Download PDF
The claimant had taken up a complaint against the defendants dated and filed on 1st March 2013 claiming for – 1. A declaration that by the constitution of the 2nd defendant, membership of the Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria is limited to all workers engaged in the maritime sector/industry excluding those in the professional and or managerial cadre. 2. A declaration that by the constitution of the 2nd defendant any person engaged in the maritime sector/industry who is in the professional and or managerial cadre is not eligible and or qualified to be a member of the 2nd defendant. 3. A declaration that the 1st defendant being a Director and in the managerial cadre of Nted International Limited, a company through which he is engaged in the marine sector/industry, is not eligible to be members of the 2nd defendant. 4. A declaration that the 1st defendant being a Director and in the managerial cadre of Nted International Limited, a company through which he is engaged in the marine sector/industry is not eligible or qualified to be the President General or hold any other post of the 2nd defendant. 5. An order directing the 2nd defendant to remove the name of the 1st defendant as member of the Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria. 6. An order of perpetual injunction of this Honourable Court restraining the 1st defendant from parading himself as the President General of the 2nd defendant. 7. An order of perpetual injunction of this Honourable Court restraining the 1st defendant from presenting himself for any election into any post in the 2nd defendant. 8. An order of perpetual injunction of this Honourable Court restraining the 2nd defendant from parading conducting any election into its executive position until the provisions of its constitution are complied with. Accompanying the complaint are the statement of facts, list of witness to be called, witness statement on oath, list of documents and copies of the documents. In reaction, the defendants entered appearance and filed their memorandum of appearance, statement of defence, written statement on oath of their witness, list of witnesses, list of documents to be relied on and copies of the documents. At the Court’s sitting of 7th May 2013, the Court raised the issue whether the case of the claimant discloses a reasonable cause of action given that beyond the affidavit evidence, there is no proof as to membership/being President General of the 2nd defendant by the 1st defendant; and there is no proof in the case file of the activities of the company the 1st defendant is said to be a Director in order to determine whether the said company is one in the maritime sector of the economy. Parties were then asked to file and serve written addresses in that regard starting with the claimant. The claimant’s written address is dated 2nd October 2013 but filed on 21st October 2013. That of the defendant is dated and filed on 18th November 2013. The claimant’s reply on points of law is dated 18th February 2014 but filed on 20th February 2014. In arguing his position in his written address, the claimant stated what he thinks the Court asked parties to address it on. To the claimant, therefore, the Court observed that the claimant did not attach any document to show that – (a) The 1st defendant is truly the President General of the 2nd defendant; and (b) The 2nd defendant (sic) is truly acting in managerial capacity of the company by which it is alleged he is claiming membership of the 2nd defendant. That the Court is of the opinion that the requirement of frontloading of documents to be relied on at trial will make the documents attached reveal whether the case discloses cause of action. The claimant proceeded to frame three issues for the determination of the Court based on his perception of the issues raised by the Court. The claimant’s three issues are – 1) Whether the case of the claimant discloses a cause of action. 2) Whether the Court can consider the evidence of the parties at this stage to say that the case does not disclose a cause of action. 3) Whether shutting out the claimant from the Court at this stage will not amount to a violation of his fundamental right to fair hearing as guaranteed under the 1999 Constitution. Regarding issue 1), the claimant contended that it is trite that in considering whether or not the claimant’s case discloses any cause of action, regard should be had to the averments in the writ of summons and statement of claim only, referring Oshoboja v. Amuda [1992] 6 NWLR (Pt. 250) 690, Yusuf v. Akindipe [2000] 8 NWLR (Pt. 669) 376, Lemna Energy Resources Ltd v. Mukaila Musa [2013] LPELR – 20367 (CA) and NICON Insurance Corp v. Olowoofoyeku [2006] 5 NWLR (Pt. 973) 244. That in SPDC Nig. Ltd v. Y. M. Federal Ltd [2006] 7 SC (Pt. II) 27, I. F Ogbuagu, JSC cited with approval Lord Esher, MR in the case of Read v. Brown (1888) 22 QBD 128 at 131/151 where he defined cause of action as “Every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed in order to support his right to the judgement of the court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence within is necessary to be proved”. Also referred to the Court is Lasisi Fadare v. A.G of Oyo State [1982] 4 SC 1 at 6 – 7, where Read v. Brown (1888) was also cited with approval. To the claimant, he has shown in the statement of facts that he has reasonable cause of action. His averments are to the effect that he is a member of the union; has interest in ensuring that the union he belongs to is governed by the constitution of the union; as a member, there is privity of contract between him and the union and its members and an inherent right to enforce the constitution of the union. Hence, he brought this action. That in view of the above, it suffices to say that the averments in the claimant’s writ of summons and the statement of claim clothed his case with the requisite cause of action for the Court’s determination. On issue 2) i.e. whether the Court can consider the evidence of the parties at this stage to say that the case does not disclose a cause of action, the claimant referred the Court to Abubakar v. Bebeji Oil and Products Ltd [2007] SC 48 where the Supreme Court held that “It is a cardinal principle of law that to ascertain a cause of action, the immediate materials a court should look at are the writ of summons and the averments in the statement of claim, for it is by examining them that a Court can satisfy itself on the actual grouse of a party and the remedy or relief it is seeking from the Court”. Also referred to the Court were UBN v. Umeoduogn [2004] 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) 352, Adesokan v. Adegorolu [1991] 3 NWLR (Pt. 179) 293, Julius Berger Nig. Plc v. Toki Rainbow Community Bank Ltd [2009] LPELR – 4381 (CA), Yusuf v. Akindipe (supra) and Rinco Const. Co. v. Veepee Ind. Ltd [2005] 3 – 4 SC l. That, as stated earlier, the claimant’s writ of summons and statement of claim clearly raised serious issues for determination and, therefore, clothed this suit with the requisite cause of action, strong enough to invite the intervention of this Court. To the claimant, to shut the claimant out at this stage on the basis that his processes do not disclose any cause of action will amount to denying him access to justice and an infringement of his fundamental right to fair hearing, citing Thomas v. Olufosoye [1986] 2 SC 325, where the Supreme Court held that “...So long as the statement of claim or the particulars disclose some cause of action or raise some questions fit to be decided by a judge or jury, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed is no ground for striking it out”. Also referred were Yusuf v. Akindipe (supra), Gov. Ekiti State v. Akinyemi [2011] LPELR – 4218 (CA), Bamaiyi v. The State [2001] FWLR (Pt. 46) 956 at 974 and Kotoye v. CBN [1989] 1 NWLR (Pt. 98) 419. That the Supreme Court has held clearly that the question whether on the evidence adduced in view of the pleadings and the defence of the defendant the claim can be established is a different matter from the question as to the existence of a cause of action itself, citing Bello v. A.G, Oyo State [1986] 5 SC 28 and Adesokan v. Adegorolu [1997] 3 SCNJ 1 at 16. The claimant then submitted that it is premature to consider whether the claimant can prove his case based on the documents attached at this stage. That the defendant may either deny or admit the allegations of facts. Where the facts are admitted, there is no duty on the claimant to prove as that which is admitted need not be proved. The question should, therefore, be whether the claimant has pleaded all necessary facts, not whether he has attached all necessary documents. Regarding issue 3) i.e. whether shutting out the claimant from the Court at this stage will not amount to a violation of his fundamental right to fair hearing as guaranteed under the 1999 Constitution, the claimant submitted that it will amount to a violation of the right to fair hearing to shut him out at this stage. That a hearing cannot be said to be fair if any of the parties is refused a hearing or denied the opportunity to be heard or present his case. That in a matter as crucial as the determination of the rights or wrongs of an action, the parties ought to be given an opportunity of being heard before the Court takes its decision, referring to Ughuterbe v. Shonowo [2004] 6 – 7 SC 1. The claimant continued that the Court of Appeal in Jambo v. Govornor of Rivers State [2007] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1062) 198 at 218 acknowledged the discretionary power of the courts to strike out or dismiss an action at any stage of the proceeding on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action. It however warned that such exercise of discretionary power must be done with greatest caution and circumspection. That the Court further maintained that the power must be seen to have been exercised not only judicially but also judiciously; and the exercise must not in any way been allowed to inhibit the parties rights to the fair hearing, citing section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. That shutting the claimant out at this stage will amount to a violation of his fundamental right to fair hearing as guaranteed under the 1999 Constitution, as amended, referring to Ika LGA v. Mba [2007] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1049) 676, Okereke v. Ibe [2008] LPELR – 4714 (CA) and Ezechukwu v. Onwuka [2006] 2 NWLR (Pt. 963) 151 at 155. Furthermore, that it has been held that in the exercise of prescription to hear applications before it, the Court is guided by the consideration of doing justice between the parties and to ensure ultimately that the dispute between the parties was decided on its merits, citing Urhobo v. Oteri [1999] 2 NWLR (Pt. 589) 147. In conclusion, the claimant submitted that it is premature to consider whether the claimant can prove his case based on the documents attached at this stage. The defendant may either deny or admit the allegations of facts. Where the facts are admitted, there is no duty on the claimant to prove as that which is admitted need not be proved. The question should, therefore, be whether the claimant has pleaded all necessary facts not whether he has attached all necessary documents. Furthermore, that it is not only through documents that facts are proved before the Court. A credible witness may establish facts that are not required to be established by documents. This can only be done after the Court would have seen and heard the witnesses in the box. The Court at this stage is not determining the credibility of the witnesses and or the sufficiency of the documentary evidence. This is a matter for trial. That it is after the conclusion of pleadings and at the trial that the Court can decide on the documents attached. That disclosure of cause of action is only tied to the statement of facts and the writ under our jurisprudence. The claimant, therefore, prayed the Court to allow the case to go to trial, more so that the defendants have filed their defence and other applications to regularize their defence. In reaction, the defendants framed two issues for the determination of the Court, namely – (a) Whether with the advent of frontloading, a claimant ought not to furnish necessary documents in order to establish a reasonable cause of action. (b) Whether the claimant has a reasonable cause of action having regard to the circumstances of the instant case. On issue (a), the defendants contended that our new frontloading system has abolished trial by ambush where parties spring surprises. The new frontloading system was designed to put on end to delayed injustice occasioned by the old procedural system. That in order to ovoid surprise to the opposite party the frontloading system requires a claimant to an action to plead all the facts and all the documents he intends to rely on at the trial of the case. He is expected to present the evidence, oral or documentary, he intends to rely on before the trial of the action. To the defendant, the Supreme Court in a plethora of cases reiterates that averments in pleadings are facts as perceived by the party relying on them. That there must be oral or/and documentary evidence to show that the facts pleaded are true. Consequently, pleadings without evidence in support are worthless, citing Cameroon Airlines v. Mr. Mike E. Otutuizu [2011] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1238) 512 at 544G. The defendants went on to refer to Order 4 Rule 4 of the Rules of this Court, which provides in that – The complaint shall be accompanied by – (i) A statement of facts establishing a cause of action. (ii) Copies of every document to be relied on at the trial. (iii) List of witnesses to be called. That it is strict compliance with the rules that makes for quicker administration of justice. Therefore, it is the defendants’ contention that the claimant neither pleaded nor frontloaded any document to support his case and that makes his case incurably bad in line with the new frontloading system and the Rules of the Court are meant to be obeyed; otherwise parties would flout it with reckless abandon. That in Dingyadi & anor v. INEC [2010] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224) 1 Muhammad, JSC stated unequivocally that where the exercise of a right is circumscribed or limited by a rule of practice, and except where it is satisfactorily shown that compliance with such a rule has been waived, then that rule must be complied with. Court Rules are meant to be obeyed. Where there is non-compliance, such non¬compliance may result into any step taken to be a nullity. Also referred to the Court is Owners of the M.V “Arabella” v. Nigeria Agricultural Insurance Corporation [2008] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1097) 182. The defendants then submitted that failure of the claimant to furnish the Court with the necessary documents which the claimant tends to rely on is a flagrant violation of the Rules of Court, and thereby goes to the root of the claimant’s case, urging the Court to strike out the claimant’s suit for non-disclosure of reasonable cause of action. Regarding issue (b) i.e. whether the claimant has a reasonable cause of action having regard to the circumstances of the instant case, the defendants submitted that the claimant in paragraphs 4, 5 and 7 of his statement of facts contended that the 1st defendant is not qualified to be a member of the 2nd defendant but failed to show any document that disqualified him. Also, that it is the claimant’s contention in paragraph 6 of the statement of facts that the 1st defendant was a Director in Nted Ltd and thereby he could not be the President of the 2nd defendant; however, the claimant again failed to show the Court any document to support this claim. It is the defendants’ submission that from a cursory examination of the processes filed by the claimant in this suit, the suit as constituted discloses no cause of action against the defendants. That the case of the claimant must firstly find a foundation upon which it must stand to enable the Court look into it in order for the Court not to delve into an academic exercise. The defendants continued that the claimant in paragraph 4.1.1 of his written address cited the case of NICON Insurance Corp v. Olowoofoyeku; however, that in that case the appeal court stated that what is important is to examine the pleadings in the claimant’s averments but in this case the claimant neither pleaded anything to be examined nor attached any document thereby leaving the Court with nothing to examine. Furthermore, that in paragraph 4.1.2 the claimant cited the case of SPDC v. XM Federal Ltd where the Supreme Court said that what is important is every fact which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove and in that case the plaintiff pleaded all the facts leading to breach of contract and attached all necessary documents but unfortunately the claimant in the instant case has not pleaded anything and cannot want to prove that which he has not pleaded. Further still, that in paragraphs 4.2.2, 4.2.5, 4.2.6, 4.2.7 and 4.2.8 of the claimant’s written address, the claimant erroneously cited cases decided in 2004, 1986, 1989, 1986 and 1997 before the advent of frontloading system where there was no need to frontload; rather the pleadings were to be proved through oral evidence. Those cases, to the defendants, are not apposite and should be discountenanced by this Court. To the defendants, a cause of action is the entire set of circumstances giving rise to enforceable claim. It is in effect, the fact or combination of facts which gives rise to a right to sue and it consists of two elements which include the wrongful act of the defendant which gives the claimant his cause of complaint and the consequent damage. That Kawu, JSC puts it succinctly in Dada v. Ogunsanya [1992] 1 NSCC 569 as follows – ...What is important is to examine the averments in the pleadings and see if they disclose some cause of action or raise some questions fit to be decided by a judge. Referring to Ojukwu v. Yar’Adua [2009] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1154) 50 130 – 131 F – A and P. N. Udoh Trading Company Ltd v. Sunday Abere & anor [2001] 11 NWLR (Pt. 723) 114, the defendants submitted that the Courts have elucidated on the meaning of cause of action as follows – a. The fact or facts which give a person a right to judicial relief. b. The legal effect of occurrence in terms of redress to a party to the occurrence. c. A situation or state of fact which would entitle a party to sustain action and give him right to seek judicial remedy in his behalf. d. Facts, or state of facts, to which law sought to be enforced against a person or thing applies. e. Fact which gives rise to one or more relations of rights and duty to one or more relations of rights and duty between two or more persons. f. Failure to perform legal obligation to do, or refrain from performance of some act. g. Matter for which action may be maintained. h. The right which a party has to institute judicial proceedings. The defendants then submitted that the claimant has not discharged the burden of placing before this Court as required by law those facts which are material and necessary for the Court to reach a conclusion that his case discloses a reasonable cause of action. That the Rules of Court that complaints are to be accompanied with statement of facts, list of witness and list of documents is meant to be obeyed. Therefore, the complaint cannot be viewed in isolation. Obviously, that the claimant has not supplied the Court all those documents he intends to rely in order to show his cause of action. On whether shutting the claimant from the Court at this stage will not amount to violation of his fundamental right to a fair hearing as guaranteed under the 1999 Constitution, the defendants adopted the definition of fair hearing in paragraph 4.3.3 of the claimant’s written address. To the defendants, the claimant misapprehends the issue. That the Court was of the opinion that the claimant has not done what is necessary to give him ground to present his case before the Court, hence, this written address. That the fair hearing principle entrenched in section 36 of the 1999 Constitution is not for the indolent or the lazy litigant, but it is for the party who is alive and kicking in the judicial process by taking advantage of the principle at the appropriate time. The principle is not available to a party who sets a trap in the litigation process against the Court and accuses the Court of assumed wrongdoing even when such so-called wrongdoing is, as a matter of fact, propelled or instigated by the party, through his counsel, referring to Newswatch Communications Limited v. Atta [2006] 12 NWLR (Pt. 993) 144 at 171 F – G. Therefore, that a party who had the opportunity of being heard but failed to utilize same, as herein, cannot complain of breach of fair hearing. The claimant has been given the opportunity to file his case and the supporting documents; it would be very unfair for him to complain, citing Odunlami v. Nigerian Navy [2013] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1367) 20 at 52 A – E. In conclusion, the defendants submitted that a party who seeks judgment in his favour is required by law to produce adequate credible evidence in support of his pleadings, and where there is none then the averments in the pleadings are deemed abandoned. The defendants then prayed the Court to hold that the suit of the claimant as constituted has not disclosed any cause of action and should be struck out with substantial cost. In his reply on points of law, the claimant alluded to the defendants’ submission in paragraphs 4.6 and 4.6 of their address that since the claimant neither pleaded nor frontloaded any document to support his case, his case is incurably bad for disclosing no cause of action. Here the claimant submitted that he frontloaded documents as can be seen in the documents attached to the complaint. That the legal bases for his submission were the new frontloading system, the Rules of this Court and a judicial authority as contained in paragraphs 4.2 to 4.11 of their address. To the claimant, none of the legal bases relied on by the defendants support their submission. That the issue to be resolved is whether the advent of the frontloading system has changed the time-honoured legal determinants of a cause of action by including an additional requirement that claimant must furnish necessary documents in order to established cause of action. That in answering this issue in the affirmative, the defendant relied on the dictum of Justice Rhodes-Vivour, JSC in Cameroon Airlines v. Mr. Mike E. Otutuizu [2011] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1238) 512 at 544G. To the claimant, this dictum does not apply to or state the necessity of frontloading documents to show cause of action. The dictum concerns the weight to be attached to facts contained in pleadings in the absence of supporting documents. Hence, the dictum says that such facts are worthless in value. The claimant went on that a critical examination of Order 3 Rule 4 of the National Industrial Court Rules that the defendants additionally relied on in paragraph 4.5 of his address rather supports the claimant’s argument. The said provision is to the effect that the complaint shall be accompanied by a statement of facts establishing a cause of action; copies of every document to be relied on at the trial; and list of witnesses to be called. That the requirement of a statement of facts establishing a cause of action shows that in recognition of the time-honoured principle that in order to determine a claimant’s cause of action, the Court examines only the statement of facts in his claim. That the drafters of this provision merely provided that all the claimant needs to establish the cause of action is “A statement of facts establishing the cause of action”. The claimant then submitted that these statements of facts are already contained in the claimants’ compliant in this case. That the emphasis regarding the requirement of copies of every document to be relied on at the trial clearly shows that documents are to be gone into only at the trial and not at this preliminary stage. The claimant continued that the defendants in paragraphs 4.6 – 4.10 of their address submitted that failure of the claimant to frontload the necessary documents he is to rely on is a flagrant violation of the Rules of Court, and thereby goes to the root of the claimant’s case, relying on Dingyadi & anor v. INEC [2010] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224) 1 and Owners of the M.V. “Arabella” v. Nigeria Agricultural Insurance Corporation [2008] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1097) 182 which both decided that Rules of Court must be obeyed. To the claimant, these judicial authorities are off the tangent of the facts of this case and the Rule of this Court reproduced above, the reasons being – a. The citing of the cases is based on the defendants’ assumption that the claimant did not file any document as required by the Rules of this Court. However, the true position is that the claimant, in obedience to the said Rules of Court reproduced above, filed copies or documents he is to rely on at the trial. b. Although the defendants submitted in same paragraph 4.10 that the claimant failed to file the “necessary documents” he is to rely on, it is clear from Order 3 Rule 4(ii) that it is left for the claimant to determine which document he is to rely on in his complaint. It does not lie in the mouth of the defendants to determine which documents are necessary for the claimant to pursue his case. That Court is also disabled from directing the claimant on which document he is to frontload. The claimant went on that most germane is the recent Court judgment which held that notwithstanding the frontloading system, the law on the determinants of a cause of action has not changed, as it is determined by statements of fact in the writ of summons and the statement of claim, and not by documents attached to the statement of claim, referring to Buhari & ors v. Haddy Smart Nigeria Ltd & anor [2009] LPELR CA/A/116/M/08. That the Court further held that documents are attached to claimant’s originating process to merely fulfil the requirement of Court Rules that require that documents be attached. The claimant then submitted that what the Court means is that the frontloading process is only meant to speed up trial by allowing parties to make quick decisions after having information on what to expect from each other, rather than for the purpose of determining cause of action. The claimant concluded by urging the Court to dismiss as being of no moment the defendants’ argument, including paragraphs 4.13, 4.14 and 4.16 where the defendants made an insignificant exposition about the claimant’s failure to attach necessary documents to support his claim. That his prayer is based on his argument which has shown that the frontloading system does not require that the claimant frontload documents for the purpose of establishing that he has a cause of action. I heard learned counsel and considered all the processes filed in this case. In considering the merit of the matter at hand, I need to remark on a thing or two. The claimant framed his issue 3) as whether shutting out the claimant from the Court at this stage will not amount to a violation of his fundamental right to fair hearing as guaranteed under the 1999 Constitution. The Court did not raise that issue for the address it asked. I know of no authority that says that where a suit is incompetent for not disclosing a reasonable cause of action, the fundamental right to fair hearing is thereby infringed. In any event, fair hearing is not a talisman for recovery. Fair hearing means opportunity; and that is what the claimant has to convince this Court that his case is competent and discloses a reasonable cause of action. The requirement of a claimant having to have a reasonable cause of action before he can come to Court is just so that the time of the Court is not wasted. A claimant who comes to Court must from his originating processes convince the Court that there is a reasonable cause of action regarding his case. The facts necessary to sustain his case must disclose a reasonable cause of action; otherwise, his case is liable to be struck out. In this era of frontloading, a claimant cannot come to Court hoping that he will scoop for evidence in the process of trial (almost like a trial and error thing) and expects that the Court will sit aloof and watch him play the games that will unearth the facts needed to establish his case. The argument of the claimant is that his averments are to the effect that he is a member of the union; that he has interest in ensuring that the union he belongs to is governed by the constitution of the union; that as a member, there is privity of contract between him and the union and its members and that he has an inherent right to enforce the constitution of the union. The problem is that given the requirement of frontloading today, there is nothing in the case file connecting him with or indicating that he is actually a member of the 2nd defendant union. Once the claimant cannot show any nexus with the 2nd defendant union, what then is his interest, locus standi, to come to Court? In paragraph 2 of the statement of facts, the claimant described the 1st defendant as the President General of the 2nd defendant. Again, there is nothing in the case file to show any nexus between the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant, or to show that the 1st defendant is the President General of the 2nd defendant. What thereby makes the case competent? Even when the claimant referred to Abubakar v. Bebeji Oil and Products Ltd [2007] SC 48, where the Supreme Court held that “it is a cardinal principle of law that to ascertain a cause of action, the immediate materials a court should look at are the writ of summons and the averments in the statement of claim, for it is by examining them that a Court can satisfy itself on the actual grouse of a party and the remedy or relief it is seeking from the Court”, the claimant must understand that the case did not factor in the requirement of frontloading, a requirement today that seeks to ease and speed up trial. The practice then was that only the writ of summons and statement of claim constituted the originating processes. Today, originating processes are composed of the complaint, statement of facts/claim, list of witnesses, witness statement(s) on oath, list of documents to be relied upon at the trial and copies of the documents. See, for instance, Order 3 Rule 4 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007. It is from the totality of these documents that a Court must today determine whether a claimant had a reasonable cause of action. If from the totality of these documents a claimant still has not made out his case, then the claimant has no business coming to Court. In reaction, the claimant referred the Court to what he termed as most germane and recent Court judgment in Buhari & ors v. Haddy Smart Nigeria Ltd & anor [2009] LPELR CA/A/116/M/08, which held that notwithstanding the frontloading system, the law on the determinants of a cause of action has not changed, as it is determined by statements of fact in the writ of summons and the statement of claim, and not by documents attached to the statement of claim. That the Court further held that documents are attached to claimant’s originating process to merely fulfil the requirement of Court Rules that require that documents be attached. The claimant then quoted the Court, per His Lordship Lokulo-Sodipo, JCA at 32 – 33 F – B as follows – The rationale of frontloading of witness statements and documents pleaded by a Plaintiff, or which the Plaintiff relies upon in proof of his case, is designed to expedite trial by giving the defendants the overview of the case he has to contend with and to provoke an informed decision as to whether it is prudent to contest the case. Conversely, the same applies to the Plaintiff, as the Plaintiff, having had the benefit of the overview of the defendant’s case, from the witness statements and documents exhibited by the defendant, would be able to make an informed decision as to whether or not the case as instituted is worth pursuing (emphasis is the claimant’s). I do not see how much of assistance this case is to the claimant. Given the specialized nature of this Court and its jurisdictional mandate, the claimant does not just have a case if he does not show (not verbally) that he is a member of the trade union in question, that the 1st defendant parades himself as President General and Nted International Limited is a company in the maritime sector as to bring its workers within the jurisdictional scope of the 2nd defendant thus grounding the instant action. All these are minimum prerequisites to founding the cause of action as brought to this Court by the claimant. There is nothing (even in terms of the pleadings) showing that these facts are capable of documentary proof if the case goes to trial. This is because, the same issue of frontloading that the claimant makes light of, warrants a measure of foreclosure (given the limited right of consequential amendments, without overreaching the opposing party, that may be permissible) during trial. Yes, the frontloading requirement is meant to expedite trial; but how would that expeditious trial be if, as argued by the defendants, booby traps are laid by a claimant in the manner done in the instant case? The claimant is not saying that the documents necessary to establish the nexus of the claimant and the 1st defendant as to the issue before the Court exist; all he is saying is that allow us to go to trial. Is it when trial commences that the claimant will begin to scoop for the documents? In terms of these documents needed to show the nexus talked of, there is even no pleading in their regard. The list of documents frontloaded by the claimant contains only two sets of documents; and the second document, the certified true copy of the consent of the 1st defendant to act as Director of Nted International Ltd, does not even disclose the name of the 1st defendant on it. So how is the claimant intending to bring the documents in or show their nexus to the case at hand? The claimant said that the defendants may not even deny his pleadings. Is this not speculative, a trial by speculation? The claimant contended that the question should be whether he has pleaded all necessary facts, not whether he has attached all necessary documents. The claimant seems not to appreciate that this is a specialised Court dealing with a specialised subject matter (labour, employment, trade unions and trade unionism, et al), where you cannot divorce the statement of facts and the accompanying documents. A statement in the statement of facts that one is a member of a trade union or one is the President General of the union as in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the statement of facts are not issues that can be established by oral testimony. Only documentary evidence suffices, which is lacking in the instant case. The same is the case regarding paragraph 6 where it is stated that the 1st defendant is majority shareholder, Director and in managerial cadre of a company known as Nted International Ltd with no documents frontloaded to show that. Can shareholding in a company be proved by parol or oral evidence? Even the three letters of consent (wherein consent as Director was given in each) frontloaded as part of the originating processes merely have signatures but not the identity of those giving the consent. Paragraph 6 describes Nted International Ltd as the company through which the 1st defendant claims membership of the 2nd defendant. The 2nd defendant’s jurisdictional scope is statutorily provided for under item 3 of Part B of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act Cap. T14a 2004 and covers all workers in the Nigerian Ports Authority and all persons employed in the manning of ocean going, inland waterways, coastal and harbour vessels or crafts afloat. Also covered are all dock-workers including workers engaged by shipping, clearing and forwarding agencies, but excluding managerial, professional and administrative staff. Once again, there is nothing in the case file indicating the line of business of the company called Nted International Ltd so as to determine whether it prima facie falls within the jurisdictional scope of the 2nd defendant union as to create the cause of action needed to sustain the instant case. The memorandum of association of Nted International Ltd is not even frontloaded in order to determine at least from the object clause whether what it is set out to do falls within the maritime industry as to raise a reasonable cause of action for purposes of the instant suit. The claimant relied on Order 3 Rule 4 of the National Industrial Court Rules, which is to the effect that the complaint shall be accompanied by a statement of facts establishing a cause of action, copies of every document to be relied on at the trial, and list of witnesses to be called. The argument of the claimant is that the requirement of a statement of facts establishing a cause of action shows that in order to determine a claimant’s cause of action, the Court examines only the statement of facts in his claim. That the drafters of this provision merely provided that all the claimant needs to establish the cause of action is “a statement of facts establishing the cause of action”. The claimant then submitted that these statements of facts are already contained in the claimants’ compliant in this case. That the emphasis regarding the requirement of copies of every document to be relied on at the trial clearly shows that documents are to be gone into only at the trial and not at this preliminary stage. In truth Order 3 Rule 4 talks of cause of action. Bt definition, the cause of action is said to announce a conclusion of law i.e. that the known facts meet the requirements of a particular, recognized legal basis for obtaining relief from a Court. Cause of action is accordingly the aggregate of facts giving rise to or upon which an enforceable claim is anchored. It is the fact(s) that establish or give rise to a right of action. Cause of action, therefore, consists of all those things necessary to give a right of action. The things so necessary must have happened and so includes every material thereof that entitles the plaintiff to succeed that the defendant has the right to traverse. See ‘lai Oshitokunbo Oshisanya’s An Almanac of Contemporary Judicial Restatements – With Commentaries – The Basebook, Vol. ia, Administration of Justice and Evidence (Spectrum Books Limited: Ibadan), 2008 at page 3 paragraphs 10 – 13. The point regarding the instant case is that the fact of the claimant being a member of the 2nd defendant trade union, the 1st defendant being the President General of the 2nd defendant and Nted International Limited being a company in the maritime sector as to bring its workers within the jurisdictional scope of the 2nd defendant, are all prerequisites in determining the cause of action that grounds the instant action. The issue here is not the weakness of the claimant’s case or its unlikelihood to succeed (see AG, Federation v. AG of Abia State & 35 ors [2001] FWLR (Pt. 64) 202 SC at 254), but the fact that there is no case at all once these prerequisites are missing. In all, I find and hold that the claimant’s case discloses no reasonable cause of action and so is incompetent as filed. The case is accordingly struck out. Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip