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By a Complaint filed on the 26th day of July 2013, the Claimant sought the determination of the following questions: 1. Whether by the tenets of the Government White Paper on Ceding of Alvan Ikoku College of Education to the Federal Government of May 2010 and a letter with reference number HIS/PNS/ACCTS/4/VOL.62/716 dated 9/9/2012, the Defendants are not supposed to pay the claimants their unpaid gratuities and pension arrears from 2003 – 2009 which was the State Government portion/liability in line with the present policy of government enforced throughout the federation of Nigeria. 2. Whether in view of a policy letter of the 3rd Defendant dated 6/10/95, the defendants can evict the claimants without allowing the claimants to remain in occupation of their various flats for at least six months after the payment of their unpaid gratuities and pension arrears from 2003 to 2009. 3. If the answer to the above questions are in the negative, the Claimants therefore seek the following reliefs: i. A declaration of the honourable court that the defendants cannot lawfully eject the claimants from the quarters aforesaid without following due process of law. ii. An order of court setting aside the notice of owner’s intention to recover possession of the houses legitimately occupied by the claimants, for being incompetent. iii. A declaration of the honourable court that the claimants are entitled to hold and own the houses aforesaid respectively occupied by them on owner-occupier basis in line with the present policy of government in force throughout the federation. iv. An order of court compelling the Defendants to pay the claimants their unpaid gratuities and pension arrears from 2003 to 2009 which was the state portion/liability in line with the recommendation of a government constituted technical committee on the ceding of Alvan Ikoku College of Education, Owerri to the Federal Government. v. An order of injunction restraining the defendants, their servants, agents or howsoever called from whatsoever manner forcibly ejecting or disturbing and/or interfering with the claimants’ occupation of the said houses. By a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated and filed on the 8th day of October 2013, the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants prayed the court for an order dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction. The application was brought upon the following grounds: a. The suit is incompetent b. The suit is statute barred c. The Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain and hear the same. In the written address in support, Counsel recalled the provision of Section 2a of the Public Officers’ Protection Act which prescribes a 3 month limitation period for the commencement of actions against public officers for acts done in the course of their public duty. It was submitted that public officers include agencies and agents of Federal and State governments, therefore the 1st and 2nd defendants are public officers, and therefore covered by the protection offered by POPA. Ofili vs. CSC (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt.1071) Pg. 238; Achu vs. CSC Rivers State (2009) 3 NWLR (Pt.1129) Pg. 475 @ 479. To determine the period of limitation, it was submitted that regard must always be had to the time the cause of action accrued and comparing it with the date the action was filed. The writ of summons and the statement of claim determine the date of accrual of the cause of action. In this case, the claimants were retired between 2007 and 2009 and they filed this action in 2013, a period above 4 years, therefore, the claimants are caught up by statute. See Egbe vs. Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) Pg. 1, Chukwu vs. Amadi (2009) 3 NWLR (Pt.1127) Pg. 56 @ 57, Omotosho vs. B.O.N. Ltd (2006) 9 NWLR (Pt. 986) Pg. 577. Counsel urged the court to decline jurisdiction and dismiss the suit for being statute barred. Madukolu vs. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 SCNLR 241; Unity Bank Plc vs. Nwadike (2009) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1131) Pg. 352 @ 359. By a motion on notice filed on the 8th day of November 2013, the 3rd and 4th Defendants sought for an order of court dismissing the suit as being incompetent. The application was brought under the following grounds: 1. The action is statute-barred, the same having been brought outside the time prescribed by Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act, Cap 41, LFN 2004. 2. The suit as constituted is not justiceable in that the action is founded on a collective agreement, that is to say, the letter dated 6th October 1995 between an employer in this case the 3rd defendant and the retired members of staff, which is not intended to create any legal relations giving rise to any contractual obligations, and did not, in law, create any contractual obligations. 3. The action as constituted is wrongful in law in that the parties do not have a collective right to sue or be represented in the suit. 4. The Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The motion is supported by a 5 paragraph affidavit deposed to by one Charity Mezieobi, a litigation secretary. In the written address in support of the preliminary objection of the 3rd and 4th defendants, a sole issue was raised for the determination of the court, namely; “Whether this suit as presently constituted, is competent before the honourable court.” In arguing the sole issue, submissions were proffered in four parts, namely: a. Whether this suit is not statute barred; b. Whether this action is justiceable; c. Whether the suit is wrongful in law based on non-collective interest and rights; and d. Whether the court has jurisdiction to entertain the action. With regard to limitation of action, the applicants submitted that this action is statute barred having been brought outside the time prescribed by Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Law Cap 41 LFN 2004. Citing SPDC vs. Amadi (2010) 13 NWLR Pt. (1210) 82, the court was thus said to be deprived of jurisdiction as the action is incompetent and ought to be struck out. The 3rd and 4th defendants also submitted that they are entitled to the protection contemplated by the Public Officers’ Protection Act, as the definition of public officers include agencies or agents of Federal or State Government. Ofili vs. CSC (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1071) 238. That being the case, the action is therefore statute barred because the cause of action arose on 14th December 2012 but the action was filed on 26th July 2013, a period that has clearly exceeded the three month limitation prescribed by POPA. Yakubu vs. NITEL Ltd. (2006) 9 NWLR (Pt. 985) 367. They submitted that the proper order to make therefore is dismissal. With regard to non-justiceability of the suit, the applicants submitted that the agreement reached between the claimants and the defendants as contained in the letter dated 6/10/1995 is a collective agreement as envisaged by Section 47(1) of the Trade Dispute Act, and therefore not legally binding, having not created any legal relations. It was merely a gratuitous concession distinct and separate from the conditions of service or contract of employment of the claimants, therefore it is not intended to create any legal relations. Also, having not been incorporated expressly or by necessary implication into the respective contracts of employment of the claimants, it is therefore unenforceable. Osoh vs. Unity Bank (2003) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1358) Pg. 1 @ 26-27; U.B.N. vs. Edet (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 287) 288. With regard to non-collective right to sue, it is contended by the 3rd and 4th defendants, relying on Bossa vs. Julius Berger Plc. (2005) 15 NWLR (Pt. 948) 409, that the contract of employment of each claimant is personal to him, therefore the claimants do not have a collective right to sue or be represented in the suit. It is further submitted that the terms of the claimants’ contracts are different from each other. It is contended that there is no interest being represented, as some of the claimants are infact non-members of staff of the 3rd defendant. Above all, there is no proof of authority of such representation. With regard to lack of jurisdiction to entertain the suit, citing A. G. Federation vs. Abubakar (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1112) Pg. 135 at 138, counsel submitted that jurisdiction to entertain a suit is based on the claimants’ averments in the Statement of Facts. That it is clear from the claimants’ claims and reliefs sought that the action is statute barred. In the circumstance, the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit. That is to say there are features in the case that robs the court of jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Madukolu vs. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 S. C. NLR 341. Being statute barred and being non-justiceable counsel submitted, are the two features that rob the court of jurisdiction to entertain the action. He urged the court to dismiss the action. In opposition to the 1st and 2nd defendants’ preliminary objection, the claimants filed a counter affidavit and a written address on the 11th day of November 2013. They also filed a counter affidavit and written address on the 19th day of November 2013 in opposition to the 3rd and 4th defendants’ preliminary objection. The claimants submitted that the suit is competent and proper before the court, and that the claimants came to court when they were issued seven days’ notice of owner’s intention to recover possession of their houses which were legitimately allocated to them by virtue of their employment. They were therefore right to bring this action to protect their interest. As regards whether the suit is statute barred, the Claimants submitted that the cause of action arose on 21/12/2012 when they were served with the notice complained of, and that is what dominates the relief being sought before the court and not their pension. They submitted further that the proper thing to do is for the court to have regard to Exhibit B and hold that the claimants duly filed their action within time at the High Court. To the claimants, Section 2 of the Public Officers’ Protection Law is about persons and not institutions. On the issue of proof of authorization to sue, Claimants’ Counsel submitted that the claimants have the authority of the other claimants to sue, and that failure to file a letter of authorization will not vitiate the action. C.B.N. vs. Adedeji (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 244) 912 @ 926-927. On non-justiceability of the suit and non-collective right to sue, the Claimants submitted that they have a right to bring a collective action, considering that they have a common interest and a common grievance and the reliefs sought is beneficial to all who are represented. They further submitted that the policy the 3rd defendant made for the benefit of their retirees does not translate to a collective agreement. They urged the court to assume jurisdiction in the matter. The 1st and 2nd defendants on the 11th day of March 2014, filed a reply on points of law wherein the content of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act was recalled and submitted to be clear and unambiguous as regards its application; that it relates to any action, any act, any public duty or authority, and any alleged neglect. By Section 2 of the Public Officers’ Protection Act, “Where any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provision shall have effect: The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.” Counsel urged the court to hold in line with cited authorities that the wordings of the section are clear and unequivocal and unambiguous, and that having failed to institute this action within 3 months, the defence of limitation of action is available to the defendants. See Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation vs. Tunji Bankole (1972) 4 SC 94; Bakare vs. N. R. C. (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1064) 606 at 616; Nigeria Ports Authority vs. Construzioni Generali (1974) 12 SC 81. After considering the arguments of Counsels, both for and against the grant of these applications, it became necessary to ask the parties to address the court as regards what is the cause of action in this suit vis-à-vis the reliefs sought. Counsel to the Claimant filed his written address on the 4th day of June 2014 while counsel to the 1st and 2nd defendants filed her address on the 9th day of June 2014. It was the Claimant’s submission that the claimants want the court to determine whether by the tenets of the government white paper on ceding of Alvan Ikoku College of Education to the Federal Government, whether the defendants are not supposed to pay the claimants their unpaid gratuities and pension arrears from 2003 to 2009, and whether in view of a policy letter dated 6/10/95, whether the defendants can evict the claimants without allowing the claimants to remain in occupation of their various flats for at least six months after payment of their unpaid gratuities and pension arrears from 2003 to 2009. Therefore, the cause of action in this case is two legged. The suit therefore ought not to be viewed from only one set of facts. Counsel cited the case of C.B.N. vs. Amao (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 558) 806 @ 827 where the Supreme Court held that where the injury complained of is continuing, Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act will not apply. The 1st and 2nd defendant’s counsel on the other hand filed an address titled “brief statement of facts” wherein they submitted that the Claimants have disclosed no cause of action against the 1st and 2nd defendants. Citing the authorities of Bessony Ltd vs. Honey Legon (Nig.) Ltd (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 503) Pg. 1380 at 1402, Ikenne L.G. vs. West African Portland Cement Plc. (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 642) Pg. 1747 at 1770-1771, S.P.D.C. vs. Okonoedo (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 109) 85 at 117-118, and Accord Party vs. Governor of Kwara State (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 555) Pg. 220 at 276, the 1st and 2nd defendants submitted that the Claimants’ statement of facts has not disclosed any reasonable cause of action. Counsel went further that the defendants have in their statement of defence established the fact that the Imo State Law No 6 transferred all the College assets and responsibilities to the Federal Ministry of Education for and on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (Cited as Alvan Ikoku College of Education (Transfer) Law of 2009). It is Counsel’s submission that the Government white paper upon which the Claimants rely, is superseded by the Law No. 6 of 2009; and that the white paper is a mere recommendation, and cannot take effect or be of any relevance except the extant law is repealed and another law passed to accommodate and implement the white paper. Thus, the claimants have not clearly disclosed a cause of action. She urged the court to dismiss the claims of the claimants on grounds of being statute barred, and for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. Counsel to the 3rd and 4th defendants did not file any address relating to cause of action, but relied on their address in respect of the substantive application. They also associated themselves with the address of the 1st and 2nd defendants. I have considered the affidavit evidence, written addresses and arguments of counsel and indeed the addresses filed as regards cause of action. The sole issue for determination is “Whether this suit as presently constituted, is competent before the honourable court.” The facts of the case as pleaded in the Statement of Facts and the Counter-Affidavit of the 1st Claimant is that the Claimants are all retired staff of the 3rd defendant who was ceded to the Federal Government vide a white paper dated May 2010, which is pleaded by the claimants. The Claimants worked for the 3rd defendant at various periods between 1973 and 2009, during which they were legitimately allocated houses which they have occupied and maintained for decades, and they still occupy, paying rent at commercial rate. By a policy letter dated 6th October 1995 pleaded by the Claimants, all staff resident in college-owned quarters were notified of the college governing council approval that if a retiring staff lives in college-owned quarters, he/she should be allowed to remain in the said quarters for six extra months from the date he/she is paid full retirement benefits. At the end of the period, he/she must vacate the quarters. By a circular dated 27th June 2003, the Federal Government introduced the monetization of fringe benefits in the Federal Public service, which policy includes sale of existing government owned houses to workers currently occupying same. The claimants are yet to be paid their gratuities and accumulated pension arrears which had already been approved. The said pensions and gratuities, by virtue of the Government white paper, are to be paid by the Government of Imo State. By a letter dated 14th December 2012, the Claimants were given 7 days’ notice of owner’s intention to recover possession of the houses they occupy. The said notice was served on them on the 20th of December 2012 and they promptly briefed a counsel who filed an action at the Owerri High Court on the 14th day of March 2013. The defendants raised an objection that the suit was not proper before the High Court. Therefore the Claimants withdrew the suit to re-file before this court. They then filed this present action on the 26th day of July 2013. In determining the sole issue, regard must be had to the facts as outlined above and the content of the various affidavits and written addresses of counsel. Cause of action has been defined in the case of S.P.D.C Nig. vs. OKONOEDO (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt.109) 85 @ 117-118, as a factual situation, the existence of which entitles the plaintiff to obtain from the court a remedy against another person or the facts which constitutes the essential ingredients of an enforceable right of claim. See also ACCORD PARTY vs. GOVERNOR OF KWARA STATE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 555) Pg. 220 @ 276. In Oshoboja vs. Amuda (1992) NWLR (Pt. 250) 690, Uwais JSC in determining what “cause of action” entails, held that the words “cause of action” have been defined by the supreme court to mean the facts which when proved, will entitle a plaintiff to a remedy against a defendant. In determining cause of action therefore, recourse must be had to the remedies of reliefs sought by the claimants. At the risk of repetition, the reliefs sought by the claimants in this case are: i. A declaration of the honourable court that the defendants cannot lawfully eject the claimants from the quarters aforesaid without following due process of law. ii. An order of court setting aside the notice of owner’s intention to recover possession of the houses legitimately occupied by the claimants, for being incompetent. iii. A declaration of the honourable court that the claimants are entitled to hold and own the houses aforesaid respectively occupied by them on owner-occupier basis in line with the present policy of government in force throughout the federation. iv. An order of court compelling the Defendants to pay the claimants their unpaid gratuities and pension arrears from 2003 to 2009 which was the state portion/liability in line with the recommendation of a government constituted technical committee on the ceding of Alvan Ikoku College of Education, Owerri to the Federal Government. v. An order of injunction restraining the defendants, their servants, agents or howsoever called from whatsoever manner forcibly ejecting or disturbing and/or interfering with the claimants’ occupation of the said houses. Apart from relief No iv, all the reliefs stated above relate to the threatened ejection of the claimants from the quarters they occupy. The main claims are those listed as i, ii, iii and v above, while relief no iv is the ancillary claim. This is further supported by paragraph 3 of the Claimant’s counter-affidavit which reads thus: “That what prompted this suit was when the 3rd and 4th Defendants served us with Notice of Owner’s intention to apply to recover possession of the houses wherein we occupy.” In the Claimants’ written address, Counsel submitted in Paragraph 3.3 that the cause of action arose on 21/12/2012 when the claimants were served with the notice complained of, and that is what dominates the relief being sought before this court and not their pension. He stated therein that even if the relief concerning the pension is removed, the suit still stands. Using the words of learned counsel to the Claimant, “that is what dominates the reliefs being sought before this court and not their pension.” What determines jurisdiction of the court or competence to entertain a suit is the principal reliefs or claims of the claimants and not the consequential issues flowing from the main reliefs sought. See Nwangwu vs. Osemenam (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 376) Pg. 779. The principal reliefs of the Claimants as shown on the Complaint and Statement all relate to the threat of their eviction from their official quarters. I therefore hold in line with the submission of learned counsel to the Claimant, that the cause of action arose on 21/12/2012 when the claimants were served with the notice complained of, and that that is what dominates the relief being sought before this court and not their pension. The main reliefs sought in this action relates to the threatened eviction of the Claimants from their official quarters. The issue of pension therefore becomes ancillary, and I so hold. A court cannot adjudicate on ancillary reliefs where it has no jurisdiction to entertain the main claims especially where the determination of the ancillary claim must necessarily involve consideration in the main claim. This was the decision of Ogebe JCA in Mrs. Foluke Mudashiru vs. Persons Unknown & 5 Ors (2004) LPELR-7412. See also Tukur vs. Govt of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517. The same principle was followed by the Court of Appeal in Nabore Properties Ltd vs. Peace-Cover Nigeria Limited & Ors. (2014) LPELR 22586 (CA) where Iyizoba JCA held thus: “The law is that a court cannot adjudicate on ancillary reliefs where it has no jurisdiction to entertain the main claim especially where the determination of the ancillary claim must necessarily involve consideration of the main claim.” In the Claimants’ written address on cause of action, Counsel submitted that the cause of action in this case is two legged, and the suit ought not to be viewed from only one set of facts. In his written address in opposition to the preliminary objection however, Claimant’s Counsel stated that even if the relief concerning the pension is removed, the suit still stands. These submissions presuppose that the two causes of action are distinct and can be adjudicated upon separately if properly constituted and in the appropriate venue. In Patkun Industries Ltd. vs. Niger Shoes Manufacturing Company Ltd (1988) LPELR-2906 (SC), Karibi-Whyte JSC has held that although the question is necessarily determined by whether there is jurisdiction, the court would only allow a joinder of causes of action, where the two claims can conveniently be tried or disposed of together. The jurisdiction of this court is governed by Section 254C (1) (a) to (m) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). Essentially, the jurisdiction of this court relates among others, to labour matters, employment, industrial relations, and trade disputes. The question will then arise whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain the main claims which are essentially grounded on tenancy related issues. Clearly, this court has no jurisdiction to entertain tenancy matters. What may have conferred tenancy jurisdiction on this court is for the Claimant to show that their occupation of the staff quarters is a right derivable from their contract of employment. Incidentally, this is not before me. It is imperative for the Claimants to show that their occupation of official quarters is an aspect of their employment. This they have not shown. The Claimants have not put before this court, any document by which the said accommodation was allocated to them to enable the court determine the terms of the said allocation, or tie the said allocation with their contract of employment. In the absence of all these, the court is unable to assume jurisdiction. The Claimants have flourished a letter dated 6th October 1995 wherein the Registrar wrote to all staff resident in Staff quarters that retired staff can remain in staff quarters for up to six extra months after receiving their full retirement benefits. I have however gone through the Claimants’ originating processes including their Statement of facts and the frontloaded documents, one of which is a letter from the solicitors to all the retired staff of the 3rd defendant (Njemanze & Njemanze Solicitors), dated the 18th day of August 2006. The said letter was clearly protesting against a certain circular issued by the Registrar/Secretary to Council, of the 3rd defendant dated 06/7/2006 which negates the content of the letter of 6/10/95 upon which the Claimants have placed heavy reliance in this suit, as conferring the continual right of occupation of their quarters on them. Strangely, the said circular of 06/7/2006 was not frontloaded along with the Claimant’s originating process. There is however a pre-supposition from the frontloaded Solicitor’s letter that a circular exists, which negates the content of the earlier circular of 6/10/95, upon which this action is founded. It is the contention of the 3rd and 4th defendants that the letter dated 6/10/1995 is not legally binding, and that it was merely a gratuitous concession distinct and separate from the conditions of service or contract of employment of the claimants, therefore it is not intended to create any legal relations. I seem to agree with this submission, and I hold that the letter dated 6/10/1995 is not sufficient to tie the Claimants’ occupation of staff quarters to their contract of employment. Even if this court were to assume jurisdiction in the light of the letter dated 6/10/1995, the question that will then arise is when the cause of action arose, vis-à-vis when the action was filed in this court. This I have held to be 21/12/2012 when the claimants were served with the notice complained of. Now to determine what date this action was filed, the claimants have submitted that the court ought to have regard to Exhibit B and hold that the claimants duly filed their action within time at the High Court. Exhibit B is a copy of the writ of summons filed at the Imo State High Court on the 14th day of March 2013, a period within the limitation period, going by the date of accrual of the cause of action of 21/12/2012. The said suit No HOW/175/2013 was withdrawn from the High Court. It wasn’t transferred to this court. A fresh suit was filed at the National Industrial Court on the 26th day of July 2013. Even if the Claimant had filed the earlier suit filed at the Imo state High Court, Owerri within the statutory limitation period of three months, the fact that the suit was withdrawn puts an end to that earlier suit. The Supreme Court has clearly stated the effect of withdrawal of a suit when it held per Muhammad JSC in the case of Efet vs. Independent National Electoral Commission (2011) 7 NWLR 423 that “withdrawal of an action connotes the termination of that action from the cause list of that court. It exists no more before that court. It has slumped down, fainted and ultimately died, only waiting for resurrection where there will be one.” Going by this authority, any chance of resurrection can only be by way of an application to relist the suit before the same court, and such an application may or may not be granted, subject to the court’s discretion, among other considerations. Suit No NICN/OW/07/2013 filed in this court on the 26th day of July 2013 is an entirely different suit from HOW/175/2013 which no longer exists. In the case of UTA French Airlines v. Williams [2000] 14 NWLR (pt. 687) 271, the plaintiff had first filed the action, within the limitation time, at the Lagos High Court. On the advice of the Chief Judge of Lagos State, she filed fresh processes at the Federal High Court. The latter case was held to be different from that of the Lagos High Court; and because it was filed out of the limitation period, it was held caught up by the limitation period of two years under the relevant law. The above position speaks for itself. It is not in doubt that Section 254(C) (1) (k) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), confers jurisdiction on this court to entertain matters relating to pension, which right is guaranteed by Section 210 (1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). However, a court cannot adjudicate on ancillary reliefs where it has no jurisdiction to entertain the main claims. See Nabore Properties Ltd vs. Peace-Cover Nigeria Limited & Ors. (2014) LPELR 22586(CA). The main reliefs sought in this action relates to the threatened eviction of the Claimants from their official quarters, which is a tenancy issue, for which this court lacks jurisdiction. Therefore, even though the court has jurisdiction to entertain the ancillary claim, it cannot adjudicate on it, as this suit as presently constituted is incompetent. In the circumstance, by the authority of HYSON (NIGERIA) LTD vs. IJEOMA & ORS (2008) LPELR-5159(CA), the proper order to make would be that of striking out. Accordingly, the suit is hereby struck out. No order as to cost. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Presiding Judge