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The claimant took up a complaint dated and filed on the 30th day of April 2013 against the defendant praying for the following reliefs – (1) The sum of Two Million Naira (N2,000,000.00) only, being and representing compensation due to the Claimant for injury caused and/or suffered under the employment of the Defendant. (2) The sum of Two Million Naira (N2,000,000.00) only, being and representing payoff and/or retirement benefits due to the Claimant as an employee of the Defendant. (3) The sum of One Million Naira (N1,000,000.00) only, being and representing general, special, exemplary and aggravated damages due to the Claimant flowing from neglect and loss of livelihood caused the Claimant by the Defendant. (4) 10% interest on the judgment sum from the date of judgment until the entire judgment sum is liquidated. The Complaint was accompanied with an Affidavit in verification of the endorsement on the complaint, Statement of Facts establishing the cause of action, the Claimant’s written deposition on oath, list of witnesses, list of documents and copies of documents to be relied upon at the trial. The Defendant entered appearance on the 23rd day of May 2013 and filed a Statement of Defence, list of witnesses, witness’ statement on oath, list of documents and copies of documents to be relied upon. The Claimant on the 6th of August 2013 filed a Reply to the Defendant’s Statement of Defence, Claimant’s additional deposition on oath, additional list and copies of documents. The case proceeded to hearing on the 19th day of November 2013. The Claimant testified on of himself as CW1; Justice Gbiega, a personnel officer with the defendant testified as DW1, while Vincent Akinde, the defendant’s Head of Department, General Services testified as DW2. Hearing was concluded by the 13th day of January 2014, and at the close of the case for each of the parties, final written addresses were filed in accordance with the rules of this court, starting with the defendant. The defendant filed its written address on the 31st day of January 2014 and the Claimant’s written address was filed on the 27th day of February 2014. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a Reply on points of Law on the 10th day of March 2014. They adopted their respective written addresses on the 8th day of April 2014. The brief facts of the case as distilled from the pleadings, is that the Claimant was first employed by the defendant in January 1998. He was laid off on grounds of redundancy on 15th January 2009, and again re-employed as a skilled labourer. In the same year, he was involved in an accident which occurred in the course of carrying out his functions in the defendant’s premises. The accident occurred from a crane compression on the Claimant, which caused serious crush injury and damage to his waist and hip. He was hospitalized at the University of Port Harcourt Teaching Hospital and treated as an indoor patient; with the resultant effect that he has been experiencing severe pains on his waist hip and pelvic region since then. The Claimant was thereafter laid off by the defendant who did not pay him any retirement benefit and compensation for the injury he sustained while in their employ. The Claimant avers that he has since not been able to engage in any manner of work due to the resultant effect of the injury. X-ray results taken in January 2013 were tendered in evidence to show that he still suffers from the effects of the injury. He thereafter filed this action. The defendant raised the following four issues for the determination of the court: 1. Whether there was a contract of employment between the parties that was extinguished in January 2009. 2. Whether there was a binding and enforceable contract of employment between the parties as at the time of the incident in October 2009. 3. Whether the claimant is entitled to any compensation and retirement benefits in the circumstance? Is this case not statute barred? 4. Whether in the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Claimant established his claim for special and general damages in the sum of N1,000,000.00 against the defendant. In arguing issue one, the defendant submitted, referring to the Claimant’s deposition and Exhibits C1, C4 and DD4, that the Claimant was employed as a skilled laborer on 20th January 1998, and his employment was terminated due to the redundancy exercise carried out in January 2009. That the defendant did all that is required by law to terminate its master-servant relationship with the claimant. The required notice was given, and the Claimant and other staff affected by the redundancy exercise were paid off in form of accrued benefit. Counsel therefore urged the court to hold that the claimant’s contract of service was extinguished on the 15th January 2009. On issue two, the defendant submitted that as at October 2009, the defendant had no master-servant relationship with the Claimant; that the Claimant was only privileged to work on the defendant’s premises as a daily paid laborer under a contract for service. There being no contractual relationship of master and servant between the claimant and the defendant, Counsel submitted, referring to the case of ACB Ltd. vs. Apugo (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 399) 65 at 68-69, that the Claimant was no longer part and parcel of the organization and also not under the strict management and control of the defendant. From Paragraph 7 of the Claimant’s deposition and his testimony before the court, he was re-employed by the defendant as a skilled labourer. His brother working with the defendant was sent to call him. No appointment letter was issued, and no terms of employment were entered into. The defendant asserts, citing the case of Nigeria Gas Co. Ltd. vs. Dudusola (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt. 957) Pg. 292 at 298, that the Claimant has not proved that he is an employee of the defendant. Counsel therefore urged the court to hold that the Claimant has no cause of action against the defendant. On issue three, the defendant submitted that for any claim under the Employee Compensation act 2010 to succeed, the Claimant must show that the injury was caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Compensation was defined as amount payable or service provided in respect of a disabled employee and includes rehabilitation. The defendant submitted that the Claimant was involved in an accident and was given free medical attention by the Defendant, after which he returned to his regular duties with the defendant, and that he was never and still is not disabled. He voluntarily stopped going to work after the Christmas break in 2009, and was not seen all through 2010, 2011 and 2012. He only showed up in 2013 with a Solicitor’s letter (Exhibit C8) along with medical reports (Exhibits C6 and C7) both dated January 2013, which the defendant believes were made in anticipation of this case. Counsel pointed out further that the Claimant has been constant in court all through the hearing, strong and hearty. He cited the case of Gwar vs. Adole (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt. 808) 516 to support this. Citing Section 6(2) and (3) of the Employees Compensation Act, the defendant submitted that the Claimant is not entitled to any form of compensation, and that the action is statute barred. On issue 4, it is the submission of the defendant that there is no documentary or corroborative evidence to support the Claimant’s claim for either special or general damages; that the Claimant on whom lies the onus, has failed to show the court how he came to be entitled to any of the claims. Nekab B.B.B. Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. African Continental Bank Ltd (2004) NWLR (Pt. 858) 521 at 526-530. Counsel concluded by urging the court to take notice that the action of the Claimant is one requiring strict liability, and that the case of Claimant has failed to answer the fundamental questions raised by the issues. The Claimant’s case should therefore be dismissed for failing to disclose any cause of action against the defendant. The Claimant in his written address file on the 27th day of February 2014 formulated the following 4 issues for determination: 1. Whether there was a contract of employment between the claimant and the defendant as at the time the accident and/or injury occurred. 2. Whether the Claimant is entitled to any form of compensation for injury suffered under the employment or in the course of employment in the premises of the defendant. 3. Whether the Claimant is entitled to payoff and/or retirement benefits for the period the claimant remained under the employment of the defendant. 4. Whether from the totality of the facts and evidence placed before this honourable court, the claimant is entitled to the claim for general, special, exemplary and aggravated damages against the defendant. In arguing issue 1, Counsel to the Claimant submitted that at all material times before and after the occurrence of the accident/injury, the Claimant in the eyes of the law and equity, is seen as an employee to the defendant; that it can be conveniently implied from the facts placed before the court, that a relationship exists between the Claimant and the Defendant, and that such does not necessarily need to be in written or formal form. At the time of the accident, the Claimant was in the premises of the defendant based on the relationship existing between the claimant and the defendant, whether as a daily paid contract staff or a labourer. DW2 testified under cross examination that he was a supervisor to the Claimant when the accident occurred. Counsel referred to Section 7(5) of the Labour Act 1990, Cap 198; Section 73 of the Employee Compensation Act 2010, and Section 78 of the Factories Act Cap F1 Laws of the Federation, for the definition of an employee and the case of Shena Security vs. Afropak (Nig.) Ltd & 2 Ors. (2008) 4-5SC (Pt.11) Pg. 119-130. He submitted that the Apex court has held that a contract of employment need not be in written form, and that it can be oral or written, or express or implied. He referred the court to Section 87 of the Factories Act Cap F1 which defines factory; and the case of Iyere vs. Bendel Feed and Flour Mill (2008) 7-12 SC 163-164. He urged the court to hold that the Claimant was at all material time, an employee of the defendant. In arguing issue 2, it is the Claimant’s submission that where an action is predicated on a claim for compensation by an employee in respect of injury and/or accident suffered under the employment of an employer, the relevant principle or provision of the law to be relied upon are the Employee Compensation Act 2010 and the duty of care owed by an employer to an employee under the common law of contract. Counsel cited various provisions of the Act (Section 2(2); Section4(1), (3) & (4)(b); Section 5(1),(2)&(5); Section 6(2),(3),(4)&(5); Section 7(1); Section 12(1)&(3); Section 13(1)&(2); and Section 24(1) and 25(1)); and submitted that it is settled that an employee is entitled to compensation under the Employee Compensation Act 2010 in respect of any injury suffered under the employment of an employer. He stated that the Claimant has not been paid any compensation. He recalled the testimony of DW1 who under cross-examination stated that the Claimant was not paid any compensation because the defendant decided not to report the claimant’s injury to their insurance company as provided in Section 2(1) & (2) of the Employee Compensation Act 2010, and that it was the duty of the employer to make that report. See Section 4(4). It was the contention of the Claimant that the submission of the defendant that failure to comply with Section 6 (2) and (3) of the Act is a bar to this suit, is misconceived and should be discountenanced. He again recalled the testimony of DW1 who told the court that the defendant on its own volition, resolved not to report the accident to the insurance company for compensation. DW1 also told the court, claimant recalled, that he is not an expert in insurance business to know whether or not the Claimant should be paid compensation. The defendant having failed in its obligation to report the Claimant’s injury cannot therefore visit its lapses on the Claimant, as the defendant cannot benefit from its own wrongdoing and cannot be relieved of its liability to pay compensation, as compensation cannot be waived, being an entitlement by virtue of Section 7 of the Act. Usong vs. Hanseatic International Ltd (2009) 5-6 SC (Pt.1) Pg. 6-19; Iyere vs. Bendel Feed and Flour Mill (2008) 7-12 SC Pg. 192. The Claimant went on that from the totality of the facts and evidence before the court, it is clear that the claimant was involved in an industrial accident while under the employment and within the premises of the defendant; and that this fact was admitted by the defendant, both in their Statement of Defence, and in the testimony of DW1 and DW2 who both also admitted that the Claimant is hardworking and has not been queried all through his employment. He referred to Sections 20, 21 and 22 of the Evidence Act 2011 and the case of Iyere vs. Bendel Feed and Flour Mill (Supra). The Claimant submitted further that the defendant’s contention that Exhibits C6 and C7 were made in anticipation of litigation, is misplaced, because the said documents does not suggest such, but confirms the fact of the industrial accident which the defendant had been aware of; and that it is indeed a confirmation that the Claimant still suffers from consequences flowing from the said injury till date. Having therefore discharged the evidential burden of proof placed on him by law, the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought. Usong vs. Hanseatic International Ltd (Supra). In arguing issue 3, on the issue of payoff or retirement benefits, the Claimant contends that he worked with the defendant from January 1998 till 2009 (Exh C1) when he was laid off on grounds of redundancy (Exh C4). Exh C3 was a long service award that evidenced that the Claimant had worked for up to 10 years. But that Exh DD3 evidences accrued benefit for only the year 2009. No document was tendered by the defendant to show that benefits had been paid for previous years, even though DW1 told the court that the claimant had been paid all his benefits. This contradiction, the Claimant submits, the court should resolve in his favour, since the document Exh DD3 speaks for itself as evidencing payment of accrued benefits for the year 2009 only. Ekeagwu vs. Nigeria Army & Anor (2010) 6-7 SC 62-63, 81-83. Claimant contends that he is entitled to payoff and accrued benefit for the period he remained under the employment of the defendant. Having undergone the 6 month probation period at the beginning of his employment, by necessary implication, he is a permanent staff, whether or not a letter was issued to that effect. He urged the court to hold that he is entitled to the claim in paragraph (b) of the complaint. Ekeagwu vs. Nigeria Army & Anor (Supra). On issue 4, the Claimant submitted that he has proved that he is entitled to special, general, exemplary and aggravated damages flowing from the defendant’s conduct. That the defendant did not deny that the claimant was injured, and that the defendant was clearly in breach of its duty of care owed to the Claimant. Iyere vs. Bendel Feed and Flour Mill (2008) 7-12 SC Pg. 152-155. He submitted further that the Claimant had discharged the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent in the discharge of the duty of care owed under the contract of employment. He is therefore entitled to damages as contained in paragraph (c) of the claim. The Claimant referred to the testimony of DW2 to the effect that he (DW2) possesses only WAEC certificate and no further skill or qualification. This he said, amounts to failure on the part of the defendant to hire a more skilled personality to act as supervisor under whom the Claimant worked and sustained the injury, thereby amounting to breach of Section 23 of the Factories Act. The defendant was therefore in breach of the duty of care owed to the Claimant. He went further that DW1 testified that the defendant did not consider it necessary to report the accident to the Insurance Company. This he said is a manifestation of non-challance towards the Claimant’s predicament. The Claimant submitted that from the preponderance of evidence before the court, he has made out a case against the defendant. He therefore urged the court to enter judgment for the Claimant. The defendant filed a reply on points of law on the 18th day of March 2014 wherein Counsel referred to the Claimant’s submission with respect to Section 7 (5) of the Labour Act 1990, and submitted that it will only stand if the terms of the purported second employment are the same. A contract of service must be proved by empirical evidence, therefore cannot be presumed. Anike vs. SPDC (Nig.) Ltd (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 638) Pg. 975. The defence observed that the Claimant has informed the court how he came into the purported second employment through an invitation by his brother who is staff of the defendant. There is no contract of employment, and he has never written to management for anything, not even about the incident. He claimed that after his discharge from the hospital, he worked for a month or two, and the personnel officer asked him to leave, without a termination letter, and then he left, only to come back 4 years later to ask for compensation. This, he said, is unknown to law. He submitted that the Claimant has slept over his right if any, and equity will not aid the indolent. He went further that the Claimant has not satisfied the court for the award of damages. O.M.T. Co. Ltd vs. Imafidon (2012) 4 NWLR 332; that the Claimant is not entitled to any payoff or retirement benefit, and urged the court to so hold. He submitted also, that the court should discountenance the exhibits which were admitted in evidence, for being legally inadmissible. Bank of the North Ltd. vs. Bello (2000) 7 NWLR (Pt. 664) 244 at 255-256. He urged the court to dismiss the claims of the claimants. Having carefully considered the pleadings of the parties, the evidence adduced and the addresses of counsels in this matter, I have formulated only one issue for determination, and that is: “Whether the claimant is entitled to any or all the reliefs sought.” The claimant averred in paragraph 18 (g) of the statement of facts that, under the relevant laws of Nigeria, the defendant is liable to pay him compensation for the injuries he sustained. Consequently, he sought the sum of N2,000,000.00 (Two Million Naira only) against the defendant as compensation for the injuries he suffered under the employment of the defendant. One of such enactments in Nigeria governing employees’ entitlements to payment of compensations for injuries sustained during the employment is the Employee Compensation Act 2010, hereinafter referred to as “the ECA”. It is seen in section 2 (1) of the ECA that its provisions are applicable to all employers and employees in Nigeria, except the Armed forces. I therefore agree with the Claimant’s counsel’s submission that where an action is predicated on a claim for compensation by an employee in respect of injuries sustained under the employment, the applicable laws are either the ECA or the principles of the Common law duty of care. Section 7 (1) of the Employee Compensation Act 2010 (ECA) provides that any employee, whether or not in a work place, who suffers disabling injury arising out of or in the course of employment, shall be entitled to payment of compensation. To succeed in his claim for compensation under this section, the claimant must show- i. that he is an employee of the defendant, ii. that he suffered disabling injury, and iii. that the injury arose out of or in the course of his employment The claimant testified that as at 2009 when the accident from which he sustained the injuries occurred, he was an employee of the defendant. He further told this court that he was employed in 1998 as a skilled labourer on probation but he was not confirmed until 15th January 2009 when he was terminated on ground of redundancy. It is his evidence also that in the same 2009, he was re-employed by the defendant as a skilled labourer and was being paid monthly salary of N18,000.00. His Identity card issued to him by the defendant was admitted in evidence as Exhibit C2. On the other hand, the defendant’s position is that at the time the injury occurred, there was no employer/employee relationship between the claimant and the defendant. The defendant further asserts that the Claimant was properly terminated in January 2009 but was reabsorbed into the general services unit of the defendant as a “contract staff”. The defendant therefore claims that the subsequent engagement of the claimant did not create an employer/employee relationship. In his written address, counsel to the defendant submitted that the claimant was only privileged to work for the defendant as a daily paid labourer under a contract for service. He further submitted that no appointment letter was given to the claimant nor were terms of the employment entered into. He concluded that the claimant has not proved he was an employee of the defendant. From the facts of this case, can it be said that there was an employer/employee relationship between the parties as at September 2009 when the accident happened? An employee, as defined in section 73 of the ECA, is “a person employed by an employer under oral or written contract of employment whether on a continuous, part time, temporary, apprenticeship, or casual basis and includes a domestic servant...…”. Further under the section, whosoever employs another on any of the basis outlined above is an employer. The facts and evidence presented by both sides in this case show clearly that the claimant is covered in the definition of employee. It is contained in the testimony of DW1 that the claimant was re-absorbed as a “contract staff”. Perhaps the defendant meant to describe the claimant as a casual or temporary staff. The definition of who is an employee has been extended widely by the Act to include persons engaged temporarily or casual daily workers. The defence had submitted that the claimant has not proved his employee status because he did not show any employment letter or the terms of the employment. This argument does not hold water in view of the positions of the courts in a plethora of authorities. It is well settled that any agreement, whether oral or written, express or implied whereby one person agrees to employ another as a worker is a contract of employment. See S.S.C Ltd. vs. Afropak (Nig.) Ltd (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 426) 1827 at 1838. Thus, a Contract of Employment may be in writing, oral or can be inferred or implied from the conduct of the parties. See Section 91 Labour Act, Cap L1, LFN 2004. Thus, the claimant need not necessarily prove his employment by a written employment letter. In proving further that he was an employee, the claimant testified that upon his being re-employed, he was paid monthly salary of N18,000.00. The defendant, having admitted that the claimant was reabsorbed by the defendant, also admitted in paragraph 14 of its statement of defence that the claimant was paid salary. Where a worker is being paid salaries or wages, this is indicative that there is a contract of employment between them. S.S.C Ltd. vs. Afropak (Nig.) Ltd (Supra) at 1838. From the foregoing therefore, I am convinced that the claimant has proved that he was an employee of the defendant when the accident happened, and I so hold. Now to the second requirement, there is no dispute that the claimant sustained injuries from crane compression. The evidence of the parties are agreed on this fact. Is the claimant’s injury disabling? Disability under the ECA is the physical, mental or physiological health conditions arising from and in the course of employment that causes a deviation for more than 12 months from the normal condition of the person. See section 73 of the ECA. The claimant testified that he suffered serious crush injury and damages to his waist and hip in 2009. After his discharge from hospital, he has since then been having severe pains on his waist, hip and pelvic region and as a result has difficulty moving about. In his additional deposition, the claimant testified that as a result of the disabling effect of the injury, he could not perform his work well. That resulted to the defendant terminating his employment. The claimant further said he still suffers from the injury as a diagnosis and X-ray he took in 2012/2013 reveal the presence of pelvic fracture and an early lumber spondylosis. The diagnosis and X-ray were admitted as Exhibits C6 and C7 respectively. The defendant on its part claimed that the injury does not have any disabling effect on the claimant as he is strong, healthy and has demonstrated agility. DW1 in his evidence told this court that after the discharge of the claimant from hospital, he was “certified medically fit”. The defendant however failed to put the certificate of fitness in evidence for this court to believe that assertion. I am satisfied with the evidence of the claimant and I hold that he has been able to show that the injury he sustained is disabling. As regards the 3rd requirement, the evidence of the claimant and that of the defendant further agree that the injury happened in the premises of the defendant and while the claimant was performing his duties. There is no doubt therefore that it has been shown that the injury arose out of or in the course of his employment. The claimant has pleaded in paragraph 10 of his statement of facts that he was never paid compensation for the injury by the defendant. The defendant did not deny this fact and didn’t supply any evidence to the contrary. I am satisfied that the claimant has established the requirements entitling him, under section 7 of ECA, to be paid compensation by the defendant for the injuries he sustained during his employment. Where there is an employment relationship between an employer and an employee, the employer is under duty to take reasonable care for the safety of the employee in all circumstances as not to expose the employee to unnecessary risk. The employer will be liable to compensate the employee should he fail in that duty and injury results to the employee. Iyere vs. Bendel Feed and Flour Mills Ltd. (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 453) 1217 at 1233. The defendant’s counsel has contended in his written address, that the claimant is not entitled to be paid compensation because his claim is statute barred by virtue of section 6 (2) and (3) of the Employee Compensation Act. For a full understanding of the import of that provision, there is need to set out the provisions. The section provides- (1). an application for compensation shall be made on the form prescribed by the Board and shall be signed by the employee or the deceased employee’s relative. (2). unless an application is filed or a determination is made within one year of the date of death, injury or disability arising from an occupational accident or disease, no compensation shall be payable except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 of this section. (3). if the Board is satisfied that there existed special circumstances which precluded the filing of the application within one year after the date of the occurrence, the Board may pay the compensation provided by this Act if the application is filed within 3 years after that date. With due respect to the defendant’s counsel, the limitation period in the provision applies only to applications for compensation made to the Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board. The limitation period under the section does not extend to bar the claimant from approaching this court for compensation at the time he did. This court has the exclusive jurisdiction under section 254C (1) k of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) to hear disputes as to claims to any entitlement of an employee. Once the claimant has chosen to seek redress in this court, his suit is not barred by section 6 of the ECA. Furthermore, reliance by the defendant on statute bar fails also for the reason that a party who seeks to rely on any statute of limitation must plead it. The issue was only raised in the written address of the defendant counsel but was not pleaded. See N.I.I.A vs. Anyafalu (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 325) 141 at 155. Having held that the claimant is entitled to be paid compensation, what amount is appropriate to be awarded to him? He has asked this court to award him N2,000,000. Perhaps, in order to mitigate the eventual award against it, the defendant asserted that he paid all the medicals bills of the claimant while he was in the hospital. The claimant denied this assertion and contended that the defendant refused to pay for the medicals. However, Exhibit DD2 tendered by the defendant contains receipts and summaries of medical expenses incurred by the defendant due to the hospitalization of the Claimant on account of the industrial accident. There are 3 summaries of payment. They are in the sum of N58,640.00 (Fifty Eight Thousand, Six Hundred and Forty Naira), N74,110.00 (Seventy Four Thousand, One Hundred and Ten Naira) and N76,400.00 (Seventy Six Thousand, Four Hundred Naira) respectively. This adds up to a total of N209,150.00 (Two Hundred and Nine Thousand, One Hundred and Fifty Naira) only, which the defendant spent on medical expenses in the course of treating the Claimant from injuries sustained from the industrial accident. This sways me to reduce the amount of compensation to be awarded, by the sum spent on medical expenses. I have taken note of the evidence adduced on the difficulties and sufferings the claimant has faced and is still going through since the injury. The court may award generous compensation depending on the extent of the injury and the pain and suffering. See Igbosewe vs. Delta Steel Co. Ltd. (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 410) 741. Therefore, I hold the view that the claimant is entitled to his claim of N2,000,000.00 (Two Million Naira) only, as the sum is an appropriate compensation to the claimant for the injuries he sustained during the course of his employment with the defendant. If the sum of N209,150.00 (being medical expenses incurred by the defendant) is reduced from this award, the balance of compensation payable to the Claimant by the defendant will be N1,790,850 (One Million, Seven Hundred and Ninety Thousand, Eight Hundred and Fifty Naira) only, and I so hold. The claimant further prays for the sum of N2,000,000.00 representing payoff and retirement benefits against the defendant. This sum has not been proved by the claimant. The claimant, to succeed in this claim, is expected to set out clearly and prove how the sum he claims is arrived at. The claimant has failed to do that. The claim ought to fail and it is according dismissed. Another relief sought by the claimant is a claim for the sum of N1,000,000.00 for general, specific, exemplary, and aggravated damages. There is no distinction as to what sum is claimed in respect of what head of damages. In view of the claimant’s case, the various heads of damages under which the claimant claims the sum can safely be grouped into 2. That is general damages and special damages. It is a settled principle of law that special damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. See Usman vs. Abubakar (2001) 12 NWLR (Pt. 728) 685. The claimant has not satisfied this requirement. No particulars of any sum of money claimed as special damages was pleaded neither did he give evidence of any specific sum of expenses for which he seeks the relief. General damages, in personal injury cases, are what the law implies in relation to physical injuries and it will include compensation for pains, sufferings or loss resulting from the injury. Thus, where a party has been fully compensated under one head of damages for a particular injury, he cannot be awarded damages again in respect of the same injury. This is the rule against double compensation. See Texaco PLC vs. Kehinde (2002) FWLR (PT 94) 143 AT 163. I have held in this judgment that the claimant succeeds in his claim for compensation. The compensation is in respect of the injuries he sustained while in the employ of the defendant and the resultant effects on him. Awarding him general damages again will amount to compensating him twice for the same injury. The award of general damages is at the discretion of the court; therefore, I cannot exercise my discretion in favour of the claimant by awarding him general damages. The claimant further seeks a 10% interest on the judgment sum from the date of judgment until the sum is paid. This claim is for post judgment interest on the judgment sum. No duty is placed on the claimant to prove his entitlement to the relief. It is a relief within my discretion to grant or refuse. See Uko vs. Ekpeyong (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 324) 1927. I am further permitted by Order 21, Rule 4 of the National Industrial Court Rule 2007 to order interest at a rate not less than 10% on any judgment sum. The relief is accordingly granted. The issue is therefore resolved in favour of the claimant in part. Accordingly, and for the avoidance of doubt, I hereby order as follows: 1. Compensation in the sum of N1,790,850 (One Million, Seven Hundred and Ninety Thousand, Eight Hundred and Fifty Naira) only is hereby awarded to the claimant against the defendant. 2. The defendant is to pay the sum ordered in (1) above, to the claimant within 30days from today, failure of which it begins to attract interest of 10% per annum from the time of default until the final liquidation of the judgment sum. This is in line with the provision of Order 21 Rule 4 of the NIC Rules, 2007. 3. The Defendant is to pay N50,000.00 cost to the Claimant. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe