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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE J. D. PETERS DATE: SEPTEMBER 30, 2014 SUIT NO: NICN/LA/555/2012 BETWEEN The Registered Trustees of Union Bank Pensioners Association - Claimant AND 1. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc 2. The Managing Director, UBN - Defendants 3. Mrs. FunkeOsibodu REPRESENTATION Oladosu Ogunniyi with Emeka Kambia and Ade Oyeniyi for the Claimants. Mrs. Odunola Jegede for the Defendants. JUDGMENT The Claimant in this suit by a General Form of Complaint dated 1/11/12 approached the Court for the following reliefs: i. A Declaration that the abrupt stoppage of the 13th month pay is improper and contrary to the mutual understanding of both parties and to the long established custom and practice ii. An order for the payment of the 13th month to all members of the Claimant's Association for the year 2011 and the resumption of its regular payment as from the end of the current year. iii. Interest on the unpaid 13th month stipend from December 2011 payable to all members of the Association calculated at 25% per annum from 4th December, 2011 to date. iv. Cost of this action in the sum of =N=3.5 Million. The Claimant's Complaint was accompanied by all requisite processes to wit Statement of Facts, List of Witnesses, Witnesses Statements on Oath and copies of documents to be relied upon at trial. On 21/3/13, Defendants also filed their Statement of Defence in opposition to the claims by the Claimant. Pursuant to a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 30/11/12 for an order of striking out of the names of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, this Court per Obaseki-Osaghae J on 3/5/13 granted the prayers sought and struck out the names of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants accordingly. The case of the Claimant was that sometime in 1988 the 1st Defendant informed the Claimant by a letter dated 20th September, 1988 of the introduction of the 13thmonth pay for the benefit of the members of the Pensioners’ Association; that since the introduction members of the Claimant have continuously enjoyed with unbroken regularity the payment of the 13th month pay for the last 7 years; that the 1st Defendant have paid the 13th month pay for 23 years without interruption; that sometimes in December 2011 without notification the 13th month pay was withdrawn; that upon the withdrawal of the 13th month pay, the Claimant’s representatives met with the 3rd Defendant who stated that, the 1st Defendant decided to discontinue with the 13th month pay because of its adverse economic impact and that it is not a payment made by any other Banks within the industry and finally, that it is unsustainable and that on the 30th January 2012 the claimant wrote to the National Pension Commission (NPC) a letter dated 30/1/2012 about the unilateral and abrupt stoppage of this important component of member’s income. Claimant further averred that subsequent to the letter of complaint to the National Pension Commission (NPC), the Commission responded with a letter dated 10th February 2012; that the 1st Defendant response to the National Pension Commission (NPC) was re-harsh of the 3rd Defendant’s reply to the Claimant when the Claimant earlier made representation of the 1st Defendant; that the 13th month pay is sustainable contrary to the stand of the 1stDefendant particularly considering increases in perquisite and other generous benefits and emoluments enjoyed by the Management of the 1st Defendant and the stupendous terminal benefits accruing to members of its management' First Bank Plc. a sister Bank in its circular, dated 12/1/1998 emphasizes that the Bank will pay annually every December the 13th month pay contrary to the Statement of the 1st Defendant that 13 month pay is not practiced in the industry and that the stoppage of this benefit which many of the pensioners have enjoyed for over 20 years every December caused the Pensioners indescribable economic hardship and Psychological problem. It was also the case for the Claimant that the most shocking to the Claimant was the abruptness and lack of any consultation necessary for the maintenance of good interpersonal relations. On 7/11/13, Claimant opened its case and called one Benjamin Olufemi Odutayo as CW1. CW1 adopted his witness deposition dated 1/11/12 as his evidence, stated that he referred to some documents in his said oath and identified the said documents as contained on the list of documents to be relied upon at trial. The documents were admitted and marked as Exh. D1 - Exh. D9. Witness urged the Court to grant the reliefs sought. Under cross examination, witness stated that members of the Association are over 6000 presently; that he was a Retiree of the Defendant; that he disengaged from the defendant 7/4/04 having served for over 39 years; that he was paid his gratuity when he disengaged from the Defendant; that Defendant is still paying him monthly pension up till date and that some retirees collect monthly pension while others have their contributory pensions paid to their PFA’s. Witness testified further that Claimant is in Court for the reinstatement of the 13th month ex-gratia payment from 2011 to date; that Exhibit ‘D’ was in response a request made; that by Article 12 of Exhibit D2 that only serving employees of the Defendant are covered for the 13th month cash payment. According to the witness, 'ex-gratia' means 2 things, that firstly it is money given by employer to his employees out of his free will and that it could also mean payment which if it has taken some time is assumed to be permanent; that apart from Exhibit ‘D’, there is no other document where the Defendant agrees to be paying ex-gratia13th month to the Claimants; that there is no letter from PenCom mandating the Defendant to continue to pay the 13th month ex-gratia payment; that he was aware that in 2009 Central Bank of Nigeria rated some Banks as distressed Banks and that he was aware that the 1st Defendant was one of the distressed Banks. Witness stated further that he was aware that the CBN gave the distressed Banks some money to stabilize and that there is no agreement (referring to paragraph 3 of his Statement on Oath) between First Bank and the Defendant that Defendant will always do for its staff what First Bank does for its. Claimant called one Samuel Olawole Owopetu as its second witness. CW2 testified that he retired from the Defendant in 1994 adopted his written witness deposition made on 1/11/12 as his evidence and urged the Court to grant the reliefs sought by the Claimant. Under cross examination CW2 testified that he is member of the Claimant and not a member of the Board of Trustees; that one Mr. Adeagbo is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Association; that the Secretary would be in a better position to state the Trustees. Witness stated that he is still being paid his monthly pension and that the 13th month pay was stopped in 2011. The case of the Defendant is that the Claimant is an association of interested retired pensioners; that the Claimant does not have responsibility for the advancement of its business whatsoever as they are no longer in its employment and does not contribute by any measure to the smooth running of the Defendant; that the entire retired pensioners of the Defendant including members of the Claimant received their full benefit upon retirement or disengagement; that Defendant by its letter dated 20/9/08 conveyed the decision of its Management to pay 13th month ex-gratia payment to the members of the Claimant and that the ex-gratia will be paid on the same date as that of the serving staff; that the said letter does not create a legal duty on the Defendant to make its ex-gratia payment to the Claimant annually and that the Collective Agreement dated 27/8/71 does not provide for payment of 13th month ex-gratia salary to the retired pensioners or ex-employee of the Defendant. Defendant further averred that the payment of ex-gratia 13 month salary to ex-members of the Claimant in the past was at the discretion of the Defendant; that Defendant reserved the right to withdraw the 13th month ex-gratia payment to the Claimant at any time without recourse to the claimant though the claimant was duly notified of the withdrawal of ex-gratia payment and reason for the withdrawal by the Defendant; that ex-gratia is not part of the fringe benefits or earnings accrued to the Claimant and the Claimant could not complain over the withdrawal of same; that increase in perquisites, emoluments and benefits enjoyed by the Management of the Defendant has no relevance to the withdrawal of the ex-gratia payment to the Claimant and are not yardstick for the gratuitous pay and that the payment of 13th month ex-gratia to ex-employees/pensioners is not a practice in the banking industry. Defendant stated further that notwithstanding that First Bank Plc is paying the 13th month ex-gratia to its ex-employee retired early, the Defendant is not legally obliged to pay 13th month ex-gratia payment to the Claimant; that the withdrawal of the ex-gratia payment did not occasion economic hardship and psychological trauma on the Claimant as the ex-gratia payment is not an earning or part of their benefits; that the ex-gratia payment is not an earning due to the Claimant and the withdrawal of same did not impose financial misfortune and that Claimant is not entitled to the reliefs stated in its General Form of Complaint and the Statement of Facts. Defence opened its case on 22/1/14 when it called one Benjamin Okorie as its sole witness - Dw1. Dw1 adopted his witness written deposition dated 21/3/13 as his evidence in this case and urged the Court to dismiss the claim of the Claimant. Under cross examination, DW1 testified that he is a Senior Manager with the Defendant; that he has been working with the Defendant for about 31 years; that he was familiar with the compensation, benefits policy and remuneration trend of the Defendant; that Defendant has been consistent in paying the 13th month salary to staff; that he did not know when Defendant started paying the 13th month pay; that he was aware that Defendant has stopped paying 13th month pay to the Claimants and that Defendant is still paying the 13th month pay to all staff except its Pensioners. Witness further testified that he did not know when the 13th month pay was extended to the Claimants; that Exhibit D1 did not state that the payment of 13th month salary is at the discretion of the Management of Defendant; that the reason for stopping the 13th month pay was that the cost of same was no longer sustainable and that he was aware that Defendant made profit. Parties closed their respective cases on 22/1/14 and learned Counsel on either side were ordered to file their final written addresses. In the final written address for the Defendant dated 6/3/14 and file on 7/3/14 learned Counsel set down two main issues for determination as follows: 1. Whether the Defendant is under legal obligation to continue the payment of the 13th month ex-gratia to the Claimant. 2. If answer to issue 1 is in the negative, whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought in this action before this Honourable Court. In relation to issue 1, Counsel argued that from the evidence before the Court particularly Exh. D1 and paragraph 8 of the Statement of Claim that the payment of 13th month to pensioners was approved in 1988 as an ex-gratia. Referring to Black Laws Dictionary, 7th Edition Counsel stated that ex-gratia means ''as a favour; not legally necessary; a payment not legally required''. Referring further to Mohammed J.C.A in P.A.N v. Oje (1997)11 NWLR (Pt. 530) 1 at 17 submitted that ex-gratia payment ''is a payment by one who recognises no legal obligation to pay''. According to the learned Counsel, when a payment is ex-gratia, it takes away legal obligation and the giver is not bound in any way to give or make such payment as it is a mere privilege and not a right, a gift which can only continues as long as the giver wishes to give. It was the submission of learned Counsel that Exh. D2 - Collective Agreement of 1971 which Claimant heavily relied on for entitlement to continuous payment of the 13th month is only in respect of serving employees of the Defendant which Claimant is not but rather group of retirees. Counsel submitted that from evidence led, there is no other agreement or letter where the Defendant approved the payment of the 13th month ex-gratia payment except Exh. D1. Counsel urged the Court to answer the issue 1 in the negative. With respect to issue 2, learned Counsel submitted that if issue 1 is answered in the negative and the Court finds that the Defendant is not obligated to continue payment of the 13th month ex-gratia, all the reliefs flowing directly from it will obviously fail. Counsel submitted that Exh. D6-D8 which Claimant heavily relied on in convincing the Court that Defendant had more than enough to continue to pay the 13th month ex-gratia are not relevant at to the fact in issue and same should be discountenanced. According to learned Counsel, Defendant gave reason for the stoppage of the payment because it is no longer financially sustainable due to economic recession and that none of the Exhibits tendered shows the contrary. Picking on Exh. D9, Counsel referred the Court to the oral evidence of CW1 who stated that 'there is no agreement between the Defendant and First Bank Plc'; and submitted that that Exhibit has no relevance to this case, has no probative value and as such no weight should be attached to same. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. Finally, learned Counsel submitted that there is no gainsaying that this suit lacks merit and urged the Court to dismiss same relying on Omomeji v. Kolawole (2008)14 NWLR (Pt. 1106) 180 at 198 per Muhammad J.S.C. Claimant's final written address was dated and filed on 3/4/14. In it, learned Counsel set down four main issues for determination as follows: 1. Having regard to the letter dated 20/9/88, Exh. 1 and considering the length of time, 23 years, over which the 13th month pay had been paid to the members of the Claimant whether custom, tradition and practice had been established raising the legitimate expectation of the Claimants and creating a legal obligation on the part of the Defendant. 2. Whether by the ordinary wording and legal interpretation of Exh. 1 as presented, the payment of the 13th month to members of the Claimant is discretionary as stated in their Statement of Defence (sic) or even dependent on the whims and caprices of the Defendant as stated by the learned Counsel to the Defendant in his Written Address in support of his Preliminary Objection, regardless of its judicial interpretation in industrial relations matters and the need to conform to international best practice. 3. Whether in all circumstances and regardless of long practice and especially in circumstances such as surround this case, the phrase ex-gratia payment carries in law and justice the meaning that it is not legally obligatory or is discretionary and that it is dependent on the whims and caprices of the promisor. 4. Whether having regard to the reference to the Collective Agreement, Exh. 2, to which the Defendant directed the attention of the Claimant, -the doctrine of incorporation by reference especially useful in industrial relations matter is not applicable in this case, moreso when the decision to pay was communicated to the Claimant and reference was also made to the Collective Agreement (Exh, 2) which forms the foundation of the practice; and -whether the stoppage of this benefit resulting in the diminution of the Claimant's take-home pay is not in conflict with section 99 of the Pension Reform Act, 2004. Learned Counsel argued issues 1 and 2 together. In doing so, counsel addressed issues of Custom and Long Practice; and the Doctrine of Estoppel. Regarding the former, Counsel submitted that having regard to the length of time over which the 13th month had been paid, 23 years, before its abrupt stoppage, custom, tradition and practice had been established raising the legitimate and reasonable expectation of the Claimants and creating a legal obligation on the part of the Defendant such that they are estopped from denying or reneging from the promise solemnly made, accepted and acted in good faith by the Claimant. Linking this up with Estoppel, learned Counsel stated referring to Faponle v. U.I.T.H.B.M (1991)4 NWLR (Pt. 183) 54 that estoppel generally means an admission or something which the law treats as equivalent to an admission of an extremely high and conclusive nature, so high and conclusive that the party whom it affects is not permitted to aver against it or offer evidence to controvert it. It was the submission of the learned Counsel that the Defendant having induced the Claimant to believe and accept that the 13th pay will be paid to the Claimant unconditionally and having paid it for over 20 years, are estopped from renouncing their obligation to pay what the Claimant had received with unfailing regularity for more than two decades. Counsel further submitted that the Defendant, having led the Claimant to accept the promise of regular payment of the 13th month pay and the Claimant had adjusted their position as a result of Defendant's promise cannot now renounce that promise and that Claimant must have suffered indescribable economic hardship by the sudden withdrawal of the promised payment. Counsel referred to Shola Coker v. Sanyaolu (1976)6-10 SC 203 at 221, Obaya v. UniIlorin (2005)15 NWLR (Pt. 947) 123. Referring to Anaeze v. Anyaso (1993)5 NWLR (Pt. 291) 1 submitted that where a person, byhis conduct represented to another person of the existence of a state affairs and has induced such other person to act in reliance thereof, he will be bound by the fair inference to be drawn from his words or conduct. Counsel urged the court to hold that Defendant is estopped from contesting the state of affairs it created upon which the Claimant acted. On issue 3, learned Counsel submitted that the Defendant's argument on the meaning and intendment of ex-gratia payment is completely misconceived and narrow as same is at variance with the correct position of the law; that the mere use of the phrase ex-gratia in the Defendant's letter dated 20/9/88 is not intended and cannot be interpreted to mean that it should have no binding effect in law considering its payment with unbroken regularity over a long period of time and because of the wider judicial interpretation of the word ex-gratia payment as opposed to a mere narrow dictionary definition. Contending that the phrase ex-gratia carries legal implication, learned Counsel cited Edwards v. Skyways Limited (1964)1 All E.R 494 at 500 where Megaw J stated thus- ''As at to the first proposition, the words 'ex-gratia' do not, in my judgment, carry a necessary, or even a probable, implication that the agreement is to be without legal effect. It is, l think, common experience amongst practitioners of the law that litigation or threatened litigation is frequently compromised on the terms that one party shall make to the other a payment described as 'ex-gratia' or 'without admission of liability'. the two phrases are, l think, synonymous. No one would imagine that a settlement, so made, is unenforceable at law''. Counsel also referred to the book 'The Law of Contract' 7th Edition, at pages 94-95 where the learned Authors stated as follows- 'It is true, and indeed inevitable, that if the parties are speaking in jest or uttering idle boasts the law will take no notice of their words. It is equally true that, if they clearly indicate their intention not to create legal obligations, the law will respect their intention and not regard them as bound. But if they use language which reasonable persons would construe as importing mutual promises, their real intention is irrelevant. The comparatively infrequent cases where a contract is denied on the ground that there was no intention to involve legal liability may be divided into two classes. On the one hand there are social, family or other domestic agreements, where the presence or absence of an intention to create legal relations depends upon the inference to be drawn by the court from the language used by the parties and the circumstances in which they use it. On the other hand there are commercial agreements where this intention is presumed and must be rebutted by the party seeking to deny it''. Learned Counsel submitted that the letter dated 20/9/88 could not be regarded as a mere social, family or domestic agreement which is incapable of being enforced; that the contents of the said letter are not mere jest or idle boast and that the language used in the said letter is intended to create legal obligations between the parties. Counsel urged the Court to so hold and to resolve this issue in favour of the Claimant. Canvassing issue 4, learned Counsel reiterated the fact that in informing the Claimant of the extension of the 13th month pay to them made reference to the Collective Agreement between Defendant and the Union in 1971. Counsel thus submitted that by refernce to the said Collective Agreement, Exh. 2, and its reinforcement by Exh. 1, coupled with the stipulation that the Claimant will be paid the same day as the serving employees, both documents constitute express reference by incorporation into the relationship between them. Learned Counsel referred to Burroughs Machines Limited v. Timmoney (1977)1 RLR 404 where Lord Emslie stated that - '... in our opinion it is clear that by the reference in that contract to the guaranteed week provisions in the National Agreement, the employer offered and the employee accepted on certain interdependent terms and conditions. ... The contract of employment of the respondent, as we see it, must be understood to have included essentially the provision of guaranteed week...' Furthermore, Counsel cited ACB Plc v. Nwodika (1996)4 NWLR (Pt.443) 470 at 474 where the Court of Appeal stated that enforceability of Collective Agreement in employer and employee relationship depends on four factors, namely, i. Their incorporation into the contract of service, if one exists; ii. The state of pleadings; iii. The evidence before the Court; and iv. The conduct of the parties. It was the submission of the learned Counsel that indeed by Section 2 of the Trade Disputes Act either party to a Collective Agreement may take legal action to enforce the agreement. Counsel submitted that all the conditions needed for the enforceability of the Collective Agreement exist in this case particularly the reference by the Defendant to Exh, 2 and the unchallenged fact and tendered evidence that the 13th month pay had been paid for over 20 years. He also referred to Section 99(3) of the Pension Reform Act which preserves additional benefits other than pension and gratuity enjoyable upon retirement by any pensioner before the commencement of the Act. Counsel urged the Court to find in favour of the Claimant and grant all its reliefs as sought. Learned Counsel for the Defendant filed a Reply on Point of Law dated and filed 17/4/14. Learned Counsel submitted that the cases of Ondo State University v. Folayan (1994)7 NWLR (Pt. 354)1 and Okomkwo v. Kpajie (1992)2 NWLR (Pt. 226) 633 are misconceived and have no nexus to the present case as regards the issue of estoppel. Relying on Abalogu v. S.P.D.C. Limited (2003)13 NWLR (Pt.837) 309, Counsel submitted that there was no legal relation or any intendment of creating any legal relation between the parties to warrant the use of estoppels on the Defendant and that there was no act done or consideration given by the Claimant which will enable the Court compel the Defendant to continue to pay the said ex-gratia. Secondly, on the issue of ex-gratia, Counsel submitted that the case of Edwards v. Skyways Limited (1964)1 All E.R relied upon by the Claimant in urging the Court that ex-gratia payment has legal backing is misconceived and is not impair with the case at hand. According to Counsel, the payment of ex-gratia or without admission of liability referred to is when a party agrees to pay the other to end or abort litigation and the party who has agreed to pay such ex-gratia cannot stop the payment simply because it is ex-gratia because the other party had acted on that believe. According to Counsel, the Claimant did not do any act on the belief or assurances of the Defendant's letter and hence its reliance on the authority does not hold water. This Judgment was adjourned for delivery on 31/7/14. Unfortunately, the Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria (JUSUN) embarked on industrial action which lasted from 18/7/14 to 4/8/14. Hence, this Judgment, though ready to be delivered on 31/7/14 could not be for the reason as stated. Thus it was adjourned till today for delivery. I have read with understanding and reviewed all the processes filed by learned Counsel on either side in this case. I also did listen with attention to the oral submissions on behalf of the parties and appropriately evaluated all the Exhibits tendered and admitted. Having done so, i have come to narrow the issues for determination to mainly two as follows - 1. Whether in the circumstances of this case the Defendant is under legal obligation to continue the payment of the 13th month ex-gratia to the Claimant. 2. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought. The nature of the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant is clear and not in contention. Exh. D1 conveyed the approval of the Defendant for the payment of '13th Month Ex-Gratia Payment to Pensioners' to the Claimant. That Exhibit was dated 20/9/88. By the first paragraph of that Exhibit it was apparent that the Defendant did not on its own volition suddenly wake up and approved the payment. Exh. D1 referred to previous correspondence. That exhibit also indicated that the 13th month ex-gratia is payable on the same date as serving staff, referring to Exh. D2. P.A.N. Limited v. Oje & Ors (1997)LPELR-6331 (CA) is a good authority for the proposition that ex-gratia connotes something given out of grace, favour, indulgence or gratuitous. It however seems to me that previous discussions between the parties which Exh. D1 referred to and a reference to Exh. D2 by Exh. D1 changed the nature of that payment notwithstanding that it was tagged ex-gratia. The reference to previous correspondence aptly indicates that there was a demand for the payment of the 13th month pay by the Claimant; the eventual approval and issuance of Exh. D1 further indicates the meeting point by the parties on the payment and how it was to be effected. Now in PAN Ltd v. Oje (supra) the Court of Appeal quoted with approval the definition of ex-gratia as given by Henry Campbell Black, author of Black's Law Dictionary when he defined the term as a ''term applied to anything accorded as a favour, as distinguished from that which may be demanded ex debito, a matter of right''. The demand for same is an indication on the part of the Claimant that it was entitled to payment of same. I find and hold that Claimant indeed demanded the payment of the 13th month pay from the Defendant and that the discussions and correspondences between the parties culminated in the Defendant communicating Exh. D1 to the Claimant. Secondly, l have evidence before me that the Defendant consistently paid and Claimant also consistently received regularly the 13th month pay for a period spanning over two decades. the payment commenced in 1988 was suddenly brought to an end in December, 2011, a period of 23 years. Could the payment of 13th month pay have become a custom and/or tradition of the Defendant? Custom is said to be a mirror of accepted usage and for a practice to be accepted as custom or tradition it must have been practiced for a fairly long period of time. In the instant case, the practice of payment of 13th month pay has been consistently and regularly on uninterrupted for period of 23 years. In Chief Loveday Ebere & Ors v. John Onyenge (1999)LPELR-5479 (CA) the Court stated that 'the essence of custom is in its uninterrupted practice, acceptability and habit of compliance by the people so affected. A period of 23 years is long enough for the Court to hold a particular practice to have become a custom of the people concerned. In the instant case there is evidence that 13th month pay has been paid consistently, regularly and uninterruptedly. I thus find and hold that that practice having been carried on for a long time has become a custom between Claimant and the Defendant to such an extent that a party may seek its enforcement as in the instant case through judicial process. It is conceded custom is not static, but rather elastic in that it responds to social, economic and indeed technological changes and development. In other words, what was accepted as custom even within labour and industrial regime may cease to be so accepted. It is however for the party contending against same to adduce sufficient evidence to rebut the acceptance or continued prevalence of that custom. The only argument put forward by the defence in this case was that the payment of the 13th month pay was no longer economically feasible. Claimant argued that it was feasible and that Defendant was viable. It was up to the Defendant to rebut the assertion of the Claimant that it was making enough profit by adducing evidence to the contrary. Defendant could have if it wanted have tendered its Audited Accounts and Annual Returns to show that it was indeed not economically feasible for it to continue to pay the 13th month pay. This was not done. It is thus obvious why the Court cannot find in its favour. I may add that it is on record that Defendant did not tender any documentary evidence in its defence in this case, though it is not bound to do. The issue 1 is therefore resolved and answered in the affirmative. I hold, considering the circumstances of this case and the available exhibits, that the Defendant is under a legal obligation to continue the payment of 13th month ex-gratia to the Claimant. The success or otherwise of issue 2 is predicated on issue 1. Issue 1 having been so resolved and answered in the affirmative, l here declare that the stoppage of the 13th month pay is improper and contrary to the mutual understanding of both parties and to the long established custom and practice. Relief b of the Claimant also succeeds. I here order that the Defendant shall pay 13th month to all members of the Claimant's Association for the year 2011 and the resumption of its regular payment from 2011. Relief c is for payment of interest on the unpaid 13th month stipend from December 2011 payable to all members of the Association calculated at 25% per annum from 4/12/11 to date. Claimant did not lead any evidence in proof of this relief. However, judicial notice is taken of the fact that Defendant is a financial institution which is involved in banking business. Defendants, among other things give loan out to customers with interest payable on same. In relation to pre-judgment interest, N.M.B. Ltd v. Aiyedun In. Ltd (1998)2 NWLR (Pt. 537) 221 is a good authority for the proposition that the law treats the holder of such funds as a borrower of it on which interest must be paid. With regard to post-judgment interest monetary judgment attracts interest even where none is claimed, see Diamond Bank Ltd v. P.I.C. Ltd (2009)18 NWLR (Pt. 1172) 67. In any event award of post-judgment interest is sanctioned by the Rules of this Court, see Order 21 Rule 4, National Industrial Court Rules, 2007. I thus hold that the judgment sum awarded in this case shall attract 10% interest from the day the sum becomes due and payable. Relief d is for cost of this action in the sum of =N=3.5 Million. Again, respecting this, no evidence before me on how the Claimant came about incurring the sum claimed. Notwithstanding this, the fact remains that cost follows event. In any event, if Defendant had paid the 13th month pay as at and when due, there would have been no need for this action in the first place. I award cost of =N=100,000.00 in the circumstance to the Claimant. Finally and for the avoidance of doubt, l - 1. Declare that the abrupt stoppage of the 13th month pay is improper and contrary to the mutual understanding of both parties and to the long established custom and practice; 2. I order that the Defendant shall pay 13th month pay to all members of the Claimant's Association for the year 2011 and the resumption of its regular payment from 2012. 3. Order that Defendant shall pay interest at the rate of 10% on the entire judgment sum from the day the judgment debt becomes payable. 4. Award the sum of =N=100,000.00 as cost of this proceedings. The total sum payable under and by virtue of this judgment shall be paid within Fourteen (14) days from the date of this judgment. Judgment is entered accordingly. ____________________ Hon. Justice J.D. Peters Presiding Judge