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The claimant took out a general form of complaint dated and filed on the 16th October, 2012 wherein he claims against the defendants as follows: 1. A declaration that the 1st and 2nd defendants lacked jurisdiction to investigate and to have found the claimant culpable and punished the claimant by terminating his employment with the 1st defendant. 2. A declaration that the termination of the employment of the claimant by the 1st defendant in unlawful, null and void for non-compliance with the fair hearing provisions of the 1999 Constitution. 3. A declaration that the allegations leveled against the claimant by the administrative bodies are criminal in nature and only a court of law or a Judicial Tribunal is competent to adjudicate on same. 4. A declaration that the administrative bodies did not observe the rules of natural justice before proceeding to adjudge the claimant culpable of the criminal offences leading to the termination of his employment. 5. A declaration that the provision of Regulations 43 of the Lagos State Civil Service Commission Law Cap L10, Laws of Lagos State 2003 is unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect in the circumstances of this suit. 6. A declaration that the 1st and 2nd defendants shall be bound by the outcome of proceedings in this suit notwithstanding the provisions of Regulations 43 of the Lagos State Civil Service Commission Law, 2003. 7. A declaration that the letter of Termination dated 15th June, 2009 is ineffective, null and void as follows: (a) The Lagos State Civil Service Rules 1982 does not have a Section 40501. (b) The letter of Termination was addressed to the claimant as “Chief Accountant, GL 14” whereas at 1st January 2007, the claimant had been promoted as an Assistant Director. 8. CONSEQUENTIAL ORDERS: (a) That the claimant is entitled to be reinstated into the Lagos State Government Civil Service. (b) That the claimant is entitled to all salaries and allowances from the 15th day of June 2009 until reinstated by the claimant. (c) That the termination of the appointment of the claimant by the 1st defendant is unlawful, null and void for non-compliance with the fair hearing provisions of the 1999 Constitution. (d) That the claimant be reinstated into the Lagos State Government Civil Service. (e) An order, that upon being reinstated, that the claimant be accorded all the missed promotions and allowances of his peers in the Lagos State Government Civil Service as at the date of his termination from the Service. (f) An order that the claimant is to be paid all salaries and allowances from the 15th day of June 2009 until reinstated by the 1st defendant. (g) Exemplary Damages in the sum of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira). 9. Cost of this action in the sum of N1,000,000.00. Filed along with the complaint is the statement of facts, written statement on oath, list and copies of documents to be relied upon at the trial. In reaction the defendants entered appearance, thereafter filed a statement of defence, list of documents to be relied upon and documents list of defendants’ witness and written statement on oath of the defendants’ witness. The defendants thereafter filed a motion on notice dated 11th June, 2013. The said motion on notice was brought pursuant to Section 2 (a) Cap p. 26 of the Public Officers (Protection) Law of Lagos State 2003 wherein the defendants prayed for the following orders: (1) An order of court striking out this suit. (2) And for such other or further orders as this court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The grounds upon which this application is brought is that by virtue of S.2 (a) Cap. p. 26 Public Officers (Protection) Law of Lagos State 2003, any action filed against Public Officers shall not be brought after the expiration of three months from the date on which the cause of action accrued. The defendants’ motion is supported by an affidavit and a written address. Arguing the said application, the defendants submitted that the issue for determination is whether this action is statute barred by virtue of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Law Cap. p. 26 Laws of Lagos State 2003. The defendants counsel submitted that this action is caught by the provisions of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Law which is a statute of Limitation and as such the action is statute barred. That the effect of the Public Officers Protection Law is to remove the right of action, the right of enforcement and the right to judicial relief in a claimant and this leaves him with a bare and empty cause of action which he cannot enforce if the alleged cause of action is statute barred i.e. if such action is instituted outside three months statutory period allowed by law, citing Ibrahim v. JSC [1998] 14 NWLR (pt. 584) 1 at 31 – 31 and Araka v. Ejeagwu [2000] 12 SC (pt. 1) 99 at 122 – 123. That this cause of action arose on the 15th June, 2009 while the claimant instituted this action on the 16th October, 2012. Thus the action is instituted outside the three months statutory period allowed by law. That where a statute provides for the institution of an action within a prescribed period, proceedings shall not be instituted after the time prescribed by such statute. And that any action that is instituted after the period stipulated by the statute is totally barred as the right of the plaintiff or the injured person to commence the action would have been extinguished by such law. The court was referred to Egbe v. Adefarasin [1985] 1 NWLR (pt. 3) 549, F.R.I.N. v. Gold [2007] 4 FWLR 7097 at 7118 SC. The defendant further submitted that limitation of action though a special defence in a civil action is one of the factors that may rob a court of its jurisdiction to entertain an action on the merit. That the general principle is that where a statute provides for the commencement of an action within a prescribed period, in respect of a cause of action accruing to a plaintiff, any action commenced after the time prescribed will be statute barred and the court will lack the jurisdiction to adjudicate over the matter, citing W.A.P.C Plc v. Adeyeri [2003] 12 NWLR (pt. 835) 517, Kasandubu v. Ultimate Petroleum Ltd [2008] 3 FWLR 4335. The defendants concluded that this action is incompetent and therefore urge this court to strike out this suit in its entirety. In opposition to the defendants’ motion, the claimant filed a reply on points of law in opposition to the defendants’ motion on notice. This was done with leave of court. The claimant then filed a written address on points of law on the 22/10/2013. The claimant raised one issue for determination i.e. (1) Whether this action is statute barred by virtue of Section 2 (a) Cap p. 26 Public Officers (Protection) Law of Lagos State 2003. The claimant’s counsel submitted that while it is the correct position of the law that actions against Public Officers must be brought within 3 months of the accrual of a cause of action and as stated in Section 2 (a) Cap p. 26 Public Officers Protection Law of Lagos State 2003, where such actions are not brought within the time allowed by law, such actions are to be deemed statute barred. That however this is only a general rule with some exceptions. That from the claims formulated by the claimant, this action is not statute barred. That the position of the claimant in this case is in consonance with the views of the Supreme Court in Ibrahim v. JSC (supra) which recognized that there are statutory exceptions to the applicability of the Act. That this was further expounded by the Supreme Court in Offoboche v. Ogoja LGA [2001] 16 NWLR (pt. 739) 458 at 297 – 299. The two categories of exceptions to this is Malice and Abuse of Office. That on malice, the law is designed to protect against malice, the officer who acts in good faith and does not apply to acts in abuse of office with no semblance of legal justification. That abuse of office is use of power to achieve ends other than those for which power was granted, for example for personal gain, to show undue favour to another or wreak vengeance on an opponent to mention a few. That a close look at the claims of claimant and from the averments of the claimant in his statement of facts and his witness statement on oath will reveal that the claimant’s case is within the exception allowed under the law and so urged this court to so hold. The claimant’s counsel further submitted that it is only at a full trial that the court can be given the opportunity to determine the case of the parties. Counsel urged the court to hold that sequel to the plethora of constitutional issues raised, the issue of malice alleged and that acts were ultra vires the officers concerned in this case, citing Dr. G.O. Sokefun v. Chief N.O.A. Akinyemi & 3 Others RJ SCN (May – July 1980) p. 1 – 27. Learned Counsel therefore urged the court to hold that the case formulated by the claimant is grounded, on a genuine complaint of breaches of the claimant’s fundamental rights and the suit should proceed to hearing. The defendants filed a reply on points of law dated 28/11/2013. Responding, the defendants submitted that the claimant misconceived, misunderstood and misquoted the views expressed by the court. That Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Law provides as follows: “where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any law or authority, the following provisions shall have effect – (a) the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage of injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof”. That in other words Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Law gives full protection or cover all public officers or persons engaged in the execution of public duties who at all material times acted within the confines of their public duty. That the act done by the public officer in respect of which the action is commenced must be an act done in pursuance or execution of any law, public duty or authority or in respect of an alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority. That the question that arises now is what is the act done by the public officer in this instance in respect of which this suit is commenced? The answer according to the defendants answer is the termination of appointment of the claimant in a letter dated 15th June, 2009. That the issue or question is whether the termination of the claimant is done in pursuance or execution of any law, public duty or authority. The defendants counsel submitted that the claimant’s appointment was terminated by the 1st defendant which was established by the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and was inter alia conferred with powers to appoint, dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over persons holding offices in the State Civil Service. The defendants’ counsel referred to Part II of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution. To counsel therefore, the defendant acted within its lawful authority when it terminated the claimant’s appointment. The defendant’s counsel submitted that the cases cited by the claimant are not relevant in this case. That as a matter of fact the Supreme Court held in Egbe v. Adefarasin (supra) that the conduct of the defendants as to whether it was malicious or not is irrelevant to the determination whether the cause of action is statute barred under Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law. Learned Counsel further submitted that the issue of malice and abuse of power are substantive issues to be dealt with in the suit. However that where a legislation requires or has a statutory bar on when action could be commenced, the issue has to be resolved first before dealing with the substantive case. The defendants counsel finally submitted that this action is incompetent and the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit and same should be dismissed in its entirety. I have carefully considered the issues raised in the Preliminary Objection, the submission of Counsel and the authorities relied upon by parties. The Defendants is essentially asking this court to strike out this suit because it is statute barred having been instituted against a Public Officer outside three months after the cause of action occurred contrary to Section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Law of Lagos State, 2003. There is array of judicial authorities to the effect that in considering whether a particular case is statute barred, that Statement of Claim of the Plaintiff is the place to turn. See Ibafon Co. Ltd v. Nigerian Ports Authority Plc [2000] 8 NWLR (pt. 667) p. 86 at p. 100. From the processes filed in this suit it is obvious that the Claimant filed this suit on the 16th October, 2012 at the Registry of this court. It is also clear from the pleadings that by a letter dated 15th June, 2009 the 1st Defendant terminated the employment of the Claimant. That is to say, the cause of action occurred on the 15th June, 2009. By this action the Claimant is challenging the termination of his employment. The Public Officers (Protection) Law of Lagos State, 2003 provides in Section 2(a) a follows: “Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority, the following provision shall have effect— (a) The action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.” In view of the above cited law, any person who intends to sue a public officer must do so within three (3) months of the cause of action, otherwise the action becomes statute barred. In the instant case, it is clear that the Claimant’s cause of action has been extinguished. This suit was commenced more than three months after the happening of the cause of action. It is, therefore, statute barred. The Public Officers (Protection) Law is a statute of limitation. The general principle of law is that where a statute provides for the institution of an action within a prescribed period, the action shall not be brought after the time prescribed by such statute. Any action that is instituted after the period stipulated by the statute is totally barred as the right of the plaintiff or the injured person to commence the action would have been extinguished by such law. See A.G Rivers State v. A.G Bayelsa State [2013] 3 NWLR (pt.1340) p. 123, PHCN v. Alabi [2010] 21 N.L.L.R (pt. 58) p. 1 at p. 20, Ibrahim v. J.S.C [1998] 14 NWLR (584) p.1, Unilorin v. Adeniran [2007] 6 NWLR (pt 1031) p. 498 at p. 521, Egbe v. Adefarasin [1985] 1 NWLR (p. 3) p. 549 at p. 568, Woherem v. Emereuwa [2000] 3 NWLR (pt. 650) p. 529, Bank of the North v. Gana [2006] All FWLR (296) p. 826. I therefore find that this suit is statute barred and I so hold. Having found that the Claim of the Claimant is statute barred, the proper order that is to be made is the one of dismissal. Accordingly, the claim of the Claimant is hereby dismissed. I make no order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. …………………………………… Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu Fishim Judge