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The claimant filed a complaint on 4th December 2012 against the defendants praying for – 1. A declaration that the purported alteration or amendment of the Radio, Television, Theatre and Arts Workers Union of Nigeria (RATTAWU) constitution 2003 is unlawful, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 2. A declaration that the query dated 15th November 2012 issued by the 2nd defendant to the claimant is in breach of the Radio, Television, Theatre and Arts Workers Union of Nigeria (RATTAWU) constitution 2003 therefore invalid and of no effect whatsoever. 3. An order for an account of all the payments including the levies, check-off dues, new weigh-in allowance levy, subscriptions and donations collected from the Zonal, State, Chapter Councils of the Radio, Television, Theatre and Arts Workers Union of Nigeria (RATTAWU) and other sources on behalf of the union. 4. An order directing the 5th defendant to set up an investigative auditing of the account of all payments made including levies, check-off dues, new weigh-in allowance levy, subscriptions and donations collected from the Zonal, State, Chapter Councils of the Radio, Television, Theatre and Arts Workers Union of Nigeria (RATTAWU) and all other sources on behalf of the union from 2008 to date. 5. An order directing the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants to step-down pending the conclusion of the terms of reference of the investigative auditing of the account of all payments made including levies, check-off dues, new weigh-in allowance levy, subscriptions and donations collected from the Zonal, State, Chapter Councils of the Radio, Television, Theatre and Arts Workers Union of Nigeria (RATTAWU) and other sources on behalf of the union from 2008 to date. 6. An order of injunction to restrain the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants form performing the functions of their office pending the conclusion of the terms of reference of the investigative auditing of the account of all the payments made including levies, check-off dues, new weigh-in allowance levy, subscriptions and donations collected from the Zonal, State, Chapter Councils of the Radio, Television, Theatre and Arts Workers Union of Nigeria (RATTAWU) and other sources on behalf of the union from 2008 to date. 7. An order of injunction to restrain the defendants through any person acting on their behalf or on their instructions or with their encouragement from carrying out or acting on the decision to suspend the claimant from the union based on the query dated 15th November 2012. 8. An order of injunction to restrain the 1st defendant and other elected officers, the National Executive Council and the Central Working committee of the Radio, Television, Theatre and Arts Workers Union of Nigeria (RATTAWU) through any person acting on their behalf or on their instruction or with their encouragement (including for the avoidance of doubt the General Secretary) from harassment, intimidation and victimization of the claimant and all other members of the union sympathetic to his cause. 9. An order of injunction to restrain the 1st defendant and other elected officers, the National Executive Council and the Central Working Committee of the Radio, Television, Theatre and Arts Workers Union of Nigeria (RATTAWU) 2003 through any person acting on their behalf or on their instruction or with their encouragement (including for the avoidance of doubt the General Secretary) from disciplining the claimant otherwise than in strict accordance with the Rules. 10. Damages against the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants for breach of contract of union membership and the costs of this action as assessed by the Court. In reaction, the 1st – 4th defendants filed two preliminary objections to the suit dated and filed on 9th May 2013 and 5th February 2013 respectively. The grounds, from the two objections, upon which the 1st – 4th defendants are challenging the suit for incompetence, are – 1. This Court lacks original jurisdiction over issue of intra-union dispute without same going through the process of Part I of the Trade Disputes Act (TDA) 2004 which deals with mediation, conciliation and arbitration. 2. The suit is premature in that the internal mechanism of resolving the grievance of members of the union has not been exhausted. 3. The suit is not in compliance with the clear provision of section 19(1) of the Trade Unions Act (TUA) Cap. T14 LFN 2004. 4. The supreme power of the union rest on the National Delegate Conference and therefore the claimant cannot challenge or question the validity of the alteration or amendment of the Union Constitution. 5. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants on record are non-juristic persons, and as such this action cannot be sustained against them. The 1st – 4th defendants went on to then cumulatively frame five issues for the determination of the Court, namely – a) Whether this Court has original jurisdiction over issues of intra-union disputes without same going through the process of Part I of the Trade Disputes Act 2004 which deals with mediation, conciliation and arbitration. b) Whether the claimant has exhausted the internal mechanism of resolving grievance of members of the union before bringing this action. c) Whether the claimant’s claims are in accordance with the clear provisions of sections 19(1), 39, 40 and 41 of the Trade Unions Act 2004. d) Whether the claimant can question or challenge the decision of the union Delegates Conference being the supreme organ of the union when such decisions are in accordance with the provisions of the Trade Unions Act 2004 and the union’s constitution. e) Whether the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants on record are juristic persons capable of being sued. In arguing issue a), the 1st – 4th defendants submitted that this Court does not have original jurisdiction over the issue of intra-union dispute as provided for under section 7(1)(b) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 and section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. The Court was then referred to Eleme Petrochemicals v. Dr Morah Emmanuel [2009] 17 NLLR (Pt. 46) 81 at 106, which held that a trade dispute must pass through the processes of mediation, conciliation and arbitration in Part I of the TDA. In any event, that where there are clear procedure enacted by statute, and the words are clear and unambiguous, courts are bound to give effect thereto, citing Hon. Kere anor v. Kaiba & ors [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 221) 1477 at 1509. The Court was then urged to decline original jurisdiction over the claimant’s complaints and strike out same with costs. On issue b), the Court was referred to Rule 3(vii) of the RATTAWU constitution 2003, which provides as follows – Any member who has grievances with any official of the union or Executive Committee of his branch shall have the right to seek redress from his local chapter’s general meeting. If he or she is not satisfied, he/she has a right of appeal to the State Council, the Central working Committee, the National Executive Council or National Delegates Conference in that order. That from the above provision, it is clear that the claimant ought to explore all internal mechanisms of the union for resolving his grievances before coming to Court, referring to Aribisala v. Ogunyemi [2005] 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 212. To the 1st – 4th defendants, the claimant’s case is premature and fails to use the internal mechanism created by the TUA 2004 and the RATTAWU constitution for settlement of dispute; and so the Court should dismiss the suit. Regarding issue c), the 1st – 4th defendants referred to section 19(1) of the TUA 2004, which provides that – Without prejudice to the right of any person making a sufficient interest to the relief sought to apply for an injunction to restrain any unauthorized or unlawful application of the funds of a trade union, an injunction restraining any such application of the funds of a trade union may be granted by the appropriate Court upon application of – (i) The Attorney General of the Federation; or (ii) The Registrar; or (iii) Any five or more members of the union. To the 1st – 4th defendant, by this provision, an action can only be brought by five or more members of the union seeking for an injunction to restrain the misapplication of the funds of a trade union. That in the instant suit, only the claimant brought this action sole in his name though he claimed to sue on behalf of unnamed members of RATTAWU. Furthermore, that the claimant is seeking to transfer the statutory duties of the Registrar of Trade Unions to the Director of Trade Union Services, which is not statutorily provided for under the TUA 2004. That by sections 37, 39, 40 and 41 of the TUA, it is only the Registrar of Trade Unions that is authorized to receive annual returns, audited accounts, to call for accounts and investigation of unsatisfactory accounts of trade unions. Therefore, that “the declarations and orders sought for by the claimant for investigation of the accounts of RATTAWU by the 5th defendant who is the director of Trade Union services are not only illegal, unlawful but against the clear provisions of the Trade Union Act, 2004”. On issue d), the 1st – 4th defendants referred to section 29 of the TUA 2004, which provides that a trade union may alter its rules by any method of doing so provided for by its rules, but no alteration of the rules of a trade union shall take effect until the alteration is registered. They also referred to Rule 6(iii) of the RATTAWU constitution, which states that no new rules shall be made or any rules altered, amended and rescinded unless agreed to by a majority vote in a secret ballot at the Delegates Conference of the union – a deed (according to the 1st – 4th defendants) that had been done since May 2012. That from these provisions, it is lawful for the RATTAWU constitution to be altered, amended or rescinded by majority vote in a secret ballot at its last national delegates Conference held in May 2012. Therefore, the claimant is not competent to challenge the lawful action of the majority of members of the National Delegates Conference to alter or amend or rescind the union’s constitution being the supreme organ of the union. Regarding issue e), the 1st – 4th defendants contended that when a legal personality is being sued, it must be sued in its correct name, and such persons must possess the requisite capacity of being sued. That it is not open to a party to give the party being sued another name, citing Abibakar v. Yar’Adua [2008] 19 NWLR (Pt. 1120) 1 at 150. This is because no claim or judgment can be enforced against a fictitious or non-existent person, referring to Njemanze v. Shell-BP Port Harcourt [1966] NSCC 6. To the 1st – 4th defendants, there is no entity known by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants’ names. That the 1st – 4th defendants lack the legal capacity to sue and be sued, citing Agbomagbe Bank Ltd v. General Manager, GB Ollivant Ltd [1961] All NLR 116; [1961] 2 SCNLR 317 and Baroda v. Iyalabani Ltd [1998] 2 NWLR (Pt. 539) 600 at 611. That the law is that this Court cannot adjudicate on any matter on the merit between one party only, citing PENGASSAN v. Bellbop-Conoil Nigeria Limited unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/12/2011, the judgment of which was delivered on April 25, 2012. The 1st – 2nd defendants also referred the Court to its decision in Comrade Matawalle v. National President of MHWUN & 8 ors [2009] 15 NLLR (Pt. 42) 369 at 375 – 378. In conclusion, the 1st – 4th defendants urged the Court to decline jurisdiction and dismiss the suit with substantial cost. In reaction, the claimant framed only one issue for the determination of the Court i.e. whether the defendant/applicants are entitled to the reliefs sought. To the claimant, citing Hon. Davies v. Mr. Mendes & ors [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 348) 883 at 910 CA, the present application of the defendants is incompetent as it is not supported by affidavit stating the facts upon which they intend to rely on. The claimant would, however, cite ANPP v INEC & ors [2005] all FWLR 971 at 990 CA and then hold it as evidence of discordant comments coming from the same Court of Appeal. The case of ANPP v. INEC & ors held that a preliminary objection need not be supported by an affidavit so long as enough material is placed before the Court on which it can judiciously pronounce on the preliminary objection. The claimant, however, contended that in the instant case, there are no such materials, urging the Court to so hold. The claimant continued that the primary claim of the claimant in this case relates to the interpretation of the RATTAWU constitution 2003 which is a collective agreement within the meaning of the TDA. The claimant then reproduced section 47(1) in terms of the meaning of collective agreement and trade dispute and section 15(1) in terms of the right of the Minister of Labour or any party to a collective agreement to apply for its interpretation in this Court – all sections of the TDA. To the claimant, looking at section 47(1), it is clear that it is not a ‘stand alone’ provision but an interpretation of the earlier provisions of section 15(1). That a close reading of section 47(1) reveals that it provides for the interpretation to be followed by the Court when faced with questions of jurisdiction of the Court in matters like in the instant case. That a Court is not to read anything into or remove anything form a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended something which it omitted to express, citing Johnson v. Mobil Producing (Nig) Unlimited [2010] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1194) 462 and NSITF Management Board v. Klifco Nigeria Ltd [2010] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1211) 307. The claimant went on that looking at the claims he filed, it will be discovered that this suit cannot be categorized as a trade dispute within the meaning of the TDA since the 5th – 8th defendants cannot be parties to a trade dispute from the wordings of section 47 since they are not the employer of the claimant nor is the claimant a worker in the 1st – 8th defendants’ office. More so, that the dispute is not between workers and workers in the defendants’ offices. That section 47 is indispensable in determining whether an action is a trade dispute or not, referring to National Union of Electricity Employees v. Bureau of Public Enterprises [2010] 41 (Pt. 1) NSCQR 611 at 640. Regarding the argument of the 1st – 4th defendants that the claimant’s claim is not in accordance with sections 19(1), 39, 40 and 41 of the TUA 2004, the claimant contended that counsel to the 1st – 4th defendants refused to provide evidence as to the failure. That counsel’s argument is a matter of fact which should be brought to the attention of the Court by leading evidence and counsel’s address cannot be a substitute for evidence, citing Technoplastic v. Jatau [1986] 4 NWLR (Pt. 38) 771. On the issue of the claimant not exploring internal remedies under the RATTAWU constitution, the claimant argued that the provisions of the RATTAWU constitution are inferior to the provisions of an Act of parliament like the TDA; therefore, they cannot override a law, citing SLB Consortium v. NNPC [2011] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1252) 317. That in the instant case, the defendants have not shown any arguable grounds upon which the Court can uphold the preliminary objection. In adopting his written address, the claimant made it clear to the Court that he did not file any reaction in respect of the second preliminary objection of the 1st – 4th defendants. The claimant then referred the Court to the additional authority of UCTHB v. Dr Sunday Christian Ogbodo unreported Suit No. NIC/EN/01/2011, the ruling of which was delivered on May 16, 2011. The claimant thereafter urged the Court to dismiss the preliminary objection with substantial costs. I heard learned counsel and considered all the processes filed in the matter. In considering the merit of the preliminary objection, I need to clarify a thing or two regarding the submission made by counsel to the claimant in this matter. The claimant’s counsel in submitting that the claimant’s primary claim relates to the interpretation of the RATTAWU constitution 2003 went on to state that the RATTAWU constitution 2003 is a collective agreement within the meaning of the TDA. First, the claimant’s counsel did not disclose which section of the TDA says that a union constitution is a collective agreement. Second, in seeking to equate a union constitution with a collective agreement, the claimant’s counsel referred to sections 47(1) and 15(1) of the TDA without still indicating how those provisions transmute a union constitution into a collective agreement. Even in quoting sections 47(1) and 15(1), this, I presume, was of the old TDA LFN 1990. This is because, as I must note, the claimant’s counsel throughout his written address (even when the 1st – 4th defendants made it clear that its reference to the TDA is to that of LFN 2004 – and note further that it is only the TUA that the claimant’s counsel indicated that it is of LFN 2004) never for once indicated which of the TDAs he is citing in his submissions, whether the old LFN 1990 or the newer LFN 2004. All of this simply revealed the ignorance of the claimant’s counsel as to the state of trade union law in the country, and what actually a union constitution is and what a collective agreement is. A union constitution regulates the internal affairs of members of the union and which Nigeria Civil Service Union v. Essien [1985] 3 NWLR (Pt. 12) 306 held is a contract between the members of the union, and that the members have subsumed their several rights into the letters of that constitution. A collective agreement on the other hand by section 48(1) of the TDA 2004 is – …any agreement in writing for the settlement of disputes and relating to terms of employment and physical conditions of work concluded between – (a) an employer, a group of employers or organisations representing workers, or the duly appointed representative of any body of workers, on the one hand; and (b) one or more trade unions or organisations representing workers, or the duly appointed representative of any body of workers, on the other hand. How then is the union constitution same with a collective agreement to warrant the submission of the claimant in that regard? I really do not know. The claimant’s counsel would then go on to contend that the instant suit is not a trade dispute within the meaning of the TDA; for how then could the claimant have sued the 5th – 8th defendants? This contention is uncalled for since the 1st – 4th defendants never argued that the suit was a trade dispute in the first place. The argument of the 1st – 4th defendants is that the suit is an intra-union dispute. Here again, the claimant’s counsel seems to be equating a trade dispute with an intra-union dispute when in reality they two are different. The claimant’s counsel proceeded to assert that in relation to sections 19(1), 39, 40 and 41 of the TUA, the 1st – 4th defendants did not provide evidence of the failure of the claimant’s claim to be in accordance with the said sections. I really do not understand what point the claimant’s counsel is seeking to make here. If I get the 1st – 4th defendants very well, relief 4, as claimed by the claimant, seeks for “an order directing the 5th defendant to set up an investigative auditing of the account of all payments made including levies, check-off dues, new weigh-in allowance levy, subscriptions and donations collected from the Zonal, State, Chapter Councils of the Radio, Television, Theatre and Arts Workers Union of Nigeria (RATTAWU) and all other sources on behalf of the union from 2008 to date”. To the 1st – 4th defendants, by the cumulative effect of sections 19(1), 39, 40 and 41 of the TUA 2004, only the Registrar of Trade Unions, not the Director of Trade Union Services (the 5th defendant) can be so ordered. That by seeking relief 4 against the 5th defendant, the claimant is seeking to transfer a statutory duty placed only on the Registrar of Trade Unions to a person not so recognized by law, the 5th defendant. Instead of answering to this submission, the claimant’s counsel is talking about the 1st – 4th defendants not providing evidence of the failure of his client’s claim to be in accordance with the said sections. I really wonder whether counsel to the claimant appreciates the nitty-gritty of trade union law. The defendant’s first ground for objecting to this action is that the dispute in issue is an intra-union dispute for which the claimant must exhaust the processes of Part I of the TDA 2004 before this Court can be approached. The question, therefore, is whether even if the dispute is an intra union dispute, the claimant cannot activate the original jurisdiction of the Court. Relief 1 relates to the alteration of the RATTAWU constitution. Reliefs 2 and 7 relate to whether the query and suspension issued to the claimant conform to the RATTAWU constitution. Relief 3 seeks for an account of the union’s money. Relief 4 seeks for the auditing of the union’s money. Reliefs 5 and 6 relate to relief 4 in that they seek for 1st – 4th defendants to step down from their offices to give way for the auditing. Reliefs 8 and 9 seek to stop the 1st defendant or his agents from harassing, intimidating or victimizing and disciplining the claimant. And relief 10 prays for damages against the 1st – 4th defendants for breach of contract of union membership and costs of the action as may be assessed by the Court. The thing about all these reliefs is that they derive not because of the fact of an intra-union dispute (for an intra-union dispute in being a dispute within a trade union means that all the reliefs qualify as such) but because they derive directly from the TUA 2004 itself; and within the structure of the TUA, issues, before now, were resolvable by the High Court. By the combined effect of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 and the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution, it is this Court that now has jurisdiction over those matters, having taken over from the High Court. Section 254C(1)(b) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, for instance, grants jurisdiction to this Court over the Trade Unions Act; and section 254C(1)(j)(vi) grants jurisdiction regarding the interpretation of a trade union constitution. Even the 1st – 4th defendant themselves cited sections 19(1), 39, 40 and 41 of the TUA 2004 as justification for their objection that the claimant cannot come to this Court in the manner he did. The point I seek to make is that the reliefs sought for by the claimant are structured under the TUA 2004; and that is what gives original jurisdiction over them to this Court; and I so find and hold. The argument of the 1st – 4th defendants that the claimant should have exhausted the processes of Part I of the TDA 2004 before coming to this Court is consequently inapplicable regarding the claims of the claimant. The argument is accordingly rejected. The second ground for objecting to this suit is that the claimant did not exhaust the internal mechanism for resolving grievances under Rule 3(vii) of the RATTAWU constitution 2003. A look at Rule 3(vii) of the RATTAWU constitution shows it to be cumbersome and so offensive. The claimant is expected to complain to his local chapter’s general meeting; then, if not satisfied, he complains to the State Council, then the Central working Committee, then the National Executive Council or National Delegates Conference in that order. By the time the claimant exhausts these processes, the term of office of those he complains about would long had been completed rendering the complaint inconsequential. In any event, in arguing this point, the 1st – 4th defendants cited Aribisala v. Ogunyemi, which held that – Where a statute prescribes a legal line of action for the determination of an issue, an aggrieved party must exhaust all the remedies in that law before going to Court. All the local remedies in the statute on every subject must be exhausted before embarking on actual litigation in Court. This authority talks of “a statute prescribing a legal line of action” and “all local remedies in the statute”. The 1st – 4th defendants cited the TUA 2004 but did not state which of its provisions lays down an internal remedy. But in citing Rule 3(vii) of the RATTAWU constitution 2003, the 1st – 4th defendants did not seem to appreciate that the constitution of a union is not a statute and so cannot be treated as such. I accordingly reject the argument of the 1st – 4th defendants that the claimant needed to comply with Rule 3(vii) of the RATTAWU constitution before coming to this Court. That argument accordingly fails; and I so hold. The third ground for the 1st – 4th defendants’ objection is that the claimant did not comply with sections 19(1), 39, 40 and 41 of the TUA 2004 in filing his claims in the manner he did. Here I agree with the argument of the 1st – 4th defendants. I alluded earlier to the confusion of thought exhibited by the claimant in responding to this argument. To reinforce the argument of the 1st – 4th defendants especially in terms of section 19(1) of the TUA 2004, Sodade v. Imagie [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt. 114) 250 held that an injunction restraining an unauthorized application of the funds of a trade union pursuant to the then section 16 (now section 19) of the TUA may only be granted upon the application of the Attorney-General of the Federation, or the Registrar of Trade Unions or any five or more members of the union. Reliefs 3, 4, 5 and 6 all pray for an account and/or auditing, and injunctive orders restraining the unauthorized application or unlawful application, of union funds. A valid suit for these purposes must be by the Attorney-General of the Federation or the Registrar of Trade Unions or at least 5 members of the union. The claimant brought this action in his personal capacity, and merely stated on the face of the originating processes that he is suing for himself and as National Vice-President (South-West) of Radio, Television, Theatre and Arts Workers Union of Nigeria (RATTAWU) on behalf of aggrieved members of the RATTAWU. Reliefs 2, 7, 8 and 9 all seek personal reliefs peculiar only to the claimant in his individual capacity. In truth, therefore, the claimant did not satisfy the requirement of section 19(1) of the TUA 2004 before filing this action. On this ground alone, the claims of the claimant, and hence the suit itself, are incompetent; and I so find and hold. The fourth ground of objection by the 1st – 4th defendants is that the claimant cannot challenge the decision of the union’s National Delegates Conference in altering the union constitution simply because the National Delegates Conference is the supreme organ of the union. The 1st – 4th defendants themselves cited section 29(1) of the TUA 2004 dealing with alteration of rules of trade unions, and which provides – Subject to this section, a trade union may alter its rules by any method of doing so provided for by its rules, but no alteration of the rules of a trade union shall take effect until the alteration is registered. A global reading of section 29 of the TUA 2004 does not suggest the kind of absolutism that the 1st – 4th defendants credited to the National Delegates Conference. That the union can alter its rules does not make the alteration absolute and unquestionable. Section 29(1) permits the union to alter its rules so long as it is in the manner sanctioned by the ‘rules’ itself and so long as the alteration is registered. If conditions are laid down for a valid alteration of the union rules, how can the 1st – 4th defendants argue in the absolute terms that they did? In Nigeria Civil Service Union v. Essien [1985] 3 NWLR (Pt. 12) 306, it was held that the constitution of a trade union is a contract between the members of the union. That the members have subsumed their several rights into the letters of that constitution. And that the Registrar of Trade Unions has the duty to register any amendment or alteration of a trade union’s constitution if it is validly made and does not infringe the provisions of the then section 27(2) – now 29(2) – of the TUA. I consequently do not agree with the 1st – 4th defendants that the claimant is not competent to challenge the alteration of the union constitution. That argument of the 1st – 4th defendants is hereby rejected and accordingly dismissed. The last ground of the objection of the 1st – 4th defendants is that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants on record are not juristic persons capable of being sued. Of all the authorities cited by the 1st – 4th defendants here, the most relevant and which bears a very close affinity to the instant case is Comrade Ali Munir Matawalle, Kano State Chairman, MHWUN v. National President of MHWUN & 8 ors [2009] 15 NLLR (Pt. 42) 369. In this case, the defendants were simply National President of Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria (MHWUN); National Deputy President, MHWUN; Six Zonal Vice Presidents, MHWUN; National Treasurer, MHWUN; National Trustee, MHWUN; National Auditor, MHWUN; National Publicity Secretary, MHWUN; Central Working Committee Members, MHWUN; and 12 Elected NEC Members, MHWUN. An objection was raised that these 9 defendants were not juristic persons capable of being sued. In a considered ruling, this Court per Hon. Justices Dadda (of blessed memory, Presiding), Esowe, Ibrahim and Shogbola agreed with this submission and held that the suit as filed was incompetent. This Court accordingly struck out the case. In the instant case, the 1st – 4th defendants are: The National President Radio, Television, Theatre and Arts Workers’ Union (RATTAWU); The General Secretary Radio, Television, Theatre and Arts Workers’ Union (RATTAWU); The Trustee Radio, Television, Theatre and Arts Workers’ Union (RATTAWU); and The National Treasurer Radio, Television, Theatre and Arts Workers’ Union (RATTAWU). Having to sue offices in this suit bears close affinity with Comrade Ali Munir Matawalle, Kano State Chairman, MHWUN v. National President of MHWUN & 8 ors. The Court has not been shown any reason why it should depart from Comrade Ali Munir Matawalle, Kano State Chairman, MHWUN v. National President of MHWUN & 8 ors. In fact, the claimant offered no response whatsoever to the submission that the 1st – 4th defendants are not juristic persons capable of being sued. Abiding by Comrade Ali Munir Matawalle, Kano State Chairman, MHWUN v. National President of MHWUN & 8 ors, therefore, I hold that the instant suit is incompetent as filed against the 1st – 4th defendants. On the whole and for the avoidance of doubt, for not complying with sections 19(1), 39, 40 and 41 of the TUA 2004 in filing his claims in the manner he did and for the 1st – 4th defendants not being juristic persons capable of being sued, the claimant’s case in its totality is incompetent; not just in relation to the 1st – 4th defendants but in relation to all the defendants. I so find and hold. The case is accordingly struck out. Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip