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By a Complaint dated the 20th day of November 2013 and filed on the 19th day of December 2013, the Claimant seeks the following reliefs: a. A Declaration that the purported dismissal of the Claimant from Abia State Public Service by the 2nd Defendant on the alleged approval of Abia State Governor is contrary to all known rules of natural justice and fair hearing guaranteed in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended and Abia State Public Service Rules as same is malicious and ultra vires their powers and therefore wrongful, illegal, unconstitutional, unlawful, null and void and of no legal effect whatsoever. b. A Declaration that the Defendants lack the competence to dismiss the Claimant from Public service over an allegation of financial impropriety, fraud which are criminal in nature and within the original exclusive jurisdiction of court of competent jurisdiction to entertain and determine same. c. A Declaration that the dismissal of the Claimant from public service by the Defendants amounts to double punishment and therefore unconstitutional, unlawful, illegal and of no legal effect. d. An Order setting aside the purported dismissal of the Claimant and compelling/directing the defendants by themselves, servants, agents, privies to reinstate and pay the claimant all her salaries, allowances, grants, emoluments, privileges and entitlements without loss of seniority and the due promotion effected accordingly as if the purported dismissal had not occurred. e. An Order compelling/directing the defendants to pay the Claimant all the unjustified monthly deductions made on her salary from April 2010 to September 2010 which is the sum of N94, 809.69 (Ninety Four Thousand, Eight Hundred and Nine Naira, Sixty Nine Kobo) only. The defendants/applicants filed three preliminary objections on 03/02/2014, 06/03/2014 and 19/03/2014 respectively. Written Addresses in respect of the three objections were adopted on the 3rd day of April 2014, on which day, G.O.B. Okeh esq sent in a letter to inform the court of the inability of counsel for the Claimants to attend court, and to seek the indulgence of the court to deem adopted, the Claimant’s Written Addresses filed on 25/02/2014, 02/04/2014 and 02/04/2014 respectively, in response to the Defendants’ preliminary objections. This request was duly granted and the court proceeded to hear the defence Counsel C. Ogwo, who moved the court in respect of the 3 objections which were consolidated and taken together as follows: By a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated and filed on the 3rd day of February 2014, and brought pursuant to Section 25(1) of the Abia State Universal Basic Education Board Law, Cap 37, Laws of Abia State 2005 and Section 2(9) of the Public Officers’ Protection Law, Cap 140, Laws of Abia State (2005), the defendants sought an order of this court dismissing the suit as being statute barred on the following grounds: a. That this suit was brought outside the time limited by Section 25(1) of the Abia State Universal Basic Education Board Law, Cap 37, Laws of Abia State 2005, against the 1st and 2nd Defendants. b. That this suit is incompetent as the Claimant no longer has a right of action. c. That this suit is incompetent and this honourable court cannot assume jurisdiction to entertain the instant suit. The said notice of objection was accompanied with a written address wherein counsel canvassed arguments in support of the application. By another Notice of Preliminary Objection dated and filed the 6th day of March 2014 and brought pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Law Cap 140, Laws of Abia State (2005) and the Rules of this court, the defendants are also seeking for an order of this court dismissing the suit as being statute barred on the grounds that a. That this suit was brought outside the time limited by Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Law, Cap 140, Laws of Abia State (2005), against the 3rd to the 5th Defendants. b. That the 5th Defendant is not a juristic party that is clothed with the powers to sue or be sued. c. That this suit is incompetent as the Claimant no longer has a right of action. d. That this suit is incompetent and this honourable court cannot assume jurisdiction to entertain the instant suit. The notice is also accompanied by a written address. In the written addresses filed by Counsel to the defendants/applicants, the main issue for determination was whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit by virtue of the various limitation laws cited, to wit: Section 25(1) of the Abia State Universal Basic Education Board Law, Cap 37, Laws of Abia State 2005 and Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Law, Cap 140, Laws of Abia State (2005); both of which prescribe a 3 month limitation period for the commencement of actions against the Board or member, officer or employee of the Abia State Universal Basic Education Board or against any person for any act done in pursuance of a public duty, as the case may be. The Supreme Court case of EGBE vs. ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) Pg. 1 was cited to disclose how a statute barred action is determined; that is by looking at the writ of summons and statement of claim to ascertain when the wrong which gave the plaintiff a cause of action was committed, and by comparing that date with the date on which writ of summons was filed. The case of ONUORAH vs. KADUNA REFINING & PETROCHEMICAL CO. LTD (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 393 @ 408 was also cited by counsel to support this point. See also FORESTRY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NIGERIA vs. GOLD (2007) 30(2) NSCQR 850 @ 865-866. Counsel then drew the attention of the court to Paragraphs 1, 55, 62, 66 & 67 of the Claimant’s Statement of Claim which shows that the cause of action arose on the 1st day of August 2011. He submitted that it is a well-known principle of law that a case brought outside the statutory period such as this case which was filed on the 19th day of December 2013, is statute barred. He submitted that Section 195 of the Constitution provides for the position of the Attorney-General as the Chief Law Officer of the State, while Section 318(1) of the Constitution defines public service to include a member of the Federation or of the State in any capacity in respect of the Government of the Federation or the State as the case may be. He relied on IBRAHIM vs. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMITTEE, KADUNA STATE (1997-1998) 302 at 326 where the Supreme Court held that the positions of Attorney-General, Permanent Secretary, Inspector-General of Police, etc. are covered by the protection offered by POPA. See also GYANG vs. N.S.C. (2002) 15 NWLR 454 @ 463. Counsel raised a second issue as regards whether the 5th defendant is a juristic body capable of being sued or suing another party. In arguing this issue however, counsel’s contentions were directed at the 4th defendant. He contended that the 4th defendant is not a juristic person, and the action against that office is not properly constituted. On the whole, counsel to the applicants urged the court to dismiss the suit as held in BAKARE vs. NIGERIA RAILWAY CORPORATION (2007) 32 NSCQR 176 @ 215. In opposition to the Notice of Preliminary Objection filed on the 3rd day of February 2014, the Claimant on the 25th day of February, deposed to a Counter-Affidavit of 43 Paragraphs. She also deposed to a Counter-Affidavit of 9 paragraphs on the 2nd day of April 2014 in opposition to the Notice of preliminary objection filed by the defendants on the 6th day of March 2014. Both Counter-Affidavits were accompanied by Written Addresses wherein Counsel canvassed arguments in opposition to the objections raised by the defendants. To the Claimant, the defendants abused their office, acted maliciously and in bad faith, and acted outside the colour of their office; therefore the issues of fact need to be determined by taking oral evidence at the trial. It is counsel’s submission that the Claimant’s action is not caught up by statute. He said the Public Officers’ Protection Law is designed to protect the officer who acts in good faith, and that it does not apply to acts done in abuse of office and with no legal justification. He therefore urged the court to hold that the averments in the Claimant’s Statement of facts show malice, bad faith and abuse of office, therefore, they cannot enjoy the protection offered by the Public Officers’ Protection Law. See HASSAN vs. ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 547; ABUBAKAR vs. GOV. GOMBE STATE (2002) 17 NWLR (Pt. 797) 533; DANGANA vs. GOV. KWARA STATE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 593) 1851; and OFFORBOCHE vs. OGOJA L.G. (2001) NWLR (Pt. 739) 458. He submitted that the defendants having acted outside their statutory and constitutional duties without any semblance of legal justification cannot enjoy the protection offered by the Public Officers’ Protection Law. To the Claimant, the protection offered by Section 25(1) of the Abia State Universal Basic Education Board Law, Cap 37, Laws of Abia State 2005 cannot be available to protect an officer or member who has acted maliciously or in bad faith or has acted outside the law establishing the office. It was counsel’s further submission that the Abia State Universal Basic Education Board Law will not apply where the damage is a continuous one. He said the dismissal of the Claimant is causing a continuous damage to her, therefore she can maintain the suit. He urged the court to go into the facts of the case by taking oral evidence as the Claimant’s suit is maintainable. Claimant’s counsel submitted that the 4th and 5th defendants are juristic or artificial persons and therefore can sue and be sued. Both positions are constitutionally provided for, thereby conferring them with legal entities, albeit artificial. The cases of IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C. KADUNA (supra) and GYANG vs. N.S. C. (supra) were cited to support this. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the preliminary objections filed, and hold that the Claimant’s suit is not statute barred. In reaction to the Claimant’s Counter-Affidavit of 25th February 2014, the Defence filed a Reply on the 6th day of March 2014 wherein they raised two issues of law for the determination of the court: i. Whether the issue that should be addressed is whether this action is in breach of the provisions of Section 25 of the Abia State Universal Basic Education Board Law and Section 2(a) of the Public Officer’s Protection Law or whether extraneous issues that were not in these laws be read into them. ii. Whether the 1st and 2nd defendants have the power to take the action of 1/8/2011 as directed by the 5th defendant which is in charge of the Public Service of Abia State. Counsel re-iterated the decisions in Egbe vs. Adefarasin (supra) and Onuorah vs. Kaduna Refining & Petro-Chemical Co. Ltd (supra) where it was held that the only determinant of jurisdiction is the writ and statement of claim. He submitted that the claimant was under the direct employ of the 1st defendant who had the power to pay, approve leave and allowances and also discipline staff under its employment. Therefore, it did not act outside the colour of its office. See NWOSU vs. IMO STATE ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORITY (1989-1999) 35 CJE 248 at 267. Counsel also referred to OFFORBOCHE vs. OGOJA LOCAL GOVT (supra) where it was held that overzealousness of a public officer or where he acted in error of judgment or in honest excess of his responsibility will not amount to bad faith or abuse of office. Abuse of office, the court held, is the use of power to achieve ends other than that for which power was granted. In EGBE vs. ALHAJI (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 128) 546 at 567, the Supreme Court referred to Egbe vs. Adefarasin where it was held that when the protection under the law is invoked, the question whether the act which the plaintiff complains of was performed maliciously or in bad faith is irrelevant. Similarly in ANOZIE vs. A.G. FED (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095)278 at 291, it was held that the appellant cannot raise the issue of malice since he was clearly outside the limitation period. That is to say that the issue of malice still needs to be raised within the limitation period. Counsel therefore submitted that the question of bad faith or malice is only relevant if the action complaining this state of things is filed before the expiration of the statutory period. The allegation of bad faith and malice therefore cannot rejuvenate the dead matter or breathe life into a dead cause of action. He concluded by urging the court to dismiss the suit of the Claimants. In a 3rd Notice of Preliminary Objection filed on the 19th day of March 2014, the defendant sough for an order striking out the alleged service effected in this court for being in breach of Sections 97 and 99 of the Sheriffs and Civil Processes Act. The objection was premised on the fact that (1). The writ was served on the various defendants at ASUBEB Office, Umuahia Abia State and the Attorney General’s Chambers Umuahia Abia State respectively. (2). The 4th Defendant being a distinct office, ought to have been served directly and not through the 3rd defendant. (3). The suit was fixed for hearing less than 30 days of the service of the originating processes on some of the defendants. In his written address in support, the defence cited the case of M. V. ARABELLA vs. NAIC (2008) 34(2) NSCQR 1091 at 1129 and submitted that the writ having been issued in Owerri in Imo State ought to have been endorsed for service before being served in Abia State. He also argued that the suit was filed on the 19/12/2014 and required the defendants to enter appearance within 14days instead of the 30 days provided by Section 99 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. Counsel urged the Court to strike out the alleged service on all the defendants, or in the alternative, the Claimant be made to comply with the law. In opposition, the Claimant deposed to a 10 paragraph Counter-Affidavit on the 2nd day of April 2014. In the accompanying written address filed on the same day, Counsel to the Claimant raised the following 3 issues for the determination of the Court: a. Whether the provisions of Section 97 and 99 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act are applicable in the National Industrial Court in view of Section 21 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. b. Whether non-compliance with the provisions of Sections 97 and 99 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act is voidable which divests the trial court of jurisdiction; and whether a waiver by the defendants so served can cure such non-compliance. c. Whether the service of the process on the 4th defendant through the 3rd defendant amounts to a nullity. In arguing ISSUES 1 and 2, Counsel submitted that “courts” is defined in Section 95 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act apply to mean “a court to which parts III, IV,V and VI apply”. And Section 2 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act has interpreted “Court” to include a High Court and Magistrate Court. Section 19 Part III of the said Act gave exhaustive and elaborate meaning of what court is, to include High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja or of the State. It is Counsel’s submission that the NIC is not one of the courts contemplated since it wasn’t expressly mentioned in the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. If the draftsman had intended NIC to be one of the courts within the contemplation of the Act, it would have mentioned it as well. Counsel submitted that by Section 21 of the NIC Act, the court can exercise jurisdiction throughout the Federation of Nigeria. He also referred to Order 7 Rule 1 of the NIC Rules which provides for the manner of service for the purpose of Section 21 of the NIC Act. Without conceding to the strict applicability of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act in this Court, it was counsel’s submission that non-compliance can only render the service voidable, capable of being set aside upon necessary application being made. The endorsement on the writ as required by Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act is a function of the Registrar of Court and not the Claimant, and the mistake of the Registrar cannot be visited on the Claimant. As regards the 30-day requirement within which the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act allows a plaintiff to enter appearance, Claimant submitted that non-compliance would not render the writ void, and indeed, a period of 49 days elapsed before the matter came up for mention. Indeed he said that non-compliance with the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act only amounts to an irregularity. To the Claimant, the defendant’s act of filing a memorandum of appearance, followed by the various preliminary objections amounts to taking active steps in the proceedings, and would amount to an abandonment of the defendant’s right to object to this irregularity. The cases of JOB CHARLES vs. OKONKWO (2002) FWLR (Pt. 117) 1067 at 1085; AYANWOKO vs. OKOYE (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1188) 497 were cited in this regard. As regards whether the service of originating process through another defendant is a nullity, counsel submitted that it is not, since the defendants have a common interest; and indeed, the defect if any, had been cured by the defence filing a memorandum of appearance for all the defendants, and also filing objections on behalf of all the defendants, which, if granted, will terminate the Claimant’s suit in limine. The law is that where a defendant as in the instant situation though not properly served with a writ, nevertheless attends court and participates actively in the proceedings, he would be deemed to have waived his rights and would no more be heard to complain of non-service. Counsel concluded by urging the court to dismiss the objection of the defendants. I have considered all the submissions and arguments relating to all the preliminary objections filed by the defendants as well as all the issues raised by counsel on both sides with regard to the three objections. I have formulated the following issues for consideration, in this order: i. What is the effect of non-compliance with Sections 97 and 99 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act on this suit? ii. Whether the suit is statute barred, having regard to the provisions of Section 25(1) of the Abia State Universal Basic Education Board Law, Cap 37, Laws of Abia State 2005 and Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Law, Cap 140, Laws of Abia State (2005). In determining issue (i), it was held in MAKO v. UMOH (2010) LPELR-4463(CA), that non-compliance with Section 97 and/or Section 99 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act and the rules of Court requiring leave of the court or a judge for a writ to be served out of jurisdiction renders the writ and/or service of it voidable and the defendant who complains of such noncompliance is entitled ex debito justitiae to have same set aside as was done in the cases of SKENCONSULT (NIG) LTD vs. UKEY (1981) 1 SC, NWABUEZE vs. OBI-OKOYE (1988) 4 NWLR (PT 91) 664, NEPA vs. ONAH (1997) 1 NWLR (PT 484) 680, provided he has not taken fresh steps in the matter which will amount to a waiver of the irregularity complained of. Where the latter is the case, his application to set aside must be refused." PER UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, J.C.A (P. 33-35, paras. G-A) The defendants in this case had taken fresh steps when they entered appearance and filed notices of preliminary objection. Having joined issues, they can therefore be seen to have waived the perceived irregularity complained of. I agree with the submission of the claimant to the effect that sections 97 and 99 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act do not apply to processes emanating from this Court. The emphasis on service out of the State in which it was issued cannot be applicable to this Court especially if section 12(2) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006, which permits the Court not to be formal, is taken note of. Therefore, objections based on failure of a claimant to seek leave to issue an originating process or make the endorsement required by S.97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act on the complaint are bound to be dismissed as it was done in OLAMIJU v. LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE COMMISSION, EKITI STATE (Unreported) NIC/LA/157/2011. In the National Industrial Court case of BRIGHT CHINEDU WODI vs. DIFFERENTIAL ALUMINIUM AND STEEL COMPANY LTD & ANOR, Suit No: NICN/CA/75/2012 (unreported), in a judgment delivered on the 21st day of January 2014, Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip had this to say: “Not all courts are covered by section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act; and I so find and hold. Since this is the case, I hold that this court is not covered in terms of the application of the said section 97. My view point is reinforced by section 36(1)(g) of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. T8 LFN 2004 which permits this court to do all such things or give such directives as are necessary or expedient for dealing especially with matters before it. This provision is reinforced by section 12(2) of the NIC Act 2006. This court was not set up to be bound by the sort of technicality that section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act represents. Even aside from all of this, a look at section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act will reveal that while its first part may apply to this court, its second part cannot; and statutes are to be construed holistically, not isolatedly. Section 97 provides as follows: “Every writ of summons for service under this Part out of the State or the Capital Territory in which it was issued shall, in addition to any other endorsement or notice required by the law of such State or the Capital Territory, have endorsed thereon a notice to the following effect” (emphasis is the Court’s). From this provision, one will notice that references to State and Capital Territory implies territorial limitation in terms of the jurisdiction that the State High Courts or High Court of the Capital Territory suffers from, which this court does not, in view of section 21 of the NIC Act 2006. Secondly, in the underlined portion of section 97 quoted above, it can be discerned that aside from the endorsement required by section 97 itself, other endorsements may be required by State laws or laws applicable to the Capital Territory; again, the reference here conjures up the question of territorial law and limitations.” I align myself wholly with the reasoning of my learned brother as outlined above. Non-compliance with Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act does not rob this court of jurisdiction to hear this matter, and I so hold. By Section 21(1) of the National Industrial Court Act, “The court shall have and exercise jurisdiction throughout the Federation and for that purpose, the whole area of the Federation shall be divided by the president of the court into such number of judicial divisions as the President may from time to time, by instrument published in the Federal Gazette decide”. Given the National geographic jurisdiction of the court, the National Industrial Court generally holds that it is not contemplated under the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act 2004 for the purposes of the requirements of especially Section 97 thereof. Besides, it is specifically noted that this division of the court was established to entertain cases emanating from Imo State, Abia State and indeed Rivers State. The thought of issuing processes for service out of jurisdiction in strict compliance with the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act would be misplaced. See the case of IKEGBULAM vs. ASSOCIATION OF SENIOR CIVIL SERVANTS OF NIGERIA (2011) 23 NLLR (Pt. 65) pg. 263. In determining issue (ii) whether the suit is statute barred, having regard to the provisions Section 25(1) of the Abia State Universal Basic Education Board Law, Cap 37, Laws of Abia State 2005 and Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Law, Cap 140, Laws of Abia State (2005), it is noted that the two laws cited provide a three-month limitation period for commencement of action against public officers, or against the board, member or employee. The Claimant was employed by the Secondary Education Management Board vide a letter of appointment dated the 10th day of November 2005, which appointment was later confirmed by a letter dated 11th February 2008. By a letter dated 1st August 2011, the Claimant was dismissed from service. The Claimant contends that before her dismissal from service, she had series of problems with the 2nd defendant, a director known as Lady Mary Otigbuo among other people mentioned in the Statement of Claim and Counter-affidavit. The Claimant was redeployed to the Internal Audit Unit of the 1st defendant where she carried out her functions diligently. This included vetting and verification of figures on a monthly basis, to ensure correctness before cheques were issued for payment of salaries. In the process, she sometimes discovered discrepancies which she often tagged “do not pay”. The Claimant’s diligence, she avers, ensured that ghost workers were not paid any salary. By a letter dated 29th March 2010 and signed by Lady Mary Otigbuo and titled: “Report of Investigation Carried out at ASUBEB Zonal Office Aba on the Case of Financial Impropriety and Forgery perpetrated by some staff of the Zone,” which letter indicted the Claimant of the crime of financial impropriety by giving clearance to pay salaries to two teachers who were not so entitled. In consequence, the said sums of money, amounting to N94,809.69 were deducted from the Claimant’s salary from April to September 2010. In reaction, the Claimant protested to the 1st and 2nd defendants vide a letter dated 07/04/2010, which action earned her more reprimands and threats from the said Lady Otigbuo. The Claimant believes that due to her diligence, honesty and hardwork, she became a victim of conspiracy and malice, because she was making it impossible for the 1st and 2nd Defendants and Lady Otigbuo to achieve their aim of perpetrating ghost workers whose salaries were pocketed by the trio. After series of events further outlined in the Statement of Claim and Counter-Affidavit, the Claimant was eventually dismissed from the Abia State public service by a letter dated 1st August 2011. The dismissal letter is frontloaded along with the originating processes. Upon her dismissal, the Claimant wrote several protest letters to various bodies including the 4th and 5th defendants and the Public Complaints Commission. This action was then filed on 19th December 2103. In determining whether or not a suit is Statute barred, it is pertinent to determine what the cause of action is, and when it arose. Cause of action has been defined in the case of S.P.D.C Nig. vs. OKONOEDO (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt.109) 85 @ 117-118, as simply a factual situation, the existence of which entitles the plaintiff to obtain from the court a remedy against another person or the facts which constitutes the essential ingredients of an enforceable right of claim. In OKENWA vs. MILITARY GOVERNOR OF IMO STATE (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 507) Pg. 154 @ 167, a cause of action was held to accrue on the date on which the incident giving rise to the action occurred. From the facts stated in the Statement of Facts, the cause of action in this suit is the purported dismissal of the Claimant by a dismissal letter dated 1st August 2011. The Claimant has alleged malice and bad faith in asking the court to hold that this suit falls under the exceptions to the limitation law. The Court of Appeal in the case of RAHAMANIYYA UNITED (NIG) LTD. vs. MINISTRY FOR FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY & ORS [2009] 43 WRN 124 CA at 145. at page 146, applying the principle of the Supreme Court in CHIGBU vs. TONIMAS (NIG) LTD [2006] 31 WRN 179; [2006] 9 NWLR (Pt. 986) 189 SC at 210, held that the propriety or otherwise of the act of the defendants is not a relevant consideration for the applicability of the Public Officers Protection Act. It was held that if an action against a public officer or public institution and organization is statute-barred having not been brought within the prescribed period of three months, there will be no basis for investigating the conduct of the public officer which gave rise to the action. It held further, referring to Egbe v Adefarasin [2002] 14 WRN 57 and Aremo II v. Adekanye [2004] 42 WRN 1 SC that the conduct of the defendant as to whether he was malicious or not is irrelevant in determining whether the cause of action is statute-barred under section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act. Also in AG Federation vs. Ali Abacha (2010) LPELR-8997 (CA), where the Court of Appeal Per Okoro JCA in determining the parameters within which a public officer can take protection under the Public Officers’ Protection Act, held that as long as the public officer acts in the usual function of his office, whether he does it correctly or wrongfully, he is protected by the section. It is not open to the court to pry into his conduct in carrying out his official assignment in order to determine whether the Act applies or not. Where however a public officer on a frolic of his own does an act which is not part of his normal duties or has nothing to do with his official functions, then he cannot claim protection under the Act. A public officer who indulges in enticing other men’s wives cannot claim protection under the Act. This is so because enticing another man’s wife is not a public duty or act envisaged in the law. It is noted that the said Lady Otigbuo is not a party in this suit. Even if she were, one would wonder if the allegations made against her would be determinable by this suit. On the whole, therefore, the attempt by the claimant to found his case on malice as an exception to the application of the Abia State Universal Basic Education Board Law and the Public Officers’ Protection Law of Abia State fails in the light of the authorities and reasons given; and I so find and hold. The Claimant has also alleged continuance of injury in claiming the exception to the limitation law. Continuance of injury or damage has been held in a plethora of cases to mean the continuance of the act which caused the injury or damage, and not merely continuance of the injurious effect of a legal injury. It means the continuance or repeat of the act which caused the injury. It doesn’t mean the concomitant effect of the damage or injury. See OLAOSEBIKAN vs. WILLIAMS (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 449) 437 at 456; OBIEFINA vs. OKOYE (1961) All NLR 357. Going by the above definitions of continuance of injury, it is my view that the case of the Claimant does not fall under the category of cases of continuance of damage or injury, and I so hold. By Shamsideed Abolore Bakare v. Nigerian Railway Corporation [2007] 7 – 10 SC 1, limitation of action is the principle of law requiring the plaintiff as a matter of obligation to seek prompt remedy for the breach of his right in a court of law within the time limited by the law otherwise his right of action or cause of action becomes unenforceable at the expiration of the period allowed for commencing an action by the law. So where the law provides for the bringing of an action within a prescribed period in respect of a cause of action, accruing to the plaintiff, proceedings shall not be brought after the period prescribed by law (Dr. Charles Oladeinde Williams v. Madam Olaitan Williams [2008] 4 – 5 SC (Pt. II) 253) except the claimant can show that the case comes within any of the laid down exceptions which I must state the claimant has not succeeded in showing in the instant case. In a plea of a matter being caught up by the limitation law, (in this case the Abia State Universal Basic Education Board Law and the Public Officers’ Protection Law of Abia State), all that is required of the applicant is to show from the originating processes when the cause of action arose and when the action was filed in court. The cause of action arose on the 1st day of August 2011 and the action was filed on the 19th day of December 2013. That is a period of over two years and four months. This is clearly above the 3 month limitation period prescribed by the Abia State Universal Basic Education Board Law and the Public Officers’ Protection Law of Abia State. In the circumstance and for all the reasons given, I hereby hold that the preliminary objection of the Defendants/Applicants succeeds on the ground that the suit of the Claimant is statute barred having been filed outside the three months limitation period provided by Section 25(1) of the Abia State Universal Basic Education Board Law, Cap 37, Laws of Abia State 2005 and Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Law, Cap 140, Laws of Abia State (2005).The suit is accordingly hereby dismissed. I make no order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe