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This suit was commenced by way of Writ of Summons filed at the Rivers State High Court on the 27th day of July 2012. By an order of transfer made on the 15th day of April 2013, the case was transferred to the National Industrial Court vide a letter dated the 30th day of May 2013 but received at the registry of this court on the 3rd day of June 2013. By a Complaint and other originating processes filed in the registry of this court on the 11th day of October 2013, pursuant to an order of this court made on the 26th day of September 2013, the Claimant sought the following reliefs against the defendant: a) A Declaration that the defendant’s action in failing refusing and neglecting to release its findings (Investigation report) having concluded investigation since July, 2011 up till date despite repeated demands while the Claimant remained in an indefinite suspension, pending the release of the said findings (investigation report) thereby subjecting the claimant to inhumane treatment, undue hardship, frustration, pain, inconveniences, untold discomfort, emotional and psychological trauma is unlawful inhumane and amounts to unlawful interference with the claimant’s employment. b) A Declaration that the Claimant is entitled to general and special damages for the inhumane treatment, undue hardship frustration, pain, inconvenience, untold discomfort, emotional and psychological trauma suffered by the Claimant as a result of the defendant’s action and inaction in refusing to release the said investigation report having concluded its investigation since July, 2011. c) An order of this court directing the Defendant to release the said investigation report forthwith. d) An order of this court awarding the sum of Forty five Million Naira (N45,000,000.00) only, being and representing special and general damages. By a Motion on Notice dated and filed on the 29th day of April 2014, the defendant/applicant prays this Honourable Court for an order dismissing this suit as same amounts to an abuse of court process, and this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain, hear and determine same. The grounds upon which the application is brought are:- i) The instant suit is based on the same set of facts, circumstances and alleged cause of action in Suit No. NICN/PHC/40/2013 – MR. CHIDI AKWARANDU vs. JEMMTEK RESOURCES LIMITED. ii) The Claimant’s suit in Suit No. NICN/PHC/40/2013 – MR. CHIDI AKWARANDU vs. JEMMTEK RESOURCES LIMITED, which is in respect of similar facts, alleged cause of action, circumstances and reliefs predates the instant suit in Suit No. NICN/PHC/78/2013 – MR. CHIDI AKWARANDU vs. BAKER HUGHES NIGERIA LIMITD. iii) The suit as presently constituted amounts to multiplicity of action and an abuse of court process. iv) This Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain, hear and determine this matter. v) It is in the interest of justice to dismiss/strike out this suit. The motion is supported by a 19 paragraph affidavit and a written address wherein counsel to the defendant/applicant formulated a sole issue for the determination of the court, to wit: Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, particulary the pendency of Suit No: NICN/PHC/40/2013 – MR. CHIDI AKWARANDU vs. JEMMTEK RESOURCES LIMITED at the Calabar Division of this Honourable Court, whether the Claimant’s claims in the instant case as presently constituted amounts to an abuse of court processes and liable to be dismissed. In arguing the sole issue, counsel submitted that the concept of abuse of court process is imprecise. It involves circumstances and situations of infinite varieties and conditions. He cited the case of R – BENKAY (NIG) LTD. vs. CADBURY (NIG). PLC (2012) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1306) Pg. 596 at 614 where the Supreme Court per Ngwuta, J.S.C held that: “As a matter of fact, whether a case constitutes abuse of court process will depend on the facts and circumstances of that case”. In the said, the Supreme Court proceeded to look at the various situations and conditions that could give rise to an abuse of court process. In the words of Adekeye JSC at pages 616 – 617 paragraphs H-F the position at law was stated succinctly thus: “The concept of abuse of court process relying on numerous decided authorities is imprecise. It involves circumstances and situation of infinite variety and conditions. But a common feature of it is the improper use of judicial process by a party in litigation to interfere with the due administration of justice. The circumstances which will give rise to abuse of court process include: (a) Instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter against the same opponent on the same issues or multiplicity of actions on the same matter between the same parties even where there exists a right to begin the action. (b) Instituting different actions between the same parties simultaneously in different courts, even though on different grounds. (c) Where two similar processes are used in respect of the exercise of the same right for example a cross-appeal and a respondent’s notice. (d) Where an application for adjournment is sought by a party to an action to bring an application to court for leave to raise issues of fact already decided by the lower court. (e) Where there is no law supporting a court process or where it is premised on frivolity or recklessness. (f) Where a party has adopted the system of forum-shopping in the enforcement of a conceived right. (g) It is an abuse of court process for an appellant to file an application at the trial court in respect of a matter which is already subject of an earlier application by the respondent at the Court of Appeal, when the appellant’s application has the effect over reaching the respondent’s application. (h) Where two actions are commenced, the second asking for a relief which may have been obtained in the first, the second action is prima facie vexatious and an abuse of court process.” Counsel submitted that the above circumstances and situations highlighted by the Supreme Court are disjunctive and independent of each other and each circumstance or situation if established will suffice to sustain an application praying the court to dismiss an action for being an abuse of court process. This application, he submits, is premised on condition (h) emphasized above, which has to do with commencing an action to ask for a relief which may have been obtained in an already pending case. He went on that a careful perusal of the Claimant’s case in Suit No: NICN/PHC/40/2013 – MR. CHIDI AKWARANDU vs. JEMMTEK RESOURCES LIMITED will reveal that the alleged facts averred to in the Statement of Fact are the same in the instant suit and the cause of action alleged are the same and the relief sought in the instance case could have been sought and obtained in the other suit. For the avoidance of doubt, the Statement of Fact in the instant case is a complete replication of the Statement of Fact in Suit No: NICN/PHC/40/2013 – MR. CHIDI AKWARANDU vs. JEMMTEK RESOURCES LIMITED, which forms part of the bundle of documents attached to the affidavit in support of this application as Exhibit BHNL I. For ease of reference, counsel reproduced the replicated paragraphs (being paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24) as follows: 4. Baker Hughes Nigeria Limited is an Oil Servicing Company, and carries on business with Mobil Producing Nigeria Limited, and other multinational oil producing company. It equally (sic) in concert as joint contractors with Addox Nigeria Limited, work for Total Fina Elf. 6. The Defendant Company provides logistics services and is a local content partner to Baker Hughes Nigeria Limited, by reason of the above, I work in concert with Baker Hughes personnel and thus the relationship intermingled. 7. The Claimant’s duties in the Defendant Company include overseeing the liquid mud plant, receiving and loading on behalf of the Defendant company and Baker Hughes Nigeria Limited, all based mud, brine, preparations of mud, recondition of mud and other products used for drilling. The Claimant also carried out daily stuck and reports all such transactions to the defendant base coordinator, Mr. Johnson Sule. 8. The claimant is assisted in his duties by his subordinates who took delivery and/or load out the aforesaid drilling products in my absence or while on off-duty. 9. The claimant worked assiduously, diligently and faithfully for the defendant, which said work earned me recommendation and payment of the sum of N250,000.00 by the defendant in appreciation of good work in March 2011. The letter of appreciation dated 18th March 2011 is hereby pleaded. In addition, the claimant’s monthly take home pay after all deductions is N221,383.96 (net pay). The claimant’s monthly salary slip is hereby pleaded. 10. On the 9th day of June 2011, the defendant company had several jobs line up for execution, which included operations on the mud plaint for the night crew to carry out, however, due to technical problems, the job was not executed on the night in question. 11. The claimant avers that when he reported to work on the 10th day of June 2011, he discovered that I had only one personnel, Mr. Gershion to work with. 12. Due to the lack of personnel who were trained in the claimant’s line of duty, the claimant managed to recondition tanks nos. 1 & 8 of the Addax mud plant and build about 3,000 barrels of total mud in tanks no. 18 simultaneously with just one staff (personnel), which took me late into the night. 13. The claimant states that upon the completion of the job, Mr. Johnson Sule (Base Coordinator) requested that he should load two (2) trucks for Addax Nigeria Ltd. One (1) truck for premix and the other for base oil. The claimant told Mr. Sule that I had been at work since morning with little or no assistance and was completely exhausted, and pleaded that the assignment should be given to the night crew, but Mr. Sule while acknowledging the fact that the claimant had been overworked due to shortage of manpower, insisted that he carries out the assignment as directed. 14. In order not to be accused of insubordination, the claimant went ahead to load the said trucks of the drilling products bound for Owerri that night. He loaded the trucks, closed the hatches, sealed the tail end and documented the seal number in the way bill which was issued to the drivers, who were to convey them to Owerri that night, while he left for his home. 15. The claimant avers that in the morning of 11th June 2011, he received a call from the defendant company to the effect that the trucks were recalled back by the security personnel to the defendant’s base for discharge and re-confirmation of the loaded products. 16. The claimant avers that one Mr. Osazee Igbinoba, security manager to Baker Hughes, personally supervised the trucks and confirmed that the seals and numbers thereon to were intact. He also monitored the discharge of the trucks which he confirmed that there was in access of 38 barrels of base oil, which he (Mr. Osazee Igbinoba) did not return to the tank were it was taken from with a void space capacity of 10.385 barrels/inch as against the mix pit of 2.658 barrels/inch it was returned Mr. Osazee Igbinoba then took the seals and other relevant documents to his office. 17. The claimant was asked to submit in writing, a report on the excess 38 barrels base oil, which he did on the 16th June, 2011 to the said Mr. Osazee Igbinoba, wherein the claimant clearly stated all that he knew about the incident and how he was coerced into loading the trucks on the instruction of Mr. Johnson Sule, despite acknowledging his exhaustion and fatigue on the day in question. 18. On the 18th day of June, 2011, without being issued with any query as regards to the incident of 11th June 2011, the claimant was suspended indefinitely by the defendant company. 19. The Claimant states that he was suspended alongside Mr. Godson of Baker Hughes Nigeria Limited. The claimant protested in writing against my suspension and demanded for an independent investigation into the matter. The claimant’s protest letter which he copied several staffs of the defendant and Baker Hughes Nigeria is hereby pleaded. 20. Based on the aforesaid protest by the Claimant, a 6 man investigation panel was set up to look into the matter, which included Mr. Osazee Igbinoba, whom the claimant protested the inclusion of Mr. Osazee Igbinoba in the panel as he cannot be an accuser and a judge at the same time, but to no avail. 21. The Claimant appeared before the panel who sat in Lagos and Port Harcourt; witnesses were called including one Mr. Gershion, a subordinate to the claimant. The claimant avers that Mr. Gershion informed him that Mr. Johnson Sule told him to give incriminating testimonies against him (Claimant) before the panel. 22. The claimant contends that during the sitting of the panel, Mr. Gershion told the panel that Mr. Johnson Sule asked him, to incriminate the claimant, a fact which led the panel to direct Mr. Gershion to put in writing what he has told them about Mr. Johnson Sule vis-à-vis the claimant. 23. The panel had since concluded its sitting and investigation in July 2011 or thereabout. They have not made their findings known, but the Claimant observed that Mr. Gershion had been re-absorbed in his employment, while the claimant is still at home. 24. That Claimant states that failure by the investigative panel to make its findings known is due to the fact that he had not been found culpable in the saga and no report was made to any security agency against him. Counsel submitted that the reproduced paragraphs makes it quite glaring that the claimant’s case in Suit No. NICN/PHC/40/2013 is exactly the same as the instant case as presently constituted. For example, a comparison of the Statement of Facts in the two cases will show that paragraphs 10 to 19 of the claimant’s Statement of Facts in Suit No. NICN/PHC/40/2013, are also paragraphs 10 to 19 of the Statement of Facts in the instant case. Paragraph 19 in the other case is paragraph 20 in the instant case paragraph 20 in the other case is paragraph 21 in the instant case, paragraph 21 in the other case is paragraph 22 in the instant case, paragraph 23 in the other case is paragraph 30 in the instant case, paragraph 24 in the other case is paragraph 32 and 33 in the instant case, paragraph 25 of the other case is paragraph 34 of the instant case, paragraph 26 of other case is paragraph 35 of the instant case, paragraph 27 of the other case is paragraph 25 of the instant case and paragraph 28 of the other case is paragraph 26 and 37 of the instant case. It was Counsel’s further submission that it is obvious that both cases were constituted and instituted on the same set of facts alleging the same cause of action; therefore, the reliefs sought in this case also flow directly from the facts averred to in the Statement of Facts in Suit No. NICN/PHC/40/2013, and as such, the reliefs claimed in this case could also have been obtained in the other suit. Restating the claimant’s claim in this suit, counsel submitted that the said reliefs also flow from the facts alleged in the Statement of Facts in the other suit particularly paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24. He went on that a juxtaposition of the reliefs sought by the claimant in this (Suit NO. NICN/PHC/78/2013) and the facts alleged in Suit No NICN/PHC/40/2013 will show that the instant suit falls within the category of abuse of court process created by the Supreme Court in the case of R. Benkay Nig. Ltd. vs. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (Supra) where it was stated that Where two actions are commenced, the second asking for a relief which may have been obtained in the first, the second action is prima facie vexatious and an abuse of court process. Further reference was made to the case of Dingyadi v. INEC (No. 2) (2011) Pt. 1224, Pg. 154 at 221 paragraph D-G, where the Supreme Court held thus: “I earlier on alluded to the fact that appeals NO. CA/S/EP/GOV/10/2009 and CA/A/276/08 are pending before the Court of Appeal in Sokoto and Abuja. They both seek interpretation of the judgment of the Court of Appeal Kaduna. The filing of two suits on the same issue in two different jurisdiction amounts to multiplicity of actions. A clear case of multiplicity of proceedings. The rule well laid down by the courts is that where matters involving the same issues are raised contemporaneously in two different courts, it is desirable and in the interest of justice that these matters should be heard in only one of these two courts. It is designed to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. The basis of the rule is the real possibility of two conflicting decisions in respect of one and the same subject matter.” To the defendant, what the claimant is set out to achieve principally in the two suits is to seek redress over an alleged suspension from his employment by his employer. The Supreme Court had stated with clarity in the case C.P.C. vs. I.N.E.C (2013) 13 NWLR Pt. 1317 Pg. 206 at Pg. 276 paragraph A, that it is an abuse of court process to file two similar processes to achieve the same purpose. Counsel went further that where a party duplicates a court process, the more current one which results in the duplication is regarded as an abuse of court process. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of TSA Ind. Ltd. v. F.B.N. Plc (NO. 1) (2012) 14 NWLR Pt.1320 Pg. 362 particularly at Pg. 345 paragraph A – B; and African Reinsurance Corporation vs. J. D. P. Construction Nig. Ltd. (2003) 133 NWLR pt 838, 609 at 635 paragraphs E – G and submitted that it is clear that the other suit in Calabar Division of this court is first in time, being Suit No. NICN/PHC/40/2013 as against this Suit which is No. NICN/PHC/78/2013; therefore, it is the instant suit that is an abuse of court process. He cited the case of Onyeabuchi v. INEC (2002) 8 NWLR Pt. 769 Pg. 417 at 443 par. E, where the Supreme court per Mohammed J.S.C. held that it is an abuse of the process of court for a claimant to litigate again over an identical question, and submitted that the issues and reliefs raised herein are identical with the other suit in Suit No. NICN/PHC/40/2013. On the proper order that should be made once a court finds that its process is being abused, Ayoola J.S.C held in the above case of Onyeabuchi (Supra) at pg. 441 pars. G – H thus: The only issue left is whether or not the trial judge should have struck out the suit instead of dismissing it. In AIYELERU (1993) 3 NWLR Pt. 280 126; (1993) 24 NSCC (Pt. 1) 225, this court, per NNEMEKA –AGU, JSC, citing WILLS v. EARL OF BEAUCHAMP (1886) 11 P. 59, 53 said: Once a court is satisfied that any proceeding before it is an abuse of court process, it has the power, indeed the duty, to dismiss it. Further, it was repeated at p. 68: Once a court is satisfied that the proceedings before it amounts to an abuse of process, it has the right, in fact, the duty, to invoke its coercive powers to punish the party which is in abuse of its process. Quite often, that power is exercisable by a dismissal of the action which constitutes the abuse. The power of the court to stay or dismiss proceedings which are an abuse of its process derives from the inherent jurisdiction of the court. Counsel therefore urged the court to resolve the issue distilled in this application in favour of the defendant/applicant and dismiss this suit as same amounts to an abuse of court process, and award substantial costs against the claimant as the suit is misconceived, frivolous, vexatious, irritating, unmeritorious. In opposition to the motion on notice, the Claimant filed a Counter affidavit of 21 paragraphs and a written address wherein counsel to the claimant formulated a lone issue for the court’s determination; to wit: Whether the Parties, cause of action and reliefs sought in this suit are the same with that in NICN/PHC/40/2013, as to amount to an abuse of court process. It is Counsel’s submission that this suit does not in any way amount to an abuse of court process, being that the claimant has a right to seek redress in a court of law, and the claimant has not filed a multiplicity of action against the defendant in this suit or any other party whatsoever. The claimant has only sued his employers Jemmtek Resources Limited for wrongful suspension and payment of his salary and other entitlements in NICN/PHC/40/2012. The defendant in this suit is not a party to that suit; and the claimant has not sought any relief against Baker Hughes Nig. Ltd. (defendant in the instant case) in suit no. NICN/PHC/40/2012. The Supreme Court in A.C.B. PLC vs. NWAIGWE (2011) 7 NWLR (PT. 1246) 308 AT 385 RATIO 3; held “An abuse of court process will arise when, (a) A party institutes several actions against the same party on the same subject matter, and the same issues; (b) A party institutes different actions between the same parties in different courts at the same time, the ground being different notwithstanding” N.V. SCHEEP vs.M.V “S. ARAZ” (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 691) 622. He submitted further that this suit NICN/PHC/78/2013 between Mr. Chidi Akwarandu vs. Baker Hughes Nig. Ltd. is not in any way the same with suit No. NICN/PHC/40/2012 between Mr. Chidi Akwarandu vs. Jemmtek Resources Limited. The defendants in the two suits are not the same. He therefore urged the court to hold that the defendant in this suit has not put forward any credible evidence whatsoever to show that the claimant in this suit has ‘instituted several actions against the same party on the same subject matter; and the same issue’ and or instituted different actions between the same parties in different courts at the same time. It was Counsel’s further submission that although the circumstances of what constitutes an abuse of court process are not closed or exhaustive, the conditions to satisfy or to establish an abuse of court process are that, two suits are instituted and pending simultaneously which have; (a) The same subject matter/cause of action and (b) The same parties. It does not amount to abuse of court process where the parties are not the same. NOSPETCO OIL & GAS LTD. vs. OLORUNNIMBE (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1307) 115 at 132 ratio 16. In considering whether or not an action is an abuse of court process, counsel stated that it is the claimant’s motive in instituting the action as can be inferred from the manner and the circumstances to which the action has been instituted that are to examined to see if they are malafide or intended to annoy, irritate or embarrass the defendant. He referred the court to the authority of KOLAWOLE IND. CO, LTD. vs. A.G. FED (2012) 14 NWLR (1320) 221 @ 225 -226 ratio 3, and submitted further that where an allegation of abuse of process of court is raised, it is the duty of the court to look at all relevant materials before it in deciding whether the allegation is true or not. In all the process filed before this honourable court, the defendant has not shown how this suit or any part of it annoy, irritate or embarrass the defendant at all. Upon constituting an investigative panel to investigate the incidence of 10th June, 2011 wherein the claimant was summoned to appear which he did, the defendant owes the claimant a duty to release the report/findings of the said investigative panel, and failing to so do the claimant has a right of action, to sue to compel the defendant to release the said report as well as sue for damages. We further submit and urge the court to hold that it was wrong for the defendant to suggest that the claimant should have joined the defendant in this suit to the suit in NICN/PHC/40/2012, as well as claim against the defendant the reliefs sought in this suit in the said suit. Counsel went on that where a party to a suit is by law, given the option or discretion to exercise this right by different ways, his opponent cannot prescribe the particular method by which the party must exercise his right and the opponent cannot complain that there was an abuse of court process if the party exercises his right in any of the permitted ways. See R. BANKAY (NIG.) LTD. vs. CADBURY (NIG) PLC (2012) NWLR (Pt. 1306) 596 @ 601 ration 3. He submitted that although the authorities relied upon by the defendant/applicant may be good laws, but they do not avail the defendant/applicant in any way in this application, as they are either against his legal arguments or the facts and circumstances of each of the cases are distinct and different from the instant case and therefore cannot apply. In the case of R. BANKAY (NIG.) LTD. vs. CADBURY (NIG) PLC (2012) NWLR (Pt. 1306) 596 cited by the defendant/applicant, the court held that a suit filed by a party who exercises his right to either file a counter – claim or file a fresh suit, by filing a fresh suit does not amount to an abuse of court process In DINGYADI vs. INEC (NO. 2) (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224) 154 cited by the defendant/applicant, the parties were the same, unlike the instant case were the parties are not same, hence the authority does not support their argument at all, we therefore urge the court to discountenance the said authority as it does not apply in support of the defendant’s argument in this case. In C.P.C. vs. INEC (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1317) 260 cited by the defendant/applicant, the parties were the same, the action was one and the same the court only referred a preliminary objection filed by a party in the same suit, unlike the instant case were the parties are not the same, hence the authority does not support their argument at all, we therefore urge the court to discountenance the said authority as it does not apply in support of the defendant’s argument in this case. The authority of TSA IND. LTD. vs. F. B. N. PLC (NO. 1) (2012) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1320) cited by the Defendant/Applicant, the parties in that case were the same, the subject was the same, the reliefs sought were also the same, unlike the instant case were the parties are not the same, the reliefs sought are not in any way the same, hence the authority does not support their argument at all, we therefore urge the court to discountenance the said authority as it does not apply in support of the defendant’s argument in this case. In the case of AFRICA RE-CORP vs. JDP CONST. (NIG) LTD. (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 838) 609 cited by the Defendant/Applicant, the parties in that case were the same, unlike the instant case were the parties are not the same, hence the authority does not support their argument at all, we therefore urge the court to discountenance the said authority as it does not apply in support of the defendant’s argument in this case. In ONYEABUCHI v. INEC (2002) 8 NWLR (Pt. 769) 417 cited by the defendant/applicant, the parties in that suit were the same, as well as the cause of action, unlike the instant case were the parties and the cause of action are not the same. Hence the authority does not support their argument at all. He therefore urged the court to discountenance the said authority as it does not apply in support of the defendant’s argument in this case. In ARUBO vs. AIYELERU (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 280) 126 cited by the Defendant/Applicant, the parties were the same, the action was one and the same, unlike the instant case were the parties are not the same. Beside an order of striking out or dismissal cannot only be made when the court has first satisfied itself that there is indeed and abuse of court process and not otherwise, hence the authority does not support their argument at all, we therefore urge the court to discountenance the said authority as it does not apply in support of the defendant’s argument in this case. To the Claimant, a grant of this application will prejudice the Defendant as it would have robbed the court its hard earned jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit on its merit; and the grant of this application will prejudice the Claimant in every way and it would not be in the interest of justice that it be granted. In conclusion, Counsel to the Claimant urged the Court to dismiss this application with substantial cost, as the application on its own constitutes an abuse of court process. The defendant/Applicant on the 19th day of June 2014, filed a reply on points of law, wherein he raised the following issues for the determination of the court: i. Whether the Claimant/Respondent can maintain two suits simultaneously in the same court in respect of the same cause of action relating to same subject matter even if the defendants are different; ii. Whether the claimant suit is reckless, frivolous and capable of annoying and irritating the defendant; and iii. In view of the facts averred to and the claims of the claimant/Respondent in the Statement of Fact (attached to the affidavit in Support of the Defendant/Applicant’s Motion as Exhibit (BHNL 1), whether the prior determination of the issues arising in Suit No. NICN/PHC/40/2013, by the Calabar Division of this Honourable Court will not render the issues in this suit to be caught by the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicata. As regards whether the Claimant/Respondent can maintain two suits simultaneously in the same court in respect of the same cause of action relating to same subject matter even if the defendants are different, Counsel to the defendant/applicant submitted that a cause of action is the aggregate of facts that can sustain a suit in court. He relied on the case of Dantata vs. Mohammed (2000) 7 NWLR (Pt. 664) 176 at 196 Para. H where the Supreme Court held that the words ‘cause of action’ means ‘simply a factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain a remedy against another person’ The court held further in the case, quoting Uwais JSC in Egbue v. Araka (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 84) 598, that a cause of action is “the fact or combination of facts which give rise to a right to sue”. Applying the above judicial authority to the facts of this case, counsel submitted that the cause of action is the alleged suspension of the claimant and the refusal of the purported investigative panel set up by the defendant herein to release the alleged investigation report. Therefore, a perusal of the facts alleging the cause of action in the present case and the previous case also filed before this honourable court (now pending at the Calabar Division), although against a different party, will no doubt reveal the following: i. That both suits are premised on the alleged incident which happened on 10th and 11th of June 2011; ii. Both suits are complaining against an alleged investigative panel constituted by the defendant in this suit purportedly in July, 2011, which had failed to release the result and the alleged effect of the non-release of the investigation report by the defendant in the previous suit. iii. Both suits are seeking reliefs, inter alia, for unlawful interference with claimant’s employment. Sequel to the alleged facts in the two pending suits which require exactly the same evidence to substantiate on the part of the claimant, the defence submitted that the claimant cannot maintain two different actions in the same court over the same cause of action and in respect of the same subject matter even if the parties are different. We submit that although authorities on abuse of court process are more often than not decided on facts relating to matters where both parties are the same, it is our contention that circumstances giving rise to abuse of court or judicial processes is not short circuited or limited to matters were the parties are the same only. It is trite that the most elementary position of the law in relation to abuse of court processes is that its varieties and the circumstances that can give rise to it are infinite. This position was stated with abundant clarity in the judicial authority of UNITY BANK (FORMERLY BANK OF THE NORTH) vs. KAYODE OLATUNJI ESQ. (carrying on Business in the name and Style of Kayode Olatunji & Co., Legal Practitioners) (2013) (CA), LPELR - 20305 pgs. 24 – 25 paras. D – A where the Court of Appeal, Kaduna Division, per Abiru JCA held thus: Now, abuse of process is a concept; it is an idea or a general notion formed by generalization from particular examples. It is a concept that is imprecise. It involves circumstances and situations of infinite variety and conditions. In MESSRS NV Scheep & anor vs. The MV’s araz’ & Anor (2002) 15 NWLR (pt. 691) 622 at pg. 664 Karibi-White JSC said of the concept thus: “The legal concept of the abuse of the judicial process or the abuse of the procedure of the court is very wide. The scope and content of the circumstances of the material facts and conduct, which will result in such abuse, are infinite in variety. It does not appear that the category can be closed. New unforeseen conduct from the stratagem of the plaintiffs can give rise to the abuse. An abuse may be constituted through a proper and legitimate conduct in bringing actions even in the exercise of an exercise of an established right in the manner of time of instituting actions. It may be constituted by irregularities in the pursuit of action.” Counsel referred to the decision in the case of NIMB Ltd. vs. UBN (2004) 12 NWLR Pt. 888 at Pg. 599, where the Supreme Court made pronouncement on the proprietary of instituting two actions in respect of the same subject matter before courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction where the claims in the latter suit can be made in the former. The Supreme Court per Mohammed JSC held at page 624 paras D – F thus: Thus if two actions are commenced, the second asking for a relief which may have been obtained in the first, the second action is prima facie vexatious and an abuse of the process of court. Further submissions made by the learned counsel to the defendant/applicant was to the effect that in the event that this Honourable Court holds that the above cited and quoted authorities, as well as those cited and quoted in the defendant/Applicant’s Written Address in support of the instant Motion dated and filed on 19th April 2014, are only applicable in cases where the parties are the same, as contended by Claimant/Respondent’s Counsel, he submit that on the strength of the decision in UNITY BANK (FORMERLY BANK OF THE NORTH) v. KAYODE OLATUNJI ESQ. (carrying on Business in the name and Style of Kayode Olatunji & Co., Legal Practitioner) “New unforeseen conduct from the stratagem of the Plaintiffs can give rise to the abuse.” He urged the court to hold that the stratagem of the claimant in this case constitutes an abuse of court process and falls into the category of “New unforeseen conduct” in respect of which no pronouncement had been made before now. On whether the Claimant’s suit is capable of annoying and irritating the Defendant, the defence counsel submitted that in law, a party is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his action. The institution of multiplicity of action in respect of the same subject matter is undoubtedly irritating, annoying, embarrassing and constitutes a harassment of the Defendant. As regards the issue whether in view of the facts averred to and the claims of the claimant/Respondent in the Statement of fact (attached to the Affidavit in Support of the defendant/Applicant’s Motion as Exhibit BHNL 1), whether the prior determination of the issues arising in Suit No. NICN/PHC/78/2013, by the Calabar Division of this Honourable Court will not render the issues in this suit to be caught by the doctrine of estoppels per rem judicata; it was the submission of counsel to the defendant/applicant that the concept of abuse of court process is inextricably linked with the doctrine of res judicata. In the case of Jimoh vs. Akande (2009) 5 NWLR part 1135, page 549 particularly at 577, paragraphs D & E, the Supreme Court per Chukwuma – Eneh showed this relationship by holding thus: Besides, it constitutes an abuse of court process for the Plaintiff or his privies to raise a suit against the same defendant or his privies on the same subject matter and issues which have been previously decided between him and the defendant by a court of competent jurisdiction. In this regard the principle of res judicata could be raised many a time in limine by the defendant to show that the Plaintiff is re-litigating on issue or issues in the present suit, which have been finally and conclusively decided on the merits (whether is earlier in time), between the same parties and their privies by a court of competent jurisdiction. On the above authority, counsel submitted that a party who seeks to litigate an issue already decided between him and the opponent or others who may not even be parties in the previous suit (as it would happen in this case) is abusing the process of court. In the instant case, we have shown that the issue arising for consideration in both cases filed by the Claimant are the same. Paragraphs 23 and 24, of the Statement of facts which forms the plank of the Claimant’s case in Suit No. NICN/PHC/40/2013 pending before Calabar Division of this Honourable Court is also the plank of the Claimant’s case in the instant suit. Any pronouncement on the issues arising for determination in that suit will constitute an estoppel in this suit as this honourable court can no longer look at issues already decided by a court of co-ordinate or concurrent jurisdiction. In the case of NIMB LTD. vs. UBN (2004) 12 NWLR Pt.888 at page 599, the Supreme Court, per Pats-Acholonu, JSC, at page 518, para. A – G, held thus: Now there is no doubt that the two courts in this case of co-ordinate jurisdiction became seised of the same subject matter in which it must be made clear, made orders which from whatever or however any one may look and try to synthesize or analyze, were pitched against each other. In that case the protagonists, id est, the legal combatants would inevitably be put in the quandary as to which order would prevail or be obeyed. It is I believe inelegant and a matter that would go against the grain of our procedural law for courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction instead of endeavoring to shore up the jurisdiction of each other engage in a form of unsavory competition. Where a Federal High court is prayed to make an order that is diametrically or in conflict with a subsisting order of a State High court in the context of the same subject matter and where equally identical or seeming identical prayers are sought, it should, in my view refuse to entertain it and may advise that the parties transfer the matter first filed or instituted in the State High court to its own court particularly in an area where it may even possess wider jurisdiction than the State High Court due to the subject matter. The learned justice of the Supreme Court state further at pages 619 - 620, paras. H- C that. Where counsel for different parties to a matter either due to over zealousness to comply with the dictates of their Client or cause sheer nuisance by the nature of proceedings they foist on the courts which are likely to bring them to ridicule, it behoves of the courts particularly the latter one to which proceedings in the same subject matter were entertained in the first court, to exercise utmost caution. In this connection, it should school itself on the probability and naughtiness of abuse of process of the court which some counsel sometimes in their eagerness to pursue their case lose sight of the possible consequence of causing disaffection that leads to ridicule and opprobrium of the court. Although the above authority decided issues relating to the Federal and State High Court which are courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, counsel submitted that the principles embedded therein are applicable to two divisions of this honourable court having concurrent jurisdiction, mutatis mutandis. Further in the case of Wema Bank Plc. vs. Abiodun (2006) 9 NWLR Pt. 984 Pg. 1, the court of Appeal at page 34 paras. D-E, per Honourable Justice Clara Ogunbiyi analyzed the position of the law in this respect as follows: “the rule of res judicata is derived from the maxim of nemo debet bis vexari pro-eadem causa. It is the causa that matters and a plaintiff cannot by formulating a fresh claim, re-litigate the same causa. That is why section 53 of the Evidence Act does not speak of the claim, but of the facts directly in issue in the provious case” It was held further in that case that: It would appear apparent from the foregoing laid down legal principles that the salient underlying deduction gives an inclination that on the one hand, the issues may be the same, although the form of action and the marshalling of the parties may be different. On the other hand, the issues may be distinct though both relate to the same transaction or property. The test however is to inquire whether the same evidence would support both issues.” Counsel stressed that the statement of fact in Suit No. NICN/PHC/40/2013 makes copious reference to the Defendant throughout its length and breadth, and makes similar allegations against the Defendant herein, although the Defendant herein is not a party to that suit; and that the issues arising from the Statement of Facts in this suit as comprised in Suit No. NICN/PHC/78/2013 (which is a replica of the statement of fact in the previous suit as shown in the affidavit in support of the instant Application and the written address in support of same). Counsel contended therefore that if the Calabar Division of this Honourable court makes a pronouncement on the issues raised in the statement of fact in Suit No. NICN/PHC/40/2013, the issues in this suit would have been pronounced upon by a court of concurrent jurisdiction and the Claimant would be estopped from re-litigating the said issues. This, counsel submits, is a reality and not speculative, as the previous suit is earlier in time and is already at the judgment stage as the matter had been fixed for adoption of final written address as far back as 11th June 2014, as deposed to in paragraph 16 of the Affidavit in Support of the instant application. He urged the Court to dismiss this suit, and award substantial cost against the claimant as this suit is misconceived, frivolous, vexatious, irritating, unmeritorious and an abuse of court process. I have carefully considered the arguments of counsel for and against the grant of this application, the averments and depositions and indeed the exhibits attached. In my consideration of this application, I shall adopt the issue for determination formulated by the applicant’s counsel in his written address, although with a little modification. The issue to be determined is: Whether having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the pendency of Suit No. NICN/PHC/40/2013 at the Calabar Division of this Honourable Court, the Claimant’s instant suit is not an abuse of court process and liable to be dismissed. This application of the applicant is for an order of this court dismissing this suit on the ground that it is an abuse of court process. The ground founding the objection, as contended by the applicant, is that the same set of facts and the cause of action in this case are already the same set of facts and cause of action being litigated by the Claimant/Respondent in suit NICN/PHC/40/2013 pending before the Port Harcourt Division of this court, sitting in Calabar, although the defendant in suit No. NICN/PHC/40/2013 is Jemmtek Resources Limited. In order to establish its contention that the same set of facts and cause of action in suit NICN/PHC/40/2013 is also what is before this court, the applicant annexed exhibit BHNL 1 to the application. The exhibit is the statement of facts filed by the respondent in suit NICN/PHC/40/2013 as establishing his cause of action against the defendant in that suit. In opposing the application, the respondent, while admitting the pendency of suit NICN/PHC/40/2013, has however contended that his instant suit is not the same with suit NICN/PHC/40/2013. From his counter affidavit and written address, I have identified two reasons he has advanced for his contention.- 1. The defendants are not the same 2. The reliefs sought in the 2 cases are not the same. For these reasons, the respondent maintains that his instant suit is not an abuse of court process. The brief facts of this case as summarized by the Claimant is that the claimant/respondent in this suit following an incident that occurred on the 10th of June, 2011 while working for his employers Jemmtek Resources Limited at the defendant’s facility in Federal Lighter Terminal (FLT) Onne, was suspended alongside a Baker Hughes Nigeria Limited (the defendant’s) staff. The defendant subsequently constituted a panel (all of which members were the defendant’s staff) to investigate and make recommendations on the said incidence of 10th June, 2011. The defendant’s panel sat, and concluded hearing wherein the claimant was summoned to appear before the panel which he did. The defendant upon the conclusion of the hearing/investigation of the panel recalled it staff, leaving the claimant to his fate. The defendant has refused, neglected to release the said investigative panel report/findings up till date. The claimant aggrieved has now filed an action against the defendant seeking a declaration amongst others that “the defendant’s action in failing, refusing and neglecting to release its findings (investigation report), having concluded investigation since July, 2011 up-till date, despite repeated demands while the claimant remained in an indefinite suspension, pending the release of the said findings (investigation report) thereby subjecting the claimant to inhumane treatment, undue, hardship, frustration, pain, inconveniences, untold discomfort, emotional and untold discomfort, emotional and psychological trauma is unlawful, inhumane and amount to unlawful interference with the claimant’s employment”. The facts in opposition of this application is that the claimant following his suspension filed an action against his employers (Jemmtek) for wrongful suspension and payment of his salary and other entitlements on one hand. The defendant (Baker Hughes) who owns the facility where the claimant’s employers (Jemmtek) were managing and where the incidence of 10th June 2011 occurred also on their own without recourse to the claimant’s employers set up an investigative panel to investigate the incidence and make recommendations. That the defendant immediately after the hearing of the panel recalled its staff, but refused and neglected to release the investigative panel report/findings as to ascertain the claimant’s culpability, involvement and/or innocence in the said incident of 10th June, 2011, despite the claimant’s demand and request for the said report. In the consideration of this application and in the determination of the sole issue I have identified for determination in this application, the process to look at are the originating processes in suit NICN/PHC/40/2013 and the one for this suit. The applicant has annexed the statement of facts in suit NICN/PHC/40/2013 to its affidavit in support of the motion as exhibit BHNL 1. I have read the statement of facts of suit NICN/PHC/40/2013 and I have similarly read the statement of facts of this instant suit. In both processes, related facts founding the respondent’s causes of action in the two suits are revealed. For the purpose of this ruling, I deem it necessary to briefly set out these related or similar facts. Common in the two pleadings is the fact that the respondent was an employee of Jemmtek Resources Limited. Baker Hughes Nig. Ltd operates the Federal Lighter Terminal (FLT) and the Federal Ocean Terminal (FOT). These facilities were being operated for and on behalf of Baker Hughes Ltd by the respondent’s employer, Jemmtek Resources Ltd. when the respondent was employed in 2006, he worked in these facilities. The facts further show that Jemmtek is a local content partner to Baker Hughes Nig. Ltd. As a result, staff of both companies work together in the said facilities of Baker Hughes Ltd. The respondent’s duties included receiving and loading on behalf of his employer and Baker Hughes Nig. Ltd. As a result of technical problems, some jobs the respondent’s employer was to execute for Baker Hughes Ltd on 9th June 2011 on the Mud plant at Baker Hughes’ facility were not done. It was when the respondent reported for duty on 10th June 2011 that he had to execute the tasks with only a staff. Upon completion of the job in the night, one Mr. Sule, the base Co-ordinator, ordered him to load two trucks with premix and base oil. The respondent did as instructed, did the documentation and went home. The following day, he was informed that the trucks were recalled for re-confirmation of the loading. One Mr. Osazee Igbinoba of Baker Hughes Ltd supervised the trucks, confirmed the seals and supervised the discharge. Upon the discovery of an excess of 38 barrels of base oil, the respondent was instructed to submit his report on the incidence and he did so but on 16th June 2011, his employers suspended him along with a staff of Baker Hughes Ltd. Not happy with his suspension, the respondent wrote a protest letter to both his employer and Baker Hughes Ltd demanding for an investigation into the incidence. Pursuant to his letter, Baker Hughes Ltd set up a committee to investigate the issue. The facts contained in the respondent’s two processes in comparison further contain facts to the effect that Baker Hughes has since concluded the investigation but has refused to release the report of the investigation. According to the respondent, it is the refusal by Baker Hughes Ltd to release the report that has resulted in his remaining on indefinite suspension. Consequent on these facts, the respondent instituted suit NICN/PHC/40/2013 against his employer, Jemmtek Resources Ltd, which is now pending before the Port Harcourt Division of this court, sitting in Calabar wherein the respondent claims- a. A Declaration that the Claimant's employment as a Supervisor, in the Defendant company is still subsisting. b An order directing the Defendant to pay to the Claimant the sum of N1,992,455:64 being and representing his salary and allowances at the monthly net pay of N221,383:96, from June 2011 till February 2012. c. And the monthly sum of N221, 383:96 being the Claimant's salary and allowances from February 2012 until due determination of this suit. d. In the alternative, the sum of 50million naira being and representing damages for the unlawful interference with the Claimant's employment by the Defendant Company. Suit No NICN/PHC/40/2013 which is now at adoption stage, was first instituted at the Rivers State High Court on the 1st day of March 2012 before it was transferred to the National Industrial Court by an order of Hon. Justice D. S. Nyesom-Nwike made on the 1st day of March 2013. The originating processes were re-filed by order of the Port Harcourt Division of this Court sitting in Calabar on the 30th day of September 2013. On the other hand, Suit No NICN/PHC/78/2013 was first instituted at the Rivers State High Court on the 27th day of July 2012 before it was transferred to the National Industrial Court by an order of Hon. Justice T. S. Oji made on the 15th day of April 2013. The originating processes were re-filed in this Court on the 11th day of October 2013. The Claimant’s claims against the defendant in this suit are as follows: a. A Declaration that the Defendant's action in failing, refusing and neglecting to release its findings (investigation report), having concluded investigation since July, 2011 up-till date, despite repeated demands while the claimant remained in an indefinite suspension, pending the release of the said findings (investigation report) thereby subjecting the claimant to inhumane treatment, undue hardship, frustration, pain, inconveniences, untold discomfort, emotional and psychological trauma is unlawful, inhumane and amounts to unlawful interference with the claimant's employment. b. A Declaration that the claimant is entitled to general and special damages for the inhumane treatment, undue hardship, frustration, pain, inconveniences, untold discomfort, emotional and psychological trauma suffered by the Claimant as a result of the defendant’s action and inaction in refusing to release the said investigation report, having concluded its investigation since July 2011. c. An order of this court, directing the Defendant to release the said investigation report forthwith. d. An order of this Court awarding the sum of Forty-five Million Naira(N45,000,000.00) only, being and representing special and general damages. Noticeable from the brief facts constituting the cases is the fact that besides the reliefs which are different, the cause of action and the facts founding it are the same. It is also obvious that the reliefs sought in both actions flow from these same set of facts. Generally, abuse of court process means that the process of court has not been used bona fide and properly. A party will be said to be guilty of abuse of court process when he improperly uses the judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent. See NV SCHEEP vs. MV “S.ARAZ” (2001) FWLR (PT 34) 543 AT 590. The term has also been held to occur when there is multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter between the same parties or instituting different actions between same parties simultaneously in different courts. See OPEKUN vs. SADIQ (2003) FWLR (PT 150) 1654 at 1661, A.R.C V. J.D.P CONSTRUCTION NIG. LTD. (2003) FWLR (Pt. 153) 251 at 270. It has however been held that the circumstances that will give rise to abuse of process are not closed. Several other situations can give rise to abuse of court process. Whether a suit constitutes abuse of court process is a matter of the facts of each case. See NV SCHEEP vs. MV “S.ARAZ” (SUPRA) at 589. The Supreme Court put it this way in R-BENKAY NIG. LTD vs. CADBURY NIG PLC (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 631) 1450 at 1466 Per Adekeye JSC- “The concept of abuse of court process is imprecise. It involves circumstances and situations of infinite variety and condition. But a common feature of it is the improper use of the judicial process by a party in litigation to interfere with the due administration of justice”. His Lordship went on to observe that some circumstances which would constitute an abuse of court process include: a. Where a party has adopted the system of forum shopping in the enforcement of a conceived right b. Where two actions are commenced, the second seeking for a relief which may be obtained in the first, the second action is vexatious and an abuse of court process Also, in R-BENKAY NIG LTD. vs. CADBURY NIG PLC (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 631) 1450 at 1466, it was the opinion of the Supreme Court that multiplicity of suits by one person against his opponent on the same set of facts will amount to abuse of court process. I have considered these different circumstances of abuse of process viz-a-viz the application before me and I find the presence of abuse of process in the respondent’s suits. In both cases, it is the same set of facts which found the causes of action. The basis of the complaint of the respondent in both suits is on the incident he alleged to have occurred on the 10th and 11th of June 2011 for which he was suspended. His complaint in both cases also pertain to the investigation into the incident which report he wants released as it is the non-release that is still keeping him in suspension. The nature of the reliefs he seeks in both cases concern and touch on his employment. I cannot find any difference between the 2 suits. Even the reliefs sought by the respondent in both suits appear to be different but they are such that could have been sought in only one of the suits. All that the respondent needed to do is join the applicant as co-defendant in suit NICN/PHC/40/2013. The respondent elected not to adopt this procedure but chose to separate the persons against whom he is aggrieved and then initiate separate actions in two divisions of the same court against them. I find no better description for the conduct of the respondent than forum shopping. The two pending cases instituted by the respondent constitute a clear case of multiplicity of suits. This view finds legal support in the decision of the Supreme Court in DINGYADI vs. INEC (No.2) (2011) NWLR (Pt.1224) 154 at 221 thus: “The filing of two suits on the same issue in two different jurisdiction amounts to multiplicity of actions. A clear case of multiplicity of proceedings. The rule well laid down by the courts is that where matters involving the same issues are raised contemporaneously in two different courts, it is desirable and in the interest of justice that these matters should be heard in only one of these two courts. It is designed to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. The basis of the rule is the real possibility of two conflicting decisions in respect of one and the same subject matter” The respondent’s counsel has submitted in his written address that abuse of court process will be said to arise when the action is against the same parties, on the same subject matter and the same issue. Rightly, that is the position of the law. From my examination of the respondent’s statement of facts in the two cases, it is obvious that the same set of facts and cause of action found suit NICN/PHC/40/2013 and this suit. The facts are such that both suits are hardly separable and can and ought to be properly tried together as a single cause. In my view, the subject matter and the issues in the two cases can hardly be distinguished. They are the same. It is the respondent’s counsel’s view also that since the defendants in the two cases are not the same, the present suit cannot constitute an abuse. With respect to learned counsel, the concept of “party” in judicial proceedings is not limited to how counsel wanted it understood. A plethora of judicial authorities have defined the term to include not only those named in the suit or in the record of proceedings but also those who have direct interest in the subject matter of the dispute. See BALOGUN vs. AFOLAYAN (2002) FWLR (Pt. 85) 331 at 349, OKUKUJE vs. AKWIDO (2001) FWLR (Pt. 39) 1487 at 1539. The facts of the suits set out in this ruling show that Baker Hughes Nig. Ltd and Jemmtek Resources Ltd have direct interest in the subject matter leading to the disputes in the suits. From the facts, Baker Hughes Nig. Ltd is a necessary party to suit NICN/PHC/40/2013 while Jemmtek is also a necessary party to this instant suit. Although both of them are not named co-defendants in the processes of their respective suits, they are deemed by law to be parties thereto. In my view, Jemmtek Resources Ltd and Baker Hughes Nig. Ltd are parties in both suits. In that circumstance, I hold that the ingredients of abuse of court process are clearly present. Where a court process is duplicated, the more current one which results in the duplication is regarded as an abuse the court process. It is clear that this suit (NICN/PHC/78/2013) was initiated later in time as compared to suit No NICN/PHC/40/2013. It is therefore the offending process and it should suffer the consequences prescribed for processes amounting to abuse. Having come to that conclusion, the proper order I should make in the circumstance is to dismiss this suit. Once a court is satisfied that any proceeding before it is an abuse of court process, it has the power, indeed the duty, to dismiss it. See ARC vs. J.D.P CONSTRUCTION NIG. LTD (SUPRA) at 270. This suit is accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Presiding Judge