEN (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 480. He urged the court to take judicial notice of the establishment of Federal Ministries by the Government of the Federation and submitted that the 4th defendant is a party whose presence before the court is necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate on and settle all the questions involved in this matter. Counsel concluded by urging the court to dismiss this preliminary objection for the following reasons. a. The grounds of this objection which constitution points of law were not raised in the 4th defendant’s statement of defence as required by Order 16 Rule 2(1) of the Federal High Court Rules 2009. b. All the defendants are within the jurisdiction of this honourable court and no leave is required to either issue or serve the originating process in this suit. c. The cause of action in this suit is not statute – barred and the Public Officers Protection Act is not available to the defendants. d. The 4th defendant is properly joined in this suit as a party. In its reply on points of law filed on the 16th day of August 2013, the 4th defendant raised a preliminary issue regarding the plaintiff’s affidavit dated 28th June 2013 to the effect that the said affidavit is entirely defective, as it contains legal arguments or conclusions, thereby offending Sections 86, 87, 88 and 89 of the Evidence Act. (See paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Plaintiff’s affidavit). In urging the Court to strike out the said paragraphs, Counsel submitted that the plaintiff in paragraph 3(a) of the affidavit did not state where the Bailiff served Mrs. P. U. Nwankwo, Confidential Secretary. The writ of summons stated that the 3rd defendant should be served in Lagos, but was evasive as regards where the service was done whether in Owerri or Abuja or Lagos. Therefore the court cannot speculate. As regards issuance and service of the writ of summons, it was submitted that the suit as initiated by the Plaintiff did not fulfill the condition precedent to the issuance and service of the writ, and therefore the court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter. See DREXEL ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LTD. vs. TRANS INTERNATIONAL BANK LTD. (Supra) at 186 – 189. The Plaintiff did not comply with Section 96 and 97 of Sheriffs and Civil Process Act CAP 407, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 which is mandatory for the issuance and service of the writ of summons outside Owerri Judicial Division. He went further that the provisions of the said Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act are applicable in all High Courts including the Federal High Court, and that the said provisions have nothing to do with the coverage of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court which is nation-wide. It is therefore a total misconception to believe that the provisions of the Section are inapplicable to the Federal High Court because the jurisdiction of that court covers the entire nation. Counsel submitted that the case of owners of MV “ARABELLA” vs. NIGERIA AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE COPORATION (Supra) at Pg. 189 at 226 arose in the Federal High Court, Lagos and the defendant was resident in Abuja, yet the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did not seek leave of the court to serve the Writ in Abuja, and the plaintiff did not endorse the writ as required by section 97 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act CAP 407, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 and therefore struck out the suit. The same procedure was followed in DREXEL ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LTD. vs. TRANS INTERNATIONAL BANK LTD (Supra). On Cause of Action being Statute barred, the 4th defendant argued that what the court should determine is when the suit was filed in court and when the cause of action arose. This, Counsel said, can be gathered from the Statement of Claim. Once the court finds that the action was caught up by the Statutes of Limitation, the court is estopped from proceeding further. In EGBE vs. ADEFARASIN (NO. 2) (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) at 3 – 4, the Supreme Court held that: “A cause of action is this said to be statute-barred if in respect of it, proceedings cannot be brought because the period laid down by the limitation Act has elapsed.” This the court held can be determined by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of Claim alleging when the wrong was committed and comparing that date with the date the writ of summons was filed. If the time is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute barred. This comparison can be done without calling oral evidence. Counsel cited the authorities of ALHAJI AJIBONA V. ALHAJI KOLAWOLE & ANOR (1996) 10 NWLR (pt. 476) 22; ELABANJO & ANOR vs. DAWODU (2006) 6 – 7 S.C 24 at 58 – 67; (2006) 15 NWLR (pt. 1001) 76 at 134 – 143; and OWNERS OF M. V. “ARABELLA” vs. NIGERIA AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (Supra), and submitted that a case caught up by the statute of limitation removes the plaintiff’s right to action, the right to enforcement and the right to judicial relief and leaves the plaintiff with a bare and empty cause of action which he cannot enforce. On legal personality, it was submitted that the 4th defendant herein is sued and not joined, and that there is a world of difference between suing a defendant ab initio from a defendant being joined in the suit. He went on that the Constitution did not establish the 4th Defendant; that what Section 147 of the said Constitution established is the office of Ministers not Ministry(ies); and that the cases of ALFA vs. ATANDA & GREEN vs. GREEN cited by the plaintiff is not applicable as they deal with joinder of parties. It was the Counsel’s submission therefore that the 4th defendant is not a juristic person or person known to Law, and that rather, the Plaintiff may decide to sue the Minister which is recognized by the Constitution, and not the Ministry. Counsel concluded by urging the court to strike out/dismiss this suit on the grounds that a. The plaintiff did not seek the leave of the court before the Writ in the instant suit was issued. b. The plaintiff did not seek leave of the court to serve the Originating Process. c. The plaintiff did not comply with Section 96 & 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act CAP 407, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. d. The Cause of action in this suit is statute-barred by virtue of the Public Officers Protection Act, CAP 41, LFN, 2004. e. The 4th defendant herein is a Non-Juristic person and therefore cannot be sued. Having carefully considered the objections, arguments, authorities and written addresses of counsels in this ruling, I desire to first of all observe, as I have already pointed out earlier in this ruling, that this suit was transferred to this court from the Federal High Court. The applications to be determined in this ruling were filed in the Federal High Court before the transfer of the suit to this court. In the grounds of the objections and in the arguments thereto, provisions of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 were cited and relied on by counsels in their respective submissions. I take notice that the Rules of Court applicable to the issues at time of the commencement of this suit and the filing of the applications was the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009. In that respect, this application shall be considered, where necessary, in line with the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 applicable to the issues and as addressed by counsels in their respective written addresses. Same consideration is given, in making reference to the claimant as plaintiff and vice versa. In his reaction to the preliminary objection raised by the 1st and 2nd defendants counsel, the claimant’s counsel has raised, in his written address, an objection to the competence of the preliminary objection. I am of the view that this point raised by the claimant’s counsel need to be resolved first in this ruling before I go into determining the main applications. This is necessary as to avoid embarking on a futile exercise of going into the application only to find that I was not supposed to entertain it in the first place. The claimant’s counsel’s contention is that the 1st and 2nd defendant did not comply with Order 7, Rule 1 (1); Order 13 Rule 2(1) and Order 16 Rules 1 and 2 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009. Counsel observed that the 1st and 2nd defendants have not filed their Statement of Defence and he argued that the Rules do not allow for raising a preliminary objection before filing of statement of defence. The claimants counsel consequently prayed the notice of preliminary objection by the 1st and 2nd defendants be struck out for being incompetent. The objection of the claimant’s counsel to the preliminary objection is on ground of non-compliance with the Federal High Court (Civil procedure) Rules 2009. The Rules itself had prescribed the procedure for raising such complaint of non-compliance. Order 51, Rule 2 (2) of the Federal High Court (Civil procedure) Rules provides that a party challenging non-compliance with any provision of the rules shall do so by way of summons or motion on notice and the grounds of such objections shall be stated in the Summons or Motion on notice. In view of this provision, I am in agreement with the 1st and 2nd defendant’s counsel when he submitted that the claimants counsel cannot raise a preliminary objection to respond to a preliminary objection. The preliminary objection by the 1st and 2nd defendants touches on the jurisdiction of this court to continue to hear and determine the suit. Jurisdictional issues such as locus standi, service of process and statutory limitation have been raised. These grounds go to the very foundation of this action. In that circumstance, the objection ought to be taken at the earliest opportunity before any other step in the proceedings is taken. See T.O.M.C NIG. LTD. vs. U.T.C PLC (2003) FWLR (Pt. 173) 130 at 151 where it was held that issues of jurisdiction can be raised even by motion by a defendant without first filing a statement of defence. This is because if there is no jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are a nullity no matter how well conducted. Issue of jurisdiction of court is very fundamental and the defendants are permitted to raise it pre-emptorily without first filing a statement of defence. See ELABANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) ALL FWLR (Pt. 328) 604 at 650-651; I hold that the objection of non-compliance with the rules in bringing the preliminary objection raised by the claimant is incompetent and it is hereby dismissed. Another preliminary issue I need to clear is the submissions made by the learned counsels for the 1st and 2nd defendants counsel on one hand and the 4th defendant’s counsel on the other hand in their respective replies to the written addresses of the claimant’s counsel to the addresses in support of the preliminary objections wherein they urged this court to expunge some offensive paragraphs from the claimant’s counter affidavits. According to the 1st and 2nd defendant’s counsel, paragraphs 5, 9, 10 and 11 of the claimant’s counter affidavit should be expunged for offending sections 86, 87, 89, 109 and 112 of the evidence Act. For the 4th defendant, its counsel want paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the counter affidavit expunged for offending section 86, 87, 88 and 89 of the Evidence Act. Counsels argument are that the facts deposed in these paragraphs of the counter affidavits are hearsay as they are facts outside the personal knowledge of the claimant and he failed to state the source of his information. The 4th defendants counsel further submitted that the paragraphs complained off are legal arguments and conclusions. I wish to observe, with respect to the defendants counsels, that these cited sections are sections of the repealed Evidence Act 2004, CAP E14. At the time of filing of the applications in 2013, the operative rules of evidence is the Evidence Act, 2011 and the section dealing with the issue canvassed by counsels is section 115 of the Act. Section 115 of the Evidence Act is to the effect that affidavit used in court shall contain only statements of facts and the circumstance to which the witness deposes, either of his own personal knowledge or from information which he believed to be true. When the deponent disposes to fact not within his personal knowledge but derived from any other source, he shall state the name of his informant, time, place and circumstances of the information and the grounds of his belief in the information shall be stated. This provision is mandatory. Noncompliance with the provision will result in the rejection or striking out of the offending paragraphs. See EDU vs. COMMISSIONER FOR AGRICULTURE, WATER RESOURCES AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT (2001) FWLR (Pt. 55) 433 at 451-453. I have read the counter-affidavits filed by the claimant and I have reason to agree with the submissions of the defendants’ counsels. The claimant did not disclose the basis on which he deposes, whether he is deposing from his personal knowledge or from information he received from 3rd parties is not stated. What is more, the facts deposed in some of the paragraphs could not have been facts within his knowledge as his case has revealed that he is no longer in the employ of the Federal Medical Centre nor has he shown that he is a member of the 3rd defendant. How he got the facts contained therein is not stated. I find that paragraphs 5, 9, 10 and 11 of the claimant’s counter affidavit to the 1st and 2nd defendants preliminary objection offend section 115 of the Evidence Act while only paragraphs 7 and 8 of the claimant’s counter affidavit to the 4th defendants preliminary objection is found to be similarly offensive. These paragraphs are accordingly expunged. Having done with the preliminaries, I can now proceed to the substance of the preliminary objections. The 1st and 2nd defendants have raised 4 grounds of objection while the 4th defendant raised 5 grounds. A look at all the grounds reveals that they can be grouped and determined under 3 grounds or issues. The issues are: i. Whether the claimant has locus standi to institute this action? ii. Whether the suit can be maintained against the defendants? iii. Whether there is valid service of the originating processes in this suit on the defendants? 1. Whether the claimant has locus standi to institute this action? Issue one is to determine the locus standi of the claimant to bring this action. In the notice of preliminary objection filed by the 1st and 2nd defendant, they have contended that the claimant has no locus standi to bring this action. Generally, a party instituting an action must have locus standi. This term denotes the legal capacity to institute proceedings in court. It has also been defined as the competence of a party to seek redress in a court of law and to assert a right which is enforceable at law. See ACCORD PARTY vs. GOVERNOR OF KWARA STATE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 555) at 283. Where the party instituting the action has no locus standi, it means that the proper party is not before the court and the jurisdiction of the court cannot be properly invoked. In considering this ground of the objection, it is settled that the only process that should be examined to determine whether the claimant has standing or not is the statement of claim. See OWODUNNI vs. REGISTERED TRUSTESS, CELESTIAL CHURCH (2000) FWLR (Pt. 9) 1455 at 1495; SEHINDEMI vs. GOV. LAGOS STATE (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 311) 1858. In the statement of claim filed in this suit by the claimant, he averred that he was a former employee of the Federal Medical Centre, Owerri and he brought the suit to protect the integrity of the Federal Medical Centre, Owerri and to protect the general public. The reason for this protective suit is seen in the preceding paragraphs of the statement of claim. It is the claimant’s case that the 1st defendant has been de-registered by the 3rd defendant from practicing as a dental surgeon but still remained in the employ of the 4th defendant at the Federal Medical Centre, Owerri and he is still being paid salary, hence, his suit to protect the FMC. It is in view of the totality of the claimant’s pleadings that the defendants have now objected that nothing is disclosed in the pleading as conferring locus standi on the claimant. Counsel to the 1st and 2nd defendants has submitted that the plaintiff did not raise or plead in his statement of claim facts establishing his civil rights and obligations in respect of the subject matter of the suit. He relied on ADESANYA vs. PRESIDENT OF NIGERIA (1981) 2 NCLR 338 in his argument and he contended that the claimant does not have any cause of action against the defendants. I have read and re-read the statement of claim and it is my observation that the plaintiff, who is no longer a staff of the Federal Medical Centre, did not disclose what immediate interest or relationship he has with the Federal Medical Centre, Owerri as to be concerned with its protection. I cannot also find anywhere how the employment or the registration or de-registration of the 1st defendant by the 3rd defendant would affect him neither has the plaintiff shown any personal interest in the subject that is immediately affected or would be affected in the future. On the facts averred in the statement of claim, clearly, the claimant has not disclosed his locus standi. This non-disclosure of interest in view, the claimant’s counsel tried to justify the action and submitted that a look at paragraphs 19 (a) (d) (e) and paragraphs 1 and 17 of the statement of claim will show that the suit falls within the realm of public interest litigation on a constitutional issue. It is his submission that the defendants have breached the law and in such a situation, the courts have now adopted a liberal approach to the issue of locus standi. He relied on FAWEHINMI vs. THE PRESIDENT F.R.N (SUPRA); SHELL PET. DEV. CORP. vs. NWAWKA (SUPRA); FAWEHINMI vs. AKILU (SUPRA) which decisions he urged the court to follow to confer locus standi on the claimant. The submissions of the learned counsel for the claimant seem to follow the new trend taken by the courts on the issue of locus standi in constitutional matters. The courts have been tending to depart from the perceived narrow interpretation given to the term in the Adesanya’s case. This new position has been copiously explained by the Court of Appeal in ACCORD PARTY V. GOVERNOR OF KWARA STATE (SUPRA) at 283-291, per AGUBE JCA who supports a departure from the old concept of locus standi. It was His Lordship’s opinion that in constitutional issues, while relying on a number of authorities including FAWEHINMI vs. THE PRESIDENT F.R.N, a liberal approach should be given to the issue of locus standi. It seems to me it is the same line the claimant wants this court to tow in this instance. However, the issue in this case is hardly a constitutional issue. A reading of the statement of claim has not shown any constitutional or statutory issues that have arisen in the case. The claimant’s complaint is purely on an administrative matter. It is on this point that the claimant’s case is distinguished from the Fawehinmi cases relied on by counsel. However, this new trend has not imbued every one with right to approach the court on every perceived infraction or on any issue. Before a person can litigate on public interest or right, some requirements must be shown. The Supreme Court in OWODUNNI vs. REGISTERED TRUSTESS, CELESTIAL CHURCH (SUPRA) at 1479 held that before a person can be allowed to invoke the judicial powers in litigations of public right or interest or to determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive action, he must show that either his personal interest will immediately be or has been adversely affected by an injury to himself and which interest or injury is over and above that of the general public. This requirement is as also encapsulated in section 6 (6) b of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 to the effect that judicial powers- “shall extend to all matters between persons, or between government or authority and to any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person”. Hence in OKON vs. UBI (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 328) 717 at 749-750, the condition and the basis for it was explained this way- “Locus standi is a constitutional requirement to enable a person maintain an action in court and it is limited to prosecution of matters relating to the civil right and obligation of the plaintiff. To entitle a person to invoke the judicial powers, he must show that either his person interest will immediately be or has been adversely affected by an injury to himself and which interest or injury is over and above that of the general public” In my view, the principle in determining a plaintiff’s locus standi, whether in public interest litigation or otherwise is as stipulated by the Supreme Court in the Owodunni case. I am in total agreement with that principle. Applying the test to the claimant’s case in this suit, the claimant’s statement of claim did not disclose any interest personal to him in the subject matter or the act or omission he seeks to challenge neither can I find anywhere in the statement of claim where he shows that his civil right or obligation is affected or injured by the subject of his complaint. Consequently, since he has not shown these matters, interest or injury he suffered over and above that of the general public, is not also disclosed. The claimant has averred that the suit is meant to protect the Federal Medical Centre, Owerri. The said Federal Medical Centre is an institution used by the general public. Whatever interest the claimant has in the Federal Medical Centre is shared with all members of the public. It is trite that a general interest shared with all members of the public is not a litigable interest. However, for the claimant to be allowed to litigate such general interest, he must show a special interest over and above the generality of persons. See SEHINDEMI vs. GOV. LAGOS STATE (SUPRA) at 1874. In the statement of claim, the claimant has not shown that he has an interest in the subject matter greater than what other ordinary members of the society have nor did the statement of claim state how the Federal Medical Centre or the public would benefit by this action. In the final analysis, I cannot find any material in the statement of claim to qualify this suit as public interest litigation as to entitle the claimant to maintain same. Consequently, I hold that the claimant has no locus standi to institute this suit. Where a plaintiff is found not to have locus standi to sue, the suit is incompetent and must as of necessity be struck out. See OWODUNNI vs. REGISTERED TRUSTESS, CELESTIAL CHURCH (SUPRA) AT 1479. It is clear from the foregoing that this court can no longer excise jurisdiction in this case. The only duty left for me to discharge is to strike out the suit. However, there are the other issues, and they are important ground of the objection, left to be determined. I think they deserve the attention of the court too. I shall proceed to examine them. 2. Whether the suit can be maintained against the defendants? On issue 2, the defendants have relied on section 2 (a) of the Public Officers protection Act and submitted in their written addresses that the claimant’s suit is statute barred. It is their submission that the defendants are public servants and the act of deregistration of the 1st defendant which is the claimant’s cause of action in this suit occurred in March 2005 and in view of the date of filing of this suit, the action has become statute barred. While admitting that the defendants are public officers, the claimant has contended however that the acts he complained of against the defendant are such that the defendants cannot be protected under the Act. For a fuller appreciation of the submissions of counsels and a proper consideration of the issue, it is necessary to set out the provision of Section 2 (a) of Public Officers Protection Act. It provides- “Where any actions, prosecution or proceedings commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any act of law or any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such act, law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect. a) The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three (3) months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three (3) months next after the ceasing thereof”. This provision is to the effect that actions against public officers must be filed within 3 months of the accrual of the cause of action otherwise, the right to enforce the action will be barred and the court will no longer have jurisdiction to entertain the action. For the provision of section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act to be applicable to cover the defendants in this case, it has to be determined whether: 1. The person against whom the action is commenced is a public officer or person acting in the execution of public duties within the meaning of that law. 2. The act done by the person in respect of which the action is commenced is an act done in pursuance or execution of any law, public duty or authority or in respect of an alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority. See IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1 at 32. The meaning of the term “public officer” or “any person” as used in section 2 of Public Officers Protection Act has been defined extensively by the Supreme Court in IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C KADUNA STATE (SUPRA) to mean not only natural persons invested with performance of duties of a public nature but extends to public bodies created by statutes or corporate soles. In determining whether the defendants are public officers within the meaning of the Public Officers Protection Act, it is best to consider them on individual basis starting from the 4th defendant. The 4th defendant is the “Federal Ministry of Health”. The claimant has argued that it is the body responsible for the establishment, management and control of Federal Medical Centre’s in Nigeria, hence the reason it is made a defendant in this suit. It is the contention of the 4th defendant’s counsel however that the 4th defendant is not a juristic entity as it is not an establishment of any law in Nigeria. As a general rule, only juristic person can sue or be sued. Juristic persons include natural persons, incorporated companies, corporate aggregate or corporate sole. See IYKE MEDICAL MERCHANDISE vs. PFIZER, INC (2001) FWLR (Pt. 53) 62 at 77. The term corporate sole is ascribed to bodies established by law or statute. For the 4th defendant to be a competent party to this suit, it must be shown that it is an establishment of law. The claimant’s counsel has referred to section 147 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and contended that the 4th defendant was created under that section. It is most difficult for me to subscribe to that argument of learned counsel for the claimant. What section 147 of the constitution created is “offices of the Ministers of the Government of the Federation”. I cannot find anywhere in the section where “Federal Ministry of Health” is created. The claimant’s counsel has not referred this court to any other law, and it seems to me there is none, in which the 4th defendant is established. In this circumstance, I agree with the 4th defendant that it does not have the competence to be sued. In view of the foregoing, the 4th defendant, which is not a juristic person, cannot be said to be a public officer and it also cannot be sued. What then is the purpose of the 4th defendant in this suit? I think none. The proper order to make at this stage is to strike the 4th defendant out of this suit. I so order. The statement of claim shows that the 1st and 2nd defendants are staff of the Federal Medical Centre, Owerri, which no doubt is a public institution. The 2nd defendant has been described as the person responsible for administering the Federal Medical Centre. The duties of the 1st and 2nd defendant are therefore of a public nature. See ADEOMI vs. GOVERNOR, OYO STATE (2003) FWLR (Pt. 149) 1444 at 1465. The 1st and 2nd defendant are therefore public officers within the meaning of section 2 of Public Officers Protection Act. The 3rd defendant is established by the Medical and Dental practitioners Act 2004 to execute the duties prescribed under the Act, among which are the registration or deregistration of medical and dental practitioners in Nigeria. It is the execution or non-execution of that duty that is now called for question in this suit. The 3rd defendant is clearly a public officer within the meaning of section 2 of Public Officers Protection Act. Having been resolved that the existing defendants are public officers, the next issue consider is whether the act complained of by the claimant is covered under the Public Officers Protection Act as to entitle the defendants take protection under the Act. The claimant’s cause of action as seen in the statement of claim is the de-registration of the 1st defendant by the 3rd defendant in March 2005. The issue of registration or de-registration or payment of salary of the 1st defendant is the performance of the public duty of the 3rd defendant and the Federal Medical Centre or the 4th defendant (which are not or no longer parties to this suit) respectively. The claimant contends that the Public Officers Protection Act does not avail the defendants. According to him, the defendants in this suit were not sued for acts done in pursuance or execution of any law or of any public duty but they were sued for breaching the law by allowing the 1st defendant to benefit illegally from the plaintiff’s tax money. With respect to counsel, the reason he gave for suing the defendants still falls under the protection of the Public Officers Protection Act. By breaching the law and allowing the 1st defendant to continue to draw salary falls under “any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such act, law, duty or authority”. The claimant’s view, as I understand it, is that the defendants have the duty under law not to allow the 1st defendant remain in employment and receive salary. Will the defendants’ failure in that duty not be a default to execute their duty? I think it is. In that circumstance, the defendants are still protected under the Public Officers Protection Act. It is the claimant’s further contention that cause of action in this suit has not ceased as such he is not yet foreclosed from bringing this suit. Counsel seems to found his position on the following wording of section 2 of Public Officers Protection Act, “in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three (3) months next after the ceasing thereof”. On this argument, I ask, what is the cause of the action in this suit? The claimant’s complaint was the de-registration of the 1st defendant and his unsuitability to practice which happened on 10th March 2005. The cause of action started from that day and by the provision of the section 2 (a) Public Officers Protection Act, the claimant was expected to initiate the action 3 months thereafter. Furthermore, it seems to me that the provision “in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three (3) months next after the ceasing thereof” will apply only in cases of proven injury or damages of a continuous nature. I have looked at the statement of claim, I did not find anywhere where it is shown that the act of the defendants has caused or has been causing any injury or damage to the claimant or even to the Federal Medical Centre itself which his suit was allegedly brought to “protect”. The claimant’s counsel’s argument on this issue can hardly be sustained. In view of my findings herein, I have no hesitation to conclude that the acts complained of by the claimant are protected under the Public Officers Protection Act. The cause of action arose in March 2005 and this suit was not commenced until 29th November 2012, a period of over 7 years and 8 months since the cause of action arose. The action is no longer maintainable against the defendants. It is obvious that this suit is caught by Public Officers Protection Act and it is therefore statute barred. I resolve issue two against the claimant. Having thus resolved issues one and two, I do not find it necessary to delve into the third issue, as it will be academic. On the whole, the preliminary objections of the 1st, 2nd and 4th defendants succeed. Consequently, it is my holding that: i. The claimant has no locus standi to institute this action ii. This suit is caught up by the Public Officers Protection Act. It is therefore statute barred. The suit is accordingly struck out. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Presiding Judge