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REPRESENTATION: S. I. Opara Esq; with him C. C. Onyekanne Esq. for the Claimant/Respondent Nkechi Obioha for the Defendants/Applicants RULING/JUDGMENT This action was instituted by the claimant against the Defendants vide a General Form of Complaint dated and filed on the 27th day of September, 2012. The Complaint, filed along with supporting originating processes, seeks the determination of the following question: 1. Whether by the provision of Section 31 of the Civil Service Commission Regulation 1994 and Rule 02809 of Imo State Public Service Regulation, the defendants are empowered to retire the claimant from the Imo State Judicial/Civil Service when the claimant has neither attained the age of 60 years nor 35 years of service. 2. If the answer for the question is in the negative, the claimant therefore seeks the following reliefs: a) A declaration that the claimant is only due for retirement on the 7th September 2016 when he would have attained 35 years in service, same being earlier than 5th December 2019 when the claimant would have attained 60 years of age. b) A declaration that in computation of 35 years of service of the claimant, the four years study leave without pay granted to the claimant by the defendants is not and should not be inclusive. c) An order of court restraining the defendants from retiring the claimant earlier than the 7th day of September 2016 when he would have attained 35 years of service; By a Notice of Preliminary Objection filed on the 12th day of November 2013, the Defendants/Applicants seek for an order of court dismissing this suit for want of jurisdiction, and for such further orders as the honourable court may deem fit to make in the circumstance. The grounds upon which the objection is sought are: 1. The suit as constituted is statute barred and, therefore, incompetent based on section 2(a) of the public officers Protection Act Cap 4, Vol. 14, Laws of the Federation, 2004. 2. The action or suit does not disclose any cause of action. 3. The action is speculative. In support of the motion is an affidavit of 9 paragraphs deposed to by one Chukwunyere Nnodi, a civil servant. Also attached is a written address wherein learned counsel to the defendants/applicants formulated two issues for the determination of this honourable court. (a) Whether the suit is statute barred, and therefore, incompetent having regard to section 2(a) of the public officers Protection Act, Cap P4.Vol 14, Laws of the Federation, 2004 (b) Whether from the statement of facts of the claimant, there is any reasonable cause of action against the defendants. In arguing ISSUE ONE, Counsel submitted that the suit as constituted is statute barred on the ground that it was commenced after the three month limitation period prescribed by section 2(a) of the Public officers Protection Act Cap P4, Vol.14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. He defined a public officer in accordance with Section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act, 2004 to mean a member of the Public Service of the Federation or of a state within the meaning of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. See ABUBAKAR V. GOVERNOR OF GOMBE STATE (2002) 17 NWLR (Pt. 797) 533 CA. Public Officers have been held by our apex court to include an artificial person, public officer, public bodies or body of persons, corporate or incorporate, statutory bodies or persons. See IBRAHIM vs. JSC (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt.584), Per IGUH JSC. Counsel submitted that the defendants in this suit fall under the ambit of the Public Officers Protection Act; and that in determining when the cause of action arose, recourse must be had to the Statement of Facts. He added that a cause of action generally accrues on the date on which the incident giving rise to the cause of action arose, which inference can be drawn from the following averments of the Claimant in his statement of facts: a. He went on study leave without pay between 1st April 1982 through August 1986. b. He also avers that between 01/04/1982 and August 1986, he was not in the service of any of the defendants. c. He avers that he will be due for retirement by the year 2016 when he would have attained 35years of service (in exclusion of the four years study leave without pay) or sixty years of age whichever comes first. That the grouse of the claimant against the defendants as can be gathered from the above averments is that his retirement from service is without recourse to the period of study leave without pay, granted to him by the 3rd defendant. To the applicants, the claimant was retired based on the report of the committee on downsizing and right sizing of Imo State Civil Service set up by the Imo State Government in 2008, which report was published sometime in July 2010; and that it follows, that the cause of action of the claimant arose in 2010 when he became aware that the defendants intended to retire him in September 2012. In determining the period of limitation, counsel submitted that one has to look at the time the cause of action arose and compare it with when the Writ of Summons was filed. This can be done without taking oral evidence from a witness. If the time of the writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute barred. He referred the court to the case of OKENWA vs. MILITARY GOVERNOR IMO STATE (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 507) Pg. 154 at 167. See also IKURIE vs. EDJERODE (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 745) 446 He went further to submit that proceedings filed outside the limitation period prescribed by law, is statute barred; that actions caught by the provisions of Section 2a of the Public Officers (Protection) Act must be commenced within 3 months next after the cause of action arose. ADIGU V. AYORINDE & ORS (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 313) Pg. 516 @ 535. Thus an action for any act done in pursuance of or in execution of any public duty, alleging neglect or default which is not brought against a public officer within 3 months of the accrual of the cause of action shall not lie as the court, will lack the requisite jurisdiction. Counsel stated that as at the time the Claimant filed his complaint he was already out of time as prescribed by section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act (2004). Counsel stated that the claimant had the opportunity to contest his retirement date when the Government white paper was published in July 2010, and he had another opportunity to complain when the establishment circular from the office of the secretary to the state government was published in June 2011 but he did not; therefore the claimant was already out of time by the time he filed his complaint. He urged the court to hold that the court lacks jurisdiction because the suit is statute barred and resolve ISSUE ONE in favour of the defendants/applicants. EGBE vs. ADEFARASIN (No. 2) (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1. See also OWNERS OF THE MV "ARABELLA" vs. NAIC (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1097) 182 @ 219. In arguing ISSUE TWO, it is Counsel’s submission that the claimants have no cause of action against the defendants and urged the court to so hold. He further posited that it is trite that a cause of action is made up of an aggregation of facts recognized by law as giving the plaintiff a substantive right to the claim or relief sought. See BESSONY LTD vs. HONEY LEGON (NIG) LTD (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 503) Pg. 1380 @ 1402. In IKENNE L.G. vs. WEST AFRICAN PORTLAND CEMENT Plc. (2012) All FWLR (Pt.642) Pg. 1747 at Pg. 1770-1771, it was held that all the court is concerned with in deciding whether there is a reasonable cause of action, is to look at and see whether the statement of claim standing alone or on its own disclosed a cause of action that has a chance of success. Cause of action has been defined in the case of S.P.D.C Nig. vs. OKONOEDO (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt.109) 85 @ 117-118, as a factual situation, the existence of which entitles the plaintiff to obtain from the court a remedy against another person or the facts which constitutes the essential ingredients of an enforceable right of claim. See also ACCORD PARTY vs. GOVERNOR OF KWARA STATE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 555) Pg. 220 @ 276. To Counsel, from the statement of facts, the claimant has not disclosed facts, the existence of which entitles him to the reliefs he is seeking before this Honourable court. He urged the court to so hold. He said the defendants have, both in their affidavit in support of this application and the defence they filed in this court established that the Pensions Act 1990 on which the claimant based his claim has been repealed. He urged the court to take judicial notice of the Pension Act 2004. Counsel stated that the claimant has lost the protection of section 14 of the repealed Act (Pension Act 1990), therefore, the court ought to hold that the question as to whether the period of study leave without pay should form part of the officer’s years of service is regulated by the Establishment circular of the Government of Imo State issued on 8th June 2011 which counsel says is the extant Policy regulating the pensionability or otherwise of the period of study leave without pay in computing the retirement period of public officers in Imo State. The court was invited to look at the statement of facts and note that no documents have been exhibited to discharge the onus on the claimant to prove that the defendants were planning to retire him before his “actual” date of retirement. Counsel therefore urged the court to hold that the action is speculative, and that it was a mere assumption that the defendants will retire him before his “actual” retirement date, having not shown any clear evidence to that effect; and that the court will not base its findings on a mere speculation. Counsel finally placed reliance on the case of LAZARUS IGWE vs. ALVAN IKOKU COLLEGE OF EDUCATION (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 88) @ 478, PER EDOZIE JCA: “Since the law settled that employee on approved study leave without pay is still in the employment of the employer during the period of leave, the inevitable conclusion is that in computing the employees period of service for purposes of his retirement date, the period of leave of absence or study leave without pay will be included or added. To submit otherwise will be preposterous. It is further submitted that this State of the Law cannot be amended or altered by an administrative directive, regulation or command.” Counsel concluded by urging the court to dismiss the complaint of the claimant. In opposition to the Notice of preliminary objection, the claimant/respondent on the 3rd day of December 2013, filed a 9 paragraph counter affidavit deposed to by the claimant himself, as well as a written address canvassing arguments in opposition of the preliminary objection filed by the applicants. The respondents formulated two issues for determination. In arguing ISSUES ONE & TWO together, Counsel to the Claimant/Respondent submitted that the Public Officers Protection Act is an Act which is applicable only to Federal Public Officers as Imo State has its own Limitation Law 1994, Section 42 of which states thus: Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment or rule of law to the contrary, all actions to which this Edict applies howsoever arising against the State or against any State public authority, or Officer thereof or any person acting in the stead of such public authority or Officer thereof, for anything done or intended or omitted to be done in pursuance or execution of any such act, duty or authority or in respect of any neglect or default in the execution of any such act, duty or authority shall be commenced within the same period of time after the cause of action arose as if such action were brought by are against a private individual". Section 44 Limitation Law of Imo state 1994 further states thus; "Any enactments relating to the limitation of action which were in force in the State immediately before the commencement of this Edict shall cease to apply"' Counsel urged the court to hold that the act cited by the applicants does not apply. Assuming but not conceding that POPA is applicable to Imo State public officers, counsel stated that recourse should only be made to the writ and statement of facts as filed by the claimant, since that is what vests jurisdiction in the court. It is the claimant’s counsel’s argument that recourse should only be made to the writ and statement of facts as filed by the claimant. Citing the case of P.C.H.S. Co. Ltd. vs. Migfo (Nig) Ltd. (2012) All FWLR part 642 page 161 @ 163, he stated that "It is trite law that it is the Plaintiff's claim that determines and vest jurisdiction in the court." See also S.P.D.C NIG vs. OKONOEDO (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt. l09) and ACCORD PARTY vs. GOV. KWARA STATE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 555). Counsel urged the court to discountenance the applicant’s reference to Exhibit ‘MOJ 1’ as it does not form part of the Claimant’s claim and statement of facts. IKURIE vs. EDJERODE (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 745). Counsel stated that Claimant's relief 1 is a call on this Honourable Court to interpret a statute based on which the reliefs in paragraph 2 are predicated. Relief 2(a) and (b) are declaratory which the court can assume jurisdiction to determine at any time as it bothers on interpretation of a document. Counsel submitted that, cause of action will not arise except; "when there is in existence a person who can sue and another who can be sued, and when all facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed" Citing the case of N.E.C.O. vs. Tokode (2011) All FWLR part 574 Page 122 paragraph F, counsel submitted that the claimant was not retired until 2012 when Exhibit A was issued. Learned counsel stated that in view of the above authority, time had not elapsed as at the time this suit was instituted hence the reliefs are declaratory and restraining in nature. What is more, the facts came to completion in February 2012 when Exhibit A was issued, and urged the court to hold that the action is not statute barred. Counsel contended however, that Statute Bar period is calculated from the cessation of continuous damage or injury, and that the non-payment of the claimant’s salary and emoluments since February 2012 amounts to a continuous injury, and urged the court to hold that the cause of action arises at the end of every month. He further relied on the case of Aremo II vs. Adekonye (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt.891) Pg. 572 @ 593 - 594 where the Supreme Court per Edozie JSC held that the law of limitation recognizes some exceptions, and that where there has been a continuance of damage, a fresh cause of action arises from time to time as often as damage is caused. Counsel stated that in view of the above authority and looking at the facts of this case, the claimant respondent was issued Exhibit 'A' in February 2012 and has not been receiving his monthly salaries and emoluments, causing fresh causes of action on monthly basis and urged the court to so hold. It is Counsel’s submission that the applicant’s argument that the claimant ought to have sued in 2010, holds no water, as the claimant was neither retired nor personally affected in 2010 rather in 2012 when he was issued with Exhibit ‘A' which he had earlier gone to court to restrain the defendants/applicants from issuing and that cause of action kept on arising at the end of every month since February 2012 by non-payment of claimant's salary. On the argument of the learned counsel that the action is speculative, it is submitted that the said argument cannot stand in view if Exhibit A which the claimant had earlier gone to court to restrain the defendants from issuing. To the claimants, this further buttresses the fact that the cause of action is continuous and fresh on a monthly basis. He concluded by submitting that this court is ceased with requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit on its merits; and that the arguments relating to the Pensions Act are issues that are best determined at the trial, and to delve into it at this stage is improper, especially as they are issues that do not rob this court its jurisdiction as expressly provided for under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended. By way of adumbration, Claimant argued that the limitation law does not apply to labour matters, citing the recent ruling of this honourable court sitting at Enugu delivered on the 10th day of December 2012 in CHIEF JOHN AKARUAYEN EWENEDE vs. SOLOMON AJOMATA ALA AND ORS. (Suit No. NICN/EN/149/2012 unreported), and the case of FGN vs. ZEBRA ENERGY LTD (2002) 12 SC Pt. 2, Pg. 136 where it was held that limitation law does not apply to labour matters. I have carefully considered the arguments of Counsels, both for and against the grant of this application. I will jointly consider the two issues for determination raised by the defendants/applicants being: (a) Whether the suit is statute barred, and therefore incompetent, having regard to section 2(a) of the public officers Protection Act Cap P4. Vo1. 14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. (b) Whether from the statement of facts of the claimant there is any reasonable cause of action against the defendants. The most crucial question that arises from these two issues is when the cause of action can be said to have arisen. The courts have continually held that the only way to find out is to look at the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim (Statement of Facts) of the claimant. In determining whether or not a suit is limited by statute, it is always necessary to ascertain the exact date on which the cause of action arose. This is because time will start to run for the litigant from the date the cause of action arose. The Court of Appeal in determining how to compute the time or period of limitation both under the Limitation Law and Public Officers Protection Law, has held in the case of MUDUN & ORS vs. ADANCHI & ORS (2013) LPELR-20774(CA) that: “In order to determine the period, consideration, must be given to the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim alleging when the wrong was committed and by comparing that date with the date on which the Writ of Summons was filed. This can be done without taking oral evidence from witnesses.” This was the reasoning in the in the case of WOHEREM vs. EMERUWA (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt.890) 398 @417 where the Supreme Court decided that “for the purpose of determining whether or not an action is statute barred, the period of limitation is determined by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim only.” The Supreme Court added in the case of MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR OF EKITI STATE & ORS vs. ALADEYELU & ORS (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1055) 619 that: “It is from either or both the writ of summons and statement of claim that one can ascertain the alleged date when the wrong in question is said to have occurred or been committed, thereby giving rise to the plaintiff’s cause of action. When that ascertained date is compared with the date the writ of summons or originating process was filed in court, it can then be determined whether the action was instituted within the period allowed by law or outside it. When it is found that the action was instituted within the period allowed by law, the action is said to be competent and the court and the court has the jurisdiction to entertain same but where it is found to have been instituted outside the period allowed by law, the action is said to be statute barred and consequently, the court is without jurisdiction to entertain same.” Per Onnoghen JSC. Briefly stated, the fact of the claimant’s case as pleaded in his Complaint and Statement of Facts is that he was employed in July 1977; and that in 1982 he sought and obtained leave to proceed on study leave without pay. That at the completion of two years, he applied for extension of the period of study leave, which was granted in July 1984, thereby meaning that the period of study leave covers the period between April 1982 through to August 1986. That by a letter dated 29th August 1986; he was re-instated after the completion of his study leave without pay. The Claimant filed this suit in September 2012. In his counter-affidavit, he stated that he filed the suit when he noticed that the respondents were having series of meetings to retire him before his actual year of retirement. The suit was therefore commenced with the objective of restraining the defendants from doing that, among other reasons as shown on the claim and the statement of facts. His further averments are to the effect that his salary was stopped since September 2012 after he commenced this action. The claimant also averred that Exhibit A was issued to him after he commenced this action, but backdated. Looking at the facts outlined above, one would ask: “when did the cause of action arise” or better put, what event triggered this action. The Claimant stated in paragraph 2 of his counter affidavit that “this suit was instituted on 27th September 2012 for declaratory and restraining reliefs when I discovered that the defendants have perfected plans to retire me.” In paragraph 4, claimant stated that he filed this suit when he noticed that the respondents were having series of meetings to retire him before his actual year of retirement. These are speculations which do not amount to a cause of action. It is noted however, that Exhibit A attached to the Claimant’s counter affidavit is dated 12th March 2012. On the other hand, to the defendants, the cause of action of the claimant arose in 2010 when he became aware that the defendants intended to retire him in September 2012. No further facts were stated in this regard as to how the Claimant became aware of his impending retirement. I can hardly place reliance on a mere statement that he was aware, and without more. Furthermore, I have looked at the content of Exhibit B which is a letter titled SUSPENSION/REVIEW OF APPOINTMENTS/PROMOTIONS NOT CONTAINED IN THE 2010 APPROVED BUDGET dated 8th June 2011written by the Secretary to the Imo State Government conveying the Governor’s directives to all ministries, departments and agencies. What the defendants did not address in this application, is whether or how Exhibits MOJ1 was brought to the notice of the Claimant and/or how it affects the Claimant. It is my view that both arguments do not support any clear date of the accrual of the claimant’s cause of action. In determining Statute bar, the exact date the cause of action arose must be established. In the absence of an exact date therefore, the prescribed comparison with the date of filing cannot be effectively achieved to determine Statute Bar. See MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR OF EKITI STATE & ORS vs. ALADEYELU & ORS (supra) “……When that ascertained date is compared with the date the writ of summons or originating process was filed in court, it can then be determined whether the action was instituted within the period allowed by law or outside it…..” Per Onnoghen JSC. Clearly from the facts before the court and the various definition of “cause of action” in S.P.D.C NIG vs. OKONOEDO (Supra) and ACCORD PARTY vs. GOVERNOR OF KWARA STATE (Supra) as “simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles the plaintiff to obtain from the court a remedy against another person or the facts which constitutes the essential ingredients of an enforceable right of claim”. Nothing in the Claimant’s statement of claim shows or points to any action that can be said to have triggered the action. In Paragraph 2 of the Claimant’s counter affidavit, he deposed to the fact that: “….the suit was instituted on 27th September 2012 for declaratory and restraining reliefs when I discovered that the defendants have perfected plans to retire me.” And in Paragraph 6, he said: “That upon issuance of the said letter in Paragraph 6 above, the defendant stopped my salary/emoluments since September 2012 till date.” It is noted that Exhibit A is dated 12th March 2012. It is also noted that the Claimant’s Counter-affidavit whereto Exhibit A was attached, did not disclose the date Exhibit A was received by the Claimant. Even though the Claimant has stated that Exhibit A (notice of retirement) was backdated and issued to him after this action was commenced, one can hardly place reliance on that assertion, as no exact date was stated as the date the Claimant received it. The content of Exhibit A is to the effect that the Claimant is due to retire from the Imo State Public Service with effect from 7th September 2012. The written address of the Claimant’s Counsel was consistent in arguing that the Claimant’s salary was stopped since February 2012, and indeed, that Exhibit A was issued to the Claimant in February 2012, and infact relied on Paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Counter Affidavit. The Claimant’s counter-affidavit in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 was consistent in stating that the Claimant’s salary was stopped since September 2012. In Paragraph 5, the Claimant deposed “That while this suit was pending, the defendants wrongfully retired me with a letter backdated to /09/12 and since then have stopped paying my salary. The said notice of retirement is annexed as Exhibit A.” However, the Claimant did not indicate the exact date he received Exhibit A, which is a very relevant question of fact that ought to have been either pleaded in the Claimant’s statement of facts or deposed to in his counter-affidavit to which he attached Exhibit A. Given the disputations between the parties and the apparent inconsistencies and uncertainties in the Claimant’s depositions and Counsel’s submissions, the main question which remains unanswered is “when the cause of action arose”. The only fact that is certain and supported by documentary evidence is the Notice of Retirement issued to the Claimant on the 12th day of March 2012 and annexed as Exhibit A to the Claimant’s Counter Affidavit. I am inclined to believe that the cause of action arose on the 12th day of March 2012 when Exhibit A (Notice of Retirement) was issued, and I so find and hold. I disagree with the submission of the Claimant’s counsel that that the Public Officer’s Protection Act is an Act that is only applicable to Federal Public Officers, therefore not applicable to Imo State because Imo State has its own Limitation Law 1994, relevant sections of which I have earlier cited in this ruling. It is noted that the said Limitation Law of Imo State has not made any specific provision for actions brought by or against private individuals. Rather, a general provision in Section 18 of the said law makes provision for a five year limitation period for actions founded on contract and tort. In my view, this is a general provision which does not specifically provide for limitation of actions brought against public officers. In my view, Section 18 of the Imo State Limitation Law is general and relates to other suits founded in contract, tort, etc. These wordings of Section 44 of the Imo State Limitation Law: "Any enactments relating to the limitation of action which were in force in the State immediately before the commencement of this Edict shall cease to apply” certainly do not expressly repeal Section 2a of the Public Officers Protection Act. Rather, it is clearly a general provision which refers to "Any enactments relating to the limitation of action ... " The Courts have since drawn a distinction between general provisions and special provisions. In the case of Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria v. Onoh (2002) FWLR (Pt. 107) 1244 at 1252 - 1253, the Supreme Court drew a very clear distinction and so, put the matter beyond question. The law is now settled that where it is the intention of a later statute to modify or repeal an earlier one, such intention must be clearly stated or unequivocally deducible from the provisions of the later statute. See the case of Abacha v. Fawehinmi (2000) FWLR (Pt. 4) 533. The law is well settled that a specific provision prevails over and above that which is general. This was the dictum of Ogunbiyi JCA in ADEDAYO & ORS. vs. PDP & ORS (2013) LPELR-20342(SC). See also Ibori V. Ogboru (2004) 15 NWLR (PT.895) 154 AT 194 - 195. The Specific provision of the Public officers Protection Act which is a statute of General Application will therefore prevail, and I so find and hold. In a recent ruling of this Court sitting in Enugu in the case of Dr Atonte Diete-Spiff vs. Governor of Bayelsa State & Anor (Unreported) Suit No. NICN/CA/31/2012 delivered on July 26, 2013, the applicability of federal legislation to states was affirmed. The Public Officers’ Protection Act was held to be a Statute of General application, applicable both in Federal and State Public service. See also SOPAKRIBA I. HORSEFALL vs. RIVERS STATE POLYTECHNIC BORI & Anor (Unreported) Suit No NICN/PHC/05/2012 delivered on 23rd October 2013. I align myself with the position of my learned brother on this point. The Claimant’s counsel raised a point that fresh causes of action continues to arise on a monthly basis upon continued failure to pay the Claimant’s salaries and emoluments. If this submission is anything to go by, then it means that the cause of action itself has not arisen, and so the talk of the application of the limitation law or any of its recognized exceptions will not arise in the first place. That point is therefore misconceived, and I so hold. Claimant’s counsel also raised a point that statute of limitation does not apply to labour cases. While it is true that in case No NICN/EN/149/2012 cited by Counsel and indeed in other cases such as John Ovoh v. The Nigerian Westminster Dredging & Marine Company Ltd Unreported suit No NIC/9/2002, this Court had held that the limitation laws do not apply to labour rights issues especially as to the claims for salary and entitlements/benefits, the truth is that this Court had in recent times, had to change that stance in cases other than those relating to salary and benefits given the weight of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court authorities to the effect that the limitation laws apply to employment cases as of other cases, all of which are binding on this Court. In cases of claims for salary and allowances, the previous decisions of this Court would still appear to be good law, only if the test on “continuance of damage or injury” laid down in the recent Supreme Court decision in AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 144 – 150 is met. In this sense, for the continuing injury exception to apply, the employee would need to be in employment. The stance of this court in cases such as John Ovoh v. The Nigerian Westminster Dredging & Marine Company Ltd (supra) among other decisions, must therefore be understood qualifiedly. See the case of Hon. Runyi Kanu & 6 others vs. AG Cross Rivers & 19 others (Unreported) Suit No NICN/CA/39/2012 delivered on 13th March 2013. Having thus held, the next pertinent thing the court would do in determining Statute Bar is to compare the date the cause of action arose which has been held to be 12th March 2012, to the date this suit was filed which is 27th September 2012. This is above 6 months apart. The Public Officers Protection Law provides a three month limitation period for the commencement of such actions. On the whole, therefore, I find and hold that the instant case filed on 27th September 2012 but whose cause of action arose on 12th March 2012 is statute-barred. The action is caught up by section 2a of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap4 Vol. 14, Laws of the Federation 2004, having been filed outside the three month limitation period stipulated by the said Act. It is accordingly hereby dismissed. I make no order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Presiding Judge