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This is a transferred matter from the High Court of Lagos State. The claimant had taken up against the former ACB International Bank Plc a writ of summons dated 2nd April 2004. By a Court order dated 18th December 2006, the defendant was substituted with Spring Bank Plc. This Court later substituted Spring Bank Plc with Enterprise Bank Ltd as defendant. The claims of the claimant are for the following reliefs – 1. A declaration that the claimant’s dismissal by the defendants is wrongful, unlawful, null and void and of no effect. 2. Special damages in the sum of N24,585,735.17 (Twenty-Four Million, Five Hundred and Eighty-Five Thousand, Seven Hundred and Fifty-Three Naira, Seventeen Kobo) being total unpaid earnings, entitlements and retirement benefits. 3. General damages in the sum of N5,000,000.00 for breach of procedure, lack of fair hearing, illegal and wrongful dismissal, pain, mental and spiritual torture, stress, loss of honour, name and reputation extreme deprivation and collateral damage etc. 4. Interest at the rate of 21% per annum on the said sum of N29,585,753.17 (Twenty-Nine Million, Five Hundred and Eighty-Five Thousand, Seven Hundred and Fifty Three Naira, Seventeen Kobo) from 30th June 2003 to judgment and thereafter at the rate of 6% per annum until the whole amount is liquidated. 5. Dismiss the defendant’s statement of defence in its entirety as the defendant has no defence whatsoever and howsoever to this action. 6. Dismiss the defendant’s counterclaim of N9,000,000.00 (Nine Million Naira) and interest claimed with substantial and punitive cost as the counterclaim is not only contradictory but also frivolous, vexatious, manipulative, speculative, illusory, fraudulent and unsubstantial in fact or law and an attempt to further victimize and intimidate the claimant as well as an abuse of the judicial process of the Court. 7. Cost of the action. The defendant filed a memorandum of appearance on 15th April 2004. The claimant had subsequently filed an amended statement of facts dated 3rd December 2012 and in opposition the defendant filed its amended statement of defence dated 17th July 2013 wherein the defendant denied the claimant’s allegation, counterclaimed against the claimant and also prayed the Court to dismiss the case of the claimant for being vexatious, speculative and gold digging. In response to the defendant’s defence and counterclaim, the claimant filed a reply to the defendant’s amended defence and defence to the counterclaim dated 7th December 2013. At the trial of the suit the claimant and the defendant called one witness each. The claimant testified on his own behalf as CW. The claimant as CW adopted his statements sworn to on 9th May 2012 and 5th December 2012, and the additional written statement sworn to on 7th October 2013 and tendered Exhibits CW1 – CW93) annexed to his statements as his evidence before the Court. Mrs. Chinyere Brown-Ekeledo, a Banker who works in Human Resources Department of Enterprise Bank, Head Office at 143, Ahmadu Bello Way, Victoria Island, Lagos (she had started her Banking career with ACB International in 2001; thereafter, she joined Spring Bank in February 2006 after which she joined Enterprise Bank in August 2011) testified on behalf of the defendant as DW. DW adopted her statement on oath sworn to on 20th June 2012 and also tendered Exhibits DW1 – DW14 annexed to the evidence before the Court. At the close of hearing, the Court directed parties to file their final written addresses pursuant to Order 19 Rule 13 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Rules 2007. The defendant’s final written address is dated and filed on 20th January 2014, while that of the claimant is dated and filed on 11th February 2014. The case of the claimant is that he was wrongly and unlawfully dismissed from employment on 15th April 1998. Therefore, the action of the defendant is null and void and of no effect whatsoever. He continued that he was wrongly accused of granting unauthorized credit facilities, which facilities were duly approved by the defendant’s Head Office and fully collaterised by the customers and all records kept by the defendant Company Secretary and Legal Department. That he was not given opportunity to defend himself in accordance with the collective agreement between the Bank and senior staff members of the Bank. He went on that he never at any point admitted any lapse or breach of his fiduciary duty in the recovery of the credit facilities granted by the defendant to its customers. That he never at any point forged the Bank’s letter-headed paper or at any point acted without the consent and authority of the Bank, nor wrote and signed a petition to the Deputy Inspector General of Police representing himself as a Senior Manager in the Loan Recovery Department of the Bank. In addition, that he was never at any point confronted with any allegation of allowing customers of the Bank to obtain benefit under credit facilities without ensuring that the collateral for protecting the credit facilities were completed and registered or for forging the Bank’s letter-headed paper. Finally, that this suit is not statute-barred as the claimant instituted same within the statutory period prescribed by law. On the other hand, the case of the defendant is that the claimant was dismissed from employment on 26th March 1998 for gross misconduct, irregular practices and granting unauthorised credit facilities by allowing the customers of the Bank to obtain benefit under the credit facilities without ensuring that the collateral for protecting the credit facilities were completed and registered, for forging the Bank’s letter-headed paper and generally for breakdown of mutual trust and confidence between the Bank and the claimant. That before the claimant was dismissed from the Bank, the claimant was given ample opportunity to defend himself in accordance with the collective agreement between the Bank and senior staff members of the Bank. That in the course of his defence, the claimant admitted his lapses and breaches of his fiduciary duty, and thus pleaded for time to recover the unauthorised credit facilities. That while on suspension in 1995 and before his dismissal from the defendant on 26th March 1998, the claimant forged the Bank’s letter-headed paper and without the consent and authority of the Bank wrote and signed a petition to the Deputy Inspector General of Police representing himself as a Senior Manager in the Loan Recovery Department of the Bank with full knowledge that he was not employed in that capacity. The defendant went on that the conduct of the claimant seriously militated against the commercial interest of the defendant and fundamentally undermined the confidence and trust that should exist between an employee and an employer. Finally, that this suit is statute-barred as the claimant instituted same outside the statutory period prescribed by law. The defendant framed two issues for the determination of the Court, namely – (a) Whether the evidence before the court has not justified the dismissal of the claimant for gross misconduct. (b) Whether this suit is not statute-barred having been commenced outside the period laid down by the Limitation Act. Regarding issue (a), the defendant invited the Court to look at all the documentary evidence tendered by the parties at the trial of this case to determine whether the dismissal of the claimant is not justified in law. That it is trite principle of law that parties to an agreement or to a contract for that matter are bound by the terms and conditions of the contract or agreement and cannot be allowed to operate outside those terms and conditions, citing Isheno v. Julius Berger Nigeria Limited [2008] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1084) 582 at 609 – 610 H – C. That it is also trite law that an employer is at liberty to dismiss an employee with or without notice and/or ascribing reasons there for, citing Lake Chad Research Institute v. Mohammed [2005] 11 NWLR (Pt. 953) 1 at 26E. To the defendant, the claimant in his testimony tried to impress upon the Court of his membership of the Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) without tendering evidence of his application to become a member of the association or his acceptance by the union as a member. That in the absence of clear evidence of the claimant’s membership of this association, the Court should discountenance Exhibit CW2. The defendant continued that it is not in dispute that a query was issued which the claimant responded in writing admitting his lapses and requesting that the defendant should give him more time to recover the outstanding unauthorised loans. The defendant referred the Court to Exhibit DW9 and submitted also that it is not in dispute that while on suspension and in the course of recovering the outstanding loans facilities the claimant forged the Bank’s letter-headed paper with which and without the consent and authority of the defendant, he signed a petition to the Deputy Inspector General of Police representing himself as a Senior Manager in the Loan Recovery Department of the Bank with full knowledge that he was not employed in that capacity, a conduct which seriously militated against the commercial interest of the defendant and fundamentally undermined and eroded the confidence and trust that existed between the claimant and the defendant. The defendant then referred the Court to Exhibit DW13 and urged the Court to compare Exhibit DW13 with Exhibits C25 dated 1st February 1996 and subsequent correspondences of the defendant respectively, Exhibits C29, C30, C31, C36, C37 and C41, to ascertain that the claimant forged Exhibit DW13 for which conduct he was dismissed by the defendant whilst on suspension. The defendant went on that it is trite law that an employer is at liberty to terminate and or dismiss an employee with or without notice and/or ascribing reasons thereof, citing Lake Chad Research Institute v. Mohammed [2005] 11 NWLR (Pt. 953) 1 at 26 and Isheno v. Julius Berger Nigeria Limited [2008] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1084) 582 at 609 – 610 H – C. That there is no dispute as to the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties before the dismissal of the claimant and as such the defendant can hire and fire an employee, in this instance the claimant, with or without notice or reasons thereof. That the claimant has alleged that he was wrongfully and unlawfully dismissed by the defendant. The defendant denied such allegations stating that the claimant was fairly dismissed. To the defendant, it is fundamental that the claimant who alleges wrongful dismissal has the burden to prove the allegation, otherwise the claim would fail, referring to sections 131, 132 and 133 of the Evidence Act 2011. In that instance, that the dismissal of the claimant can only be lawfully implemented in accordance with Exhibit CW2 entered in November 1997. The defendant then submitted that the claimant cannot rely on Exhibit CW2 as the claimant has not shown evidence of his membership of that union. That “the Court can only rely and urge the Court to reach its decision by relying on claimant’s letter of employment Exhibit CW1” which states that: ...the Bank also reserves the right to determine your employment if adverse reports are received all or any of your referees. To the defendant, the claimant was dismissed for gross misconduct on 26th March 1998 whilst on suspension for forging the Bank’s letter-headed paper (Exhibit DW13) dated 4th December 1995. That Exhibit CW2 was made on 27th November 1997; and so Exhibit CW2 cannot govern the relationship between the claimant and the defendant being that the misconduct for which the claimant was dismissed occurred in 1995 long before Exhibit CW2. The defendant urged the Court to dismiss the claimant’s claims on this ground. On issue (b) i.e. whether this suit is not statute-barred having been commenced outside the period laid down by the Limitation Act, the defendant submitted that it is, the action having been commenced outside the statutory prescribed period laid down in section 7(1)(a) of the Limitation Act LFN 1990 which provides inter-alia – ... action for breach of contract shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date in which the cause of action accrued..... That in Okenwa v. Military Governor Imo State [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt. 455) at 394 at 97 it was held that – ...a cause of action arose on the date on which the incidence giving rise to the cause of action arose. A statute of limitation begins to run from the moment the cause of action arose. For the purpose of instituting an action in court, time begins to run from the date the cause of action accrues.... To the defendant, the claimant instituted this action on 2nd April 2004; and the defendant filed his memorandum of appearance on 15th April 2004. The cause of action arose on 26th March 1998 which was the effective date of dismissal of the claimant, referring to Exhibits D1A and D1B. That at the time of dismissal of the claimant there was no pending High Court suit between the claimant and the defendant bordering on the dismissal. That the claimant had ample time to commence this action but chose to sleep on his right to approach the Court for redress. That a legal right to enforce an action is not a perpetual right, but a right generally limited by statute. The defendant further submitted that a cause of action is statute-barred if legal proceedings cannot be commenced in respect of same because the period laid down by the Limitation Act has elapsed, referring to Adeosun v. Jibesin [2001] 11 NWLR (Pt. 724) 96. The defendant invited the Court to look at the record of proceedings and the pleadings filed in this suit since 2nd April 2004 and indeed the writ of summons filed by the claimant in this action at the High Court of Lagos state and ascertain without taking oral evidence from a witness that the action is statute-barred. In conclusion, the defendant urged the Court to dismiss this suit in its entirety with substantial cost against the claimant as same is vexatious, frivolous and gold-digging. The claimant on the other hand framed nine issues for the determination of the Court, namely – (1) Whether by the evidence before the Court, the claimant is not entitled to judgement in his favour in respect of the claims before the Court. (2) Whether the defendant can terminate the claimant’s employment during the pendency of criminal proceeding in Charge No. FBFMT/L/Z11/10c/97 initiated by the Federal Government of Nigeria based on the complaint and information given by the defendant against the claimant. (3) Whether the striking out of Charge No. FBFMT/L/Z11/10c/97 against the claimant on 10th February 2000 pursuant to the prosecution’s notice of discontinuance dated 4th February 2000 after the prosecution of the claimant for three and half years and after witnesses of the prosecution (defendant’s employees) had given evidence and tendered exhibits does not amount to a dismissal of the criminal Charge No. FBFMT/L/Z11/10c/97 and discharge of the claimant. (4) Whether the claimant is not entitled to the award of damages in view of the unlawful and wrongful termination of the employment of the claimant. (5) Whether the claimant is a senior staff of the defendant. (6) Whether the claimant forged the letterhead paper of the defendant. (7) Whether the termination of the claimant’s employment by the defendant can be BACKDATED to 26th March 1998 from 15th April 1998 or alternatively 24th April 1998. (8) Whether an intention to terminate employment amounts to an actual termination of employment. (9) Whether the limitation law applies to this suit or whether this suit is statute-barred having been commenced on 2nd April 2004 which is within six (6) years of the wrongful, incompetent and illegal dismissal of the claimant on 26th April 1998 or alternatively 24th April 1998, the period laid down by the Limitation Act. The claimant addressed issues (1) to (4) together. It is the submission of the claimant that, from all the evidence given in Court including the documentary evidence, the claimant is entitled to judgement in his favour in respect of the claims before the Court and that the dismissal of the claimant by the defendant is wrongful and unlawful. That it is trite principle of law that parties to an agreement or to a contract for that matter are bound by the terms and conditions of the contract or agreement. In this instance, it is Exhibit C1, the letter of employment and Exhibit C5, the collective agreement made on 27th November 1997, which came into force and “oppress” for two (2) years from 1st December 1997 to 31st November 1999 (referring to PART III GENERAL – ARTICLE 1 – DURATION (a). The Court was also referred to Ojilere v. Clemmessy Nig. Ltd [2009] 17 NLLR (Pt. 46) 1 CA. Thus that the defendant cannot be allowed to operate outside those terms and conditions, citing Isheno v. Julius Berger Nigeria Limited [2008] 6 NWLR 9 (Pt. 1084) 582 at 609 – 610 H – C. That it is trite law that an employer is at liberty to terminate the employment of an employee, but such termination must be lawful and in accordance with the terms of service between them, citing Olanrewaju v. Afribank Plc [2001] FWLR (Pt. 72) 2008 Ratio 5, Lake Chad Research Institute v. Mohammed [2005] 11 NWLR (Pt. 953) 1 at 26E and Mgt. NACB Ltd v. NUBIFIE & anor [2008] 17 NLLR (Pt. 47) 210 NIC. It is the submission of the claimant that while an employer is not bound to give reasons for LAWFULLY terminating a contract of service he MUST give reason for SUMMARILY DISMISSING the employee. In the instant case, that the allegation of GROSS MISCONDUCT given as reason for the dismissal of the claimant, which borders on criminal allegation and which became the subject matter of Charge No. FBFMT/L/Z11/10c/97 dated 28th November 1997 before the Failed Bank Tribunal/Federal High Court, was not proved. That by this action, the defendant deprived the claimant of his right to fair hearing as provided for in section 36 of the 1999 Constitution, citing Savannah Bank Nig. Plc v. Fakokum [2002] 1 NWLR (Pt. 749) 544 Ratio 5. It is the claimant’s further submission that in a case where the dismissal of an employee is based on an allegation of crime, the allegation must first of all be proved before the dismissal can stand. In the instant case, that it was an obvious fact that the claimant was dismissed on allegation of crime. The fact that the appellant resorted to referring to the criminal allegation as gross misconduct does not itself rule out the allegation being crime. The allegation, which became the subject matter of Charge No. FBFMT/L/Z11/10c/97 dated 28th November 1997 before the Failed Bank Tribunal/Federal High Court, was not proved but was struck out of against the claimant on 10th February 2000 pursuant to the prosecution’s notice of discontinuance dated 4th February 2000 after the prosecution of the claimant for three and half years and after witnesses of the prosecution (defendant’s employees) had given evidence and tendered exhibits; which amount to a dismissal of the criminal Charge No FBFMT/LlZ11/10c/97 and discharge of the claimant, referring to Savannah Bank Nig. Plc v. Fakokum [2002] 1 NWLR (Pt. 749) 544 Ratio 5. That the claimant was wrongly accused of granting unauthorized credit facilities, which facilities were duly approved by the defendant’s Head Office and fully collaterised by the customers and all records kept by the defendant’s Company Secretary and Legal Department, referring to Exhibit C50, C51A, C51B, C52 (12 documents), C53 (9 documents), C54 (4 documents) and C55 (3 documents). The claimant continued that he was not given opportunity to defend himself in accordance with the collective agreement between the Bank and senior staff members of the Bank. That the defendant’s staff committee (STAFFCO) charged with the functions of heading disciplinary matters against Group 5 and below employees of the defendant did not sit or meet to consider the defendant’s allegations against the claimant; did not invite the claimant to defend himself; did not consider or make any written recommendation against the claimant to the Executive Committee (EXCO) neither did the Executive Committee (EXCO) ever meet, receive or considered any adverse recommendation or forwarded any recommendation against the claimant to the Board of Directors in compliance with the disciplinary procedure provided by the collective agreement and/or internal procedure of the defendant. Consequently, all the wild allegations of the defendant against the claimant were not even considered and, therefore, were not proven and thus the defendant’s allegations against the claimant remained simply unfounded wild allegations which the claimant variously denied, contested and disputed. The claimant went on that though an employer is not bound to give reasons for terminating the appointment of his employer, where, as in this case, he gives a reason or cause for terminating the appointment, the law imposes on him a duty to establish the reason to the satisfaction of the Court. In this case, the defendant having given gross misconduct as its reasons for the claimant’s dismissal has the onus to establish that the claimant was indeed guilty of the alleged misconduct to warrant his dismissal. That this was not done by the defendant. In a case such as this, the Court must be watchful to ensure that in the investigations or proceedings of the domestic panel culminating in the employee’s dismissal, the rules of natural justice were not breached, citing Shell Petroleum Dev. Coy Ltd v. Chief Victor Olanrewaju [2008] 36 (Pt. 2) NSCQR 1187 at 1207, Ratio 1. In the instant case, that there was no investigation or any proceeding of the domestic panel which culminated in the employee’s dismissal. To the claimant, it is trite that where the termination of the employment of an employee by the employer is wrongful and unlawful, the remedy of such employee wrongfully terminated or dismissed is to sue for damages as presently done, citing Nigeria Produce Market Board v. Adewunmi [1972] 11 SC 111 and Olanrewaju v. Afribank Plc [2001] FWLR (Pt. 72) 2008 Ratio 8. It is the claimant’s submission he, having been wrongfully dismissed by the defendant, has the right to his terminal salary and other entitlements from the defendant since the defendant who wrongfully dismissed him has by implication put an end to his contract of service/employment. That the claimant is, therefore, entitled to damages for breach of contract. In the instant case, that the claimant is entitled to his salary and other benefits and entitlements, citing Savannah Bank Nig. Plc v. Fakokum [2002] 1 NWLR (Pt. 749) 544 Ratio 6. It is the claimant’s submission that in a case of wrongful dismissal or termination of employment, there is no need to distinguish between special and general damages. In the instant case, that “the claim for special damages of N24,585,735.17 (Twenty-Four Million, Five Hundred and Eighty-Five Thousand, Seven Hundred and Fifty Three kobo)”, being total unpaid earnings, entitlements and retirements benefits, and general damages in the sum of N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) for breach of contract, et al, should be awarded together as general damages in the sum of N29,585,735.17 (Twenty-Nine Million, Five Hundred and Eighty-Five Thousand, Seven Hundred and Fifty Three Kobo), referring to Savannah Bank Nig. Plc v. Fakokum [2002] 1 NWLR (Pt. 749) 544 Ratio 8 and Ijebu-Ode Local Govt. v. Adedeji Balogun & Co. Ltd [1991] 1 NWLR (Pt. 166) 136. The claimant then addressed issues (5) and (6) together. Here it is the claimant’s submission that he is and became a senior staff of the defendant and a member of the Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) at about 1981, which he confirmed in his testimony. That this is further confirmed by the treatment and acceptance of the claimant by the defendant, referring to Exhibits C11 (No 12 on the list), C12, C47, C48A, C48B and C48C. The claimant went on that the defendant also deducted union dues directly from his salary and paid to ASSBIFI, referring to Exhibits C13B, C13C and C13D. That the deductions were done pursuant to provision of PART III GENERAL – ARTICLE 4 – LEVIES: “Member companies of the Association shall deduct levies prescribed by the Union’s Headquarters secretariat from time to time from the salaries of their employees covered by this Agreement and shall remit these in full direct into the Union’s Bank Account as specifically advised by the Union provided that WHERE ANY MEMBER OF THE UNION OBJECTS IN WRITING TO THE DEDUCTION OF ANY LEVY, the union undertakes to indemnify the member company concerned”. The claimant continued that his membership of ASSBIFI is not based on an application to become a member of the association, but based on his acceptance to be a member of the union pursuant to the provisions of Exhibit C5 – Part 1 Section 1 of recognition and procedure matters - Article 1 – Recognition, the collective agreement is applicable to all senior staff engaged in all establishments of the association, NEABIAI except “(VI) Employees who may by themselves decide not to belong to the Senior Staff Association and so state it in writing, provided that such members shall cease to be represented by the union”. The claimant then submitted that his membership of the association is based on the clear provision of the collective agreement. To the claimant, it is not in dispute that a query was issued which he responded in writing, but not admitting any lapse on his part. That the defendant made false allegations of unauthorized overdrafts against him with such chicanery and viciousness that the employment and career of the claimant was seriously threatened and at gave risk. Consequently, the claimant had to write several letters to the defendant disputing, denying, contesting strongly and severally the unfounded allegations by the defendant in order to save his job and career which was gravely at risk. The claimant further submitted that following the defendant’s unfounded allegations, the defendant also persisted in ordering and insisting that the claimant recovers the overdraft facilities the defendant granted customers and for the claimant to always report his recoveries to the defendant. That the claimant’s letter, Exhibits D10 and D11 dated 6th November 1995 and 28th December 1995 respectively, are part of the several letters the claimant wrote to the defendant disputing the defendant’s allegations but nevertheless reporting the claimant’s recovery activities to the defendant. That there was nowhere in his several letters to the defendant including the letters dated 6th November 1995 and 28th December 1995 that the claimant admitted that he granted unauthorized overdrafts as alleged save for disputing the allegations and reporting the claimant’s recovery actions to the defendant. The claimant continued that faced with the unfounded allegations by the defendant and the risk of the claimant unjustly losing his about 18 years excellent service with the defendant and which the defendant was latently and apparently pursuing arising from the defendant’s false allegations, the claimant adopted the attitude and language of courtesy, decency and decorum in the several letters of the claimant as employee to the defendant as employer. The claimant could not be abusive or any other thing but DECENT in his letters as employee to the defendant as employer. That Exhibits D2 to D8 being replied upon by the defendant are copies of defendant’s letters containing the false and founded allegations against the claimant and which the claimant has disputed, contested and denied. That the contents of these letters on their own do not constitute proof of the defendant’s allegations and that the allegations were not proven, and have remained unproven in accordance with the disciplinary procedure provided by the collective agreement; any of defendant’s internal disciplinary process and procedure or by the due process of law till date or even during the prosecution of Charge No. FBFMT/L/Z11/10c/97 dated 28th November 1997. To the claimant, it is not in dispute that while on suspension the claimant continued the course of recovering the outstanding loan facilities granted by the defendant and the claimant never at any point forged the bank’s letter-headed paper. That in the exercise of his loans and advances recovery duties, the claimant had to utilize personal contacts and letters which he signed as a category “A” signatory, and did not need any further consent and/or authority to sign letters on behalf of the defendant pursuant to the claimant’s loans and advances recovery duties and functions, EXCEPT where the claimant’s signing powers have been withdrawn in writing by the defendant. The claimant further submitted that at all material time prior to and after Exhibit C65 or D13 dated 4th December 1995, the claimant’s signing powers were not withdrawn neither was there any credible documentary evidence that the claimant’s signing power were or had been withdraw by the defendant. That beside the fact that loans and advances recoveries form part of the duties of the claimant, the defendant nevertheless in its letters such as Exhibit D5 dated 1st August 1995 and all such previous defendant’s letters directed and/or authorized the claimant to recover overdrafts the defendant granted to its Agege Branch customers which the defendant mischievously classified wrongly as unauthorized overdraft. That the defendant vide its letter dated 17th April 1996 directed the claimant to proceed on two (2) weeks leave to enable the claimant recover the overdraft facilities. Further to his loan and advances recoveries functions that the claimant performed and pursuant to the defendant’s directives and authority to go and recover the overdraft facilities it granted to its Agege Branch customers which the claimant as a loyal employee obeyed, the claimant approached and exploited his personal and private relationship with the then Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Federal Intelligence & Investigation Bureau (FIIB), Alagbon Close, Ikoyi, Lagos to assist with Nigeria Police Force machinery in recovering the defendant’s overdraft facility to the customers. At the time he wrote his letter dated 4th December 1995, he was reporting for duty at the Head Office, Loan Recovery Department where ALL loan recovery efforts of the defendant were consolidated and where the defendant deployed various managers and officers for recovery operations throughout Nigeria as the defendant’s major operations were recovery of debts to avoid being liquidated. ‘Further to the above, the claimant as an employee of the defendant and whose legal address of employment was then “African Continental Bank Plc, 106/108, Broad Street, Lagos”, the addressed his letter dated 4th December 1995 to the then Deputy Inspector-General of Police by stating the claimant’s obvious legal address of employment as an employee of the defendant and signed the letter “For Senior Manager, Loan Recovery Department” where the claimant and other officers of the defendant were displayed for country-wild recovery operation. Stating his address in bold Centred Relief’s is modern secretarial practice by secretaries and Typists and further it is incontrovertible that he was an employee of the defendant and that “African Continental Bank Plc, 106/108 Broad Street, Lagos” was the claimant official address, and that he was an employee and agent of the defendant’; that he was on recovery assignment for the defendant and that he stated his official address in writing his letter dated 4th December 1995 and that the two customers mentioned in the said letter of 4th December 1995 were debtor customers of the defendant’s Agege Branch. Consequently, the claimant denied that his letter was fraudulent and/or that he forged the defendant’s letter-headed papers. That all said and done, the defendant gleefully collected and received the sums of money so recovered WITHOUT raising any objection or compliant of “Lack of consent, authority and/or fraud and forgery”. That the defendant did not complain or query and/or confront the claimant for forgery of its letter-headed papers, lack of defendant’s consent and/or authority or fraudulently writing to the DIG, FIIB, Alagbon Close, Ikoyi Close, Ikoyi at any material time but happily received and appropriated the N2,050,000 (Two Million and Fifty Thousand Naira) recovered from Mrs. Otitoloiu by the DIG, FIIB, Alagbon Close, Ikoyi Close, Ikoyi pursuant to the claimant’s letter dated 4th December 1995. The claimant lastly took issues (7) to (9) together. Here the claimant submitted that the defendant wrongfully, incompetently and illegally dismissed him with effect from 15th April 1998 vide the defendant’s letter No. HRM/STA.4268 dated 15th April 1998, Exhibit D1A, and this action was COMMENCED against ACB International Bank Plc at the High Court of Lagos State on 2nd April 2004. That the defendant was substituted with Spring Bank Plc by Court order dated 18th December 2006 and the matter was subsequently fixed for trial at the High Court of Lagos State on 29th September 2011. The defendant was further substituted with Enterprises Bank Limited by Court order dated 26th April 2012. Consequently, this suit is NOT statute-barred. That the defendant’s letter No. HRM/STA.4268 dated 24th April 1998, Exhibit D1B, relied upon by the defendant BACKDATING the purported dismissal to 26th March 1998 was not a letter of dismissal but incompetent, malicious and illegal and consequently null and void. The claimant went on that the defendant’s letter No. HRM/STA.4268 dated 15th April 1998 purportedly dismissing the claimant with effect from 15th April 1998 was wrongful, illegal, null, void and of no effect whatsoever as it is in contravention and in utter breach of the provision of the collective agreement for Senior Staff, Exhibit C5. That there was no opportunity of fair hearing and presumption of innocence given to the claimant. Furthermore, that this is contrary to Part 2 – section 1, Article 4, sub III(b) which provides that the employee “shall be dealt with in accordance with the appropriate section of the DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE as set out in the COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT, PROVIDED that THE MATTER IS NOT IN COURT”. To the claimant, the said defendant’s letter dated 15th April 1998 in language, construction and on the face of it did not show or disclose any consent and authority of the defendant’s Board of Directors. That by law the powers and authority of the defendant as a registered company rests and is vested with its Board of Directors and delegated to the defendant’s MANAGEMENT and all actions of agents of the defendant should be clearly seen to have been exercised under and within this power and authority. Consequently, the said letter dated 15th April 1998, written on a purported headed paper of the defendant without disclosure of source of authority is not only illegal, wrongful, incompetent but absolutely a nullity without effect whatsoever and howsoever. That the letter purporting to dismiss the claimant, a managerial grade employee of the defendant and indeed for all employees, must show and disclose clearly the consent and authority of the appropriate lawful authority of the defendant as employer and a registered company under the law. The claimant continued that it is trite that the determination of the guilt or innocence of a person accused of a serious criminal offence is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of tribunal as specified in the 1999 Constitution. That it is also trite that the right to fair hearing involves the right to be heard in open court in defence of one’s character and good name when a person is accused of misconduct amounting to crime. Furthermore, that it is trite that conduct amounting to crime must first of all be a matter for the court or criminal tribunal before disciplinary issues or action can be raised. Consequently, that the claimant averred that the defendant’s letter dated 15th April 1998 issued to the claimant when the alleged misconduct amounting to crime was pending before the Federal High Court in Charge No. FBFMT/L/Z11/10c/97 and in clear breach of the collective agreement which provides that no disciplinary procedure or action should be taken on any matter before the court is consequentially wrongful, unlawful, illegal, incompetent, null and void and of no effect whatsoever and howsoever, referring to Part 2 – section 1, Article 4, Sub III(b) of the collective agreement, Exhibit C5. “The defendant’s letters dated 15th April 1998 and 24th April 1998 both written and delivered to the claimant while the allegations of offences amounting to crime were pending before the court or tribunal established by law (Federal High Court in Charge No. FBFMT/L/Z11/10c/97”. To the claimant, the defendant’s letter No. HRM/STA.4268 written and dated 24th April 1998, Exhibit D1B, without the knowledge, consent and authority of the appropriate authority of the defendant and unlawfully and illegally BACKDATED is not and cannot be constructed on the face of it as a lawful and authorized letter of dismissal to the claimant, nor is it a letter of dismissal in the contemplation of the law or fact and/or in all material particular. Furthermore, that termination of employment, like resignation of employment, is effective from the date of the letter of termination or resignation or the day of delivery of the letter and cannot be BACKDATED. The claimant continued that as there is absolute power to resign, so there is absolute power to terminate employment and there is no discretion to refuse to accept the resignation or lawful termination, citing Adeyemi v. Abegunde [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 203) 2109 Ratio 10. That an illegality cannot be foisted or found on an illegality. Consequently, the defendant’s letter dated 24th April 1998 is null and void and of no effect whatsoever for being without the knowledge, authority and consent or disclosure of any authority and in contravention of the collective agreement and due process of law. That the defendant’s letter dated 24th April 1998 is compounding illegality. That the 26th of March stated on the same letter can best be taken as the date when the INTENTION TO TERMINATE was formed. The claimant went on that the limitation law does not apply to this action, referring to NUPENG v. Geco Prakla Nigeria Limited [2010] 20 NLLR (Pt. 57) 372 NIC at pages 397 – 398 where this Court held that in four cases decided by the Court, the Court had the opportunity to review the authorities on the subject of limitation of actions and then held inter alia that – 1. In labour matters, the limitation of actions law is inapplicable and so a cause of action cannot be statute-barred given that the injury complained of is always of a continuing nature. 2. Whether or not a cause of action is affected by the limitation law as to make it statute-barred is an issue that can only be raised as a defence and not one to be raised as affecting the jurisdiction of the court, for a court may have the jurisdiction to entertain a matter but may nevertheless rule in favour of the defence on the ground that the matter is statute-barred. In this sense, the question of limitation of action is simply one of disability. It is not that the claimant has no rightful claim, or that the court has no jurisdiction; only that the claimant is disabled by time from pursuing the claim in issue. 3. In general, the limitation law is inapplicable where labour rights are in issue; for to hold otherwise may mean that an employer minded not to pay an employee’s salary would only need to stall until the expiration of the limitation period. The injustice of this case is best imagined. To the claimant, even if the limitation law applies, this action is not statue-barred having been commenced within the statutory prescribed period laid down in section 7(1)(a) of the Limitation Act LFN 1990 which provides inter alia “...action for breach of contract shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date in which the cause of action accrued...”. That in Okenkwa v. Military Governor Imo State [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt. 455) at 394 at page 97 (this citation is incomprehensible), it was held that “...A cause of action arose on the date on which the incidence giving rise to the cause of action arose. A statute of limitation begins to run from the moment the cause of actions arose. For the purpose of instituting an action in court, time begins to run from the date the cause of action accrues....” The claimant continued that he instituted this action on 2nd April 2004. That the defendant filed his memorandum of appearance on 15th April 2004. That the cause of action arose on 15th April 1998 or alternatively on 24th April 1998, the date of the last letter, which stated and indicated the date when the intention to terminate the employment was made as being the 26th day of March 1998. The claimant referred the Court to Exhibits D1A and D1B. Furthermore, that “at the time of wrongful and unlawful dismissal of the claimant there was a pending criminal Charge No. FBFMT/L/Z11/10c/97 dated 28th November 1997 before the Failed Bank Tribunal/Federal High Court suit between the claimant and the customer of the defendant...and the Federal Government prompted by the complaint of the [defendant]”. The claimant then submitted that a cause of action is not statute-barred if legal proceedings can be and is commenced in respect of same before the period and time laid down by the Limitation Act elapse, citing Adeosun v. Jibesin [2001] 11 NWLR (Pt. 724) 96. In conclusion, the claimant submitted as follows – (a) That the claimant has proved his claim and is entitled to judgment on same. (b) That there is no single documentary or oral evidence adduced by the defendant controverting or challenging the claim of the claimant in respect of his terminal benefits, thus the defendant has not and does not dispute the claim of the claimant for unpaid salaries benefits and retirements benefits and for general damages where his dismissal by the defendant is declared wrongful and unlawful by the Court. (c) That there is no single documentary or oral evidence adduced by the defendant in support of their counterclaim; thus the same fails. Whereof, the claimant moved the Court to – 1. To enter final judgment in favour of the claimant as per the claims before this Court. 2. Dismiss the defendant’s statement of defence in its entirety as the defendant has no defence whatsoever and howsoever to this action. 3. Dismiss the defendant’s counterclaim of N9,000,000.00 (Nine Million Naira) and interest claimed, with substantial and punitive cost as the counterclaim is not only contradictory but also frivolous, vexatious, manipulative, speculative, illusory, fraudulent and unsubstantial in fact or law and an attempt to further victimize and intimidate the claimant as well as an abuse of the judicial process of the court. I heard learned counsel and considered all the processes filed in this matter. In considering the merit of the case, I need to remark on a thing or two. The defendant in arguing that this case is statute-barred, referred the Court to section 7(1)(a) of the Limitation Act LFN 1990 as its authority on that submission. In reaction, the claimant too referred to the 1990 piece of legislation. In the first place, the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 1990 are dated and so are rarely in use. Secondly, the Limitation Act 1990, if there was one named as such, is no more; as the limitation law (except for the Public Officers Protection Act) is now a matter of State law. This means that the argument of the defendant hinged on a wrong/non-existent law goes to no issue. However, I note that Pius Adaka & ors v. Christopher Anekwe & ors [1997] 11 NWLR (Pt. 529) 417, Falobi v. Falobi [1976] 1 NMLR 169; [1976] 9 – 10 SC 1 especially at 13 – 14, Akuma v. AG, Anambra State [1977] 5 SC 161, Majekodunmi v. Wapco Ltd [1992] 1 NWLR (Pt. 219) 566 and Dim v. Adibua [2002] FWLR (Pt. 107) 1271 held that the fact that a party brings an application under a statute other than the applicable one does not disentitle him to the relief(s) he is seeking as long as the relief is provided for by any written law or by common law or even equity. In other word, where a relief or remedy is provided for by any written law or by common law or equity that relief or remedy if properly claimed by the party seeking it cannot be denied to the applicant simply because he has applied for it under a wrong law. For this reason, I shall proceed to consider the defendant’s defence that the matter at hand is statute-barred. The defendant had argued that the claimant instituted this action on 2nd April 2004; and the cause of action arose on 26th March 1998 which was the effective date of dismissal of the claimant. Invariably, the defendant had issued Exhibit D1(a) dated April 15, 1998 and titled “Dismissal from Service”. Exhibit D1(a) states that the claimant is dismissed from the services of the bank for gross misconduct and it takes effect from the date of the letter. Exhibit D1(b), also issued by the defendant and is dated 24th April 1998 and titled “Dismissal from Service”. It refers to Exhibit D1(a) and then “[adds] that the said dismissal is to take effect officially from 26th of March, 1998 and not the 15th of April, 1998 as earlier stated”. To the defendant, therefore, the cause of action arose on 26th March 1998, the date Exhibit D1(a) said the dismissal took effect. The claimant reacted to the defendant’s argument that the matter is statute-barred at two fronts. First, that he instituted this action on 2nd April 2004. That the cause of action arose on 15th April 1998 or alternatively on 24th April 1998, the date of the last letter, which stated and indicated the date when the intention to terminate the employment was made as being the 26th day of March 1998, referring to Exhibits D1(a) and D1(b). In other words, that the defendant is wrong in backdating the date of termination/dismissal so as to claim the benefit of the limitation law. The question that, therefore, arises is the effect of backdating a letter of dismissal. In Adefemi v. Abegunde [2004] 15 NWLR Pt. 895 1 CA, it was held that resignation takes effect from the date notice is received. And WAEC v. Oshionebo [2006] 12 NWLR Pt. 994 258 CA went on to hold that a notice of resignation is effective not from the date of the letter, or from the date of any purported acceptance, but from the date on which the letter was received by the employer or his agent. A fortiori, a dismissal letter cannot be effective when backdated. This means that the defendant, vide Exhibit D1(b), in backdating the dismissal of the claimant to 26th March 1998, acted wrongly. The backdating of the dismissal of the claimant is accordingly null and void and of no effect whatsoever; and I so find and hold. This means that Exhibit D1(b) is of no consequence as far as its content is concerned; and I so hold. The law permits resignation, termination or dismissal to be with immediate effect, not retrospectively. Consequently, Exhibit D1(a), in stating that the dismissal of the claimant takes effect from the date of Exhibit D1(a), accords more with the law than Exhibit D1(b). In consequence, I find and hold that the dismissal of the claimant by the defendant was on April 15, 1998. This means that the cause of action arose on April 15, 1998, not March 26, 1998 as contended by the defendant. The instant case was filed on 2nd April 2004. This means that the case was filed within the 6 years argued by the defendant as the limitation period. I consequently find and hold that that the claimant filed this action within the limitation period. The case is accordingly not statute-barred as argued by the defendant; and I so find and hold. The second strand of the claimant’s argument regarding the issue of the limitation law is that this Court had previously held that the limitation law does not apply to labour rights. The claimant then referred the Court to its decision in NUPENG v. Geco Prakla Nigeria Limited [2010] 20 NLLR (Pt. 57) 372 NIC. In Hon. Runyi Kanu (JP) & ors v. The Attorney General & Commissioner for Justice, Cross River State & ors [2013] 32 NLLR (Pt. 91) 63 NIC, however, this Court explained the current law in the following words – The claimants had further referred this Court to its decisions in John Ovoh v. The Nigerian Westminster Dredging & Marine Company Ltd and Captain Tony Oghide and ors v. Shona Jason Nig. Ltd. While it is true that in these cases this Court had held that the limitation laws do not apply to labour rights issues especially as to the claims for salary and entitlements/benefits, the truth is that this Court had had to change that stance in cases other than those relating to salary and benefits given the weight of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court authorities to the effect that the limitation laws apply to employment cases as of other cases, all of which are binding on this Court. In cases of claims for salary and allowances, the decisions of this Court in John Ovoh v. The Nigerian Westminster Dredging & Marine Company Ltd and Captain Tony Oghide and ors v. Shona Jason Nig. Ltd would appear to be good law if the test on “continuance of damage or injury” laid down in the recent Supreme Court decision in AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 144 – 150 is met. In that case, at pages 148 – 149, the Supreme Court held that the case for the deprivation of allocation, which the plaintiff was entitled to every month and same has not ceased, was “a situation continuance of damage or injury which has not ceased”; and so the defence of the Public Officers Protection Act would not avail the 1st defendant who had raised it. I understand this authority to lay down that where an allocation which comes periodically, say, monthly (like salary and allowances, which also come periodically) is deprived a plaintiff State (like salary and allowances deprived to an employee), then there is continuing damage or injury for which the Public Officers Protection Act or Law will not apply. In this sense, for the ‘continuing injury’ exception to apply, the employee would need to be in employment; for otherwise, the claim that the deprivation continues would not stand. In the instant case, the claimants ceased to be in office in 2010. There is, therefore, no question as to the existence of a deprivation of an entitlement which comes in periodically and has not ceased after 2010. This being the case, the claimant in the instant case cannot claim the benefit of the exception to the Public Officers Protection Law of Cross River State. In any event, the definition of the phrase “continuance of the injury” by case law authorities to mean continuance of the “act which caused the injury” and not the injury itself presupposes that this Court’s stance in cases such as John Ovoh v. The Nigerian Westminster Dredging & Marine Company Ltd and Captain Tony Oghide and ors v. Shona Jason Nig. Ltd must be understood qualifiedly. A look at the reliefs sought for by the claimant will reveal that the claimant is not seeking any relief relating to the payment of salary, allowances or the like. This means that the rule enunciated in AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor is inapplicable to the instant case. The second strand of the claimant’s argument regarding the inapplicability of the limitation laws to labour rights accordingly goes to no issue as far as the instant case is concerned; and I so find and hold. The claimant severally argued that his membership of ASSBIFI is based on the clear provision of the collective agreement. To the claimant, his membership of ASSBIFI is not based on an application to become a member of the association, but based on his acceptance to be a member of the union pursuant to the provisions of Article 1 dealing with recognition of Part 1 (Section 1) of Exhibit C5. That the collective agreement is applicable to all senior staff engaged in all establishments of the association, NEABIAI except “(VI) Employees who may by themselves decide not to belong to the Senior Staff Association and so state it in writing, provided that such members shall cease to be represented by the Union”. The point to note here is that article 1 of Part 1 (Section 1) of the collective agreement does not deal with membership of the union but merely states that the Nigeria Employers Association of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions (NEABIAI) accords ASSBIFI recognition as the sole collective bargaining agent authorised to negotiate on behalf of, and to represent all senior staff except those whose responsibilities would conflict with their loyalty to their companies. It is accordingly wrong for the claimant to use this provision as evidencing his membership of ASSBIFI; it is equally wrong for the claimant to use it as evidence of the applicability of the collective agreement to all senior staff. The question even arises whether membership of a senior staff association depends on the provisions of a collective agreement as the claimant seems to think. The membership of a union is a function of law, not a collective agreement. In as early a case as Corporate Affairs Commission v. AUPCTRE [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 1) 1 NIC, this court held that for junior staff, eligibility is the yardstick for determining membership of a union with the right to opt out; while for senior staff actual membership is the rule with the right to opt in. In other words, a senior staff is not deemed to be a member of a union i.e. membership of ASSBIFI is not automatic. He/she must specifically, individually and in writing opt to be a member before he/she can be held to be a member. The argument of the claimant that his membership of ASSBIFI is based on the clear provision of the collective agreement is accordingly wrong and so goes to no issue; and I so find and hold. To further prove that he is a member of ASSBIFI, the claimant referred the Court to Exhibits C13(b), C13(c) and C13(d) – all payslips wherein it is indicated that union dues were deducted from the claimant’s salary. The problem here is that the Exhibits do not indicate the actual union that the deduction was paid to. The claimant started off as a junior staff before he rose to be a senior staff. So it is not known which union the deduction of union dues from the claimant’s salary was paid to. I note that by Habu v. NUT, Taraba State [2005] 4 FWLR (Pt. 283) 646, the deduction from salaries and wages as check-off dues of a worker and the remittance of same to a trade union is an incidence of membership of the worker whose statutory right is mandatorily for or vested by the Labour Act. But it has to be known which particular union is the recipient of the deduction. In consequence, and as far as the instant case is concerned, Exhibits C13(b), C13(c) and C13(d) are insufficient to proof the fact that the claimant is a member of ASSBIFI; and I so find and hold. If the evidence is insufficient to show that the claimant is a member of ASSBIFI, then the claimant cannot rely on any collective agreement applicable to ASSBIFI for the determination of his rights and privileges. This means that the argument of the claimant that he was not given opportunity to defend himself in accordance with the collective agreement remains unsubstantiated. In relief 1, the claimant prayed for “a declaration that the claimant’s dismissal by the defendants is wrongful, unlawful, null and void and of no effect”. To this effect, the claimant contended that in a case where the dismissal of an employee is based on an allegation of crime, the allegation must first of all be proved before the dismissal can stand. In other words, that it is trite that conduct amounting to crime must first of all be a matter for the court or criminal tribunal before disciplinary issues or action can be raised. The claimant was invariably relying on the old dispensation as evinced by case law authorities such as Biishi v. The Judicial Service Commission [1991] 6 NWLR (Pt. 197) 331 CA, which were to the effect that where a criminal offence is alleged against an employee, he must first be prosecuted for the offence before disciplinary measures if necessary are taken against him. The new dispensation is, however, exemplified by cases such as Arinze v. First Bank (Nig.) Ltd [2000] 1 NWLR (Pt. 639) 78 CA, which laid down that it is not an immutable principle that where the act of misconduct by an employee also amounts to a criminal offence the employee must first be prosecuted before the employer can exercise his power of summary dismissal of the employee. The Supreme Court in same case, Arinze v. FBN Ltd [2004] 12 NWLR (Pt. 888) 663 SC affirmed this principle when it held that an employer can dismiss an employee where the accusation against such employee is of gross misconduct involving dishonesty bordering on criminality; and in such a case, it is not required under section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution that an employee must first be tried in a court of law. That it is, therefore, erroneous to contend that once crime is detected, the employer cannot discipline the employee unless he is tried and convicted first. The Supreme Court went on that in cases of misconduct bordering on criminality, all that is required of an employer before summarily dismissing an employee is to give him fair hearing by confronting him with the accusation made against him and requiring him to defend himself; and to satisfy the rule of natural justice and fair hearing, a person likely to be affected directly by the disciplinary proceedings must be given adequate notice of the allegation against him to afford him the opportunity for representation in his own defence. The Court of Appeal in ATA Poly v. Maina [2005] 10 NWLR (Pt. 934) 487 CA reiterated and applied this principle. In the instant case, therefore, the argument of the claimant in that regard accordingly goes to no issue; and I so find and hold. This means that the claimant cannot succeed in relief 1. Relief 1 accordingly fails and is dismissed. Relief 2 is for “special damages in the sum of N24,585,735.17 (Twenty-Four Million, Five Hundred and Eighty-Five Thousand, Seven Hundred and Fifty-Three Naira, Seventeen Kobo) being total unpaid earnings, entitlements and retirement benefits”, while relief 3 is for “general damages in the sum of N5,000,000.00 for breach of procedure, lack of fair hearing, illegal and wrongful dismissal, pain, mental and spiritual torture, stress, loss of honour, name and reputation extreme deprivation and collateral damage etc”. How the claimant arrived at these sums of money has not been told to the Court. The Supreme Court in University of Jos v. Dr M. C. Ikegwuoha [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1360) 478 has cautioned that a claim for salary, allowances and the like without any particularisation as to how the sum was earned and arrived at makes such a claim vague; and courts are enjoined not to grant same. In like manner reliefs 2 and 3 of the claimant are vague and so cannot be granted. They are accordingly dismissed. Relief 4 is for “interest at the rate of 21% per annum on the said sum of N29,585,753.17 (Twenty-Nine Million, Five Hundred and Eighty-Five Thousand, Seven Hundred and Fifty Three Naira, Seventeen Kobo) from 30th June 2003 to judgment and thereafter at the rate of 6% per annum until the whole amount is liquidated”. The sums upon which this relief rests have been dismissed. This means that the relief cannot stand. In any event, in Kurt Severinsen v. Emerging Markets Limited [2012] 27 NLLR (Pt. 78) 374 NIC, this Court decided that pre-judgment interest is not recoverable. Relief 4 accordingly fails and so is dismissed. Relief 6 prays that this Court should “dismiss the defendant’s counterclaim of N9,000,000.00 (Nine Million Naira) and interest claimed with substantial and punitive cost as the counterclaim is not only contradictory but also frivolous, vexatious, manipulative, speculative, illusory, fraudulent and unsubstantial in fact or law and an attempt to further victimize and intimidate the claimant as well as an abuse of the judicial process of the Court”. In its amended statement of defence dated 17th July 2013, the defendant had counterclaimed against the claimant. But throughout its written address, the defendant did not advance any submission on the counterclaim. If this may not be read as meaning that the defendant has abandoned its counterclaim, certainly it shows that the defendant has no proof of its counterclaim against the claimant; and I so find and hold. DW under cross-examination had testified that the N9 Million the defendant claims as counterclaim represents the balance of the unrecovered overdrafts. However, that as a Banker, if she has authority to give an overdraft and she exercises it, if the overdraft is not repaid she will not be requested to repay the sum. But if she has no authority to give the overdraft and does so, she will be required to repay the said sum. The Court, however, asked DW why Exhibit C50 shows the overdrafts complained of to be approved from Head Office as at 1993 and all of a sudden in 1996 Exhibit D8 is saying the facilities are unauthorised. There was no convincing answer from DW. I am convinced that the defendant has no convincing proof as to its counterclaim against the claimant. The counterclaim of the defendant is accordingly dismissed. To this extent only, relief 6 of the claimant succeeds. Relief 5 in seeking the Court to dismiss the defendant’s statement of defence in its entirety is hinged on the claimant proving his case. Since the claimant could not prove his case, relief 5 cannot be granted. Before concluding this judgment, I must remark that the claimant’s case consists of a mass of documents. The problem, however, is that little was done in the claimant’s written address to appropriately evaluate these documents into a coherent piece that will indicate how they engender the rights and privileges of the claimant. On the whole, therefore, the claimant did not prove his case. Except for relief 6, and only to the extent of dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim, the reliefs prayed for by the claimant were not proved. The claimant’s case according fails and so is hereby dismissed. In like manner, the defendant’s counterclaim also fails and so is dismissed. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip