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The claimant had taken a complaint dated and filed on 20th May 2011 against the defendants. By an order of Court on 1st February 2012, leave was granted the claimant to amend its originating processes. By the amended complaint and amended statement of facts dated and filed on 12th November 2011, the claimant prayed for – a) A declaration that the defendant’s notice dated 16th day of May 2011 threatening to protest or engage in any industrial action against the claimant at the expiration of 7 days for failing to recall the erstwhile staff Messrs Nosaghare Ikponmwosa, Abutu Jerry, Odeh Kamaru Osajimi, Uwazie Jude, Joshua Onyeaduru and Genesis Onaa is illegal, null and void. b) A declaration that the defendant’s notice dated 16th May 2011 threatening to protest or engage in any industrial action against the claimant at the expiration of 7 days for failing to deduct the check-off dues of the contract staff, staff on probation or casual workers and transmit same to the defendant is illegal, null and void. c) A declaration that the proposed protest or industrial action against the claimant by the defendant, their agents or privies is a gross interference to the internal management of the claimant and against universal labour practices. d) A declaration that the termination of employment of Messrs Nosaghare Ikponmwosa, Abutu Jerry Odeh, Kamaru Osajimi and Genesis Onaa by the claimant having failed to respond to the queries issued them individually consequent upon the dereliction/abandonment of duty is valid in law and not as a result of their union activities. e) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, their agents or privies from instigation (sic) industrial disharmony between the claimant and her workers/staff based on its letter dated 16th May 2011. Also filed by the claimant are the list of witnesses and additional list of witness, claimant’s written statements on oath, list of documents, additional list of documents and copies of the documents to be relied upon at the trial, reply to the defendant’s counterclaim. The defendant on its own entered appearance and filed a statement of defence and counterclaimed against the claimant on 7th July 2011 seeking for the following reliefs – 1. A declaration that the employment of Nosaghare Ikonmwosa, Abutu Jerry Odeh, Kamaru Osajimi and Genesis Onaa who are the unit executive officers of the counterclaimant in the defendant’s company is wrongful, unlawful, illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever, having been terminated as result of the said officers trade union activities. 2. A declaration that having subscribed for membership in the counterclaimant and are dues paying members of the counterclaimant, employees of defendant who are on probation, contract staff and casual staff of the defendant are members of the counterclaimant and as such, the counterclaimant has a right to protect their interest within the defendant and is entitled to derive check-off dues from their salaries. 3. A declaration that the defendant’s practice of placing its junior employees [on] probation for more than a period of 6 months is contrary to the condition of service governing the employment of the said defendant and constitute a violation of the provisions of the collective between the counterclaimant and Nigeria International Couriers Association (NIACA) which the defendant is a member. 4. A declaration that the defendant’s junior employees placed on probation at the time of employment and whose probationary period exceeded the contractual period of 6 months are confirmed employees of the defendant and as such are entitled to all rights and privileges accorded to confirmed staff of the defendant. 5. A declaration that the conversion by the defendant of the employment of its junior employees who had hitherto been on probation for over a period of 6 months to contract or casual staff is illegal, null and void and constitute a violent violation of existing labour Laws. 6. A declaration that the defendant’s act of deducting monies from the its junior employees salaries as pension contribution and tax without remitting same to the said employees Pension Fund Administrator and relevant tax collecting authorities is wrongful, illegal, null and void. 7. An order setting aside the purported termination of the employment of Nosaghare Ikonmwosa, Abutu Jerry Odeh, Kamaru Osajimi and Genesis Onaa and re-instating [them] in the defendant’s employment without lost of salaries and position. 8. An order setting aside the conversion by the defendant of the employment of all its junior staff who had been on probation for more than a period of 6 months to contract staff and mandating the defendant [to] review their salaries [and] accord them all rights and privileges accorded to confirm junior employees of the defendant. 9. An order mandating the defendant to remit all monies deducted from its junior employees’ salaries as pension contribution and the defendant’s own contribution to the said employees Pension Fund Administrator. 10. An order mandating the defendant to refund to its junior employees forthwith, all monies deducted as tax from their salaries and which were not paid to the relevant tax collecting authorities. 11. An order mandating the defendant to forthwith, deduct and remit check-off dues from the salaries of its contract staff, casuals and staff on probation to the counterclaimant. 12. A perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from engaging in any further undue delay in the payment of the counterclaimant’s members salaries and remittance of check-off dues to the counterclaimant. Also filed by the defendant are list of witnesses and additional list of witnesses, list of documents and additional list of documents and copies of the documents to be relied upon at the trial. At the trial of the matter, the claimant called one witness, Ignatius Nwamata, a Courier Officer with the claimant company, who testified as CW. His witness depositions are dated 23rd July 2012 and 9th August 2012 respectively. The defendant called two witnesses. Comrade Patrick Okodo who works with the defendant union as the General Secretary of shipping/Courier Branch of the union, testified as DW1; while Nosaghare Ikponmwosa who works as an Administrative staff with Carverton Helicopters Ltd at the International Airport, Lagos, testified as DW2. DW1’s and DW2’s statements on oath are both dated 1st August 2012. I indicated that the claimant amended its originating processes; and the defendant counterclaimed against the claimant. In consequence, the following (culled from the record of proceedings) transpired at the Court’s sitting of 20th June 2012 – The claimant’s counsel informed the court that they filed a final written address on 18th April 2012. The respondent’s counsel objected to this saying that they have counter-claims against the claimant for which they intend to call oral evidence. The Court asked counsel to read out the reliefs sought by way of counter-claim and the reliefs sought by the claimant in its originating processes. Except for relief d) in the amended complaint, all the other reliefs are hinged on the question of the industrial action that gave rise to this case in the first place. The Court noted that the reliefs sought by way of counter-claim are not reliefs related to the issue of strike upon which this Court drew its original jurisdiction. The Court therefore reiterated to both counsel that its original jurisdiction over this suit was because of the issue of strike as complained of by the claimant. In this regard, the sole issue which calls for the intervention of this Court in its original jurisdiction is as follows – The validity and legality or otherwise of the strike action threatened or undertaken. Anything outside of this is beyond the original jurisdiction of this court. Consequently, the Court informed the parties that relief d) of the amended complaint and the reliefs sought by way of counter-claim are all outside of the original jurisdiction of this Court given the principle enunciated in earlier cases by this Court that a counter-claim that is outside of the claims of the claimant in the originating processes cannot be entertained by this Court. The respondent’s counsel however maintained that they would still be calling in witnesses whereupon the Court ordered that all parties intending to call in oral evidence are to file and serve witness depositions but such depositions must be restricted to the sole issue before the Court: the legality or otherwise of the strike threat or action. Despite this admonition and the delimitation of the issue in line with the jurisdiction of the Court, parties still went on to lead evidence on and argue issues bordering on relief d) of the amended statement of facts and the counterclaims of the defendant. In Nestoil Plc v. National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers [2012] 29 NLLR (Pt. 82) 90 NIC, this Court had held as follows – The second issue is whether the defendant can counterclaim in the manner it did in this case. In other words, does this Court have original jurisdiction to entertain the counterclaim of the defendant? The rule is that where the original jurisdiction of this Court is activated in terms of the interpretation jurisdiction of the Court or a fortiori its jurisdiction on issues of strike, a counterclaim cannot be raised where issues that it relates to qualify as trade dispute. Here, the best course of action for the counterclaimant is to declare a trade dispute and exhaust the dispute resolution processes of Part I of the TDA before approaching this Court in its appellate jurisdiction. This principle can be gleaned from this Court’s decision in Eleme Petrochemicals v. Dr Morah Emmanuel [2009] 17 NLLR (Pt. 46) 81 at 106, which is as follows – The complaint of the defendant in the counterclaim is one connected with his employment or non-employment, which makes it a trade dispute within the meaning of section 48 of the TDA. This means that the process of mediation, conciliation and arbitration in Part I of the TDA ought to have been exhausted by the defendant before filing the counterclaim. See Hotel & Personal Services Senior Staff Association v. Ikeja Hotel Plc & ors (unreported) Suit No. NIC/39/2008 delivered on 2nd July 2009 and Anthony Oyekanmi & Ors v. NITEL & Bureau of Public Enterprises (unreported) Suit No. NIC/7/2008 delivered on July 15, 2008. The interpretation jurisdiction of this court cannot be used to adjudicate the trial issues raised in the counterclaim. See Itodo v. Chevron Texaco [2005] 2 NWLR (Pt. 5) 200 at 222 – 223 and Hotel and Personal Services Senior Staff Association v. Tourist Company of Nig. Plc (unreported) Suit No. NIC/14/2002 delivered on October 27, 2004. We find that the counterclaim has not been properly raised and, therefore, the defendant cannot maintain his action against the claimant. We, therefore, hold that this court lacks original jurisdiction to entertain the counterclaim. The counterclaim is hereby struck out. For this reason, therefore, in the instant case, we hold that the counterclaim of the defendant is premature. The Court lacks original jurisdiction to entertain it. It is accordingly struck out. And in Chevron Nigeria Limited v. NUPENG & anor, unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/37/2010 the judgment of which was delivered on December 2, 2013 this Court held thus – Having made these points, I must state what this case is not about despite the troubles taken by the parties to draw the Court to an issue that cannot be heard by this Court as a Court of first instance. Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 is clear that certain matters can be made by the National Assembly to go through conciliation and arbitration before being heard by this Court in its appellate jurisdiction. In other words, those issues must go through the dispute resolution processes of Part I of the Trade Disputes Act (TDA) before being heard by this Court. One such issue is trade dispute. The claimant argued that there is no trade dispute between the parties. The 1st defendant did not seem to think so, hence its first issue is “whether the claimant and the 2nd defendant can refuse to recognize the workers of the 2nd defendant working for or seconded to work for and in the claimant’s company the right of membership of the 1st defendant”. The 1st defendant would later in paragraph 3.1.4 of its written address argue that this recognition issue is a trade dispute for which the Court has no original jurisdiction to entertain, calling on the Court to decline jurisdiction in respect of the whole case of the claimant. While I agree with the 1st defendant that this issue sufficiently qualifies as a trade dispute for which its determination must necessarily go through the dispute resolution processes of Part I of the TDA before it can be entertained by this Court (see Nestoil Plc v. National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/08/2010 the judgment of which was delivered on March 8, 2012), that alone is not sufficient for the whole case of the claimant to be dismissed since the primary issue before the case is the legality or otherwise of the industrial action complained of. In consequence, all arguments in regard to the recognition dispute are hereby discountenanced for purposes of this judgment. When the claimant filed this action the reliefs sought for from this Court relate to the issue of industrial action/strike. This is what gave rise to this Court assuming original jurisdiction over the matter given the authority of section 7(1)(b) of the NIC Act 2006. This means that once the claimant introduced issues as to whether there is a contract of employment between members of the 1st defendant and the claimant or who the actual employer is of the members of the 1st defendant, the claimant actually went beyond the pale of the original jurisdiction of this Court. Except to the extent that that issue may be necessary in determining the legality of otherwise of the industrial action in issue, I shall discountenance all arguments in that regard as the instant case is not about the legality or otherwise of outsourcing. The ploy by the claimant to get this Court to resolve that issue through the back door is hereby resisted. This case is not about the legality or otherwise of outsourcing. In like manner, the attempt by the parties to get this Court to determine issues relating to the termination of the named employees in the claimant’s relief d) and the defendant’s reliefs 1 and 7 of the counterclaims, and indeed the counterclaims of the defendant as a whole, is hereby resisted. The named employees were not brought before this Court in their individual capacities so as to activate the original jurisdiction of this Court. The defendant even in its written address had argued that it has a right to issue the notice of industrial action dated 16th May 2011 in contemplation of a trade dispute between it and the defendant over the unfair labour practices it is complaining of. In this wise, even the defendant acknowledges that the issues it is canvassing are trade dispute issues. By law, they are issues that ought to go through the processes of Part I of the Trade Disputes Act. See section 7(3) of the NIC Act 2006. The issue activating the original jurisdiction of this Court is the strike threat/action going by section 7(1)(b) of the NIC Act 2006. On the authority of the two cases of Nestoil Plc v. NUPENG and Chevron Nigeria Limited v. NUPENG, therefore, I shall discountenance all arguments/submissions of the parties on issues not bordering on strike threat or action. For emphasis, the only issue before the Court, and for which this Court can exercise original jurisdiction, is: “the validity and legality or otherwise of the strike action threatened or undertaken”. The evidence of the witnesses as to issues of the unionisation of employees of the claimant, the deduction and remittance of check-off dues of these employees, the termination of the named employees, etc is relevant only to the extent of determining the issue of the validity of the strike threat/action. As advised in Nestoil Plc v. NUPENG, if the counterclaimant feels strongly about the counterclaims, the proper course of action is to declare a trade dispute and exhaust the processes of Part I of the TDA 2004 given that the issues canvassed in the counterclaim qualify as matters of trade dispute. As for the claimant, if it feels strongly about its relief d), the proper course of action is to sue the named employees in their individual capacities. The parties filed and served written addresses in accordance with Order 19 Rule 13 of the NIC Rules 2007 starting with the defendant. The defendant’s written address is dated and filed on 10th June 2013. The claimant reacted to this by filing its written address, which is dated and filed on 13th August 2013. The claimant responded and filed a reply on points of law on 15th November 2013. The defendant went on to file and serve a further reply on points of law dated 17th January 2014. Counsel to both parties adopted their respective written addresses. In adopting its written address, the counsel to the claimant urged the Court to discountenance the further reply on points of law of 17th January filed by the defendant. The filing of written addresses at the close of hearing is governed by Order 19 Rule 13 of the NIC Rules 2007, which Rule provides as follows – 13. (1) When the party beginning has concluded his or her evidence, the Court shall ask the other party if the party intends to call evidence. If the other party does not intend to call evidence, the party beginning shall within 21 days after close of evidence file a written address. Upon being served with the written address, the other party shall within 21 days file his or her own written address. (2) Where the other party calls evidence he or she shall within 21 days after the close of evidence file a written address. (3) Upon being served with other party’s written address the party beginning shall with 21 days file a written address. (4) The party who files the first address shall have a right of reply on points of law only. The reply shall be filed within seven days after service of the other party’s address. A reading of this Rule 13 does not suggest that there can be two replies on points of law or a further reply on points of law as the defendant labeled its process of 17th January 2014. A line has to be drawn to the filing of processes – and that is just what Order 19 Rule 13 has done. I agree, therefore, with the call of the claimant that the defendant’s further reply on points of law of 17th January 2014 be discountenanced. It is accordingly discountenanced for purposes of this judgment. The claimant is a courier company and a member of the Nigeria International Air Courier Association (NIACA). Its case is that it terminated the employment of Messrs Nosaghare Ikonmwosa, Abutu Jerry Odeh, Kamaru Osajimi and Genesis Onaa based on their abandonment of their duties on 3rd May 2011 and their failure to respond individually to the queries issued to them by the defendant. That following the said termination of employment, the defendant issued it with a letter dated 16th May 2011 containing an ultimatum compelling the claimant to recall the said staff whose employment were terminated within 7 days or face industrial action by the defendant. That the claimant was equally issued an ultimatum to deduct and remit to the defendant check-off dues from salaries of staff on probation, contract staff and casual workers within 7 days. That before the expiration of the notice/ultimatum which ought to expire on 23rd May 2011, the defendant invaded the premises of the claimant on 20th May 2011 and disrupted its business on 21st and 22nd May 2011. In consequence, the claimant commenced this action on 20th May 2011 seeking for the reliefs it prayed for. On the other hand, the case of the defendant is that it is the trade union to which the junior employees of the defendant belong. That the said Nosaghare Ikonmwosa, Abutu Jerry Odeh, Kamaru Osajimi and Genesis Onaa were its unit executives in the defendant. That on the said 3rd May 2011 the said unit executives came to work in the morning and subsequently obtained permission from one of claimant’s management staff and went to the police station to secure the release of one of their union members to wit a security man who was being detained by the police following a report made by one of the “defendant’s management staff that his car was stolen while parked outside the defendant’s premises”. That the said visit to the police lasted for about an hour and when they came back, the defendant issued them with a query which they responded to jointly. That the defendant thereafter terminated their employment with that of the security man whom they went to secure his release and some other of their union members, who they had in time past, fought for their rights. That the claimant has persistently breached the conditions of service of its junior employees and the collective agreement between the defendant and the Association of Courier Service Providers which the claimant belongs to, that salaries of the claimant’s junior employees are not paid as and when due and most times salaries are owed for an upward of 3 – 4 months. That employees of the claimant who are the defendant’s members are kept on probation for a longer period than the period stipulated in their conditions of service and the claimant has persistently failed to deduct and remit check-off dues deducted from defendant’s members’ salaries to the defendant. That it is because of all these unfair labour practises being carried out by the claimant that the defendant wrote its latter dated 16th May 2011 requesting the defendant to amend its ways and stop the unfair labour practises or face industrial action. In arguing its case, the defendant contended, as a preliminary issue, that the Court cannot make a case for the parties, citing Tanko v. Mai-Waka [2010] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1176) 468 at 488 and Yalogu v. Agu [2002] 3 NWLR (Pt. 753) 168 at 183, invariably reacting to the admonition and delimitation of the issue for determination by this Court. I must state that the Court is not making a case for the parties. When parties come to Court in a matter that is outside of the jurisdiction of the Court, the parties cannot raise the issue that because the Court refuses to assume jurisdiction, it is thereby making a case for the parties. It is elementary learning that parties do not and cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court. See Okolo v. Union Bank of Nig. Plc [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 197) 981 and FGN v. Oshiomhole [2004] 3 NWLR (Pt. 860) 305 which held that parties cannot by connivance, acquiescence or collusion confer jurisdiction on a Court where jurisdiction is lacking. Neither can lack of jurisdiction be waived by one or both parties. See Okolo v. Union Bank of Nig. Plc and Mobil Production Nig. Unltd v. Monokpo [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 195) 575. In like manner, by Tukur v. Government of Gongola State [1989] NWLR (Pt. 117) 517, Mudiaga-Erhueh v. NEC [2003] FWLR (Pt. 137) 1066 and African Newspaper & ors v. FRN [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 6) 137 SC, a Court cannot expand its jurisdiction, it can only expound the jurisdiction conferred on it, which is what this Court has done throughout the hearing of the instant case. If the argument of the counsel to the defendant is to be correct, then it will not be out of place for parties in a land dispute to agree amongst themselves and come to this Court for adjudication. So for the counsel to the defendant to contend that Courts are bound by the pleadings filed by parties and to decide the case put forward by the parties in their pleadings is stating the law out of context. Where pleadings relate to issues outside of the jurisdiction of a Court, no amount of submission of counsel can confer jurisdiction on the Court. The issue is not one of making a case for the parties (as counsel to the defendant seems to think) but whether this Court has original jurisdiction over the issues canvassed by the parties. Throughout the hearing of the case, the Court made out this point consistently, but counsel chose to ignore same; and counsel now seeks to twist the issue. The defendant went on to frame four issues, namely – 1. Whether the claimant has shown that the defendant’s notice of industrial action contained in its letter of 16th May 2011 is illegal. 2. Whether the claimant was right in terminating the employment of the named defendant’s unit executives. 3. Whether the claimant’s refusal to pay its junior employees salaries as at when due and its refusal to confirm the employment of its staff on probation within the period stipulated in their conditions of service amount to unfair labour practice. 4. Whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought. I have remarked regarding issues 2 and 3. They are matters that this Court, in the circumstances of this case, cannot hear in its original jurisdiction and so all arguments in their regard will be discountenanced. The Court shall, therefore, restrict itself to only issues 1 and 4. Regarding issue 1, the contention of the defendant is that globally, the right of workers to strike or engage in industrial action is a fundamental freedom. Hence the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights guarantees the right to right to strike provided it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country. The defendant then referred the Court to the English case of Crofter Hand Woven Hariss Tweed Co. Ltd v. Veitch [1942] AC 435 at 463 and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize and Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining. That the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO has consistently affirmed that the right to industrial action/strike is one of the essential and legitimate means by which workers and their organizations may promote and defend their economic and social interests and as such, the right to industrial action is an integral part of the free exercise of the rights guaranteed by the above stated Conventions, referring to the text, Labour Law 5th Edition by Simon Deakin & Gillian S. Morris at page 890. The defendant went on that implicit in its right to organize the junior employees of the claimant is the freedom to engage in industrial action against the claimant in the face of any unfair labour practices against the said employees and the refusal of the claimant to deduct and remit to it, check-off dues deducted from the salaries of its members employed by the claimant once it complies with the relevant labour laws. That section 42 of the Trade Unions Act (TUA) Cap T14 LFN 2004 guarantees right to peaceful picketing to a trade union or persons acting on its behalf in contemplation of a trade dispute or in furtherance of trade dispute. It is, therefore, the defendant’s case that their notice of industrial action to the claimant contained in their letter dated 16th May 2011 was as a result of unfair labour practices meted/being meted out on the said defendant’s members who are employees of the claimant to wit: termination of the employment of the defendant’s unit executive officers in the claimant due to their trade union activities, refusal to pay salaries to the said defendant’s members as at when due which the claimant has not denied, refusal to confirm the employment of the defendant’s members on probation within the period stipulated by their conditions of service, refusal to deduct and remit check-off dues deducted from the salaries of the defendant’s members to it, etc. To the defendant, therefore, it has a right to issue the notice of industrial action dated 16th May 2011 in contemplation of a trade dispute between it and the defendant over the aforesaid unfair labour practices. The defendant continued that it is trite law that he who asserts a state of fact, has the onus to prove it by credible evidence, referring to Ukpabio v. NFVCB [2008] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1092) 219 at 240 – 241. That the burden of proving that the defendant did not exercise the said freedom in conformity with the law lies with the claimant who has alleged that the said notice is illegal. This burden can only be discharged by the claimant, showing both in its pleading and evidence what the defendant ought to do to comply with the law and also show that the defendant failed to take those steps or do such things. This according to the defendant is a question of fact which must be established by evidence and which must be pleaded. That the claimant did not in its pleading show what steps the defendant ought to take before issuing its said notice so as to comply with the law and how the defendant failed to take those steps. The defendant then submitted that the claimant has failed to discharge this burden and has, therefore, completely failed to establish that the defendant’s notice of industrial action contained in its letter of 16th May 2011 is illegal, urging the Court to so hold. On issue 4 i.e. whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought, the defendant contended, on reliefs a), b), c) and e), that the defendant as the labour union organizing the junior employees of the claimant has the right to engage in industrial action against the claimant in the face of unfair labour practices being carried out by the claimant against the defendant’s members to wit: termination of employment of the named unit executives of the defendant as a result of their trade union activity, refusal of the claimant to confirm the employment of the defendant’s members on probation within the period prescribed by their conditions of service, the claimant’s refusal to deduct and remit check-off dues deducted from the said defendant’s members salaries to the defendant, refusal to pay the defendant’s members salaries as at when due which the claimant has not denied. That the burden of proving that the defendant did not exercise its right in conformity with the law lies on the claimant which it has utterly failed to establish. That the claimant is, therefore, not entitled to reliefs a), b), c) and e), urging the Court to so hold. In its written address, the claimant first raised a preliminary issue as to the jurisdictional scope of the defendant to unionize the claimant’s employees i.e. whether the defendant, a maritime association, can unionize the employees of the claimant who are courier service operators in view of section 34(3) of the Trade Unions Act 2004. To the defendant given the jurisdictional scope of the claimant vis-à-vis the defendant, the defendant cannot lawfully unionize the staff of the claimant’s company. That the issue whether the defendant can lawfully unionize the employees of the claimant is an issue of law that this Court cannot and must not shut its eyes to, referring to Ehinlanwo v. Oke [2008] LPELR-SC 291/2007 or [2008] 6 – 7 SC (Pt. 11) 123 or [2008] 16 NWLR (Pt. 113) 357. To the claimant, section 254C(1)(b) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, gives this Court jurisdiction over the TUA. That the jurisdictional scope of the defendant to unionize the claimant does not conform to the TUA 2004. The claimant then submitted the defendant is listed as No. 3 in Part A of the Third Schedule to the TUA; while its jurisdictional scope is provided for in item 3 of Part B of the Third Schedule to the TUA in the following words – Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria. All workers in the Nigerian Ports Authority and all persons employed in the manning of the ocean going, inland waterways, coastal and harbour vessels or crafts afloat. All dock-workers including workers engaged by shipping, clearing and forwarding agencies, but excluding managerial, professional and administrative staff. Components: (1) Dock-Workers Union of Nigeria. (2) Nigerian Ports Authority workers union. (3) National Union of Seamen and Water Transport Workers. (4) Union of Shipping, Clearing and Forwarding Agencies of Nigeria. To the claimant, this jurisdictional scope of the defendant excludes it from the activities of the claimant. That the claimant is a company engaged in the business of courier services, an activity that does not in any way relate to the business of maritime. In consequence, the claimant submitted that the unionization of the employees of the claimant by the defendant is wrong and unlawful ab initio and should be declared as such by this Court because a union that lacks the jurisdictional powers to unionize workers of an establishment whose interest are not similar or rather covered within the provision of the TUA cannot call out such staffers for strike or any form of industrial action, citing Anigboro v. Sea Trucks (Nig.) Ltd [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 399) 35. The claimant then urged the Court to resolve this preliminary issue in its favour. The claimant went on that if this preliminary issue is not resolved in its favour, then the following issue becomes one for the determination of this Court – Whether the defendant is entitled either to continue, or to declare, or to embark upon, or to proceed with or to implement and carry into subsistence and effect any strike action within the contemplation of the Trade Unions Act LFN 2004, Trade Disputes Act Cap. T8 LFN 2004 or any strike of any other kind without due compliance with the provision of the law barring the notice dated 16th May 2011. Regarding the validity of the notice dated 16th May 2011, the claimant contended that the procedure before embarking on a strike or an industrial action is one that is governed and regulated by law, referring to sections 4, 6 and 18 of the Trade Disputes Act 2004 as containing provisions which ought to be followed before the embarking on a strike action. That this procedure to proceed on strike in the Trade Disputes Act is in tandem with the guidelines advocated by the Committee on Freedom of Association of the ILO. That the procedure undertaken by the defendant runs riot of the Trade Disputes Act and the ILO guidelines for engaging in any form of industrial action. That the defendant abridged the notice and invaded the premises of the claimant. The claimant then urged the Court to set aside the notice and the entire process or procedure already undertaken by the defendant to commence the strike action. The claimant went on that the defendant never went through any of the steps or procedure laid down by law before embarking or invading the premises of the claimant on 21st and 22nd May 2011 as shown in Exhibits R1 and R2, referring to Management of Nipol Limited v. National Union of Chemical and Non Metallic Product Workers (1978 – 2006) DJNIC page 133. That all the defendant did was to write a letter dated 16th May 2011 (Exhibits D and E) threatening to call out their members for a strike action within seven days of receipt of that letter. However, that the defendant did not even wait till the expiration of the seven days ultimatum before invading the premises of the claimant irrespective of the fact that the claimant wrote back to the defendant calling for dialogue in their letter of 19th May 2011 (Exhibit V). To the claimant, Exhibits R1 and R2 are the photographs/pictures of the defendant and their union vehicle showing the invasion and lock-up of the claimant’s premises before the expiration of the 7 days notice issued by the defendant contrary to the testimony of DW1 and DW2 denying same under cross-examination. That whereas the notice, which was issued on 16th May 2011 (Exhibits D and E) ought to have expired on the 23rd May 2011, the defendant threw caution to the wind and invaded the claimant’s company and disrupted the claimant’s activities between 21st and 22nd May 2011, submitting that photographs and/or pictures do not lie and are admissible in evidence as true position of events, citing Udoro & ors v. The Governor, Akwa Ibom State & ors [2008] LPELR – CA/C/125/2006 and Agboola v. The State [2011] LPELR – CA/L/258/09. The claimant went on to submit that the parties sufficiently joined issues on the jurisdictional powers of the defendant to unionize employees of the claimant and as such the Court can find on the issue, one way or the other. The argument of the claimant as to whether the defendant can force a willing employee whose employment has been duly terminated on the claimant by threat of an industrial action was tailored towards the grant of its relied d). In consequence and for the reasons already given, I shall discountenance same; and I so hold. On the issue whether the defendant can compel the claimant with a threat of an industrial action for failure of the claimant to deduct check-off dues from contract staff, and workers on probation who are not yet full staffers of the claimant, the claimant referred to Metal Products Workers Union of Nigeria v. Dorman Longand Amalgamated Engineering Ltd (1979) DJNIC at page 40 and contended that the threat to proceed on strike by the defendant on the failure of the claimant to deduct check-off dues from its contract staff, non-remittance of payment of pension or taxes goes to no issue and such notice to strike is illegal, null and void. The argument of the claimant regarding the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the defendant’s counterclaim is a rehearse of the Court’s posture at its sitting of 20th June 2012, which I have alluded to. In conclusion, the claimant urged the Court to declare the notices (Exhibits D and E) issued by the defendant as being null and void and of no effect and hold that the defendant is not entitled either to continue, or to declare, or to embark upon, or to proceed with or to implement and carry into subsistence and effect any strike action within the contemplation of the TUA, Trade Disputes Act or any strike of any other kind except with due compliance with the provisions of the enabling enactment. In its reply on points of law dated 14th November 2013 but filed on 15th November 2013, the defendant referred to what the claimant termed preliminary issue wherein it called upon this Court to determine whether or not the defendant has the jurisdictional scope to unionize the employees of the claimant. To the defendant, the claimant is bound by its pleadings, referring the Court to the claimant’s statement of facts dated 3rd November 2011 particularly the reliefs sought by the claimant and submitted that the issue of the jurisdictional scope of the defendant or whether or not the defendant can unionize employees of the claimant was never raised in the claimant’s pleading and the defendant did not join issue with the claimant on that point. That this Court is bound to decide only the issues raised in the parties’ pleadings and not to give judgment on facts not pleaded, referring the Court to Aghararuka v. FBN Ltd [2010] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1182) 465 at 468 Ratio 1 where the Court of Appeal held that it is wrong for a trial Court to give judgment on facts that were neither pleaded nor claimed. The defendant then urged the Court to resist the dangerous invitation by the claimant to give judgment on an issue which was not pleaded nor claimed by the claimant. That counsel’s final address cannot take the place of pleadings or evidence, urging the Court to so hold and discountenance the claimant’s argument on the right of the defendant to unionize its employees. To the defendant, assuming without conceding that this Court can determine an issue that is neither pleaded nor claimed by claimant or that the issue was raised by the claimant in its pleading, the issue of whether or not the defendant has the jurisdiction to unionize employees of the claimant is an issue which this Court has no original jurisdiction to determine/pronounce upon. That this Court has in plethora of its decisions held that its jurisdiction over trade disputes, inter and intra union disputes is an appellate one and the Court will refrain from assuming jurisdiction where the process of conciliation, mediation and arbitration outlined in sections 4 – 14 of the Trade Disputes Act 2004 have not been exhausted. The defendant then referred to National Union of Hotels v. Awala Hotels [2009] 16 NLLR (Pt. 43) 15 at 35 where the Court held that in trade dispute matters, the processes outlined in sections 4 – 14 of the Trade Disputes Act must be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the NIC can be activated. Also referred to is the decision of the Court in the case of Azuzu & anor v. Ajewole & ors [2009] 14 NLLR (Pt. 39) 434 at 455 where this Court held that the jurisdiction of the NIC to entertain inter and intra-union disputes is contingent on the exhaustion of the procedure outlined in Part I of the Trade Disputes Act. That the Court in interpreting the provisions of section 7(1)(a) of the NIC Act 2006 which gives this Court exclusive jurisdiction to entertain causes and matters relating to labour, trade unions and industrial relations; environment and conditions of work, health, safety, welfare of labour and matters incidental thereto held that the whole structure of the NIC Act of 2006 recognizes the applicability of the Trade Disputes Act. That the import of section 7(l)(a) and (3) of the Act is that matters within the purview of section7(1)(a) which before the commencement of the NIC Act had to go through the processes of conciliation, mediation and arbitration under Part I of the Trade Disputes Act will continue to go through the processes and the jurisdiction of the NIC over such matters will be contingent upon the exhaustion of those processes. Undoubtedly, that section 254C(a) and (b) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended by the Third Alteration Act of 2010) did not repeat the provisions of section 7 of the NIC Act 2006 and sections 4 – 14 of the Trade Disputes Act. Indeed, that there is no provision of the Constitution that repeals the above stated laws. To the defendant, the law is trite that there can be no implied repeal of a statute. Also the provisions of section 7 of the NIC Act 2006 and sections 4 – 14 of the Trade Disputes Act 2004 do not conflict with the provisions of section 254C(a) and (b) of the Constitution or any other provision of the Constitution and as such this Court is bound to follow its decisions that this Court has no original jurisdiction to entertain trade disputes, inter and intra union disputes or matters over which jurisdiction is conferred on the Court under section 7(l)(a) of the NIC Act, urging the Court to so hold. The defendant went on that the claimant’s counsel argued that this Court is a court of law and has powers to determine every issue of law. That granted that this Court is a court of law and has power to determine issues of law, the Court is enjoined to restrict itself to issues of law which it has the jurisdiction to determine as a Court is only competent to decide such issues when every condition precedent to the exercise of its jurisdiction has been fulfilled and in the instant case, the condition precedent to the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction to determine the issue of jurisdictional scope of the defendant to unionize the employees of the claimant which is a species of inter-union dispute has not been fulfilled. The defendant urged the Court to discountenance all the argument of the claimant’s counsel on this issue and resist the dangerous invitation by the claimant to pronounce on or determine at this stage an issue which this Court has no original jurisdiction to entertain. I held earlier that the further reply on points of law of the defendant of 17th January 2014 is discountenanced for purposes of this judgment. I reiterate that holding once again. The issue calling for the determination of this Court, as I have severally stated, is the validity and legality or otherwise of the strike action threatened or undertaken. In this wise, the jurisdictional scope of the defendant to unionise the employees of the claimant is relevant only to the extent of determining whether thereby the defendant is in a position to then call out employees of the claimant for an industrial action. The defendant itself in paragraph 14.01 of its main written address had argued that as the labour union organizing the junior employees of the claimant, it has the right to engage in industrial action against the claimant in the face of unfair labour practices being carried out by the claimant against the defendant’s members. The defendant went on to be very categorical that it has a right to issue the notice of industrial action dated 16th May 2011 in contemplation of a trade dispute between it and the defendant over the unfair labour practices it enumerated. In this respect, DW1 in paragraphs 3 and 4 of his sworn deposition averred that the defendant has the “jurisdiction to unionise all non-management workers in courier industry” and that “it is the responsibility of the defendant to protect the interest and welfare of its members employed in the courier industry”. In paragraph 5 of his sworn deposition, DW1 went on that “all junior employees of the claimant are members of the defendant, who voluntarily applied to join the defendant’s union”. And in paragraph 44 of his sworn deposition, DW1 continued that it is for the unfair labour practices meted out by the claimant that necessitated the defendant to protect its members who voluntarily subscribed to its membership by issuing the ultimatums contained in its letters of 16th May 2011 and 26th May 2011 to the claimant. In like manner, DW2 in paragraphs 3 and 4 of his sworn deposition averred in similar words to those in DW1’s paragraphs 3 and 4. DW2’s paragraph 5 is also similarly worded as DW1’s paragraph 5. What all of this shows is that 1) the fact of threat to industrial action has been shown to exist; 2) even the defendant acknowledged that its jurisdictional scope is relevant to arriving at the conclusion that it can call out employees of the claimant on an industrial action; 3) the defendant does not seem to appreciate that as to membership of its union, eligibility is the yardstick, not voluntary joining as DW1 and DW2 deposed to. Since eligibility is the yardstick, that DW1 and DW2 are averring that employees of the claimant voluntarily joined the defendant, that evidence alone is indicative that the defendant had no right to unionise the employees of the defendant in the first place. The defendant had to rely on voluntary joining in order to claim membership. The argument of the defendant that the issue of its jurisdictional scope was not pleaded consequently falls like a pack of cards. In paragraphs 2 – 4 of the defendant’s counterclaim, the defendant pleaded that it has jurisdiction to unionise all non-management workers in courier industry and it is its responsibility to protect the interest and welfare of its members employed in the courier industry and other industries in which it has jurisdiction to operate. How then can the defendant assert that the issue of its jurisdictional scope is not pleaded? I think that counsel to the defendant is trying to be clever by half. The issue still remains: can the defendant call out employees of the claimant on any strike action? A union can call out its members on a strike action only when it has jurisdictional scope over them except of course the instance is one of a secondary strike which incidentally is not the case of the parties in the instant case. A union that has no jurisdictional scope over workers cannot just call them out for any industrial action. If it does, it is merely a busy body liable to be treated as such. Such a union cannot just go about shopping for members in sectors it has no right to unionise under existing laws of the country and then calling them out on strikes in the name of being their guardian against unfair labour practices as the claimant appeared to have done in the instant case. Such a union has not been bequeathed the right or appointed to police the world of work in that regard. Such a union, consequently, is not and cannot act as the policeman of labour practices in the world of work. It is in this context that the jurisdictional scope of the defendant becomes essential, not actually to determine whether a trade dispute exists but whether thereby it has the right to call out members on a strike. This is the context of the admonition of the Court to the parties that counsel to the defendant simply refused to appreciate and address the Court on when asked to do so. As quoted earlier, and at the risk of repetition, the jurisdictional scope of the defendant is provided for in item 3 of Part B of the Third Schedule to the TUA in the following words – Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria. All workers in the Nigerian Ports Authority and all persons employed in the manning of the ocean going, inland waterways, coastal and harbour vessels or crafts afloat. All dock-workers including workers engaged by shipping, clearing and forwarding agencies, but excluding managerial, professional and administrative staff. Components: (1) Dock-Workers Union of Nigeria. (2) Nigerian Ports Authority workers union. (3) National Union of Seamen and Water Transport Workers. (4) Union of Shipping, Clearing and Forwarding Agencies of Nigeria. A simple reading of item 3 of Part B of the Third Schedule to the TUA will show that nowhere in it is a courier company contemplated as an industry the employees of which that can be eligible to be members of the defendant union. In evidence, all agreed that the claimant is a courier company. Once the defendant cannot unionise the employees of a courier company, then it has no business calling out the said employees on any industrial action. Only in respect of a secondary strike action can a union not directly involved in an industry call out it members on a strike action. However, a case for a secondary strike action has not been made out here by the defendant and so that issue is a non-issue as far as this instant case is concerned. Without any hesitation, I find and hold that by item 3 of Part B of Third Schedule to the TUA, it is not contemplated that the defendant has jurisdictional scope over employees of courier companies; as such the defendant cannot call out employees of the claimant on any industrial action. Having so found and held, I must declare that the strike action threatened by the defendant in the instant case is illegal, null and void. On the whole and for the avoidance of doubt, the claims of the claimant succeeds in terms of reliefs a), b), c) and e) but only to the following extent – a) It is hereby declared that the defendant’s notice dated 16th May 2011 threatening to protest or engage in any industrial action against the claimant at the expiration of 7 days for whatever reason is illegal, null and void. b) It is hereby declared that in the circumstances of the instant case the proposed protest or industrial action against the claimant by the defendant, their agents or privies is a gross interference in the internal management of the claimant and against universal labour practices. c) A perpetual injunction is hereby issued restraining the defendant, their agents or privies from instigating industrial disharmony between the claimant and her workers/staff based on its letter dated 16th May 2011. d) Cost is put at One Hundred Thousand Naira (N100,000) payable by the defendant to the claimant within 30 days of this judgment. Judgment is entered accordingly. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip