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The claimant filed this complaint on the 18th January 2013 against the defendants. By an amended complaint filed on May 15, 2013 the claimant claims against the defendants jointly and severally as follows: 1. A declaration that the purported compulsory retirement of the claimant by the defendants without recourse to due process is illegal, unconstitutional, null and void of no effect whatsoever. 2. A mandatory injunction mandating, directing and ordering the defendants to reinstate the claimant back to his employment as lecturer; his post as director of CRUTECH Entrepreneurial Centre; and all sundry offices and positions occupied by him before his illegal and purported retirement, with effect from 1st January, 2012. 3. A mandatory injunction mandating, directing and ordering the defendants to pay to the claimant all outstanding arrears of his entitlements in whatever form they maybe including those to accrue to him from promotions he ought to have earned from the day of his illegal and purported retirement to the day judgement is given, delivered and executed. 4. A perpetual injunction restraining the defendants either by themselves or their agents, privies, assigns or representatives from ever compulsorily retiring the claimant for no reason whatsoever and without recourse to duly stipulated or laid down procedure or due process. 5. General damages to the tune of N45,000.000.00 (forty five million naira) for the excruciating difficulties and psychological trauma the defendants have subjected the claimant to for no reason whatsoever. 6. Exemplary damages to the tune of N4,500,000.00 (four million five hundred thousand naira) only for the primitive, inhuman, unrepentant and unremorseful conduct of the defendants despite being put on notice about their wrongful deeds, so they make amends. 7. Cost of N5000,000.00 for the prosecution of this suit. Accompanying the complaint is the amended statement of facts, copies of documents, witness statement on oath. The defendants entered a conditional appearance on the 14th May 2013 and filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Court on the grounds that the action is statute barred and is an abuse of the process of Court. The grounds upon which the objection is predicated are as follows: (a) Suit filed on 18/1/2013 whilst cause of action arose on 4/1/2012 hence outside the 6 months allowed by law. (b) The jurisdiction to entertain claims on defamation is totally lacking in this Honourable Court. (c) It is not the function of Court in this Suit or any howsoever to pick and choose which of the claim to entertain in a suit before it. The objection is supported by a written address dated 13th May 2013. In response the claimant filed a written address opposing the objection dated 5th November 2013 and filed the same day. The defendants filed a reply on point of law on the 28th November 2013. The parties adopted their written addresses. Learned counsel to the defendants submitted the following issues for determination: (1) Whether the action is statue barred having regards to section 1A of the Cross River State Public Officers Protection Law (2) Whether or not this suit is not an abuse of the process of Court in so far is it statute barred yet brought also in a Court without jurisdiction. (3) Whether the combination by the claimant of other causes of action for which this Court has no jurisdiction with another within the Court jurisdiction has not robbed the Court of the juridical power to entertain the matter in the state it is filed. He submitted that it is the claims of the claimant that determines the jurisdiction of the court citing Adeyemi v Opeyori [1976] 10 SC 31, Bronik Motors v Wema Bank Nig Ltd [1983] 6 SC 158, CRUTECH v Obeten [2012] All FWLR (Pt 641) 1567. He referred to section1 of the Public Officers Protection Law Cross River State 2004 as amended in 2007 and submitted that an action must be instituted within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. He referred to section 1 A (b) and submitted that the 1st defendant is a body corporate established by law and therefore falls within the definition of Public Officer. He submitted that the cause of action arose on 04/01/2012 and this suit was filed on 18/01/2013 which is outside the six months period provided by law and as such the action is statute barred and should be dismissed. He cited Utilh v Egorr [1990] 5 NWLR (Pt 153)774, P.N.Udoh Trading Co Ltd v Abere [2001] FWLR (Pt 57)900,Egbe v Adefarasin [1987] NSCC 1 at 3. It was his submission that it is an abuse of the process of court to bring an action outside the mandatory six months period in which the court has no jurisdiction citing Maiwa v Abudu [1986] 1NLR (p17)438 H6.He submitted that the court may have jurisdiction to grant the claimant’s reliefs touching on his retirement but would not have same if facts complained of by the claimant are interwoven with facts of defamation which are outside the jurisdiction of the court. He submitted that the issue of defamation is not incidental to the claim on retirement but is a distinct relief citing IN Arnold Nwifa v Ububa [1966] NMLR 219. He then prayed the court to dismiss the suit. Learned counsel to the claimant raised three issues for determination as follows: 1. Whether the Public Officers Protection law applies to a suit of this nature which is challenging a breach of the claimant’s /respondents contract of employment with the 1st defendant/applicant that led to the unwarranted compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent. 2. Whether the time started running for limitation from 4th January 2012 when the purported retirement letter was written by the defendants/applicants or on 24th October 2012 when the Cross River State House of Assembly passed a resolution affirming the action of the defendants/applicants after hearing from them and the latter became aggrieved. 3. Whether there is any claim on defamation before the court other than that harping on a breach of the contract of employment between the claimant/respondent and the 1st defendant/applicant as to warrant the nullification of the claimant/respondent’s action. He submitted that the defendants are all Public Officers citing Offoboche v Ogoja Local Govt [2001] FWLR (Pt 68) 1051, FGN v Zebra Energy Ltd [2002] 18 NWLR (Pt 798) 162 at 195, Ibrahim v JSC Kaduna State [1998] 14 NWLR 1. He submitted that Section 1(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law of Cross Rivers State as amended does not apply as the claimants claim is one founded on a contract of employment and claim for salaries and entitlements. He argued that the law is intended to apply in cases where Public Officers act in pursuance of a legislation or execution of a public duty and has no application to contractual matters or obligation citing Amoa v Civil Service Commission & 2 Ors [1992] 7 NWLR (Pt 252) 214 at 219,FGN v Zebra Energy Ltd supra, Mrs Emilia Ekpo v University of Calabar ( unreported) FHC/CA/CS/35/2003 Judgement delievered on 26th January 2006. He submitted that since the subject matter of the action is founded on contract, the provision of Section 1 (a) of the Law does not apply so as to render the suit statute barred even if not commenced within the period limited by statute. Counsel argued that the cause of action did not arise on 4th January 2012 the date the claimant’s letter of retirement was written because the claimant had petitioned the House of Assembly which had referred the complaint to its Committee on Judiciary, Public Service Matters, Public Petitions, Human Rights, Ethics and Privileges and a hearing was conducted. That a report was presented by the Committee to the House which deliberated on it and passed a resolution on 24th October 2012 which further aggrieved the claimant and then he filed this action on the 18th January 2013. He submitted that even if the time to file the suit had expired, the proceedings at the House of Assembly revived it. He submitted that there is no other subject matter before the court outside that prescribed under the National Industrial Court Act as can be discerned from the amended complaint and amended statement of facts filed on 15th May 2013 which reduced the number of defendants and the statement of facts to 69 paragraphs. He urged the court to dismiss the Objection and hear the case on the merit. Replying on point of law, defence counsel submitted that the actions of the defendants is in pursuance of their official authority as contemplated in the Public Officers Protection Law and are entitled to the protection citing Hassan v Aliyu [2010] 7 MJSC 1 at 30, Alli v Govt of Borno State [2008] All FWLR (Pt 408) 365. He submitted that negotiation does not stop time from running citing Godswill Company Ltd v Calabar Cement Coy Ltd [2010] ALL FWLR (Pt 544) 34 at 41. He urged the court to strike out the suit. Having considered the submissions of learned counsel and the authorities cited, the issue to be determined is whether this action is caught by the Public Officers Protection Law Cap P17 Laws of Cross River State 2004 as amended. Both parties agree that the defendants are all Public Officers. A Court can only assume jurisdiction if the subject matter is within its jurisdiction and the case has been initiated by due process of law and upon fulfilment of any condition precedent to the exercise of its jurisdiction. See Madukolu v Nkemdilim [1962] 2 SCNLR 341. In deciding whether a case is statute barred or not, the court only has to look at the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave rise to the cause of action and comparing that date with the date the writ of summons was filed. In this instance it is the complaint and statement of facts. If the time on the complaint is beyond the period allowed by the Limitation Law, the action is statute barred. See Elabanjo v Dawodu [2006] 6-7 SC 24, Forestry Research Institute of Nigeria v Gold [2007] 11 NWLR (Pt 1044) 1 at 18. The defendants argue that this action is caught by the provisions of section 1(a) Of the Public Officers Protection Law. It is reproduced as follows: 1. Actions against Public Officers Where any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance of execution or intended execution of any Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect-- (a) Limitation of Time the action, prosecution, or proceedings shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of continuance of damage or injury, within six months next after the ceasing thereof: A cause of action is said to be statute barred if in respect of its proceedings it cannot be brought because the period laid down by the limitation has elapsed. See Egbe v Adefarasin [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt 47) 1 at 20, Udoh Trading Coy Ltd v Abere[2001] 11 NWLR (Pt 723) 114. The 1st defendant compulsorily retired the claimant on January 4, 2012. Learned counsel to the claimant has argued that as a result of his petition to the House of Assembly which deliberated on the matter, the cause of action accrued on the 24th October 2012 when the House passed a resolution upholding the action of the defendants. I do not agree with him. The “act” of the defendants in respect of which the claimant petitioned the House of Assembly occurred on January 4, 2012. In other words, the compulsory retirement is the act the claimant complained of as stipulated in section 1(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law. Petitioning the House of Assembly over his compulsory retirement is not a relevant consideration for the applicability of the Act. While the law does not prohibit the parties from negotiations or exploring other means of resolving a dispute, it does not stop the period of limitation stipulated by statute from running. See Goodwill Co Ltd v Calabar Cement Co Ltd [2010] All FWLR (Pt 544) 34. The cause of action arises at a date certain and final and the suit must be filed within six months. I find that the cause of action arose on January 4, 2012 when the letter of compulsory retirement was written. This action was filed on January 18, 2013. This is outside the six months statutory limit. The claimant ought to have instituted this action within six months to protect his rights in case his petition failed. It is therefore unnecessary to rule on the issues of defamation. The claimant has argued that the Public Officers Protection Law does not apply as the nature of the claim is founded on a contract of employment. This is not the correct position as case law is replete with employment contracts that were caught by the provisions of the Limitation Law. See Forestry Research Institute of Nigeria v Gold supra where the Supreme Court held that the action for wrongful dismissal was caught by the Public Officers Protection Act. Furthermore, this action is not one in which the claimant is making a claim for labour and work done but one of illegal compulsory retirement as can be clearly seen from the claimant’s claims. I find that this suit has been instituted outside the six months of accrual of cause of action. I hold that it is not maintainable as it is statute barred. The defendants are protected by the Public Officers Protection Law. This court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this matter. It is hereby struck out. I make no order as to costs. Ruling is entered accordingly. ---------------------------------------- Hon Justice O.A.Obaseki-Osaghae