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The Claimant filed a complaint in this Court against the Defendant claiming these reliefs-- 1. A DECLARATION that by virtue of her letter of Resignation dated the 4th of July, 2013 the defendant has voluntarily resigned from the employment of the claimant. 2. A DECLARATION that the Defendant can no longer continue to parade herself as a Staff or employee of the Claimant, the Defendant having voluntarily resigned from the employment of the claimant by her Letter of Resignation dated the 4th of July, 2013. 3. A DECLARATION that the Defendant having voluntarily resigned from the employment of the Claimant by her Letter of Resignation dated the 4th of July, 2013, the Defendant cannot hold on to the Claimant's official properties Itemized below which were handed over to the Defendant whilst being a staff of the Claimant: a. Hyundai Accent Car with Registration Number, Lagos JJJ 726 BC. b. HP Laptop and the Claimant's very confidential documents contained therein . c. Identity Card in the name of the Defendant belonging to the Claimant. d. Company issued Mobile Phone given to the Defendant by the Claimant. 4. A DECLARATION that the Defendant, having voluntarily resigned from the employment of the Claimant by her Letter of Resignation dated the 4th of July, 2013, is only entitled to the sum of N480,011.12 as her disengagement entitlements/accruals which is broken down as follows: i. July 2013 Salary less Pension (N 12,068.14) and PAYE Tax (N 19,891.40) is N 246,471.49. ii. 1 month's Salary in Lieu of Leave less Driver's Allowance (N 25,000.00) and PAYE Tax (N19,891.40) is N233,539.63 iii. TOTAL - N480,011.12. 5. AN ORDER prohibiting the Defendant from parading herself as a Staff or employee of the Claimant having voluntarily resigned from the employment of the Claimant by her Letter of Resignation dated the 4th of July, 2013. 6. AN ORDER compelling the Defendant to release to the Claimant all the Claimant's property handed over to the Defendant while the Defendant was in the employment of the claimant, the Defendant having voluntarily resigned from the employment of the Claimant by her letter of Resignation dated the 4th of July, 2013. 7. AN ORDER compelling the Defendant to pay to the Claimant the sum of N35,000.00 daily as special damages from the 23rd of July, 2013 until the Defendant releases to the Claimant, the Claimant's Hyundai Accent Car with Registration Number, LAGOS JJJ 726 BC unlawful wrongfully retained by the Defendant after the determination of her employment with the Claimant. 8. AN ORDER compelling the Defendant to pay to the Claimant the sum of N15,000.00 being the value of the very confidential and classified information as well as vital trade secrets to the Claimant, contained in the Claimant's HP Laptop unlawful wrongfully retained by the Defendant after the determination of her employment with the Claimant. 9. AN ORDER permitting the Claimant to set-off its adjudged claims form the Defendant's adjudged entitlements/accruals; and ordering the Defendant to pay any shortfall to the Claimant. 10. The cost of this action. Accompanying the complaint are the statement of facts, list of Claimant's witness, written statement of oath of NORBERT OFILI, Claimant's witness and list of Claimants documents. The case of the Claimant is that the Defendant was employed by the Claimant vide a letter of appointment dated 7th of February, 2011 as a team Head Business Development/Sales. That the Defendant provided two guarantors signed a guarantors forms for the Claimant. It was averred that the Defendant agreed to her terms and conditions of employment evinced by the letter of appointment and employee handbook. He stated that the Defendant was placed on one year probation after which her appointment was confirmed vide a letter dated 18th June, 2012. He continued that the Claimant gave the Defendant a new Hyundai Accent car with Registration number LAGOS JJJ 726 BC as an official car under a car allocation agreement dated 10th May, 2011. According to the Claimant witness both parties agreed that at the termination of the Defendant's employment the car would be automatically withdrawn. He went on that the Claimant was given a salary increase despite the fact that she did not meet her sales target, thus on 1st August, 2012 the Claimant wrote the Defendant expressing its dissatisfaction to the Claimant. That on 31st July, 2013 the Claimant resigned her appointment, she was paid her entitlements but went away with the Claimant's properties such as the Hyundai car, Laptop, ID card and Mobile phone. The laptop contained classified and vital Claimant's documents worth about N15M and N35,000.00 daily value of the car. It was the testimony of the Claimant that it has severally requested the Defendant to return its properties and collect her entitlement but she has failed or refused to do so and finally the Defendant has been going round disparaging the name and interest of the company and that the Defendant should be stopped from parading herself as the staff of the Claimant. He denied and averred that the Claimant is not owing the Defendant any 3 months maternity salary and that the Claimant was never aware of any trauma the Defendant went through and was not the cause of same if any. Tendered and admitted in evidence are Exhibits NO1- NO20 which are Defendant's letter of employment, Record of her employment form signed by the Defendant on 20th April, 2011, Guarantors form, Claimant's employee handbook, Defendant's confirmation of employment, invoice and delivery note and proof of ownership of Hyundai Accent car, car allocation agreement, performance sheet of the Defendant, letter of resignation of the Defendant dated 4th July, 2013, payslip for February, 2013 of the Defendant, form CO7 of data streams Ltd, reconciliation of Customers balance of the Defendant, letter of acceptance of the Defendant's resignation dated 22nd July 2013, entitlements of the defendant, letter dated 30th July to the Defendant and Email sent to the Head of Administration of the Claimant by the Defendant on 1st August, 2013 and payslip of the Defendant for the months of January to June 2013. The Defendant on her own part testified by admitting that she was employed by the Claimant, her appointment was confirmed whilst she produced two guarantor and was given Hyundai Accent car as her official car, but denied that she was the only Team Head business Development of the Claimant. She equally admitted that her letter of employment forms part of her contract of employment but denied ever seeing the Claimant's handbook. She denied that she could not meet her target. She went on that she went on three months maternity leave and was not paid her salary. She continued that she was forced to resign her appointment by her line boss. Her husband's company is one of the client's sourced by her to the Claimant, she however, denied that her husband's company is owing the Claimant, rather it is a client's work brought in by Data Stream her husband's company for which part payment has been made. She denied receiving acceptance of her resignation, rather she stated that she got to know of that when she was asked to return all company's items in her possession. She stated further that she has not resigned her appointment from the Claimant but had since 22nd of July 2013, not held out herself as a staff of the Claimant or had any contact with any of the Claimant's clients. She averred that she had no intention of resigning her employment until she was forced to do so by the Group MD and MD of the Claimant. She asserted that the purported letter of resignation dated 4th July, 2013 was non est factum suum is so far as it did not originate from her and that she did not voluntarily agree to same. She was traumatised by the Claimant's treatment of her and all her efforts to amicably settle this matter was proven abortive by the Claimant. She filed a suit no NICN/LA/445/2013 on 20th August 2012 in this Court not knowing that the Claimant had filed this suit on the 7th of August. She is counter claiming the sum of N738,000 being her 3 months salary when she was on maternity leave, 26% per annum from the 15th July 2012 till judgment is delivered and 10% until the sum is liquidated. She tendered exhibits CSO1- CSO6 i.e. Notice of management committee meeting dated 13th May, 2013, Schedule of outstanding payments at 10th May, 2013, Defendant's solicitor's letter to the Claimant, her employment letter, handover note and Email. The Court has carefully and calmly considered all the processes filed in this suit and suit No. NICN/LA/443/2013 filed by the Defendant in this present. I have equally perused and read both written addresses filed and the case law authorities cited by both parties in support of their respective claims. It should be reiterated that by consent of both parties and their counsel and the authority of Section 12(2) (a) of NICN ACT 2006, which permits this Court to regulates its procedure and proceedings as it thinks fit, it was agreed that the decision in this case should be applicable to the sister case suit No. NICN/LA/443/2013 filed by the Defendant. This judgment shall be considered under these issues- 1. Whether or not the Defendant voluntarily or otherwise resigned her employment from the Claimant. 2. Whether or not the employment of the defendant is governed by both her employment letter and employee handbook. 3. Whether or not the Claimant has proven its case to warrant granting the reliefs sought and 4. Whether or not the Defendant has proven her case to warrant granting the reliefs sought. Now, on issue one and two taken together, which is whether or not the Defendant voluntarily or otherwise resigned her employment from the Claimant and whether or not her contract of employment is governed by both her employment letter and the Employee handbook. It was the submission of learned Defence counsel on behalf of the Defendant on this issue that parties are in agreement that the Defendant was employed by the Claimant on the 7th February 2011 as Team Head, Business Development/Marketing and was confirmed on 18th June, 2013. Also that they both are ad idem that the Defendant submitted a letter of resignation but are in disagreement in that while the Defendant maintains that the said letter was obtained by duress, the Claimant insists that the same was voluntary. It was contended that whilst the Defendant specifically mentioned names of two people whom allegedly forced her to resign and whom the Claimant ought to have called as witnesses to disprove her allegation, the Claimant witness who testified is alien to the alleged scenario, cited in support is the case of PHARMACISTS BOARD OF NIG. V FRANKLIN ADEGBESOTE[1986] 10-11 S.C. 97 @ 121Where the Apex Court per Belgore JSC held thus-- '' The evidence of the shop assistant is very material and her not being called as a witness is fatal to this case. Could it be possible that this evidence which was available but not brought before the Committee would , if brought be unfavourable to the prosecution of this case and lead to the presumption of envisaged in section 148(d) of the evidence Act?...'' Also in support is Section 167 (d) of the Evidence Act, 2011. The Defendant urged the Court to find and hold that the evidence of both Mr. Hassan Alao and Mr. Mike Olajide are very material in establishing the voluntariness of the Defendant's resignation and that withholding that evidence and urged the Court to also hold that the resignation of the Defendant was not voluntary and that the Defendant's employment is not yet terminated. The Claimant on the other hand in its written address filed on its behalf by its counsel on 7th January 2014, argued that the Claimant admitted signing her letter of resignation i.e. Exhibit NO 11 but admitted under cross examination that she signed same under duress. Whilst placing reliance on the case of AKANIWO V NSIRIM [2008] ALL FWLR (PT 410) P 610 @ 663; it was submitted that the Court should disallow the Claimant from speaking from the two sides of her mouth. It was further submitted by the Claimant that the Defendant has failed to prove the duress alleged by her and thus the alleged involuntary resignation should be discountenanced. The case of KACHIA V HADI [2012] ALL FWLR (PT 650) 1403 was commended to the Court, which is to the effect that the onus of proving the alleged duress is on the Claimant who raised same as a defence and that her failure to so proof is fatal to her defence in that regard. It went on to state that since duress is a specie of fraud which is a crime, the onus of prove of same is prove beyond reasonable doubt, which the Defendant has failed to so proof and same cannot shift. Cited is AYANWU V UZOWUAKA [2009] ALL FWLR (PT 499) 411. The Claimant urged the Court to hold that the Defendant voluntarily signed her letter of resignation without duress and thus bound by the said letter Exhibit NO11. It was posited that the evidence of CW i.e. Claimant sole witness being a staff is not hearsay evidence since the Claimant being a juristic personality could only act through natural persons and any of its servant or agent. Counsel added that the action of the two Managing Directors of the Claimant i.e. Mr. Hassan Alao and Mr. Mike Olajide acted as agents of the Claimant and thus their actions are regarded as that of the Claimant, it urged the Court to discountenance the argument of the Defendant that they ought to have testified in this case. To the Claimant assuming but not conceding that the Defendant resigned under duress/forced as alleged amounts to constructive termination of employment, by virtues of paragraph 3 of Exhibit NO1i.e. her employment letter she is only entitle to one month notice or salary in lieu of notice, which the Claimant has agreed to pay including her 3 months and leave allowance. Whilst contending that the Court cannot compel an unwilling employer to retain an employee or give reasons for terminating an employee's employment, it was also submitted that all that the Claimant is entitle to is salary for the period of notice and other legitimate entitlements as remedy and not award of damages as prayed. It was the final submission of the Claimant on issue one that the contract of employment of the Claimant was based on her letter of employment and the company's handbook and not by the Labour Act since she was a management staff of the Claimant. Parties to this suit are in agreement as regards the date of appointment of the Defendant vide Exhibit NO1 dated 7th February, 2011. They however, hold a divergent views as submitted by the Claimant that the contract of employment of the Defendant constitute both Exhibit NO1 and the employee handbook, which the Defendant disapprove of, contending that she had never seen the said employee handbook. It is the law of common place that a contract of employment (service) is the foundation upon which the case of an employer/employee is predicated. Thus, the success or failure of the case thereof is fundamentally predicated on the terms and conditions inherent in the contract of employment thereof. As aptly, and rather emphatically, held by the Apex Court in IBAMA V SPDC [2005] 17 NWLR (PT954) 364 @ 379 Per Mohammed JSC. stated thus- "In a written contract of service, the court will not look into any matter outside the terms stipulated and agreed therein between the parties to the contract in determining the respective rights and obligations of the parties." It is a trite and well settled principle of law that the only onerous duty of Court is to simply interpret and enforce the agreement lawfully entered into by parties. thus the Court lacks the jurisdictional competence to make a new contract for the parties. See IFETA V SPDC (NIG) LTD [2006] 8 NWLR (PT983) 585; IBAMA V SPDC, supra; PACERS MULTI-DYNAMIC LTD v. THE MV. DANCING SISTER & ANOR. SC. 238, 2001 (unreported) at 28. It is apparent at paragraph 21 of the letter of offer of employment i..e. Exhibit NO1 that the Defendant's condition of service is predicated on both Exhibit NO1 and the Employee handbook i.e. Exhibit NO4 respectively. That is the agreement between both parties in this suit. I find and hold that both documents regulate the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant in this suit. Consequently I discountenance with the Defendant's position that Exhibit NO4 does not form part of her contract of employment because according to her she did not see it. It does not lie in her to say so, in view of the fact that she accepted the employment offered under the above terms and conditions and signed same (emphasis mine). In a contract of Service, the Court will not look into any matter outside of the terms stipulated and agreed by the parties in determining the respective rights and obligation of the parties. See CADBURY NIG. PLC V OLUBUNMI O.ONI [2012]LPELR 19821. Having said that, it is thus incumbent upon this Court to consider both Exhibits NO1 and NO4 in the consideration of this case vis a vis the Claims and counter claims before this Court. Now, the main issue begging for a verdict under issue one is whether or not the Defendant's resignation was voluntarily and if the answer is in the negative, has her employment been determined ? Clause 3 of Exhibit NO1 states-- '' NOTICE OF TERMINATION/RESIGNATION OF APPOINTMENT. Either of the parties may terminate the appointment at any time by one month notice in writing or payment of one month full salary in lieu of notice'' Clause 2.22 of Exhibit NO4 i.e. the Employee handbook made the same provision for termination/resignation of appointment. It was the contention of the Defendant that although she resigned but she did so under duress, according to her two Directors of the Claimant forced her to do so. It is a fundamental principle of law which has gained notoriety over the years and has its statutory blessing in Section 137 (1) of the Evidence Act, is that in civil cases the burden of proven the existence or none existence of a facts lies upon the party against whom judgment would be given if no evidence were adduced by either party; regard being had to any presumption that may arise in the pleadings. It was the take of the Defendant that she was called by one Mr. Hassan Alao and Mike Olajide who are both the Group Managing Director and her line Managing Director and forced to resign. She did not place before the Court how and why she resigned under duress. She continued that she never intended to resign. Exhibit NO11is her alleged letter of resignation. In the content of the letter is reproduced hereunder for avoidance of doubt-- '' The Admin Manager Sidmach Technologies Nigeria Limited Dear Sir/Ma, LETTER OF RESIGNATION I Onuorah Chinwe wish to resign from my position as Team Head Business Development with Sidmach Technologies Nigeria Limiited. Kindly be informed that I will be giving the organization one month notice. My last day of employment will be July, 31st 2013. I am looking forward to starting a new and higher phase of my career. I wish you and the company the best of success in the future. If I can assist with the transition, please do let me know. Thanks once again. Yours Faithfully, Chinwe Onuorah (Mrs)'' The above letter speaks for itself and there is no ambiguity in same that would have necessitated any interpretation by the Court. It is not in the ambit of the Court to read meanings into the above letter i.e. Exhibit NO11 to do so would occasion injustice. The Defendant admitted under cross examination that she did sign the letter but did so under duress. This is not a confessional statement in a criminal case requiring going through a whole hug of a trial within trial to authenticate the voluntariness or otherwise of same. Her plea for non est fatum suum was denied under cross examination when she answer in that regard that she did sign the letter but she did so because her two bosses urged her to tender her resignation letter with immediate effect. I find it difficult to agree with the Defendant that she was forced to resign, I say so in view of the fact that first she is a human with a free will to choose and pick her actions, she is educated at a university graduate level and she is matured and a management staff . She had a moment of giving it a taught which elicited a reaction from her. Her reaction was the typing of the said letter which was a well taught out reaction , wherein she indicated her intention to give the Claimant one month notice, her desire to move higher in her career, her best wishes to the Claimant and signed the letter by herself. She exercised her free will and choice by the letter and signed same, why couldn't she inform her lawyer and sought his legal opinion before writing Exhibit NO11, I borrow a leave from the statement of OPUTA JSC (as he then was ) in JOSIAH STATE [1985] 1 NWLR (PT1) 140, where he stated thus ''The ordinary layman, even the intelligent and educated layman is not skilled in the science of law and he therefore needs the aid and advice of counsel''. Ordinarily if she was not too comfortable with the alleged duress, seeking counsel for her lawyer would have been germane. According to the Black's Law Dictionary 9th Edition at P 578, "Duress strictly is the physical confinement of a person or the detention of a contracting party's property. In the field of tort, duress considered a species of fraud in which compulsion takes the place of deceit in causing injury.. threat to harm made to compel a person to do something against his/her will or judgment. The use or threatened use of unlawful force, usually that a reasonable man cannot resist...'' Going by the above definition of the word 'Duress'', there is nothing on record suggestive of all the circumstances envisaged by law in the instance case. The content and tenor of Exhibit NO11 did not suggest any of her claim. It is therefore in the calm and considered view of the Court that the Defendant's letter of resignation when weighed on the scale of probabilities and applying the reasonable man's test was written as against her claim voluntarily by her. I find that her plea of non est fatum suum is abandoned and she was unable to prove her assertion that she resigned under duress. It is also against the known principle of law to hold that the failure of the Claimant to call both Mr. Hassan Alao and Mr. Mike Olajide is fatal to the Claimant's case, rather it is the law as had been decided above in this judgment that it is the duty of the Defendant who asserts that she wrote the letter under duress to proof same and not the other way round. The Defendant having failed to proof her assertion, Consequently, her resignation was voluntary, the Defendant's employment in the Claimant's company is determined. Having held that the Defendant's employment with the Claimant has been determined vide Exhibit NO11, has the Claimant proven its case to warrant granting the reliefs sought. The claims of the Claimant is as stated above. Claims has been proven as decided above. Claims 2 and 3 are for a declaration that the Defendant having resigned from the Claimant's employ, she can no longer parade herself as a staff or employee of the Claimant and that she cannot hold on to the Claimant's properties itemised as follows- a. Hyundai Accent Car with Registration Number LAGOS-JJJ 726 BC. b. HP Laptop and the Claimant's very confidential documents contained therein. c. Identity Card in the name of the Defendant belonging to the Claimant. d. Company issued mobile phone given to the Defendant by the Claimant. It was the submission of the Defendant on this issue that the Defendant has a common law right of lien on the Claimant's properties since her resignation is involuntary. It was contended that assuming without conceding that the resignation sufficed to determine the Defendant's appointment, the question posed was as regards the effective date of resignation? To the Defendant a notice of resignation by the decision of the Court of appeal in W.A.E.C V OSHIONEBO [2006] 12 NWLR (PT 1994) 258, that a notice of resignation is effective not from the date of the letter nor from the date of any purported acceptance but from the date on which the letter is received by the employer or his agent. It was contended that evidence in this case show clearly that the letter was received by the Claimant on the same date i.e. the 4th of July, 2013 up till 22nd July when an acceptance letter was alleged written but was not communicated to the Defendant, that the Claimant failed to compute or make any pronouncement on the Defendant's severance entitlements. It was further submitted that as a creditor from the 4th July, 2013 when she resigned her appointment, the Defendant has a right of lien on the Claimant's properties under the common law. It stands as security for all of the debts of the debtor to the creditor. Cited in support of this is the case of TAPPENDEN V ARTUS [1964] 2 QB 185, where DIPLOCK L.J referred to a lien as a ''self help'' remedy like other primitive remedies such as abatement of nuisance, self defence or ejection of trespassers to land. It was argued that the Claimant has exhibited an inclination towards cheating the Defendant out of her entitlements as was the case with her maternity leave allowance of 2012. The Defendant urged the Court to find and hold that the Defendant is in continued possession of the items as an employee in continued service of the Claimant and her common law right of lien as an unpaid creditor and that no order of Court could issue to disturb or abridge those right. It was the take of the Defendant as regards the Claimant's claim for N35,000.00 and N15,000.00 special damages for the use of the Claimant's Hyundai car and the value of classified information and trade secrets of the Claimant respectively, To the Defendant this type of special claims must be pleaded with reasonable particular that would justify their grant. Cited in support is the case of NEKA B.B.B. MANUFACTURING CO.LTD V ACB, Supra, where the apex Court held Per IGUH, JSC '@ P 261,thus- '' .. it must be stressed that the law is firmly established that special damages must be pleaded with distinct particularity and strictly proved and a Court is not entitled to make an award of special damages based on conjecture or on some fluid and speculative estimate of alleged loss sustainable by the Plaintiff...'' It was further contended that going by the decision of the apex Court a trial Court is entitled to make its own assessment of the quantum of such general damages or by its own arbitrary assessment of what it thinks the plaintiff is entitle to but must be strictly based on facts presented before it. Also cited are OSUJI V ISIOCHA [1989] 3 NWLR (PT 111) 623; IJEBU ODE LOCAL GOVT V BALOGUN & CO LTD [1991] 1 NWLR (PT 166) 136. It was posited that the Claimant has not given distinct particular as regards the nature and value of the alleged trade secret or the confidential classified information and the basis for their pricing. She further posited that the person who loaded the particular information in the laptop ought to have been called to give a scientific prove of their valuation failing which it should be presumed that his information would be detrimental to the Claimant's case, hence he was not called as a witness. She then urged the Court to hold that the Claimant has failed in establishing its claims of special damages and same failed. It was submitted on the claim of the claimant that the Court should permit it to setoff its claims from the Defendant's entitlement/accrual and order the Defendant to pay any short fall to it and the Cost of action; To the Defendant those claims are preposterous and as regards the issue of cost, the law is that cost follows events hence if the Claimant fails in this suit it would pay cost. The Claimant submitted on this issue that the Defendant suo muto seized the Claimant's properties without any Court order and has failed/refused to return same. The items are as enumerated above in this judgment. The Claimant referred the Court to paragraphs 27,34, 37, 38, 39, 46-49 of its statement of facts. It was further submitted that the Constitution of this Country is founded on the rule of law, hence everything must be done in accordance with the law. The case of GOV. OF. LAGOS STATE V OJUKWU [1986] 1 NWLR (PT 18) 621, and posited that in the realm of the rule of law, the rule of self help by force is abandoned. The Claimant urged the Court to hold that self help and jungle justice is unknown to the Constitution. To the Claimant the special damages and the cost of action claims are exemplary and punitive in nature and such claims are usually awarded whenever the Defendant's conduct is sufficiently outrageous to merit punishment as where it discloses malice, fraud, cruelty, insolence or flagrant disregard of the law. By virtue of clause 2.17 of Exhibit NO4 i.e. the Employee handbook of the Claimant, when an employee leaves the Claimant service, he/ she is to return his ID card and other company's properties with the Finance and admin department before his final entitlement are paid. The clause is reproduced hereunder for the avoidance of doubt- 2.17 IDENTITY CARD '' when an employee leaves the company's service, his identity card and other company properties must be deposited with the F & A dept, before his final separation entitlements are paid. The continued possession of these after leaving the company employment is illegal and any violation of this requirement may lead to prosecution'' It is obvious from the above provision which regulates the relationship of both parties that the Defendant ought to have returned the above listed items to the Claimant when she tendered her resignation letter on the 4th July, 2013. It was the position of the Defendant that the letter of resignation should take effect from the date it was received. She continued that the letter was received by the Claimant on same date i.e. 4th of July, 2013, up till 22nd July, 2013 when it accepted the resignation but did not communicate same to the Defendant, that the Claimant failed/refused to compute the Defendant's severance entitlements. It was contended that the Defendant became an unpaid creditor from the 4th July, 2013. It is a settled principle of law as held severally by the appellate Court that resignation of appointment dates from the date notice is received. The Court of Appeal in ADEFEMI V ABEGUNDE [2004] 15 NWLR , P 1 @ p 28, that ''... There is absolute power to resign and no discretion to refuse to accept the notice. The Resignation of an employee can be effective whether or not it has been approved...'' Applying the decision of the Court of appeal in Abegunde's case, I agree with the Defendant that the letter of resignation i.e. Exhibit NO11 was received by the Claimant on the 4th of July, 2013. I so find and hold. It is on record that the Defendant has not returned to the Claimant any of the items listed above. Her defence is that she has a common law lien over the items, hence she is still holding on to them. Now, a pertinent question here is, does the Defendant has a right under the law to hold on to the items listed above which belong to the Claimant?. In answering this question first a ''lien'' is defined by Black's law Dictionary 9th Edition, Page 1006, defines ''common lien'' as '' A lien granted by the common law, rather than by statute, equity, or agreement by parties''. What this means as clearly stated is that a common law lien could only be granted where parties have not entered into an agreement, or where there is no statute or equity. In other words the type of lien claimed by the Defendant cannot avail her in this instance having entered in agreement with the Claimant vide Exhibits NO 1 and NO4 respectively including exhibit NO8. The Court will not go outside of the agreement regulating the relationship between both parties to this suit and that is both the Defendant's letter of employment and the employee handbook i.e. Exhibits NO1 and NO 4 respectively, which bind both parties. The particular clause in Exhibit NO4 that makes provision for the Defendant to return all company's items in her custody is as reproduced above. The clause is to the effect that all such items or properties as the case may be should be returned to the Director Finance and administration before his/her entitlement would be paid. There is a rider to that clause which is that it is illegal for an employee to do otherwise. The Claimant as evinced on record wrote a letter dated 22nd July, 2013 acknowledging receipt of Defendant's resignation letter and whilst accepting same the Claimant urged the Defendant to return the company's property and documents in her possession to the director administration and hand over all her ongoing projects to one Mrs. Bose Osayimwen with immediate effect. She was equally urged to reconcile all outstanding cash advances in her name; i.e. Exhibit NO14, Exhibit NO15, is the Computation of Final Entitlement dated 22nd July, 2013; Reconciliation of Customer's Balances dated 22nd, July, 2013 and Exhibit NO16, i.e. another letter requesting the Defendant to return the company's items dated the 30th July, 2013. These are all documents on record evidencing the request for the Defendant to return the items belonging to the Claimant but still in the custody of the Defendant. The Defendant by the provision of the agreement she entered into with the Claimant, titled ''CAR ALLOCATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN SIDMACH TECHNOLOGIES NIGERIA LIMITED AND MRS CHINWE ONURAH , MAY, 2011'' is expected by Article 5 .4.1 to have returned the car to the Claimant immediately she resigned her appointment. From all the provisions of the Employee Handbook coupled with the letter of 22nd of July and 30th of July, 2013 respectively, it is obvious and apparent that the Defendant has flouted the provisions of the mutual agreement she entered into with the Claimant by holding on to the Claimant's properties in her possession. The Defendant is not denying the fact that the properties are not hers, but her defence for holding on to the Claimant's properties is that she as a self acclaimed creditor has a right of common law lien on the Claimant's property in her custody. There is no Creditor/ debtor relationship in this case, the relationship in this case between the Claimant and the Defendant is an employer/employee relationship regulated by their contract of service as held above in this judgment. The relationship here is not sale of goods. This type of action on the part of the Defendant holding on to the Claimant's properties is not known to law. I therefore find and hold that the Defendant has acted contrary to the provision of the contract of employment she mutually entered into with the Claimant. There is no known law in the world of work to support the Defendant's action in this wise. She fragrantly acted outside the ambit of her right under the law. The Claimant's claims as listed above are for the Defendant to return all its properties in her custody; that the Defendant should pay the sum of N35,000.00 and N15,000.00 respectively as special damages from 23rd of July, 2013 in respect of the Hyundai accent car and the value of the confidential and classified information as well as trade secrets of the Claimant contained in the laptop. The Claimant's claim for special damages for the daily use of the Hyundai accent and the classified information and trade secret has not been proven by the Claimant as posited by the Defendant. Special damages as the law is settled should be proven strictly, giving particular of the loss incurred by the Claimant. where the property or chattel is not profit earning, it would be extremely difficult to assess the damages by the Claimant for the detention of same by the Defendant. It is on record that the Hyundai accent is an official car and not a commercial car, hence the value of N35,000.00 daily placed on same is questionable, because the Claimant did not show how it arrived at that rate same fate befalls the classified trade secret. The apex Court held in its decision in the case of ANYANWU V UZOWUAKA [2009] 13 NWLR (PT 1159) 445,S.C. that- '' With respect to the special damages claimed the settled principle of law is that special damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. See SHELL B.P. v COLE (1978) 3 SC 183; DUMEZ v OGBOLI (1977) 2 SC 45; SOMMER v FEDERAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (1992) 1 NWLR (Part 219 548 at 560; OKUNZUA v AMOSU (1992) 6 NWLR (Part 248) 416 at 432; OSHUNJIRIN v ELIAS (1970) 1 ALL NLR 153 at 156; A.G. OYO STATE v FAIRLAKES HOTELS (No.2) (1989) 5 NWLR (Part 121) 255 at 278- 279. In an attempt to prove special damages the only witness for the Plaintiffs at page 132 of the record gave details of some items allegedly damaged and their monetary values. Some receipts were admitted in evidence but it cannot be ascertained from them the actual quantity damaged and/or stolen and their monetary values. In my view the evidence falls short of the strict proof required in special damages." Per TABAI, J.S.C. (Pp.33, Paras.A-E). See also these cases SPDC NIG LTD V TIEGBO V11[2005] 9 NWLR (PT 931) 439; DAVID TAYLOR & ANOR V EDWIN OGHENEOVO [2011] LPELR, 8955. I refuse to agree with the submission of the Claimant that special damages claim is punitive in nature in view of the Defendant's conduct which according to learned Claimant's counsel merit punishment. It may be, but a decision of Court based on such insinuations alone and not on the sound principle of law, are but quicksands in the law, and if indulged in, it will swallow up all the principle laid down by law. The only unavoidable conclusion that could be arrived at, at this stage flowing from all that have been held above in this judgment is that the Claimant's has failed to proof special damages in the sum of N35,000.00 and N15,0000.00 per day for the Hyundai accent car and the classified trade secret for failing to give specific details or particulars of their loss as regards the two claims, Consequently the Claimant's claims 7 and 8 fails, I so find and hold. On issue three which is whether or not the Defendant has proven her counter claim to warrant giving the reliefs sought. The Defendant's claims are as stated in her counter claim and claims in the sister case as reproduced hereunder-- "1. The sum of N738,000.00 ( Seven Hundred and Thirty Eight Thousand Naira ) being the Defendant's salary for the three month maternity leave between April 2012 and July 2012 at the rate of her monthly salary of N246,000.00; which the claimant wrongfully seized and detained from her. 2. Interest on the said sum of N378,000.00 at the rate of 26% per annum from 15th July 2012 when it became due and payable till the date of judgment and thereafter, at the rate of 10% until same is liquidated. 3. The sum of N1,000,000,.00 (One Million Naira) as general damages for conversion and detinue. It was submitted by the Defendant that she is entitle to three months maternity leave allowance put at N738,000.00 and 26% interest on same per annum from 15th July, 2012 till date of judgement. The Claimant opposed this claim by contending that they never agreed that the Defendant would be paid her maternity leave. Reference was made to the Claimant's reply to the statement of defence and defence to counter claim and the additional written statement of oath of the Claimant witness. To the Claimant the Defendant had already proceeded on a leave before the second one and that she is not entitle to any leave allowances. It was the submission of the Claimant that pleadings are not evidence and that averments in pleading must be proved with credible evidence. In support is the case of ADIGHIJE V NWWAOGU [2010] ALL FWLR (PT521)1512@ P 1536, It was further submitted that in civil cases a party succeeds on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the Defence case. It was submitted that argument of the Defence counsel cannot take the place of credible evidence. The case of NWANOSIKE V JOHN HOLT PLC [2006] ALL FWLR (PT 301) 1809 @ 1833 was commended. To the Claimant all the arguments of defence counsel at paragraphs 3.4.1 - 3.4.13 in her written address are outside of the Defendant's pleading, rather they are inviting the Court to speculate which is strange in law as judgment of Court must be based on pleadings and not on speculations. Responding to the submission of the learned defence counsel on paragraph 3.3.11 where it was stated that the Claimant's claims are preposterous and that the Claimant's claim 9 presupposes that it has already written the judgment in this suit. It was the reaction of the Claimant that the law is trite that the Court cannot compel an unwilling employer to retain any employee. To the Claimant the only entitlement of an employee whose employment is wrongfully terminated is salary in lieu of notice and other lawful entitlements. Now, clause 4.8 of the Employee handbook provides thus-- (i) ''A female employee who has completed 24 months (2) years) continuous service or who had served for twelve months after the last maternity leave may be granted maternity leave with full pay for a period of 4 weeks before, and 8 weeks after delivery, provided that annual leave shall not be granted to such officers within the same calendar year. If annual leave for the year had been taken, the salary for an equivalent number of days of authorised maternity leave shall be forfeited to the Company. The above provision presupposes that for an employee to be qualified, for a maternity leave as also alluded to by the Defendant, she ought to have worked for 2 years in the Claimant's company. The Claimant's witness answered under cross examination that he was aware that the Defendant went on maternity leave but would not know if she was paid any money. The Defendant in her paragraph 7 and 9 of her written statement on oath dated 2nd October, 2013, averred that she went on maternity leave but was not paid. Same was averred on paragraphs 6 and 7 of her statement of Defence and Counter claim. It is therefore, apparent as against the Claimant's claim that the Defendant pleaded this claim. However, the Defendant has failed to proffer credible evidence in proof of her averment. For justice is not a game of hide and seek. Rather it is one where law and facts play a pivotal role as the rules of the game. The Defendant merely asserting that she is entitle to maternity leave allowance cannot suffice as prove of this claim. She did not provide any document in proof of her right to the allowance. By clause 4.8 of the employee handbook reproduced above, the Defendant is not entitle to maternity leave for having not spent 2 years in the service of the Claimant. Paragraph (iv) of clause 4.8 thereof provides thus-- ''(iv) Maternity leave cannot be granted for more than once in two years except on the agreement that she shall forfeit the salary for an equivalent number of the days of maternity leave authorised'' It is the law of common place that in civil cases, the onus is on him who asserts to prove. See OGAN & ORS V N.L.N.G.LTD & ANOR [2013]16 NWLR (PT 1381) 506, @ 542 -547. The Defendant's has failed to prove on the balance of probability that she was entitle to the leave allowances claimed in view of clause 4.8 (i) and (iv) of the Employee handbook i.e. Exhibit N04. There is nothing on record to show that clause 4.8 (iv) was waived in her case ,thus entitling her to maternity allowance. By Exhibit NO4 she must have applied for the maternity leave in writing and approval given in writing, that is not before this Court. I therefore find and hold that the Defendant has failed to proof her claim in her counter claim. Consequently, I find and hold that her claims in the counter claim fail. For all the reasons given above, I hereby find for the Claimant , declare and order as follows- 1 The Defendant's resignation is voluntary and thus determined her employment from the Claimant's company. 2. The Defendant should desist from parading herself as the staff of the Claimant. 3. The Defendant should return to the Claimant these items belonging to the Claimant within two days of this judgment- (a) Hyundai Accent with registration number LAGOS JJJ 726 BC in good and motorable condition (b) The HP laptop with all its content intact. (c) ID Card issued to the Defendant by the Claimant. (d) The mobile phone issued to the Defendant by the Claimant. (e) The Defendant is entitle to the sum of N480,011.12 being her July salary and one month salary in lieu of leave. This should be paid within 7 days of this judgment. No order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. HON. JUSTICE OYEBIOLA O. OYEWUMI. JUDGE IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE O.O. OYEWUMI DATE: 25TH March, 2014. SUIT NO.NICN/LA/443/2013 MRS CHINWE SOPHIA ONUORAH - CLAIMANT AND SIDMACH TECHNOLOGIES NIG LTD MR. HASSAN ALAO DEFENDANTS MR MIKE OLAJIDE REPRESENTATION: A. Hassan for the Claimant. Olu Falana for the Defendants JUDGMENT The claims of the Claimant as per the complaint filed in this Court on 20th August, 2013 are for the following reliefs: a. AGAINST THE 1ST ONLY: i. A DECLARATION that the purported Letter of Resignation dated 4th July 2013, having been obtained under duress is ineffectual, null and void. ii A DECLARATION that the claimant continues in the employment and service of the 1st Defendant and is therefore entitled to be paid all her accrued but unpaid salaries, allowances and emoluments without prejudice to any promotion, salary adjustment, review and improved allowances as she may be entitled. iii. AN ORDER compelling the 1st Defendants to pay to the Claimant forthwith all her accrued but unpaid salaries, allowances and emoluments from and including July 2013 until the date of judgment in this suit at the rate of N246,000.00 per month being her last salary and emolument and thereafter, as and when due. b. AGAINST THE 1ST, 2ND & 3RD DEFENDANTS DEFENDANT JOINTLY AND/OR SEVERALLY: i. PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Defendants, either by themselves or any one of them, their joint or several agents, servants, privies or other persons howsoever called or described, from dispossessing or attempting to dispossess the Claimant of the Hyundai accent car with registration number Lagos JJJ 726 BC, a Hewlett Packard (HP) laptop and a Nokia cell phone presently in the possession of the Claimant and in respect of which the Claimant is exercising a right of lien as an unpaid creditor. ii. GENERAL DAMAGES in the sum of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) for breach of contract, inciting breach of contract and for emotional/psychological trauma iii. THE COST of this action The Claimant's case is that she was employed by the Defendant, her appointment was confirmed whilst she produced two guarantors and was given Hyundai Accent car as her official car, but denied that she was the only Team Head business Development of the Defendant. She equally admitted that her letter of employment forms part of her contract of employment but denied ever seeing the Defendant's handbook. She denied that she could not meet her target. She went on to state that she went on three months maternity leave and was not paid her salary. She continued that she was forced to resign her appointment by her line boss. Her husband's company is one of the client's sourced by her to the Defendant, she however, denied that her husband's company is owing the Defendant, rather it is a client's work brought in by Data Stream her husband's company for which part payment has been made. She denied receiving acceptance of her resignation, rather she stated that she got to know of that when she was asked to return all company's items in her possession. She stated further that she has not resigned her appointment from the Defendant but had since 22nd of July 2013, not held out herself as a staff of the Defendant or had any contact with any of the Defendant's clients. She averred that she had no intention of resigning her employment until she was forced to do so by the Group Managing Director and Managing Director of the Defendant. She asserted that the purported letter of resignation dated 4th July, 2013 was non est factum suum in so far as it did not originate from her and that she did not voluntarily agree to same. She was traumatised by the Defendant's treatment of her and all her efforts to amicably settle this matter was proven abortive by the Defendant. She filed this suit on 20th August 2012 in this Court not knowing that the Defendant had filed suit No NICN/LA/426/2013 on the 7th of August. She tendered exhibits CSO1- CSO6 i.e. Notice of management committee meeting dated 13th May, 2013, Schedule of outstanding payments at 10th May, 2013, Defendant's solicitor's letter to the Claimant, her employment letter, handover note and Email. The case of the Defendant is that the Claimant was employed by the Defendant vide a letter of appointment dated 7th of February, 2011 as a team Head Business Development/Sales. That the Claimant provided two guarantors signed a guarantors forms for the Defendant. It was averred that the Claimant agreed to her terms and conditions of employment evinced by the letter of appointment and employee handbook. It was stated that the Claimant was placed on one year probation after which her appointment was confirmed vide a letter dated 18th June, 2012. The Defendant continued that it gave the Claimant a new Hyundai Accent car with Registration number LAGOS JJJ 726 BC as an official car under a car allocation agreement dated 10th May, 2011. According to the Defendant witness both parties agreed that at the termination of the Claimant's employment the car would be automatically withdrawn. He went on that the Claimant was given a salary increase despite the fact that she did not meet her sales target, thus on 1st August, 2012 the Defendant wrote the Claimant expressing its dissatisfaction to the Claimant. That on 31st July, 2013 the Claimant resigned her appointment, she was paid her entitlements but went away with the Defendant's properties such as the Hyundai car, Laptop, ID card and Mobile phone. The laptop contained classified and vital Defendant's documents worth about N15M and N35,000.00 daily value of the car. It was the testimony of the Defendant that it has severally requested the Claimant to return its properties and collect her entitlement but she has failed or refused to do so and finally the Claimant has been going round disparaging the name and interest of the company and that the Claimant should be stopped from parading herself as the staff of the Defendant. He denied and averred that the Defendant is not owing the Claimant any 3 months maternity salary and that the Defendant was never aware of any trauma the Claimant went through and was not the cause of same if any. Tendered and admitted in evidence are Exhibits NO1- NO20 which are Claimant's letter of employment, Record of her employment form signed by the Claimant on 20th April, 2011, Guarantors form, Defendant's employee handbook, Claimant's confirmation of employment, invoice and delivery note and proof of ownership of Hyundai Accent car, car allocation agreement, performance sheet of the Claimant, letter of resignation of the Claimant dated 4th July, 2013, payslip for February, 2013 of the Claimant, form CO7 of data streams Ltd, reconciliation of Customers balance of the Claimant, letter of acceptance of the Claimant's resignation dated 22nd July 2013, entitlements of the Claimant, letter dated 30th July to the Claimant and Email sent to the Head of Administration of the Defendant by the Claimant on 1st August, 2013 and payslip of the Claimant for the months of January to June 2013. The Court has carefully and calmly considered all the processes filed in this suit by both the Claimant and the Defendant in this present suit. I have equally perused and read both written addresses filed and the case law authorities cited by both parties in support of their respective claims. This judgment shall be considered under these issues- 1. Whether or not the Claimant voluntarily or otherwise resigned her employment from the Defendant. 2. Whether or not the employment of the Claimant is governed by both her employment letter and employee handbook. 3. Whether or not the Claimant has proven her case to warrant granting the reliefs sought. Before going into the issues framed, it is pertinent to state that it is obvious by the pleadings filed in this suit by the Claimant that both the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are group Managing Director and Managing Director Administration respectively of the 1st Defendant. A cursory perusal of both the statement of facts and Claimant's written statement on oath show that all that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants did were within the scope of their duties as employees of the 1st Defendant. It follows that both the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are agents of a disclosed principal in this case. It is the law of common place that an agent of a disclosed principal cannot be sued when the said agent/s act within the scope of his/their authority/s. See UBN V EDET [1993] 4 NWLR (PT 287) P.288. In view of this the Court is compelled to strike out the names of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants as no cause of action is disclosed against them. I so find and hold. Now, on issues one and two taken together, which is whether or not the Claimant voluntarily or otherwise resigned her employment from the Defendant and whether or not her contract of employment is governed by both her employment letter and the Employee handbook. The Defendant in its written address filed on its behalf by its counsel on 7th January 2014, argued that the Claimant admitted signing her letter of resignation i.e. Exhibit NO 11 but admitted under cross examination that she signed same under duress. Whilst placing reliance on the case of AKANIWO V NSIRIM [2008] ALL FWLR (PT 410) P 610 @ 663; it was submitted that the Court should disallow the Claimant from speaking from the two sides of her mouth. It was further submitted by the Defendant that the Claimant has failed to prove the duress alleged by her and thus the alleged involuntary resignation should be discountenanced. The case of KACHIA V HADI [2012] ALL FWLR (PT 650) 1403 was commended to the Court, which is to the effect that the onus of proving the alleged duress is on the Claimant who raised same as a defence and that her failure to so proof is fatal to her defence in that regard. It went on to state that since duress is a specie of fraud which is a crime, the onus of prove of same is prove beyond reasonable doubt, which the Claimant has failed to so proof and same cannot shift. Cited is AYANWU V UZOWUAKA [2009] ALL FWLR (PT 499) 411. The Defendant urged the Court to hold that the Claimant voluntarily signed her letter of resignation without duress and thus bound by the said letter Exhibit NO11. It was posited that the evidence of DW i.e. Defendant's sole witness being a staff is not hearsay evidence since the Defendant being a juristic personality could only act through natural persons and any of its servant or agent. Counsel added that the action of the two Managing Directors of the Defendant i.e. Mr. Hassan Alao and Mr. Mike Olajide acted as agents of the Defendant and thus their actions are regarded as that of the Defendant, it urged the Court to discountenance the argument of the Claimant that they ought to have testified in this case. To the Defendant assuming but not conceding that the Claimant resigned under duress/forced as alleged amounts to constructive termination of employment, by virtues of paragraph 3 of Exhibit NO1i.e. her employment letter she is only entitle to one month notice or salary in lieu of notice, which the Defendant has agreed to pay including her 3 months and leave allowance. Whilst contending that the Court cannot compel an unwilling employer to retain an employee or give reasons for terminating an employee's employment, it was also submitted that all that the Claimant is entitle to is salary for the period of notice and other legitimate entitlements as remedy and not award of damages as prayed. It was the final submission of the Defendant on issue one that the contract of employment of the Claimant was based on her letter of employment and the company's handbook and not by the Labour Act since she was a management staff of the Defendant. It was the submission of learned counsel on behalf of the Claimant on this issue that parties are in agreement that the Claimant was employed by the Defendant on the 7th February 2011 as Team Head, Business Development/Marketing and was confirmed on 18th June, 2013. Also that they both are ad idem that the Claimant submitted a letter of resignation but are in disagreement in that while the Claimant maintains that the said letter was obtained by duress, the Defendant insists that the same was voluntary. It was contended that whilst the Claimant specifically mentioned names of two people whom allegedly forced her to resign and whom the Defendant ought to have called as witnesses to disprove her allegation, the Defendant witness who testified is alien to the alleged scenario, cited in support is the case of PHARMACISTS BOARD OF NIG. V FRANKLIN ADEGBESOTE[1986] 10-11 S.C. 97 @ 121Where the Apex Court per Belgore JSC held thus-- '' The evidence of the shop assistant is very material and her not being called as a witness is fatal to this case. Could it be possible that this evidence which was available but not brought before the Committee would , if brought be unfavourable to the prosecution of this case and lead to the presumption of envisaged in Section 148(d) of the Evidence Act?...'' Also in support is Section 167 (d) of the Evidence Act, 2011. The Claimant urged the Court to find and hold that the evidence of both Mr. Hassan Alao and Mr. Mike Olajide are very material in establishing the voluntariness of the Claimant's resignation and that withholding that evidence and urged the Court to also hold that the resignation of the Claimant was not voluntary and that the Claimant's employment is not yet terminated. Parties to this suit are in agreement as regards the date of appointment of the Claimant vide Exhibit NO1 dated 7th February, 2011. They however, hold divergent views as submitted by the Defendant that the contract of employment of the Claimant constitute both Exhibit NO1 and the employee handbook, which the Claimant disapprove of, contending that she had never seen the said employee handbook. It is the law of common place that a contract of employment (service) is the foundation upon which the case of an employer/employee is predicated. Thus, the success or failure of the case thereof is fundamentally predicated on the terms and conditions inherent in the contract of employment thereof. As aptly, and rather emphatically, held by the Apex Court in IBAMA V SPDC [2005] 17 NWLR (PT954) 364 @ 379 Per Mohammed JSC. stated thus- "In a written contract of service, the court will not look into any matter outside the terms stipulated and agreed therein between the parties to the contract in determining the respective rights and obligations of the parties." It is trite and well settled principle of law that the only onerous duty of the Court is to simply interpret and enforce the agreement lawfully entered into by parties. thus the Court lacks the jurisdictional competence to make a new contract for the parties. See IFETA V SPDC (NIG) LTD [2006] 8 NWLR (PT983) 585; IBAMA V SPDC, supra; PACERS MULTI-DYNAMIC LTD v. THE MV. DANCING SISTER & ANOR. SC. 238, 2001 (unreported) at 28. It is apparent at paragraph 21 of the letter of offer of employment i..e. Exhibit NO1 that the Claimant's condition of service is predicated on both Exhibit NO1 and the Employee handbook i.e. Exhibit NO4 respectively. That is the agreement between both parties in this suit. I find and hold that both documents regulate the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant in this suit. Consequently I discountenance with the Claimant's position that Exhibit NO4 does not form part of her contract of employment because according to her she did not see it. It does not lie in her to say so, in view of the fact that she accepted the employment offered under the above terms and conditions and signed same (emphasis mine). In a contract of Service, the Court will not look into any matter outside of the terms stipulated and agreed by the parties in determining the respective rights and obligation of the parties. See CADBURY NIG. PLC V OLUBUNMI O.ONI [2012]LPELR 19821. Having said that, it is thus incumbent upon this Court to consider both Exhibits NO1 and NO4 in the consideration of this case vis a vis the Claims and counter claims before this Court. Now, the main issue begging for a verdict under issue one is whether or not the Claimant's resignation was voluntarily and if the answer is in the negative, has her employment been determined ? Clause 3 of Exhibit NO1 states-- '' NOTICE OF TERMINATION/RESIGNATION OF APPOINTMENT. Either of the parties may terminate the appointment at any time by one month notice in writing or payment of one month full salary in lieu of notice'' Clause 2.22 of Exhibit NO4 i.e. the Employee handbook made the same provision for termination/resignation of appointment. It was the contention of the Claimant that although she resigned but she did so under duress, according to her two Directors of the Defendant forced her to do so. It is a fundamental principle of law which has gained notoriety over the years and has its statutory blessing in Section 137 (1) of the Evidence Act, is that in civil cases the burden of proven the existence or none existence of a facts lies upon the party against whom judgment would be given if no evidence were adduced by either party; regard being had to any presumption that may arise in the pleadings. It was the take of the Claimant that she was called by one Mr. Hassan Alao and Mike Olajide who are both the Group Managing Director and her line Managing Director and forced to resign. She did not place before the Court how and why she resigned under duress. She continued that she never intended to resign. Exhibit NO11is her alleged letter of resignation. In the content of the letter is reproduced hereunder for avoidance of doubt-- '' The Admin Manager Sidmach Technologies Nigeria Limited Dear Sir/Ma, LETTER OF RESIGNATION I Onuorah Chinwe wish to resign from my position as Team Head Business Development with Sidmach Technologies Nigeria Limiited. Kindly be informed that I will be giving the organization one month notice. My last day of employment will be July, 31st 2013. I am looking forward to starting a new and higher phase of my career. I wish you and the company the best of success in the future. If I can assist with the transition, please do let me know. Thanks once again. Yours Faithfully, Chinwe Onuorah (Mrs)'' The above letter speaks for itself and there is no ambiguity in same that would have necessitated any interpretation by the Court. It is not in the ambit of the Court to read meanings into the above letter i.e. Exhibit NO11 to do so would occasion injustice. The Claimant admitted under cross examination that she did sign the letter but did so under duress. This is not a confessional statement in a criminal case requiring going through a whole hug of a trial within trial to authenticate the voluntariness or otherwise of same. Her plea of non est fatum suum was denied under cross examination when she answered in that regard that she did sign the letter but she did so because her two bosses urged her to tender her resignation letter with immediate effect. I find it difficult to agree with the Claimant that she was forced to resign, I say so in view of the fact that first she is a human with a free will to choose and pick her actions, she is educated at a university graduate level and she is matured and a management staff . She had a moment of giving it a taught which elicited a reaction from her. Her reaction was the typing of the said letter which was a well taught out reaction , wherein she indicated her intention to give the Defendant one month notice, her desire to move higher in her career, her best wishes to the Defendant and signed the letter by herself. She exercised her free will and choice by the letter and signed same, why couldn't she inform her lawyer and sought his legal opinion before writing Exhibit NO11, I borrow a leave from the statement of OPUTA JSC (as he then was ) in JOSIAH STATE [1985] 1 NWLR (PT1) 140, where he stated thus ''The ordinary layman, even the intelligent and educated layman is not skilled in the science of law and he therefore needs the aid and advice of counsel''. Ordinarily if she was not too comfortable with the alleged duress, seeking counsel for her lawyer would have been germane. According to the Black's Law Dictionary 9th Edition at P 578, "Duress strictly is the physical confinement of a person or the detention of a contracting party's property. In the field of tort, duress considered a species of fraud in which compulsion takes the place of deceit in causing injury.. threat to harm made to compel a person to do something against his/her will or judgment. The use or threatened use of unlawful force, usually that a reasonable man cannot resist...'' Going by the above definition of the word 'Duress'', there is nothing on record suggestive of all the circumstances envisaged by law in the instance case. The content and tenor of Exhibit NO11 did not suggest any of her claim. It is therefore in the calm and considered view of the Court that the Claimant's letter of resignation when weighed on the scale of probabilities and applying the reasonable man's test was written as against her claim voluntarily by her. I find that her plea of non est fatum suum is abandoned as she was unable to prove her assertion that she resigned under duress. It is also against the known principle of law to hold that the failure of the Defendant to call both Mr. Hassan Alao and Mr. Mike Olajide is fatal to the Defendant's case, rather it is the law as had been decided above in this judgment that it is the duty of the Claimant who asserts that she wrote the letter under duress to proof same and not the other way round. The Claimant having failed to proof her assertion, Consequently, her resignation was voluntary, the Claimant's employment in the Defendant's company is determined. Having held that the Claimant's employment with the Defendant has been determined vide Exhibit NO11, has the Claimant proven her case to warrant granting the reliefs sought. The claims of the Claimant are as stated above. The Defendant submitted on this issue that the Claimant suo muto seized the Defendant's properties without any Court order and has failed/refused to return same. The items are as enumerated above in this judgment. The Defendant referred the Court to paragraphs 27,34, 37, 38, 39, 46-49 of its joint statement of Defence. It was further submitted that the Constitution of this Country is founded on the rule of law, hence everything must be done in accordance with the law. The case of GOV. OF. LAGOS STATE V OJUKWU [1986] 1 NWLR (PT 18) 621, and posited that in the realm of the rule of law, the rule of self help by force is abandoned. The Defendant urged the Court to hold that self help and jungle justice is unknown to the Constitution. By virtue of clause 2.17 of Exhibit NO4 i.e. the Employee handbook of the Defendant, when an employee leaves the Claimant service, he/ she is to return his ID card and other company's properties with the Finance and admin department before his final entitlement are paid. The clause is reproduced hereunder for the avoidance of doubt- 2.17 IDENTITY CARD '' when an employee leaves the company's service, his identity card and other company properties must be deposited with the F & A dept, before his final separation entitlements are paid. The continued possession of these after leaving the company employment is illegal and any violation of this requirement may lead to prosecution'' It is obvious from the above provision which regulates the relationship of both parties that the claimant ought to have returned the above listed items to the Defendant when she tendered her resignation letter on the 4th July, 2013. It was the position of the Claimant that the letter of resignation should take effect from the date it was received. She continued that the letter was received by the Defendant on same date i.e. 4th of July, 2013, up till 22nd July, 2013 when it accepted the resignation but did not communicate same to her, that the Defendant failed/refused to compute the Claimant's severance entitlements. It was contended that the Claimant became an unpaid creditor from the 4th July, 2013. It is a settled principle of law as held severally by the appellate Court that resignation of appointment dates from the date notice is received. The Court of Appeal in ADEFEMI V ABEGUNDE [2004] 15 NWLR , P 1 @ p 28, that ''... There is absolute power to resign and no discretion to refuse to accept the notice. The Resignation of an employee can be effective whether or not it has been approved...'' Applying the decision of the Court of appeal in Abegunde's case, I agree with the Claimant that the letter of resignation i.e. Exhibit NO11 was received by the Defendant on the 4th of July, 2013. I so find and hold. It is on record that the Claimant has not returned to the Defendant any of the items listed above. Her defence is that she has a common law lien over the items, hence she is still holding on to them. Now, a pertinent question here is, does the Claimant has a right under the law to hold on to the items listed above which belong to the Defendant?. In answering this question first a ''lien'' is defined by Black's law Dictionary 9th Edition, Page 1006, ''common lien'' as '' A lien granted by the common law, rather than by statute, equity, or agreement by parties''. What this means as clearly stated is that a common law lien could only be granted where parties have not entered into an agreement, or where there is no statute or equity. In other words the type of lien claimed by the Claimant cannot avail her in this instance having entered in agreement with the Defendant vide Exhibits NO1 and NO4 respectively including exhibit NO8. The Court will not go outside of the agreement regulating the relationship between both parties to this suit and that is both the Claimant's letter of employment and the employee handbook i.e. Exhibits NO1 and NO 4 respectively, which binds both parties. The particular clause in Exhibit NO4 that requires the Claimant to return all company's items in her custody is as reproduced above. The clause is to the effect that all such items or properties as the case may be should be returned to the Director Finance and administration before his/her entitlement would be paid. There is a rider to that clause which is that it is illegal for an employee to do otherwise. The Defendant as evinced on record wrote a letter dated 22nd July, 2013 acknowledging receipt of Claimant's resignation letter and whilst accepting same the Defendant urged the Claimant to return the company's property and documents in her possession to the director administration and hand over all her ongoing projects to one Mrs. Bose Osayimwen with immediate effect. She was equally directed to reconcile all outstanding cash advances in her name; i.e. Exhibit NO14, Exhibit NO15, is the Computation of Final Entitlement dated 22nd July, 2013; Reconciliation of Customer's Balances dated 22nd, July, 2013 and Exhibit NO16, i.e. another letter requesting the Claimant to return the company's items dated the 30th July, 2013. These are all documents on record evidencing the request for the Claimant to return the items belonging to the Defendant but still in the custody of the Claimant. The Claimant by the provision of the agreement she entered into with the Defendant, titled ''CAR ALLOCATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN SIDMACH TECHNOLOGIES NIGERIA LIMITED AND MRS CHINWE ONURAH , MAY, 2011'' is expected by Article 5 .4.1 to have returned the car to the Defendant immediately she resigned her appointment. From all the provisions of the Employee Handbook coupled with the letter of 22nd of July and 30th of July, 2013 respectively, it is obvious and apparent that the Claimant has flouted the provisions of the mutual agreement she entered into with the Defendant by holding on to the Claimant's properties in her possession. The Claimant is not denying the fact that the properties are not hers, but her defence for holding on to the Defendant's properties is that she as a self acclaimed creditor has a right of common law lien on the Defendant's property in her custody. There is no Creditor/ debtor relationship in this case, the relationship in this case between the Claimant and the Defendant is an employer/employee relationship regulated by their contract of service as held above in this judgment. The relationship here is not sale of goods. This type of action on the part of the Claimant holding on to the Defendant's properties is not known to law. I therefore find and hold that the Claimant has acted contrary to the provision of the contract of employment she mutually entered into with the Defendant. There is no known law in the world of work to support the Claimant's action in this wise. She fragrantly acted outside the ambit of her right under the law. It is thus apparent from all the above that the Claimant has failed to prove her case against the Defendant in this case. Consequent upon which the Court finds and hold that Claimant having resigned from the Defendant's employ, she can no longer parade herself as a staff or employee of the Defendant and that she cannot equally hold on to the Defendant's properties itemised above in her custody. For all the reasons given above, I hereby find, declare and order as follows- 1. The Claimant's resignation is voluntary and thus determined her employment from the Defendant's company. 2. The Claimant should desist from parading herself as the staff of the Defendant. 3. The Claimant should return to the Defendant these items belonging to the Defendant within two days of this judgment- (a) Hyundai Accent with registration number LAGOS JJJ 726 BC in good and motorable condition (b) The HP laptop with all its content intact. (c) ID Card issued to the Defendant by the Claimant. (d) The mobile phone issued to the Defendant by the Claimant. (e) The Claimant is entitle to the sum of N480,011.12 being her July salary and one month salary in lieu of leave. This should be paid within 7 days of this judgment. The cost of N50,000.00 is awarded in favour of the Defendant, the Claimant should pay same within 14 days of this Judgment. Judgment is entered accordingly. HON. JUSTICE OYEBIOLA O. OYEWUMI. JUDGE The facts of this case, the originating and defence processes as well as the submissions filed by the parties are similar to those filed in SIDMACH TECHNOLOGIES NIG LTD V MRS CHINWE SOPHIA ONUORAH, Suit No NICN/LA/426/2013. By consent of counsel and the parties, and the authority of Section 12(2)(a) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, which empowers the Court to ''regulates its procedure and proceedings as it thinks fit''; it was agreed that the decision in SIDMACH TECHNOLOGIES NIG LTD V MRS CHINWE SOPHIA ONUORAH, just delivered should abide the instant case. Consequently, and for all the reasons given in SIDMACH TECHNOLOGIES NIG.LTD V MRS CHINWE SOPHIA ONUORAH Suit No. NICN/LA/426/2013. However, its apparent from the pleadings in this suit that both the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are Group Managing Director and Managing Director Administration respectively of the 1st Defendant. A cursory perusal of the statement of facts and the Claimant's deposition on oath show that all that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants allegedly did were within the scope of their duties as employees of the 1st Defendant. See UBN V EDET [1993] 4 NWLR (PT 287) P 288. It follows therefore that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are agents of a disclosed principal in this case. It is the law of common place that an agent/s of a disclosed principal cannot be sued when the said agent/s act within the scope of his/their authority. In view of this am compelled to strike out the names of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants as no cause of action is disclosed against them. In all the Claimant's claims fail in its entirety. I award the cost of N10,000.00 for the Defendant, this should be paid by the Claimant within 14 days of this Judgment. HON. JUSTICE OYEBIOLA O. OYEWUMI. JUDGE