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This suit was commenced by way of Originating Summons dated and filed on the 10th day of December 2013, seeking the determination of the following question: 1. Whether or not Section 4 (second schedule Table A) of the Rivers State Parastatals Unified Pension Scheme Law, Laws of Rivers State 2001 is inconsistent with the Federal Retirement Age of Staff of Polytechnic and Colleges of Education (Harmonisation) Act 2012. Upon the determination of the said question, the Claimants seek the following reliefs from the court: 1. A declaration that Paragraph 4(1) second schedule, Table A, Rivers State Parastatals Unified Pension Scheme Law, Laws of Rivers State 2001 is inconsistent with the Retirement Age of Staff of Polytechnic and Colleges of Education (Harmonisation) Act 2012 and by the extent of its inconsistency, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 2. A declaration that the claimants are still in the services or employment of the Rivers State Polytechnic, Bori, and should be paid all their salaries, entitlements and allowances forthwith. 3. An order setting aside the purported certificates of retirement issued to the claimants on 2/7/2013 and 28/6/2013 respectively as being null, void and of no effect whatsoever. In support of the originating summons is a 13 paragraph affidavit deposed to by the 1st Claimant, as well as Exhibits numbering A to E. Also in support is a written address wherein counsel canvassed arguments in support of the application. The case of the Claimants is that they were staff of the Rivers State Polytechnic until 3rd and 28th July 2013 respectively when they were retired without notice. They were merely issued certificates of retirement notifying them that they have been retired pursuant to the Rivers State Pension Scheme Law No 4 of 2001 upon attaining the age of 60 years. This, the Claimants submit, is inconsistent with the Retirement Age of Staff of Polytechnics and Colleges of Education (Harmonisation) Act 2012 which stipulates a 65 years retirement age. Claimant’s counsel referred the court to the case of Musa vs. INEC (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 778) Pg. 223 and the provisions of Section 4(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended, which provides that “If any law enacted by the House of Assembly is inconsistent with any law validly made by the National Assembly, the law made by the National Assembly shall prevail, and that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.” The Rivers State Parastatals Unified Pension Scheme Law No. 4 of 2001 which stipulates a 60 year retirement age, it is submitted, is inconsistent with the Retirement Age of Staff of Polytechnics and Colleges of Education (Harmonisation) Act 2012 and therefore void to the extent of that inconsistency. It is submitted that the defendant is not only aware of the Act, but that at its meeting of 24/7/2012, adopted it. (Exhibit D). The Claimants urged the court to grant the reliefs sought. In opposition to the originating summons, the defendant on 1st April 2014 filed a 3 paragraph counter-affidavit and a written address wherein two issues were formulated for the determination of the court: (i) Whether the Retirement Age of Staff of Polytechnics and Colleges of Education (Harmonisation) Act 2012 relied upon by the Claimants applies to a non-academic staff of a polytechnic and College of Education. (ii) Admitting without conceding that the Retirement Age of Staff of Polytechnics and Colleges of Education (Harmonisation) Act 2012 applies to non-academic Staff of a Polytechnic and College of Education, whether the said Act is applicable to the Defendant being a Rivers State Government establishment. In arguing issue one, the defendant submits that Section 3 of the Retirement Age of Staff of Polytechnics and Colleges of Education (Harmonisation) Act 2012 provides that the 65 year retirement age applies only to academic staff of Polytechnics and Colleges of Education. The first Claimant was employed as a Principal Technologist (Electrical) while the second Claimant was employed as a Technical Officer. The Claimants not being academic staff, the Act does not apply to them. Citing the case of Obi vs. INEC (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1046), the defendant submitted that the express mention of “academic staff” in Section 3 discloses that the intention of the draftsman is that it applies to only the class of persons mentioned. Counsel pointed out that the schedule of the Act made mention of the 65 year retirement age of staff of polytechnics and colleges of Education without indicating “academic staff”. He however submitted that the schedule is a mere parliamentary note which is not part of the Act; or at best, the schedule can be said to conflict with Section 3 of the Act. He submitted, referring to Pages 56 and 57 of Sylvester O. Imhanobe’s book Legal Drafting and Conveyancing that the rule of statutory interpretation is that the enacting part of a statute must prevail over a conflicting schedule. Also, when the main document is unambiguous, it must prevail over any schedule which is in conflict with it. In arguing issue two, the defendant citing A. G. Abia State vs. A. G. Federation (2006) 9 MJSC 1 at 73, stressed on the autonomy and independence of states from the Federal Government, and submitted that it is within the state legislature’s competence to enact a law to regulate the defendant being a state-owned institution; and that it is the Rivers State Parastatals Unified Pension Scheme Law No. 4 of 2001 that is applicable to regulate the defendant and not the Retirement Age of Staff of Polytechnics and Colleges of Education (Harmonisation) Act 2012. It was submitted further that the Act would need to be domesticated for it to be made applicable in Rivers State. The Claimants, on the 7th day of April 2014, filed a 27 paragraph further affidavit and a reply on points of law. As regards the applicability of the Harmonisation Act to non-academic staff, the Claimant referred to Section 2 of the Act which provides that “A law or rule requiring a person to retire from the public service after serving 35 years shall not apply to staff of Polytechnics and Colleges of Education.” Counsel therefore submitted that the said Act applies to non-academic staff, referring to the instance of the Registrar a non-academic staff who had been recalled. He cited the case of Ogieva vs. Igbinedion (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 894) 467 where the court of Appeal declared the retirement of some officers a nullity because the respondent could not produce evidence that the appellants do not fall within the relevant statutory provisions, and the respondents did not follow the procedure provided by relevant statute. It was submitted further that it amounted to an abuse of office when all other institutions in Rivers State had adopted the Harmonisation Act but the defendant insists on passage of a law by the Rivers State House of Assembly before it will obey a Federal Act. Referring to the Supreme Court case of A. G. Abia State vs. A. G. Federation (Supra) at page 1512, the Claimant submitted further that the doctrine of covering the field applies. He therefore urged the court to hold that Section 4 (Second Schedule Table A) of the Rivers State Parastatals Unified Pensions Scheme Law, Laws of Rivers State 2001 is inconsistent with the Retirement Age of Staff of Polytechnics and Colleges of Education (Harmonisation) Act, 2012. And that the defendant is not entitled to the protection of the POPA and dismiss the counter affidavit and the submissions thereon and grant the reliefs as prayed in the summons. By a Motion on Notice filed on 1st April 2014, the defendant sought an order of court striking out this suit for being incompetent. The grounds upon which the application was brought are: 1. The defendant is a body created by the Polytechnic (Bori) Law Cap 97, Laws of Rivers State of Nigeria, 1999. 2. The case of the Claimant is caught up by Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act and is therefore statute barred. 3. Failure to institute the action within three (3) months of the accrual of the cause of action. 4. The court lacks the vires and/or jurisdiction to entertain the Claimants’ claim. The motion is supported by a 6 paragraph affidavit and a written address canvassing arguments in support of the application. The defendant/applicant raised a sole issue for determination, and that is “whether the Claimants’ suit is competent.” In answering the said issue in the negative, the defence placed reliance on the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act Chapter P41 Laws of the Federation, 2004 which provides thus: “Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect- a. the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.” Counsel then went on to submit that when a Statute such as the Public Officers’ Protection Act uses the word “shall” in its ordinary meaning, it is a word of command which is given a compulsory meaning because it is intended to denote obligation. Where a statute provides for the institution of an action within a prescribed period, any action instituted after the said period is barred by statute. Ibrahim vs. Judicial Service Committee, Kaduna State (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) Pg. 1 at 32A-B. In determining the period of limitation, counsel submitted that it is the writ of summons and the Claim that is looked at, to ascertain the date on which the wrong complained of was done. In this case, the cause of action arose on 2/07/2013 and 28/06/2013 respectively, when the defendant retired the Claimants from their employment; and this action was filed on 10/12/2013. Where a limitation is imposed in a statute, decree or edict, the court cannot extend the time except if the statute, decree or edict makes provision for such extension. Akinnuoye vs. Military Administrator, Ondo State (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt. 483) Pg. 564 at 572F. To the defendant, the Claimants’ claim as presently constituted, is incompetent, same having been caught by the three months limitation period provided by the Public Officers’ Protection Act. The court was urged to so hold, and strike out the case. He went on that it is only when the action is brought within the three (3) months prescribed that the legality of the action complained of can be in issue. Fajimolu vs. University of Ilorin (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1017) Pg. 74 at 89 D-F. The defendant being a statutory body established by the Polytechnic (Bori) Law Cap 97, Laws of Rivers State of Nigeria, 1999, is one of the bodies envisaged and contemplated under Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. See Ofili vs. Civil Service Commission (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1071) Pg. 238 at 254-255. The court was then urged to strike out the suit on grounds of incompetence, having been brought outside the three months statutory period prescribed by the Public Officers Protection Act. In opposition to the motion on notice, the Claimants filed a counter-affidavit of 27 paragraphs and a written address wherein they formulated two (2) issues for determination: 1. Whether or not from the circumstances of this case, the Claimants’ case is caught by Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. 2. Are there exceptions to the protection under Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act? In arguing the two issues together, the Claimants’ counsel citing the case of NEPA vs. Adesaaji (2002) 17 NWLR (Pt. 797) Pg. 578 at 603-604, submitted that their action falls within contracts of employment which falls into three categories: (i) Master and Servant relationship; (ii) Where a servant holds an office at the pleasure of master; and (iii) Employment that is governed by statute. He submitted further that the Public Officers Protection Act is designed to protect the officer who acts in good faith, and does not apply to acts done in abuse of office. See Offorboche vs. Ogoja Local Government & Anor. (2001) All NLR (vol. 6) 452 at 461 where the Supreme Court held further that abuse of office and bad faith are factors that deprive a party who would otherwise have been entitled to the protection of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act of such protection. To the Claimants, the court has jurisdiction to entertain this action, as the Public Officers Protection Act is not a general blanket for all acts. That it is an abuse of office for the defendant to single out the Claimant for retirement when their colleagues were recalled. The defendant cannot therefore hide under the protection of POPA to break the law of the land (the Harmonization Act), as such acts are never protected by POPA. Counsel cited the case of C.B.N. vs. Okojie (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt. 882) 488 at 532 and submitted that POPA was designed to protect public officers who act in absolute good faith and does not apply to acts done in abuse of office and with no semblance of legal justification. He submitted that the facts deposed to in paragraphs 3 to 27 of the defendant’s counter affidavit are all abuse of office and bad faith. He also referred to the Black’s Law dictionary definition of abuse as being “a departure from legal or reasonable use in dealing with (a person or a thing), or to misuse” and that the defendants had clearly from the following acts, wrongly departed from legal or reasonable use of the office of the rector to victimize and punish the Claimants: i. Recalling the Registrar and refusing to recall the claimants. ii. Recalling Mr. Puema and refusing to recall the claimants. iii. Refusing to obey a Federal legislation. iv. Assuming a legislative function by insisting on domestication of a Federal enactment before it could be operational, only to the defendant. v. Assuming a judicial function of interpretation of Federal and State enactments without recourse to the court of law. vi. Branding the Claimants as enemies or opponents that must be dealt with. Citing the authority of Abubakar vs. Gov. Gombe State (2002) 17 NWLR (Pt. 797) 533 at 576-577, Claimant’s counsel submitted that POPA only protects officers who act within the confines of their public duty. Once they step outside the colour of their office or statutory duty, they automatically lose the protection of that law, and therefore can be sued outside the three months limitation period. And that by the definition of abuse of power in Offorboche vs. Ogoja LG (Supra), the defendants has lost its protection under POPA. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the preliminary objection of the defendant and grant the reliefs as prayed in the originating summons. The defendant filed a reply on points of law in respect of the preliminary objection. The said reply on law which was filed on the 29th day of April 2014 reacted to the issues raised in the Claimant’s counter-affidavit in opposition to the defendant’s preliminary objection. In reaction to the Claimant’s contention that POPA does not apply to contracts of employment and the defendant’s reliance on the case of FGN vs. Zebra Energy Ltd. (2002) All NLR (Vol. 7) Pg. 391 at 404, 405 & 406, the defence submitted that what the Supreme Court meant in FGN vs. Zebra Energy (Supra) was that POPA does not apply to independent contracts, but applies to employments in the public sector. He referred to the recent case of University of Jos vs. Dr. Sani Muhammad Adam (2013) LPELR-20276 (CA) Per Agbo JCA, where it was held that contracts as used in FGN vs. Zebra Energy can only mean independent contract, it cannot and does not extend to contracts of employment in the public sector. Counsel also referred to the case of Sopakriba Horsefall vs. Rivers State Polytechnic Bori and Another (unreported) Suit No NICN/PHC/05/2012 where the court echoed the above decision. He urged the court to hold that the Claimant’s action is statute barred. Counsel referred to the case of Sulgrave Holdings Inc. vs. FGN (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) Pg. 335 and submitted that the court at this stage need not go into the substance of the case to determine good or bad faith. The question to be resolved is whether the action of the Claimant is statute barred, having been commenced outside of the three months limitation period prescribed by POPA. There is therefore no basis for prying into the conduct of the defendant which gave rise to the action. See also Fadare vs. A. G. Oyo State (1982) 4 SC 1 and Egbe vs. Adefarasin & Anor (No. 1) (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 3) 549 at 560. Counsel concluded by submitting that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit, having been commenced outside the three months prescribed by POPA, and therefore statute barred. He urged the court to so hold. In determining the preliminary objection which touches on jurisdiction as priority demands, I have carefully considered the processes filed, the various depositions in the respective affidavits, the written addresses of counsel and their verbal submissions as they relate to both the originating summons and the preliminary objection, and have found that they overlap in all material content and particulars. It is therefore expedient in the circumstance, that they both be, and are therefore considered together, bearing in mind, the priorities as set down by law. In doing so, I have identified a sole issue, which is: Whether the Claimants’ suit is competent. The event that culminated into filing this action was the defendant’s act of retiring the claimant from its service. the retirement was communicated to the claimants vide exhibits A and A1, dated 2nd July 2013 and 28th June 2013 respectively, annexed to the claimants’ affidavit in support of the Originating Summons. The claimants commenced this suit on 10th December 2013. Upon these facts, the defendant has now raised this preliminary objection on the grounds that the suit against the defendant, which is a body created by the laws of Rivers State, is statute barred not having been instituted within three (3) months of the accrual of the cause of action. The defendant consequently urged this court to strike out the suit as this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Claimants’ claim. Learned counsel for the defendant has argued that Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act, Chapter P41, Laws of the Federation, 2004 bars the claimant from maintaining this suit against the defendant. For a better appreciation of the provision, it is set out below: 2. “Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect- a. the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.” The significance of this provision is that actions against public officers must be filed within 3 months of the accrual of the cause of action otherwise, the right to enforce the action will be barred and the court will no longer have jurisdiction to entertain the action. Can the reliance placed on this provision by the defendant avail it in this suit? It has been laid down that before a defendant can take protection under the Act, the following must be established by the defendant: see IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (PT 584) 1 AT 32 1. That the person against whom the action is commenced is a public officer or person acting in the execution of public duties within the meaning of that law. 2. The act done by the person in respect of which the action is commenced must be an act done in pursuance or execution of any law, public duty or authority or in respect of an alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority. The meaning of the term “public officer” or “any person” as used in section 2 of Public Officers Protection Act has been copiously elucidated by the Supreme Court in IBRAHIM V. J.S.C KADUNA STATE (SUPRA) to mean not only natural persons but extends to public bodies created by statutes, artificial persons, institutions or persons sued in their official names or titles. The affidavit evidence of the defendant in support of the preliminary objection shows that the defendant was established by the Polytechnic (Bori) Law, Cap 97, Laws of Rivers State, 1999. The defendant is a creation of law and it is therefore a public officer within the meaning of the Public Officers Protection Act. It is not in dispute in this case that the act done by the defendant which resulted in the action before this court was the retirement of the claimants by the defendant from the service of the defendant. I have carefully looked at all the processes filed before me in this suit and I have seen from the claimant’s affidavit in support of the originating summons that the defendant relied on the Rivers State Parastatals Unified Pension Scheme Law, Laws of Rivers State 2001 to retire the claimant from service. It is clear to me that the defendant acted in pursuance of a law and was performing a public duty in retiring the claimants from service. It is my considered view therefore that the facts are such that will permit the defendant to safely rely on the protection afforded it under the POPA. What then is left for this court to do is to determine whether this suit is barred. By the provision of POPA, an action must be commenced against a public officer within 3 months of the accrual of cause of action. In determining whether the action is statute barred, I am permitted to look at the originating summons and the affidavit in support to ascertain the date on which the cause of action accrued. I have looked at the affidavit in support of the originating summons and the accompanying affidavits and I have seen therein that the claimants’ causes of action arose on 2nd July 2013 and 28th June 2013 respectively, when the defendant wrote letters to them retiring them from its employment. The originating summons in this case was issued on 10/12/2013. There is no gainsaying that the suit was filed more than 3 months from the date the cause of action arose. The claimant did not commence this suit against the defendant within the statutorily prescribed 3 months. In opposing to the application, the claimants’ counsel has argued in his written address that the defendant cannot take cover under the POPA. It is counsel’s contention that the defendant acted in bad faith and has abused its office in the retirement of the claimants, hence, Counsel submitted that the Public Officers Protection Act is designed to protect only public officers who acted in good faith but does not apply to acts done in abuse of office. He cited Offorboche vs. Ogoja Local Government (Supra) in support. Under the provision of section 2 of POPA, any action not commenced against a public officer within 3 months of accrual of the cause of action is barred. Indeed, at this stage, the claimants no longer have a cause of action against the defendant. Thus, the question whether the defendant acted in good faith or abused its office can only be canvassed where there is a cause of action; that is if the action was commenced within 3 months. This was the same view held by the supreme court in EGBE V. ALHAJI (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 128) 546 at 585 where NNAMANI JSC (as he then was) commented as follows: “A public officer who in the cause of performance of public duty does so maliciously or for private spite, has no protection under section 2(a) of Public Officer Protection Act if an action is filed against him within 3 months” In the same case at page 572, UWAIS JSC (as he then was) also held the same view thus: “In a civil action when the defendant invokes in limine, the provision of the Public Officer Protection Act, it is not proper for the trial court to conclude or infer from the pleadings that the protection afforded the defendant by law has been vitiated by malice or bad faith. What the trail court is obliged to decide at that stage is whether the action is maintainable and not whether the defendant is liable” The opinion of their Lordships in view, the issues canvassed by the claimants’ counsel is premature at this stage. The question whether bad faith or abuse of office can be attributed to the defendant as to strip it of its protection under the Public Officers Protection Act is not a matter to be considered at this point. I am in agreement with the submission of the defendant’s counsel in his reply when he submitted that the court at this stage need not go into the substance of the case to determine good or bad faith nor is there a basis for prying into the conduct of the defendant which gave rise to the action. In a ruling delivered on 8th October 2013 in the unreported case of Mrs. Folorunsho Victoria vs. Police Service Commission & 2 others NICN/IB/16/2012, Justice B.B. Kanyip held thus: “In any event, Rahamaniyya United (Nig.) Ltd v. Ministry for Federal Capital Territory & Ors. [2009] 43 WRN 124 CA at 145 at 146, applying Chigbu v. Tonimas (Nig.) Ltd [2006] 31 WRN 179; [2006] 9 NWLR (Pt. 986) 189 SC at 210, held that the propriety or otherwise of the act of the defendants is not a relevant consideration for the applicability of the Public Officers Protection Act. The case continued that if an action against a public officer or public institution and organization is statute-barred having not been brought within the prescribed period of three months, there will be no basis for investigating the conduct of the public officer which gave rise to the action. That the conduct of the defendant as to whether he was malicious or not is irrelevant in determining whether the cause of action is statute-barred under section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act, referring to Egbe v Adefarasin [2002] 14 WRN 57 and Aremo II v. Adekanye [2004] 42 WRN 1 SC.” The claimants’ contention in their opposition to the preliminary objection, as I understand it, is to the effect that in as far as the defendant has acted outside a valid and applicable law or failed to comply with a statutory duty, it automatically loses the protection of the Public Officers Protection Act. This position may have been informed by the decided decisions cited by the claimants’ counsel to the effect that public officers who acted outside the color of their office or acted outside the law or statutory duty or without legal justification are not protected by the Public Officers Protection Act. He placed reliance on ABUBAKAR vs. GOV, GOMBE STATE (SUPRA) and OFFORBOCHE vs. OGOJA LOCAL GOVERNMENT (SUPRA). This line of argument makes it expedient that I venture briefly into the question raised in the Claimant’s originating summons, a voyage which I am willing to take, in order to put the Claimants concern to rest. The depositions in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14 15 and 16 of the claimants counter affidavit are to the effect that the defendant did not act according to the Retirement Age of Staff of Polytechnic and Colleges of Education (Harmonisation) Act 2012. The basis of the claimants claims in this suit was that the Act, a Federal Statute, raised the retirement age of staff of polytechnics, which included the defendant, to 65 years but the defendant relied on the State’s Law, the Rivers State Parastatals Unified Pension Scheme Law, Laws of Rivers State 2001, to retire them at 60 years. According to the claimants, the Act prevails over the State Law, consequently, the defendant acted outside the requirement of its office not to have abided by the provisions of the prevailing Act. The defendant, in its affidavit in support of the preliminary objection, has contended that the 65 years provided by the Act does not apply to the claimant as they were not academic staff of the defendant. The claimants have admitted in their counter affidavit that they are members of the non-academic staff of the defendant but they have however deposed in their counter affidavit that the Act applies to academic and non- academic staff of polytechnics. The provision of the Act relied upon by the claimants as requiring them to retire at 65 years is in section 3 (1) of the Act which reads thus: 3. “1. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Pension Reform Act, the compulsory retirement age of an academic staff of Polytechnics and Colleges of Education shall be 65 years” The section specifically mentions the beneficiaries of the 65 years provision. It is the academic staff. In the case of KWARA STATE POLYTECHNIC vs. OYEBANJI (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 447) 151 at 190, “academic staff” was defined as “member of staff whose sole or primary duty is teaching.” I have observed on the claimant’s retirement certificates (Exhibits A and A1 annexed to the affidavit in support of the origination summons) that they were staff of the works department of the defendant. By their admissions also in paragraph 18 of their counter affidavit, I am satisfied they are non-academic staff of the defendant. The claimants, not being academic staff, cannot claim under the section. This is because, if it was the intendment of the legislators for the provision to apply to all staff of polytechnic, they would have generalized it. Not having done that, the maxim expression unius es exclusio alterius applies. Thus, where a statutory provision names specific things, the intention is that those not named are not intended to be included. See NECO vs. TOKODE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 574) 105 at 121. The effect is that non-academic staff are not mentioned in section 3 (1) of the Harmonisation Act and they are therefore excluded from the 65 years retirement age availed to academic staff of Polytechnic and Colleges of Education. In the circumstance, the Rivers State Parastatals Unified Pension Scheme Law, Laws of Rivers State 2001 still applies to the claimants, and the defendant rightly exercised the power of its office to retire the claimants under the Law. I do not therefore find any reason to believe that the defendant acted outside the color of its office or acted outside the law or statutory duty or acted without legal justification. The claimants counsel has further argued that the relationship between the parties being that of contract of employment, the POPA does not apply to bar the suit. With respect to counsel, that is hardly the position of the law. I am inclined to subscribe to the submission of learned counsel for the defendant on the point in his reply on points of law. The correct position on the point is as expounded in the UNIVERSITY OF JOS vs. DR. SANI MUHAMMAD ADAM (Supra) case cited by learned defence counsel. In my view also, the POPA applies to causes arising from contract of employment in the public sector as, generally, the protection will avail a public officer where the alleged breach is in the performance or execution of a public duty. See AJIKITI vs. NYSC (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 591) 1582 at 1591. Therefore, the contention of the claimant’s counsel on this issue does not hold water. Where a statute prescribes a period within which an action should be brought, legal proceedings cannot be properly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. An action which is not brought within the prescribed period offends the provision of the law and does not give rise to a cause of action. The claimant’s suit was not filed within 3 months from the date of their retirement by the defendant. Their action is no longer maintainable. The action is incompetent and this court is robbed of jurisdiction to determine it. The case is liable to be struck out and it is accordingly struck out. No order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe