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By a Complaint dated and filed on the 5th Day of August 2013, the Claimant claims the following reliefs against the defendants: 1. A Declaration that the purported retirement or attempt to retire the claimant from the public service of Imo state prematurely is unlawful, ultra vires, null and void. 2. An order of Court setting aside the Secondary Education Management Board Imo state Retirement Notice reference IM/SEMB/15 159/1/197 dated 10th April, 2013 purporting to notify the claimant of his retirement from the service with effect from 1st March 2010. 3. An Order of injunction restraining the defendants whether by themselves or their servants, agents or privies from implementing or enforcing the premature retirement of the claimant before his actual retirement date. 4. An order of Court directing the defendants to pay the claimant all his entitlements, emoluments and promotions due to him till his due retirement date. By a Motion on Notice by the dated and filed on the 31st day of October, 2013 brought pursuant to Section 36(1) of Secondary Education Board Edict No. 3 of 1989 and under the inherent jurisdiction of this court, The 1st Defendant/Applicant seeks for: a. An Order of the Honourable Court setting down for hearing and determination the issue of law raised by the 1st Defendant/Applicant in her statement of Defence to wit: that this suit is statute barred. b. An order of the Honourable Court dismissing this suit for being statute barred. The application is supported by a 10 paragraph affidavit deposed to by Nicholas Osuji a public servant. Also in support is a written address wherein counsel formulated two issues for determination. 1. Whether the claimants suit is statute barred: 2. What is the effect of a statute barred suit. In arguing issue 1, counsel to the 1st Defendant/Applicant relied on Section 36(1) of Secondary Education Board Edict No. 3 of 1989 which provides thus: “No suit against the Board or against any member, officer or employee of the board respecting any act, neglect or default done or committed in the capacity as such member, officer or employee, shall lie or be instituted in any court, unless it is commenced within three months from the occurrence of the act, neglect or default or in the case of continuance of damage or injury, within three months immediately after the cessation thereof” Counsel stated that a cause of action is said to be statute barred if it is instituted outside the time frame provided by the law. Citing the Supreme Court case of NIGERIA PORTS AUTHORITY PLC V. LOTUS PLASTIC LIMITED & ANOR (2006) ALL FWLR pt. 297 pg. 1023, Counsel submitted that for the purpose of Statute of Limitation, time begins to run from the date on which the cause of action accrues. The sole cause of action of the claimant is his retirement or disengagement which he has approached this court to challenge. From the Statement of Claim, the Claimant/Respondent’s employment with the 1st Defendant/Respondent was determined by a letter No: IM/SEMB/15159/1/197 of 10th day of April, 2013 following his retirement from the service of the 1st Defendant. Section 36(1) of Secondary Education Board Edict No. 3 of 1989 provides a three month limitation period within which such an action is to be brought. It was Counsel’s submission that the said retirement was communicated to the Claimant/Respondent through a letter No: IM/SEMB/15159/1/197 of 10th day of April, 2013 and the Claimant/Respondent instituted this action on the 5th day of August, 2013 which is 3 months and 26 days which clearly falls outside the three months limitation period prescribed by Section 36(1) of Secondary Education Board Edict No. 3 of 1989; therefore the Claimant’s action is statute barred. Assuming, that the court is of the opinion that the cause of action is the second retirement Notice dated 11th April 2013, Counsel stated, the action would still be statute barred. On issue 2, it was the submission of Counsel to the 1st Defendant/Applicant that the suit as presently constituted is grossly incompetent and cannot form a basis for any action in law. Citing the cases of ELEBANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) ALL FWLR Pt. 328 pg. 622 and NIGERIA PORTS AUTHORITY PLC vs. LOTUS PLASTIC LTD & ANOR (2006) ALL FWLR Pt. 297, Pg. 1023, it was counsel’s submission that a statute barred action removes the right of action, the right of enforcement, the right to judicial relief and leaves the claimant with a bare and empty cause of action which he cannot enforce. Concluding, Counsel urged the court to dismiss the action of the Claimant/Respondent with punitive cost, on the ground that the suit is statute barred and it discloses no cause of action. EGBE vs. ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NWLR (pt. 47) Pg. 1. By another notice of preliminary objection filed on the 27th day of November 2013, the 2nd Defendant is praying the court for an order striking out this suit for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that: 1. This case is statute barred based on the Public Officers’ Protection Act Chapter P. 41 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, Volume 14, 2004. 2. The suit is Incompetent 3. There is no proper/reasonable cause of action disclosed against the 2nd Defendant sued, being that the said cause of action is statute barred by virtue of the provision of Public Officers Protection Act. In support, the 2nd defendant filed a 4 paragraph affidavit deposed to by one ONUKWUGHA COMFORT, as well as a written address wherein counsel formulated 3 issues for determination. 1. Whether this suit is statute barred having regard to the provisions of the Public Offices Protection Act. 2. Whether the instant application is not incompetent where by the Court is robbed of jurisdiction 3. Whether the Claimant’s suit discloses a cause of action In arguing ISSUE ONE, counsel to the 2nd Defendant/Applicant submitted that this suit is statute barred, relying on the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Chapter P41 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria Volume 14, 2004 which provides a 3 month limitation for the institution and commencement of action against the default, act and neglect of public officers, done in the course of public duties. Relying on the authority of ADEKOYA vs. FEDERAL HOUSING (2008) 4SC.167.A, Counsel submitted that once the issue of statute bar is raised, the duty of the court is to look at the processes of the claimant and determine indeed whether he has filed his action outside the limitation period set by the statute, and if that is so the Court must declare same as statute barred and does not have the jurisdiction to hear and determine same. From the Claimant’s Statement of Claim, the cause of action arose on the 10th day of April 2013 and the Claimant filed this action in the 5th day of August 2013. Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act Cap P41, Laws of the Federation, 2004 (LFN 2004) which is also applicable in Imo State, has stipulated a 3 month limitation. Counsel cited the cases of ALHAJI ALIYU IBRAHIM vs. JSC KADUNA & ANOR (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 583) P.1 and SULGRAVE HOLDINGS INC & 19 ORS vs. FGN & 3 ORS (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) P. 309 AT 338; and submitted that the position of the law has shifted and public bodies, organs and institutions now enjoy protection as public officers. It was submitted that the law is that the limitation of action laws do apply to contracts of employment generally. See JOHN EGBELE vs. THE POST MASTER GENERAL (NIPOST) (2009) LPELR-8870 (CA); FORESTRY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NIGERIA vs. GOLD (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1044) and BAKARA vs. NIGERIA RAILWAY CORPORATION (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1064) 628. Counsel also stated further that the claimant has shown that the retirement notice was served on him on the 10/4/2013 and he instituted this action on the 5/8/2013 which is over three months after the occurrence of the alleged act; and that by the authority of IBRAHIM VS. JSC (1998) 14 NWLR (PART 584), artificial persons are included in the protection provided by the Public Officers’ Protection Act, and not only natural persons. See also NWAOGWUGWU vs. THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA AND OTHERS (2007) 1 ALL FWLR (PART 389) 1327 where it was held that the words any person in section 2(a) of the POPA is not limited to human beings/persons or to persons sued in their personal names but also includes artificial persons, public bodies or body of persons, corporate or incorporate, statutory bodies or persons. Therefore the 2nd defendant is also covered by the POPA. It is also settled law that it is the Plaintiff’s claim that determines the question of the Court’s jurisdiction. See IKURIE vs. EDJERODE (2001) 18 NWLR (PART 745) @ 446. Counsel therefore referred the court to paragraphs 7 & 8 of the Claimants’ Statement of Claim wherein the Claimant was stated to have been issued a notice of retirement dated 10/04/2013. It follows that the Claimant’s cause of action arose on 10/04/2013 and this suit was filed on the 5th day of August 2013 over three months after the alleged default, act or neglect of the defendants. This court is therefore robbed of jurisdiction to hear this suit. See MADUKOLU vs. NKEMDILIM (supra) and NWAOGWUGWU vs. THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA AND OTHERS (supra) where it was held that a legal right to enforce an action is not a perpetual right but a right limited by statute. After the date on which the applicable statute provides that legal proceedings cannot be taken, any person having a right of action cannon competently institute an action. In arguing ISSUE TWO counsel to the 2nd defendant/applicant submitted that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the claim before the court and never by the parties. Counsel further argued referring to the case of TUKUR vs. GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1999) 4 NWLR (PT. 117) 517 AT 547; that the jurisdiction of the NIC conferred by Section 254 is so enormous and encompassing that it will be a gross disservice to inundate or seek to overwhelm the NIC with matters over which it has no concern such as where a suit is improperly constituted howsoever the claim is ingeniously couched; and that this court lacks jurisdiction the suit. See SLB CONSORTIUM LTD vs. NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR. Counsel further referred the court to the case of OKOLO vs. UBN (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt. 859) 87 Pg. 329, paras D-F where it was held that a court is competent when it is properly constituted, when the subject matter is within its jurisdiction and when the case is initiated by due process of law and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is very fundamental and can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Having been raised, the issue of jurisdiction must therefore be determined before any further action is taken in the proceedings. UWAZIRI VS STATE (1997) 3 NWLR (Pt. 496) 689. In arguing ISSUE THREE, counsel contended that the present suit as constituted discloses no cause of action against the 2nd defendant. The court was urged to so hold, having regard to the content of the claim. A cause of action is said to consist of every fact necessary to be proved in order to support a Plaintiff’s right to judgment. Counsel cited the case of SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED vs. FARAH (1995) 3 NWLR (PT 382) Pg. 1. Citing the case of ADIMORA VS AFUFO (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 86) P. 302 Para A, counsel submitted that the Claimant’s case discloses no cause of action against the 2nd defendant; and concluded by urging the court to decline jurisdiction and dismiss the suit. Counsel to the Claimant/Respondent on the 5th day of November 2013, in opposition to the preliminary objection of the 1st defendant, filed a 7 paragraph counter-affidavit and a written address. He also on the 16th day of December 2013 filed a 4 paragraph counter-affidavit and a written address in opposition to the 2nd defendant’s preliminary objection. Both counter-affidavits were deposed to by the Claimant himself. It is his contention that he was never served with any retirement notice dated 11th April, 2013 at anytime or at all, and that he only saw it when the 1st defendant frontloaded it as part of its defence to this suit. The only notice of retirement he received from the 1st defendant was the one dated the 10th April 2013; therefore Counsel in his written address submitted that the objection is misconceived. The Imo State Secondary Education Board Edict No. 3 of 1989 he said, enjoins a claimant to serve a one month pre-action Notice on the 1st defendant which the claimant duly served in person on the defendant on 3/6/2013 as acknowledged in Exhibit A. He argued further that the Pre-action notice operates as commencement of action against the defendant, and that the statute of limitation only applies to a claimant that has refused to officially notify the defendant of any action against the conduct of the defendant complained of within 3 months, either serving a pre-action notice on the defendant or filing an action in court within the period. Counsel stated that in the instant case, pre-action notice was served on the 3rd of June, 2013 which serves as commencement of the action and therefore makes the suit not statute barred. To the Claimant, the defendant’s acknowledgment that it had cancelled or withdrawn the first retirement notice dated 10th April 2013 has introduced a new dimension to the case which has essentially changed the course of events. The case of the Claimant was founded on the retirement notice dated 10th April 2013 which was the only one served on the Claimant. The cancellation of the retirement notice of 10th April 2013 was never communicated to the Claimant. Counsel submitted that the ground for retirement in the Retirement Notice dated 10th April, 2013 was that the claimant has completed the 35 years in service. Nothing was said about age in that letter. The Retirement Notice dated 11th April, 2013 in which the defendant gave a different reason for the claimant’s retirement as having attained 60 years of age was never served on the claimant; and that it could have only taken effect if it was duly served on the Claimant. Counsel further submitted that it is a violation of the Fundamental Human Right of the Claimant to force him out service before the required 35 years. The first Retirement Notice of 10th April 2013 having been superceded by the Retirement Notice of 11th April, 2013, therefore becomes void and of no legal effect whatsoever. See ADEWUNMI vs. A-G ONDO STATE (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt.464) 731 where the court held that what is superceded is deemed as having been overtaken or deemed as having not existed. Counsel submitted finally that the effect of the foregoing scenario in law is that the defendant has not duly and validly communicated any notice of retirement to the claimant. The issue of Statute Bar will therefore not arise, as the cause of action can only accrue upon due service of Retirement Notice on the Claimant, and it is only then that time will begin to run against him. The Claimant vehemently denies being served with the 2nd Retirement Notice of 11th April, 2013. He therefore urged the court to determine this issue by calling oral evidence in resolution thereof. See AZUOKWU VS. NWOKANMA (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt. 937) 537 @ 549 F-G. Counsel stated further that a preliminary issue of competence or jurisdiction that is dependent on resolution of conflicting facts cannot be decided in limine merely on affidavit evidence without oral evidence and examination in court. DAWODU vs. AJOSE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 580) 1334 AT 1348-1349 F-D; ORUK ANAM L.G VS. IKPA (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt. 835) 558 at 575 –576 B-A; WOHEREM vs. EMERUWA (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) 390 at 419 F-H. Claimant’s Counsel submitted by way of conclusion that it is settled law that facts are the fountain head of law and without the ascertainment of facts no basis exists for the application of law see: DINGYADI vs. INEC (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 581) 1426 at 1457 A-B. He therefore urged the court to dismiss the preliminary objection as lacking in merit. In his reply on points of law, Counsel to the 1st Defendant/Applicant reacted to the point raised by the Claimant that a pre-action notice operates as commencement of action, meaning that time starts to run from the date the pre-action notice was served. It is Counsel’s submission that the point is misconceived by the Claimant’s counsel. In determining Statute Bar, the Court is only permitted to look at the writ of summons and statement of Claim; therefore the pre-action notice has no relevance, and indeed the court is not permitted to look at the Statement of Defence. In the 2nd Defendant’s reply on points of law, it was Counsel’s submission that having regard to the complaint of the claimant and reliefs sought by him which are clearly stated in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10 of the statement of facts , the Claimants claims relate to or are connected with his contract of employment and retirement. It is trite that a plaintiff is bound by the case put forward in his writ of summons and complaint as in the instant case. Counsel also submitted that to determine whether a suit discloses a cause of action the court has to look at the writ or complaint and the statement of claim or facts alleging the wrong or breach, when the wrong or breach was committed which gave rise to the cause of action. See the case of UNIJOS vs. IKEGWUOHA (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1360) 478. In the instant case the claimant was an employee of the 1st Defendant who served the claimant with a document dated 10/04/2013, captioned Retirement Notice. The Claimant has stated that he was served with the Retirement Notice dated 10/4/2013 which is the reason he is in court. Counsel further submitted that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at anytime, even by the court suo motu. See PETRO JESSICA ENTERPRISE LTD vs. LEVENTIS TECHNICAL COMPANY LTD. (1992) 5 NWLR (PT 224) PAGE 675 @ 693 PARA E-F Jurisdiction is the pillar upon which a case before a court stands. Once the defendant shows that the court has no jurisdiction, the foundation of the case is broken, and parties cannot be heard on the merits of the case. It will therefore amount to wasting precious time if the court delves into the merit, as the outcome will be a nullity. See OSADEBEY vs. AG BENDEL STATE (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 169) 525. Counsel concluded by urging the court to decline jurisdiction and declare that this suit is statute barred. I have considered the two objections raised by the various defendants, the arguments and submissions for and against, the affidavits and submissions of counsel. I have elected the following three issues for determination: a. What is the Cause of action giving rise to this suit and when did it accrue? b. Does pre-action notice amount to commencement of action? c. Is this suit statute barred? The facts of the case as pleaded in the Statement of Claim, is that the Claimant was employed by the then Mbaitoli/Ikeduru Local Government Area (Education Department) on 23rd October 1979. He was later uploaded as a secondary school teacher in the Secondary Education Management Board (SEMB) of Imo State, the 1st defendant. He went on approved study leave without pay to the University of Nigeria Nsukka in 1984 and was re-instated in 1986. He was born on 26th December 1957 as shown in his statutory declaration of age. He rose to the rank of Deputy Director Grade Level 15 Step 9. By a document dated 10th April 2013 captioned Retirement Notice, the 1st defendant informed the Claimant that he was due for retirement with effect from 1st March 2010. As at the date of issuing the retirement notice on 10/4/2013, the Claimant was not due for retirement, either by age or by years of service. The Claimant believes that the 1st defendant had ascribed a wrong date of birth and other erroneous details to him in their records. He protested the attempt to retire him prematurely by his letter dated 6/5/2013, he issued a pre-action notice on 16th May 2013, and he filed this action on 5th August 2013. The first question for determination as regards “what is the cause of action giving rise to this suit and when did it accrue,” is easily determinable from the above stated facts. The document notifying the Claimant of his purported retirement is the Retirement Notice dated 10th April 2013. Cause of action has been defined in the case of S.P.D.C Nig. vs. OKONOEDO (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt.109) 85 @ 117-118, as simply a factual situation, the existence of which entitles the plaintiff to obtain from the court a remedy against another person or the facts which constitutes the essential ingredients of an enforceable right of claim. See also ACCORD PARTY vs. GOVERNOR OF KWARA STATE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 555) Pg. 220 @ 276. In OKENWA vs. MILITARY GOVERNOR OF IMO STATE (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 507) Pg. 154 @ 167, a cause of action was held to accrue on the date on which the incident giving rise to the action occurred. There is no doubt that a cause of action has arisen by the very act of issuing a retirement notice to the Claimant when he is not due for retirement. The Claimant has argued to the effect of the purported issuance of another retirement notice on 11th April 2013 which is said to supercede the first one and which was not served on him. These go to no issue. The event that gave rise to the filing of this action is the Retirement Notice of 10th April 2013. That was the day the cause of action arose, and I so hold. The second question relates to whether issuance of pre-action notice amounts to commencement of action. The Claimant’s Counsel has submitted that pre-action notice was served on the defendant on the 3rd of June, 2013, and that it serves as commencement of the action, thereby making this suit not statute barred. Service of pre-action notice where it is statutorily provided for such as this case, is a condition precedent to commencement of an action. The Secondary Education Management Board Edict No. 3 of 1989 Imo state enjoins an intending claimant to serve a one month pre-action before an action of this nature can be commenced. The procedure is designed to give a defendant the foreknowledge of the impending suit by the claimant, so as to allow the defendant an opportunity to review his position or settle the matter before it goes to court. Issuance of Pre-Action Notice has no effect on the date of accrual of cause of action. Counsel to the Claimant in his written address, stated that pre-action notice also operates as commencement of action against the defendant. I do not agree with this assertion. Moreso, it has not been supported by any case law or statute, and therefore goes to no issue. Commencement of action is the day the suit was filed in court. I therefore hold that pre-action notice does not serve as commencement of action. Before going into the third question, I find it necessary to touch on a point raised by the Claimant’s Counsel in his verbal adumbration, to the effect that the Public Officers’ Protection Act does not apply to Contract of employment. This submission is misconceived. Counsel relied on a ruling delivered by this court on the 13th day of January 2014 in the case of CHINWO vs. RIVERS STATE UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY Unreported suit No NICN/PHC/65/2013. It is important to point out that this case is clearly distinguishable from the Chinwo case cited by counsel, and indeed, this court did not hold that the Public Officers’ Protection Act does not apply to contract of employment. For the avoidance of doubt, I will recall a portion of (page 7-8) my ruling in that case thus: “ “Learned counsel to the Claimant/Respondent had argued and submitted that by the authorities in the cases of ODUKU V GOVERNMENT OF EBONYI STATE, FGN V. ZEBRA ENEREGY LTD. (2002) 18 NWLR (PT. 891) 162 AT 197 and OSUN STATE GOVERNMENT v. DALAMI (NIG) LTD. (2007) NWLR (Pt.1038) that the Public Officers’ Protection Act is not applicable in contract of employment. I disagree with this line of argument, as the position of the law is clear on the issue of applicability of the Public Officers’ Protection Act that the said protection is permitted in respect of contracts of employment. The case of JOHN EGBELE V. THE POST MASTER GENERAL (NIPOST) (2009) LPELR (LAW PAVILON ELECTRONIC LAW REPORT) – 8870 (CA) PP 21-22, which was cited by the Counsel to the Defendant/Applicant reveals, and I agree, that the Public Officers’ Protection Act is applicable to a contract of employment. A detailed and painstaking review of the John Egbele Case (Supra), however reveals that the same case also provides an exception to “specific contracts”. The court held thus: “The Statutory limitation period will not apply to specific contracts such as where there is an agreement to do an act and it is broken. That is specific contract. Where there is a relationship of employer/employee backed up by specific agreement and appellants fails to observe the terms of the contract then the limitation period will not apply because it is a specific contract”. The court continued that: “An employer/employee relationship of specific contract between the parties was reflected in the defendant’s letter dated 31st October, 2012 to the manager of Skye Bank (pleaded by both parties), instructing the stoppage of the claimant’s salary because he is on industrial action. No doubt, the stoppage of the Claimant’s salary is predicated on the industrial action, which amounted to a breach of the “No work no pay” policy contained in the resolution taken at the meeting of the defendant’s governing council on the 23rd day of June 2011 (pleaded by the defendant). I hold that this suit falls within the exception, therefore, the limitation period in Section 2a of the Public Officers’ Protection Act will not apply.” I believe the portion recalled above speaks for itself. This case is clearly distinguishable from the case cited, and therefore the same parameters will not apply. In determining the last question for determination which is whether the suit is statute barred, the Supreme Court has held in the case of MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR OF EKITI STATE & ORS vs. ALADEYELU & ORS (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1055) 619 that: “It is from either or both the writ of summons and statement of claim that one can ascertain the alleged date when the wrong in question is said to have occurred or been committed, thereby giving rise to the plaintiff’s cause of action. When that ascertained date is compared with the date the writ of summons or originating process was filed in court, it can then be determined whether the action was instituted within the period allowed by law or outside it. When it is found that the action was instituted within the period allowed by law, the action is said to be competent and the court and the court has the jurisdiction to entertain same but where it is found to have been instituted outside the period allowed by law, the action is said to be statute barred and consequently, the court is without jurisdiction to entertain same.” Per Onnoghen JSC. A cause of action is said to be statute barred if it the period of limitation prescribed by statute has elapsed before the action is brought. The law is quite settled as to how to determine whether a suit is statute barred. This involves the determination of the date on which the cause of action arose and comparing same with the date on which the suit was filed. If the date on which the suit was filed shows that the Claimant came outside the period within which he should have come to court, the suit will be held to be statute barred. See HASSAN vs. ALIYU (2010) LPELR-1357 SC Pg.81 Paragraphs D-F. Per Adekeye JSC. The laws under which the objections were brought are Section 36(1) of Secondary Education Board Edict No. 3 of 1989 and Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Chapter P41 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria Volume 14, 2004. Both laws provide a 3 month limitation for the institution and commencement of action against the default, act and neglect of public officers, done in the course of public duties. The cause of action arose on the 10th day of April 2013. This action was filed on the 5th day of August 2013, Three months and Twenty-Six days from the date the cause of action arose. This is clearly outside the 3 months limitation period prescribed by both the Secondary Education Board Edict and the Public Officers Protection Act. The action is therefore caught up by the limitation. In the circumstance and for all the reasons given, I hereby hold that the preliminary objection of the Defendants/Applicants succeeds on the ground that the suit of the Claimant is statute barred having been filed outside the three months limitation period provided by Section 36(1) of Secondary Education Board Edict No. 3 of 1989 and Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Chapter P41 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria Volume 14, 2004. The suit is accordingly hereby dismissed. I make no order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe