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The claim of the claimant as per the complaint filed in this Court on 29th October 2013 is for the following relief – (a) The sum of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira only) damages for breach of the terms of employment of the claimant. The complaint is accompanied by a statement of facts, statement on oath of the claimant, list of documents and copies of the documents. The list of witnesses was not filed. In reaction, the defendants entered appearance by filing their respective memorandum of appearance. The 1st defendant then filed a notice of preliminary objection praying this Court to strike out and/or dismiss this suit for want of jurisdiction for the following reasons – 1. This Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit as there is no legal entity known as “U-Connect Telecommunication Nigeria Limited”. 2. The 1st defendant herein is a non-juristic entity. 3. This suit is academic and has been overtaken by events. 4. The suit is incompetent as presently constituted. In support of the preliminary objection are an affidavit and a written address. Thereafter, the 1st defendant filed its defence processes consisting of the statement of defence, list of witnesses, list of documents and copies of the documents. The witness statement on oath was not filed. The 2nd defendant filed two preliminary objections. The first is dated 6th December 2013 but filed on 17th December 2013. By order of Court given on 5th March 2014, this preliminary objection was withdrawn and hence struck out. The 2nd preliminary objection of the 2nd defendant is dated 18th December 2013 but filed on 19th December 2013. It prays for an order striking out the name of the 2nd defendant from this suit on the following grounds – 1) The claimant has not shown any reasonable cause of action against the 2nd defendant. 2) The claimant lacks the locus standi to institute this suit. 3) This suit constitutes an abuse of court process. 4) This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit as constituted against the 2nd defendant. In support of the 2nd defendant’s objection are an affidavit and a written address. The 2nd defendant did not file defence processes as the 1st defendant did. At the Court’s sitting of 5th March 2014, the Court noted both preliminary objections of the defendants in challenging the competence of this suit. The Court also noted that the claimant reacted to the preliminary objections in addition to filing a motion to amend the name of the 1st defendant – one of the grounds upon which the 1st defendant is objecting to the competence of the suit i.e. the absence of a juristic person in terms of the 1st defendant. The Court went on that although the rule is that when faced with two competing motions, a Court is enjoined to take the motion that has the tendency to save a suit, this rule does not extend to competence of an action where there is no competent suit in the first place as where a wrong party is sued. Additionally, that there is before the Court another suit filed by the claimant against the same defendants. The case is Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013 and the claim is for “N10,000,000.00…damages for wrongful termination of the claimant’s employment by the defendants”. In the instant case, the claim is for “the sum of N10,000,000.00…damages for breach of the terms of employment of the claimant”. The issue that consequently arose was whether this is not an abuse of court process. Parties were then asked to address the Court on this additional issue. However, because the preliminary objections filed by the defendants in Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013 raised the issue of abuse of court process and to which all parties filed written addresses, and the 2nd defendant raised the issue of abuse of court process even in its objection in the instant suit, the court simply ruled that it will use the addresses in Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013 in determining the present additional issue of abuse of court process. Parties were then asked to adopt their processes regarding the preliminary objections in both suits. In effect, the two suits are to be considered together. In arguing its preliminary objection, the 1st defendant framed two issues for the determination of the Court, namely – 1. Whether this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain this suit brought against a non-juristic person. 2. Whether from the reliefs sought and the grounds relied upon by the claimant, this suit as presently constituted is merely speculative, hypothetical and purely academic and if so whether this suit is competent. Regarding issue 1, the 1st defendant contended that a Court can only determine matters which it has established the jurisdiction to entertain, citing Braithwaithe v. GDM [1998] 7 NWLR (Pt. 557) 307 and AG Lagos State v. Dosunmu [1989] 3 NWLR (Pt. 552) 566 – 567. To the 1st defendant, the question before the Court is whether the proper parties are before the Court. That it is trite law that natural persons and bodies or institutions having juristic personality can sue or be sued; hence, to sue or be sued, one must be a legal person, referring to AG Federation v. ANPP [2003] 18 NWLR (Pt. 851) 182, ACB Plc v. Emostrade Limited [1998] 2 NWLR (Pt. 536) 19 and section 37 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) Cap. C20 LFN 2004. The 1st defendant then submitted that the 1st defendant as stated on the face of the originating processes dated 29th October 2013 is neither a natural person nor is it a person having juristic personality. That the 1st defendant is not a company registered under CAMA; hence the suit is against a non-juristic person and so is incompetent and, therefore, should be struck out, citing Iyke Med. Merchandise v. Pfizer [2001] 10 NWLR (Pt. 722) 540 at 556 and Agbonmagbe Bank Limited v. General Manager, GB Ollivant Ltd & anor [1961] 1 ANLR 116. The 1st defendant then urged the Court to dismiss/strike out the instant case as the Court has no jurisdiction to hear same. On issue 2, the 1st defendant contended that a Court exists to adjudicate disputes between parties in relation to their competing legal interests and not to engage in a mere academic discourse, no matter how erudite or beneficial it may be. That a suit is academic where it is merely theoretical and of no particular utilitarian value to the plaintiff even if judgment is given in his favour; or it is one where it is not related to practical solutions of human nature; and it is speculative if it is not supported by facts or very low on facts but high in guesses. That it is not the function of the Court to embark on advisory opinion or abstract or academic exercise or on speculation. That it follows that anyone coming before a Court must show the existence of a dispute between him and the defendant in every action filed in court and that he is not merely seeking for an answer to hypothetical questions or an opinion on a matter in which there is yet no dispute, referring to Ezerobo v. Ejindero [2009] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1148) 166 at 176 – 177 and Abubakar v. Yar’Adua [2008] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1078) 465 at 497 B – F. To the 1st defendant none of the claimant’s pleadings upon which the relief sought is supported by facts. That the claimant alleges wrongful suspension, victimization, harassment, and intimidation yet he claims damages of N10 million for breach of employment contract without showing from his claim how the defendants have breached the contract of employment. That the relief sought for does not flow from the claim. That the claimant cannot seek damages for wrongful suspension. Also that the claimant has not shown any damages suffered by him to ground the reliefs sought. In any event, that the claimant is not an employee of either of the defendants as at the date hereof. To the 1st defendant, facts are the backbone of any cause of action and address of counsel no matter how erudite cannot substitute facts. It will amount to mere speculation, raising hypothetical questions for academic discourse which has no place in our jurisprudence. The 1st defendant then urged the Court to discountenance the reliefs sought and dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction. The 2nd defendant on its part framed only one issue for the determination of the Court: whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit in the circumstance. Under this issue, the 2nd defendant addressed two sub-issues: that of no reasonable cause of action and absence of locus standi. Regarding the absence of reasonable cause of action, the 2nd defendant submitted that for a statement of facts to disclose a reasonable cause of action, it must not only set out the legal rights of the claimant but must specifically state the obligations of the defendants, referring to Rinco Construction Co. Ltd v. Veepee Industies Ltd & anor [2006] WRN Vol. 17 123 – 127 and Sehindemi v. Gov. Lagos State [2006] 10 NWLR (Pt. 987) 1 CA. That the claimant claimed against the defendants the sum of N10 million as damages for breach of terms of employment. To the 2nd defendant, the claimant has shown no reasonable cause of action against the claimant having failed to show the Court the liability of the 2nd defendant under the law or the contract of employment as he was employed by the 1st defendant via a letter of employment dated 7th December 2012 before he was seconded to the 2nd defendant. In addition, that the claimant stated in his claim that the 2nd defendant has no power under his contract of employment to suspend him as this is the exclusive prerogative of the 1st defendant. That it is, however, surprising for the claimant to now bring a claim against a person for breach of a contract which he was never a party, citing UBA v. Jargaba [2007] Vol. 43 WRN 1 SC at 19, Basinco Motors Ltd v. Woermarin-Line & anor [2009] 5 – 6 SC (Pt. 2) 123 and UBN Plc v. Soares [2012] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1312) 550. That the absence of a contract of employment between the claimant and the 2nd defendant renders any claim against the 2nd defendant with respect to the breach of his contract of employment unenforceable against the 2nd defendant. The 2nd defendant went on that assuming without conceding that the contract of employment between the claimant and the 1st defendant is for the benefit of the 2nd defendant, the claimant will still not have had a reasonable cause of action as it is the law that contract between parties cannot be enforced against a third party even if the contract is made for his benefit and it purports to give him the right to sue or to be sued, citing CB Ltd v. Intercity Bank Plc [2009] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1165) 445 CA. That the claimant by his statement of fact failed to mention in any part of same where he and the 2nd defendant entered into a contract of service. That he also failed to state in his claim what gave him the right to enforce his contract of employment with the 1st defendant against the 2nd defendant. The 2nd defendant then submitted that the failure of the claimant to establish a valid contract between himself and the 2nd defendant on the one hand and subsequent breach of such contract (if any) on the other hand renders this suit as one without a reasonable cause of action, referring to NCC v. MTN (Nig.) Comm. Ltd [2008] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1086) 229 at 263 B – C, and praying that the suit be struck out. On the absence of locus standi, the 2nd defendant submitted that where a claimant fails to establish that his right has been infringed under an existing law, he lacks locus standi and the Court ought to discountenance his claim, referring to Bewaji v. Obasanjo [2008] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1093) 540 at 578 – 579. That the claimant failed to show in his claim that he has a right under any existing contract which binds the 2nd defendant with respect to his employment. That he also failed to show in his claim which of his right under an existing law was breached by the 2nd defendant, citing In re Ijebu [1992] 9 NWLR (Pt. 266) 414 at 415, 422 and 423, Osigwelem v. INEC [2011] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1253) 425 CA and Taiwo v. Adegboro [2011] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1259) 562 SC. The 2nd defendant concluded by urging the Court to resolve the two sub-issues in its favour and uphold its objection. Given that another suit, Mr. Kelvin Ashuman v. U-Connect Telecommunication Services Nigeria Limited & anor Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013 was filed by the claimant, both defendants raised the additional issue of abuse of court process on the ground that the instant case and Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013 have the same issues and same claims as is the statement of fact in both cases. To the 2nd defendant, abuse of court process simply means that the process of the Court has not been used bona fide and properly. Also that it connotes the employment of judicial process by a party in improper use to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent and efficient and effective administration of justice, citing Aburo v. Aiyeleri [1993] 3 NWLR (Pt. 280) 126. That Suit No. NICN/LA/576/2013 earlier filed by the claimant is in pari materia with Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013. The claimant thereby brought two separate suits of similar facts and claim before the Court with the aim of harassing, intimidating and embarrassing the defendants, referring to Adeleke & ors v. OSHA [2006] 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 136. That the Court has a duty in such a situation to interfere and stop an abuse of its process, referring to Nweke v. Udobi [2001] 5 NWLR (Pt. 706) 445. To the 2nd defendant, the question which this Court should ask is whether there is similarity in the two actions and if the parties are the same, referring to UBA Plc v. Mode Nig. Ltd [2000] 12 NWLR (Pt. 680) 16 at 22 C – D. That the Supreme Court has held in a number of cases that once abuse of court process is established, a court or tribunal before whom the action is brought ought to dismiss the abusive suit and/or processes, citing Kode v. Yussuf [2001] 4 NWLR (Pt. 703) 392 at 394 and Ikine v. Edjerode [1996] 2 NWLR (Pt. 431) 468. The 2nd defendant accordingly submitted that this suit amounts to an abuse of court process and the proper order to make is to dismiss this suit in its entirety. The claimant reacted to the 1st defendant’s preliminary objection by filing a counter-affidavit and a written address, both dated 10th December 2013. In his written address, the claimant adopted the issues formulated by the 1st defendant. On issue 1 i.e. whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit brought against a non-juristic person, the claimant contended that the 1st defendant did not disclose sufficient facts before this Court to allow the Court to determine whether the 1st defendant is a juristic person or not. That the 1st defendant has not tendered any document or certificate of incorporation to enable the Court to exercise its discretion in its favour. That since the 1st defendant is asserting that it does not bear the name indicated in the process, it has the obligation to disclose to the Court what its real name is instead of leaving the Court to speculate on this fact, and the Court has no duty to speculate on any fact. In any event, that the claimant has filed an application to amend the name of the 1st defendant as shown on the letter of employment of the claimant. That it is trite that the Court has moved away from granting technical judgment to substantive judgment. That the submissions of the 1st defendant on this issue are nebulous, vague and lack any substance whatsoever. Regarding issue 2 i.e. whether the reliefs sought and the grounds relied upon by the claimant, this suit as presently constituted is merely speculative, hypothetical and purely academic and if so whether this suit is competent, the claimant submitted that he has shown on the facts of his pleadings that there are sufficient facts to ground his claim for breach of the terms of his employment. In any case, that this issue is incompetent because evidence has not been adduced by the parties to determine whether the 1st defendant has breached any term of employment or not. That the 1st defendant has not filed any defence to the claimant’s claim. To the claimant, having filed an application to amend the claim, the submission of the 1st defendant on this issue is irrelevant. That the Court is enjoined to do substantive justice to the parties as the days of Court granting judgment on technicalities are over. That the 1st defendant has not shown in its application any ground for the Court to grant the reliefs sought in its application. It is the submission of the claimant that he has reasonable cause of action against the 1st defendant, as an active participant of the breach of the claimant’s terms of employment. That the 1st defendant has not filed any pleading to enable the Court to determine whether the claimant has reasonable cause of action against the defendant or not. The claimant then urged the Court to dismiss the application as lacking any merit. In reacting to the objection of the 2nd defendant, the claimant adopted the issue framed by the 2nd defendant and submitted that he has disclosed reasonable cause of action against the 2nd defendant having regard to his pleadings, referring to paragraph 4.7 of his counter-affidavit and paragraphs 2, 6, 13 – 16, 20, 21 and 28 – 32 of his statement of facts, which to him are undisputed. The claimant went on that the preliminary objection is premature because these are issues of facts in dispute and recondite points of law which the Court must determine after the trial of the case. That some of the issues of fact and recondite points of law the Court will have to look at are – (a) What is the relationship between the defendants and if either of the defendants will be liable to the claimant in damages. (b) Whether or not the claimant is entitled to claim damages against the two defendants for breaches of the terms of his employment. That these two issues can only be determined after hearing of evidence of the parties herein. The claimant then stated that there are other salient points of law which he intends to call attention of the Court to after the trial of the case. On the issue of privity of contract, it is the submission of the claimant that there is privity of contract between the parties herein, referring to paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit. That in his letter of employment as part of the originating processes, the 1st defendant stated that the claimant will resume duty with the 2nd defendant. That there are clauses in the letter of employment and the 2nd defendant’s staff handbook that confirmed the claimant as an employee of the 2nd defendant, referring to clause 15 of the letter of employment. To the claimant, in his pleadings, he disclosed certain acts of the 2nd defendant which left a gap about the nature of the claimant’s employment with the defendants. That the Court cannot speculate on this uncertainty until after hearing evidence of both parties. For instance, that the 2nd defendant suspended the claimant on 2nd September 2013 while the 1st defendant issued its letter dated 4th September 2013. It is, therefore, the claimant’s submission that having regard to his pleadings, the 2nd defendant was never a stranger to the contractual employment of the claimant. That the 2nd defendant is a necessary party without whom the issues begging for the Court’s determination cannot be determined without the defendant in the suit. Regarding the issue of abuse of court process, it is the submission of the claimant that there is no abuse of court process because Suit No. NICN/LA/576/2013 is completely different from Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013. That in the former, he is contending various breaches of the terms of his employment culminating in wrongful suspension without pay for two weeks; whereas in the latter, he is claiming N10 million damages for wrongful termination of his employment when a suit was still pending. The claimant continued that he is also contending that in Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013, that the grounds of wrongful termination of his employment were still being contested in Suit No. NICN/LA/576/2013 when he was wrongfully terminated from his employment, referring to Labode v. Otubu [2001] 7 NWLR (Pt. 712) 156 at 279 – 280. The claimant then submitted that the 2nd defendant has not established any abuse of court process by the claimant. He urged the Court to dismiss the 2nd defendant’s preliminary objection with substantial cost. The claimant also drew the attention of the Court to the fact that regarding Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013, that a look at the letter of termination of the claimant’s employment, the 1st defendant gave its name as “U-Connect Telecommunication Services Nigeria Limited”. So whether the name is of the 1st defendant was spelt as “U-Connect Telecommunication Services Limited” or “U-Connect Telecommunication Services Nigeria Limited” is the making of the 1st defendant. He concluded by reiterating that his claim in Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013 is for wrongful termination, while his claim in Suit No. NICN/LA/576/2013 is for breach of the terms of employment. To the claimant then, there is no abuse of court process in the two suits filed against the defendants. I heard learned counsel and considered all the processes filed. The key issue before the Court is whether the Court has jurisdiction over the instant case as well as Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013. Within this key issue, the Court is called upon to decide whether the case against the 1st defendant is one against a juristic person; whether the case of the claimant in both cases disclose any reasonable cause of action; and whether the two suits fall foul of the rule against multiplicity of suits as to make both cases an abuse of court process. In considering all these issues, I must first remark that in answering the objections raised by the defendants, the claimant did not deem it fit to cite any authority to authenticate its submissions. In that wise, the claimant ended up making submissions that twisted principles on their head. For instance, on the complaint of suing a non-juristic person, it is the argument of the claimant that the 1st defendant did not disclose what its true identity is. The claimant cannot be serious here. When the 1st defendant raised the issue of juristic personality, it is the claimant who must now supply the documents identifying the party he sued as a legal person capable of being sued. To say that it is for the 1st defendant to disclose to the Court what its real name was is trying to shift the burden of proof against known norms. It is the claimant who is suing. He it is that must know who his adverse party is. So if there is a question of identity, it is the duty of the claimant to show the correct identity, not the other way round. Filing an application to amend the name of the 1st defendant is an admission by the claimant that he does not know who he wants to sue as 1st defendant. I note, however, that later in his submissions, the claimant would point out that regarding Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013, a look at the letter of termination of the claimant’s employment, the 1st defendant gave its name as “U-Connect Telecommunication Services Nigeria Limited”. So whether the name of the 1st defendant was spelt as “U-Connect Telecommunication Services Limited” or “U-Connect Telecommunication Services Nigeria Limited” is the making of the 1st defendant. Secondly, the claimant seems to think that by not filing any statement of defence, the 1st defendant cannot raise any objection in terms of reasonable cause of action. A reasonable cause of action is determinable from the originating processes, not from the defence of the defendant. See Cookey v. Fombo [2005] 22 NSCQR 411, Ogbimi v. Ololo [1993] 7 NWLR (Pt. 304) 128 and Dr Irene Thomas & ors v. The Most Rev. Olufosoye [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669, which held that when an objection is raised that the statement of claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action, it is the statement of claim that has to be examined to ascertain whether or not there is a reasonable cause of action. It is when a reasonable cause of action is established that the defence of the defendant can be made. So it is not open to the claimant to assert that the 1st defendant has not filed any pleading to enable the Court to determine whether the claimant has reasonable cause of action against the 1st defendant. In other words, it is incorrect to think that because the statement of defence has not been filed, a plea of the absence of reasonable cause of action cannot be raised. Once again, having to assert that he filed an application to amend his claim is an admission that his original claim may not have disclosed a reasonable cause of action. The claimant must note that courts generally frown on causes of action being amended or added to especially if that will deny a defendant any valid defence to the claimant’s claims. See Alhaji M. Balogun v. Panalpina World Transport (Nig.) Ltd & anor [1999] 1 NWLR (Pt. 585) 66 at 77 – 84, Ashimiyu Oduola & ors v. Chief A. B. Ogunjobi [1986] 2 NWLR (Pt. 23) 508 at 509, Mabro v. Eagle Star and British Dominions Insurance Company Ltd [1932] All ER Reprint 411 at 412 – 413 and Life v. Peasley [1980] 1 All ER 623 at 640 – 643. The main submission of the 1st defendant is that as sued the 1st defendant is not a juristic person capable of being sued. In Suit No. NICN/LA/576/2013, the 1st defendant is actually put as “U-Connect Telecommunication Nigeria Limited”, while in Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013 the 1st defendant is put as “U-Connect Telecommunication Services Nigeria Limited”. The letter of employment of the claimant dated 13th December 2012 and frontloaded by the claimant in both cases show that it was issued by “U-Connect Telecommunication Services Ltd” with the address put as “5 Ogbunike Street, Lekki Phase 1, P. O. Box 74043, Victoria Island, Lagos”. When the claimant filed both suits, he put the address of the 1st defendant as “No. 5 Ogbunike Street, Lekki Peninsula Phase 1, Lagos”. What this means is that the identity of the 1st defendant is not in issue. The mistake of the claimant is, therefore, not as to the identity of the 1st defendant but as to the spelling of its name; and I so find and hold. This finding and holding is reinforced by the fact that in Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013, in the letter of termination of the claimant’s employment (as well as the warning letter issued to him), the 1st defendant gave its name as “U-Connect Telecommunication Services Nigeria Limited”. Even the 1st defendant gave an erroneous name as to itself. In Pfizer Incorporated & anor v. Prof. Idris Mohammed [2013] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1379) 155 it was held that where a juristic and a non-juristic person are sued, the Court should simply strike out the non-juristic person; and that a party incorrectly named can be corrected but not when the error is as to identity of the party. On the authority of Pfizer Incorporated & anor v. Prof. Idris Mohammed, therefore, the objection made by the 1st defendant is curable by the simple expedient of an amendment. The argument of the 1st defendant that the two suits be struck out or dismissed because it is not a juristic person is hereby rejected. The next issue is whether the two cases disclose any reasonable cause of action. I pointed out earlier that in determining this issue, only the originating processes especially the statement of facts that can be used. It is in regard to this issue that the 2nd defendant also raised the issue of privity of contract. The pleading of the claimant as can be seen in his statement of facts is that he was employed by the 1st defendant and posted to work at the 2nd defendant. This naturally raises the legal question whether this fact gives rise to a co-employer status between the defendants on the one hand and the claimant on the other hand. In appropriate cases, the courts have upheld the fact of co-employer status between two employers in relation to an employee as was the case in Onumalobi v. NNPC and Warri Refining and Petrochemical Company [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 2) 304. This means that the argument of the 2nd defendant regarding the absence of privity of contract cannot be upheld. I agree with the claimant that it is trial that can thus show whether this fact of co-employer status is the case regarding the parties or not. The argument of the 2nd defendant in that regard is accordingly rejected. The issue of absence of reasonable cause of action remains outstanding. From the pleadings of the claimant, he was employed by the 1st defendant and posted to work with the 2nd defendant. The pleadings here raise issues of the relationship between the parties (the 1st defendant, the claimant and the 2nd defendant) i.e. whether it one of a triangular employment relationship. In PENGASSAN v. Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited [2013] 32 NLLR (Pt. 92) 243 NIC, this Court acknowledged the reality of triangular employment relationships. The argument of the defendants that this relationship does not disclose any reasonable cause of action fails and so is accordingly rejected. I must also state that a major complaint of the claimant in Suit No. NICN/LA/576/2013 is his suspension. See, for instance, paragraphs 21 – 39 of the statement of facts. ACB Ltd v. Ufondu [1997] 10 NWLR (Pt. 523) 169 CA held that a person unlawfully suspended from work can seek redress in the Court and claim his full salary; and the relief prayed for by the claimant is for the sum of N10 million for breach of the terms of employment in Suit No. NICN/LA/576/2013. The issue of suspension is an issue of the terms of employment. The claimant accordingly has the right to come to Court. His instant case accordingly as well as Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013 which is for N10 million for wrongful termination of employment disclose reasonable cause of action to warrant him coming to Court; and I so find and hold. The argument of the defendants here must, therefore, fail and is accordingly rejected. This leaves out the issue of abuse of court process on the ground of multiplicity of suits. To be able to determine whether there is multiplicity of suits regarding the two suits in issue (Suits Nos. NICN/LA/576/2013 – the instant suit – and NICN/LA/618/2013), it may be necessary to compare the two. Save for the misspellings of the name of the 1st defendant, the parties in both suits are the same. As I indicated earlier, the claims in both suits are relatively the same. In the instant case, the claim is for “the sum of N10,000,000.00…damages for breach of the terms of employment of the claimant”; whereas in Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013 the claim is for “N10,000,000.00…damages for wrongful termination of the claimant’s employment by the defendants”. Despite this similarity in the claims between the two suits, it is the argument of the claimant that both suits are actually different. The crux of the argument of the claimant here is that while in the instant case (Suit No. NICN/LA/576/2013) his claim is for breach of the terms of his employment, his claim in Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013 is for wrongful termination. In consequence, there is no abuse of court process in the two suits filed against the defendants. But I must ask: what is wrongful termination; and what is breach of terms of employment? Is termination of employment not a term of employment in so much so that breach of terms of employment would necessarily include termination of employment? In both cases, the claimant is claiming for N10 million. The facts pleaded by the claimant in both cases are the same. In answer, the claimant alluded to the fact that when he filed the instant case, he was merely suspended from work; and while the instant suit was pending, his employment was terminated hence the need for Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013. A look at paragraph 38 of the statement of facts in Suit No. NICN/LA/576/2013, for instance, will show that the claimant pleaded that “the acts of victimization and humiliation by the defendants will lead to abrupt termination of his employment”. The claimant anticipated the fact of the termination of his employment in Suit No. NICN/LA/576/2013, the issue he says is the basis of Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013. In consequence, it is my finding that both suits are the same in terms of the parties and the relief sought and so both suffer the charge of multiplicity of suits. The law is that multiplicity of actions which involve the same parties and the same subject matter amount to abuse of court process and a court is duty bound to stop such abuse. See Pavex International Co. Ltd v. IBWA [1994] 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 685, Okorodudu v. Okoromadu [1977] 3 SC 21 at 32, COP v. Fasehun [1997] 6 NWLR (Pt. 507) 180 – 181 and Chief Ohwovwioghor Ikine v. Chief Olori Edjerode [2001] SC 43. And by Chief Victor Umeh & anor v. Prof. Maurice Iwu (Chairman INEC) & 3 ors [2008] 2 – 3 SC (Pt. I) 135, it is settled law that for there to be an abuse of court process, there must exist a multiplicity of suits between the same parties on the same subject matter and on the same issues which pre-conditions are mutually inclusive as they are conjunctive. In order to determine whether an abuse of the judicial process has occurred, Agwasim v. Ojichie [2004] 10 NWLR (Pt. 882) 613 laid down that the Court is expected to consider the content of the first process vis-à-vis the second to see whether they are aimed at achieving the same purpose. In Alhaji Lateef Akinsola v. National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) & ors [2013] 33 NLLR (Pt. 96) 399 NIC, this Court had cause to apply these principles in dismissing the case in question for multiplicity of suits. Where a finding is made as to multiplicity of suits, what then is the remedy? By Registered Trustees of Ifeloju v. Kuku [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt. 189) 65 at 79 per Tobi, JCA (as he then was) – There are certain instances when the courts of law have jurisdiction to strike out a matter with an order barring the applicant from instituting the same action at all times and for all times. Such instances occur mostly when an enabling statute or law so specifically provides or when the matter which is being struck out is an abuse of judicial process. See Alhaji Lateef Akinsola v. National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) & ors (supra) where this Court applied this remedy. In the instant case, having found that the two suits before the Court suffer the charge of multiplicity of suits, the remedy available is striking out both suits. In that respect, the instant suit and Suit No. NICN/LA/618/2013 are hereby struck out for abuse of court process bordering on multiplicity of actions. For the avoidance of doubt, the two suits are struck out for no other reason than abuse of court process on the ground of multiplicity of suits. Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip