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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS Hon. Justice B.B Kanyip - Presiding Judge Hon. Justice V. N. Okobi - Judge Hon. Justice F.I. Kola-Olalere - Judge Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu-FLshim - Judge DATED: November 4, 2009 SUIT NO. NIC/41/2008 BETWEEN Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd - Appellant (SPDC) AND 1. Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) 2. Vetco Aibel Nigeria Ltd (VETCO) 3. Overseas Technical Services Ltd (OTS) - Respondents REPRESENTATION Paul Usoro (SAN), for the appellant, and with him are M. O. Liadi. A. Lalito, Miss A. Kolade, N. Ogbonaya and Miss A. I. Auta. Sola Iji for the 1st respondent and with him are A. I. Asemudara and Mrs. Olubunmi Ologuridudu-Adevvumi J. Okere for the 2nd and 3rd respondents and with him are N. Garrick and A. N. Okoye. RULING This is an appeal against the ruling of the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) which was delivered on the 5th of June, 2008 in respect of a preliminary objection raised by the appellant (Shell/SPDC). This appeal was filed with the records of proceedings in this court on the 1 8lh December, 2008, together with the appellant's brief of arguments. At the JAP, the facts in dispute are as contained in the referral from the Minister of Labour. Vide a letter with Ref No. ML.HB7552/1 1/307 and dated 17th August 2007. The terms of reference are as follows: To inquire into the trade dispute existing between the Petroleum & Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) and the Overseas Technical Services Nigeria Limited (OTS), Vetco Aibel and Shell Petroleum Development Company Limited (SPDC) over the following points: i. Refusal to negotiate a collective agreement with the union. ii. Recusal to put in place Conditions of Service. iii. Refusal [o recognize PHNGASSAN as a union for her employees. iv. Systematic pay-cut of employees' salary by reducing them to wage earners. Parties tiled their memoranda at the IA I1 on the subject matter. Thereafter, the appellant i.e. SPDC or Shell for short filed a preliminary objection together with its written address. The respondents replied Shell's written address on its preliminary objection while Shell replied the respondents on points of law. Shell's preliminary objection at the IAP is for:- 1. AN ORDER dismissing these proceedings on the ground that it is academic and unenforceable. a. the employment of the workers who are the subject matter of these proceedings having been determined by Overseas Technical Services Limited (OTS) and Velco Aibel Nigeria Limited (Vetco Aibel) prior to the Reference by the Honourable Minister of Labour to this Arbitral Panel on 03 August 2007 ("Reference") and b. the enabling contract between Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited ("SPDC") and Vetco Aibel on the one hand and SPDC and OTS on the other (and the alleged basis for the employment of the workers, the subject matter of the Reference) having been determined respectively on 31st December 2006 and 31st March 2007. AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE 2. AN ORDER dismissing and/or striking out all averments and/or issues relating to the question of whether or not OTS and Vetco Aibel workers pursuant to the aforestated contracts for services between SPDC and OTS and Vetco Aibel respectively were employees of SPDC howsoever, on the grounds that the said issues -- a. Have already been determined by the Ministry of Labour with the concurrence-Jonathan of all the parties hereto, vide the Communique that was issued and signed by all the parties, including officials of the Ministry of Labour on 09 January2007;and b. Do not constitute part of the terms of reference formulated by the Honourable Minister of Labour and referred to this Arbitral Panel; pursuant to the Reference Document for the Honourable Minister of Labour dated 03 August 2007;and c. Are academic in nature and unenforceable, i. The employment of the said workers having been determined by OTS and Vetco Aibel and the entitlements thereof duly paid prior to the Reference; and ii. there not being any subsisting contract for service IvKveen SPDC and OTS and Vetco Aibel; and d. In any case, are contractual in nature and i. the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria ("PENGASSAN") does not have the legal standing ('locus standi') to prosecute the matter; and ii. are subject to adjudication and determination exclusively by (he High Court pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. 3. AN ORDER striking out the name of SPDC from these proceedings on the ground that the Reference discloses no cause of action or dispute against the company. 4. AND such further or other Order(s) as the Industrial Arbitration Panel may deem fit or necessary to make in the circumstances of these proceedings. The appellant prayed the IAP to make award in terms of its preliminary objection, file 2nd and 3rd respondents i.e. Vetco and OTS supported Shell's preliminary objection at the IAP while the 1st respondent i.e. PENGASSAN opposed it vehemently. In its ruling, the 1AP refused to make any award or specific findings on any of the issues raised in the preliminary objection by Shell. The panel agreed with PENGASSAN that it needed to take oral evidence on those issues raised by Shell before making any award. The IAP's award/decision on the preliminary objection is inter alia as follows:- The exercise of judicial power involves the investigation of facts (see AG of Federationv. Guardian Newspaper, supra). Based on the above authorities, it is clear that facts such as contained in the memo of the first party and which were being contested by the 2nd party calls for investigation (see AG of Federation v. Guardian, supra). Investigation will involve proof, admissibility, weight etc. although; strict rules of evidence may not apply. In the memoranda of the 1st party dated 18lh September 2007 and I2lh December 2007, counsel to the 1M party continued to make the following statement - We will lead abundant oral and documentary evidence to establish this fact at the trial of this action. The 2nd parties are all hereby given notice to produce all relevant documents From the foregoing, it is clear that the 1s' party is waiting for the opportunity of the trial to present what it called "abundant" oral and documentary evidence in support of its claims. This is in line with the procedure of the Industrial Arbitration Panel for parties not to over-burden their memoranda but wait for the opportunity of the trial to produce supporting evidence. This procedure is as outlined in the Hearing notice to parties, FORM IAP 1 dated 28lh day of August, 2007 thus - The parties are warned that at the hearing they are required to bring forward all evidence by witness or by documents on which each party desires to rely in support of his own case and in contradiction of that of his opponent. Such proof will be required preferably at the hearing, though in deserving cases the Panel may hear evidence on such subsequent day(s) as the exigencies of the case permit. The first party has in its memoranda given notice that they intend to take advantage of the opportunity provided by the hearing notice. The Tribunal believes that it is only just to give this opportunity before making an Award. RULING Based on the foregoing, the tribunal refuses to make any award at this stage of the proceeding. The preliminary objection of the applicant is hereby refused. Shell then tiled an appeal to this court against the ruling of 1AP on its preliminary objection. On receiving the Shell appeal against the lAP's ruling, PENGASSAN, the 1"' respondent, raised the present preliminary objection against it. The notice of the present preliminary objection was brought pursuant to Order 11(1). Order 15 and Order 26 Rule 13 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007, sections 12(1). 14 and 36 of National Industrial Court Act 2006, section 35 of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. 432 LFN 1990 and under the inherent power of this Court. It is dated and tiled 20lh May, 2009 with the following prayers - 1. AN ORDER dismissing or striking out this suit for the reason that this Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear or entertain same. 2. AND for such further order or other orders as this Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance. The grounds for the objection are - 1. That the subject matter of the action is a trade dispute pending before the Industrial Arbitration Panel (1AP). 2. That by virtue of section 35( 1 )(g) and 36(3) of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. 432 JT'N 1 9s) The Industrial Arbitration Panel has powers to: (i) generally give all such directions and do all such things as are necessary or expedient for dealing speedily and justly with the matters referred to it, and (ii) regulate its procedure and proceedings as it thinks fit, and shall not be bound to act in any formal manner. 3. That the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this suit is contingent on the provisions of sections 8 - 13(1) of the Trade-Disputes Act Cap. 432 LFN 1990 and section 7(40), of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006. From the above, PHNGASSAN is in the main challenging the jurisdiction of this court to hear this appeal and is praying the court to strike out the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. According to PKNGASSAN, the issues for determination in their preliminary objection are:- 1. How is jurisdiction created and assumed? 2. When jurisdiction is assumed, how should the tribunal proceed? 3. In making final award/determination, what must the Tribunal consider? PENGASSAN submitted that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. It submitted that courts have held that 'jurisdiction means the authority a court has to decide a matter before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in formal way for the court's decision. See AC Oyo State v. NIC W2004| NLLR (Pt. 3) 616, Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] All NLR (P6. 2) 58l,Ndaeyo v. Ogunnayo[1977J] 1 SC 7 and National Bank of Nig. Ltd v. Shoyoye [1977] 5 SC 110. PENGASSAN submitted that in order to determine the jurisdiction of this court we must look into the NIC Act 2006, which is its enabling statute. See Ikongbeh, JCA's pronouncement in Kulunxo v. Dokubo [2004] NLLR (Pt. 1) 180. PENGASSAN pointed out that the complaint of Shell in the appeal before the court is against the interlocutory ruling of the IAP which refused Shell's preliminary objection and the reliefs sought for thereunder. PKNCJASSAN pointed out that from the provisions of the Trade Disputes Act and the National Industrial Court Act, this court's jurisdiction are both original and appellate. That the appellate jurisdiction of the court is regulated by section 13(1) of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. 432 LFN 1990 and section 7(3), (4) & (5) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. PENGASSAN then postulated another question, namely, is the subject matter of this appeal within the class of actions contemplated by the legislators? PENGASSAN answered this by quoting Mustapha, JSC's pronouncement in Tiza v. Begha [2005] 5 SC (Pi. II) 1 at 8 as follows: Appeals generally are creature of statutes. Failure to comply with the statutory requirement prescribed by the relevant laws under which such appeals may be competent and properly before the court will deprive such appellate court of jurisdiction to adjudicate on the appeal. See/Into Import Export v. Adebayo [2002] 12 SC 158; [2003] FWLR (Pt. 140), Kudibor v. Kudano 6 WACA 14. PENGASSAN went further to state that the appellate jurisdiction of this court must accord with the provisions of the Trade Disputes Act and the National Industrial Court Act. PENGASSAN then submitted that by section 12(1) of the Trade Disputes Act, the IAP is expected to make an award when a dispute is referred to it under section 8 of the Trade Disputes Act. That when the IAP makes an award, it is sent to the Minister of Labour who in turn informs the parties of it. Parties are expected to raise objection within 7 days of the notice if they intend to raise any objection. Then the Minister will refer the objection to this court. See sections 12(2) and 13(1) of the Trade Disputes Act. PENGASSAN submitted further that the appellate jurisdiction of this court must accord with Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act. Again, PENGASSAN referred to and quoted in part section 7(4) of the National Industrial Court Act to the effect that "appeal shall lie from the decisions of an arbitral tribunal to the court as of right in the matters of disputes specified in section 7(1 )(a) of the National Industrial Court Act". It went on to submit that the decisions referred to in section 7(4) of the National Industrial Court Act is not ruling, orders or direction made by IAP under section 35(7)(g) of the Trade Disputes Act but that the decision in question refers to the award of JAP in this context. PENGASSAN then submitted that above position is supported by section 7(5) of the National Industrial Court Act. PENGASSAN contended that there is no appeal before the court as contemplated under the appellate jurisdiction of this court. This is because there is no award yet by the panel to appeal against. Thai even if the court rules that there is an award, to which it is nol conceding, Shell cannot come to court on appeal directly but through a referral from the Minister Labour. See section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act. PENGASSAN then submitted that the Trade Disputes Act is an Act of the National Assembly which in its Part I prescribes the procedure to be followed before a matter under section 7(1 )(a) of the National Industrial Court Act can come before this court on appeal. PENGASSAN went on to submit that sections 8 - J3 of the Trade Disputes Act do not admit extraneous procedure. That the 1AP must make an award within 21 days or such other period as may be allowed. It contended that the preliminary objection of Shell at IAP and its appeal to this court against IAP's ruling are misconceived and an abuse of the court's processes hence should be dismissed. PENGASSAN then submitted that since this appeal did not follow the laid down procedure for its initiation, its foundation has been affected. That Shell should allow the statutory provisions in sections 8 - 13 of the Trade Disputes Act to run its due course before bringing up this appeal. It submitted that the appeal is premature hence the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it. See Outfemi v. Ayo [2009] All FWLR (Pt. 452) 1111 at 1146. PENGASSAN further submitted that section 7(4) of the National Industrial Court Act is in purl materia with section 246 of the 1999 Constitution, hence the court lacks jurisdiction on the interlocutory application. It submitted that the Trade Disputes Act and the National Industrial Court Act have made no provision for appeal on interlocutory application; therefore this suit is an abuse of court's process for the settlement of trade disputes under the Trade Disputes Act and National Industrial Court Act. PENGASSAN then urged the court to strike out this suit with substantial cost. It contended that the subject matter of this appeal though auxiliary is different from the dispute being arbitrated on by the IAP. That aside from the fact that the action has no foundation in law, it is also novel in trade dispute matters where time is of essence for resolution. Therefore, that such frivolous actions are pursued to the delay and detriment of speedy adjudication of the substantive action. PENGASSAN then submitted that this action is frivolous, vexatious, an abuse of due process and a callous invitation of court, with enormous work load, to embark on a needless and fruitless voyage of discovery. It submitted that its objection is justified and urged the court to order as prayed. It contended that there is sufficient facts ex-facia on record establishing a want of jurisdiction. See Oloba v. Akereja [1988] 3 NWER (Pt. 84) 508 or [1988] 7SC(Pt. 1) 11 - 12. Reacting to PENGASSAN's preliminary objection to its appeal, Shell filed a written address. Shell submitted that it is misconceived and erroneous for PENGASSAN to argue in its preliminary objection in question that the decision of IAP referred to in section 7(4) of the National Industrial Court Act is not in the class of ruling, orders or direction made by IAP in accordance with the IAP's powers exercised under section 35 of the Trade Disputes Act but that it refers to the IAP award. Shell emphatically asserted that this court has jurisdictional competence to entertain and determine this appeal pursuant to the provisions of National Industrial Court Act. Shell reiterated that the National Industrial Court's jurisdiction should be determined by its enabling statute which is the National Industrial Court Act. See Mahvada v. Pate [1995] 8 NWER (Pt. 412) 191 at 199 and Nigerian Shippers' Council v. United World Ltd Inc. [2001] 7 NWLR (Pt. 713) 576 at 584. Shell agreed with PENGASSAN that section 7(4) of the National Industrial Court Act is the bedrock of the court's jurisdiction on this matter. That that subsection states in part that 'L... an appeal shall lie from the decisions of an arbitral tribunal...." It pointed out that PENG ASS AN agreed that the subject matter of this appeal must come within the intendment of" section 7(1 )(a) and section 7(4) of the National Industrial Court Act. That PENGASSAN's only complaint is that the decision of IAP from which such appeal lies must be limited to MAI' Awards'. Shell opined that such a position is incorrect. It submitted that by such position, PENGASSAN is reading into the National Industrial Court Act the intendment that is not the legislators' because an IAP award is only a decision within section 7(4) of the National Industrial Court Act. Shell referred the court to Blacks Law Dictionary, 8th Edition 2004 which defines 'award' at page 147 as 'a final judgment or decision especially one by an arbitrator or by a jury assessing damages'. Shell pointed out that section 7(4) of the National Industrial Court Act did not limit appeal as of right to those against final decisions but to decisions simpliciter. It submitted that PENGASSAN is not at liberty to read into the plain and ordinary meaning of this provision. See Texaco Panama Inc. v. SPDC of Nig. Ltd [2002] 5 NWLR (Pt. 759) 209 at 227 - 228. Shell submitted that Texaco 's case is perfectly apposite because it addresses the issue completely. It submitted that the word 'decisions' in section 7(4) of the National Industrial Court Act has no delimiting clause or word attached to it. That it is as wide in scope as the phrase "any oil terminal' in Texaco Panama Inc. v. SPDC, supra. See also Arabella v. Nigerian Agricultural Insurance Corporation [2008] 1 I NWLR (Pt. 1097) 182 on the principle of interpretation. Shell drew attention to PENGASSAN's submission that section 7(5) of the National Industrial Court Act delimits the word 'decisions' in section 7(4) of the National Industrial Court Act to only 'awards'. It submitted that this is misconceived and erroneous because 'award' in that contest is only a species of'decisions' in section 7(4) of the National Industrial Court Act. That section 7(5) merely isolated one of the types of decision under section 7(4) of the National Industrial Court Act. That nothing in section 7(5) of the National Industrial Court Act suggests that other forms of decisions that may be made by an arbitral tribunal other than final decision or award are not appealable. Shell submitted that aside from its submissions above, section 8(a) of the National Industrial Court Act talks of the different decisions that this court may handle on appeal under section 7(4) of the National Industrial Court Act. These decisions as listed in section 8(a) of the National Industrial Court Act are "...judgment, award or order of court, tribunal or body...." That these are variants of decisions. That the disjunctive ward "or" used in section 8(a) means each of them could stand on its own as a subject of appeal. See Savannah Bank (Nig). Ltd v. SIC) Corporation [2001] 1 NWLR (Pt. 693) 194 at 211 and Kim v. Ernefo [2001] 4 NWLR (Pt. 702) 147 at 166 on the disjunctive word "or". See also Order 3 Rule 5(c) of the National Industrial Court Rules which talks of complaints against an award or decision by an arbitral tribunal. Shell submitted that section 318 of the 1999 Constitution stipulates that- "Decision" means in relation to a court, any determination of that court and includes judgment, decree, order, conviction, sentence or recommendation. Shell pointed out that PENGASSAN submitted that even if Shell had right of appeal, it cannot come directly to the National Industrial Court but by referral through the Minister of Labour. Shell submitted that the above position PENGASSAN is only correct if the appeal in question is on an award or final decision of the IAP. It submitted that there is nothing in sections 13 and 14 of the Trade Disputes Act that purports to take away the right of appeal donated to the parties by section 7(4) of the National Industrial Court Act. That the Trade Disputes Act only gives the Minister a right to refer an IAP award to the National Industrial Court for further consideration based on an objection raised. That this right of the Minister is different from the parties' right of appeal under section 7(4) of the NIC' Act. That the Minister can only refer under section 14 of the Trade Disputes Act; he cannot appeal since he is not a parly. That only parlies to a dispute can appeal against the decision on the dispute. See Military ( Ondo State v. Ajayi [1998] 3 NWLR (Pt. 540) 27 at 48. Shell submitted that sections 13 and 14 of the Trade Disputes Act relate to award or final decision of the IAP. That this present appeal is not against the final decision of the IAP but on an interlocutory decision of the Panel. Hence sections 13 and 14 of the Trade Disputes Act are not applicable and to that extent, paragraphs 3.3.1 to 3.3.2 of PENGASSAN's written address on its preliminary objection to Shell's appeal are misconceived, inapplicable and should be discountenanced. Again, Shell indicated that PENGASSAN sought to place section 7(4) of the National Industrial Court Act side by side with section 246(l)(b) of the 1999 Constitution. It submitted that such is erroneous and misconceived because the two statutory provisions are not in pari malaria. That in section 246(1 )(b) of 1999 Constitution, the applicable decision is qualified and limited to a determination of specific questions, whereas section 7(4) of the National Industrial Court Act is not so restricted. Hence the case of Olajemi v. Ayo, supra, cited by PENGASSAN is not apposite and is inapplicable. Shell finally urged the court to rule that it has jurisdiction to hear and determine this appeal. Alter a careful consideration of the appeal of Shell and the preliminary objection of PENGASSAN, the issue that calls for determination is the propriety or otherwise of an appeal to this court against an interlocutory decision of an arbitral tribunal. The main dispute in issue is one that is pending before the IAP. Shell raised a preliminary objection at the IAP and the IAP in its wisdom declined to make any pronouncement on it, preferring instead to take arguments on the substantive issues and make pronouncement on all issues when it is delivering its award at the end of the day. In other words, IAP merely reserved its decision until it hears the matter on merit. It is he validity of this procedure that Shell is challenging by coming on appeal to this court. The question may, therefore, be asked whether the IAP acted within the limits of the law in adopting this procedure. Sections 35 and 36 of the TDA Cap. 432 LFN 1990, which applies to both the IAP and this court provide ample guide. Section 35(l)(g) of the Trade Disputes Act 1990 provides that the IAP or this court may, for the purpose of dealing with any trade dispute or other matter referred to it, generally give such directions and do all such things as are necessary or expedient for dealing speedily and justly with the matter referred to it; and section 36(3) of the same Trade Disputes Act goes on to provide that subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules or regulations made under this section, the IAP or this court may inter alia regulate its procedure and proceedings as it thinks fits, and shall not be bound to act in any formal manner. In relation to this court, section 14 of the NIC Act 2006 goes on to provide that - The Court shall in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it by or under this Act in every cause or matter, have power to grant, either absolutely or on such terms and conditions as the Court thinks just, all such remedies whatsoever as any of the parties thereto may appear to be entitled to in respect of any legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by the Court so that, as far as possible, all matters in dispute between the parties may be completely and finally determined and all multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning any of those matters avoided. And by Order 1 Rule 1(3) of the NIC Rules 2007 - These Rules shall apply to all proceedings including part-heard causes and matters in respect of steps to be further taken in such causes and matters for the attainment of a just, efficient and speedy dispensation of justice. What all of this translates to is that speed, expediency, flexibility and above all justice are the guiding principles that the IAP and this court must always imbibe when determining matters brought before them, liven within the context of the non-specialised courts, these are guiding principles urged on all. for instance, the statement of Honourable Justice M. L. Uwais, CJN in the case of Anuull.v NPPC [20001 5 WRN 47 is apposite here. The case dealt with an interlocutory appeal in respect of a matter where the appellant challenged as wrongful, illegal, null and void his suspension and subsequent dismissal from work by the respondent. At the court of first instance, the question as to jurisdiction was raised and argued. The High Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, whereupon the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. In allowing the appeal, His Lordship had this to say in concluding the lead judgment — The chequered history of this case once more brings to light the dilatory effect of interlocutory appeal to the substantive suit between parties. The action in this case was brought on the 29lh day of April, 1987. The motion on notice to strike out the case for want of jurisdiction is dated 15th day of April, 1988; that is about a year after the suit was filed, the ruling of the High Court was delivered on the 21stlh day of June 1988. 'the appeal against the ruling was delivered by the Court of Appeal on the 16th day of February 1989. The final judgment on the interlocutory appeal is delivered today by its court (i.e. June 2nd 2000). It has thus taken thirteen years for the case to reach this stage. With the success of the plaintiffs appeal before us the case is to be sent back to the High Court to be determined, hopefully, on its merits after a delay of 13 years. Surely, this could have been avoided had it been that the point was taken in the course of the proceedings in the substantive claim to enable any aggrieved party to appeal on both the issue of jurisdiction and the judgment on merit in the proceedings as the case might be. I believe that counsel owe it a duty, to the court to help reduce the period of delay in determining cases in our courts by avoiding unnecessary preliminary objections as the one here; so that the adage justice delayed is justice denied may cease to apply to the proceedings in our courts (the emphasis is ours). Will the justice of the case be defeated if Shell had simply allowed the 1AP to treat the matter on merit without Shell losing its right to appeal to this court against all the issues that may arise thereafter including the question of jurisdiction? We do not think so. The flexibility and speed enjoined by statute permit that Shell will still get justice if the procedure adopted by the 1AP is allowed to stay. It does not take away the right of Shell to appeal against all issues that may have been canvassed at the 1AP. It must be appreciated that the IAP under the TDA 1990 often has only 21 days within which to conclude its proceedings. This is to accommodate the requirement of a speedy dispensation of justice. This will be defeated if appeals on interlocutory matters are allowed to stall the decision on the merits of a case in matters before an arbitral tribunal such as the IAP. In any event, a proper reading of section 7(4) and (5) of the NIC Act 2006 indicates that appeals on interlocutory matters may not really be contemplated. Section 7(4) provides that - An appeal shall lie from the decisions of an arbitral tribunal to the Court as of right in matters of disputes specified in subsection (l)(a) of this section. Subsection (5) then provides that for the purposes of subsection (4) of this section, a party to an arbitral award shall be entitled to obtain a copy of the records of the arbitral proceedings and the award from the arbitral tribunal. Arguments were raised by Shell that the 'decisions' provided for in subsection (4) is general enough to include decisions on interlocutory matters. Ordinarily, this would be so. The only snag is that when subsection (5) talks of an award, is this suggestive that there can be an interlocutory award in the discharge of the mandate of the IAP? Alternatively put, is the right of "a party to an award... to obtain a copy of the records of the arbitral proceedings and the award" applicable in relation to interlocutory decisions of the IAP? An arbitral tribunal is often not entrapped by the rigidity and technicalities of the court system; that is why its mandate is arbitration, not adjudication. We all have a duty to guard against trial delays as enjoined by His Lordship Honourable Justice Uwais, CJN in Amadi v. NNPC, supra. Arguments were also raised regarding section 246(l)(b) of the 1999 Constitution. In this regard, we wish to state that we do not see how relevant that is to the issue at hand. This is because section 246 of the 1999 Constitution deals with appeals from bodies listed therein to the Court of Appeal. What is before us is whether an appeal regarding an interlocutory matter from the 1AP should lie to this court. We do not therefore see how section 246 of the 1999 Constitution can assist in answering this question. For all these reasons, we think that Shell is prematurely before us. We do not see anything wrong in the procedure adopted by the 1AP. All Shell has to do is await the final award of the IAP. If the award is not favourable to it, it can then appeal against that award raising all the issues it canvassed at the IAP including the issue of the preliminary objection. This procedure will not defeat the ends of justice; if anything, it promotes it. We, therefore, hold that the present appeal by Shell to this court is premature. The matter is hereby remitted to the IAP to conclude its determination. Then can an appeal be brought to this court. We make no order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip Presiding Judge Hon. Justice V.N Okobi Hon. Justice F. I. Kola-Olalere Judge Judge Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu-Fishim Judge