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The claimant took up a complaint against the defendants dated and filed on 11th June 2013 praying for – a) A DECLARATION that the purported termination of the appointment of the claimants contained in the letters dated 5th of August 2011 with reference numbers DELSUTH/P.E.0273/28 and DELSUTH/P.E.0272/36 respectively are a continuing illegality, unlawful, null and void and no effect whatsoever being in flagrant violation of section 38(2) of the Delta State University Teaching Hospital Law 2008. b) A DECLARATION that the letters dated 5th August 2011 in that they purport to declare unfit for appointment the claimants who had been duly appointed under the Delta State University Teaching Hospital Law 2008 by the defendants are not a termination of appointment of the claimants as known to law or to fair industrial relations practice or at all and is therefore illegal, unlawful, null and void and no effect whatsoever. c) A DECLARATION that the purported termination of the employment of the claimants by the defendants is malicious, unfair, premeditated and is therefore illegal, unlawful, null and void and no effect whatsoever. d) A DECLARATION that it is unfair labour practice for the claimants who had been employed to be declared unemployable or not fit for appointment by the defendants vide letters dated 5th of August 2011 with reference numbers DELSUTH/P.E.0273/28 and DELSUTH/P.E.0272/36 respectively and the said letters are consequently illegal, null and void, and no effect. e) AN ORDER directing the defendants to reinstate the claimants to their post in the defendant forthwith without any loss as to seniority, salaries, position and other emoluments. f) AN ORDER directing the defendants jointly and severally to compute and pay to the claimants all their salaries, allowances and other emoluments due to them from the 5th of August 2011 of the purported termination of their appointment from the office by the defendant up to the date of judgment. g) INTEREST at the prevailing commercial banks’ rates on the sum arrived at in relief (e) above. Accompanying the complaint are the statement of facts, list of witness, list of documents, claimants’ written statement on oath and copies of the documents to be relied upon at the trial. In reaction, the defendants filed a preliminary objection vide a motion on notice dated and filed on 18th July 2013 praying for – 1. Leave to enter conditional appearance for the 1st and 2nd defendants in this suit which is hereto attached and marked Exhibit VN 1 time within which to enter appearance having expired. 2. That this suit be dismissed as the Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain same as being statute-barred. And that the ENUGU Judicial Division is the Court that can hear the suit. 3. That the 1st defendant is no longer in existence. 4. And take further notice that the grounds for this application are – (a) That this suit ought to have been instituted by the claimants within one year and one month of dismissal. (b) That the claimants alleged that the 1st defendant employed them while the said 1st defendant is non-existent and that if the suit is to be heard it is the Enugu Judicial Division of the Court that ought to entertain same. (c) That the claimant’s suit has not sufficiently disclosed any cause of action as the claimants lack locus standi to institute this suit. (d) That the suit filed by the claimants is not justifiable. To the defendants, the facts of this case are that the claimants were given appointment on probation by the 1st defendant and within the period of probation, the claimants’ appointments were justly terminated and they were relieved of their appointments. The claimants instituted this action against the defendants after two years of the termination of appointment in this Court instead of the appropriate Court of Enugu Division. The defendants then framed two issues for the determination of the Court, namely – 1. Whether the claimants can legally maintain this suit in view of the statute of limitation. 2. Whether this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit in view of the circumstances of this case. Regarding issue 1, the defendants submitted that the claimants are statute-barred from instituting this present suit against the defendants in view of the relevant statutory provisions of the limitation law to the effect that the claimants ought to have instituted this action within one year, one month of the alleged termination of their appointment. To the defendants, the termination of appointment letter is dated 5/8/2011 while this suit was filed on 11/6/2013, that is, more than two years after their termination of their appointment. That the law is very well settled that where a statute of limitation prescribes period within which an action must be commence, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period, referring to Aremo II v. Adekanye [2004] 42 WRN 1 at 7 Ratio 6. That the period of limitation in this case began to run from the date of termination of appointment i.e. 5/8/2011, citing Aremo II v. Adekanye (supra) at 8 ratio 8. The defendants continued that the Court in Aremo made it clear that in determining whether an action is statute-barred, all that is required is for one to examine the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the claimants a cause of action and comparing that date on which the writ of summons was filed; if the time of the writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is stature-barred, citing Aremo v. Adekanye (supra) at 8 ratio 9 and Egbe v. Adefarasin [2002] 14 WRN 57. To the defendants, in the interpretation of any statute, the conduct of parties or the morality of party is of no moment, referring to Ekeogu v. Aliri [1991] 3 NWLR (Pt. 179) 258 at 260 Ratio 21, Abayo v. Permanent Secretary Civil Service Commission, Makurdi [1991] 3 NWLR (Pt. 182) 693 at 695 Ratio 4. It is, therefore, the defendants’ submission that the conduct of the defendants in the alleged termination of claimants appointment does not fall for questioning at this stage in view of the aforementioned/cited authorities. On issue 2 i.e. whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit in view of the circumstances of this case, the defendants contended that assuming but without conceding that the case is not statute-barred, this Court still lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit as the Enugu Division is the Court with proper jurisdiction. That it is the claim of the claimants that determines the jurisdiction of the Court, hence the defendants are being sued by the claimants. The claimants’ processes show clearly that the defendants reside in Oghara, Delta State of Nigeria, hence the appropriate Court is the Enugu Judicial Division. The defendants continued that the claimants instituted this action against the defendants, but the 1st defendant is no longer in existence, relying on paragraphs 2 – 10 of their supporting affidavit; more so because the claimants alleged that it was the 1st defendant that employed them and that the same 1st defendant that terminated their appointment. The defendants then submitted that the institution of this action against the defendants does not disclose a reasonable cause of action. It is, therefore, the defendants’ submission that the claimants’ suit against the defendants is not only statute-barred, but lacks disclosure of reasonable cause of action, in view of the fact that the claimants were on probation when the alleged termination of appointment took place. In opposition to the defendants’ preliminary objection, the claimants filed a counter-affidavit on 11 September 2013 and a written address. The claimants then framed one issue for the determination of the Court, to wit: whether the defendants are entitled to the grant of this application. To the claimants, the defendants have erroneously submitted that this suit be struck out due to the fact that the claimants are statute-barred from instituting this present suit against the defendants. Unfortunately, that the defendants have failed to state the limitation law they are relying on. A cursory look that the defendants’ written address will show that the defendants have failed to specifically plead the limitation law. It is the claimants’ submission that the law is well settled beyond peradventure that limitation laws are required to be pleaded by the defence in order not to take the opposite side by surprise. The claimants referred the Court to Order 11 Rule 1 of the Rules of this Court, which provides as follows – Where by this these rules any application is authorized to be made to the Court, such application may be by motion supported by affidavit or by notice and shall state under what rule of Court or Law the application is brought. Every motion or notice shall be served within 5 days of filing. The claimants continued that the defendants have failed to state the law they are relying on and which says that this suit ought to be filed within one year; as such their application ought to be struck out as a result of the failure of specifically pleading same, referring to the Supreme Court case of Sulgrave Holdings Inc v. FGN [2012] 17 NWLR (Pt 1329) 309 at 339 – 340 G – B, where Honourable Justice Chukwuma-Eneh, JSC held as follows – The law is well settled that pleadings have to be filed and exchanged by parties before an objection to the action being stale and statute-barred can properly be taken. This is invariably is the case where demurrer has been abolished. And the rules in that case require the defendant to set down for hearing of the matter by an application raising specifically the question of the limitation action and the lack of the Court’s power to entertain the matter. The claimants went on that the law is well settled that a party relying on a special defence, such as a plea of limitation of action, is enjoined to specifically plead it and prove it. The rationale for specific plea of special defence is audi alteram partem. This will lead the Court to consider the facts relied upon by the plaintiff which gives him the right to the cause of action, referring to SPDCN Ltd v. Amadi [2010] 13 NWLR (P. 1210) 82 at 120 D – ¬E, Ajila v. Lawal [2005] All FWLR (Pt. 278) 1158, Odumosu v. ACB Ltd [1976] 11 SC 55, Union Bank Nig. Plc v. Omni Products (Nig.) Ltd [2006] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1003) 660. The claimants then submitted that the failure of the defendants not stating the limitation law they are relying on amount to speculations which this Court cannot act on. That a Court can make inferences or analytical deductions from certain facts and situations before it but the Court must never speculate as speculation is a mere imaginative guess which, even where appears plausible, should not be allowed by the Court to fill any gap in the evidence before it, referring to Olalomi Ind. Ltd v. NIDB Ltd [2009] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1167) 266 at 303 – 304 H – B. The claimants further submitted that even though the defendants have failed to state the limitation law they are relying on, the law is well settled that when the action of the defendants is a continuing breach against the claimants, the defendants cannot rely on the limitation law. Furthermore, that the defendants acted contrary to the confines of their public duties and have continued to act outside their statutory or constitutional duties and have acted with no semblance of logical justification. That the law is clear that if the grievance is continuing as in the instant case it is not caught by limitation, referring to Abiodun v. AG, Federation [2007] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1057) at 359 412 – 413 and 426 – 427. The claimants also referred to Osun State Govt. v. Danlami (Nig) Ltd [2007] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1038) at 66 83 – 84 and 100, where the Supreme Court stated as follows – Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply in cases of recovery of land, breaches of contract. It does not apply in cases of recovery of land, breaches of contract or claims for work and labour done. The claimants continued that the case of the claimants in the suit herein is on all fours with the Supreme Court authority cited above, urging the Court to discountenance the argument of the defendants and dismiss same; referring also to Olateju v. Commissioner for Lands and Housing Kwara State [2011] 12 WRN 36 at 54 lines 15 – 35. Furthermore, it is the claimant’s submission that the defendants are not protected by the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act as the defendants acted contrary to the confines of their public duties and have continued to act with no semblance of logical justification, referring to the statement of facts of the claimants and the reliefs being sought. That the law is well settled that the Public Officers (Protection) Law is designed to protect the officer who acts in good faith and does not apply to acts done in the abuse of office and with no semblance of legal justification. Thus the law will not apply if it is established that the defendant had abused his position for the purpose of acting maliciously. In that case he is not acting within the terms of the statutory or other legal authority. In such a state of facts he has abused his position for the purpose of doing wrong, and the protection of the law would never apply to such case, referring to Offoboche v. Ogoja LG [2001] 16 NWLR (Pt. 739) 458 at 485 A – D. To the claimants, it is also surprising that the defendants have stated in their grounds of their application that that the 1st defendant is not in existence. It is indeed a blind and futile argument. The claimants then referred to the letter of employments of the claimants where it is clearly revealed that the 1st defendant is in existence. That it is also surprising that counsel to the defendants decided to represent a non-existing party. That it is indeed funny in all respects. The claimants went on that the defendant has also erroneously stated that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit as the Enugu Division is the Court with proper jurisdiction. It is the claimants’ submission that this is not the position of the law as the law is trite that this Court has jurisdiction throughout the Federation of Nigeria, referring to section 21 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. In conclusion, the claimants urged the Court to dismiss the application of the defendants as same is frivolous and meant to cause unnecessary delay in the trail of this suit. In their reply on points of law dated 30th October 2013, the defendants insisted that the claimants were on probation when their appointments were terminated, which is a justified administrative action/procedure, hence the Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition at page 1202 defines PROBATION as follows – Referring to the initial period of employment during which a new, transferred, promoted employee must prove or show that he is capable of performing the required duty of the job or position before he will be considered as permanently employed in such position. Besides, that the provision of section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act provides that action of this nature must be commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of but the claimants in this case brought this action after two years of their termination of appointments hence robbing the Court of its jurisdiction. Moreover, that in Osoh & ors v. Unity Bank Plc [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1358) at 48 and 50, the Supreme Court held that the action instituted by the plaintiffs robbed the Court of its jurisdiction because as at the time the action was brought the claimants were no longer in the employment of the defendant. The defendants accordingly submitted that the Court also lacks jurisdiction because when the claimants instituted this action against the defendants they were no longer in the employment of the defendants. To the defendants, the cases of Sulgrave Holdings Inc. v. FGN [2012] NWLR (Pt. 1329), SPDCN Ltd v. Amadi [2010] NWLR (Pt. 1210) at 82, Ajila v. Lawal [2005] All FWLR (Pt. 278), Union Bank Nig Plc v. Omni Products (Nig) Ltd [2006] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1003) 600, Abiodun v. AG Federation and Ogun State Govt. v. Danlami (Nig) Ltd [2007] NWLR (Pt. 1036) at 66 and other authorities cited by the claimants’ counsel in his written address are utterly misleading and inapplicable in the circumstance of this case. That the defendants lawfully and justifiably terminated the appointments of the claimants while they were still on probation and were not yet confirmed as permanent staff of the defendants. At the adoption of their written addresses, counsel to the claimants urged the Court to note that Ibrahim v. JSC, Kaduna State & ors [1998] 12 SC 20 was decided and public officer was defined to include public institutions; so it must be read to be unconstitutional given that the Constitution defines public officers to be persons, not institutions. Also that the Court should note that AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 talks of the limitation laws not being used to promote stark injustice. The claimants’ counsel then asked: what can be more stark injustice that the actions of the dependants in the instant case? Counsel to the claimants went on to refer the Court to Osun State Govt. v. Danlami [2007] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1038) 66 at 83 – 84, FGN v. Zebra [2013] 3 WLRN 1 and SSAUTHRAI v. ASURI unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/34/2008 delivered on March 2, 2010. On this score, the Court then permitted the defendants’ counsel to formally react the issues and additional authorities cited by the claimants. In compliance, the defendants filed a further reply on points of law dated 24th March 2014. To the defendants, the conditions precedents to the applicability of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act are – 1. That the person against whom the action is commenced is a pubic officer or a person acting in the execution of public duties within the meaning of that law; and 2. That the act done by the person in respect of which the action is commenced must be one done in pursuance or execution of any law, public duty or authority. That this is the position of the law as enunciated in the case of AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 144 – 145. The defendants, therefore, submitted that they the defendants are public officers who are perfuming public duties in line with the law establishing them. The defendants continued that section 318 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, provides that Public Service of a State includes – (c) members or staff of any commission or authority established for the State or by a Law of a House of Assembly. (e) Staff of any statutory corporation established by a law of a House of Assembly. (f) Staff of any educational institution established or financed principally by a government of a state. To the defendants, the defendants conveniently come within the ambit of these categories mentioned above, as it is established by the law of the House of Assembly of Delta State 2008 and principally financed by the Government of Delta State; more so as the case of Ibrahim v. JSC, Kaduna State & ors defined public officer to include natural, artificial, corporate and incorporate. The defendants further submitted that they did not act outside the colour of their office or mete out stark injustice on the claimants as the claimants were given appointment on probation and while in the course of their probation indulged in gross misconduct for which queries were issued to them and their appointments on probation were ultimately terminated before their appointment were confirmed hence the claimants were not unjustly treated by the defendants, neither did the defendants abuse their office in any way. To the defendants, Ibrahim v. JSC, Kaduna State & ors (supra) at 37 put it beyond peradventure that a public officer or any person in public office as stipulated in section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law not only refers to natural persons sued in their personal names but it extends to public bodies, artificial persons, institutions or persons sued by their official names or titles. That the decision of Ibrahim v. JSC, Kaduna State & ors (supra) as to the definition of public officers accords with the provision of the Interpretation Act and the 1999 Constitution (as amended). The defendants went on that the learned claimants’ counsel placed heavy reliance on AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123, but the authority is not on all fours with the present suit as it has to do with recovery of land particularly oil wells or fields as well as the revenue there from. Therefore, the Public Officers Protection Act will clearly not be applicable; but this present suit is a claim arising from termination of appointments on probation before confirmation by the defendants. That assuming but without conceding that claimants’ appointments on probation were wrongly terminated, the law is that they are not entitled to the relief of reinstatement as is usually the case with confirmed officers, referring to Ondo State University v. Folayan [1994] 7 NWLR (Pt. 354) 1. The defendants then urged the Court to so hold and dismiss this suit with substantial cost for being statute-barred. I heard learned counsel and considered all the processes in this matter. In considering the merit of the preliminary objection, I must remark on a thing or two regarding especially the written address of the defendants. Firstly, the written address of the defendants was printed in a manner where some parts of the characters are not readable as it seems to have been printed when the printer’s tonner must have dried out. Secondly, counsel to the defendants labeled his written address as one “in support of preliminary objective”. This is aside from the various typographical errors in the said address. Thirdly, relief 1 prayed for by the defendants in their motion on notice is for “leave to enter conditional appearance for the 1st and 2nd defendants in this suit which is hereto attached and marked Exhibit VN 1 time within which to enter appearance having expired”. Yet throughout their written address, not one word was said of this prayer. The stratagem of having to combine a prayer for leave to enter appearance and prayers as to objection to jurisdiction, just so that two motions will not be filed and paid for, is uncalled for. But for Magnusson v. Koko [1992] 9 NWLR (Pt. 317) 289, which held that in moving a motion, the fact that the applicant is silent on one or more of the prayers sought does not indicate that he is deemed to have abandoned the prayer(s) he did not address the Court on, I would have treated relief 1 as abandoned. I accordingly grant the defendants leave to enter appearance (the Rules of this Court talk of memorandum of appearance, not memorandum of conditional appearance) out of time. Fourthly, in their argument, the defendants submitted that the claimants are statute-barred from instituting this present suit against the defendants in view of the relevant statutory provisions of the limitation law to the effect that the claimants ought to have instituted this action within one year, one month of the alleged termination of their appointment. Throughout their written address, the defendants did not disclose to the Court what these “relevant statutory provisions of the limitation law” are. It took the claimants’ submission in that regard before the defendants’ reply on points of law alluded to “section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act”, which provides for three months as the limitation period. Even at this, it should be remembered that the defendants in their main written address spoke of “the relevant statutory provisions of the limitation law to the effect that the claimants ought to have instituted this action within one year, one month of the alleged termination of their appointment”. So which one are the defendants relying on: the relevant statutory provisions of the limitation law which provides one year, one month as the limitation period, or the Public Officers Protection Act which provides three months as the limitation law? The luck that the defendants have here is that case law authorities seem to be on their side. They provide that where a relief or remedy is provided for by any written law or by the common law or equity, that relief or remedy if properly claimed by the party seeking it cannot be denied to the applicant simply because he has applied for it under a wrong law. See Pius Adaka & ors v. Christopher Anekwe & ors [1997] 11 NWLR (Pt. 529) 417, Falobi v. Falobi [1976] 1 NMLR 169, Akuma v. AG, Anambra State [1977] 5 SC 161, Majekodunmi v. Wpaco Ltd [1992] 1 NWLR (Pt. 219) 566 and Dim v. Adibua [2002] FWLR (Pt. 107) 1271. Additionally, failure to state the Rule of Court under which an application is brought will not ipso facto vitiate the application. See Adaka v. Ikot Abasi TRC [1991] NWLR (Pt. 198) 480.In any case, the rule after all is that a defendant need not even file any statement of defence. Here he is still entitled to a hearing. He could for instance decide to rely on a point of law inherent in the claimant’s case without the necessity of filing pleadings and adducing evidence. He may rest his case on the claimant’s case and simply wish to address the Court on issues raised in the claimant’s address. All that is permitted by the law. See Faladu v. Kwoi [2003] 9 NWLR (Pt. 826) 643. Fifthly, I do not understand what the perception of the counsel to the defendants is on the conception of locus standi. In ground 4(c) of their motion on notice, the defendants had pointed out that the claimant’s suit has not sufficiently disclosed any cause of action as the claimants lack locus standi to institute this suit. In paragraph 1.3 of their written address, the defendants then referred to paragraphs 2 – 10 of their affidavit in support as evidence of the fact that the 1st defendant is no longer in existence. In paragraph 3 of the affidavit in support, one Barr. Monday Akpodinyo, who described himself as Head of Legal Department of the 2nd defendant, then deposed that he knows as a fact that the 1st defendant is no longer in existence and that the claimants lack locus standi to institute this action against the defendants as they are statute-barred and this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit. It is here that I am confused when the defendants say that the claimants in complaining about the termination of their appointment by the defendants have no interest (for that is what locus standi is) in bringing this suit. Does the fact that a matter is statute-barred mean the claimant thereby has no locus standi? In other words, is statute-barred and locus standi one and the same? Even at that, how can the defendants argue that the claimants’ case did not disclose any reasonable cause of action, in view of the fact that the claimants were on probation when the alleged termination of appointment took place? The Court is yet to get to the merit of the case. Are the defendants saying that an employee on probation cannot sue for termination of employment? If the defendants really think so, then I worry because no authority was cited by them to substantiate their thought. It appears that the defendants are confusing a defence to the merit of the case and a preliminary objection as to competence of an action or jurisdiction of the Court over the action. If the argument of the defendants is that they can terminate the employment of the claimants because they are on probation (the defendants repeated this line of thought in their further reply on points of law dated 24th March 2014), then they should save it for the defence of the merit of the case. The defendants actually dove-tailed into the merit of the case when even in their further written address, they submitted that even if the claimants’ appointments on probation were wrongly terminated, the law is that they are not entitled to the relief of reinstatement as is usually the case with confirmed officers, referring to Ondo State University v. Folayan. The defendants need to note that even employees on probation have rights and so can come to Court to ventilate their infraction; whether they get a verdict or not is altogether a different ball game. Making general and sweeping submissions, and then trying to argue the merit of the case at this stage, as the defendants seem to be doing, can never be the hallmark of good advocacy. Sixthly, simply to reel out the cases cited by an opposing counsel and to say that they are “utterly misleading and inapplicable in the circumstances of this case” (without more) as the counsel to the defendants did in his written address of 30th October 2013, and without stating how misleading and inapplicable they are, says little about a submission but more about the inadequacies of thought of the counsel himself. It is idle, indeed an utterly lazy form of advocacy. In determining whether an action is statute-barred, the authorities are pretty clear on how the Courts must go about it. By Popoola Elabanjo v. Chief (Mrs.) Ganiat Dawodu [2006] 6 – 7 SC 24, the period of limitation in any limitation statute is determined by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave rise to the cause of action and by comparing that date with the date on which the writ of summons was filed. If the time on the writ of summons is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, the action is statute-barred. And by Okenwa v. Military Governor of Imo State [1997] 6 NWLR (Pt. 507) 154 at 167, a cause of action accrues on the date on which the incident giving rise to the cause of action arose. A statute of limitation begins to run from the moment the cause of action arose. Thus, for the purpose of instituting an action in Court, time begins to run from the date the cause of action accrues. The case of Mrs. O. Adekoya v. Federal Housing Authority [2008] 4 SC 167 went on to state that a cause of action arises the moment a wrong is done to the plaintiff by the defendant; and the wrong which is the basis of a dispute represents a factual situation which entitles the plaintiff to seek a remedy in a court of law by way of enforcement. All of this has been recognised and applied by this Court in (amongst others) Joshua Mnenge v. Nigerian Army unreported Suit No. NICN/IB/22/2012, the ruling of which was delivered on December 18, 2012, Mr. Friday Idugie v. Auchi Polytechnic, Auchi & ors [2013] 31 NLLR (Pt. 89) 242 NIC and Hon. Runyi Kanu (JP) & ors v. The Attorney-General & Commissioner for Justice Cross River State & ors [2013] 32 NLLR (Pt. 91) 63 NIC. In determining the applicability of the Public Officers Protection Act as a statute of limitation, the Supreme Court had in Ibrahim v. JSC, Kaduna State & ors [1998] 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1; [1998] 12 SC 20 held that the term public officers is not restricted to human beings who are the public officers but that it includes public offices and public institutions. Note that Sulgrave Holdings Inc v. FGN [2012] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 309 at 334 in terms of the lead judgment by His Lordship Galadima, JSC held the respondents presumably including the “Federal Government of Nigeria” to be public officers and so come within the provision of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. His Lordship Galadima, JSC would, however, subsequently in AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 148 hold that the National Boundary Commission is an agency of the Federal Government but not such a public officer under the definition of the real term “public officer” as defined in Ibrahim v. JSC, Kaduna State & ors. This, however, must be understood within the context of the overall decision where the Federation or State was rejected by the Court to be ranked as “public officers” for purposes of the Public Officers Protection Act. Because the case was between a State and another State with the Federal Government as a co-defendant, the Supreme Court reasoned that in that context the State and the Federation (though represented by their respective Attorneys-General) cannot be public officers within the meaning of that term under the Public Officers Protection Act. In like manner, the National Boundary Commission as an agency of the Federal Government cannot equally qualify as a public officer. This clarification becomes necessary given that the counsel to the claimants insinuated and did submit orally that because the National Boundary Commission was denied the status of public officer by the Supreme Court in AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor, the defendants in the instant case must likewise not be regarded as public officers. I do not share this view with counsel to the claimants. AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor must be seen as merely creating an exception to the conception of public officer in terms of the Public Officers Protection Act, a limitation law; and that exception does not apply to the instant case. Furthermore, it is in this regard that counsel to the claimants went on to urge the Court to note that when Ibrahim v. JSC, Kaduna State & ors was decided and public officer was defined to include public bodies/institutions, it must be read to be unconstitutional given that the Constitution defines public officers to be persons, not institutions. But is counsel to the claimants correct? This remains the question. First section 318(1) – the definition section – of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, does not define “public officer(s)”. What it defines is “public service of the Federation” and “public service of a State”. In fact, it is in paragraph 4 of Part I of the Third Schedule to the Constitution dealing with Code of Conduct Bureau that the term “public officer” is used. Part I of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution then makes provisions as to Code of Conduct for public officers. It is here in paragraph 19 (the interpretation paragraph of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution) that “public officer” is defined to mean a person holding any of the offices specified in Part II of the Fifth Schedule; and “public office” shall not include the chairmanship or membership of ad hoc tribunals, commissions or committees. Even here, the definition is qualified by the phrase: “In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires….” This means that even the definition of “public officer” in the Constitution relates to only the Code of Conduct. Part II of the Fifth Schedule then goes on to reel out who the public officers are for the purposes of the Code of Conduct. The argument of the claimants’ counsel that the decision in Ibrahim v. JSC, Kaduna State & ors is unconstitutional in extending the meaning of public officers to include public institutions is, therefore, unsubstantiated in terms of the constitutional provisions. Even in defining “public officer” in terms of the Code of Conduct, the Constitution admits that the context may require a different meaning, hence the opening phrase – “In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires…”. I do not accordingly agree with the submission of the counsel to the claimants that Ibrahim v. JSC, Kaduna State & ors is unconstitutional simply because it extended the meaning of “public officer” to include public institutions. That argument of the claimants is hereby rejected. The claimants had in paragraph 3.05 of their written address submitted that a plea of limitation of action must be specifically pleaded and proved. In Mr. Thomas Inebui v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/282.2013 the ruling of which was delivered on April 29, 2014, a similar argument was raised by the claimant therein who also argued that an objection that a suit is statute-barred must be pleaded. This Court examined the authorities and rejected the argument. This Court then held as follows – On the competence of the preliminary objection, the claimant had argued that it is incompetent for not disclosing any rule of court or law under which it was brought. Here the claimant seems to forget that a preliminary objection as to jurisdiction (I do not agree with the claimant that issues of limitation of action are not issues of jurisdiction) is first and foremost an issue of law, which does not even require a formal motion. It can be raised even orally. See Petrojessica Enterprises Ltd v. Leventis Technical Co. Ltd [1992] 5 NWLR (Pt. 244) 675 at 693. This is because the law is trite that an objection that a Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a matter or action is treated not as an ordinary point of law. In any event, the issue of jurisdiction cannot be defeated by the provisions of rules of court. See S. O. Akegbejo & 3 ors v. Dr D. O Ataga (Director NIFOR) & 3 ors [1998] 1 NWLR (Pt. 534) 459 CA. The [claimants] had further and emphatically argued that objection based on statute of limitation does not amount to a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court, citing Madukolu & ors v. Nkemdilim; that the NIC Rules do not provide for filing of preliminary objection in lieu of statement of defence or demurrer proceedings; that a defendant wishing to rely on points of law to raise a preliminary issue is required to set out such points of law in the statement of defence before the preliminary issue is regarded as properly raised, citing Mobil Oil (Nig) Plc v. IAL 36 Inc; and that the law is that statute of limitation must be pleaded and proved, referring to Savannah Bank v. Pan Atlantic [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 49) 212 at 259; and this can only be done by statement of defence. In the face of more recent authorities, these arguments of the claimant cannot be correct. In Mr. Popoola Elabanjo & anor v. Chief (Mrs.) Ganiat Dawodu Suit No. SC386/2001 the judgment of which was delivered on Friday, the 23rd day of June 2006, the Supreme Court held as follows – To say, as did the trial Court and canvassed by the Appellants in their arguments before this Court, that objection to jurisdiction should only be taken after the filing of a Statement of Defence, is indeed a misconception. This entirely depends, on what materials were available. Objection to jurisdiction could be taken on the basis of the Statement of Claim as in Izenkwe v. Nnadozie [1953] 14 WACA 361 at 363; Adeyemi v. Opeyori [1976] 9 – 10 SC 31 and Kasikwu Farms Ltd v. Attorney-General of Bendel State [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 19) 695. It could be taken on the evidence received as was the case in Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1976] 1 All NLR 409; or by a motion on notice supported by affidavit giving the facts upon which reliance is placed as in National Bank (Nigeria) Ltd v. Shoyeye [1977] 5 SC 181 at 194. In fact, it could be taken even on the face of the writ of summons before filing Statement of Claim. See Attorney-General Kwara State v. Olawale [1993] 1 NWLR (Pt. 272) 645 at 674 – 675 and the recent decision in Arjay Ltd. v. Airline Management Support Ltd [2003] 7 NWLR (Pt. 820) 577 at 601. The Supreme Court went on to hold that the case of Savannah Bank v. Pan Atlantic relied upon by the Appellants was decided on its own peculiar facts where the defence under limitation statutes generally was considered. What all of this means is that the defendant was not in error when it filed its preliminary objection even without filing the statement of defence or other defence processes. The argument of the claimant in that regard consequently fails and is hereby rejected. The claimants’ reliance on Sulgrave Holdings Inc & ors v. FGN & ors [2012] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 309 at 339 – 340 does not change this stance. In citing His Lordship Chukwuma-Eneh, JSC, counsel to the claimants did not seem to appreciate that his was a concurring, not the lead, judgment. Secondly, and more specifically to the quotation of His Lordship as cited by the claimants’ counsel in paragraph 3.04 of his written address, the counsel to the claimant did not take account of the prefatory words of His lordship preceding the quotation itself. His Lordship had prefaced his viewpoint as follows – It must be noted that in some jurisdictions of this country the limitation laws are required as per the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules to be pleaded by the defence in order not to take the opposite side by surprise although it may also arise from the facts as pleaded without specifically alleging the relevant limitation law. My take here is that the statement of His lordship, which counsel to the claimants quoted, that “pleadings have to be filed and exchanged by parties before an objection to the action being stale and statute-barred can properly be taken”, must be read within the context of the prefatory remarks just quoted. His Lordship’s remarks must, therefore, be understood to mean that they apply only when the Rules of Court so demand. His Lordship Chukwuma-Eneh, JSC in Sulgrave Holdings Inc v. FGN had at page 339 shown the clear affinity between jurisdiction and limitation of action. This being the case, it means then that objection to jurisdiction could be taken on the basis of the statement of claim, or on the evidence received, or by a motion on notice supported by affidavit giving the facts upon which reliance is placed, or it could be taken even on the face of the writ of summons before filing statement of claim. I do not, therefore, agree with the counsel to the claimants in his argument in that a party relying on a plea of limitation of action must specifically plead it. At least, the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 does not require that limitation law be pleaded by the defence. The claimants in paragraphs 3.08, 3.11 and 3.12 of their written address had argued that the defendants acted contrary to the confines of their public duties and have continued to act outside their statutory or constitutional duties and have acted with no semblance of logical justification. In Joshua Mnenge v. Nigerian Army unreported Suit No. NICN/IB/22/2012, the ruling of which was delivered on December 18, 2012, this Court had held as follows – The argument of the claimant that the defendant did not lead evidence in proof of its objection is turning upside down the logic of principle. In a plea of a matter being caught up by the limitation law (the Public Officers Protection Act 2004 is a limitation law), all that is required of the applicant is to show from the originating processes when the cause of action arose and when the action was filed in court. Once this duty has been discharged, it is for the claimant to show that the matter comes within any of the permitted exceptions to the limitation law such as that the injury in question is a continuing injury or that the public officer acted mala fide i.e. outside the colour of his office or employment or outside his statutory or constitutional duty. See Ibrahim v. JSC, Kaduna State & ors [1998] 12 SC 20 at 32. However, Rahamaniyya United (Nig.) Ltd v. Ministry for Federal Capital Territory & ors (supra) at page 146, applying Chigbu v. Tonimas (Nig.) Ltd [2006] 31 WRN 179; [2006] 9 NWLR (Pt. 986) 189 SC at 210, held that the propriety or otherwise of the act of the defendants is not a relevant consideration for the applicability of the Public Officers Protection Act. The case continued that if an action against a public officer or public institution and organization is statute-barred having not been brought within the prescribed period of three months, there will be no basis for investigating the conduct of the public officer which gave rise to the action. That the conduct of the defendant as to whether he was malicious or not is irrelevant in determining whether the cause of action is statute-barred under section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act, referring to Egbe v Adefarasin [2002] 14 WRN 57 and Aremo II v. Adekanye [2004] 42 WRN 1 SC. In is in the attempt to show that the defendant acted mala fide that the claimant posited that the defendant did not act pursuant to the law. This argument turns the principle over its head as it is the very fact of the claimant complaining that his dismissal was not in accordance with the law that brought him to Court in the first place. If the claimant’s counsel turns round to say that for this reason, the defendant cannot enjoy the benefit of the Public Officers Protection Act 2004, then there is some warped reasoning on his part in that regard. In the instant case, I am not accordingly convinced by the argument of counsel to the claimants that the defendants acted contrary to the confines of their public duties and have continued to act outside their statutory or constitutional duties and have acted with no semblance of logical justification. This Court has not been shown by the claimants how the defendants acted outside of the confines of their duties and authority. Even if this were to be the case, that is the very reason that brought the claimants to Court in the first place. The claimants in paragraphs 3.07 and 3.08 of their written address had argued that their complaint is a continuing injury and so the defendants cannot rely on the limitation law. In support, the claimants referred to Osun State Govt. v. Danlami (Nig) Ltd [2007] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1038) at 66 83 – 84 and 100, where the Supreme Court held that section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply in cases of breaches of contract or claims for work and labour done. In contrast, the defendants referred the Court to Akauve Moses Osoh & ors v. Unity Bank Plc [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1358) 1 at 48 and 50, where the Supreme Court held that the action instituted by the claimants robbed the Court of its jurisdiction because as at the time the action was brought the claimants were no longer in employment of the defendant. Termination of employment cases have generally been held by the Courts to be capable of being caught up by the limitation laws. But are all labour/employment cases so caught up? This remains the question. In earlier cases such as John Ovoh v. The Nigerian Westminster Dredging & Marine Co. Ltd [2008] 14 NLLR (Pt. 37) 68, this Court had held that the labour rights are not caught up by the limitation laws: for to think otherwise would mean that even rights as to salaries and entitlements of an office would be time-barred. This reasoning was followed in subsequent cases such as Captain Tony Oghide & ors v. Shona Jason (Nigeria) Ltd unreported Suit No. NIC/3/2008 the ruling of which was delivered on July 18, 2008 and Captain Tony Oghide & ors v. Jason Air Ltd unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/12/2009 the ruling of which was delivered on January 13, 2011. In Hon. Runyi Kanu (JP) & ors v. The Attorney-General & Commissioner for Justice Cross River State & ors [2013] 32 NLLR (Pt. 91) 63 NIC, this Court attempted a rationalization of the authorities as follows – …the test on “continuance of damage or injury” laid down in the recent Supreme Court decision in AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 144 – 150 is met. In that case, at pages 148 – 149, the Supreme Court held that the case for the deprivation of allocation, which the plaintiff was entitled to every month and same has not ceased, was “a situation continuance of damage or injury which has not ceased”; and so the defence of the Public Officers Protection Act would not avail the 1st defendant who had raised it. I understand this authority to lay down that where an allocation which comes periodically, say, monthly (like salary and allowances, which also come periodically) is deprived a plaintiff State (like salary and allowances deprived to an employee), then there is continuing damage or injury for which the Public Officers Protection Act or Law will not apply. In this sense, for the ‘continuing injury’ exception to apply, the employee would need to be in employment; for otherwise, the claim that the deprivation continues would not stand. In the instant case, the claimants ceased to be in office in 2010. There is, therefore, no question as to the existence of a deprivation of an entitlement which comes in periodically and has not ceased after 2010. This being the case, the claimant in the instant case cannot claim the benefit of the exception to the Public Officers Protection Law of Cross River State. It must be noted that the definition of the phrase “continuance of the injury” by case law authorities means continuance of the “act which caused the injury” and not the injury itself. See Okafor v. AG, Anambra State [2001] FWLR (Pt. 58) 1127 at 1146 D – G relying on the English Court of Appeal case of Carrey v. Bermondsey Metropolitan Bourough Council [1903] 675 P. 447; 20 TLR 2, Amamiwe v. The Local School Board [1971] 2 NMLR 57 at 58 and Obiefuna v. Okoye [1961] All NLR 357. It is here that counsel to the claimants had prayed the Court to note that AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 talks of the limitation laws not being used to promote stark injustice. In this regard, I must first note the concurring judgment of His Lordship Chukwuma-Eneh, JSC in Sulgrave Holdings Inc v. FGN where His lordship at page 338 opined that “the intendment of the [Public Officers Protection] Act…has not provided a level playing ground for all persons before the law and the court and ought to be revisited by our lawmakers to reconsider in the light of the stage of our development festering with poverty and illiteracy and disease vis-à-vis the individual’s constitutional rights of equality before the law and the court and as against the background of section 6(b) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).” Whatever reservations His Lordship may have with the Public Officers Protection Act, the point remains that he recognized that the corrective answer lay with the lawmakers (the Legislature), not the Courts. So when in AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor His Lordship Galadima, JSC at page 148 reiterated that the Public Officers Protection Act was never intended to deprive a party legal capacity to ventilate his grievance in the face of stark injustice, the idea was not that it represented a call to judicial activism or judicial lawmaking. The talk of stark injustice was simply a prelude to addressing the twin exceptions to the application of the Public Officers Protection Act: where there is continuance of injury; and where the public officer acted outside the colour of his office or outside his statutory or constitutional duty. In fact, His Lordship proceeded to address these twin exceptions in the case. In other words, stark injustice was not used by the Supreme Court as a third exception to the Public Officers Protection Act; it was simply used to prelude or explain the original exceptions to the rule. From all I said so far, I find and hold that, on the authority of Ibrahim v. JSC, Kaduna State & ors, the defendants are public officers and so section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41 LFN 2004 applies to them. In Dr. Atonte Diete-Spiff v. Governor of Bayelsa State & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/CA/31/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on July 26, 2013, this Court held the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41 LFN 2004 to be applicable to States. The complaint of the claimants is that their appointments were terminated by the defendants vide letters of 5th August 2011. See paragraphs 1, 2, 20 and 27 of their statement of facts. The instant case was filed on 11th June 2013 i.e. some 22 months after the cause of action (the termination of their appointments) arose. This clearly is in breach of section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act 2004. The claimants’ action is accordingly caught up by the Public Officers Protection Act 2004; and I so find and hold. As held in the concurring judgment of His Lordship Chukwuma-Eneh, JSC in Sulgrave Holdings Inc v. FGN at 338, there can be no doubt that the claimants slept on their rights and have only themselves to blame for being caught up by the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act. The argument of the claimants as to continuance of injury does not meet the rationalization made by this Court in Hon. Runyi Kanu (JP) & ors v. The Attorney-General & Commissioner for Justice Cross River State & ors. That argument accordingly fails. On the whole, I uphold the preliminary objection of the defendants and accordingly rule that the instant case is statute-barred. The case is hereby struck out. Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip