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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP……HON. JUSTICE B.A. ADEJUMO, OFR (PRESIDENT, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA) DATE: 8TH OCTOBER, 2014 SUIT NO. NICN/LA/632/2013 BETWEEN: 1. MR. THADDEUS OBIDIKE 2. MR. VICTOR OKWUMA CLAIMANTS/RESPONDENTS 3. MR. PETER IGENE 4. MRS. CATHERINE UDEOGU [Suing for themselves and on behalf of other Retirees of NIMET; NAMA; FAAN; and NCAA occupying Strabag Estate and Zone D Quarters along Agege Motor Road, Ikeja, Lagos as legal sitting tenants] AND 1. MINISTER OF LANDS, HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 2. MINISTER OF AVIATION 2ND, 3RD & 7TH 3. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE DEFENDANTS/ FEDERATION APPLICANTS 4. SECRETARY, IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE ON COMMISSION INTO THE ALIENATION OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LANDED PROPERTY 1ST, 4TH & 5TH 5. DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NIGERIA DEFENDANTS/ METEROROLOGICAL AGENCY RESPONDENTS 6. MANAGING-DIRECTOR, NIGERIAN AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT AGENCY 7. MANAGING-DIRECTOR, FEDERAL AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF NIGERIA 8. DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NIGERIA CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY REPRESENTATIONS: D. Akinlaja, SAN, for the Claimants appearing with I. Fasanmi, O. Okwusogu, SAN, for 6th Defendant appearing with Anuionwu Oyeka, O. Adetiloye, Esq; for 7th Defendant. RULING This suit was commenced by a motion ex parte on the 2nd of December, 2013. It was accompanied with a Complaint and Statement of Facts which claimed the following reliefs: i. A DECLARATION that the Claimants are entitled to the right of first purchase or lease of the residential quarters occupied by them at Strabag Estate and Zone D Quarters along Agege Motor Road, Ikeja, Lagos as retirees of Nigeria Meteorological Agency [NIMET]; Nigerian Airspace Management Agency [NEMA]; Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria [FAAN]; the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority [NCAA] by virtue of the Federal Government Monetization Policy. ii. A DECLARATION that the Claimants have acquired vested rights under the monetization policy in respect of the residential quarters and they cannot be justifiably denied of their right of first purchase of lease in respect thereof by the Nigeria Meteorological Agency [NIMET]; Nigerian Airspace Management Agency [NEMA]; Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria [FAAN]; the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority [NCAA] acting in league with the Presidential Implementation Committee and the Ministry of Aviation or any person [s] whatsoever. iii. AN ORDER mandating the Defendants to perfect the transfer of the residential quarters in question to the Claimants by way of lease or sale in consonance with the monetization policy of the Federal Government. iv. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Defendants by themselves, servants, privies or any person [s] whosoever described from evicting the Plaintiffs/Claimants from the residential quarters or in any way adversely affecting their occupation of the said quarters in negation of the monetization policy of the federal [sic] Government. Against the above, the defendants/applicants brought five separate and different Notices of Preliminary Objections [NPOs]. They are as listed, in accordance with the timing of their adoption at hearing, below: 1. The first was brought on behalf of the 3rd defendant/applicant; dated 07/02/14 and filed same date. 2. The second was brought on behalf of the 2nd, 3rd and 7th defendants/applicant [though in moving the application counsel said on behalf of the 2nd and 5th defendants/applicants]; dated 03/02/2014 and filed same date; 3. The third was brought on behalf of the 6th defendant/applicant; dated 03/02/14 and filed same date; 4. The fourth was brought on behalf of the 7th defendant/applicant; dated 7th February, 2014 and filed same date; and 5. The fifth was brought on behalf of the 8th defendant/applicant; dated 01/04/14 and filed same date. The grounds of the first NPO filed on behalf of the 3rd defendant/applicant are as reproduced below: SCHEDULE I That the suit is incompetent on the ground that the Claimant/Respondent [sic] has not disclosed any reasonable cause of action against the 3rd Defendant/Applicant. PARTICULARS 1. That the 3rd Defendant/Applicant is not a proper party. 2. That the Statement of Facts in support of the application has not disclosed any act or acts of the 3rd Defendant/Applicant that violates or threatens to violate any fundamental right of the Claimant/Respondent upon which a reasonable cause of action may arise. The grounds of the second NPO filed on behalf of the 2nd, 3rd and 7th [later 2nd & 5th] defendants/applicants are also as reproduced hereunder: i. The Claimant’s [sic] action is statute barred. ii. The Claimant’s [sic] action is an abuse of Court Process [sic]. The grounds of the third NPO filed on behalf of the 6th defendant/applicant are as likewise stated hereunder: i. The subject matter of the suit have [sic] since been adjudicated upon by the Federal High Court in suit No. FHC/L/CS/512/2009 ENGINEER EZE V. NAMA & ORS Suit No. FHC/L/CS/513/2009 OLOPHA V. NAMA & ORS. ii. The Claimants herein have the same subject matter before the National Industrial Court in Suit No. NIC/LA/612/2013 which is pending. The grounds of the fourth NPO filed on behalf of the 7th defendant/applicant are, equally, as reproduced hereunder: (a) The FEDERAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY OF NIGERIA ACT, CAP. F5 LFN 2004 [FAAN ACT.] which is the law that establishes the office of the 7th Defendant/Applicant provides at section 1 for the establishment of Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria and that it shall be a body corporate that may sue and be sued in its name. (b) The Claimants/Respondents filed this suit joining the 7th Defendant as Managing Director, Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria same not being a proper party before the Court. (c) Section 20 [2] of the FAAN Act provides that a pre-action notice has to be served on the Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria. (d) A pre-action notice is meant to be signed personally by either the Claimant or his solicitor. (e) The pre-action notice in this matter was allegedly signed by Dayo Akinlaja, SAN who describes himself as “Solicitors” to the Claimant [sic]. (f) Dayo Akinlaja is a Senior Advocate of Nigeria. (g) Section 5 [8] of the Legal Practitioners Act, Cap. L11, [sic] 2004 expressly prohibits a Senior Advocate of Nigeria from practicing or holding himself out as a solicitor. (h) In the light of the foregoing, this Honourable Court therefore lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this suit against the 7th Defendant, Managing Director, Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria. The grounds of the fifth and last NPO filed on behalf of the 8th defendant/applicant are, likewise, reproduced below: i. This action is statute barred in that – (a) The same was instituted against the 8th Defendant/Applicant more than one [1] year after the cause of action arose contrary to the provisions of the Civil Aviation Act, 2006. (b) The same was not instituted against the 8th Defendant/Applicant, being a person within the meaning and contemplation of the Public Officers Protection [POPA] Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, within three [3] months after the cause of action arose. ii. That the action, as constituted against the 8th Defendant/Applicant, is an abuse of Court processes. The claimants/respondents replied to these NPOs by filing the following processes: 1. In reaction to the NPO of the 3rd defendant/applicant, the claimants/respondents filed a written address dated 05/05/14 and filed on 06/05/14; 2. In reaction to the NPO of the 2nd and 5th defendants/applicants, the claimants/respondents filed a written address dated 04/03/14 and filed on 07/03/14; 3. In reaction to the NPO of the 6th defendant/applicant, the claimants/respondents filed a Counter Affidavit and a written address on 07/03/14; 4. In reaction to the NPO of the 7th defendant/applicant, the claimants/respondents filed a written address dated 05/05/14 and filed 06/05/14; and 5. In reaction to the NPO of the 8th defendant/applicant, the claimants/respondents filed a written address dated 05/05/14 and filed on 06/05/14. The NPO subsequently came up for hearing on the 3rd of June, 2014; and counsel to the parties adopted their respective written addresses. Thereafter, the NPO was adjourned to 02/07/14 for ruling. The ruling was not ready on that date and it was further adjourned to 30th July, 2014. Again the ruling could not also be delivered on this date. This time around, not as a result of any fault from the Court, but due to the industrial actions embarked upon by the Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria [JUSUN] which totally barred access to the Court’s premises to deliver the ruling, which was actually ready at the date. And at the date of calling off the strike, the Court had begun its annual vacation: the industrial action began on the 21st of July, 2014 and was called off on the 4th of August, 2014. This Court began its annual vacation on the 4th of August, 2014 and resumed on the 15th of September, 2014. So, the ruling had to be re-adjourned to today: the 8th of October, 2014, after the resumption from the annual vacation. This is when the exigencies of duties permit me to sit in Lagos. Let me now summarize the addresses in respect of the NPOs one after the other. I will start with that filed on behalf of the 3rd defendant/applicant, being the one adopted first at hearing. In arguing this NPO, the counsel to the 3rd defendant/applicant formulated three issues, to wit: • Whether or not the 3rd Defendant [sic] is a necessary party to the claim of the Applicant in this suit. • Whether or not there is a Reasonable [sic] cause of action disclosed against the 3rd Defendant/Applicant. • Whether or not the suit against the 3rd Defendant [sic] is an Abuse [sic] of the legal and judicial process and as such the courts [sic] lacks [sic] the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In arguing issue 1 as formulated, counsel cited A.G. Kano v. A.G. [sic] 2007 [sic] 3SC [Pt. 1] to the effect that the Supreme Court held that while the Attorney-General may be sued on behalf of government, this can only be properly done where the claim or complaint is directly against the state or federal government. Counsel argued that since the Attorney-General is not in any way directly or indirectly concerned with the matter in issue, he should not be joined. Counsel argued further that the suit is speculative in nature and as such the Attorney-General should be struck out for misjoinder of party. Counsel cited Adefarasin v. Dayekh [2007] 11 NWLR [Pt. 1044] 89 at 121, para. B to support his contention. Counsel argued further that in determining whether a party is properly joined, the court looks at the writ and the statement of claims. Counsel cited Ojo v. Ogbe [2007] NWLR [Pt. 1040] 542 at 558 in support of this contention. Counsel submitted that a perusal of the affidavit of the claimants and the reliefs sought do not disclose that the suit cannot be effectively adjudicated without the joinder of the 3rd defendant. Counsel moved to issue No. 2. Counsel argued that a cause of action must exist to justify a suit. On this counsel cited: Ambode v. Min. of Foreign Affairs [2004] 14 NWLR [sic] p. 511 ratio 3; Egbe v. Adefarasin [1995] 1 NWLR [Pt. 3] p. 549; Osigwe v. PSPLS MGT. Cons. Ltd [2009] Vol. 171 LRCN at p. 111A; and Afolayan v. Ogunrinde [1990] 1 NWLR [Pt. 369] at 382. Counsel submitted that there is no cause of action disclosed in the instant suit. Counsel moved to issue no. 3. Counsel argued that the issues raised by the NPO are issues of jurisdiction and that it must be determined before the matter can proceed further. On this, counsel cited Uwamu v. Uwamu [1998] 10 NWLR [Pt. 569] 270 at 243. Counsel argued that it is not only multiplication of actions that can ground abuse of court process and that the action of the claimants herein being speculative and brought in bad faith must be held to amount to abuse of the court’s process; and as such be struck out. On this respect counsel cited Anyaduba v. NRTC. Ltd [1990] 1 NWLR [Pt. 129] 397. Counsel finally urged the Court to strike out the name of the 3rd defendant/applicant. I shall now move to the written address on the NPO filed on behalf of the 2nd, 3rd and 7th defendants/applicant [though in moving the application counsel said on behalf of the 2nd and 5th defendants/applicants]. Counsel to the 2nd and 5th defendants/applicants formulated a lone issue for the determination of the NPO. The lone issue is as reproduced hereunder: Whether the claimant’s [sic] case is statute barred [sic]. In commencing arguments on the NPO, counsel cited section 2 of the Public Officers [Protection] Act [POPA]. Counsel argued that by virtue of the fact that Mr. President approved the sale of the property in issue to the sitting tenants since 2010 and the fact that the 4th defendant had written on the 29th April, 2010 that the property in question be treated as institutional property; it followed that the causes of action arose on these two different dates. Counsel stated that this action was commenced on 2nd December, 2013: three years after the occurrence of the causes of action. Arising from this, it was argued that the claimants have lost their right of action. Counsel relied on John Okeogu v. Ali-I [1991] 3 SCNJ 45 at 52 and Williams v. Williams [2008] 5 SCNJ 56 to ground his submission. Counsel argued further that since the action was commenced outside the three-month limitation period prescribed, it becomes unenforceable. Counsel cited Nwagwugwu v. President FGN & 1 Or. [2007] ALL FWLR [Pt. 358] 1151 at 1173; Ebiogbe v. NNPC [1994] 6 SCNJ 71 at paras. 79 – 80. Counsel argued further that whenever the issue of limitation of action is raised, the question is whether the action is maintainable against the defendant. On this counsel cited Fred Egbe v. Adefarasin [2004] 14 WRN 57; and Lawal Sanda v. Kukawa LGA [1991] 3 SCNJ 35 at p. 41. Counsel argued that the claimants still have an action on the same subject matter and between the same parties at the Federal High Court in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1073/2012 and yet instituted this same suit at this Court; and that the present suit amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Counsel cited INEC v. Agbaso [2010] 1 NWLR [Pt. 1174] CA1; and Ogoejeofo v. Ogoejeofo [2006] 3 NWLR [Pt. 966] CA 205. Counsel argued further that the claimants have not disclosed any cause of action against the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th & 8th defendants/applicants as there is no nexus between them and the claimants’ claims. Counsel submitted that this much has been admitted by the claimants in paragraphs 9 – 12 and 14 – 15 of their Statement of Claim. Counsel argued that since the claimants’ suit has not shown any clear cut dispute or claim against the above stated defendants/applicants, the Court is therefore estopped from speculating on the facts. Counsel cited Adama v. Anaja [2004] 2 NWLR [Pt. 858] 460. Counsel finally urged the Court to strike out the suit. I move to the written address filed on the NPO filed on behalf of the 6th defendant/applicant. It is necessary to state that this NPO was supported by an affidavit and further and better affidavit filed on 19/03/14: the two affidavits have exhibits attached. Counsel to the 6th defendant/applicant formulated three issues for the determination of the NPO. They are reproduced verbatim below: 1. Whether the issue of rights of Retired Staff Proprietary interest in official quarters having been decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction, is the issue not Res-Judicata [sic]? 2. Whether it is not an abuse of the Court process during the pending of a [sic] proceedings involving principally the same issues to relitigate [sic] another matter of the same facts before another Court [sic]? 3. Whether where the Court finds that its process has been abused, ought not the Honourable Court [sic] dismiss the process. [sic] In arguing his issue No. 1 counsel to the 6th defendant/applicant commenced argument by saying a matter is said to be decided when a court of records adjudicate firmly on the said matter based on the writ and the reliefs sought. Counsel cited section 59 of the Evidence Act to the effect that the existence of any judgment, orders or decree by law prevents any court from taking cognizance of a subsequent suit on the same subject matter. Counsel said by this same section, the evidence of the existence of such judgment, decree or orders is admissible in proof of whether such trial ought to hold. Counsel therefore submitted that the previous judgment contained in Exhibits J.O.V. [III] & J.O.V. [IV] are therefore relevant and cumulatively estopped the claimants from re-litigating the same issue. On this line of reasoning, counsel cited Madukolu v. Nkemdili [1962] ALL 581 at 588; Ikotun v. Oyekanmi [2008] 10 NWLR [Pt. 1094] 100 at 114 – 115; and Alapo v. Agbokere [2010] 2 – 3 SC Pt. III 133 at 152 [lines 1 – 25]. Counsel further referred to Exhibits J.O.V. I and paragraph 8 in Exhibit J.O.V. II, to argue that the same reliefs, as contained therein, are being claimed in the present suit. Counsel moved on to his issue No.2. Counsel first referred to the affidavit in support of the NPO particularly paragraphs 2 [IV] and [V] of affidavit of J.O.V. Anionwu Esq. which he argued shows unequivocally that the same parties and reliefs as are presently in issue herein are also the ones in issue therein. Counsel argued that the suit in Exhibit J.O.V. [V] was transferred to this Court from the Federal High Court and that the Court should take judicial notice of the hearing notice from this Court in Exhibit J.O.V. [V] and its adjourned date. Counsel submitted that by these, it is abundantly clear that suit No. NICN/LA/612/2013 was first in time and pending in this Court before the present suit. Counsel argued that the above scenario depicts a clear case of abuse of process. Counsel cited the following authorities to buttress his arguments: 1. Amaefule v. State [1988] 2 NWLR [Pt. 76] 157 at 177; 2. Banjo v. Eternal Sacred Order of Cherubim and Seraphim [1975] 3 SC 37 at 42; and 3. African Reinsurance Corporation v. JPD Ltd [2003] 2 – 3 SC 47 at 63. Counsel thereafter moved to issue No. 3. Counsel argued that where the process of a court is abused, the court is imbued with both statutory and inherent powers to dismiss the action amounting to an abuse of its process. Counsel cited: 1. Erisi v. Idika [1997] 3 NWLR [Pt. 66] 503 at 572 to the effect that the Court has a power to make an order that would enhance its dignity; 2. African Reinsurance Corporation [supra]; Kode v. Yusuf [2001] 2 SC 85 on the fact that the appropriate order to make in abuse of process is that of dismissal; and 3. Okafor v. A.G Anambra State [1991] 6 NWLR [Pt. 200] at 659, to the same effect as that of No. 2 above. Counsel finally urged the Court to dismiss the action. I now move to the written address in respect of the NPO filed on behalf of the 7th defendant/applicant. In arguing this NPO, counsel to the 7th defendant/applicant formulated 2 issues, to vizt: (1) “Whether the office of the Managing Director, Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria sued as the 7th Defendant in this suit is a proper party in this suit before this Honourable Court in view of the provisions of Section [sic] 1 (1) (2), Section [sic] 9 and Section [sic] 21 of the Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria Act Cap F5 LFN 2004. [sic] (2) “Whether the Pre-action [sic] notice as issued is competent in law same having been signed by a Senior Advocate of Nigeria”. [sic] In arguing issue No. 1 counsel submitted that the Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria is a juristic personality by virtue of section 1 [1] & [2] of the Federal Airport Authority Act. Counsel submitted that arising from the foregoing; the Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria cannot be sued in proxy. Counsel submitted that by suing the 7th defendant [the Managing Director] of the Federal Airport Authority, the claimants have sued a non-juristic personality. Counsel submitted that where one of the parties or both parties to a suit is non-juristic, the court would lack the jurisdiction to entertain such action. On this, counsel cited H.C.M. v. Iyoha Suit No. CA/C/135/99 Reported [2001] 46 W.R.N 103 at 126 – 127. Counsel also cited Nurses Association v. A.G. [1981] 12 NSCC 441 at 445 to the effect that a non-juristic person cannot institute an action and neither can an action be instituted against it. Counsel therefore urged the Court to strike out the name of the 7th defendant. Counsel argued further that where a court inadvertently made an order against a party in a suit on which it lacks jurisdiction, it has an inherent power to set aside such wrongful order. Counsel cited Ajike v. Moladun [1967] N.S.C.C. 364 at 266 [sic]; and Barclays Bank of Nigeria v. CBN [1976] 6 S.C [Reprint] 115 at 122. On this score, the Court was urged to set aside its order of interim injunction granted against the 7th defendant on the 5th of December, 2013 by this Honourable Court. Counsel moved to issue No. 2. Counsel cited section 5 [8] of the Legal Practitioners Act to the effect that a Senior Advocate of Nigeria which the person who signed the pre-action notice is, cannot practice other than as a barrister. Counsel therefore submitted that the pre-action notice issued by Dayo Akinlaja, SAN is most incompetent. And that arising from this, section 20 [2] of the Federal Airport Authority Act which enjoins that a pre-action notice be served before an action can be competently commenced against it has not been obeyed; and as such the Court is robbed of its jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Counsel cited Niger Care Dev. Co. Ltd v. ASWB [2008] 9 NWLR [Pt. 1093] 498 to buttress his argument. Counsel finally urged the Court to grant the NPO. I now move to the written address in respect of the NPO filed on behalf of the 8th defendant/applicant. In arguing this NPO, counsel to the 8th defendant/applicant formulated two issues: i. Whether or not the 3rd claimant’s right of action against the 8th Defendant/Applicant herein has been extinguished and his claim statute barred; and ii. Whether or not the 3rd Claimant’s action against the 8th Defendant/Applicant is a gross abuse of Court Processes [sic]. [sic] Counsel submitted that the 3rd claimant’s right of action against the 8th defendant/applicant has been extinguished. Counsel said a cause of action is said to accrue the moment there is an injury and there is a person to be sued for the injury. Counsel cited Edosomwan v. ACB Ltd [1995] 7 NWLR [Pt. 408] 472 at 478, paras. C – E; British Airways Plc v. Akinyosoye [1995] 1 NWLR [Pt. 374] 722 at 724. Counsel thereafter made references to paragraphs 6, 8, 12 13, and 25 of the Statement of Facts. Counsel said the totality of these paragraphs as admitted by the 3rd defendant is that the cause of action arose in 2010 when the directive of the President to give priority to the defendants in allocation of the quarters in issue was flagrantly disobeyed. Counsel argued in the alternative, that the cause of action could be said to have arisen on 13th September, 2012 the date on which the 8th defendant refused to consider the 3rd defendant in the allocation of the quarters concerned. Counsel submitted that by virtue of section 24 [1] of the Civil Aviation Act, 2006, an action is to be commenced against the 8th defendant 1 year next after the occurrence or cessation of the cause of action. Counsel said similar provisions contained in section 2 [a] of the POPA enures in favour of the applicant. Counsel argued that the 8th defendant/applicant is a person within the meaning attached to “person” in section 2 [a] of the POPA. In this regard, counsel cited Ibrahim v. JSC [1998] 14 NWLR [Pt. 584] 1 at 36, paras. B – C; and Kolo v. A.G. Federation [2003] 10 NWLR [Pt. 829] 602 at 624 – 625, paras. G – F. Counsel submitted that the concomitance of the provisions of sections 2 [a] of the POPA and 24 [1] of the Civil Aviation Act is that no action commenced outside either the three months or the 1 year limitation periods would be maintainable against the 8th defendant. Counsel cited Pankshin v. Pusmut [2008] 12 NWLR [Pt. 1101] 405 at 419, para. E; Ogundipe v. NDIC [2009] 1 NWLR [Pt. 1123] 473 at 498, para. H; Adekoya v. FHA [2008] 11 NWLR [Pt. 1099] 539 at 556 – 557, paras. H – I; Onyekwe v. Police Council [1996] 7 NWLR [Pt. 463] 704 at 712, paras. E – F; and Edosomwan v. ACB Ltd [1995] 7 NWLR [Pt. 408] 472 at 478, para. E – F. Counsel argued further that the direct fallout of this is that the jurisdiction of the Court is negatively affected. Counsel cited Ladejobi v. Odutola holdings ltd [2002] 3 NWLR [Pt. 753] 121 at 162 – 163, to the effect that jurisdiction is fundamental to adjudication. On abuse of court process, counsel argued that the 3rd claimant’s action against the 8th defendant is a gross abuse of the Court’s process. Counsel submitted that the abuse of process is borne out by paragraphs 3 [e], [f], [g], and [h] of its affidavit in support of the application as well as Exhibits KA1 and KA2 which showed convincingly that a similar action had earlier on been commenced by the 3rd claimant at the Federal High Court Lagos and which action is still pending therein. Counsel argued that the law is that where different actions are commenced in different courts based on the same set of facts between the same parties, an abuse of process has occurred. Counsel cited Ukachukwu v. Uba [2005] 18 NWLR [Pt. 956] 1 at 63, paras. D – H, 65 paras. A – F; and NI.M.B. Ltd v. U.B.N Ltd [2004] 12 NWLR [Pt. 888] 599 at 624, paras. D – F. Counsel also invited the Court to examine the reliefs claimed in the instant case vis-à-vis those claimed in Exhibit KA1; and that this would show clearly that the instant case is an abuse of the Court’s process. Counsel finally urged the Court to dismiss the 3rd claimant’s claim against the 8th defendant/applicant. Having carefully summarised the written addresses of the applicants on the NPO, it is now ripe to summarise the responses of the claimants/respondents to the five different written addresses in support of the NPOs. I will take these responses seriatim. The first, in accordance with the order in which the written addresses on the NPO were summarised, is the response of the claimants/respondents to the NPO of the 3rd defendant/applicant; which was dated 05/05/14 and filed 06/05/14. In reaction to the NPO of the 3rd defendant/applicant, the claimants/respondents distilled only one issue: Whether the 3rd defendant is not a proper party in this suit. [sic] In arguing this lone issue in response to the NPO, the counsel to the claimants/respondents submitted that it is beyond disputation that the Federal Attorney-General is the Chief Law Officer of the Federation. Counsel submitted further that the complaint in this case is a complaint directly against the Federal Government in that it seeks to compel the Federal Government to respect its privatization policy. Counsel submits that the 1st to the 4th defendants in this case epitomize the Federal Government, even if it is conceded that the 5th to the 8th, as heads of Federal Agencies do not directly translate to Federal Government. Counsel submitted that arising from the foregoing; the 3rd defendant [the Attorney-General] is therefore a proper party to this suit. Counsel replied to the contention of the counsel to the applicant that this case is baseless and speculative that the contention has not been supported with facts showing how and why the case is baseless and speculative. Counsel argued that at this stage, the Court is not concerned with the weakness in the claimants’ case. Counsel relied on Dada v. Ogunsanya [1992] 3 NWLR [Pt. 232] 754 at 765 to ground his argument. Counsel submitted that the 1st, 2nd, and 4th defendants/applicants are members of the Federal Executive Council of which the 3rd defendant is, by virtue of section 150 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, a member and the Chief Law Officer. Counsel submitted that since this is a case making allegation against the Federal Government, the Attorney-General is a proper party thereto. Counsel submitted that therefore any judgment in the matter would be binding on the Attorney-General as well as the other defendants. Counsel equally submitted that the case has disclosed a reasonable cause of action; and that there is therefore nothing that renders the case an abuse of the court’s process. Counsel submitted that the case cannot therefore be said to be to the annoyance and irritation of the defendants. Counsel finally urged the Court to resolve this lone issue against the 3rd defendant/applicant. I shall move to the 2nd response of the claimants/respondents. This is the response to 2nd, 3rd and 7th defendants/applicants. However, it is necessary to state that in moving the said written response, the applicants’ counsel said it was in respect of the 2nd and 5th applicants. For this purpose, the written address shall be referred to as response to the 2nd and 5th defendants/applicants’ address. This written response is dated 04/03/14 and filed 07/03/14. The claimants/respondents formulated three issues for the determination of the NPO. They are as follows: 1. Whether this action is statute-barred. [sic] 2. Whether this action constitutes an abuse of the court process [sic] 3. Whether this action does not disclose a reasonable cause of action. [sic] In replying on the submission of the 2nd and 5th defendants/applicants that the action is statute barred, counsel to the claimants/respondents submitted that time would only start to run for the purpose of limitation of time upon the happening of the wrong companied of and not before. Counsel submitted that the contention of counsel to the applicants that time began to run since 2010 when presidential approval was given that tenants on ground in the quarters be accorded priority in selling the quarters is misconceived. The misconception, according to counsel, arose from the fact that no wrong could be said to have arisen at that date: so there was nothing to complain of; and as such, time did not begin to run from that date. Counsel also contended that the contention of the opposing counsel that time alternatively began to run against this action on the 29th April, 2012 when the letter dated 29th April, 2012 was written, is grossly misconceived, as there was no wrong to be complained of from the said letter on the said date. Counsel quoted portions of the said letter to the effect that all that the letter conveyed was inchoate and contemplative of what was to be done with the premises in questions; as it merely suggested that the houses “should” be treated as institutional property. This, counsel submitted, meant that the matter was still at the administrative level of the applicants and that no concrete steps had been taken to effectuate the suggestion therein contained. Counsel further submitted that more importantly, this letter was conspicuously not meant for the claimants and was not communicated to them. And that it could not be said that they were aware that a decision had been taken to negatively deprive them of their rights on the houses in issue; and yet failed to act. Counsel also argued that upon eventually sighting the said letter, the claimants/respondents instructed their solicitor to petition the applicants not to carry into effect their contemplation; and that since the petition was never replied, the position of law is that the status quo ante was maintained. Counsel submitted that it is only when a firm communication was received from the applicants that they would deprive the respondents of their rights or when they issue a quit notice on the respondents to vacate the buildings that a cause of action could be said to have arisen. Counsel cited PHCN v. Offoelo [2012] 12 SCNJ 355 at 376 to buttress his arguments. Counsel also cited Ikine v. Edjerode [2002] FWLR [Pt. 92] 17775 at 1796, paras. E – G, to the effect that where a letter of rejection of proposal is sent to an authority by its staff, until it is replied, time cannot begin to run against such staff. Counsel moved to issue No. 2 as distilled by him. On the contention of the applicants that the action is an abuse of the process of Court, counsel to the respondents argued that this contention is grossly misconceived. Counsel submitted that the misconception is borne out by the fact that the applicant who made the assertions in their NPO did not support it with affidavit evidence as required in instances where an NPO takes the form of reliance on facts not before the court already. Counsel cited AG. Federation v. ANPP [2003] 18 NWLR [Pt. 851] 182 at 207; ANPP v. INEC [2005] ALL FWLR [Pt. 254] 971 at 975. Showing further the misconception, counsel submitted that for a process to amount to abuse of process, it must be shown that the parties and subject matter as well as reliefs sought are the same. Counsel submitted that since there was no affidavit evidence to show these, then, it follows that the objection is grossly misconceived; as he who asserts must prove. Counsel commended the authority of Ugbo v. Aburime [1994] 9 SCNJ 23 at 39 to this Court on the issue. He also cited Bello v. N.B.N. [1992] 6 NWLR [Pt. 246] 206 at 241; and Odu-Bello v. Fowler [1993] 9 SCNJ 185 at 195 – 196, to the effect that the address of counsel cannot take the place of evidence. Counsel subsequently moved to issue No. 3 on whether the action discloses reasonable cause of action. Counsel submitted that in deciding whether an action discloses reasonable cause of action, all that the court needs to do is to examine the Complaint and the Statement of Facts by which the action is initiated. Counsel cited Dada v. Ogunsanya [1992] 3 NWLR [Pt. 232] 754. Counsel argued that a careful perusal of the Statement of Facts in this case would reveal that there are triable issues disclosed; in that the claimants have vested rights in having the houses in question allocated to them, and since the 5th and 8th defendants have failed to do this, the claimants are right in approaching the Court for a declaration of their right and to compel the defendants to oblige them. Counsel cited Adigun v. A.G. Oyo State [1987] 1 NWLR [Pt. 53] 678 at 702 and 742; Igbokwe v. Udobi [1992] 3 NWLR [Pt. 228] 214 at 226. Counsel submitted further that at the stage of determining whether there is reasonable cause of action the court is limited strictly to the facts in the pleadings of the claimant and not concerned with the weakness in the case. On this, counsel relied on Nissan [Nig] Ltd v. Yaganathan [2010] 4 NWLR [Pt. 1183] 135 at 148 and 154. Counsel finally urged the Court to dismiss the NPO brought by the 2nd and 5th defendants/applicants. The next stage is to go to the 3rd response from the claimants/respondents. The written response is dated 04/03/14 and filed on 07/03/14. It is in response to the NPO of the 6th defendant/applicant. It is necessary to state that claimants/respondents filed a Counter-Affidavit to the affidavit of the 6th defendant/applicant on 07/03/14. In arguing this written address in reply to the NPO of the 6th defendant/applicant, the counsel to the claimants/respondents distilled two issues thus: 1. Whether this suit is caught by estoppel per rem judicata. [sic] 2. Whether this suit constitutes an abuse of court progress [sic]. [sic] On issue No. 1, counsel argued that a look at Exhibits J.O.V I, II, III, and IV would show that the parties to the two suits are not the same as those in the present case. Counsel also submitted that in the two suits, the grouse was on termination of appointment while the present suit is a collective action on issue of right to retain the houses occupied as retired staff of the defendants. Counsel also argued that even if, as contended, relief 8 in the two cases are the same with the reliefs sought in the instant case, that alone cannot ground a plea of estoppel per rem judicata; as the parties in the two decided cases are not the same with the parties herein. Counsel submitted further that the two cases cannot even ground a plea of issue estoppel on the relief in question. Counsel argued further that Exhibit J.O.V. III showed that suit FHC/L/CS/513/2009 was struck out while relief 8 in suit No. FHC/L/CS/513/2009 was not taken by the Court on its merits but merely dismissed because the Court thought that there was no need considering same. Counsel argued that it is clear that in none of the two cases was relief No. 8 decided on the merit. Arising from the foregoing, counsel submitted that neither of the two judgments can constitute estoppel even against the claimants directly involved. In rounding up, counsel tied his submissions on this count to the authority of Commerce Assurance v. Ali [1992] 4 SCNJ 145 at 153 and 158; Obasi v. Merchant Bank of Africa Securities Ltd [2005] 2 SCNJ 272 at 278 – 290, which is to the effects that striking out of a case cannot ground res judicata just as dismissals not on the merit cannot. Counsel moved to his issue No. 2. Counsel submitted that for a case to constitute abuse on the ground of multiplicity of actions, it must be shown that the parties, subject-matter and the reliefs sought in both cases are the same. Counsel cited Kotoye v. Saraki [1992] 9 NWLR [Pt. 264] 156; and Okorodudu v. Okoromadu [1997] 3 SC 13 at 18 [Reprint]. Counsel submitted that the parties in Exhibit J.O.V. [V] are not the same with those in the instant suit while the suit in Exhibit J.O.V. [V] was only limited to the staff and agency of the 6th defendant in this case; and all the other parties in the present case were not involved. Counsel submitted that as could be gleaned from the Counter-Affidavit, the suit in Exhibit J.O.V. [V] has been discontinued. Counsel finally urged the Court to dismiss the NPO. Attention now shifts to the claimants/respondents response to the NPO of the 7th defendant/applicant. This written response is dated 05/05/14 and filed 06/05/14. Counsel argued that the affidavit of the 7th applicant in support of the NPO at its paragraphs 3 [d], 4 and 6 offends the provision of section 115 [2] of the Evidence Act, 2011 for being argumentative and as such liable to be struck out. On this, counsel cited G.A.S. Ltd. v. Thahal [2004] 4 SCNJ 89 at 104. Counsel also submitted that the description of Dayo Akinlaja, SAN as “solicitors” to the claimants is factually incorrect and as such paragraph 5 of the affidavit wherein this is contained is liable to be discountenanced. Counsel submitted also that since there is no substance in the reaming paragraphs of the affidavit, then there is nothing in the affidavit to respond to by way of counter-affidavit; thus the objection now becomes purely a matter of law. After these initial submissions, counsel formulated the following issues: 1. Whether the 7th defendant is not a proper party in this suit. [sic] 2. Whether the pre-action notice given to the 7th defendant is not competent. [sic] In arguing issue No. 1, counsel contended, while conceding that the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria is a juristic person, that there is nothing in its enabling law that indicates that its Managing Director could not be sued or that every suit must be commenced against the Federal Airports Authority alone. Counsel argued that the word “may’ employed in the relevant section is facultative and not mandatory. Counsel cited Enakhimion v. Edo Transport Services [2006] ALL FWLR [Pt. 334] 1882 at 1900. Counsel argued further that it can be deduced from the wordings of section 20 [1] of the Act that an employee of the Authority could be sued; and as such, the Managing Director can be sued as a proxy for the Authority. Counsel argued also that the Managing Director being a corporation sole within the context of section 9 [1] of the Act, the 7th defendant therefore acquires juristic personality and can be sued. Counsel referred the Court to Carlen Nig. Ltd. v. University of Jos [1994] 1 NWLR [Pt. 323] 631 at 656. Counsel submitted that all the authorities cited by the applicant are distinguishable and are therefore not relevant. On this, counsel cited INEC V. RAY [2004] 14 NWLR [Pt. 892] at 129, paras. B – F; and Okafor v. Nnaife [1987] 4 NWLR [Pt. 64] 129 at 137. Counsel subsequently moved to issue No. 2. On the contention of the applicant that no proper pre-action notice was issued, counsel to the respondent submitted that section 5 [8] of the Legal Practitioners Act referred to by the counsel to the applicant has no relevance to the issue at hand. Counsel argued that the issuance of a pre-action notice is tied in such a way to the prosecution of a case in court such that the Senior Advocate cannot be forbidden to comply with a condition precedent to filing of action in court. Counsel argued that the issuance of pre-action notice cannot be equated with the preparation of a deed which is what the section intends to cover. Counsel contended that the preparation of a deed amounts to practice other than a barrister whereas the issuance of pre-action notice does not. Counsel contended further that the mere fact of being appointed a Senior Advocate does not ipso facto mean that the appointee is no longer a solicitor. Counsel argued that what this translates to is that a Senior Advocate cannot engage in practice otherwise than as a Barrister; and that the issuance of a pre-action notice is in furtherance of practice as a barrister. Counsel equally contended that even if it is agreed that the learned silk practised as a solicitor, it cannot vitiate the pre-action notice he signed but can only be a matter of professional misconduct between him and the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar and would not affect the interest of an innocent litigant. Counsel cited Oloruntoba-Oju v. Lawal [2001] FWLR [Pt. 72] 2029 at 2042. Counsel submitted that by virtue of section 20 [2] of the Act, a pre-action notice is to be served by the intending plaintiff or his agent; and that Dayo Akinlaja & Co. or Dayo Akinlaja, SAN qualified as an agent of the claimants herein. Counsel submitted that the objection of the 7th defendant/applicant reeks of crass technicality and that our courts have held that the era of overreliance on technicalities has gone. Counsel cited Aliu Bello v. A.G Oyo State [1986] 5 NWLR [Pt. 45] 828 at 886; The State v. Gwonto [1983] 1 SCNLR 142 at 160. Having finished summarizing the address of the respondents to the NPO of the 7th defendant/applicant, it is only left to summarise the response of the claimants/respondents to the NPO of the 8th defendant/applicant, which is the 5th and last in this series. This respondents’ written address is dated 05/05/14 and filed on 06/05/14. It is necessary to state that this NPO was supported by an affidavit. In arguing the response, the respondents adopted the two issues formulated by the 8th defendant/applicants. On issue 1, counsel to the respondents adopted in toto his arguments in response to the 2nd and 5th defendants/applicants’ NPO under issue No.1. This argument had earlier on been summarised on pages 12 to 13 of this ruling. I shall therefore not repeat it. I shall then move to issue No. 2. On whether this action constitutes an abuse of process for multiplicity of suits, counsel to the respondents submitted that Exhibit KA1 attached to the objection and relied upon for the argument that the suit is in abuse of court’s process, was not certified as required by law, and as such is not admissible in law. Counsel cited, for this proposition of law, Yero v. UBN Ltd. [2000] 5 NWLR [Pt. 657] 470 at 478 – 479. Counsel also argued against this NPO on the ground that since Exhibit KA1 relied upon by the applicant is inadmissible, it follows that the NPO is a nullity. Counsel argued in furtherance of the foregoing that the onus of proof is on the person who asserts and that the 8th defendant/applicant must prove that the parties and the subject-matter in suit No. FHC/L/CS/1073/12 is the same with the present suit; since address of counsel cannot take the place of evidence. The cases of: Ugbo v. Aburime [supra]; Bello v. N.B.N [supra]; and udubeko v. Fowler [supra] were cited in buttress of these contentions. Counsel argued further in opposition that even if Exhibit KA1 is reckoned with, it would be seen that the parties in that case are not the same with the ones in the instant suit; in that the claimants as well as the defendants defer in the two cases. Counsel argued that while the earlier suit was filed by retirees of the 8th defendant solely against the 8th defendant whereas this is not the case with the instant suit. Counsel also contended in opposition that the subject matter of the present suit is quite different from that of the previous suit. Counsel therefore finally submitted that arising from his arguments above, this action is neither statute barred nor does it constitute an abuse of the process of the Court. None of the defendants/applicants filed a reply address. However, the 6th defendant/applicants filed a better and further affidavit on 19/03/14 with written address attached. This was after the written response of the respondents which was dated 04/03/14 and filed 07/03/14. Thus, for all practical purposes, this amounts to a reply address of sort. I shall take it as such, more so, being an address in furtherance of an NPO, bearing it in mind that preliminary objections on jurisdiction could be raised anyhow, even without following laid down procedures – see Galadima v. Tambai [2000] LPELR – 1302 [SC] P. 21, paras. E – G. After all, it is in the interest both the Court and the parties to a case that issues of jurisdiction be well rested before the case proceeds to trial in order to avoid share waste of time and labour lost. In arguing the written address, counsel to the 6th defendant/applicant distilled three further issues: i. Whether or not the Claimants admitted being PRIVIES of each other and held their character as such in the light of paragraphs 3 & 4 of the Counter Affidavit dated 07/03/14. [sic] ii. Whether having regards to the capacities of the Claimants, they abuse the Court [sic] process by filling multiple Suits [sic] in view of the averment in paragraph 4 of the Counter Affidavit dated 07/03/14. [sic] iii. Whether or not the 2nd Claimant did commence a representative action to which Engr. Godfrey Eze and Mr. Bamidele Olopha’s interests amongst other were represented. In arguing his issue No. 1 counsel cited Ababio v. Kanga [1932] 1 WACA 253 at 254 to show the meaning of “privy” and section 21 [1] and [2] of the Evidence Act to the effect that statements made by the agent of a party or persons suing in representative capacities are admissible as that of the principal or the person being represented. Counsel said the claimants admitted in paragraphs 4 & 5 of their Counter Affidavit that at all material time himself and all the other retirees of the 6th defendant/applicant had been working with a common purpose. Counsel submitted that facts admitted need no further proof; and that since the claimants have admitted being privies to one another in the instant suit as well as in Suit No. FHC/IKJ/CS/90/2012, then the claimant is abusing the process of Court by filling this additional suit in respect of the same subject matter. Counsel therefore urged the Court to resolve this issue in the favour of the 6th defendant/applicant. Counsel moved to issue No. 2. Counsel started by citing Owonikoko v. Arowosaiye [1997] 10 NWLR [Pt. 523] p. 78, para. C as to the definition of “abuse of court’s process”; and that where it occurs, the sanction is dismissal of the suit. Counsel further cited Owonikoko v. Arowosaiye [supra] p. 78, paras. E – F and Arubo v. Aiyeleru [1993] 3 NWLR [Pt. 280] 126 at 142 to stress that the proper order to make in upholding abuse of court’s process is dismissal. Counsel submitted that since there is unequivocal admission by the claimants in paragraphs 4, 5 & 6 of their Counter Affidavit that there are currently multiple actions in different courts, the Court should hold the claimants guilty of abuse of court’s process. Counsel subsequently moved to issue 3. Counsel argued that a look at the writ of summons of Suit No. FHC/L/CS/90/2012 shows that the claimant sues for himself and on behalf of the sitting tenants of the Federal Government houses in occupation and control of the 6th defendant. Counsel submitted that this position is confirmed by paragraph 4 of the Counter Affidavit of the claimants. Counsel further argued that the purported “Notice of Discontinuance” referred to as exhibit CK2 in the Counter Affidavit has not been heard by the Court; and that counsel to the claimants deliberately affixed a wrong suit no. to the said exhibit CK2 in order to mislead the Court to gain tactical advantage in the various matters pending before this Honourable Court. Counsel submitted that Hon. Justice Kanyip of this Court before whom the suit to which Exhibit CK2 relates is, could not take the notice of discontinuance at the last sitting on the matter as His Lordship observed that there was no suit before the Court with Suit No. NICN/LA/613/2013. Counsel further submitted that the claimants in the instant suit include Mr. Bamidele Olopha and Engr. Godfrey Eze as retirees of the 6th defendant/applicant and occupiers of the houses in custody of the 6th defendant/applicant. Counsel argued that the two said retirees are claimants in Suits Nos. FHC/L/CS/512/09: Olopha v. Mama and FHC/L/CS/513/09: Eze v. Mama respectively; and that these suits have been determined by Hon. Justices Olateregun-Isola and Molokwu of the Federal High Court respectively. Counsel rounded up his arguments by submitting that having placed before the Court material-proof and in view of the fact that the houses forming the fulcrum of the action of the claimants have been appropriated by the Federal Government as owner vide Exhibit CK1, the Court should uphold the NPO and dismiss the case accordingly. Thus, the summaries of the addresses filed by all the applicants’ counsel and the respondents’ counsel have been brought to an end. The next stage is to apply the law to the resolution of the issues borne out by the five separate and different NPOs. In doing this, I shall not follow the order as done with the summarization of the addresses. What I shall do is to narrow the resolution to the issues of law identified by me as running across the five separate and different NPOs; such that two or more NPOs might be treated together under an issue of commonality between them. For this purpose, the following 6 issues have been identified by me, as borne out by the five NPOs in combination: 1. Whether the action as presently constituted is caught by any limitation law? 2. Whether the action complies with the condition precedent in the issuance of pre-action notice? 3. Whether the suit as presently constituted discloses no reasonable cause of action? 4. Whether the suit as presently constituted is an abuse of the Court’s process by reason of filing multiple actions on the same subject-matter and between the same parties? 5. Whether the suit as presently constituted is caught by the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicata or issue estoppel? 6. Whether the proper parties are before the Court? I shall take these issues one after the other. 1. Whether the action as presently constituted is caught by any limitation law? The above issue runs across the NPOs of the 2nd & 5th defendants/applicants and that of the 8th defendant/applicant. Counsel to the 2nd & 5th defendants/applicants has argued that section 2 of the POPA bars this action since either year 2010 when Mr. President approved that the houses in question be sold to the sitting tenants [the claimants herein] and this directive was flagrantly disobeyed or 29th April, 2012 when the 4th defendant proposed that the houses in question be treated as institutional property in defiance of the presidential directive to the contrary. Counsel is of the opinion that the causes of action arose in these two different dates. It is the contention of the applicants that since the claimants/respondents failed to take action within three months of the occurrence of either of the dates; their cause of action had become extinguished when they filed this action on the 2nd of December, 2013 which is clearly outside the prescribed three-month grace. Counsel to the 8th defendant/applicant echoed what is similar to the arguments of counsel to the 2nd & 5th defendants/applicants just recounted above. The only additions he made to it are: that in addition to section 2 of the POPA, section 24 [1] of the Civil Aviation Act, which prescribed 1 year limitation period, also bars this action; and that the alternative date of occurrence of cause of action is 13th September, 2012, the date on which the 8th defendant/applicant allegedly refused to consider the 3rd claimant in the allocation of the houses concerned. In reaction to the above, counsel to the claimants/respondents argued against the 2nd & 5th applicants that time would only begin to run upon the happening of a wrong and not before. It was submitted that the presidential directive allegedly disobeyed and the proposal to treat the houses as institutional property in disregard of the directive, that the disobediences have not been put into effect as the houses had not been allocated to other people nor quit notices issued to them over same. It was also contended that the letter of 29th April, 2010 was not directed to them and that it was only an internal administrative memo; and more so, when they got wind of it they asked their counsel to write the authority, which petition had not been replied. On this basis, it was submitted that until the said petition was replied, time could not start to run against them. These arguments were also adopted in toto in reply to the same issue in the NPO of the 8th defendant/respondent. My take on this issue is that first of all, two different limitation periods cannot be prescribed for an action against the same person or set of persons as canvassed by the counsel to the 8th defendant/applicant when he argued that both the Civil Aviation Act and the POPA prescribed two different limitation periods: the advantage of which the 8th defendant could jointly take. The law is that when there is a specific statute making provisions on a specific issue and there is a general statute making provisions on the same issue, the specific takes precedence over the general statute making general provisions – see Olawepo v. SEC [2011] LPELR – 3598 [CA] pp. 26 – 27, paras. F – A; and Board of Customs & Excise v. Ibrahim Barau [1982] LPELR – 786 [SC] pp. 65 – 66, paras. G – E, where the Supreme Court held: Ignorance of the law cannot be a defence. The Customs and Excise Management Act 1958 is, in every way, a special legislation whereas the Criminal Code Act which permits the defence of ignorance of law in certain cases is a general legislation. The Customs and Excise Management Act, 1958, is an Act subsequent to the Criminal Code Act. It is an accepted canon of construction that a general enactment is pro tanto avoided by an express provision in a subsequent enactment which is entirely inconsistent with the general enactment… the special enactment in a subsequent statute is however not a repeal of the provision of previous general statute. Once the subsequent special enactment is contrariant to the previous general enactment the general provision does not apply to the special enactment although the general provision would remain in force. The very recent authority of Integrated Data Services Ltd. v. Adewumi [2013] 21032 [CA] p. 14, paras. A – E is quite apt on the issue at stake. The Court of Appeal expounded the law thus: On the applicable limitation law in the circumstances of this case, I am of the view that a specific aw made on an issue overrides general law made on the same issue. See NDIC v. Pkem Enterprises Ltd. & Anor. [2004] 4 SCNJ 244. Thus where there is specific provision as in this case, it prevails over general provisions on the same subject matter. S. 2 [a] of the Limitation Act Laws of the Federation which is a provision of general application cannot be applicable in the face of S. 12 [a] of the NNPA Act which specifically provides a limitation period to institute a suit against the corporation. Whereas the general law provides a limitation period of three months, the specific legislation applicable to the corporation provides for a limitation period of twelve months. In this wise, the POPA is a general enactment providing limitation period for all public officers while the Civil Aviation Act is a special enactment providing limitation special period for the public officers specifically within its confines. While the one provides three-month period, the other provides one-year period. To that extent, the two statutes are incompatible; meaning that the 8th defendant/applicant cannot rely on the POPA which is a general statute. It is confined to relying on the specific provision of the specific statute, which in this case, is the Civil Aviation Act; and it provides for one-year limitation period. In addition, the Civil Aviation Act was enacted in 2006 while the Public Officer [Protection] Act was enacted in 1916. Thus, the Civil Aviation Act is a subsequent legislation which special provision in issue is totally inconsistent with that of the POPA which is of general application; and by the time-honoured doctrine, the inconsistent special provisions of a subsequent statute overrides that of an earlier statute of general nature. By either of the two cannons or by their combined effect, the applicable limitation law in this regard is the Civil Aviation Act and not the POPA. On the second ground, the argument that the date of the presidential approval [2010], which is being disregarded, is the date the limitation period would begin to run and that in the alternative it would begin to run on 29th April, 2010 the date the 4th defendant/applicant proposed to its management that the presidential directive should not be honoured but rather the houses should be treated as institutional property. These three events, as rightly argued by the counsel to the claimants/respondents do not give rise to any cause of action. In contrast there is what is called anticipatory breach and actual breach. In anticipatory breach, the other party can treat the contract as having come to an end when he is intimated of the intention to breach and sue or wait till the actual breach before bringing an action. If he elects the second option, it means, he treats the contract as still subsisting and waits till the time of performance to see if it will indeed be breached; and if it is breached, he then brings an action. Until the breach actually occurs, time cannot therefore begin to run against the claimants/respondents – see Sanda v. Kukawa LG [1991] LPELR – 3001 [SC] pp. 11 – 12, paras. G – A. By relief [iv], which goes thus: AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Defendants by themselves, servants, privies or any person [s] whosoever described from evicting the Plaintiffs/Claimants from the residential quarters or in any way adversely affecting their occupation of the said quarters in negation of the monetization policy of the federal [sic] Government. It is clear that the claimants/respondents are still very much in the houses in contention: they have neither been ejected nor served with quit notices; all that the claimants/respondents have done in this action is to take a preventive action to forestall the carrying into effect the threat or rather manifestation of intention to deprive them of their alleged rights in the houses in question. Up till the moment, this intention has not been carried into effect: for as long as the situation remains as it is, the claimants/applicants would continue to have the right to institute an action; as time would not run against them, until these demonstrations of intention on the part of the defendants are actually effectuated. Otherwise, the claimants would have asked [in the above-quoted reliefs] for a mandatory injunction to compel the defendants to reverse their already done and completed actions instead of the prohibitive or preventive injunction which is aimed at preventing or restraining them from carrying into effect their threatened actions. More so, I also agree in entirety with the submission of counsel to the respondents that the petition they wrote via their lawyer to the defendants when they learnt of the intention to disregard the presidential directive which has not been answered till date is implicative in law that no firm decision has been taken as to whether the presidential directive would be ignored as advised in the letter of 29th April, 2010; and until a reply is received indicating that this advice would be carried into effect, a cause of action cannot arise. I think the authority of Ikine v. Edjerode [supra] which the learned counsel to the claimants/respondents cited has sufficiently settles this aspect of the matter. It is on record that no contrary authority was supplied by the applicants’ counsel. This very case is also reported in [2001] LPELR – 1479 [SC]; the relevant pages being pp. 19 – 20, paras. G – B, wherein the Supreme Court held firmly; and I reproduce verbatim: This was a case of some assistant school teachers and the adjustment of their salaries during the 2nd World War. The teachers put salary claims which their corporation-employer rejected. Time, it was held, would not commence in respect of their cause of action, consequent upon the rejection of their claims, until that rejection was communicated to them and not before. Hence, it was held, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s cause of action did not accrue until they received notice of rejection of their claims on the 25th February 1946, and therefore the time limit had not expired when the Writs were issued on 23rd January, 1947. The case of the respondent is made stronger in that up till the moment, the defendants has not deemed it fit to communicate their decision on the claims of the respondents as conveyed in the said petition. It follows, like day follows night, that the claimants/respondents’ action, even if it is to be commenced today, is not negatively affected by limitation laws as argued by the applicants. Time would only begin to run the day this petition is replied: period. Finally, on the issue of limitation law, let me consider the last argument canvassed by the counsel to the 8th defendant/applicant which seems to be that on the 13th September, 2012 the 8th defendant in allocating the houses in contention failed to consider the 3rd claimant; and that as such the cause of action, as regards the 3rd claimant arose on the said date when the houses were allegedly allocated. From this, it would appear that a cause of action in deed arose if the contention is true. But the Statement of Facts and the reliefs claimed do not seem to bear this out as they seem to suggest that all the claimants/respondents are still in occupation of the various houses. My take then on this, are of two-pronged dimensions. First, it would appear that it is only evidence at trial that could only clarify these discrepancies. It means issues have been joined on this count. Second, it would appear that an issue of seeming illegality arises in this wise. The contention of the claimants/respondents in the suit is that there is a presidential directive that houses in occupation of public servants be sold to them; if this is so, it would appear that any flagrant disregard of this is signification of seeming illegality, malafide or of the defendants purportedly acting outside the colours of their offices. Until the contrary is proved at trial, issues remained joined on this. Whether or not illegality had been committed or the defendants acted without semblance of authority are questions to be resolved at trial. And the Supreme Court has held that where allegations of illegality and malafide are made, the POPA will not be urged to defeat the trial of such cases. The long and short of this being that the POPA does not protect public officers accused of illegality, malafide or of acting outside the colours of their offices – see A.G Rivers State v. A.G Bayelsa State [2012] LPELR – 9336 [SC] p. 30, where the Supreme Court held that: The second exception to the application of the Act as a defence is that it does not cover a situation where the person relying on it acted outside the colour of his office outside his statutory or constitutional duty as claimed by the plaintiff in this suit. For the sake of clarity on this important point, let me cite the Supreme Court once more. In Hassan v. Aliyu [2010] LPELR – 1357 [SC] p. 84, paras. A – B, the Supreme Court reiterated the above exceptions in the following words: A public officer can be sued outside the limitation period of three months, if at all times material to the commission of the act complained of; he was acting outside the colour or scope of his office or outside his statutory or constitutional duty. Where he acted within the colour or scope of his office, he can only lose protection of the limitation laws if he is sued within three months. See also: Moyosore v. Gov., Kwara State [2012] 5 NWLR [Pt. 1293] 242 at, 282 – 283, paras. D – B, 284 - 285, paras. G – A, 285 para. D.; and Agbatiogun v. NNPC [2008] 13 N.L.L.R [Pt. 35] 236 at 257, paras. B – H. These two other cases are to the effect that the POPA would not apply where issues bordering on illegality or on officer acting without semblance of authority are raised as in the instant case. It therefore logically follows that I must decide this issue against the defendants/applicants and in favour of the claimants/respondents. I hold therefore that the action as presently constituted is not caught by any limitation law as alleged by the defendants/respondents. This aspect of the NPO is therefore dismissed as totally lacking in merits. 2. Whether the action complies with the condition precedent in the issuance of pre-action notice? Having done with the issue of limitation law, let me now move to the second issue as distilled above. This issue was raised by the counsel to the 7th defendant/applicant. The grouse of the applicant’s counsel therein as could be fathomed by me is simply because a learned silk signed the pre-action notice it becomes inoperative as section 5 [8] of the Legal Practitioners Act prevents him from doing so. This is my take on this issue: in the first instance, section 20 [2] of the Federal Airport Authority Act [supra], which provides for a pre-action notice, did not provide that the “Pre-Action Notice” be signed before it becomes valid. What is to be contained in it has been spelt out in the subsection as quoted above. And what is more, it has been held in Peter v. NNPC (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1195) 173 at 194 – 195 paras. C – E that non-compliance with a statutorily prescribed form would not invalidate such form once the non-compliance is not material and is not calculated to mislead. Since the law did not require that the “Notice” be signed, the issue of its not been signed by the proper person cannot be a material issue; and there is no doubt that nobody has been misled as to the fact that the Firm of Legal Practitioners retained by the Claimants issued the notice. And neither is anybody misled as to the contents and essence of the pre-action notice in question. It follows that the objection being canvassed on this ground is crass reliance on technicalities. What is even more, the Legal Firm, which is presumed to be legally registered; and thus assume a legal status; should be presumed capable of signing documents, even if signature is germane to a proper or competent pre-action notice. The implication of this registration is that the Legal Firm assumes the character of a legal personality which can sign or authenticate a legal document. And it performs any of these human functions through the instrumentality of its human agents who are its brain, mind and hand. Therefore, the document in issue, to my mind and with the greatest respect, was properly signed by a human agent representing the Firm of legal practitioners. Besides, I am in total agreement with the reply of the respondents’ counsel that section 5 [8] of the Legal Practitioners Act is irrelevant to issuance of pre-action notice. The relevant section is that of section 20 [2] of the Federal Airports Authority Act. It is this Act that makes specific provisions on issuance of pre-action notice and not the Legal Practitioners Act. In accordance with the principle of law that an Act that makes specific provision on an issue overrides the one that makes general provisions, the provisions of section 20 [2] of the Federal Airports Authority Act overrides those of the Legal Practitioners Act that seems to stand in its way – see Integrated Data Services Ltd. v. Adewumi [2013] 21032 [CA] p. 14, paras. A – E; Olawepo v. SEC [2011] LPELR – 3598 [CA] pp. 26 – 27, paras. F – A [supra]; and Board of Customs & Excise v. Ibrahim Barau [1982] LPELR – 786 [SC] pp. 65 – 66, paras. G – E [supra]. Further, I am also in complete agreement with the erudite submissions of the learned counsel to the respondents that the issuance of the pre-action notice in question was an extension of the practice of a silk as an advocate or barrister as the issuance is intricately and intrinsically tied to the proper commencement of a suit; and that what the Legal Practitioners Act intends to prohibit a silk from doing is taken up a purely solicitor’s work as in the franking of a deed or other such solicitor’s jobs. Arising from this, I hold the view that the issuance of a pre-action notice is not a solicitor’s job but clearly the job of a barrister or an advocate. This is because if this is not issued; it destroys the competence of any action commenced by such silk. Thus, it is part and parcel of filing an action in Court. That is perhaps the reason why the word “issue” of pre-action notice is used just in the same manner as a writ is issued. If it be taken, the legal profession which in Britain is traditionally divided into two: solicitor and advocate, is fused by law into one in Nigeria; meaning that the two aspects cohere in one person in Nigeria. In Britain when a solicitor comes to the conclusion that a brief before him is to be properly handled by the institution of a law suit, he so advises his client and a Barrister is briefed. It thereafter becomes the duty of the Barrister to do all that is needful to ensure the action is properly commenced in court, and part of these is the issuance of a pre-action notice. As it is, if no pre-action notice is served, you cannot file a competent case in court. The poser may therefore be made: who then is to issue and serve the pre-action notice as required by law or put in another way, whose case is to suffer in court in the absence of a pre-action notice as required by law? The simple answer to this poser is: the learned silk or the case filed by the learned silk. Then it logically follows that since it is the silk or the case filed by the silk that suffers the consequences of failure to issue pre-action notice, it is the silk that must issue and serve it on the proposed defendant. Thus, the issuance and service of a pre-action notice is not and cannot be the work or duty or function of a solicitor who does not prosecute or file a case in court but that of a Barrister or advocate whose duty it is to file and advocate a case in court: issuance and service of pre-action notice is logically a condition precedent to filing a competent action in court. Once the solicitor hands over a file to the Barrister, it becomes his duty to know what steps to take to competently institute a suit on the facts presented by the facts contained in the file. And it follows that it is the silk whose duty it is to comply with this condition precedent to filing a competent case in court. As the issuance of a pre-action notice does not form part of the job of a solicitor and does not concern him as he suffers no consequences in the occasion of failure to issue it. It is the advocate that suffers the negative effects of failure to issue one; thus, it becomes logically and legally incumbent upon him to issue it in order to avoid the negative fallout of failure to issue same. I must also say on this issue that I am in total agreement with the learned counsel to the respondents that even if it is agreed that the issuance of the pre-action notice in this case, is improperly done by the learned silk, the error should not be visited on the client, who is innocent of the error – see Iroegbu v. Okwordu [1990] LPELR – 1539 [SC] p. 40, paras. B – C. It is rather an alleged matter of professional misconduct between the learned silk and the Bar and has no effect whatsoever on the agency relationship between the learned silk and his client and neither does it deprive the learned silk of his personal capacity, as distinct from his professional capacity, to act as an agent to the client-principal irrespective of whether or not he is a legal practitioner. It is obviously not in doubt that Dayo Akinlaja signed the pre-action notice. The addition of descriptive terms or appellations, if wrong, does not take away the personal capacity or human personality of the signer as a competent human agent of the client-principal. And section 20 [2] of the Federal Airports Authority Act does not say a legal practitioner must be the one to act as an agent to the claimants/respondents. It only says “his agent” which anybody, whether or not a legal practitioner could be. That Dayo Akinlaja is first and foremost a human being is not eroded by the simple fact that he has acquired the privilege of SAN. If the argument is that he cannot sign as an SAN, then since he still remains a human being when the SAN is removed, he can competently sign as a human being; and this he has done: full point. Finally on this issue, I make haste to state that even the provisions of section 5 [8] of the Legal Practitioners Act being relied on appears not to command an absolute prohibition of a silk from practicing as a solicitor, provided some conditional exceptions are met. That this is the correct interpretation of the provisions of section 5 [8] of the Legal Practitioners Act is borne out by the learned authors: Adegoke, O.A, et al, Law in Practice – Professional Responsibilities and Lawyering Skills in Nigeria, Jos University Press, 2014, p. 74, when they espoused the law, on this issue, in the following large number words: Subject to the rules made by the Legal Practitioners Privileges Committees with the approval of the Federal Executive Council, a Senior Advocate of Nigeria is entitled to engage in practise as a member of the legal profession only as a barrister, except when such a member is in partnership with a legal practitioner who is not a Senior Advocate of Nigeria. It is not in doubt that the Senior Advocate who signed the pre-action notice in question is from a firm of legal practitioners where some of the members are undoubtedly not Senior Advocate of Nigeria. It follows that the preparation and signing of the pre-action notice, if by any stretch of imagination is held to be a solicitor’s job, falls within one of the exceptions to the rule in question, having being franked by a silk in league with non-Senior Advocates. It therefore suffices to hold that there is a valid Pre-Action Notice in this suit; and I so hold. To this extent, this issue is also resolved against the defendants/applicants and in favour of the claimants/respondents. I shall move to issue No. 3 as distilled by me; issue No. 2 having been resolved. 3. Whether the suit as presently constituted discloses no reasonable cause of action? This issue was raised first by the counsel to the 3rd defendant/applicant; secondly by the counsel to the 2nd & 5th defendants/applicants. Counsel to the 3rd defendant/applicant argued that there is no nexus between the 3rd defendant and the claimants and that the case is baseless and speculative and that as such no reasonable cause of action has been disclosed. Counsel to the respondents has countered this by submitting that allegations worthy of the attention of the court had been made against the Federal Government via its agencies and that as such a reasonable cause of action had been established against the defendants. Counsel to the respondents also reacted to the submission of counsel to the 2nd & 5th defendants/applicants on the issue of non-disclosure of reasonable cause of action that what the courts consider at this stage is the Complaint and the Statement of Facts. Counsel argued that the Statement of Facts clearly established that allegations of right of the claimants to the houses in question were made and that the defendants were equally alleged of frustrating the claimants in achieving their rights and that these constitute triable issues; and that as such, a reasonable cause of action had been established. This issue, I think is not worthy of dissipating energy on. It has been settled to finality in our jurisprudence; such that it has become trite. I think it suffices here to quote the Supreme Court in Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited v. Lagos State Environmental Protection Agency [2002] LPELR – 1887 [SC] p. 30, paras. E – G: Once the allegations in the pleadings show a real controversy that were [sic] capable of leading to a relief, the pleadings cannot be rightly said to disclose no reasonable cause of action. The weakness of the plaintiff’s case is not a relevant consideration when the question is whether or not the statement of claim had disclosed a reasonable cause of action. See also SPDC Nigeria Ltd v. X.M. Federal Ltd [2006] LPELR – 3047 [SC] pp. 13 – 14, paras. G – A; and Yusuf v. Akindipe [200] LPELR – 3532 [SC] p.13, paras. D – F. It is now trite that in confirming whether there is reasonable cause of action in a suit, it is only the writ and statement of claims that are considered by our jurisprudence. Once these documents disclose triable issues capable of leading to the grant of reliefs, then the court holds that a reasonable cause of action exists. At this stage, the court does not look at the defence of the defendants; that is a matter of joinder of issues to be trashed out at trail, nor does it pay attention to the weakness in the case presented by the plaintiff; which is also a matter to be trashed out at the trial of the case. From the above it is evident that triable allegations were made against the defendants worthy of being examined by a court of law and that if no issues are joined, reliefs could be granted as claimed. I therefore hold that there is reasonable cause of action in this case. To this end, this issue, like the previous ones, is again resolved against the defendants/applicants and in favour of the claimants/respondents. Let me therefore examine the next issues, which is No. 4 on the list. 4. Whether the suit as presently constituted is an abuse of the Court’s process by reason of filing multiple actions on the same subject-matter and between the same parties? This issue was raised by three of the defendants/applicants. It was raised in the NPO of the 2nd & 5th defendants/applicants, that of the 6th defendant/applicant, and lastly in that of the 8th defendant/applicant. The counsel to the 2nd & 5th defendants/applicants argued in the main that the suit constitutes an abuse of the process of the Court because the claimants/respondents still has pending before the Federal High Court Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1073/2012 on the same subject matter and between the same parties alongside the present suit. The reply of the respondents is that the allegation of abuse of process was not supported by admissible evidence, which in this case, must be affidavit evidence; and that the address of counsel is not a substitute for evidence. Counsel also argued in opposition that for an abuse of process to be grounded, there must be proved, the existence of multiple actions on the same subject-matter and between the same parties. As for counsel to the 6th defendant/applicant, he argued that by virtue of paragraph 2 [IV] and [V] of the supporting affidavit and Exhibit J.O.V [V] thereat, Suit No. NICN/LA/612/2013 a similar case as the present one was transferred from the Federal High Court to this Court, while the claimants are still maintaining the present suit; meaning that there are at present two different cases on the same subject matter and between the same parties before this Court. The respondents’ counsel countered these by arguing that the parties in two different suits referred to are not the same; while the parties in the erstwhile suit were the staff of the 6th defendant, all the parties in the present case were not involved in the other case; and that the suit in exhibit J.O.V [V] has been discontinued, as could be gleaned from the Counter-Affidavit. In countering this, counsel to the 6th applicant in his “reply brief”, so to say, argued that the present claimants have constituted themselves into privies for all the retirees of the 6th defendants by virtue of paragraphs 4 & 5 of their counter affidavit and are as such one with the parties in the various suits. Counsel also argued that the purported notice of discontinuance referred to in Exhibit CK2 of the Counter-Affidavit has not been heard by the Court because the Court was of the opinion that no suit in the Court beared the suit no. indicated therein. Counsel argued further that the wrong suit no. was deliberately inserted by counsel in order to becloud the Court to obtain undue advantage. Counsel also argued that suits nos. FHC/L/CS/512/09: Olopha v. Mama and FHC/L/CS/513/09: Eze v. Mama respectively have been determined by Hon. Justices Olateregun-Isola and Molokwu of the Federal High Court respectively. Counsel to the 8th defendant/applicant argued that Exhibit KA1 and KA2 and paragraph 3 [e], [f], [g], and [k] of the affidavit in support showed that previous suits had been instituted on this matter at the Federal High Court and is still pending. In the reply of the respondents’ counsel, he submitted that Exhibit KA1 relied upon by the applicant is inadmissible because it was not certified. Counsel also argued that the parties and the subject matter in the previous cases were different from the present one. In respect of the issue of multiplicity of actions raised against the claimants by the 2nd & 5th defendants/applicants, I have examined the NPO and found, as contended by the respondents’ counsel that the allegations were just made in the NPO just like that: not supported by affidavit and neither were the processes allegedly filed in the Federal High Court, Lagos Division, exhibited for me to see and examine them in comparison with the instant suit to determine if indeed abuse of process occurs. I am therefore in complete agreement with the learned counsel to the respondents that this is a situation where an NPO must be accompanied with an affidavit – see Tahiru v. Ishaku [2013] LPELR – 20789 [CA] pp. 23 – 25, paras. G – B. See also Agwasim v. Ojichie [2004] LPELR – 256 [SC] p. 14, paras. D – F on the documents that the Court needs to determine abuse of its process. With regard to the 6th defendant/applicant’s objection on abuse of process, I have checked the Further and Better Affidavit [FBA] filed, I cannot find any place where it was deposed to that Hon. Justice Kanyip adjourned taking the “notice of Discontinuance” because there was no suit before the Court with the suit no. contained in the respondents’ “notice of discontinuance” and neither could I find where it was deposed to that the counsel to the respondents deliberately inserted the wrong suit no. in order to mislead the Court – see paragraphs II of the FBA. So, all the addresses of counsel to the applicant in this regard are simply unfounded. It is also of note that the purportedly correct suit and suit no. alleged by the counsel to the applicant was conspicuously not exhibited. That the case was adjourned when it came up on the 6th March 2014 was not said to be because the wrong suit no. was inserted on the filed “notice of discontinuance” or because the notice was not exhibited. What is abundantly clear is that the further and better affidavit did not give the reason why the matter was adjourned to 4th June, 2014 for hearing – see paragraph III of the FBA. To make the matter worse, no exhibition of the proceedings of that day was done by the applicant’s counsel to enable the Court see for itself why the matter was adjourned. What is not in dispute between the parties is that a notice of discontinuance has been filed. The allegation of the applicant’s counsel that the wrong suit no. is inserted is unfounded on the ground that even if this is so, the Court cannot be misled as the suit to which the notice relates: that it is the one transferred from the Federal High Court to this Court – see paragraphs 5 – 7 of the respondents’ counter affidavit, is not in doubt. This would make it easy for the Court to easily determine which suit is being withdrawn even if there is an error of suit number. Even if this is not so, it cannot be seriously contended that a mere error in suit no. cannot be corrected by oral application in Court. The Court of Appeal in Benaplastic Industries Ltd v. MV “Anatoliy Vasilev [1999] LPELR – 6552 [CA] p. 15, para. F held that: Once the NOTICE… of withdrawal has been filed that is the end of the suit and the court is entitled formally to strike out the suit from the cause list. Thus, jurisprudentially, that the legal effect of a “notice of discontinuance” is the same with that of “notice of withdrawal” has been judicially rested. Once a notice of withdrawal or discontinuance is filed, that is the end to the matter to which it relates. The only thing remaining for the court to do is to strike it out from its cause list as a matter of formality. The suit, to which this notice of discontinuance is filed, is for all practical purposes, no longer in existence. The effect on the issue at hand is that the wind has been taken out of the applicant’s sail. The premise on which he anchored his objection of abuse of court’s process on account of multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter between the same parties has been irredeemably punctured. To this end, the objection of the 6th defendant/applicant on abuse of process is totally lacking in merits and is accordingly dismissed. In respect of the objection of the 8th defendant/applicant on allegation of abuse of court’s process on account of multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter between the same parties, I have carefully examined Exhibit KA1 attached to the applicant’s affidavit and found that it is truly not certified. And this appears to me to be the fulcrum of the objection. The Supreme Court has clarified the issue in Orlu v. Gogo-Abite [2010] LPELR – 2769 p. 31, paras. A – B: “The usual method of proving a public document is by the production of a certified copy of it”. It follows that usually, no other form of public document may be admissible by the Court. But I find that the issue cannot be rested like that. To decide the matter on the technical ground that a document is not certified in this particular instance might be injurious to the whole judicial system. I have found curiously that the respondents in this instance did not file a counter affidavit to challenge the depositions contained in paragraphs [e] – [h] of the affidavit in support of the NPO. Though, counsel has argued that these depositions are argumentative or legal conclusions and as such offend the provisions of the Evidence Act. I have checked these depositions, particularly the depositions contained in paragraphs [e] – [h] specifically attacked by counsel, I must say that I find nothing in these depositions that offend any of the provisions of the Evidence Act. They therefore stand and I so hold. If, like the respondents’ counsel has contended, exhibit KA1 is expunged, what of the depositions therein contained, only which exhibit KA1 sought to strengthen: mark the word “strengthen”. The allegations in the depositions are complete by themselves without more; and it is only to further convince the Court that Exhibit KA1 is attached. Depositions in affidavit not countered by the opposing side are deemed to be admitted – see Ballantyne v. Ayi [2011] LPELR – 4543 [CA] pp. 43 – 44, paras. F – A. Furthermore, it might interest the parties and counsel to this suit to note that this Court is empowered by section 12 [2] [b] of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 [NICA] to dispense with any of the provisions of the Evidence Act in the interest of justice. In the exercise of this discretionary power, I hold that it is in the interest of justice to dispense with the provisions of the Evidence Act which says a court can only take cognizance of a certified true copy of a public document. This I do because I believe that the issue of abuse of court process is not one to be glossed over in haste. Because if it is glossed over, it might bring the whole machinery of justice into disrepute, in that two different courts or two different judges of the same court sitting in different courtrooms of the same court might end up giving totally conflicting judgments/decisions on the same matter or set of matters based on similar facts between the same parties to the everlasting embarrassment of the judicature. It is also my firm belief that the power of court to deal with abuse of process is to prevent the habit of forum-shopping amongst litigants/counsel; and to prevent a litigant, even where such litigant has the right to sue, from using the processes of courts to the annoyance of the defendant – see Saraki v. Kotoye [1992] LPELR – 3016 [SC] pp. 33 – 34, paras. E – A. For all these reasons, it can therefore be seen that the interest of justice tilts really in my taking cognizance of the contents of exhibit KA1; and I so do. In as much as the 3rd respondent has not denied that exhibit KA1 does not relate the true contents of the earlier suit in question and has not also said that the suit has been withdrawn, I shall proceed to examine its contents to see if indeed abuse of process is proved. What is even more, the counsel to the respondents has conceded by implication in his address that the said action is still pending by saying the parties in the two cases are not the same and that the subject matters differ; as could be gleaned from the said Exhibit KA1. The manifest intention to continue with the two cases is also inferentially implied. It follows that I can examine the contents to see, if in truth, the contents are dissimilar as claimed. It suffices to set out the reliefs claimed as contained in Exhibit KA1: i. A DECLARATION that the Defendants are bound by the Monetization Policy and all Federal Government directives and guidelines as stated in the Obasanjo Reforms Monetization Policy and the Letters dated 14th Jnue, 2007, 19th June, 2007 and 26th June, 2007. ii. A DECLARATION that the Plaintiffs as legal sitting tenants are entitled to the first right of purchase of the Federal Government residential houses in custody of the 1st Defendant known as Zone A Strabag quarters and Zone D quarters along Agege motor road [sic] Ikeja. iii. A DECLARATION that the letters with reference NCAA/P.99/II dated 2nd August, 2012 and NCAA/P.46/I/286 dated 8th June, 2012 captioned notice of vacation block D5 Flat 1 and block D7 Flat 3 all in Zone D Quarters along Agege Motor Road directed at the 1st and 3rd Plaintiffs are illegal and void. iv. AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants whether by themselves or through their servants, agents, privies or assigns from ejecting the Plaintiffs from Block D5 Flat 1 Zone D, Block A1 Flat 1 Zone A and Block D7 Flat 3 Zone D of the Federal Government Residential houses [sic] in Custody [sic] of the 1st Defendant. v. AN ORDER directing the Defendants to obey all Government Guidelines and Directives including the monetization policy and directives for strict compliance as contained in the letters dated 14th Junue, 2007, 19th June, 2007 and 26th June, 2007. [Mistakenly renumbered [iv]] vi. AN ORDER directing the Defendants to send the names of the Plaintiffs who are legal sitting tenants in the Zone A Strabag quarters and Zone D quarters in custody of the 1st Defendant to the Presidential Implementation Committee of the whitepaper on the commission of inquiry into the alienation of Federal Government landed property. [Supposed ordinarily to be numbered [vi] but numbered (v) as a result of the initial error in numbering pointed out at (v) above]. These are the reliefs claimed in the present suit: i. A DECLARATION that the Claimants are entitled to the right of first purchase or lease of the residential quarters occupied by them at Strabag Estate and Zone D Quarters along Agege Motor Road, Ikeja, Lagos as retirees of Nigeria Meteorological Agency [NIMET]; Nigerian Airspace Management Agency [NEMA]; Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria [FAAN]; the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority [NCAA] by virtue of the Federal Government Monetization Policy. ii. A DECLARATION that the Claimants have acquired vested rights under the monetization policy in respect of the residential quarters and they cannot be justifiably denied of their right of first purchase of lease in respect thereof by the Nigeria Meteorological Agency [NIMET]; Nigerian Airspace Management Agency [NEMA]; Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria [FAAN]; the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority [NCAA] acting in league with the Presidential Implementation Committee and the Ministry of Aviation or any person [s] whatsoever. iii. AN ORDER mandating the Defendants to perfect the transfer of the residential quarters in question to the Claimants by way of lease or sale in consonance with the monetization policy of the Federal Government. iv. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Defendants by themselves, servants, privies or any person [s] whosoever described from evicting the Plaintiffs/Claimants from the residential quarters or in any way adversely affecting their occupation of the said quarters in negation of the monetization policy of the federal [sic] Government. A dispassionate and careful juxtapositive perusal of the two set of reliefs claimed in the two suits in question would definitely reveal that the two sets of reliefs are like the two sides of the same coin such that the distinction between them is akin to the distinction between six and half-a-dozen. They are the same reliefs carefully reframed in different sets of words that portray in essence like meaning and tilted towards the achievement of the same goals: the conversion of ownership of the houses in question to that of the claimants in the two suits via allocation by virtue of right of first purchaser as a result of the monetization policy of the Federal Government arising from the accrued right of sitting tenants. A close study of these reliefs also shows clearly that the subject-matter is the same and that some of the parties are the same since the present claimants claimed they are suing on behalf of themselves and other retirees of NIMET, NAMA, FAAN and NCAA occupying Strabag Estate and zone D Quarters along Agege Motor Road, Ikeja, Lagos as legal sitting tenants. It thus means the claimants in the previous case are also being represented in the current one. But I cannot find that all the parties are exactly the same. The present suit is also against the 2nd defendant named in the previous suit which seems synonymous with the 1st but the present suit has other defendants that are not included in the previous suit. Thus, abuse of the Court’s process is proved in respect of the previous defendants who are also equally sued in the present suit on the same subject-matter and the same reliefs. Interestingly, Mr. Peter Igene who is the 3rd claimant in the present suit is also the 1st claimant in the previous suit. I therefore find that the objection of the 8th defendant/applicant in respect of the 3rd claimant/respondent holds water. After all, abuse of process can be upheld even in a situation where the claimants have a valid right of action and even where the different suits are based on the different grounds. The important factor is if the suits could be conveniently tried together in one court, it would amount to an abuse to institute different suits, either in different courts or in the same court over matters which conveniently could be tried together before one and the same court, to the annoyance and irritation of the defendant: the defendant has a right to have all actions against him brought before the same court at once and be tried together at once and then have his peace of mind; provided it is convenient for the court and allowed by law. It is for these reasons that the Supreme Court held in Saraki v. Kotoye [supra]: Thus the multiplicity of actions on the same matter between the same parties even where there exists a right to bring the action is regarded as abuse. The abuse lies in the multiplicity and manner of the exercise of the right, rather than the exercise of the right per se. The abuse consist in the intentional purpose, and aim of the person exercising the right to harass, irritate and annoy the adversary, and interfere with the administration of justice; such as instituting different actions between the same parties simultaneously in different courts, even though on different grounds. However, it is my considered opinion that the prayer that the action be struck out on this count alone cannot be granted, in view of my earlier finding that the present suit encompasses more parties than the previous one, meaning that all the parties are not exactly the same. Though, it is found that two different suits are now pending against the 8th defendant/applicant in two different courts on exactly the same subject matter where some of the parties are exactly the same as those in the previous suit, but with additional parties added. It is equally found that the multiplicity of actions against the 8th defendant herein is deliberately done to harass it wherein the grounds of the previous suit, even if they are different, [I have held that they are not in any way different] could be conveniently brought together in the present suit while the previous is withdrawn. That the counsel to the respondents has not done this is signification of the intention, either to forum-shop for the 3rd claimant in the present suit and the other plaintiffs in the previous suit who are currently being represented in the present suit, or to harass the 8th defendant/applicant who would have to continue to defend the same action in two different courts to his annoyance and irritation. This cannot be allowed by any court of law: it cannot stand and it must not stand. It must be stopped. In accordance with the provisions of section 14 of the NICA, which permits this Court to grant any relief it deems appropriate in a given circumstance, even if not demanded by the parties; and in the instant case, the applicant, I order that the this suit be and is hereby vacated and dismissed against the 8th defendant/applicant alone. After all, the application was actually made on behalf of the 8th defendant/applicant alone and cannot therefore be to the benefit of the other defendants who have either not complained of multiplicity of suits against them or have simply not been able to establish same: meaning if no other ground renders the suit nugatory or set any or all of the defendants free, they must continue to defend the suit. 5. Whether the suit as presently constituted is caught by the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicata or issue estoppel? This issue is raised clearly in the NPO filed by the 6th defendant/applicant and in its accompanying written address. In essence, the counsel to the 6th defendant/applicant contended that the suits contained in Exhibits J.O.V. [I] & J.O.V. [II] and the judgments on them as contained in Exhibits J.O.V. [III] & J.O.V. [IV] respectively constitute issue estoppel and res judicata on the present suit in that the same subject matter, parties and issues which were involved in the previous cases decided to finality by the Federal High Court are the same with the ones in the present suit. Counsel to the claimants has countered that this argument is misconceived in that the subject matter of the previous suits [termination of appointment] and the parties were not the same and that more so; the relief [8] claimed in the previous suit was not determined on the merit; and as such it could be reclaimed re-litigated upon. Before going further in this aspect of the case, I would like to take as my guidance by placing reliance on the Supreme Court in Ladega & Ors. v. Durosime & Ors. [1978] LPELR – 1733 [SC] p. 14, paras. C – F: The doctrine of res judicata, which finds expression in the maxim “nemo debet bis vexari pro una et cadem causa, lays emphasis on the “causa”. It is the cause of action that would be determined and any suit, brought to re-litigate such action, which has been determined, would be dismissed. Where, however, what is raised is an issue estoppel, then, it is only in regard to that issue, that has been raised that parties to an action shall be bound, and the proper course to take would be one of striking out all paragraphs in the pleadings raising that issue. Further reliance is placed on the Supreme Court in Ukaegbu & Ors. v. Ugoji & Ors. [1991] LPELR – 3338 [SC] p. 18, paras. C – D: In my view a plea of res judicata will arise where the plaintiff who is pleading the previous judgment was the plaintiff in the said previous judgment or his privy in title were plaintiffs in the previous judgment relied upon. Still placing reliance for guidance on the Supreme Court, I further quote from the Supreme Court’s decision in Ezewani v. Onwardi & Ors. [1986] LPELR – 1214 [SC] pp. 19 – 21, paras. F – B: As pointed out by Idigbe, J.S.C. in Samuel Fadiora & Anor. v. Festus Gbadebo & Anor. [1978] 3 S.C. 219. In that case the learned Justice of the Supreme Court while discussing the differences between the principles of “cause of action estoppel” and “issue estoppel” as estoppel by record inter partes, had these to say at pages 228 – 229:- “Now, there are two kinds of estoppel by record inter partes or per rem judicatam, as it is generally known. The first is usually referred to as ‘cause of action estoppel’ and it occurs where the cause of action is merged in the judgment, that is, Transit in rem judicatam (See King v. Hoare (1844) 13 M & W 495 at 504). Therefore, on this principle of law (rule of evidence) once it appears that the same cause of action was held to lie (or not to lie) in a final judgment between the same parties, or their privies, who are litigating in the same capacity (and on the same subject matter), there is an end of the matter. They are precluded from re-litigating the same cause of action. There is, however, a second kind of estoppel inter partes and this usually occurs where an issue comes incidentally in question in any subsequent proceedings between the same parties (or their privies); in these circumstances, “issue estoppel” arises. This is based on the principle of law that a party is not allowed to (i.e. he is precluded from) contending the contrary or opposite of any specific point which having been once distinctly put in issue, has with certainty and solemnly been determined against him. (See Outram v. Morewood (1803) 3 East 346). Issue estoppel applies whether the point involved in the earlier decision is one of fact or law or one of mixed fact and law. However, for the principle to apply, in any given proceedings, all the preconditions to a valid plea of estoppel inter partes or per rem judicatam must apply, that, (1) the same question must be for decision in both proceedings (which means, that the question for decision in the current suit must have been decided in the earlier proceeding), (2) the decision relied upon to support the plea of issue estoppel must be final (3) the parties must be the same (which means that parties involved in both proceedings must be the same ) (per se or by their privies) A close perusal of the quotations above shows that when issue estoppel is in contention, it is only the issue being re-litigated that must be struck out in the pleadings of the case while if it is res judicata, the whole suit must be declared invalid. While recognizing these distinctions, it is however clear that the criteria for upholding a plea of both issue estoppel and res judicata are the same. [1] The parties in the previous suit must be the same with the ones in the present suit or their privies. [2] The same question for determination in the previous suit must be the same question for determination in the present suit. [3] And the decision in the previous suit must be final and conclusive. A close perusal of the arguments of the counsel to the applicant shows that he is challenging the present suit on the grounds of both issue estoppel and estoppel per rem judicatam. This much is appreciated by the counsel to the respondents when he argued that the present suit is neither caught by issue estoppel nor by estoppel per rem judicatam. Let me now juxtapose the judgments relied upon for the plea res judicata with the present suit. Let me quote from page 17, paragraphs 5 & 6 of the judgment contained in Exhibit J.O.V. [III]: Generally in the public service, retirees are expected to vacate their official quarters at the expiry of three months after their tenure expires. The plaintiff is still in occupation of the residential quarters he occupied whilst in service. The issue of selling the property to him does not even arise, as the Agency says it is not selling the properties. Let me now quote pages 28 – 29 [last paragraph of page 28 running to page 29 and the first paragraph of page 29] of Exhibit J.O.V. [IV]: I therefore hereby award in full the relief claimed in paragraph XI with modification that it shall fall in line with the Pension Act. The reliefs set out in paragraphs iii, iv, v, vi, vii, viii, ix are dismissed, the alternative relief having been granted. For clarification, prayers I and II are granted, payer XI granted with modification as set out. Let me also quote relief [VIII] claimed by the plaintiff in Exhibit J.O.V [IV] as contained in page 2 of the Exhibit: viii. An Order that the Plaintiff is entitled to the first right of purchase of the official quarters which he resides in as envisaged in the Monetization Policy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2007. Let me also quote paragraph 8 on Exhibit J.O.V. [I] which is the writ by which the suit on which the judgment in Exhibit J.O.V. [III] was given: AN ORDER that the Plaintiff is entitled to the first right of purchase of the official quarters which he resides in as envisaged in the Monetization Policy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2007. Let me now set out verbatim the reliefs claimed in the present suit: i. A DECLARATION that the Claimants are entitled to the right of first purchase or lease of the residential quarters occupied by them at Strabag Estate and Zone D Quarters along Agege Motor Road, Ikeja, Lagos as retirees of Nigeria Meteorological Agency [NIMET]; Nigerian Airspace Management Agency [NEMA]; Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria [FAAN]; the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority [NCAA] by virtue of the Federal Government Monetization Policy. ii. A DECLARATION that the Claimants have acquired vested rights under the monetization policy in respect of the residential quarters and they cannot be justifiably denied of their right of first purchase of lease in respect thereof by the Nigeria Meteorological Agency [NIMET]; Nigerian Airspace Management Agency [NEMA]; Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria [FAAN]; the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority [NCAA] acting in league with the Presidential Implementation Committee and the Ministry of Aviation or any person [s] whatsoever. iii. AN ORDER mandating the Defendants to perfect the transfer of the residential quarters in question to the Claimants by way of lease or sale in consonance with the monetization policy of the Federal Government. iv. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Defendants by themselves, servants, privies or any person [s] whosoever described from evicting the Plaintiffs/Claimants from the residential quarters or in any way adversely affecting their occupation of the said quarters in negation of the monetization policy of the federal [sic] Government. Let me now examine the judgments in question, the reliefs sought and the causes of action together with the parties in order to see if the issues involved in the cases and the parties are the same with the present and whether the issues or causes of action have been determined to finality between the same parties in the previous suit. The parties in the suit contained in Exhibit J.O.V. [III] are one Engr. Godfrey Eze v. 1. Nigeria Airspace Management Agency; 2. Federal Ministry of Aviation; and 3. Attorney-General of the Federation. In the second judgment contained in Exhibit J.O.V. [IV] the parties are: Mr. Bamidele Stephen Olopha v. the same defendants as in the Exhibit J.O.V. [III] just reproduced above. The parties in the present suit are 1. Mr. Thaddeus Obidike, 2. Mr. Victor Okwuma, 3. Mr. Peter Igene, and 4. Mrs. Catherine Udeogu v. 1. Minister of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2. Minister of Aviation, 3. Attorney-General of the Federation, 4. Secretary, Implementation Committee on Commission of Enquiry into the Alienation of Federal Government Landed Property, 5. Director-General, Nigeria Meteorological Agency, 6. Managing Director, Nigeria Airspace Management Agency, 7. Managing Director, Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria, and 8. Director-General, Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority. It is necessary to state that the claimants in the instant suit are suing for themselves and on behalf of all the retirees of the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th defendants/applicants. It is not in doubt that the plaintiffs in the previous suits, on which judgments had been delivered, were and are amongst the retirees of the 5th – 8th defendants/applicants on behalf of which the present suit is brought. The counsel to the claimants/applicants has not disputed this. However, it is also abundantly clear that, apart from the 2 plaintiffs in the previous suits, all the other claimants in the present suit were not parties to the earlier suits. It is also very clear that the 2 previous suits were not brought in representative capacities. It is also not in dispute that the employment rights of all the claimants, including those being represented, are personal to each and every one of them – see Bemil Nig. Ltd. v. Emeribe & Ors. [2009] LPELR – 8732 [CA] p. 52, paras. C – E. The right of first purchaser on which the present action is brought must also be personal to each and every one of the claimants since this right is an offshoot of the incidences of their employments. This means that each of all the claimants can legally personally bring an action to challenge any alleged breach of his/her employment rights. It follows that the judgments delivered on the two earlier suits are binding on only the parties to the suits and do not affect the rights of the other claimants to bring actions individually challenging the purported breach of their rights. It is only that when similar actions like that are commenced in a court by many plaintiffs individually and separately, the court can order a consolidation of all the actions for a joint trial, so that the common issues could be laid to rest in one fell swoop. In fact, that the personal rights of the individuals are involved and that individually, as many as the claimants are, they can bring individual actions to challenge this common ground of action is brought to light by the facts of those 2 previous cases which have, as their causes of action, wrongful termination and right of first purchaser of the government’s houses as sitting tenants. Arising from the above, the parties to the 2 previous suits and the present suit are not exactly the same. Minus the 2 plaintiffs in the previous suits, all the present claimants are entirely different from the plaintiffs in the erstwhile suits. And when the present claimants sued in representative capacities for all the retirees of the 5th – 8th defendants, it can only legally mean that the representative action is in respect of the claimants which were not parties to the earlier suits. Then, even if it is agreed, for the sake of argument, that the present representative action includes the parties in the erstwhile suits, it does not follow that the present suit must be wholly bad for duplicity. It will only affect the parties that were same in the instant suit as well as the erstwhile suits such that the entirely new parties who ordinarily retained their individual and personal right of action would not be affected. In any case, the concomitance of the arguments of the applicant’s counsel seems to me to be that, the instant action is caught by estoppel simply because it purportedly represents the two plaintiffs who instituted the two previous suits on which judgments had been delivered. Then, it follows that if these two plaintiffs in the previous actions are removed from the present action, the vices that infected the instant action would have been removed. After all, the applicant’s counsel is not arguing that all the other claimants in the present action are not entitled to bring an action to challenge an alleged breach of their personal rights. If he did, the simple answer is that, this is an action in personam and not in rem; so a person who has not sued before has the right to bring an action. To stress the significant of actions in personam, as distinct from actions in rem, the Supreme Court in Rhein Mass Und See & Ors. v. Rivway Lines Ltd. [1998] LPELR – 2948 [SC] pp. 15 – 16, paras. G – C held that: Etymologically an action in personam is an action against a person, an action to compel to do or not to do a particular thing or take or not to take a particular course of action or inaction. Actions for damages in tort or for breaches of contract are clearly directed against the person as opposed to actions which are brought for the purpose of declaring or challenging a status, like proceedings under the matrimonial laws of the country or of legitimacy or an admiralty action directed against a ship or the res (and so known as action in rem) or the like. Generally therefore, all actions which are aimed at the person requiring him to do or not to do or to take or not to take an action or course of conduct must be and are actions in personam. As regards the second judgment in issue: that is, Exhibit J.O.V. [IV], relief No. viii as reproduced above was dismissed alongside other reliefs when the Court granted the alternative relief claimed by the plaintiff. The question then is: what is the effect of claiming reliefs in alternatives? This has been answered by Supreme Court in G.K.F. Investment Nigeria Ltd v. Nigeria Telecommunications Plc [2009] LPELR – 1294 [SC] p. 32, paras. D – G: I will now deal with an alternative claim and the duty of the court in such a claim. Where a claim is in the alternative, the court should first consider whether the principal claim, ought to have succeeded. It is only after the court may have found that it could not, for any reason, grant the principal or main claim, that it would now consider the alternative claim. See the case of Mercantile Bank of Nig. Ltd. v. Adalma Tanks & Bunkering Services Ltd. [1990] NWLR [Pt. 153] 747. In other words, where there are alternative reliefs as in the instant case leading to this appeal, once one of the reliefs is granted, the other relief cannot be granted as there would be no need to do so. The concomitance of the above citation is that once one set of the reliefs claimed in the alternative is granted as against the other set in the alternatives, the court is taken to have considered the two sets of alternative reliefs and granted the one it felt the party is entitled to. What this means is that all the reliefs claimed in alternatives are deemed to have been considered before the court came to its decision of choosing one. Any complaint thereafter against the decision of the court not to have granted any particular relief in the alternative reliefs becomes a matter for appeal. After all, there is a presumption of the rightness and regularity of a court’s judgment until set aside on appeal – see Falana v. Oloro [2012] [CA] p. 24, paras. A – C. See also Akredolu v. Mimiko [2013] LPELR – 20889 [CA] pp. 31 – 32, paras. E – A. Therefore, the dismissal of the alternative reliefs wherein the claimant in the suit claimed for a declaration of right of first purchaser in his favour is a dismissal on the merits and not a dismissal that amounts to striking out as the respondents’ counsel would want the Court to believe. Been a dismissal on the merits, it cannot be reversed by any other legal means than by appeal. The issue of the relief [viii] in question which was incidental to the right of employment of the plaintiff as a sitting tenant to be considered first in the sale of the house in the judgment in Exhibit J.O.V. [IV] happens now to be the main issue in the instant suit commenced in representative capacity. It follows that the plaintiff in the said judgment cannot eat his cake and continue to have it: he must either abide by the judgment or seek to appeal against it and not to use subterfuge to becloud the Court into allowing him to re-litigate the same issue over again through proxy. The plaintiff [Mr. Bamidele Stephen Olopha] in the judgment exhibited in Exhibit J.O.V. [IV] is estopped from re-litigating on the issue of right to allocation of the government quarters which he occupies as a sitting tenant; and cannot benefit from the outcome of the present suit. It also follows that the plaintiff in the first judgment [Engr. Geoffrey Eze] contained in Exhibit J.O.V. [III] is also estopped from re-litigating the issue of right to allocation of the government quarter which he occupies as a sitting tenant; this issue having been decided to finality between him and the defendants in the present suit. I therefore find and hold that the plaintiffs in the two previous suits as depicted above are estopped from re-litigating the same issue with the defendants in the present suit; and cannot therefore benefit in any form from the outcome of the present suit. I hold that the two plaintiffs in questions are now not amongst those being represented in the present action in Court. To that extent, the instant suit still enures in favour of the remaining and entirely new claimants, who have not instituted any action in the past against the defendants and those whom they represent who also have not instituted any action in the past against the defendants. Therefore, the objection of the 6th defendant/applicant on the ground of estoppel succeeds in part and fails in part. Having carefully dealt with issue No. 5 as distilled by me, I now turn my attention to issue No. 6 which is the last. 6. Whether the proper parties are before the Court? This issue was ably canvassed by the counsel to the 3rd defendant/applicant and that of the 7th defendant/applicant. The 3rd defendant/applicant in the instant suit is the Attorney-General of the Federation. Counsel to the 3rd defendant/applicant has argued that there is absolutely no nexus between the 3rd defendant/applicant and the causes of action in this suit. Counsel to the respondents has argued in opposition that the Attorney-General is always a competent party in any suit where the actions of the Federal Government via its agencies are challenged. I have carefully read through the case of A.G Kano v. A.G. Federation [2007] LPELR – 618 [SC] p. 28, paras. F – G cited by the applicant’s counsel as establishing that the Attorney-General cannot be lawfully sued in the instant case. Straight away, let me distinguish this case on its peculiar facts. The office of the Inspector-General of the Police and the Nigerian Police are creatures of the 1999 Constitution just like that of the Attorney-General and that of Mr. President. It is on this basis that the Supreme Court held that since all the allegations in the suit are against the office of the Inspector-General and not against the Federation or rather the executive arm as such, the Federal Attorney-General cannot be sued. Even though, the ratio relied upon was not contained in the lead judgment – see FRN v. Lawani [2013] LPELR – 20376 [CA] p. 23, paras. B – F and Daramola v. Aribisala [2009] LPELR – 8515 [CA] pp. 45 – 47, paras. G – E on the distinction between ratios in the leading judgment and the concurring judgment –; it is clear that this ratio re-emphasized the fact that the Federal Attorney-General could be properly sued in any civil action where complaint is being made against the Federation or any of its authorized agencies. It is because the complaint is not directly against the federation but against the Inspector-General of Police which is regarded as having a distinct personality of its own and can act on its own without any directives from any quarters by virtue of the 1999 Constitution that the ratio came into existence. In the instant case, the complaints are directly against the agencies of the executive arm of government which are to carry out the policies of executive. All the agencies sued are directly an extension of the office of Mr. President: they are not created by the Constitution and they are directly subject to the executive policies of Mr. President and his directives; even though they might be created by statutes. They simply do not enjoy the same status and freedom as the office of the Inspector-General of the Police. If the Attorney-General of the Federation cannot be lawfully sued in their respects, then I wonder when it can be lawfully sued in civil actions involving the agencies of the Federal Government. Perhaps, this would mean he can only be lawfully sued when the complaints is directly against the Federal Ministry of Justice which the Attorney-General heads or when the complaint is directly against Mr. President who appoints him as a Minister. I am afraid; this is not the intendment of the authority cited by the applicant’s counsel. More so, the defendants in this case are not created directly with distinct functions and personality by the 1999 Constitution as the office of the Inspector-General of Police is. If it may be pointed out, the agencies are all parastatal of a Ministry unlike the Police Force and the Office of the Inspector-General of Police. To this extent, the peculiar facts of that case are different from the facts of this case, which is why U.A. Kalgo, JSC prefaced his ratio in issue by holding at p. 28, paras. B – C that: It is not in dispute that the Attorney-General of the Federation can be sued as a defendant in all civil matters in which a claim can properly be made against the Federal Government or any of its authorized agencies, arising from any act or omission complained of. I therefore hold that the attorney-General of the Federation is a proper party in this suit and is therefore properly sued. To this extent, the complaint of the 3rd defendant/applicant on this ground is dismissed as it lacks merits. Issue No. 6 is therefore resolved against the 3rd defendant/applicant and in favour of the claimants/respondents. Let me now look at issue No. 6 as canvassed by the 7th defendant/applicant. Counsel to the 7th applicant argued that by virtue of section 1 [1] & [2] of the Federal Airport Authority Act the Federal Airport authority is made a juristic personality and it is therefore, it alone that can sue or be sued on any complaints against its act; and that the Managing Director who is its agent cannot be sued as a proxy. This argument has been countered by the respondents’ counsel by citing Carlen Nig. Ltd. v. University of Jos [1994] LPELR – 832 [SC] and that because the operative word employed in section 1 [1] & [2] is “may”, it is permissive to sue the Managing Director as a proxy. I shall deal with the issue of proxy first. The word “proxy” is another word for “agent”. The principle of agency relationship has become very trite on the fact that once the principal is disclosed, the proxy or agent can no longer be sued; it is the disclosed principal that must be sued. It is not in doubt and neither has it been contended by the counsel to the respondents that he does not know that the Managing Director he has sued is the agent of the Federal Airports Authority; so when he left the principal to sue the agent, his action on that ground may be a nullity depending on whether any of the exceptions to the principle applies. The Supreme Court in Carlen v. University of Jos [supra] p. 33, [paras. A – B that: The general law is that a contract made by an agent, acting within the scope of his authority for a disclosed principal is, in law, the contract of the principal, and the principal and not the agent is the proper person to sue and be sued upon such contract. However, it would seem that subsequent holding of the Supreme Court in Carlen v. University of Jos [supra] departed from this common law principle with regard to whether statutory agents could be sued either alone or alongside with the principal where the principal is clearly disclosed – see pp. 21 – 22, paras. G – B and 31 – 32, paras. G – C: It is clear from the above provisions of the Act that the Council, the Vice-Chancellor and the Registrar are creation of the University of Jos Act and each is assigned specific functions as provided for in the Act and in the exercise of such functions, rights of other persons will most certainly be affected. If in the exercise of their functions the right of anyone is infringed can it be said that any of these functionaries cannot be sued simply because the Act has not expressly stated that they can sue or be sued? … From all I have been saying above, I hold the view that upon the reading of the University of Jos Act as a whole, both the Council of the University and the Vice-Chancellor, are by implication, given juridical personality that enables each of them to sue and be liable to be sued eo nomine. The learned trial Judge had held that the second defendant, that is, the Council of the University “can be sued and is a proper party to this action.” I entirely agree with this judgment of Ahinche, J. and find myself unable to accept the judgment of the Court of Appeal which held to the contrary. Having concluded as above, I must necessarily disagree with the decision of the Court below which held that the two defendants were not proper parties to the present proceedings… To hold as that Court did that the Vice-Chacellor and the Registrar were not agents of the University when executing the contract with the plaintiff would be to overlook the clear provisions of the Act which, on a reading as a whole, would leave one in no doubt that both of them were and remain agents of the University in the discharge of their official duties. This decision or ratio seems to have been followed in toto in Global Soap and Detergent Ind. Ltd. v. Bello [2010] LPELR – 9092 [CA] pp. 13 – 15, paras. C – A. This appears to be the latest authority I can discover on the issue at hand. In Carlen’s case [supra] the Supreme Court seems to have completely overruled Agbonmagbe Bank Ltd. v. General Manager G.B. Olivant Ltd [1961] 1 ALL NLR 116 which seems to be the father of the principle of law that where a statute lays down the person that can be sued, such person cannot be bypassed for a proxy. It now seem to lay a new principle that what matters at all material times is the functions and duties of the person to be sued: if it negatively affects others, such person can be sued whether or not he is made a juristic personality by the enabling statutes. The implication of the ratio in Carlen Carlen v. University of Jos [supra] is that even though the University of Jos clearly made it clear who is to be sued in complaint against the University by making the University itself the only juristic person, this can be bypassed by means of legal fiction derivable from the functions and duties of the organs of the University. To this extent, the case of Fawehinmi v. Nigerian Bar Association & Ors [No. 2] [1989] 2 NWLR [Pt. 105] 558 also seems to have been overruled. The counsel to the 7th defendant/applicant cited two authorities on the issue: H.C.M. v. Iyoha [2001] 46 W.R.N. 103 at 126 – 127; and Nurses Association v. A.G. [1981] 12 NSCC 441 at 445 – 446. One is from the Court of Appeal while the other is from the Supreme Court. Apart from what I have said above, the two authorities cannot hold water in the faces of the Supreme Court authority of Carlen v. University of Jos [supra] and the Court of Appeal case of Global Soap and Detergent Ind. Ltd. v. Bello [supra]. The Supreme Court case cited by appliant’s counsel is impliedly overruled by Carlen v. Univsersity of Jos and likewise the Court of Appeal case cited is also overruled by both the Supreme Court case of Carlen v. University of Jos [supra] and the Court of Appeal case of Global Soap and Detergent Ind. V. Bello [supra]. This is because the doctrine of stare decisis enjoins that later of authorities be followed in case of inconsistency between two authorities either from the Supreme Court or Court of Appeal. Carlen v. University of Jos was decided in 1994 while the Nurses Association v. A.G. [supra] was decided in 1981. While H.C.M. v. Iyoha [supra] was decided in 2001 Global Soap and Detergent Ind. Ltd. v. Bello [supra] was determined in 2010. It is abundantly clear that the 7th defendant/applicant stands in exactly the same position that the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Jos stands and would therefore enjoy the benefits of the Supreme Court’s decision in Carlen v. University of Jos [supra]. All the cases cited by the applicant on the issue were either earlier in time than Carlen v. University of Jos which was decided in 1994 or are Court of Appeal’s cases. H.C.M. v. Iyoha [supra] cited by the applicant was decided in 2001 and it is a Court of Appeal case. Nurses Association v. A.G. [supra] which is a Supreme Court’s case was decided in 1981. By the sacred principle of stare decisis, it becomes unnecessary to consider them as they are bound to bow to the latter Supreme Court’s decision in Carlen v. University of Jos [supra]. I have stated earlier on that the latest authority on this issue unearthed in my research, which is a Court of Appeal’s authority, adopted in toto, the ratio in Carlen v. University of Jos. This Court of Appeal’s case of Global Soap and Detergent Ind. Ltd. v. Bello [2010] LPELR – 9092 [CA] was decided in 2010. By all standards, it follows that on the state of the law as is open to me today, the Supreme Court authority of Carlen v. University of Jos remains the extant authoritative statement of the law on the issue at hand, since, to my knowledge, it has not being overruled by any subsequent Supreme Court’s decision. It, therefore, is binding on all courts in Nigeria on the issue at hand. I accordingly find and hold that the 7th defendant/applicant is a juristic personality and is properly sued and joined in this suit. To this extent, this issue is resolved against the 7th defendant/applicant and in favour of the claimants/respondents. Having dealt with all the issues distilled, because of the complexity induced by the large number of different objections raised in the NPOs and the attendant confusions that might ensue as to what the decisions of the Court are in the overall and their implications for the case as a whole, it becomes necessary to restate the decisions of the Court on all the issues by way of summary: for the sake of clarity. The decisions of the Court on the 6 issues distilled from the NPOs jointly are as follows: (a) On issue No. 1, it is held that this action is not caught by any limitation law; consequently the aspects of the NPOs dealing with limitation of action are therefore dismissed; (b) On issue No. 2, it is held that there is a valid pre-action notice; and consequently, the aspects of the NPOs dealing with non-issuance of valid pre-action notice are accordingly dismissed; (c) On issue No. 3, it is held that there is reasonable cause of action; thus, the aspects of the NPOs, hinged on absence of reasonable cause of action, are accordingly dismissed; (d) On issue No. 4, it is held that allegation of abuse of court process succeeds in part and fails in part; and consequently, the objection of the 8th defendant/applicant succeeds and the suit is vacated and dismissed in respect of the 8th defendant/applicant ALONE while all other defendants/applicants are to continue to defend the action; (e) On issue No. 5, it is held that the NPO of the 6th defendant/applicant succeeds in part and fails in part; consequently the plaintiffs: Mr. Bamidele Stephen Olopha in the judgment [Exhibit J.O.V. [IV] and Engr. Geoffrey Eze in the judgment [Exhibit J.O.V. [III] are estopped from re-litigating the issue of right to allocation of government houses they are occupying as sitting tenants with the defendant while the right of all the other claimants to institute the present suit subsists against all the remaining defendants; and (f) On issue No. 6, it is held that the Attorney-General [3rd defendant/applicant] and the Managing-Director, Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria [7th defendant/applicant] in this suit are properly sued and joined as parties; consequently, these aspects of the NPOs of the 3rd defendant/applicant and the 7th defendant/applicant, are accordingly dismissed. Having come to this juncture, save the aspects of the NPOs [as shown in paragraphs (d) & (e) above] relating to the 8th defendant/applicant and the plaintiffs in Exhibits J.O.V [IV] and J.O.V. [III] who are also claimants in the present suit, all the aspects of the objections in the NPOs are dismissed; and consequently, the suit shall accordingly proceed to trial on the merit on the extant parties. I make no order as to cost. ……………………………………. Hon. Justice B. A. Adejumo, OFR MCI.Arb, GFSM, CFIARN, FCIArb, FNILS President, National Industrial Court of Nigeria.