Download PDF
BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS Hon. Justice B. A. Adejumo - President Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip - Judge Hon. Justice M. B. Dadda - Judge DATE: APRIL 8, 2009 SUIT NO. NIC/17M/1995 BETWEEN Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations, Civil Service Technical and Recreational Services Employees - Applicant AND Agricultural and Allied Workers Union of Nigeria - Respondent REPRESENTATION Enobong Etteh, and with him is Akinwale Ekunnusi, for the applicant T. S. Adewuyi, for the respondent RULING The applicant had on 7th August, 2001 filed a motion on notice, which by leave of court was later amended. The amended motion was then filed on 1st July, 2008. The amended motion on notice is brought under Rules 26(l)(d) & (e) and (2), 15 and 17 of the repealed 1979 National Industrial Court (NIC) Rules; section 14(1) and (2) of the Trade Disputes Act (TDA) Cap. 432 LFN 1990; and section 36(1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, the applicant is praying this court for the following orders — 1. AN ORDER ENTERTAINING the following QUESTIONS arising as to the interpretation of the judgment of the Court delivered on the 25th day of July 2001: (a) Whether the Court has made any finding on the single issue in dispute in this matter, to wit, “Poaching of AAWUN members in the Ministries of i.e. Agricultural Workers” in the light of the interpretation of the term “poaching” as contained at page 9, paragraph 3, lines 11 13 of the said judgment. (b) Whether there is an existing law conferring jurisdiction on AAWUN to unionise Civil Service employees classified as technical in the Federal and State Ministries of Agriculture in the light of the definition of “poaching” in the said judgment. (c) Whether the fundamental right to freedom of association of civil service employees classified as technical in the Federal and State Ministries of Agriculture who are members of AUPCTRE has not been infringed by virtue of the said judgement which may appear to have the effect of compelling such employees to belong to AAWUN. 2. AN ORDER REVIEWING and/or VARYING the judgment and order of the Court delivered on the 25th day of July 2001 in the following terms: (a) To expunge the portions or part of the judgment premised on the Trade Unions (Amendment,) Decree No. 1 of 1999 and Government Notice No. 44 of 1993 by reason of the subsequent Government Notice No. 2 of 1995 which CANCELLED the earlier legal notice. (b) To uphold this Court’s interpretation of the Award of the TAP as stated at page 9, paragraph 4, lines 16 — 22 as the judgment of this Court in resolving the issue for determination as framed by the judgment which should now read: - The provisions of the Government Notice No. 92 published in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 6 Vol. 65 of 8th February, 1978 confers jurisdiction on the Appellant (AUPCTRE) to unionise “civil service employees classified as technical” in the Federal and State Ministries of Agriculture and restricts the Respondent (AAWUN) to Agricultural employees in the Private Sector. (c) On whether AUPCTRE is guilty of poaching members of AAWUN in the Federal and State Ministries of Agriculture, the Court should, therefore, resolve in the negative. 3. AN ORDER for STAY OF EXECUTION of the judgment of this Court pending the determination of this Motion; 4. AN ORDER by way of AN INTERIM INJUNCTION restraining the Respondent or anybody whosoever from enforcing or relying on the judgment of the Court delivered on the 25th day of July 2001 or commenting on the said judgment outside this Court whether by letter to individuals or government institutions or the press, both print and electronic, until the determination of this Application; 5. FURTHER ORDER OR ORDERS as the Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The grounds upon which the motion is based are as follows — 1. The said judgment was based and premised on the existence of a statute and statutory instrument, which in law and/or in fact were not in existence at all material times, when the cause of action arose, that is, the following pronouncements: As to which of the two unions (AAWUN) and (AUPCTRE) has the jurisdiction to unionise junior agricultural employees in the Federal and State Ministries of Agriculture in Nigeria, the answer is contained in the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. I of 1999 to be read along with Legal Notice No. 44 published in official Gazette No.24 Vol. 80 0f31s( August 1993.... 2. Legal Notice No.44 published in official Gazette No.24 Vol. 80 of 3l August 1993 has been CANCELLED by official Gazette No.2 Vol. 32 of 8th February 1995. 3. The Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999 was not in existence when the cause of the action arose. 4. The appellant has been DENIED its right to FAIR HEARING as enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In support of the motion is a 15-paragraphed affidavit sworn to by Sylvester Ofili Zephyhus Ejiofor, the General Secretary of the applicant, with Exhibits A, B, C, D and E attached. The respondent reacted by filing an 18-paragraphed counter-affidavit sworn to by Remigius O. Idumajogwu, the General Secretary of the respondent. The applicant thereupon reacted by filing a16-paragraphed further and better affidavit sworn to by Sylvester Ofili Zephynus Ejiofor, the General Secretary of the applicant, with Exhibits Fl, F2, G and H attached. Both parties had filed written addresses in respect of the motion of 7th August, 2001 — that of the applicant on 26th October, 2001, while that of the respondent on 26th November, 2001. But when the court granted leave to the applicant to amend its motion on notice, the applicant filed a fresh written address on 29th October, 2008. The respondent, on its part and with leave of court, filed its own fresh written address dated 26th January 2009 out of time. Both parties went on to adopt their respective written address. The applicant commenced its argument by giving a brief introduction to the facts of the case. To the applicant then, this is a matter against the judgment of National Industrial Court delivered on the 25th day of July, 2001 questioning the interpretation of its judgment. That sometime on November, 1979 there arose an inter-union dispute between the applicant, the Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations, Civil Service Technical and Recreational Services Employees (AUPCTRE) and the respondent, the Agricultural and Allied Workers Union of Nigeria (AAWUN) — on the declaration of inter—union dispute accusing the applicant of poaching its members (i.e. agricultural workers) in the Ministries of Agriculture and Public Agricultural Establishments e.g. Agricultural Development Projects. The matter was entered in the respondent’s favour, to wit; that the respondent should continue to draw its membership from junior workers employed in “agriculture and livestock production; agriculture services including animal husbandry and horticulture, vertinary service, pest control and irrigation services, forestry, logging, fishing and games reserve” as contained in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 6 Vol.65 of 8th February 1978. However, that in the course of the proceedings in this suit the following exhibits were tendered. (a) Exhibit ‘A’ is the certified the copy of the judgment. (b) Exhibit ‘B’ is the Government Notice No. 24 Vol. 80 of 31st August 1993 referred to which the Court heavily relied on and which was canceled. (c) Exhibit ‘C’ is the Government Notice No. 2 of 8th February 1995 which cancelled the 1993 notice as in (b) above. (d) Exhibit ‘D’ is the letter written and sent to media houses by the regard out on the day the judgment was written. (e) Exhibit ‘E’ was the decisions published in Vanguard newspapers of Thursday 2nd August which the Respondent authorised. Being dissatisfied, the applicant filed an appeal at the National industrial Court against the award and the said award was therefore overruled to the extent of its inconsistency with the provisions of Legal Notice No. 44 published in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 24 Vol. 80 of 31st August 1993. However, that the National Industrial Court held amongst others as follows: (1) The jurisdiction of AAWUN is as “Workers in agricultural and livestock production, plantations, agricultural services including animal husbandry and horticulture, vertinary service, pest control and irrigation services (River basin), forestry, logging, fishing and games reserve and Agricultural Research institutions.” (2) The jurisdiction of AAWISN covers both the private and public sectors. The jurisdiction of (AUPCTRE) as “All junior staff employed in the Federal. (We must at once note the inelegance and incoherence in the representation of the facts as can so far be depicted from the written address of the applicant). The applicant, continued that, being dissatisfied, it decided to bring the present application. To the applicant, the following issues call for the determination of this court — (1) Whether the court has made any finding on the single issue in dispute in this matter, to wit, “Poaching of AAWUN members in the Ministries of Agriculture i.e. Agricultural Workers” in the light of the interpretation of the term “Poaching” as contained at page 9, paragraph 3, lines 11-13 of the said judgment. (2) Whether there is an existing law conferring jurisdiction on AAWUN to unionise Civil Service employees classified as technical in the Federal and State Ministries of Agriculture in the light of the definition of “Poaching” in the said judgment. (3) Whether the fundamental right to freedom of association of Civil Service employees classified as technical in the Federal and State Ministries of Agriculture who are members of AUPCTRE has not been infringed by virtue of the said judgment which may appear to have the effect of compelling such employees to belong to AAWUN. The applicant decided to argue issues 1 and 2 together as they are connected. To the applicant, by virtue of section 14(1) and (2) of the TDA 1990, this court has the power to entertain this application and the decision of. the court on interpretation sought will be deemed to form part of the original judgment. Furthermore, that this court has the power to review any order made by it and may, on such a review, revoke or vary that order on any of the several grounds listed in Rule 26(l)(a) to (e) of the NIC Rules. The applicant then conceded to the following: (I) That the Court properly defined the term “Poaching” as it relates to trade unions. (2) That the Court properly surmised the jurisdictional scope of AAWUN AND AUCPTRE (then Civil Service Technical Workers Union of Nigeria, CSTWUN) under the provisions of Government Notice No. 92 published in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 6 Vol. 65 of 8 February, 1 978 where AAWUN is restricted to the Private Sector while CSTWLTN is conferred with jurisdiction to unionise all junior staff employed in the Civil Service of the Federal and State Ministries of Agriculture, referring to page 9 paragraph 4 of the judgment. (3) That the Court quite rightly stated the legal position as at August 1993 to the effect that the position of the law changed with the promulgation of Government Notice No. 44 published in the Federal Government Gazette No. 24 Vol. 80 of 31 Augi4st, 1993. The change in the position was brought about by the insertion of the phrase “Public Sector inclusive”. (4) That the judgment of the Court would have been unassailable if the Legal Notice No. 44 of 1993 was never cancelled by a subsequent Legal Notice. (5) That the insertion of the phrase “Public Sector inclusive” in the said Legal Notice No: 44 of 1993, heavily relied upon by the Court in its judgment, accounted for the Court’s declaration that “the jurisdiction of AAWUN covers both the private and public sector”. This is more so, as the phrase “Public Sector inclusive” is conspicuously absent in the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999. (6) That this Court did not have the benefit of considering in its judgment the existence, content and purport of Government Notice No. 2 of 1995 published in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 2 Vol. 32 of 8 February, 1995 (precisely on the 17th Anniversary of the Publication of Government Notice No. 92 of 8 February, 1978). (7) That there is no way this Court, as it is presently constituted, would have known of the ex of Government Notice No. 2 of 1995 and deliberately ignored its legal implication. The applicant then proceeded with its submissions. To it, the essence of issues 1 and 2 may be surmised as follows: (1) Whether by the Court’s definition of poaching there is any finding on the point in dispute — poaching of AAWUN members in the Ministries of Agriculture i.e. Agricultural Workers — which will necessarily require a finding on. (2) Whether there is an existing law authorising AAWIJN to unionise Civil Service Employees classified as technical in the Ministries of Agriculture to ground an allegation of poaching against AUPCTRE. To the applicant, the single point in dispute remains the poaching of AAWUN membership in Ministries of Agriculture (i.e. “Agricultural Workers). As indicated earlier, the applicant agreed entirely with the judicial definition of poaching given by this Court. Its only grouse is that the Court did not apply the said definition to the point in dispute to determine whether or not AUPCTRE is guilty of poaching AAWUN’s members as alleged. The applicant proceeded to reproduce the judicial definition of poaching for a clearer appreciation of the questions, which, at page 9, paragraph 3, lines 11-13 of the said judgment, is as follows — The term ‘Poaching’ in trade union parlance occurs when one trade union tries to unionise workers who, according to existing law, belongs to another trade union. That from the foregoing definition, for a trade union to be found guilty of poaching, certain conditions must be satisfied namely, (1) The Court must ascertain the existing law prescribing the jurisdictional scope of the accusing trade union (AAWUN) and the defending trade union (AUPCTRE). (2) The Court must ascertain the jurisdictional scope of the accusing trade union according to the said existing law. (3) The Court must ascertain the jurisdictional scope of the defending trade union according to the said existing law. (4) The Court must then determine whether in the light of the ascertained jurisdictions, the accusing trade union has established a case of poaching against the defending trade union. The applicant then proceeded to consider each of these conditions to see the extend to which they were satisfied. To the applicant, this Court, in ascertaining the existing law that prescribes the jurisdictional scope of AAWVN and AUPCTRE, held, inter alia, at page 10, paragraphs 2—3 of the said judgment, as follows: Regrettably, the IAP did not make any reference to Legal Notice No. 44 of 1999 which was the appropriate law at that time but based its decision on the provisions of Legal Notice No. 92 of 1978 already superseded. The Award of the IAP is, therefore, over-ruled to the extent of is inconsistency with the provisions of Legal Notice No. 44 published in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 24 Vol. 80 of3lSL August, 1993. The applicant then submitted that first, it must be said that the above pronouncement underscores the Court’s appreciation of the fundamental duty placed on it to ascertain the existing law on the point in dispute. Second, that the position held by the Court on the inapplicability of Legal Notice No. 92 of 1978 underscores the importance which the Court attached to Legal Notice No. 44 of 1993 in coming to its conclusion. Third, that strictly speaking, the award of IAP, which restricted the jurisdictional scope of AAWIJN to the private sector, was overruled on the single ground of inconsistency with Legal Notice No. 44 of 1993. It is, therefore, without gainsaying that the judgment of this Court would have certainly been different if it is shown that the substratum of the decision was not in existence. The applicant continued that it is trite law that where the basis of an action or a decision is proved to be legally non-existent, invalid, unlawful, unconstitutional, erroneous or illegal, such action or decision cannot stand in law. Its fate is abysmally doomed and incurably bad. Such decision must surely go down with the pillar on which it stood. Its anchor cannot hold in the legal storm of justice. That the celebrated Supreme Court decision in Mcfoy v. UAC is very appropriate in considering the effect of the judgment based on a non- existing law. To the applicant, a close look at the Trade Dispute Form 3 reveals with ease that the Notification of the dispute in this matter has its date as 6th November, 1979. The law as at the time the cause of action arose was the official Gazette No. 6 Vol. 65 of 8 February 1978. That the Court clearly felt the need for the application of the applicable law as at that time was necessary hence it advertently relied on Legal Notice No. 44 published in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 24 Vol. 80 of 31st August, 1993. That the question as to what was the appropriate law existing at the time the cause of action arose is, therefore, pertinent. That a logical analysis shows that Legal Notice No. 92 Vol. 65 of 1978 was in existence prior to, during and at the time of or after the IAP award was made. The applicant went on to submit that the reliance placed on Legal Notice No. 44 of 1993 by the court when as at 1979, when the cause of action arose, the said Legal Notice was not in existence, could not have been correct. The applicant then urged the court to note that the said cancellation of the 1993 instrument by the 1995 instrument was done during the pendency of the suit at IAP and in which the award was given on 25 May, 1995. That the Legal Notice 8th February 1995 mutatis mutandi cancelled the said Legal Notice No. 44 of 1993. The applicant urged further that the court should note that the Legal Notice No. 44 of 1993 did not and could not have cancelled the 1978 gazette. Again, that Legal Notice No. 92 Vol. 65 of 1978 is not in conflict with the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999 and so the issue of preeminence over the other does not arise. That the provisions of the said Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999 are clear on the jurisdiction of AUPCTRE and so need not be mentioned. That suffice it to say that the said Decree did not confer jurisdiction on the respondent to unionise Civil Service employees classified as technical in the Federal and State Ministries of Agriculture in the light of the definition of “poaching”. To the applicant, the eternal principle of law as to the applicable law for determination of action has been and is still the existing law as at the time the cause of action arose (i.e. the Official Gazette No. 92 Vol. 65 of 1978). The applicant then posed the question whether there can be any exception to this eternal principle of law above; and answered that the only imaginable exception could be where there was a later gazette that retrospectively cancelled the 1978 Gazette, which is not the case. The applicant then referred the court to the following cases for the above principle of law: Victor I. Rossek and ors. v. ACB and ors [1993] 8 NWLR (Pt. 312) 382; Oyetayo v. Mosojo and ors [1999] 10 NWLR (Pt. 526) 636; and Nigerian Ports Plc V. Osinoya [2001] FWLR (Pt. 55) 514 at 529. The applicant continued that Blacks Law Dictionary Sixth Edition 1891 — 1991 at page 206 defines “Cancellation” as — To destroyed the force, effectiveness, or validity of. To annul, abrogate or terminate defacement of mutilation of instrument; and concluded that there is no further explanation as to the affect of cancellation of Legal Notice No.2 of 1993. Continuing, the applicant submitted that the depositions in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the respondent’s counter-affidavit suggests that the respondent union is aware of the existence of the said Legal Notice No. 2 of 1993 but has chosen to beat the forlorn path of wishing away the grave and fundamental provisions of the instrument; and then asked, what then is the content of Government Notice No. 2? To the applicant, the short title of the Legal Notice, which eloquently proclaims the purpose of the instrument, reads: “REVISED STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRIAL/WORKERS UNIONS”, and then provides as follows — The Government Notice No. 44 published in the Extraordinary Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 24 Volume 80 dated 31st August 1993 on the Revised Structure of Industrial Workers Union is here cancelled. (The quotation and emphasis is the applicant’s.) The applicant continued that the said instrument was published on 8 February, 1995 on the 17th anniversary of the publication of the notorious Legal Notice No. 92 of 1978 — the grundnorrn on restructuring of and jurisdictional scope of trade unions in Nigeria. To the applicant, the purport of Government Notice No. 2 of 1995 is simple and straight forward: to cancel, obliterate, or undo Government Notice No. 44 of 1993 as if it had never existed. That the IAP award was made on 25 May 1995 about four months after the cancellation of Government Notice No. 44 of 1993. That this, probably, may have explained why no reference was made to it by the lAP although neither of the parties drew the Panel’s attention to it for obvious reason. Yet the effect of the said cancelled and non-existent legislation, like a judicial cancer, did spread beyond the reason for the Court overruling of the award of the IAP on the private sector jurisdiction of AAWLFN. That its cancerous cells fundamentally affected the interpretation the Court has given to the jurisdictional scope of the two unions as to which of them (AAWUN and AUPCTRE) has the jurisdiction to unionise junior agricultural employees in the Federal and State Ministries of Agriculture in Nigeria. Consequently, that the provisions of the said Government Notice No. 44 of 1993 which contained the phrase “public sector inclusive” was read into the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999 to come to the conclusion that AAWUN’s jurisdiction covers both the public and private sector. The applicant then reproduced the relevant portion of the judgment to drive home this point. The relevant portion at page 1 0, paragraph 4 of the said judgment states — As to which of the two unions (AAWUN and AUPCTRE) has the jurisdiction to unionise junior agricultural employees in the Federal and State Ministries of Agriculture in Nigeria, The answer is contained in Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999 to be read along with Legal Notice No. 44 published in official Gazette No. 24 Vol. 80 of 31St August 1993.... To the applicant, nowhere in the Third Schedule to Decree No. 1 of 1999 Part B Item No. 1 is the phrase public sector found. That it is only if the said Decree is read along with the CANCELLED Legal Notice can one sustain the order in the last paragraph of page 10 of the judgment. However, that “such order cannot be sustained to the extent of Legal Notice No. 92 Vol. 65 of 8 February 1978 being the applicable existing law and the jurisdiction”. The applicant then submitted with that it will be uncharitable for anyone to say, as the respondent’s union may be understood as saying in its counter-affidavit at paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof, that the said Legal Notice No. 44 published in official Gazette No. 24 Vol. 80 of 31st August 1993 was of no consequence to the said judgment. Such argument is certainly begging the question and should be disregarded and discountenanced for the reasons already adduced. Thai even this Court would not maintain such a position being a Court of honourable members with a higher duty to the society to do justice and own up to an error where there is one. That after all, infallibility is only an exclusive preserve of the Almighty. What is more, that the lawmakers, in their wisdom had envisaged a situation like this hence the special power conferred on this Court to review its decision in the interest of justice. That even though it does not happen often, it, however, does happen. To the applicant, all the foregoing submissions conduce to one point: that this Court wrongly held that the applicable existing law for determining the single point in dispute in the appeal is the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999 to be read along with Legal Notice No. 44 published in Official Gazette No. 24 Vol. 80 o f 3lstAugust 1993. The applicant then submitted that the applicable existing law on the jurisdictional scope of both unions to unionise certain employees in the Ministries of Agriculture is the Legal Notice No. 92 Vol. 65 of 8th February, 1978, urging the court to so hold. That even if the Legal Notice No. 92 published in Official Gazette No. 6 Vol. 65 of 8 February 1978, which was the existing law a at the time the cause of action arose, has been superseded by Legal Notice No. 44 published in Official Gazette No. 24 Vol. 80 of 31st August, 1993 (which the applicant does not concede) when the action was still before the TAP, the said Legal Notice of 1993 was equally superseded and cancelled by Legal Notice No 2 of 18th February, 1995 when the action was still before the IAP, which gave its award on May, 1995. That it follows, therefore, that the court inadvertently omitted or did not draw its mind to the Legal Notice No. 2 of 1995 that cancelled the 1993 Gazette. In anycase, that the Legal Notice No. 6 Vol. 65 of 8111 February, 1978 applies as even the 1995 did not cancel the 1993 Gazette retrospectively. To the applicant, having ascertained the applicable existing law on the point, the next issue for consideration is the determination of the jurisdictional scope of the accusing trade union (AAWUN) and the defending union (AUPCTRE) according to the said existing law. Starting with AAWUN, the applicant submitted that prior to the promulgation of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999, the jurisdictional scope of AAWUN was prescribed in Legal Notice No. 92 Vol. 65 of 1978. That it was stated to cover workers in — Agriculture and Livestock Production, Agricultural services including animal husbandry and horticulture, veterinary services, pest control and irrigation services. Forestry, logging, fishing and games reserves. To the applicant, the above jurisdictional scope shows clearly that it has nothing to do with civil servants unlike the specialised Civil Service unions, viz: Civil Service Technical Workers Union of Nigeria; Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria; Nigeria Civil Service Union; and Nigerian Union of Civil Service Typists, Stenographic and Allied Staff. That this is so because the 1978 trade unions restructuring authority — the Federal Ministry of Employment Labour and Productivity — has been unequivocal in stating that the philosophy behind the 1978 trade unions restructuring exercise was to separate Civil Service unions from the private sector as far as practicable and the respondent is aware of this fact. Evidentially, this fact was communicated to the respondent union by the said Ministry vide the Federal Government’s letter Ref: ML.IK1/58/S.I/SEC/VII /209 dated 16th November, 1979 particularly at paragraph 2 thereof. That apart from the respondent, the Federal Government also communicated to civil servants in the Ministries of Agriculture particularly to the Civil Service employees classified as technical in the Department of Fisheries and the like that they were to be unionised by CSTWUN. That evidence of this is contained in the Ministry of Labour’s letter to employees of Federal Fisheries dated 3 January, 1979 Ref. ML.1K158/S.I/SEC/VI/ 1078 and the Ministry of Labour’s letter to the employees of Lagos State Ministry of Agriculture also dated 30th January, 1979. The applicant continued that this Court and the IAP could not but tow the same line of reasoning when both Court and Tribunal held in an earlier case between these same parties that: All seconded Technical Staff to the PADP from the Plateau State Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources and other Ministries who are still classified as Civil Servants by the Plateau State Government should continue their membership with the CSTWUN. . .(emphasis is the applicant’s). The applicant relied on the case of Agricultural Workers Union of Nigeria vs. Civil Service Technical Workers Union unreported Suit No. NJC/14/92 delivered on 3rd December 1993 and submitted that this Court is bound by the decision. On the jurisdictional scope of AUPCTRE, the applicant submitted that, as it stands, the jurisdictional scope of the applicant union is clearly spelt out in item 2 Part B of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999, which provides as follows: All junior staff employed in the Federal and State Corporation; Civil Service Employees classified as technical.... That from the above quoted portion of the law, it is apparent that the union has jurisdiction to cover specified workers both in the public sector and in the Civil Service sector, The applicant contended that for the purpose of the instant case, it will limit itself to the Civil Service sector since Ministry of Agriculture is in the Civil Service. That the Civil Service jurisdiction of AUPCTRE is a product of the merger of Civil Service Technical Workers Union with two other unions. That the union’s Civil Service membership is similar to that provided for CSTWUN in the Legal Notice No. 92 Vol. 65 of 1978. That the union is clearly authorised to unionise civil servants classified as technical. The applicant then submitted that the general jurisdiction of any other union in the public service sector or in the private sector is limited by the special jurisdiction of AUPCTRE to unionise civil servants classified as technical. That for the purpose of AUPCTRE’s jurisdiction, any other union is eminently qualified to unionise any worker to the extent that such a worker is not a civil servant classified as technical. That having stated the above, the question that naturally follows is who then are the civil service employees classified as technical. To that applicant, the Civil Service employees class as technical cover employees rendering services in the technical, technological, superintendent, stores and data processing cadres etc. in all the Ministries in the Federal and State Civil Service. That in appropriate cases, each officer in the respective cadres may, however, bear a functional title reflecting his specialisation without necessarily adding the word “technical” as in the cases of Drivers’ cadre and Artisan/Craftsman cadre, referring to Exhibit Fl (the Federal Government Circular of 1 2 November, 1975 Ref. No. B.62528) and Exhibit F2 (the Federal Government Circular No. 5 of 1979). The applicant then gave the example of the Ministry of Works, where the technical class includes Works Attendant, Artisan/Craftsman, Works Superintendent and Technical Assistant; and in the Ministry of Agriculture, it includes Agricultural Assistant cadre and Agricultural Superintendent cadre, referring to Exhibit G (the Federal Government Circular No. 12 of 1980 captioned “MEASURE TO ELIMINATE STAGNATION IN THE TECHNICAL GRADES”) particularly paragraph 1(f), (g) and (h). The applicant continued that a look at the names of the former unions which operated in the Civil Service listed hereunder merged with 20 others to form the CSTWUN, referring to Government Notice No. 92 of 8/02/7 8. That the following names of the House Unions showing the presence of Civil Service employees classified as technical in the respective Ministries -of Agriculture speak for themselves. (i) Federal Fisheries Workers Union (ii) Forestry Technical Workers of Nigeria (iii) Produce Inspection Technical Staff Union of Eastern Nigeria (iv) Federal Produce Inspection Tecimical Staff Union (v) Produce Inspection Technical Staff Union of Western Nigeria (vi) Lagos State Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources Workers Union (vii) Mid-West Agricultural Technical Staff Workers Union (viii) South Eastern Produce Inspection Technical Staff Union (ix) Fisheries Technical and General Workers Union. That essentially, posts in the Civil Service employees classified as technical during the pre-Udoji era were inter alia graded on C(T) salary scales. That these posts included Technical Officers/Superintendent. That these designations showing posts classified as technician still subsist till date in several Ministries/Departments including Works/Mechanical, Electrical, Agricultural, Livestock arid Forestry, referring to Exhibit H (the Federal Government Circular No. 10 of 1981). The applicant then submitted that Civil Service employees classified as technical are civil servants rendering technical services in the Craftsman/Artisan, Technician, Technical, Technological, Superintendent, Stores, Data processing, Drivers and corresponding cadres bearing titles designated to reflect their occupational areas in the Ministries or Departments of Federal and States Civil Service including Works/Mechanical, Electrical and Agriculture, urging the Court to so hold. The applicant then turned to the issue whether, in the light of the foregoing ascertained jurisdiction of both unions, the accusing trade union has established a case of poaching against the defending trade union. That to prove that AUPCTRE has poached AAWUN’s members, the onus is on AAWUN to: (1) Produce before this Court an existing law conferring jurisdiction on AAWUN to unionise Civil Service employees classified as technical in the Federal Ministries of Agriculture, and also (2) Produce empirical evidence in proof of any allegation of such poaching. The applicant then submitted that there is nothing on Record before this Court which shows even a thread of evidence that AUPCTRE has poached the members of AAWUN. Rather that the applicant has shown evidence to the contrary. First, that the applicant has established that there is a subsisting judgment of this Court to the effect that all technical staff in the Ministries of Agriculture are members of CSTWUN (now AUPCTRE) and that even if they are on secondment to a Public Service establishment such as PADP, so long as they remain classified as civil servants then they are to continue their membership in the applicant anion, referring to AAWUN v. CSTWUN, supra. Second, that AAWUNN is a non-civil service/private sector union. That this Court has rightly observed that without Government Notice No. 44 of 1999, AAWUN is a private sector union. That now that the applicant has shown that the said Notice is non—existent, the consequence is that the law, which makes AAWUN a private sector union has not changed. Third, that the 9 house unions in the Federal and State Ministries of Agriculture were among the 29 house unions that formed CSTWUN. Fourth, that the Federal Government of Nigeria which carried out the restructuring through the Federal Ministry of Labour has been very emphatic that the philosophy of the restructuring exercise was to separate Civil Service unions from the private sector. Fifth, that pertaining to technical staff in the Ministries of Agriculture, the applicant has shown Government Circulars positively and unequivocally stating that such employees in the Federal Department of Fisheries and Lagos State Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources are to belong to the applicant union. Sixth, that the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree has not made any change to the jurisdictional scope of AAWUN as contained in the Legal Notice No. 92 Vol.65 of 1978. The applicant then submitted that AAWUN has not shown any legal or factual evidence that AUPCTRE has poached its members and we urge the court to so hold. On the contrary, that it is AAWIUN that has been poaching members of the Civil Service unions as can be seen from paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit, the deponent, therefore, being the worst culprit deserving of severe sanction. Having said, the applicant proceeded to consider the third and final leg of the questions for interpretation which has to do with the judgment having the likely effect of causing an infringement of the fundamental right of the statutory members of AUPCTRE. On this issue, the applicant asked whether the fundamental right to freedom of association of Civil Service employees classified as technical in the Federal and State Ministries of Agriculture who are members of AUPCTRE has not been infringed by virtue of the said judgment which may appear to have the effect of compelling employees to belong to AAWUN. To the applicant, if this court had given the parties, particularly the applicant, the opportunity to be heard on the validity/legal implication of Government Notice No. 44 of 1993, the court would have received immeasurable assistance from both counsel. That where an applicant is given power to institute actions as an umbrella body for its members, any breach whatsoever complained of by a sister union must be carried on by the umbrella union. Therefore, that the applicant alleging breach of its fundamental human right can take action. That the Supreme Court has held that on no account should a court of law raise a point suo niotu no matter how clear it may appear to be and proceed to resolve it one way or the other without hearing the parties, particularly the party that may be adversely affected as a result of the point so raised. If it does so, it will be in breach of the parties’ right to fair hearing, referring to the Supreme Court decisions in Araka v. Ejeagwli [2000] 12 SC (Pt. 1) 99 and Hambe v. Hueze [2000] 2 SC 26. In conclusion, the applicant submitted that the interest of justice demands the review of this court’s judgment, the subject matter of this application. That the applicant’s position is premised on the issues already canvassed on the following — 1. That the judgment made was based on a non-exist law. Suffice it to add at the risk of repetition that since the Court concluded that the position of the law changed in 1993 with the “promulgation of Government Notice No. 44 published in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 24 Vol. 80 of3ls August 1993, which conferred jurisdictional scope on the respondent (AAWUN) in respect of employees (public sector inclusive) in (page 10 of the judgment, Exhibit “A” of the Affidavit in Support), then, once it has been clearly shown that in fact and in law, the “position” did not CHANGE because Exhibit “B” was CANCELLED by Exhibit “C”, this Court is bound to review and vary the judgment of the Court to bring it to the “position” of the law as it is. 2. That it is trite law that a court is bound to decide only on the issue brought before it. The position of the law as it applies to this Court is even more stringent in that the point(s) in dispute is as forwarded to this Court by an instrument of the Minister. That the only exception to this rule is where an appellant applies and is granted leave to argue additional grounds of appeal or point in dispute. That in this case, the respondent did not file any objection to the award of the TAP. That this Court is, therefore, bound to decide only the point in dispute so forwarded to it. No more, No less, referring to the case of Oladunjoye v. Akinterewa [2000] 4 SC (Pt. 1)19. 3. That it is a fundamental principle in the administration of justice, that a court and by extension a tribunal is not a Father Christmas and cannot, therefore, grant a party a relief he has not asked for, referring to Nwanya v. Nwanya [1973] NWLR (Pt. 62) 67; Odofin v. Agu [1992] NWLR (Pt. 229) 350 at 372; Ilodibia v. Nigeria Cement Company Limited [1997] 7 NWLR (Pt. 512) 74 at 191. 4. That the truth of the matter is that the appeal was not about AAWUN’s jurisdiction in both private and public sector. That the determination of such a dispute will necessarily involve and affect at least five unions namely: Senior Staff Association of Statutory Corporations and Government Owned Companies; Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria; Nigerian Civil Service Union; Nigeria Union of Civil Service Typists, Stenographic and Allied Staff; and the applicant union, which all have respective jurisdiction in the Ministries of Agriculture and Statutory Corporations and Government owned Companies engaged in agricultural undertakings in the public sector (otherwise called public service sector). 5. That the subject matter of the appeal is simple and straight forward. That the Court could, therefore, not and ought not to make an Order wider than or outside the instrument, no matter the scope of the arguments urged on the Court by counsel. Consequently, that the declaration of this Court that AAWUN’s jurisdiction covers both the private and public sectors is erroneous and should be expunged from the said judgment. 6. That considering the cause of action in this matter, which arose sometime in 1979, considering also the existing law as at that time which was the Legal Notice No. 92 published in Official Gazette No. 6 Vol. 65 of 8th February, 1978 and considering also that Legal Notice No. 44 published in Official Gazette No 24 Vol. 80 of 31st August 1993 was inadvertently relied upon by this court, the cancellation by gazette No. 24 of 1993 was done during the pendency of the said suit. That a subsequent Legal Notice No. 2 of 1995 in the same vein cancelled the Legal Notice No. 44 of 1993. That Official Gazette No. 6 Vol. 65 of 8th February, 1 978 still stands as the existing law. That even if the respondent dismisses this true and factual assertion, the Notice No. 44 of 1993 did not cancel 1978 Notice retrospectively neither did the cancellation happen after the award of the IAP on 25 May 1995. That it may interest the Court to note that the said IAP award of 1995 was made on “25 May 1995” and cancellation of the 1993 Notice made on 8h February, 1995. 7. That the big question is which law was the existing law as at the time the cause of action arose. Unless and until, this court has the opportunity of “nakedly” looking at “the three pictures evidence law and pronouncing on it”, this Court “would seen not have dispensed the administration of justice”. 8. That the respondent wrote a letter and delivered to several people and media houses on 25th day of July 2001, referring to Exhibit “D”. That the respondent caused the decision to be published in newspapers one of which was Vanguard publication of Thursday 2nd August 2001 (Exhibit ‘E’). The applicant then urged the Court for a stay of execution and injunction since by the wide publication and publicity of the judgment, the respondent intends to rely on it and enforce it immediately. That the interest of justice will be served if the judgment is stayed pending the final outcome of the application before the Court. 9. That the prayers contained in this application are of grave and serious nature of which fundamental issues have been raised for determination. The applicant then urged the Court to restrain the respondent from further publishing the said judgment until this application is heard and determined. 10. That the issues and arguments canvassed have been clearly stated. That the relief sought as contained in the Motion papers have been adopted. That hat this Court has the power to review any order made by it and may, on such a review, revoke or vary that order on any of the several grounds listed in Rule 26(1)(a) to (e) of the National Industrial Court Rules, and having regards to paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the affidavit in support of the application made before this court, urging the Court to exercise this power in the interest of justice. The applicant then rounded up its submissions stating that it has advanced arguments to assist the court in interpreting its judgment as it relates to the prayer, reliefs or orders sought by the applicant. The applicant then urged the court to seize this opportunity to do justice to the instant application in the interest of industrial peace and the development of judicial precedent in this Court. Like the applicant, the respondent commenced it written address with an introduction wherein it stated that on 25th July 2001, this court delivered its judgment in respect of a 21 year old dispute between the applicant and the respondent. That the issue in dispute, which was determined in favour of the respondent first at the IAP and later by this court as contained in the terms of reference by the Minister of Labour and Productivity is, “Poaching of AAWUN members in the Ministries of Agriculture i.e. Agricultural workers”. The respondent continued that in its judgment, this court in the last two paragraphs returned the following verdict on the single point of dispute referred to and considered by it — As to which of the two unions (AAWUN) and (AUPCTRE) has the jurisdiction to unionise junior agricultural employees in the Federal and States Ministries of Agriculture in Nigeria, the answer is contained in the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999 to be read along with Legal Notice No. 44 published in Official Gazette No. 24. Vol. 80 of 31 August, 1993. THIRD SC1-IEDULE (PART B):- Item No.1 stales the area of jurisdiction of AAWUN as “workers in all agricultural and livestock production, plantations, agricultural services including animal husbandry; fishing and horticulture; veterinary services, Pest control; irrigation services (River Basin Services); forestry, logging and game reserves; and Agricultural Institutions”. The jurisdiction of AAWUN covers both the private and public sectors. Item No. 2 states the area of jurisdiction of the Appellant (AUPCTRE) as “All junior staff employed in the Federal and States Corporations; Civil Services Employees classified as technical”. Judgment is entered accordingly. That having thus lost the appeal as set out in the portion of the judgment referred to above, the applicant, AUPCTRE, brought this Motion for the relief stated in the motion paper. To the respondent, the following issues arise for determination considering the relief being sought in this application: (i) Whether the judgment of this Court 0 July 2001 made any finding on the poaching of the respondent’s members by the applicant. (ii) Whether this Court went beyond its terms of reference in that part of its judgment of 25 July 2001 where it ruled that “The jurisdiction of AAWUN covers both private and public sectors”. (iii) Whether new evidence has become available since the making of the judgment to warrant the Court to vary its earlier decision. (iv) Whether the judgment of this Court of 25th July 2001 is not in breach of the constitutional right of a worker to belong to any union of his or her choice. On issue 1, whether the judgment of this Court 25th July 2001 made any finding on the poaching of respondent’s members by the applicant, the respondent contended that the applicant had argued in its brief that the term of reference before this Court was to determine the trade dispute declared by the respondent alleging the poaching of its members in the Ministries of Agriculture, i.e. agricultural workers, but that this Court did not make specific finding on this in its judgment of 25th July 2001. That the applicant argued that having correctly defined the word “poaching” as meaning a situation “... when one trade union tries to unionize workers who, according to existing law, belongs to another trade union”, this Court failed to apply the said definition to the point in dispute to determine whether or not AUPCTRE is guilty of poaching AAWUN members as alleged. The respondent then submitted that the above summarized contention of the applicant is non sequitur. That there was no way this Court could have rightly made a finding on the trade dispute term of reference before it without first and foremost and primarily inquiring into the facts informing the allegation couched in the term of reference and finding upon them. The fact of the matter is that both parties claimed to be entitled to unionize workers in the Ministries of Agriculture. That the respondent claimed that those workers are “agricultural workers” and rightly belong in its union, while the applicant claimed that they are “civil service employees classified as technical” and are rightly its members. Obviously, that both parties cannot be right at the same time. It is very clear that one party is wrongly insisting on unionizing workers “who, according to existing law, belong to the other trade union”; otherwise no trade dispute would have arisen between the parties requiring the intervention of the of the Minister of Labour, the IAP and finally, this Court. The respondent continued that the applicant’s defense in the trade dispute has been that it has not poached the respondent’s members because the persons allegedly poached are “civil service employees classified as technical”. That the respondent on the other hand says that the applicant has been poaching its members in the Ministries of Agriculture, i.e. “agricultural workers”. To the respondent, the question is, “what was the court’s decision regarding these respective claims of the parties?” It is, as stated in paragraph 4 of page 10 of the judgment of 25th July 2001, to wit: As to which of the two unions (AAWUN and AUPCTRE) has the jurisdiction to unionize “agricultural employees in the Federal and States Ministries of Agriculture in Nigeria” (emphasis is the respondent’s). That it is clear from this that this Court did make a finding to the effect that the concerned workers in the Ministries of Agriculture are “agricultural as claimed by the respondent, and not “civil service employees classified as technical” as contended by the applicant. That it is also clear that by unionizing or insisting on unionizing this category of workers, the applicant is poaching workers “who, according to existing law, belongs to the respondent” On issue 2, whether this Court went beyond its terms in that part of its judgment 0 July 2001 where it ruled that “the jurisdiction of AAWUN covers both private and public sector, the respondent contended that the applicant wants the judgment of 25th July 2001 reviewed or varied because according to the applicant, this Court went beyond its term of reference n holding that “the jurisdiction of AAWUN covers both the private and public sectors”. That it is the contention of the applicant that this Court came to this conclusion by relying heavily on Government Notice No. 44 published in the Federal Government Gazette No. 24 Vol. 80 of 31st August, 1993 which brought about a change by the insertion of the phrase “Public Sector inclusive”. That it is also the contention of the applicant that the reliance by this Court on the said Legal Notice accounted for the Court’s declaration that the “jurisdiction of AAWUN covers both the “private and public sectors” and that since the said Government Notice was subsequently cancelled by Government Notice No. 2 of 1995 there was no way the Court would have deliberately ignored its legal consequence. The respondent then contended that it has all along claimed that the category of workers in dispute is “agricultural workers” which it lawfully has jurisdiction to unionize. That in order to defeat this claim the applicant argued that the respondent, AAWUN, is a private sector union only with no jurisdiction over workers in the Ministries of Agriculture who belonged to the public sector. That the app1 contended that it is the only union, of the two contending trade unions, with public jurisdiction and as such that the trade dispute should be decided in its favour and accordingly workers in the Ministries of Agriculture be awarded to it. That the applicant then went into long historical excursion and tendered many documents in supposed proof of this claim that the respondent is a private sector union only. That even now that the applicant is arguing that this Court went beyond its term of reference in making such a decision, the applicant has still not ceased to proffer this argument with allegedly supportive evidence and documents (most of which are unfortunately nothing but documentary cobwebs from the past with no relevance to the present state of trade unionism in Nigeria). That worse still, if indeed the question does not arise whether AAWUN is a private sector union only, pray, by what twist of logic is the applicant praying or is permitted to pray this Court to revise its judgment to read, as urged by the applicant in prayer 2(b) of its motion paper — The provision of the Government Notice No. 92 published in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 6 Vol. 65 of 8 February 1978 confers jurisdiction on the appellant (AUPCTRE) to unionize “civil service employees classified as technical” in the Federal and States Ministries of Agriculture and restricts the respondent (AAWUN) to Agricultural employees in the private sector. The respondent then drew the attention of the Court to the copious deposition of “facts” and documents in the applicant’s affidavit in support of this motion aimed at persuading the Court that the respondent is a private sector union only. That yet the respondent has the temerity to still argue that the issue of whether the respondent is a private sector union only or has jurisdiction in both private and public sectors did not arise in the dispute and that the court should expunge its decision on this from the judgment of 25th July 2001. The respondent then suggested that it is only desperation that can account for this somersault in argument, urging the Court to refuse this attempt to lead it by the nose and sophistry into revising itself needlessly. The respondent then submitted that this Court was right in considering and rejecting the applicant’s contention in the main dispute that the respondent has no jurisdiction over public sector agricultural workers and as such cannot lawfully claim membership of workers in the Ministries of Agriculture; and also that the Court rightly held that the respondent’s jurisdiction covers workers in both the private and public sectors. On issue 3, whether new evidence has become available since the making of the judgment to warrant this Court to review, revoke or vary its earlier decision, the respondent submitted that with the pronouncement in favor of the respondent hereto by the Court in its judgment dated 25th July 2001, the question as to which bet the applicant and respondent hereto is entitled to unionize “…members in the Ministries of Agriculture i.e. “Agricultural workers” is now res judicata. That that question cannot be re-litigated all over again, under whatever guise including that in the instant application, being the very point or question or subject matter which has been in controversy for about 21 years between the parties hereto which was authoritatively and finally settled by the decision of this Court on the July 2001. There certainly must be an end to litigation in a particular matter. That the only exception to the rule stated above under the peculiar proceedings under the Trade Disputes Act is contained in the provisions of Rule 26 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 1979 which provides thus: 26(1) The Court may, either on its own motion or on application by any of the parties to the preview, revoke or vary that order on the following grounds — (a) the order was wrongly made as the result of error on the part of the Court; (b) a party did not receive proper notice of the proceedings leading to the order; (c) the order was made in the absence of a party entitled to be heard; (d) new evidence has become available since the making of the order; or (e) the interest of justice requires such review. That the applicant’s application is made, inter alia, under Rule 26(1)(d) and (e). In other words, that the applicant is alleging that new evidence has become available since the making of the order and that the interest of justice requires that this Court review its earlier decision. To the respondent, for this application to succeed, therefore, the applicant must satisfy the court as to what new evidence has become available since the judgment was delivered. Furthermore, the court must be satisfied as to the particular interest of justice that requires the judgment to be tampered with. That the Applicant in attempting to so satisfy the court to upturn its decision is placing reliance on the following grounds contained in the motion paper — 1. The said judgment was based and premised on the existence of a document or statute which in law and in fact is and was not in existence at all material times, that is, the following pronouncement: As to which of the two unions (AAWUN) and (AUCPTRE) has the jurisdiction to unionize junior agricultural employees in the Federal and States Ministries of Agriculture in Nigeria, the answer is contained in the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999 to be read along with Legal Notice No. 44 published in the Official Gazette No. 24 Vol. 80 of3lSE August, 1993. 2. Legal Notice No. 44 published in Official Gazette No. 24 Vol. 80 of 31 August 1993 has been CANCELLED by Official Gazette No. 2 Vol. 32 of 8 February, 1995. 3. The Applicant has been DENIED its right to FAIR I-IEARrNG as enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 4. The Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999 was not in existence when the cause of action arose. The respondent then submitted that the particulars contained in the applicant’s grounds 1, 2 and 4 are the “new” evidence based on which the applicant wants the Court to upturn its decision. That ground No. 3 on the other hand is what the applicant is relying on in contending that it is in the interest of justice that the judgment be reviewed. The respondent then went on that it is making this submission because these are the only three grounds disclosed in the applicant’ motion paper and that there is no other reasonable way to apportion these grounds between Rule 26 (1)(d) and (e) of the National Industrial Court Rules, 1979 under which this application was brought and is to be considered. To the respondent, it is true that in arriving at its decision that the respondent is conferred with jurisdiction to unionize “workers in the Ministries of Agriculture i.e. Agricultural workers” this Court had said — When determining this issue in May 1995, the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) in Suit Ref. No. IAP/I.500/95, applied the provisions of Government Notice No. 92 published in the Official Gazette No. 6 Vol. 65 of 8 February 1978 which conferred jurisdiction on the Appellant to unionize all junior staff employed in the civil service of the Federal and State Ministries of Agriculture and virtually restricted the Respondent (AAWUN) to agricultural employees in the private sector. The position of the law, however, changed in 1993 with the promulgation of Government Notice No. 44 published in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 24 Vol. 80 of 31st August, 1993 which conferred jurisdictional scope on the Respondent (AAWUN) in respect of employees (public sector inclusive) in plantations (emphasis is the respondent’ s). To the respondent, the applicant’s argument is that the underlined words in the portion of the judgment reproduced above means that this court has accepted that before the making of 1993 Gazette, the respondent’s jurisdiction, on the authority of the 1978 Gazette was “virtually restricted” to the private sector. The respondent then submitted that if there is any portion of the judgment which is ambiguous or ought to be reviewed or revised, it is in fact the underlined portion in the preceding paragraph. To the respondent, contrary to this Court’s assertion, there is in fact no part of the IAP award where the IAP said that the 1978 Gazette “virtually restricted” the respondent to the private sector. That those words were inadvertently imported into the IAP award by this Court. That in order to drive this point home, it may be necessary to quote verbatim the observations of the IAP made at pages 33 and 34 of the award, to wit — OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS In the matter of inter-union dispute between the Agricultural and Allied Workers Union (AAWUN) and the Civil Service Technical Workers of Nigeria (CSTWUN) the observations and findings of the Tribunal are as follows: (i) Agricultural and Allied Workers Union of Nigeria (AAWUN) is one of the registered trade unions legally mandated to represent all junior agricultural workers in Nigeria. (ii) The Civil Service Technical Workers Union of Nigeria is also one of the registered industrial unions legally mandated to represent the interest of all junior civil servants in the States and Federal Government classified as technical workers. (iii) The jurisdiction of the Agricultural and Allied Workers Union of Nigeria and the Civil Service Technical Workers Union of Nigeria are very clearly outlined by the Federal Government as the contained in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 6 of 8 February 1978. (iv) The jurisdiction of other industrial unions is also contained in the same Federal Government Official Gazette No. 6 of 8 February 1978. (v) If the industrial unions restrict themselves to their jurisdiction approved by the Federal Government, there will be no conflict over membership. (vi) The intention of the trade union structure is to ensure that the jurisdiction of the industrial unions are clearly identified and should be respected. There is, therefore, no justification, either morally or legally, for the Civil Service Technical Workers Union of Nigeria to seek to represent the interest of agricultural workers. (vii) The Agricultural Workers Union of Nigeria is the only legitimate trade union organization legally mandated to represent the interest of agricultural workers in Nigeria. (viii) The jurisdiction of the Civil Service Technical Workers of Nigeria is restricted to “Civil Servants classified as technical workers “. (ix) In resolving the intra-union dispute between the Agricultural and Allied Workers Union of Nigeria, there must be incontrovertible evidence backed by facts and figures showing clearly that all employees of the State and Federal Ministries of Agriculture are classified as Technical Workers, (x) The Tribunal does not accept the claim that Civil Service Technical Workers Union of Nigeria should represent the interest of agricultural workers. The Agricultural and Allied Workers Union of Nigeria is the only industrial union legally mandated to represent the interest of all agricultural workers in Nigeria including agricultural workers in the State and Federal Ministries of Agriculture SUMMARY OF AWARD In the matter of the inter-union dispute between the Agricultural and Allied Workers Union of Nigeria and the Civil Service Technical Workers Union of Nigeria, the Tribunal makes its Award as follows: “Poaching of AAWUN members in the Ministries of Agriculture i.e. Agricultural Workers” The Tribunal notes that the restructuring of trade unions in 1978 was intended to end poaching and scramble for union membership — provided unions restrict themselves to their jurisdiction. The Tribunal awards that the Agricultural and Allied Workers Union of Nigeria should continue to draw its membership from junior workers employed in “agriculture and livestock production; agricultural services including animal husbandry and horticulture; veterinary services, pest control and irrigation services; forestry, logging, fishing and games reserves” as contained in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 6 Vol.65 of 8 February 1978. The Tribunal also awards that the Civil Service Technical Union of Nigeria should continue to draw its membership from “All junior staff employed in the Civil Service of the Federal and State Government classified as technical employees” as contained in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 6 Vol. 65 of 8t1 February 1978. To the respondent then, the 1978 Gazette did not in fact restrict the respondent to the private sector considering — (1) that some of the unions listed and merged in the 1978 Gazette to constitute the respondent (AAWUN) were in fact public sector unions. (ii) that some fields of activities (e.g. forestry) where workers involved are expected to be unionized by the respondent are in reality, then and even now, public sector activities. The respondent continued that the contention of the applicant is that the 1995 Gazette canceled the 1993 one, which in effect means that the existing law as at the time the cause of action arisen was Federal Government Legal Notice No. 92 of 1978. That assuming this were so (and it is not conceded), the applicant has failed to show how the content o Government Notice No. 92 published in Federal Government Gazette No. 6 Vo