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By their Amended Statement of Facts dated 20th March, 2012 and filed on 2nd April, 2012 the claimants seek the following reliefs: a. A declaration that the termination of the claimants appointment midway into their tenure of 4 years is illegal, null and void and a breach of contract. b. An order of court directing the defendants to pay the claimants the 2 years salary and allowance for the unexhausted period of their contract as damages for unlawful termination of the contract of employment. c. An order of court directing the defendants to pay to each claimants all their unpaid salary arrears, sitting allowance, transportation allowance and other fringe benefits and outstanding claims and allowances which are due to the claimants from the month of April, 2004 to October, 2005 when the claimants appointment was terminated. d. An order of court directing the defendants to pay to the claimants three months salary in lieu of notice. e. An order of the court directing the defendants to pay to the claimants all their severance packages, arrears of monetization and repatriation allowance in line with Federal Government Standards. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants filed Amended Statement of Defence dated 20th March, 2012 and 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ Witness Statement on Oath dated 16th May, 2012. The Claimants’ case is that they were at all material time were nominees of the Nigeria Labour Congress to the Industrial Arbitration Panel and are therefore members of the panel between the years 2003 to 2005. The claimants stated that some time in the year 2003 they were nominated by the Nigeria Labour Congress to serve as members of the Industrial Arbitration Panel. That the nomination was accepted by the Minister of Labour and Productivity and were subsequently appointed as members of the Industrial Arbitration Panel by the 2nd defendant and started sitting immediately. That the Minister of Labour and Productivity appointed the claimants for a four year tenure with an option for renewal. That the claimants were thereafter given a letter indicating that the contract of employment of the claimant was for a 4 year certain. That as members of the Industrial Arbitration Panel, they were placed on the same salary as officers on grade level 17 of the Federal Civil Service. That they were being paid salary and other fringe benefits as enjoyed by officers in grade 17 of the Federal Civil Service. The claimants stated that regular salaries was paid to them up to the month of April, 2004 but the monetization benefit for the year 2003 to 2005 was not paid despite the series of promises made by the 2nd and 3rd defendants. The claimants pleaded that in May 2004, the 2nd and 3rd defendants, surprisingly stopped the regular payment of their salaries and for 18 months before their appointment was unceremoniously terminated their salaries and other emolument was not paid despite their repeated demand for the payment of their salaries and other fringe benefits. That in October 2005 rather than ensure the payment of their 18 months’ salary arrears and other fringe benefits to which the claimants were entitled, the claimants were given the shock of their lives with the immediate dissolution of the Industrial Arbitration Panel and the subsequent termination of the claimants’ appointment. The claimants averred that the termination by the defendants before the completion of the contract was in breach of the term of their Contract of Employment with the claimant. The claimants stated that no notice of the subsequent termination of their appointment was served on them before their appointment was terminated unlawfully. The claimants further stated that they are entitled to three months salary in lieu of notice. The claimants pleaded that they were not paid the three months salaries in lieu of notice neither were they paid any severance package in line with Federal Government standard and conditions of service. The claimants averred that 2 years after their appointment was unlawfully terminated the defendants are yet to pay their 18 months’ salary arrears, monetization benefits of 2003 to 2005, three months’ salary in lieu of notice, severance package and other fringe benefits despite repeated demands. That the defendants are in breach of contract. The Claimants thereafter repeated their reliefs. In defence the 1st defendant denied paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 respectively of the claimants’ statement of facts. The 1st defendant admitted paragraph 2 and 3 of the claimants’ statement of facts. He denied paragraph 4 of the statement of facts and states that it was not to his knowledge that the claimants were nominated in the year 2003 by one Nigeria Labour Congress to serve as members of the Industrial Arbitration Panel. The 1st defendant denied paragraph 5 of the statement of facts and stated that it was not to his knowledge that the said nomination of the claimants as members of the said Industrial Arbitration Panel was duly accepted by the 2nd defendant. He denied paragraph 6 and 7 respectively of the statement of facts and stated that it was not to his knowledge that the 2nd defendant appointed the claimants as members of the said Industrial Arbitration Panel for a four year term with an option for renewal nor any form of letter/document whatsoever indicating that the said contract of the claimants will run for four years. He denied paragraphs 8 and 9 respectively of the statement of facts and stated that it was not to his knowledge that the claimants were placed on the same salary or other fringe benefits as officers on grade level 17 of the Federal Civil Service. He also denied paragraph 10 of the statement of facts and stated that the 1st defendant was not aware of any regular salaries paid to the claimants up to the said month of April 2004 or the monetization benefit for the year 2003 to 2005 owed to the claimants nor any promise(s) on the part of 2nd and 3rd defendants. The 1st defendant denied paragraph 11 of the statement of facts and stated that it was not within his knowledge that sometimes in May 2004, the 2nd and 3rd defendants stopped any payment of the claimants’ salaries or refused/failed and neglected to pay the claimants other emoluments for 18 months which they are entitled to before the said appointment was terminated by the 2nd and 3rd defendants. The 1st defendant denied paragraph 12 and 13 respectively of the statement of facts to the extent that the Industrial Arbitration Panel was duly dissolved but not aware of any subsequent termination of the claimants’ appointment as members of the Industrial Arbitration Panel nor any breach of contract of employment. The 1st defendant denied paragraph 14, 15, 16 and 17 respectively of the statement of facts and states that the claimants are not entitled to any 18 month salary arrears, monetization benefits of 2003 to 2005 and there is no master and servant relationship between the claimants and defendants which will entitle the claimants any notice or salary in lieu of notice or any severance package in line with Federal Government standard and conditions of service as claimed by the claimants. The 1st defendant denied paragraph 18 of the said statement of facts and stated that there was no existence of contract of employment between the claimants the defendants. He urged the court to dismiss the claimants’ claim as there was no substantial cause of action in this suit as same is vexatious, gold digging and abuse of the process of the court. On their part, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants admitted paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of the statement of facts only to the extent that the claimants were nominees of the Nigerian Labour Congress to represent it at the Industrial Arbitration Panel, and the 2nd claimant was appointed by the 2nd defendant as a member of the Industrial Arbitration Panel sometime in March 2004. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants also admitted paragraphs 2 and 3 of the statement of facts. In response to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the statement of facts, the defendants stated that the letter of appointment of 2nd defendant showed that his appointment as a member of the Industrial Arbitration Panel by the 2nd defendant was made in accordance with the Trade Disputes Act Cap 228 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. The appointment in issue had an option for renewal subject to satisfactory performance in office, and provided a member was within the statutory age of 65 years. They denied paragraphs 8 and 9 of the statement of facts and pleaded that the claimants were neither appointed nor treated as Civil Servants on Grade level 17, rather the 2nd claimant was a political appointee paid under the Harmonized Salary Structure for top federal public office holders. That the defendants will rely on the Circular dated 15th May, 2000 at trial. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants denied paragraph 10 of the statement of fact as the 2nd defendant and the other members of the Industrial Arbitration Panel were paid their regular salaries, allowances and other entitlements until the dissolution of the Panel sometime in October 2005. That payment of their salaries stopped after October 2005. They rely on the Government Payroll and a letter dated 3rd October 2006. In further response to paragraph 10, the defendants stated that the claimants were not entitled to be paid monetization benefits. That for the period the 2nd claimant was a member of the Industrial Arbitration Panel, he enjoyed the fringe benefits of government cars, furnished and refurbishment of residential quarters, government drivers e.t.c. The defendants averred that the present claim for monetization benefits by the 2nd claimant is a gold-digging exercise to enjoy both the fringe benefits of his office and the monetization benefits contrary to government policy. They also denied paragraph 11 of the statement of facts. The defendants pleaded that they at no time stopped the payment of the salaries and emoluments of the 2nd claimant and/or any other member of the Industrial Arbitration Panel until after the dissolution of the Panel. In response to paragraph 12 of the statement of facts, the defendants averred that the 2nd claimant and other members of the Industrial Arbitration Panel ought not to be shocked at the Panel’s dissolution because of their unbecoming, inappropriate and overreaching attitude and meddling that led to their removal from office. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants denied paragraph 13 of the statement of facts and stated that the defendants did not breach any term in the supposed contract of employment but acted in accordance with the Trade Disputes Act. They pleaded that Section 9 of the Trade Disputes Act provides for the removal of the chairman, vice-chairman and any other member of the Panel. That the dissolution of the Industrial Arbitration Panel and the removal from office of its members neither requires prior notice nor 3 months’ salary in lieu of notice. That the defendants do not owe the 2nd claimant or any other former member of the Industrial Arbitration Panel 18 months’ salary arrears, monetization benefits of 2003 to 2005, three months’ salary in lieu of notice, severance package, or any other fringe benefit howsoever called. The defendants urged the court to refuse the entire reliefs sought by the claimants and dismiss the suit for being frivolous, vexatious and lacking in merit. On 22nd June, 2012 Claimants’ Counsel in this suit applied to argue this matter on the records without calling witnesses and the Defendants’ Counsel did not oppose. The claimants’ Counsel in his written address dated and filed on 15th March, 2013raised the following sole issue for determination: “Whether having removed the claimants from office as members of the Industrial Arbitration Panel, without any reason or proven gross misconduct before the expiration of their four year tenure, the claimants are entitled to be paid all their full salary and allowance for the remaining period of their fixed contract of appointment”. Learned Counsel submitted that the claimants having been removed from office as members of the Industrial Arbitration Panel without any reason or proven allegation of gross misconduct are entitled to be paid all their full salary and allowances for the remaining period of their fixed contract of appointment which they would have earned had the contract run its full course. He argued that the claimants were appointed via a letter of appointment dated 15th of March, 2004 for a four year term commencing from the 1st of March, 2004 or the day the claimants assumed office. He referred the Court to paragraph 1 line 8 of the appointment letter dated 15 of March, 2004 states as follows “I have accordingly appointed you for a term of four years with effect from 1st March, 2004 or the date of your assumption”. That the above letter of appointment was written pursuant to Section 10 of the Trade Dispute Act that guarantees the claimants appointment for four year duration. Learned Counsel submitted that the section provides that ‘The Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and any other members of the panel shall unless he previously resign or is removed from office, hold office for a period of four years in the first instance which may be renewable only for one more term of four years’. Continuing, he submitted that contract of service is the bedrock upon which an aggrieved employee must found his case, he succeed or fail upon the terms thereof. Therefore in a written or documented contract of service, the court will not look outside the terms stipulated or agreed thereon in deciding the rights and obligations of the parties. He found reliance on the case of Akinife v. U.B.N Plc [2007] 10 NWLR (pt. 1041) 11, Afribank (Nig) Plc v. Osisanya [2007] 1 NWLR (pt. 642) 592. He argued that by the letter of appointment dated 15th of March, 2004, issued to the claimants which is the foundation of every labour contract the claimants were offered a contract of appointment for a specific duration of a term of four years commencing from the date they assumed office which is the 15th of March, 2004. In other words the claimants’ employment as per the contract of service or appointment is for a fixed period of 4 years. He relied on the case of David Osuagwu v. A.G Anambra State [1993] 4 NWLR (pt. 285) 13 where it was held that a contract of appointment is a temporary and non-pensionable appointment for a post of level to which the appointment is made for a specific periods. He noted that the claimants’ appointment was terminated via a letter dated 13 of October, 2005 after working for only 1 year seven months contrary to the four year term in the letter of appointment. He submitted that the letter of appointment specifically stipulated that the claimants shall hold office for a period of 4 years commencing from the date they assumed their post which in the instant case is 15th of March, 2004 and that by the letter of appointment the claimants were suppose to complete their term on 14th of March, 2008 rather than the 13th of October, 2005 when their appointment was terminated in breach of the contract of appointment as manifested in the letter dated 15th of March, 2004. He added that by refusing to honour the 4 years tenure term in the contract of appointment the defendants are in breach of the contract of appointment as manifested in the letter of appointment dated 15th of March, 2004 and he urged the court to so hold. He also referred the court to the case of College of Education Ekiado v. Osayande [2010] 6 NWLR (pt. 1191) 423, where it was held that where a contract of service is for a fixed term, the employee cannot be removed during the period of the term contracted except for misconduct or where the employee dies. He argued that in the instant case the claimants’ removal was not as a result of any misconduct on their part. That in the letter of dissolution dated 13th of October, 2005, the defendants thanked the claimants for the service rendered to it and there was no allegation of any gross misconduct leveled against the claimants in the letter of dissolution. Learned Counsel submitted that the claimants’ removal from office before the expiration of the 4 years duration stipulated in the contract of appointment as manifested in the letter of 15th of March, 2004 is a clear breach of contract of service entered with the claimants. He further submitted that where a contract of employment is for a specific period and the employee was removed wrongly from office during the term of the contract, then the employee shall be entitled to an award of damages in full amount of salary allowance and other entitlement which the employee would have earned if the contract of service had run its full course. He cited the cases of David Osuagwu v. A.G Anambra State [1993] 4 NWLR (pt. 285) 13. He also referred to the case of College of Education Ekiado v. Osayande [2010] (supra), where it was held that where the contract of employment is determined before the expiration of term agreed, the employer shall be made to pay the employee the full salary he would have earned for the period of his fixed term. That in the case at hand the claimants were only in service from the 15th of March, 2004 to 13th of October, 2005 amounting to 1 (one) year and 7 (seven) months out of the 4 years term in the contract of service before they were removed from office and the unexhausted period of their contract is calculated at 2 years and five months if they were to run full duration of the contract as stipulated in the letter of appointment dated 15th of March, 2004 which should have lapse on the 14th of March, 2008. Learned Counsel therefore urged the court to hold that the claimants having been removed from service before the expiration of their 4 years term stipulated in the letter of appointment dated 15th of March, 2004 are entitled to be paid their full salary and allowances for 2 years and five months which they would ordinary earn if the contract was allowed to run its full course. He further urged the court to resolve the issue in favour of the claimants and direct the defendants to pay the claimants their full salary and allowance for 2 years and five months. The 1st Defendant Counsel raised two issues for determination in this suit as follows: a) Whether a contract of employment subsisted between the parties as to entitle the claimants to any notice, salary in lieu of notice or any severance package in line with Federal Government standards. b) Whether having removed the claimants from office as members of the Industrial Arbitration Panel, without any reason or proven gross misconduct before the expiration of their four year tenure, the claimants are entitled to be paid all their full salary and allowance for the remaining period of their fixed contract of employment. Arguing Issue one, Learned Counsel submitted that in order to address this issue it is expedient to delve into its meaning as provided for in the governing legislation i.e. the Labour Act, Cap 198 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. He referred to the case of SSC Ltd v. Afropak (Nig) Ltd 2008 All FWLR (pt. 426) 1827 at 1838 par. P. He submitted that from the processes filed by the claimants before this court, it is evident that no contract of employment existed. That in spite of the fact that the claimants may have been appointed as members of the Industrial Arbitration Panel of the Federal Government as alleged sequel to paragraphs 5 – 8 of the amendment statement of facts, this however ought not to be construed as making them employees of Federal Government. He added that from the totality of facts averred by the claimants and the documents exhibited to their processes, there is no disclosure of facts therein which relates to any employer/employee relationship; there was no term of employment, physical conditions of work of any person to which the claimants could predicate their claims upon. He argued that the relationship that existed between the Federal Government and the claimants as shown in the letters of appointment issued through the Ministry of Labour and Productivity and signed by one Dr. Timiebi A. Koripamo Agary dated 15th March, 2004 is not one of employer/employee or master/servant as envisaged by the Labour Act, Cap 198 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 or even the Civil Service Rules and he urge the court to so hold. Learned Counsel pointed out that the claimants in their amended statement of facts alleged that the defendants were in breach of the contract of employment which subsisted between both parties as set out in paragraph 13 and as a result claimed they were entitled to notice, three months’ salary in lieu of notice, payment of severance package, emoluments e.t.c. He submitted that the question that arises here is whether it be said that the relationship which subsisted between the parties herein was one which enjoyed statutory or legal flavor or subject to a rule or regulation made pursuant to the Constitution or a statute? He added that the answer to this poser is in the negative as the claimants on whom lay the onus to demonstrate before this court that they were Civil Servants at the time their appointments were terminated have not discharged that burden that they were indeed Civil Servants who were entitled to enjoy the protection of the Civil Service Rules. He relied on the case of Udemah v. Nigeria Coal Corporation [1991] 2 NWLR at 479. He submitted that he who asserts a fact before a court must prove that those facts exist with legally acceptable evidence placing reliance on Section 131 Evidence Act (2011), Oceanic Bank Int’l Ltd v. Udumebraye [2008] All FWLR (pt. 430) 769 – 782 and Seatrucks Nig. Ltd v. Pyne [1999] 12 NWLR (pt. 607) 514 and Oceanic Bank Int’l Ltd v. Udumebraye [2008] All FWLR (pt. 430) 769 at 781 – 782 paras. H – G. Learned Counsel also submitted that since the claimants, in the instant case, have not been able to discharge this onus from the totality of their pleadings, they ought not to be heard to argue that they are entitled to claim the reliefs asked for when there is nothing before your Lordship to substantiate their claims. We are therefore of the humble view that the claimants’ claims ought to fail in the event that they have failed to discharge the burden of proof on them. On issue two, Learned Counsel submitted that the claimants are not entitled to be paid the acclaimed monies, with reference to Section 10 of the Trade Dispute Act, Cap T8, LFN 2004, as regards tenure of office of members of panel which provides clearly that “The Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and any other member of the panel shall, unless he previously resigns or is removed from office, hold office for a period of four years…” He submitted that from the said statute, there is a proviso to being removed from the Panel and no provisions as to reasons for such removal; hence, the claimants cannot on their own, input any reason for removal. He argued that the operational word here “REMOVAL” from office and since the statute relied upon had provisions for removal, the defendants acted within the purview of the Act and are thus justified. He called upon the court to discountenance the authorities relied upon by the claimants as they are only relevant in a master/servant relationship, particularly those savoured with statutory flavor, which is not the position in the instant case. Learned Counsel for the 2nd and 3rd Defendants on his part raised the following issues for determination as follows: i. Whether in view of the claimants’ reliefs bordering on the termination of their appointments and a document in evidence showing the dissolution of the Industrial Arbitration Panel there is a cause of action upon which the court can grant the reliefs sought. ii. Whether the phrases ‘termination of an appointment’ and ‘dissolution of the Industrial Arbitration Panel’ mean the same thing or are co-terminous. Arguing both issues together Learned Counsel submitted that the claimants frontloaded some documents pursuant to Order 3 Rule 4 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 to prove their claim against the defendants. Amongst the documents is a letter allegedly evidencing the termination of the claimants’ appointments by the 2nd defendant dated 13th October, 2005 and titled ‘DISSOLUTION OF THE INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION PANEL’ and authored by one Elder (Mrs.) B.E. Edem for the Hon. Minister of Labour and Productivity. He added that the crucial question that arises is whether the sole declaratory relief sought by the claimants (the foundation upon which the other reliefs rest) pertaining to the subject matter of termination of their appointments is the proper relief which the court can grant in view of the clear evidence that what the 2nd defendant did was the dissolution of the Industrial Arbitration Panel and not the termination of the claimants appointment. He contended that the court should not grant the reliefs sought by the claimants as there is no evidence on record to show that the claimants’ appointments were terminated. He submitted that the claimants can only succeed on the strength of their case and whichever relief they claim must be supported by facts and evidence in proof thereof, citing the case of Saraki v. Kotoye [1990] 6 SCNJ 36 at 62. He submitted that the declaratory relief they are seeking is different from the administrative action the defendants took. That from the 2nd defendant’s letter in evidence it was the Industrial Arbitration Panel that was dissolved, therefore, the dissolution therefore ought to be the subject matter of this suit and not termination of appointment. He further submitted that the ‘termination of the claimants’ appointments’ and the ‘dissolution of the Industrial Arbitration Panel’ do not mean the same thing and are not also co-terminus. That the termination of their appointments may be the effect or fall out of the dissolution but certainly it was not the act carried out by the defendants and as such, a relief claiming the termination of the claimants’ appointments cannot ground a cause of action the basis of which this court can grant the relief sought. He relied on the Supreme Court in NPA v. Lotus Plastics [2006] 134 LRCN 549 at 586 while applying Bellow v. A.G Oyo State [1986] 1 NWLR (pt. 45) 828 at 876 which defined ‘cause of action’ as any act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff a cause of complaint. Learned Counsel urged the court not to grant the claimants reliefs because evidence indicates the contrary. He submitted further that the court cannot also grant them a relief(s) not sought because it is a fundamental principle for the administration of justice in civil cases that the court is limited and circumscribed in what it can grant or the awards it can make to the claim of the plaintiff. He relied on the cases of Kotoye v. CBN 2 [2006] LC 265 at 701, Ekpnyong & Ors. v. Inyang Nyong & Ors [1975] 2 SC 71, 80 , African Continental Seaways Ltd v. Nigerian Dredging Roads & General Works Ltd 1 LC 267 at 281, Veepee Industries Ltd v. Cocoa Industries Ltd [2008] 7 MJSC 125 at 143; Gabriel Ativie v. Kabel Metal Nigeria Ltd [2008] 8 MJSC 82 at 93, 101 and 104 – 105. Counsel urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the 2nd and 3rd defendants and dismiss this suit. Counsel submitted that assuming without conceding that the reliefs sought by the claimants are proper, he contended that their contract of appointment were with statutory flavor and that the claimants have not established their case to entitle them to the reliefs they are seeking. That from the pleadings and evidence it is a common ground that the 2nd defendant appointed the claimants as members of the Industrial Arbitration Panel for a term of four years with effect from 1st March 2004. That it is also a common ground that the appointment was made pursuant to Section 8 (2) of the Trade Disputes Act, Cap 228 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 (TDA). Learned Counsel submitted that TDA also makes provision for the constitution of an arbitral tribunal in section 8 (4); tenure of office of chairman and members of the Panel in Section 10; remuneration for members of the Panel and other allied matters – Section 11 (6). That from the foregoing, it is our contention that the appointment of the claimants (political appointees) is one regulated by statute. He submitted that employment is said to be with statutory flavor when statutory provisions govern appointment and termination. This is the position in the instant case. He relied on the case of Osumah v. Edo Broadcasting Service [2005] (pt. 253) 773 , Abu v. Molukwu [2004] All FWLR (pt. 238) 664. Counsel submitted that the removal of the Claimants from office was legal, lawful and in accordance with the TDA. He urged the court to discountenance the cases cited by the claimants as they can be distinguished from the instant case. That for instance, the case of College of Education Ekiadolor v. Osayande [2010] 6 NWLR (pt. 1191) 423 cited by the claimants do not support their case. According to them the court held that where a contract of service is for a fixed term, the employee cannot be removed during the period of the term contracted except for misconduct or where the employee dies. Learned Counsel concurred with the submission but humbly wish to draw the court’s attention to 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ statement of Defence (paragraph 10) which was not rebutted. The said paragraph states: “… the defendants aver that the 2nd claimant and other members of the Industrial Arbitration Panel ought not to be shocked at the Panel’s dissolution because of their unbecoming, inappropriate and over-reaching attitude and meddling that led to their removal from office”. Counsel argues that this averment in the pleading was again restated and reinforced in our 2nd witness statement on oath filed on 16th May, 2012 which states in paragraphs 9 and 10 respectively: 9. “That as members of the IAP the 2nd claimant and other members’ misplaced the noble duty they owed the Federal Republic of Nigeria in arbitrating in disputes between parties before them”. 10. “That rather than assist the government in enthroning industrial peace and harmony they exhibited inappropriate, unbecoming and meddlesome attitudes that culminated in their removal from office”. Counsel submitted that these averments were not controverted and the effect of an admission is that the allegation is taken as established and does not have to be proved relying on Section 123 of the Evidence Act 2011. He argued further that the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 7th Edition at page 938 gives the meaning of the word ‘misconduct’ as unacceptable behavior, especially by professional person. He submitted that the ‘unbecoming, inappropriate, overreaching and meddling’ by the claimants in the affair of the Industrial Arbitration Panel amounts to misconduct and was against national interest. He added that that the TDA did not provide that the 2nd defendant must give a reason before the claimants’ appointments are terminated and the giving of a reason or the ground in which their contracts were terminated is a privilege and not a right which cannot in any way vitiate the termination. He relied on the case of Osumah v. Edo Broadcasting Service which held that contract of appointment regulated by statute can only be terminated based on the way and manner prescribed by the statute and any other manner of termination inconsistent with the statute is null and void and of no effect. Learned Counsel submitted finally that from the claimants’ final address it can be seen that they abandoned their reliefs’ c, d, and e in the statement of facts. He urged the court to dismiss the said reliefs having been abandoned. I have carefully considered the processes filed in this case, the argument of Counsel for the parties and the authorities relied upon. In my view, the issue for determination is whether the termination of the Claimants’ appointments before the expiration of their tenure was lawful and whether the Claimants are entitled to the reliefs sought. The Claimants in this suit were the nominees of the Nigerian Labour Congress who were appointed members of the Industrial Arbitration Panel with effect from 1st March, 2004. The Claimants’ appointments were as contained in the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ letters dated 15th March, 2004. The said letter of one of the claimants is reproduced as follows. 15th March, 2004 Mr. A.B Dania c/o Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) Labour House, Plot 820/281, Central Business District, Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. Dear Sir, APPOINTMENT AS A MEMBER OF THE INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION PANEL I am pleased to inform you that by virtue of the powers conferred upon me by Section 8(2) of the Trade Dispute Act, CAP 228 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, I, Dr. Timiebi A. Koripamo-Agary, Permanent Secretary, and Acting Honourable Minister of Labour and Productivity, do hereby approve your nomination by Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) as a member of the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) and I have accordingly appointed you for a term of four years with effect from 1st March, 2004 or the date of your assumption of duty. 2. You may be eligible, subject to satisfactory performance on office, for consideration for re-appointment, for a further term of four years, provided you are within the statutory age of 65 years prescribed by the extant law. 3. I shall be grateful if you will indicate as to whether or not you accept the offer of appointment. 4. A copy of the Conditions of Service as recently approve will be sent to you in due course. 5. Please accept my warmest congratulations. Yours faithfully Sgd. Dr. Timiebi A. Koripamo-Agary Permanent Secretay/Acting Honourable Minister From the claimants’ letters of appointment, their tenure of office were expected to be for a four year term certain with option for renewal based on satisfactory performance of the Claimants. The claimants were therefore members of the Industrial Arbitration Panel. However, by virtue of a letter dated 13th October, 2005 the 2nd and 3rd Defendants dissolved the Industrial Arbitration Panel with immediate effect and requested the Claimants to hand-over all Government property in their possession to the most senior Administrative Officer of the panel. The dissolution was said to be on directives of the President and Commander in Chief, even though the Trade Dispute Act has no provision for dissolution of the Industrial Arbitration Panel as was done in this case. In determining whether the termination of the claimants’ appointments were lawful it is important to consider the relevant provisions of the Trade Dispute Act under which the appointment of the Claimants were predicated. Section 8(1) of the said Act provides that, The Minister may for the purposes of Section 7 of this Act appoint a fit person to act as conciliator for the purpose of effecting a settlement of the dispute. (2) the person appointed as conciliator under this section shall inquire into the causes and circumstances of the dispute and by negotiation with the parties endeavour to bring about a settlement. Section 10 provides as follows: TENURE OF OFFICE OF MEMBERS OF THE PANEL The Chairman, the vice-chairman and any other member of the Panel SHALL (emphasis mine), unless he previously resigns or is removed from office, hold office for a period of FOUR years in the first instance which may be renewable only for one more term of four years. Section 11 provides that, Subject to the provision of this section, a person holding or appointed to act in the office of the chairman, vice-chairman or who is a member of the Panel shall vacate that office when he attains the age of sixty-five years. From the above provisions of the Trade Dispute Act and the letters of appointment issued to the claimants, it is obvious that the TENURE of the claimant’s appointments are CLEARLY SPECIFIED and regulated by the Trade Dispute Act and cannot be truncated by dissolution without more. It is not in doubt that the mode of appointment of the Claimant’s and the tenure of their office is spelt out by the Trade Dispute Act to the effect that they hold office for FOUR years which may be renewed for another four years without prejudice to the power of the appointing authority to remove the claimants before the expiration of their tenure. The Minister of Labour and Productivity exercised that power of removal when he dissolved the Industrial Arbitration Panel and terminated the appointment of the claimants. The action of the Minister call to question whether he can just wake up and terminate the appointment of the claimants whose appointment under normal circumstances will terminate by affluxion of time of four years from the date of their appointment. The claimants pleaded that their appointments were abruptly terminated before the completion of their contract without notice and that the action of the defendant is in breach of the terms of the contract. I am of the opinion that the truncation of the appointment of the claimants whose appointments was for a four year period without any reasonable cause and without recourse to disciplinary procedure whatsoever is illegal. This is so because the appointment of the claimants is expected to expire after four years and if anything will lead to the removal of the claimants from office before the completion of their tenure, that thing must be weighty enough to warrant their removal. It is worst when the Minister did not state any reason for termination of the appointment of the claimants. The only feeble attempt to mention a reason for the removal of the claimants is in paragraph 10 of the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ Statement of Defence wherein it was stated that the claimants ought not to be shocked at the Panel’s dissolution because of their unbecoming, inappropriate, over-reaching attitude and meddling that led to their removal from office. This contention of the 2nd and 3rd defendants did not emanate from the letter terminating the claimants’ appointment. The said averments is therefore, an afterthought as the claimants were not queried nor faced any disciplinary inquiry on those allegations more so that the letter dissolving their appointment did not state such reason. The 2nd and 3rd defendants’ defence is accordingly discountenanced. My understanding of Section 10 of the Trade Dispute Act is that the claimants as members of the Industrial Arbitration Panel can only be removed for good cause or misconduct/abuse of office. In the absence of any of the above, it is my view that since they have an expressed tenure of four years, it is unlawful to remove them by way of dissolution without any reason. My finding is that the claimants’ appointment as members of the Industrial Arbitration Panel continued till February 28th, 2008. I therefore hold that the claimants are entitled to their salaries from November, 2005 to 28th of February, 2008 when their appointments ought to come to an end. The claimants also claimed their unpaid salary arrears and other allowances from April 2004 to October, 2005 when their appointments were terminated. To this claims, the 2nd and 3rd defendants contended that the claimants’ salaries and allowances up till October, 2005 when the claimants’ were dissolved were paid. They exhibited the Claimants’ emolument records indicating that the claimants have been paid salary up to October, 2005. I, therefore, believe the evidence of the 2nd and 3rd defendants that the claimants have been paid their salaries up to October, 2005. The claimants’ claim for three months salary in lieu of notice is not proved as there is no agreement to that effect. Same goes to the claim for severance packages, arrears of monetization and repatriation allowance. This head of claims therefore fails. For the avoidance of doubt, I hereby hold and order as follows: 1. The termination of the claimants’ appointments by way of dissolution whose appointments are for a four year period without any reasonable cause and without recourse to disciplinary procedure whatsoever before the expiration of the four years is unlawful and is hereby set aside. 2. The 2nd and 3rd defendants are hereby ordered to pay to the claimants without delay their salaries and allowances for the unexhausted tenure from November, 2005 to 28th February, 2008 when their appointment ended. 3. I make no order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. …………………………………… Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu Fishim Presiding Judge