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The claimants had taken up a complaint against the defendant dated and filed on 5th December 2013. By their statement of facts, they are praying for – 1. An order that the claimants are the owners of the houses they occupy having fully paid in excess the recommended price by the Federal Government. 2. A refund of the excess money paid to the tune of N2,469,422.00k. 3. A declaration that the attempted sale of the houses by the defendant contrary to the Federal Government Housing Scheme, 1977 is illegal and of no effect. 4. An order that the defendant refund to the claimants the part-payment deposited with the accrued interest. 5. An order that the defendant pay to the claimants the retained severance benefits and cost i.e. N2,270,105.00k and or N3,257,138.48. Accompanying the complaint are the statement of facts, list of witnesses, written statement on oath of the witnesses, list of documents and copies of the documents. The defendant did not enter formal appearance and so did not file even the memorandum of appearance as enjoined by Order 8 Rule 1 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Rules 2007. Neither did the defendant file any defence process. The Court at its sitting of 20th January 2014 had noted the claims of the claimant, which claims are over houses they occupy in virtue of a Federal Government Housing Scheme of 1977. The Court accordingly doubted if it has jurisdiction over the matter. Parties were then asked to file and serve written addresses on the issue starting with the claimants. This the parties did. The written address of the claimants is dated 3rd February 2014 but filed on 4th February 2014; and is accompanied by an affidavit of facts sworn to on 4th February 2014. The defendant’s written address is dated 26th February 2014 but filed on 27th February 2014. The claimants did not file any reply on points of law. The case of the claimants is that they took the defendant to Court in 2009 at the Lagos State High Court but the suit was caught up by the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution which ousted the jurisdiction of the State High Court to entertain matters relating to, connected or arising from workplace, labour, employment, et al. That the issue of jurisdiction was raised for the consideration of the Court and upon a well considered ruling of Oshodi J on 28th November 2013, the suit was struck out for want of jurisdiction. They accordingly commenced the present matter afresh in this Court. To the claimants, they are retirees and serving staff of the defendant company and institute this case claiming as per their complaint. It is their case that while in the employment of the defendant, they were allocated the houses they occupy on owner/occupier by the defendant in compliance with the Federal Military Government guidelines and conditions for the allotment of land to companies and parastatals with 500 or more employees. That the Federal Military Government had initiated the Federal Government Housing Scheme to facilitate home ownership for Nigerian workers. And being inclined to spread the benefit of home ownership to Nigeria workers accepted applications for allocation of land without cost from companies and parastatals with a minimum of 500 workers. That the defendant applied and was allocated land to build and deliver to its staff on owner occupier. That the Federal Government acquired all that parcel of land known as Satellite Town for the Military and afterwards the unused land was converted to build houses for staff. The Federal Government first built modest prototypes of 1000 No. units and thence determined the cost price of every house. The Federal Government bore 47% of every single house built by the companies. That the claimants have fully amortized the determined prices and now seek the Court to declare them the owners since the defendant refused to do so. And contrary to the Federal Ministry of Housing and Urban Development directive to deliver same on owner/occupier, offered same at exorbitant prices the houses to the claimants. That the defendant held back 50% of the claimants’ retirement benefits which is also among the claims. The claimants then framed one issue for the determination of the Court, namely: whether the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction in this case notwithstanding the provisions of section 254C(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution (as altered), which provides as follows – (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters:– (a) relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matter incidental thereto or connected therewith. To the claimants, their pleadings in paragraphs 1 and 7 – 20 of the statement of facts show that they were at all times material to this suit employees (and one is still serving) of the defendant. Consequently, upon their employment, they were allocated the houses they occupy on owner/occupier. They contended that the construction of the houses was the initiative of the Federal Government to facilitate home ownership for Nigerian workers (sic) welfare as contemplated in the Constitution. Moreover, that by paragraphs 24 – 29 of the statement of facts, they have shown that the part-payment deposited in interest yielding account and the holding back of their retirement benefits are all connected and incidental to their employment, referring to GCC Nig. Ltd v. Asaogbara [2000] FWLR (Pt. 17) 11. That it is the law that the Court must interpret the law as it is and not as it ought to be, citing Basinco Motors Ltd v. Woermann-Line & anor [2009] 6 MJSC (Pt. 1) 65 at 86. The claimants went on that notwithstanding any contrary provision of the labour and employment law, the Court must now entertain any matter arising from the workplace or bordering on employment whether issues of title are involved or otherwise. That it does not matter whether the contract of employment provides for house ownership or not although in this case it is provided, referring to clause 16 of the collective agreement they attached to their affidavit of facts of 4th February 2014. To the claimants, the Court will have no difficulty in assuming jurisdiction over this case in line with the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bronic Motors Ltd v. Wema Bank Ltd [1985] 5 NCLR (Pt. 1), ANPP v. Goni & ors [2012] 2 MJSC (Pt. II) 1 and Dangana v Usman & ors [2012] 2 MJSC (Pt. III) 145, all of which enjoin that where words of a statute are clear, they should be given their ordinary and plain meaning. That the Constitution being the ground norm of the laws in force in Nigeria, it overrides any other law be it an enactment of the National Assembly. That the Constitution has enlarged the jurisdiction of this Court beyond the functions contained in the NIC Act 2006. The claimants the urged the Court to assume its rightful jurisdiction; but that where the Court feels otherwise (which is doubtful) then it has one option, to transfer the cause of action to the State High Court given section 24(2) of the NIC Act 2006. In conclusion, the claimants urged the Court to assume jurisdiction because – a) If the claimants were not in the employment of the defendant at the time material the issue of allocation of houses will not arise. b) Also the forfeiture of their housing allowance will not arise. c) Their retirement benefits will not be withheld by the defendant to date. To the defendant, the claimants are former employees of the defendant who were allocated official quarters as licensees. That at a stage, the defendant decided to sell the flats by ballots to its staff. The exercise was embraced by all but the 12 claimants herein, who claimed that they now own their respective flats by virtue of the deduction made from their entitlements while in office on account of accommodation. The defendant then submitted that a critical look at the claims of the claimants will show that only claim 5, which is an ancillary claim to the main claims 1 – 4 can be argued as being remotely connected to labour, employment, industrial relation or trade union. The defendant framed one issue for the determination of the Court: whether the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction to entertain this claim. To the defendant, the law is that it is the claim before the Court that determines the jurisdiction of the Court; and in considering whether or not a Court has jurisdiction to entertain a matter, only the writ of summons and the statement of claim (and nothing more) can be looked at, referring to Adeyemi v. Opeyori [1976] 10 SC 31 at 51 and Tukur v. Gongola State [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517. The defendant continued that an examination of the claims of the claimant show that they are claims of declaration of title to the property at Shell Housing Estate, satellite Town, Lagos. That these are matters outside the jurisdiction of this Court. That the statement of facts does not plead any contractual document which shows any relationship of employer and employee between the defendant and the claimants, nor does it plead any document which shows what the alleged retained severance benefit of the claimants should be. Indeed, that employment law is the law that this Court will use in determining labour and trade dispute matters brought before it. On the face of the statement of claim, that it is clear that this suit is neither a labour nor a trade dispute matter. Thus it falls outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Referring to the reliefs claimed by the claimants as per their statement of facts, the defendant submitted that it is clear that the suit is a matter which deals with ownership of houses and payment of money in relation to the said houses; and so the nature of the claim is outside the jurisdiction of this Court. The defendant then urged the Court to discountenance the collective agreement attached to the affidavit of facts filed by the claimants as same does not form part of the statement of claim nor was it pleaded. That no reference was made to it in the statement of facts and no part of it was alleged to have been breached. To the defendant, the Court cannot look at the purported collective agreement for the purpose of determining whether the Court has jurisdiction over this suit. The defendant continued that there is no live issue relating to any matter arising from the workplace. That none of the reliefs is remotely connected with labour. That the NIC Act 2006 and the Third Alteration to the Constitution do not have retrospective effect. Thus, this Court has no jurisdiction over the claim before it, referring to Osoh v. Unity Bank Plc [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt 1358) 1 at 49 – 59, where it was held that – In the instant case, the appellants were no longer employees of the respondent at the time they filed their suit and the appellants’ claim was for terminal benefits. In the circumstance, the dispute between the appellants and the respondent was not a trade dispute. Consequently, the dispute did not fall within the ambit of the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court as rightly held by the Court of Appeal. Accordingly, the trial High Court has jurisdiction over the appellant’s suit. To the defendant, the claimants are no longer in the employment of the defendant and so the claim does not relate to any trade or labour dispute. Therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction. The defendant went on that it could be argued that one out of the 12 claimants is still in the employment of the defendant, yet this fact does not derogate from the fact that the subject matter of this suit is title to land/ownership of property. Thus a claimant out of 12 being still in employment of the defendant does not alter the position of the law. That there is no collective agreement or conditions of service referred to in the pleadings before this Court. More so, that no part of the collective agreement which the claimant’s tried to smuggle in through the back door has been alleged to have been breached. The end result should still be that the entire suit ought to be struck out, or at best, the claims and the names of all other 11 claimants, except that one employee only, ought to be struck out. The defendant then urged the Court to decline jurisdiction. The defendant continued that besides, only relief 5 of the claimants deals with severance benefits; and even though it said to be for severance benefits it is really a claim for alleged debt recovery and breach of contract. That the parties are no longer employer/employee. In any case, that relief 5 is an ancillary claim. That the real dispute between the parties is whether or not the claimants have purchased the flats that they occupy, or having refused to participate in the ballot, whether they had become tenants from whom possession can be recovered. That the law is that an ancillary claim must follow the main claim to the Court which ordinarily has jurisdiction to entertain the main claim, referring to Tukur v. Governor of Gongola State [1989] ANLR 575 at 619 – 620. That it is also the law that a Court cannot adjudicate over ancillary claims if it has no jurisdiction to entertain the main claim. That the principal claim in this suit is one of ownership of houses and money in relation to those houses. That relief 5 is, therefore, an ancillary claim, urging once again that the Court should decline jurisdiction in this matter. The defendant went on that the Court should reject the attempt by the claimants to hoodwink it with the ruling of Justice Oshodi of the Lagos High Court. That it is a ruling of a Court of coordinate jurisdiction which is unlikely to survive the test of an appeal. On the affidavit of facts filled by the claimants, the defendant submitted that the law is that when a person deposes to his belief in any matter of fact and his belief is derived from any source other than his own personal knowledge, he shall set forth explicitly the facts and circumstances forming the ground of his belief as well as the name of his informant shall be stated and reasonable particulars shall be given respecting the informant and the time, place and circumstances of the information, referring to section 115(3) and (4) of the Evidence Act 2011. That paragraphs 3 and 6 of the affidavit of the claimants do not state the facts and circumstances forming the ground of the deponent’s belief nor do they state the reasonable particulars respecting the informant and the time, place and circumstances of the information. Thus that it is clear from the face of the affidavit of the claimants that paragraphs 3 and 6 offend section 115(3) and (4) of the Evidence Act 2011, urging the Court to discountenance the affidavit of facts as well as the two exhibits attached to it filed by the claimants. That paragraphs 4 and 5 of the affidavit are predicated upon paragraph 4, while paragraph 7 is predicated on paragraph 6; an Exhibits R1 and R2 are attached to the said affidavit. To the defendant, if paragraphs 3 and 6 of the affidavit are discountenanced, there will be no affidavit of the claimants before the Court. That one cannot put something on nothing, referring to Macfoy v. UAC [1961] 3 All ER 1169. The defendant went on that the claimants allege that the Federal Government contributed towards the total cost of the said scheme. That it is a matter between the Federal Government and the defendant. Meanwhile, that the claimants are not privy to the agreement between the Federal Government and the defendant in respect of the housing scheme. The defendant then urged the Court to hold that it has no jurisdiction on the claim in this suit. I heard learned counsel and considered all the processes filed in this case. In considering the merit of the case, I need to clarify a thing or two. First, I must register the Court’s displeasure regarding the attitude of counsel to the defendant in referring this Court to cases that have incomplete citations. Counsel to the defendant in his written address referred to the following cases with their citations given as such: Ikenne Local Government v. WAPC Plc [2011] (Pt. 1261) 223 at 242 – 243 H – B (paragraph 4.02 of the written address); Onuekwusi v. RTCMZC [2011] 6 (Pt. 1243) 341 at 359 D (paragraph 4.05 of the written address); Adetona v. IG Ent. Ltd [2011] (Pt. 1247) 535 at 561 – 562 (paragraph 4.08 of the written address); and Babington v. [A] Ashaye v. EMAG Ent (Nig) Ltd [2011] (Pt. 1256) 479 at 516 (paragraphs 4.10 and 4.23 of the written address). In all these case, their citations are incomplete as the names of the Law Reports where they are reported are not disclosed. Is counsel expecting that it is the Court that will source for the Reports for him? Secondly, the defendant appears to equate a labour dispute with a trade dispute; hence the argument in paragraphs 4.09, 4.17 and 4.18 that the dispute before the Court is not a labour dispute or a trade dispute, and citing of Akauve Moses Osoh & ors v. Unity Bank Plc [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt 1358) 1 at 49 – 59 as supporting authority. While a trade dispute is a labour dispute, a labour dispute may not be a trade dispute. In other words, a labour dispute is wider than a trade dispute. By definition, at least under the purview of section 48(1) of the Trade Disputes Act (TDA) Cap. T8 LFN 2004 and section 54(1) of the NIC Act 2006. Section 54(1) of the NIC Act 2006, which has a wider definition of the term “trade dispute” than that under the TDA, provides as follows – “trade dispute” means any dispute between employers and employees, including disputes between their respective organizations and federations which is connected with – (a) the employment or non-employment of any person, (b) terms of employment and physical conditions of work of any person, (c) the conclusion or variation of a collective agreement, and (d) an alleged dispute In defining a trade dispute as a dispute between ‘employers’ and ‘employees’, what is envisaged is a collective labour dispute, not an individual labour dispute. This means that while a labour dispute includes individual labour disputes, a trade dispute does not include or signify an individual labour dispute. In, therefore, arguing as if both concepts mean one and the same thing, the defendant erred. Additionally, in referring to Akauve Moses Osoh & ors v. Unity Bank Plc as supporting authority for its argument, the defendant did not seem to take note of the fact that the case was filed in 1994 at the High Court of Edo State, Benin and so the cause of action arose long before the current Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution was passed. The cause of action dealt with in Akauve Moses Osoh & ors v. Unity Bank Plc arose when this Court had a much more restrictive jurisdiction than today. So how Akauve Moses Osoh & ors v. Unity Bank Plc applies under the current dispensation of the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution has not been pointed out by the defendant. In using Akauve Moses Osoh & ors v. Unity Bank Plc as authority for its submissions, the defendant appears to be saying that because the appellants are no longer employees of the respondent the dispute in question is not a labour dispute or a trade dispute; yet by definition a trade dispute even in its strict meaning is one connected with the employment or non-employment of any person. In talking of ‘non-employment’, it would seem that post-employment rights are contemplated, an issue not pointed out to the Supreme Court in Akauve Moses Osoh & ors v. Unity Bank Plc. The issue for determination is whether this Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on the claims of the claimants. I agree with the defendant that in deciding jurisdiction, it is the statement of facts as filed that must be considered. By Governor of Kwara State v. Lafiagi [2005] 5 NWLR (Pt. 917) 139, Inwelegbu v. Ezeani [1999] 12 NWLR (Pt. 630) 266, Tyonzughul v. AG Benue State [2005] 5 NWLR (Pt. 918) 226, Egbuonu v. BRTC [1997] 12 NWLR (Pt. 531) 29, FGN v. Oshiomhole [2004] 3 NWLR (Pt. 860) 305, AG Federation v. Guardian Newspaper Ltd [2001] FWLR (Pt. 32) 97, Sken Consult v. Ukey [1981] 1 SC 6 and Kotoye v. Saraki [1994] 7 NWLR (Pt. 317) 414, the law is that in determining jurisdiction, the Court is to consider only the writ of summons and statement of claim. In trying to convince the Court that it has jurisdiction over their claims, the claimant filed what it termed affidavit of facts. By this affidavit of facts two exhibits were attached: Exhibit R1, a ruling of Hon. Justice O. H. Oshodi of the Lagos High Court delivered on 28th November 2013 striking out (and refusing to transfer to this Court in the process) Suit No. LD/1548/2009, the parties of which are same with those in the instant case; and Exhibit R2, a 1986 Collective Agreement between the defendant in this suit and Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN), the aim being to show that the employment contract of the claimants include providing housing for them in the longer term as contained in the collective agreement. The defendant opposed the affidavit of facts and the attached exhibits, calling on the Court to discountenance all of them. In the first place, Exhibit R1 being a ruling of a Court established under the Constitution qualifies to be judicially noticed under section 122 of the Evidence Act 2011. So that ruling cannot be discountenanced as prayed by the defendant. However, Exhibit R2, a collective agreement, does not qualify for judicial notice and so in bringing facts outside of the statement of facts it offends established principle that in determining jurisdiction, only the complaint and the statement of facts (the originating processes) are to be considered. I agree with the defendant that nothing about Exhibit R2 was pleaded by the claimants in their statement of facts. In consequence, Exhibit R2 and the facts averred to in its regard in the affidavit of facts will be discountenanced for purposes of this ruling. I now proceed to examining the statement of facts to ascertain the cause of action of the claimants in other to determine whether this Court can entertain same. In paragraph 1 of the statement of facts, the claimants described themselves as retirees (except for the 9th claimant who is still in service) of the defendant and own the houses set out against their respective names under the Federal Government Housing Scheme 1977. By paragraph 7 of the statement of facts, the idea of home ownership for Nigerian workers was that of the Federal Military Government in 1977; and by paragraph 11(ii), the title to the land in question is vested in the Federal Government. By paragraph 13, the Federal Government’s contribution amounted to 47% of the cost of each fully developed house. By paragraph 18, from 1998 – 2009, the defendant charged outright rent on the houses in issue. To the claimants in paragraph 19, the defendant breached the Federal Government guidelines by entering into a tenancy agreement with them and not executing the purchase agreement. They then demanded from the Federal Government to prevail on the defendant to implement the scheme (paragraph 21). Letters and circulars were then issued by Government in that regard. One of such letters dated 15th August 1994, by paragraph 23, indicted the defendant. A trade dispute was even declared on the issue by PENGASSAN but had to be withdrawn to allow for settlement (paragraphs 25 and 30). It is the failure of settlement that led to an action being filed at the Lagos High Court, Suit No. LD/1548/2009. At the passage of the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution, the Lagos High Court declined jurisdiction, and instead of transferring the matter to this Court, struck out the case. The claimants accordingly filed the instant action. What I can gather from this narrative is that three parties are involved: the Federal Government, the defendant and the claimants. The reliefs the claimant are praying for from this Court are orders proclaiming them owners of the houses they occupy, refund of excess money paid in respect of the houses, declaration that the attempted sale of the houses by the defendant contrary to the Federal Government Housing Scheme 1977 is illegal, refund of part-payment deposited in respect of the houses and payment of retained severance benefits, which were retained in relation to the said houses. Under what law are these issues to be resolved? The Federal Government that gave rise to the scheme in question is not a party to this suit. The orders the claimants seek for have not been shown to be resolvable under employment or labour law. The claimants described themselves as retirees; they have not shown to the Court that what they claim appropriately come within their post-employment rights to warrant this Court to assume jurisdiction. Section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, is pretty clear that the jurisdiction of this Court relates to employment and labour matters. The argument of the claimants is that their claims come under matters incidental to labour or employment. When in doubt as to jurisdiction especially in the hybrid/borderline cases, this Court has evolved a simple but effective expedient; and that is to ask the question: what legal rules would apply in resolving the issue at hand? If it is labour or employment law rules, then the Court would assume jurisdiction, but if it is some other rule of law then most probably the Court would have no jurisdiction. See Okosun v. A & P Foods Ltd unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/474/2012, the ruling of which was delivered on 5th March 2013 and Bamidele Aturu – Law and Practice of the National Industrial Court (Hebron Publishing Co. Ltd: Lagos), 2013 at page 45. For instance, this Court has always assumed jurisdiction over workplace injuries i.e. injuries occasioned by negligence at the workplace where employers are sought to be held liable under tortious principles of employer’s liability; and this is because section 254C(1)(b) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, specifically confers jurisdiction on the Court over the Workmen’s Compensation Act or any other enactment replacing it. But regarding other heads of liability in tort, which are all sui generis, the NIC has been reluctant to assume jurisdiction even when the “matters incidental thereto or connected therewith” argument has been raised. Towards this end, this Court had declined and still declines jurisdiction in claims for defamation even when the defamatory imputation was said to have arisen from the workplace (Lawrence Idemudia v. LASU unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/08/2009 the ruling of which was delivered on September 28, 2010, Dr E. G. Ayo Akinyemi v. Crawford University [2011] 22 NLLR (Pt. 61) 90 at 110 and Mr. C. E. Okeke & 2 ors v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc [2011] 22 NLLR (Pt. 61) 161 at 183) given that Agbo v. CBN [1996] 10 NWLR (Pt. 478) 370 CA held that where a master accuses a servant of misconduct, whether proved or not, but decides merely to terminate his appointment in accordance with the service agreement without reference to the fact of misconduct in the latter of termination, the servant cannot rely on wrongful termination of appointment as cause of action to clear his name for his future, among other purposes. His recourse in an appropriate case may be in an action for defamation. Additionally, Geoffery v. Setraco Nigeria Ltd & ors unreported Suit No. NIC/ABJ/296/2012 the ruling of which was delivered on 4th March 2013 is a case where an applicant was assaulted by fellow workers or superior officers and verbally abused (see also Francis v. Bedebede & ors [2012] 26 NLLR 38). This Court declined jurisdiction to entertain the matter under section 254C(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. Quite rightly then, Bamidele Aturu (2013) op.cit at page 25 remarked thus – The fact that the right of a person is infringed in the workplace is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court except an employment issue is involved. See also Comrade Joseph Faniwunmi & ors v. National Union of Chemical Footwear, Rubber, Leather and Non-Metallic Product Employee & ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/431/2013 the ruling of which was delivered on April 29, 2014 a case of malicious prosecution, transferred to this Court by the High Court of Ogun State sitting at Ota, but presently referred to the Court of Appeal for its opinion as to the proper Court (the High Court of Ogun State or this Court) to hear the matter. In the instant case, the claimants chiefly want a pronouncement that they are the owners of the houses they occupy. They also want a declaration that the attempted sale by the defendant of the houses they occupy contrary to the Federal Housing Scheme 1977 is illegal. Can this Court make these pronouncements? I do not think so; and I so find and hold. The claimants raised the point that they had filed the action at the High Court of Lagos State and by the ruling as per Exhibit R1 the Lagos High Court struck out the case and refused to transfer same to this Court. The matter was not transferred to this Court; so what is before me is a fresh case and must be treated as such. If that case had been transferred then I would have had no option but to make a case stated to the Court of Appeal under section 24(5) of the NIC Act 2006. When the Lagos High Court, therefore, struck out the case before it, the option opened to the claimants was to have appealed against that decision instead of filing the present action in this Court. As it is, for the reasons given, I do not think that this Court has jurisdiction over the case of the claimants as filed. I accordingly decline jurisdiction. The case is accordingly struck out. Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip