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The claimant by a general form of complaint dated and filed on 21st September, 2012 claims as follows: 1. An order Declaring the letter of Dismissal from employment addresses to the claimant dated June 15, 2001 as illegal, malafide, ill conceived, null and void. 2. An order Directing the defendant to reinstate the claimant back to work forthwith. 3. An order Directing the defendant to pay the claimant the sum of N16,593,884.08 being his benefits, allowances and entitlements from the period of June 2001 to 31st May, 2012 (a period of 11 years). 4. Interest on the said sum of N16,593,884.08 at the rate of 21% per annum from the 1st day of June 2012 until Judgment and thereafter at the same rate of 21% until final liquidation of the total Judgment debt and cost. 5. An order Directing the defendant to pay to the claimant in accordance with his benefits, allowances and entitlements from the 1st June 2001 until he is fully reinstated back to work. 6. General damages in the sum of Ten Million Naira only (N10,000,000.00) for loss in career and health suffered by the claimant as a result of the defendant’s act. 7. Cost of this action. The complaint is accompanied by a statement of facts, list of witnesses, list of exhibits to be relied upon and witness’ statement on oath. The claimant also front loaded exhibits to be relied upon. In reaction, the defendant by the order of this court filed a memorandum of conditional appearance and thereafter filed a motion on notice urging the court to dismiss this suit. The said motion on notice is dated 3rd December, 2012 and filed on the same date. The said motion is brought pursuant to Order 11 Rule 1 (1) of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007 and Section 7 (1) (A) of the Limitation Act, Cap 522 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 and under the Inherent Jurisdiction of this court. The motion prays for the following orders: (1) An order of this court striking out and or dismissing this suit for want of jurisdiction. (2) An order of this court dismissing this suit on the ground that the suit is caught by the statute of limitation. (3) And for such order or further orders this court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The grounds upon which this application is based are as follows: 1. The claimant’s suit challenges the determination of contract of employment between the claimant and Eko International Bank Plc via Letter of Dismissal from employment dated 15th June, 2001. 2. The cause of action in this matter occurred on 15th June, 2001 when the claimant’s contract of employment with Eko International Bank Plc was determined via letter of Dismissal from employment dated 15th June, 2001. 3. By the provisions of Section 7 (1) (a) of the Limitation Act, Cap 522, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, the limitation period for instituting actions in contract is 6 years next after the accrual of the cause of action. 4. The instant suit was instituted by the claimant on 21st September, 2012 long after the expiration of the prescribed limitation period. 5. The court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit having regard to the true and proper meaning and intendment of Section 7 (1) (a) of the Limitation Act, Cap 522, Law of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. 6. This suit is statute barred against the defendant and the court has no jurisdiction to entertain same. 7. The present suit is incompetent and therefore ought to be dismissed. 8. The court has no jurisdiction in all circumstances to entertain the suit. The motion on notice was supported by an affidavit and a written address also dated and filed on 3rd December, 2012. The defendant raised the following issues for determination: (1) Whether this suit is statute barred in view of the provisions of Section 7 (1) (a) of the Limitation Act, Cap. 522, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. (2) Whether having regard to provisions of Sections 7 (1) (a) of the Limitation Act, Cap 522, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, the claimant has any enforceable right of action against the defendant. (3) Whether the claimant has the requisite locus standi to institute and or maintain this suit against the defendant. (4) Whether this court has the jurisdiction to entertain this suit as constituted. Arguing issue one, the defendant’s counsel submitted that this suit is statute barred against the claimant in the light of the provisions of Section 7 (1) (a) of the Limitation Act, Cap 522, Laws of the Federation 2004. That a careful examination of the complaint and statement of facts filed in this suit, shows that the claimant is by this suit challenging the determination of his employment by Eko International Bank Plc via a letter of dismissal from employment dated 15th June, 2001. That from the foregoing, the alleged act or default of the defendant which is the subject matter of this suit occurred on 15th June, 2001 and urged the court to so hold. Learned Counsel also submitted that it is a settled principle of law that time begins to run against a person in whose favour any cause of action has arisen from the date the said cause of action arose, citing the case of Grains Production Agency v. Charles Ezegbulem [1999] 1 NWLR (pt. 587) at 408 paras. B to the effect that time begins to run against the person in whose favour the cause of action has arisen. That Section 7 (1) (a) of the Limitation Act provides as follows: 7 (1) The following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued – (a) actions founded on simple contract. The defendant’s counsel then submitted that the contract of employment between the claimant herein and Eko International Bank falls within the contemplation of the provisions of Section 7 of the Limitation Act as the said contract of employment is governed by the general laws of contract and is a simple contract citing UBA Ltd v. Michael O. Abimbola & Co [1995] 9 NWLR (pt. 419) 317 at 384 and Nwobosi v. ACB Ltd [1995] 6 NWLR (pt. 404) 658 at 683. That the claimant’s cause of action arose on 15th June, 2001 and that time began to run against the claimant from the said date and that as 21st September, 2012 a period of over 11 years after the cause of action arose, referring to Muhammed v. Military Admin. Plateau State [2001] 16 NWLR (pt. 740) at 545 para. F. Counsel referred and reproduced paragraph 56 of the statement of facts to show when the cause of action arose and when this suit was commenced as well as the claimant’s letter of dismissal dated 15th June, 2001 which gave rise to this cause of action. That this suit is statute barred and so unenforceable against the defendant. That as such the proper order this court is to make is that of dismissal of this action referred to Ebioye v. NNPC [1994] 5 NWLR (pt. 347) 649 at 666, NPA Plc v. Lotus Plastics Limited [2005] 19 NWLR (pt. 959) 158 at 189 and urged this court to dismiss the claimant’s action on the grounds that the action is statute barred. Issues two and three were argued together by the defendant’s counsel. The defendant’s counsel on these issues argued that the claimant has lost his right of action against the defendant having failed to institute this suit within the period stipulated by Section 7 (1) (a) of the Limitation Act, LFN 2004. That it is trite that where a suit is statute barred, a litigant who might having a cause of action loses the right to enforce the said cause of action by judicial process because the period of time laid down by the limitation law for instituting such an action has elapsed. That so failure of the claimant to timeously institute this suit has divested the claimant of any right of action against the defendant, citing Ibrahim v. J.S.C Kaduna State [1998] 14 NWLR (pt. 584) 1 and Tafida v. Abubakar [1992] 3 NWLR (pt. 230) 511 at 520 – 521. To counsel, given that the claimant’s right of action has been extinguished by law on the ground of the action being statute barred, the claimant lack the requisite locus standi or legal capacity to institute and or maintain this action against the defendant, citing Disu v. Ajilowura [2006] 14 NWLR (pt. 1000) 783 at 804, paras E – G, B.M. Ltd. v. Woermann-Line [2009] 14 NWLR (pt. 1157) 149 at 179 – 180, 199, Emezi v. Osuagwu [2005] 12 NWLR (pt. 939) 340 at 361, Owodunni v. Regd. Trustees of C.C.C [2000] 10 NWLR (pt. 675) 315. Learned Counsel therefore submitted that the claimant’s suit raises no reasonable cause of action against the defendant and ought to be struck out in its entirety. On issue four, the defendant’s counsel submitted that this court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain this suit having regards to the fact that the action is statute barred therefore this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit. The defendant’s counsel therefore urged the court to dismiss this suit against the defendant. In reaction, the claimant filed a counter affidavit of 19 paragraphs in opposition to the defendant’s motion on notice, along with a written address. Both the counter affidavit and the written address were dated and filed on 19th February, 2013 and by an order of this court deemed to be properly filed and served. In the said written address, the claimant’s counsel raised three issues for determination: (1) Whether going by the circumstances of this case, it can be said that the cause of action accrues from the date the letter dated 15th June, 2001 dismissing the claimant from employment was written. (2) Whether the cause of action in this matter accrues from the date of the letter of dismissal on 15th June, 2001 or from the date of the Judgment of the Honourable court which tried the criminal prosecution of the alleged crime against the claimant dated 7th December, 2007. (3) Whether the matter is indeed statute barred. Arguing issue one and two together, the claimant’s counsel in the case of Adekoya v. FHA [2008] 28 WRN p. 1, the Supreme Court explained the cause of action and distinguished it from a right of action. That a cause of action is the fact or facts which establish or give rise to a right of action, it is a factual situation which gives a person a right to judicial relief. That at the time the claimant was dismissed, there was already an ongoing issue, which is an allegation or theft hanging on him being driven and instigated by the defendant who on the other hand was dismissed his employment. And so the factual situation that will give rise to the cause of action is yet to be completed, so the claimant will have no right of action until the criminal charge hanging on him before a court of competent jurisdiction is discharged. Learned Counsel submitted that in this case the right of action is yet to be factual because of the ongoing criminal matter on the claimant before a court of competent jurisdiction. Learned Counsel referred the court to Oyetoki v. NIPOST [2008] 22 WRN p. 93 at 97, Institute of Health Ahmadu Bello University Hospital Management Board v. Mrs. Jummai R.I. Anyip [2005] 5 MJSC pt. 1 p. 1. To counsel, the claimant had averred in the statement of facts that the defendant dismissed him from employment based on the letter dated June 15, 2001 which dismissal was based on the reports from inspectorate division and the disciplinary committee set up by the defendant to look into the loss of foreign currency in international services department. That at the time of the letter of dismissal from employment was handed over to the claimant, a criminal matter had already been commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction which was instigated by the defendant for the matter to be prosecuted by the Police against the claimant and two others. Learned Counsel cited the case of Sofekun v. Akinyemi [1981] 1 NCLR 121 which held that once a person is accused of a criminal offence, he must be tried in a court of law where the complaints of his accusers can be ventilated in public where he would be sure of getting a fair trial. That it is necessary for a prior judicial determination before further disciplinary action could be meted out on a person accused of commission of a criminal offence to be heard. The claimant’s counsel submitted that owing to the decisions of the courts cited above, the report of the disciplinary committee set up by the defendant bank to investigate the allegation of crime committed by the claimant and 2 others was concluded to be null and void and the dismissal was wrongful more so that the defendant submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction when the matter was even pending before the court and decided to hand over to him the dismissal letter. To counsel, by the submission of the defendant to a court of competent jurisdiction to try the claimant in a situation that there was an allegation of crime, the cause of action will not arise until after the determination of the criminal case instituted by the defendant to determine the crime, citing Uzondu v. UBN Plc [2009] 3 WRN p. 97 at 103. That the cause of action in this case was based on the wrongful dismissal of the claimant from employment but was vindicated by the court of competent jurisdiction in the judgment dated 7th December 2007 where the claimant was discharged and acquitted. Therefore to counsel this cause of action arose from the 7th December 2007 when the said judgment of the High Court which discharged the claimant was delivered. To counsel, the criminal charge on the claimant is a continuance of damage with regard to his employment. That if the claimant had gone to court earlier than the date of judgment would have meant heading to court with speculative materials which will be difficult to establish and damages will be unascertainable. Learned Counsel also submitted that in Jallico Ltd v. Owoniboys Technical Services Ltd [1995] 4 NWLR pt 391, 534 at 554 it was held that for the purpose of limitation of action, the cause of action would be deemed to have arisen or accrued when all the material facts which if proved would entitle the claimant to succeed in his claim against the defendant all complete. The claimant therefore urged the court to hold that the cause of action in case arose on the 7th December, 2007. On issue three, the claimant’s counsel submitted that the matter is not statute barred and the claimant has locus standi to prove the case. The time in this matter began to run from the date of the judgment of the court which trial the defendant fully participated and urged this court to so hold that the cause of action in this case arose from 7th December, 2007. The claimant therefore urged this court to dismiss the objection of the defendant with substantial costs against it. Replying on points of law, the defendant’s counsel submitted that contrary to the argument of the claimant’s counsel that the claimant was acquitted in a criminal trial for stealing and conspiracy on 7th December, 2007 and so the cause of action arose on that day, the defendant’s counsel countered that the basis of the dismissal of the claimant from the employment of the defendant was not criminal. That the claimant’s letter of dismissal dated 15th June, 2001 was based on serious breach of procedure and negligence in the discharge of his duties, whereas the claimant was being prosecuted for stealing and conspiracy at the High Court. To counsel the dismissal of the claimant had nothing to do with the subject matter of the charges against him in the High Court as the claimant was not dismissed based on criminal allegation of stealing and conspiracy. Learned Counsel also responded that whilst it if established that during the pendency of criminal proceedings an employer cannot take steps to make pronouncement of guilt upon an employee in respect of a crime an employer is not precluded from taking disciplinary steps of a civil nature to sanitize its work environment, citing the cases of Eze v. Spring Bank Plc [2011] 18 NWLR 113 at 130 – 131 and Uni-Agric Makurdi v. Grace Jack [2000] 11 NWLR (pt. 679) at 678. That the claimant was never precluded by the criminal trial from seeking redress in respect of the termination of his appointment by the defendant, particularly when his employment was not terminated over the issue of conspiracy and or stealing over which the claimant was standing criminal trial before the Lagos State High Court, citing Alao v. NIAB [1999] 9 NWLR (pt. 617) 103 at 110 – 111. Based on the above authority the defendant submitted that the claimant was not barred by the criminal proceedings before the High Court from seeking civil remedies/redress in court over his dismissal, particularly when the dismissal was expressly stated to be founded upon breach of procedures and negligence in the discharge of duties which issues were not before the court in the said criminal case. Also that the authorities relied upon by the claimant relate to employments with statutory flavor which is clearly distinct from the claimant’s employment which is purely a master and servant. The defendant urged the court to dismiss the claimant’s suit as being statute-barred as same having not been filed within the period of 6 years next after the dismissal of the claimant by the defendant. After a careful consideration of the submission of the parties, the processes filed, in my humble view the sole issue for determination is: Whether this case is statute barred. The defendant had argued that the claimant’s action is statute barred and so unenforceable against the defendant as the cause of action arose on June 15, 2001. That the claimant has filed this on 21 September 2012 as such this suit contravened the provisions of Section 7 (1) (a) of the Limitation Act LFN 2004 which provides for six years for actions regarding simple contracts. The claimant’s counsel on the other hand argued that this matter is not statute barred because the cause of action did not arise until 7th December, 2007 when the claimant was discharged and acquitted by a Lagos High Court on a criminal charge against the claimant of stealing and conspiracy. To the claimant’s counsel, the cause of action here will only begin to run on the date of the judgment since according to counsel the criminal action as well as a civil action such as this cannot run concurrently. The defendant in reply on points of law submitted to the contrary urging this court to hold this action statute barred. It is trite law that the period of limitation in an action is determinable by looking at the Writ of Summons or General Form of Complaint as the case may be and the statement of claim or facts which allege the wrong and when it occurred. This is what the court needs to look at to determine whether or not such a suit or action is statute barred. See Amusa v. Obideji [2005] 14 NWLR (pt. 945) 322, Union Bank v. Umeoduaga [2004] 7 SCM 201, Shell B.P Ltd & Ors v. Osasanya [1976] 6 SC 89 and Yakubu v. NITEL Ltd [2006] 9 NWLR (pt. 985) 367 at 398. Where a statute prescribes a period for instituting an action, proceedings cannot be instituted after the prescribed period. The period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the cause of action accrued. See Egbe v. Adefarasin [1985] 1 NWLR (pt. 3) 549, Sanda v. Kukawa Local Govt. [1991] 2 NWLR (pt. 174) 379 and Alao v. NIDB [1999] 9 NWLR (pt. 617) 103. In the instant case both parties are in agreement that the claimant was dismissed from the employment of the defendant on 15 June, 2001. The only point of disagreement is that the claimant’s position is that the cause of action accrued not on 15th June, 2001 when he was dismissed but rather on 7th December, 2007 when Judgment was delivered by the Lagos High Court discharging him of the criminal charge of stealing and conspiracy. Section 8 (1) (a) of the Limitation Law, LFN 2004 applicable to the instant case dictates that no action shall be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date in which the cause of action accrued. If admits of no argument that a writ or complaint taken out after efflux ion of time allowed by law. The claimant had argued that because he was standing trial in a criminal charge of stealing and conspiracy at the Lagos High Court he could not sue until the conclusion of the said criminal trial which he was acquitted. He cited the case of Smith v. Selwyn to support this submission. The principles in Smith v. Selwyn is simply as follows:- “An action for damages based on a felonious act on the part of the defendant committed against the plaintiff is not maintainable so long as the defendant has not been prosecuted or a reasonable excuse shown for his not having been prosecuted, and the proper course for the court to adopt in such a case is to stay further proceedings in the action until the defendant has been prosecuted” per Kennedy L.J. On the above principles, Nzeako, JCA (as she then was) held in Alao v. NIDB (supra) that the application of the said rule is limited if ever it applies as follows:- “1. Its application is available only to stay of proceedings in the civil matter brought against the person who did the criminal act until the determination of the criminal case. 2. The rule applies where the plaintiff is the injured party who in a civil case is claiming against a defendant who caused the injury amounting to felony. 3. The claim must be one based on the act which amounts to a felony. 4. It is not the rule that a plaintiff who is charged with causing injury which is felonious to a defendant cannot commence a civil claim against the defendant.” In the case at hand it is my humble view that the claim of the claimant does not arise from any felonious act committed by the defendant bank and the claimant’s case does not have any link with felony. Therefore even if the Rule in Smith v. Selwyn apply that it cannot by any stretch apply to the claimant’s case herein. It is therefore pretty clear that from the analysis of the above authority, the fact that the claimant was subject to criminal trial at the Lagos State High Court will not avail the claimant in calculating the period of limitation allowed by law. That is to say the fact of the claimant’s trial will not act as an exception to the limitation rule. The limitation period of six years is still applicable in the instant case. In this wise, the claimant in this case having sued more than six years after the cause of action arose in 2001 is clearly statute barred. I equally agree with the submission of the defendant’s counsel that the claimant was dismissed for serious breach of procedure and negligence in the discharge of his duties while he along with others were charged for stealing and conspiracy which is a criminal allegation different from the reasons adduced in the claimant’s dismissal letter. I therefore hold that the issues are clearly not the same. On the whole I find and hold that the claimant’s action is statute barred having been instituted after six years of the accrual of the cause of action. This suit is therefore dismissed. I make no order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. …………………………………… Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu Fishim Presiding Judge