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This action was instituted by the claimant against the Defendants vide a General Form of Complaint dated the 31st day of July 2012 and filed on the 12th day of September, 2012. The Complaint, filed along with supporting originating processes, seeks the determination of the following question: 1. Whether by the provision of Section 31 of the Civil Service Commission Regulation 1994 and Rule 02809 of Imo State Public Service Regulation, the defendants are empowered to retire the claimant from the Imo State Judicial/Civil Service when the claimant has neither attained the age of 60 years nor 35 years of service. 2. If the answer for the question is in the negative, the claimant therefore seeks the following reliefs: a) A declaration that the claimant is only due for retirement on the 31st day of January 2017 when he would have attained 35 years in service, same being earlier than 8th April 2017 when the claimant would have attained 60 years of age. b) A declaration that in computation of 35 years of service of the claimant, the four years study leave without pay granted to the claimant by the defendants is not and should not be inclusive. c) An order for the payment of the Claimant’s salary/emolument up to 31st January 2017. d) An order of court restraining the defendants from retiring the claimant earlier than the 31st day of January 2017 when he would have attained 35 years of service; By a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated the 28th day of October 2013 and filed on the 30th day of October 2013, the Defendants/Applicants seek for an order of court dismissing this suit for want of jurisdiction, and for such further orders as the honourable court may deem fit to make in the circumstance. The grounds upon which the objection is sought are: 1. The suit is statute barred. 2. The honourable court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In support of the motion is an affidavit of 6 paragraphs deposed to by one Nnodi Chukwunyere, a civil servant. Also attached is a written address wherein learned counsel to the defendants/applicants formulated three issues for the determination of this honourable court. (a) Whether the suit is statute barred having regard to the provisions of the Public officers Protection Act, Cap P4.Vol 14, Laws of the Federation, 2004. (b) Whether Administrative action can be used to correct an issue of law. (c) On the resolve of issues 1 and 2, what is the proper order the court ought to make. In arguing ISSUE ONE, Counsel submitted that the suit as constituted is statute barred on the ground that it was commenced after the three month limitation period prescribed by section 2(a) of the Public officers Protection Act Cap P4, Vol.14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. He defined a public officer in accordance with Section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act, 2004 to mean a member of the Public Service of the Federation or of a state within the meaning of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. See ABUBAKAR V. GOVERNOR OF GOMBE STATE (2002) 17 NWLR (Pt. 797) 533 CA. Public Officers have been held by our apex court to include an artificial person, public officer, public bodies or body of persons, corporate or incorporate, statutory bodies or persons. See IBRAHIM vs. JSC (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt.584), Per IGUH JSC. Counsel submitted that the defendants in this suit fall under the ambit of the Public Officers Protection Act which must be brought within 3 months of the occurrence of the incidence that gave rise to the cause of action. In determining whether the action is statute barred, counsel said it is pertinent to determine when the cause of action arose. Cause of action has been defined in the case of S.P.D.C Nig. vs. OKONOEDO (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt.109) 85 @ 117-118, as a factual situation, the existence of which entitles the plaintiff to obtain from the court a remedy against another person or the facts which constitutes the essential ingredients of an enforceable right of claim. See also ACCORD PARTY vs. GOVERNOR OF KWARA STATE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 555) Pg. 220 @ 276. Counsel to the applicant submitted that a cause of action generally accrues on the date the incident giving rise to the cause of action arose; and that in determining when the cause of action arose, recourse must be had to the Complaint and Statement of Facts. In determining the period of limitation, counsel submitted that one has to look at the time the cause of action arose and compare it with when the Writ of Summons was filed. This can be done without taking oral evidence from a witness. If the time of the writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute barred. He referred the court to the case of OKENWA vs. MILITARY GOVERNOR IMO STATE (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 507) Pg. 154 at 167. See also IKURIE vs. EDJERODE (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 745) 446 Counsel submitted that from the reliefs sought in the Complaint of the Claimant and paragraphs 2 to 10 of his statement of facts, the cause of action is the inclusion of the Claimant's 4 years period of study leave without pay in the computation of his retirement date. On this, reference was made to paragraph 3 and 4 of the supporting affidavit and counsel stated that the case of the claimant was hinged on Section 14 of the Pensions Act 1990 which provides thus: "In the computation of the quantifying service, no period during which an officer was less than fifteen years of age or was absent from duty on study leave without pay shall be taken into account unless such absence was for the purpose of utilizing a bursary or scholarship awarded to him by the Government of the Federation or of a state thereof or the absence was on account of such purpose as the minister may permit.” Counsel stated that the Pensions Reform Act 2004 repealed the Pensions Act 1990 which justified the non-pensioning of the period of study leave without pay or adding the period in computation of years of service of public officers, the repeal rendered the case of the Claimant frivolous, null, void and of no effect and he urged the court to so hold. To the applicants, the cause of action of the Claimant is the inclusion of the 4 years of his study leave in the calculation of his years of service and his retirement date. It was therefore the submission of counsel that the incident that gave rise to the cause of action of the Claimant is the repealing of the 1990 Pension Act by the 2004 Pensions Reform Act and urged the court to so hold; that since the Claimant failed to sue in 2004, he is now statute barred as this action was filed far beyond the 3 months limitation period prescribed for such actions to be filed. In arguing ISSUE TWO, counsel to the defendant/applicant submitted that he agreed with the averments in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the statement of facts of the Claimant that letters, circulars and regulations cannot over-ride the Act of the National Assembly. Counsel therefore saw no need in the Claimant parading Exhibit A to this application. Exhibit A is a letter titled "the waiver to serve out period of study leave without pay", which counsel says is contrary to the 2004 Pensions Reform Act. Therefore if the Claimant is allowed to place reliance on Exhibit A, it would tantamount to using a mere letter to repeal the 2004 Pensions Act. He urged the court to hold that Exhibit A is inconsistent with the Pension Reform Act 2004, and a letter such as Exhibit A cannot save this case. It was further argued that assuming without conceding that the cause of action of the Claimant accrued in June 2011 or 4th November 2011 when Exhibits B and B2 were respectively issued cancelling Exhibit A, the case is still statute barred having been filed in September 2012 as it is beyond 3months; and he urged the court to so hold. Citing the case of OGUNMOKUN V. MILAD, OSUN STATE (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 594) Pg. 261 @ 265, Counsel submitted that Exhibit A which the Claimant is relying on cannot override the Pension Reform Act which repealed Section 14 of the 1990 Pensions Act; and that no person can by letter, grant waiver to the claimant to include the 4 years of study leave in the computation of his retirement date. In arguing ISSUE THREE, counsel referred the court to the case of IBRAHIM vs. JUDICIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE, KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1 where it was held that the Public Officers Protection Act is a limitation law and it removes the right of action, the right of enforcement and the right to judicial relief in a Plaintiff and leaves him with a bare empty cause of action which he cannot enforce if such action is commenced outside the 3 months statutory period allowed by the law, See also the case of ADIGUN vs. AYINDE (1993) I NWLR (Pt. 319) 516 at 536 paragraphs C-E or Pg. 534 paragraphs A-B. See also in the case of EGBE v ADEFARASIN (No 2) (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47)1 Counsel further submitted that on the strength of the Supreme Court case of OWNERS OF THE MV “ARABELLA” vs. NAIC (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1097) 182 AT 219 that the order the court ought to make now is that of dismissal of the suit, and he urged the court to so hold. In opposition to the Notice of preliminary objection, the claimant/respondent on the 13th day of November 2013 filed a 9 paragraph counter affidavit deposed to by the claimant himself, as well as a written address canvassing arguments in opposition of the preliminary objection filed by the applicants. In reaction to ISSUES ONE & TWO formulated by the applicants in their argument, the Claimant’s counsel submitted that recourse should only be made to the writ and statement of facts as filed by the Claimant. Citing the case of P.C.H.S. Co. Ltd. vs. Migfo (Nig) Ltd. (2012) All FWLR part 642 page 161 @ 163, he stated that "It is trite law that it is the Plaintiff's claim that determines and vests jurisdiction in the court." He urged the court to discountenance the contents of Exhibits A, B, B1 and B2 as they do not form part of the Claimant’s claim and statement of Facts. See also S.P.D.C NIG vs. OKONOEDO (2008) I NWLR (Pt. l09) and ACCORD PARTY vs. GOV. KWARA STATE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 555). Counsel stated that Claimant's relief 1 is a call on this Honourable Court to interpret a statute based on which the reliefs in paragraph 2 are predicated. Relief 2(a) and (b) are declaratory which the court can assume jurisdiction to determine at any time. Counsel submitted that, cause of action will not arise except; "when there is in existence a person who can sue and another who can be sued, and when all facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed" Citing the case of N.E.C.O. vs. Tokode (2011) All FWLR part 574 Page 122 paragraph F, counsel submitted that as at this material time as alleged by the applicants, all facts have not happened as the claimant was not retired until 2013. He said in view of the above authority, time was not running as at the time this suit was instituted hence the reliefs are declaratory and restraining in nature. What is more, the facts came to completion in January 2013 while this suit was already pending. He urged the court to hold that the suit is not statute barred. Counsel contended however, that Statute Bar period is calculated from the cessation of continuous damage or injury, and that the non-payment of the claimant’s salary and emoluments since January 2013 amounts to a continuous injury, and urged the court to hold that the cause of action arises at the end of every month. He further relied on the case of Aremo II vs. Adekonye (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt.891) Pg. 572 @ 593 - 594 and submitted that looking at the facts of this case, the claimant respondent was issued a letter in January 2013 and has not been receiving his monthly salaries and emoluments, causing fresh causes of action on monthly basis and urged the court to so hold. It is Counsel’s submission that the applicant’s argument that the claimant ought to have sued in 2004, holds no water, as the claimant was neither retired nor personally affected in 2004 rather in 2013 when he was issued with a letter which he had earlier gone to court to restrain the defendants/applicants from issuing and that the cause of action kept on arising at the end of every month since January 2013 by non-payment of claimant's salary. He concluded by submitting that this court is ceased with requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit on its merits; and that the arguments relating to the Pensions Act are issues that are best determined at the trial, and to delve into it at this stage is improper, especially as they are issues that do not rob this court its jurisdiction as expressly provided for under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended. By way of adumbration, Claimant argued that the limitation law does not apply to labour matters, citing the recent ruling of this honourable court sitting at Enugu delivered on the 10th day of December 2012 in CHIEF JOHN AKARUAYEN EWENEDE vs. SOLOMON AJOMATA ALA AND ORS. (Suit No. NICN/EN/149/2012 unreported), and the case of FGN vs. ZEBRA ENERGY LTD (2002) 12 SC Pt. 2, Pg. 136 where it was held that limitation law does not apply to labour matters. Counsel to the Defendants/Applicants filed a further affidavit and reply on points of law dated 17th February 2014, wherein it was submitted that Exhibit A was part of the documents frontloaded by the Claimant, therefore, it was wrong to conclude that it was the defendants that imported the document. He said that Exhibits B, B1 and B2 arose from Exhibit A and they are relevant to this case, being necessary to determine the propriety of this action. Counsel also referred the court to the case of OBA J. A. AREMO II vs. S.E ADEKANYE and 2 ors (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) Pg. 572 @ 590 where the Supreme Court held that where an objection is raised to the jurisdiction of the trial court to try an action, the court at that stage has to enquire whether in fact its jurisdiction has been ousted: Nwosu vs. Imo Environmental Sanitation Authority (1990) NWLR (Pt.135) 688. In urging the court not to jettison Exhibits B, B1 and B2, the applicant’s Counsel submitted that if there is an issue in the case of the Claimant requiring reference to the defence it can be referred to in arguing the issue of statute barred. Having carefully considered the arguments of Counsels, both for and against the grant of this application, it became necessary to ask the parties to address the court on “whether a reasonable cause of action has been disclosed”. Following this, the defendants filed a written address on the 7th day of April 2014, wherein counsel nominated 2 issues for determination: i. What is reasonable cause of action ii. Whether reasonable cause of action was disclosed in this case. Cause of action was again defined as an entire set of facts or circumstances giving rise to an enforceable claim. Citing ADEPOJU vs. AFONJA (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 363) 437 @ 453-454, BELLO vs. A. G. OYO STATE (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 828, AKILU vs. FAWEHINMI (No.2) (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 102) 122 wherein cause of action was variously defined, Counsel submitted that the relevant consideration in determining whether a reasonable cause of action has been disclosed is by looking as the statement of claim of the claimant. Counsel urged the court to hold that no cause of action arose from the complaint in this case; and that the Statement of Facts does not disclose any cause of action, rather, it is based on speculation. There is no date from the statement of facts from which to determine when the cause of action arose to determine Statute Bar. Any claim that discloses no reasonable cause of action will affect the competency of the suit and deprive the court of jurisdiction to entertain the action. I have carefully considered the affidavits and submissions of counsel on both sides as it relates to this preliminary objection as well as all the written addresses filed. The most crucial question that arises from the issues raised in this application is when the cause of action can be said to have arisen. The courts have continually held that the only way to find out is to look at the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim (Statement of Facts) of the claimant. The Court of Appeal in determining how to compute the time or period of limitation both under the Limitation Law and Public Officers Protection Law, has held in the case of MUDUN & ORS V. ADANCHI & ORS (2013) LPELR-20774(CA) that: “In order to determine the period, consideration, must be given to the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim alleging when the wrong was committed and by comparing that date with the date on which the Writ of Summons was filed. This can be done without taking oral evidence from witnesses.” This was the reasoning in the in the case of WOHEREM vs. EMERUWA (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt.890) 398 @417 where the Supreme Court decided that “for the purpose of determining whether or not an action is statute barred, the period of limitation is determined by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim only.” Briefly stated, the fact of the claimant’s case as pleaded in his Complaint and Statement of Facts is that he was employed in January 1978; and that in 1982 he sought and obtained leave to proceed on study leave without pay which was granted. That he was on study leave without pay for four years from 1982 to 1986 when he was reinstated after the completion of his study leave. In paragraph 12 of the Statement of facts, it was stated that: “The defendants are plotting to retire the claimant earlier than his due date for retirement.” The Claimant filed this suit in September 2012. In his counter-affidavit, he stated that he filed the suit when he noticed that the respondents were having series of meetings to retire him before his actual year of retirement. The suit was therefore commenced with the objective of restraining the defendants from doing that, among other reasons as shown on the claim and the statement of facts. His further averments are to the effect that his salary was stopped since January 2013 till date. Looking at the facts outlined above, one would ask: “when did the cause of action arise” or better put, what event triggered this action. It is noted that no notice of retirement was issued to the claimant until after he had filed this action. He merely speculated that he was going to be retired, hence this suit. He stated in paragraph 4 of his counter affidavit that “this suit was commenced in 2012 when I noticed that the respondents were having series of meetings to retire me before my actual year of retirement in order to restrain them.” These are speculations which do not amount to a cause of action. On the other hand, to the defendants, the cause of action of the claimant arose in 2004 when the Pension reform Act repealed the Pensions Act 1990, or at best in 2011 when Exhibit B and B2 were issued cancelling Exhibit A. It is my view that both arguments do not support any clear date of the accrual of the claimant’s cause of action; therefore, the prescribed comparison with the date of filing cannot be effectively achieved to determine Statute Bar. I will therefore not overflog the issue of statute bar, as it will be academic. Clearly from these facts and the various definition of “cause of action” in S.P.D.C NIG vs. OKONOEDO (Supra) and ACCORD PARTY vs. GOVERNOR OF KWARA STATE (Supra) as “simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles the plaintiff to obtain from the court a remedy against another person or the facts which constitutes the essential ingredients of an enforceable right of claim”, it is unclear as to when exactly the cause of action in this suit arose. That being so, comparing the date of the cause of action with the date the suit was filed, becomes impossible. This is because there is no clear evidence to determine the date of the cause of action. It had been noted earlier that there was no notice of retirement that may have been said to have triggered the filing of the suit. Nothing in the Claimant’s statement of claim shows or points to any action that can be said to have triggered the action. In Paragraph 2 of the Claimant’s counter affidavit, he deposed to the fact that: “….the suit was instituted on 12th September 2012 for declaratory and restraining reliefs when I discovered that the defendants have perfected plans to retire me.” In Paragraph 4, the Claimant deposed that “That the suit was commenced in 2012 when I noticed that the respondents were having series of meetings to retire me before my actual year of retirement in order to restrain them.” In Paragraph 5, the Claimant deposed that “That while this suit was pending, the defendants wrongfully retired me on 31st January 2013 and since then have stopped paying my salary.” And in Paragraph 6, he said: “That upon issuance of the said letter in Paragraph 5 above, the defendant stopped my salary/emoluments since January 2013 till date.” It can be properly inferred that the Claimant has not clearly disclosed a specific event or trigger that can be tagged “cause of action”. See MADAKI vs. GOVERNOR OF NASARAWA STATE (2011) LPELR-5115. It is clear that the action was filed even before the cause of action arose. The Claimant has stated that the suit was for restraining reliefs which in my view, have obviously been overtaken by events. Again, the Claimant has stated that notice of retirement was issued to him after this action was commenced. It is noted that no document has been placed before the court to prove that the defendants were planning to retire the Claimant before his “actual” date of retirement. In IKENNE L.G. vs. WEST AFRICAN PORTLAND CEMENT Plc. (2012) All FWLR (Pt.642) Pg. 1747 at Pg. 1770-1771, it was held that all the court is concerned with in deciding whether there is a reasonable cause of action, is to look at and see whether the statement of claim standing alone or on its own disclosed a cause of action that has a chance of success. The Claimant’s counsel raised a point that fresh causes of action continues to arise on a monthly basis upon continued failure to pay the Claimant’s salaries and emoluments. If this submission is anything to go by, then it means that the cause of action itself has not arisen, and so the talk of the application of the limitation law or any of its recognized exceptions will not arise in the first place. That point is therefore misconceived, and I so hold. Claimant’s counsel also raised a point that statute of limitation does not apply to labour cases. While it is true that in case No NICN/EN/149/2012 cited by Counsel and indeed in other cases such as John Ovoh v. The Nigerian Westminster Dredging & Marine Company Ltd Unreported suit No NIC/9/2002, this Court had held that the limitation laws do not apply to labour rights issues especially as to the claims for salary and entitlements/benefits, the truth is that this Court had in recent times, had to change that stance in cases other than those relating to salary and benefits given the weight of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court authorities to the effect that the limitation laws apply to employment cases as in other cases, all of which are binding on this Court. In cases of claims for salary and allowances, the previous decisions of this Court would still appear to be good law, only if the test on “continuance of damage or injury” laid down in the recent Supreme Court decision in AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 144 – 150 is met. In this sense, for the continuing injury exception to apply, the employee would need to be in employment. The stance of this court in cases such as John Ovoh v. The Nigerian Westminster Dredging & Marine Company Ltd (supra) among other decisions, must therefore be understood qualifiedly. See the case of Hon. Runyi Kanu & 6 others vs. AG Cross Rivers & 19 others (Unreported) Suit No NICN/CA/39/2012 delivered on 13th March 2013. Claimant’s Counsel had submitted earlier in his arguments in opposition to the application on grounds of being statute barred, that cause of action will not arise except when all facts have happened which are material to be proved, to entitle the Plaintiff to succeed. Relying on NECO vs. Tokode, he submitted that all facts had not happened at the time the suit was filed, as the claimant was not retired until 2013 and that the facts came to completion in January 2013 while this suit was already pending. He further submitted that time was not running as at the time this suit was instituted, hence the reliefs are declaratory and restraining in nature. To my mind, this submission, even though adduced in opposition to statute bar, rather than help the Claimant’s case, further supports the fact that no cause of action had arisen at the time the suit was filed. Having considered the totality of the Claim, statement of facts and all the documents frontloaded, it is my view that there are no live issues to be determined, as there is nothing upon which the Claimant could have placed his claim. Paragraph 2 of the Claimant’s counter affidavit which is the closest account the Claimant has, as to what could have amounted to a cause of action, is a mere speculation and does not supply any further facts to help the court in this regard. It is my holding therefore that the Claimant has not disclosed any reasonable cause of action against the defendants. This suit is hereby struck out. I make no order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Presiding Judge