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This suit was commenced by way of Complaint dated the 17th day of July and filed on the 9th day of August 2012. By an amended Complaint dated the 21st day of December and filed on the 23rd day of January 2013, the Claimant seeks the following reliefs jointly and severally against the defendants: 1. A declaration that the due retirement date of the claimant is 26th September 2008 calculated from his date of 1st appointment on 26th September 1973 based on length of service, and that his date of birth is 29/12/48. 2. A declaration that the withholding of the Claimant’s salaries and allowances from 1st January 2006 to 26th September 2008 including the withholding of his notice of retirement, his pension and gratuity and other benefits from 26th September 2008 till date, by the defendants are illegal, unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect. 3. An Order of the honourable court compelling the defendants to release the Claimant’s notice of retirement and pay the Claimant in bulk and up to date, all his salaries and allowances, and other benefits from forthwith, withheld by the Defendants since 1st January 2006 plus the interest accruing therefrom at the bank rate of 40% and to issue the Claimant pay slips showing legitimate deductions. 4. An order of this Honourable Court mandating the Defendants to pay to the Claimant, his retirement benefits from 26th September 2008 and to release the Claimant’s identity card No 4434 which is not yet released. 5. N20million Naira damages against the Defendants. 6. N5million Naira punitive damages against the Defendants jointly and severally for the inhuman treatment meted to the Claimant by the Defendants. 7. Perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants of anybody acting through them or on their behalf from further delay or non-payment of the Claimant’s current and future entitlements. By a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated the 12th day of March 2013 and filed on the 18th day of March, 2013, the Defendant/Applicant seeks for the following reliefs: 1. An order of Court dismissing or striking out the suit for lack of jurisdiction on grounds that: a. the suit is statute barred having exceeded statutorily allowed limitation period for bring the action against the 3rd -8th defendants who are statutory board and its officers respectively being contract of employment with statutory flavour. b. Non-issuance of pre-action notice on the 3rd – 8th defendants aforesaid. c. Abuse of Court process d. Writ of summons not signed by counsel. In support of the motion is a 37 paragraph affidavit deposed to by one Christopher Duru a civil servant. Also attached is a written address wherein the defendants/applicants formulated the following four issues for determination. 1. Whether claimants suit against 3rd – 8th defendants who are statutory Board and its officer is not statute barred having exceeded 3 months mandatory limitation period to sue. 2. Whether non-service of pre-action notice on 3rd – 8th defendants before commencement of the suit is not fatal to court’s jurisdiction to determine this suit. 3. Whether this suit not an abuse of court process. 4. Whether this suit is not incompetent for non-signing of complaint/ writ of summons by counsel. In arguing issue one learned counsel to the defendants/applicants contended that that suit is statute barred having exceeded 3 months mandatory statutory period within which to an commence action bordering on contract of employment with statutory flavour, Learned counsel submitted that the 3rd defendant is a statutory board while the 4th – 8th defendants are its officers; and that the claimant’s contract of employment with the 3rd defendant was a contract with statutory flavour. That the issue in dispute is whether the claimant’s retirement by the 3rd defendant is lawful. Counsel submitted that the purported complaint against the 3rd – 8th defendants was in their official capacities in relation to the claimant and the suit against them should be instituted in compliance with Public Officers (Protection) Act 1990 LFN 1990 and/or in compliance with public officers protection law applicable to Imo State or Imo State law 2005 that created the 3rd defendant. And that is by instituting the suit within 3 months of the alleged act or omission complained of, after the issuance of pre-action notice on the board and its officers. It was Counsel’s submission that it is manifest on the writ of summons that the period between the claimant’s retirement of December 2005 and the date of instituting the action in 2012 exceeded 3 months, and this action is statute barred. Counsel stated to the court that the consideration of the statutory period is done by looking at the writ of summons and statement of claim alleging when the wrong which gave rise to the cause of action was allegedly committed and comparing that date with one in writ of summons. This is done without taking evidence from the parties and once done, if the period between date the cause of action arose and the date of filing of the writ of summons is beyond the period allowed by the limitation Law/Act, then the action is statute barred as in the instant case. Counsel referred the court to the case of ORANYELI vs. FIRST BANK OF (NIG) PLC (2001) FWLR (Pt. 68) Pg.1217 @ 1218 Ratio 2 and also EGBE vs. ADEFARASIN (1987) I NWLR (Pt. 47) 1. Counsel continued by stating that Claimant was retired in December 2005 and his salary stopped in January 2006. That this case was instituted on 9/8/2012; and an earlier suit HO/33/09 filed at the High Court Okigwe was struck out on 27/5/2010, while a 2nd suit was instituted in 2011. Counsel stated that both suits were statute barred having been brought outside the limitation period prescribed by Section 2(a) of POPA, being an action bordering on contract of employment with statutory flavour, rather than contract of supply or evacuation. He relied on TAJUDEEN vs. CUSTOMS IMMIGRATION & PRISONS SERVICES BOARD (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 1742) Pg. 1742 Ratio 3; and FORESTRY RESEARCH INST of NIG vs. GOLD (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 391) 1579 @1751; and submitted that in the instant case, the suit of the claimant is statute barred and the remedy is dismissal. See FBN vs. NDOMA- EGBA (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 307) 1017; ARMTI VS BAYER (2003) FWLR (Pt. 155) Pg. 649 at 651. Counsel submitted that the fact that the claimant was writing letters requesting for re-instatement does not stop time from running in this suit and does not stop the suit from being statute barred when 3 months had lapsed for him to validly commence this suit. See ARMTI VS BAYER (2003) FWLR (Pt.155) Pg. 649 at Pg.651. He said that the claimant was due for retirement by both length of service and age. In arguing ISSUE TWO, Learned counsel to the Defendant/Applicant submitted that non-issuance of pre-action notice on the 3rd – 8th defendants being the Statutory Board and its officers/employees respectively, renders the suit invalid, incompetent and is fatal to court’s jurisdiction to determine this suit for non-compliance with conditions precedent for court to assume jurisdiction. Counsel stated that by S. 31, of Edict No 4 of 1995 which established State Primary Education Board now replaced by 3rd defendant (SUBEB), "no action shall be instituted against the education board or any officer - unless pre-action notice was issued.” Similar provision was made in Law No 5 of 2005 which established the 3rd defendant. That this is a mandatory provision of law and a condition precedent and fundamental requirement which goes to the root of this suit, and that non-compliance is fatal to the court’s jurisdiction in this suit. NWANKWO vs. ABMIE (2003) FWLR (Pt. 80) Pg. 1410-1411. NNPC vs. FEMFA OIL LTD (2003) FWLR (Pt. 155) Pg. 796. Counsel further held that negotiations do not prevent the period of limitation from running. When the period of limitation begins to run, it does not cease to run merely because the parties engaged in negotiation. GOODWIN CO LTD vs. CALABAR CEMENT CO. LTD (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 544); EBOIGBE vs. NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 649. In arguing ISSUE THREE, Learned Counsel for the Applicants submitted that the suit is an abuse of court process. That the claimant had instituted several suits against the 3rd – 8th defendants, seeking for the same reliefs, based on the same facts in pleadings in HO/33/2009, HO/2/2011, and now, the instant suit. He cited the case of AITEIDU vs. OBI (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 533) Pg. 1819. In arguing ISSUE FOUR, Counsel submitted that the suit is incompetent, null, void and of no effect, due to failure of counsel to sign the complaint, thus making it a worthless document which cannot be redeemed by amendment, and therefore making the entire proceedings incurably void. FARO BOTTLING CO. Ltd vs. OSUJI, (2002)1 NWLR (Pt. 748) at Pg.316. In opposition to the Preliminary objection, Counsel to the Claimant/Respondent filed a counter affidavit of 18 paragraphs deposed to by the Claimant himself. In his supporting written address, he raised a lone issue for determination; and that is “whether the application has merit”. He submitted that the application of 3rd – 8th Applicants to dismiss or strike out the suit lacks merit. That the suit is not statute barred; it is not an abuse of court process; the suit is competent; the Writ of Summons complained about was signed by counsel and finally, that the Respondent has demonstrated in his Counter Affidavit that he variously issued 3rd – 8th Defendants/Applicants with sets of pre-action notices before taking out the suit. He submitted that the cause of action arose in this suit on 16/9/2008 when the Respondent retired from service but was denied his retirement notice, and that his salary which was withheld since January, 2006 was still being withheld up to September, 2008. On retirement he was not provided with the platform to process his pension and gratuity for which he issued the 3rd – 8th applicants the first set of pre-action notices dated 12/12/2008, an action that was within the mandatory statutory 3 months for the issuance of same, after the cause of action arose. Counsel submitted that as against the illusion of 3rd – 8th defendants, the issue has gone beyond "the contract of employment". That the issues border on claim for payment for work and labour done; and the malicious action of the 4th – 8th defendants as public officers who acted outside the colour of their authority. To counsel, the Claimant/Respondent has demonstrated in his Counter Affidavit that though he was unlawfully retired on 29/12/2005, he was re-instated back into the teaching service by the 3rd Applicant; and that he continued in service until his proper date of retirement on 26/9/2008. Counsel contended that the Respondents' name was deliberately removed from the payroll of 3rd Defendant/Applicant by the duo of 4th and 5th Defendants/Applicants from January 2006, and was not replaced until he retired on 26/9/2008, thereby refusing to implement the directive of the Executive Chairman of the 3rd Defendant/Applicant to re-instate the Claimant/Respondent. Counsel continued that between January 2006 and September 2008, the Respondent never received any salary from the 3rd defendant/applicant, including allowances due to him. His notice of retirement was also withheld; therefore he could not process his pension and gratuity. The 6th defendant/applicant who was the Education Secretary of the Okigwe Local Government Education Authority at the material time, made sure that the Respondent's Notice of Retirement was not issued to him upon his eventual retirement on 26/9/2008. He said the action of the 6th defendant/Applicant is tainted with malice and not unconnected with the demand he made on the Respondent in 2006 for the sum of 40,000.00 (Forty Thousand Naira) from the N600,000.00 (Six Hundred Thousand Naira) World Bank Assisted School Project fund meant for the renovation of the school block of the Orreh Community School, Okigwe, which demand the Respondent turned down. Counsel again submitted that the Public Officers Protection Law has exceptions to statute barred actions. These include where the claim is for payment for work and labour done, and where the public officer in question has acted in malice or outside the colour of his authority. It was Counsel’s submission that the Claimant/Respondent had demonstrated in his affidavit that the issues border on payment for work and labour done and, that the 4th – 8th Defendants/Applicants had acted outside the colour of their statutory authority and also with malice or bad faith. KASANDULU AND ANOR vs. ULTIMATE PETROLEUM LTD AND ANOR (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt. 147) 155 @ 158. ABUBAKAR vs. GOVERNOR OF GOMBE STATE (2002) 17 NWLR (Pt. 797) 533 @551. Referring the court to the case of NUPENG vs. GECO PRAKLA NIGERIA LIMITED (2010) NLIR (Pt. 57) 361 and the recent ruling of this honourable court sitting at Enugu delivered on the 10th day of December 2012 in CHIEF JOHN AKARUAYEN EWENEDE vs. SOLOMON AJOMATA ALA AND ORS. (Suit No. NICN/EN/149/2012 unreported), counsel stated that matters of labour rights in general are not affected by the limitation law, as in the instant case. On the issue of non-issuance of pre-action notice, Counsel stated that the Claimant/Respondent had sufficiently demonstrated in his Counter-Affidavit that pre-action notices were issued to the 3rd – 8th Defendants/Applicants. Two twin sets of pre-action notices were issued. One set was personally issued by the Claimant/Respondent and the other set was issued by his counsel. The 3rd – 8th Defendants/Applicants denied the first set dated 12/12/2008 but, acknowledged the second set dated 11/10/10 (See paragraphs13, 34 and 35 of Affidavit in support of the motion on Notice). Counsel Submitted that the proper party to object to non-issuance of pre-action is the party entitled to it. (MOBIL PRODUGING NIG. UNLTD. vs. LASEPA (2003) FWLR (PT. 137) 1030 @ 1035. That the action is, therefore, competent and valid, and the court has jurisdiction to entertain it. On the issue raised by the Applicants that this suit is an abuse of court process, Respondent’s Counsel submitted that on it is not. He said an abuse of court process, in the main, means that the process of the court has not been used bona fide and properly (RE-BENKAY NIGERIA LIMITED VS. CADBURY NIGERIA PLC (2012) MRSCJ VOL. 1 PG. 24 AT 26 R. 1), and that the circumstances that will give rise to an abuse of Court process include but, not limited to, instituting different actions between the same parties simultaneously in different courts, even though on different grounds and where there is no law supporting a court process or where it is premised on frivolity or recklessness Counsel stated that in the instant case, the Respondent is pursuing a legitimate right; he is using the court process bona fide; the suit is not a frivolity; the Respondent was not on forum shopping, and that the proper forum for this action is the present court. Also, he has not instituted multiplicity of actions in this court or other courts. He therefore, urged the court to discountenance the objection of the applicants on the ground that the suit is an abuse of court process. On the issue raised by the 3rd to 8th applicants that the suit is incompetent, the complaint/writ of summons having not been signed by counsel, and therefore incompetent, Counsel stated that this had been overtaken by events of the court process. He recalled that through an oversight of the Respondent's former counsel, the Writ of summons was not signed; though the counsel's name and address were endorsed on it. This, he said, amounted to an irregularity which was regularized vide a motion on notice which was moved on 7/3/2013 without opposition and granted by the honourable court. In urging the court to discountenance the applicant’s protest on this issue Counsel stated that the Respondent also came by the way of amendment, thereby amending the writ of summons and other processes, and action which counsel said, cured the original writ of any inadvertence and irregularity, and therefore overtakes it. The applicants, on the 5th day of June 2013, filed a 21 paragraph further affidavit deposed to by Christopher Duru, as well as a written address urging the court to reject the submissions and issues raised by the Claimant/Respondent, and dismiss the suit with punitive cost, as the suit is statute barred and incompetent, being a contract of employment with statutory flavour filed outside the statutorily allowed period of three months. Counsel referred to earlier authorities cited and submitted further that what is to be examined in determining the applicability of Public officers (Protection) Act under a contract of employment is whether the facts constituting the complaint in the case arose out of a specific contract or a complaint against an act done in the performance or execution of a public duty. He said in the instant case, the claimant’s complaint against the 3rd to 8th defendants arose out of performance or execution of a public duty, and not out of a specific contract. He submitted that this application has sufficient merit to warrant dismissal of this suit, and urged the court to so hold. Having considered the submissions of both counsel, depositions, arguments and authorities cited, I have chosen to adopt the issues raised by the applicant’s counsel, though in a different order. As regards the non-signing of the writ of summons by counsel, I wish to call the attention of counsel to Form1 of the Rules of this Court, which is the General Form of Complaint, as well as a few provisions of the Rules of this court as follows: Order 3 Rule 1 of the NIC Rules 2007 provides that: "Any action for determination by the court shall be commenced by way of complaint which shall be filed and sealed. The Complaints shall be in form I with such modifications or variations as circumstance may require" Order 4 Rule 4(3) of the NIC Rules provides that “an originating process shall be signed by the Claimant or his or her legal practitioner where the claimant sues through a legal practitioner.” Order 1 Rule 3 (2) of the NIC Rules defines an Originating process to mean “a complaint or any other court process by which a suit is initiated.” Order 3 Rule 4 indicates that “the complaint shall be accompanied by a statement of facts establishing the cause of action, copies of every document to be relied upon at the trial, and the list of witnesses to be called.” The said Form 1 does not contain any space for signature of the claimant or his solicitor. It is noted that lawyers have variously modified Form 1 in order to give room for Solicitors’ signature, while some have out rightly adopted the writ of summons format. Due to the flexible nature of this court, all these modifications have been accepted without much fuss, especially in the light of the provisions of Order 15 of the NIC Rules 2007 which gives room for such flexibility where the provisions of the rules are found to be inadequate. The cumulative effect of all the provisions cited above is that the originating process is made up of all the processes stated in Order 3 Rule 4. The complaint is not a document that can exist in isolation. Since the Form 1 does not contain any space for signature of counsel, the NIC generally holds that once the statement of facts, the list of documents and the list of witnesses to be called at the trial are appropriately signed by the solicitor, then Order 4 Rule 3 of the Rules has been complied with. This was the decision of the National Industrial Court in UZOIGWE M. C. & OTHERS vs. AGBOEZE & OTHERS (2011) 22 NLLR (Pt. 63) 443 @ 445. I therefore hold that non-signing of the writ of summons by counsel is a mere irregularity, which has been regularised by the order of this honourable court sitting at Enugu on the 7th day of March 2013. Any objection to that order of court will have to be by way of Appeal, and not an application of this nature. I have chosen to deal with the issue as to whether or not this suit is an abuse of court process together with the issue as to whether or not the suit is statute barred. In doing this, I find it necessary to recall the relevant facts as gathered from the Statement of Claim. The Claimant first sued the defendants in 2009 in the Imo State High Court in suit No HO/33/09, and the said suit was struck out on the 27th day of May 2010. The claimant brought yet another action at the Imo State High Court on the 26th day of January 2011 in suit No HO/2/2011. In June 2012, the Claimant’s counsel filed a motion asking that the matter be transferred to the National Industrial Court, Enugu. The court however struck out the matter out on the 2nd day of July 2012. The Claimant then filed a fresh suit before this court on the 9th day of August 2012. A cause of action is said to be statute barred if the period of limitation prescribed by statute has elapsed before the action is brought. The law is quite settled as to how to determine whether a suit is statute barred. This involves the determination of the date on which the cause of action arose and comparing same with the date on which the suit was filed. If the date on which the suit was filed shows that the Claimant came outside the period within which he should have come to court, the suit will be held to be statute barred. See Hassan vs. Aliyu (2010) LPELR-1357 SC p.81 Paragraphs D-F. Per Adekeye JSC. In the case of Adekoya vs. Federal Housing Authority (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1099) Pg. 539, the Supreme Court held Per Tabai JSC, that this comparison can be done without taking oral evidence from witnesses. In the instant case, the Claimant/Respondent’s counsel in his written address in opposition to this application has submitted that the cause of action in this suit arose on the 26th day of September 2008 when the Claimant retired from service. The Claimant filed the complaint in this case at the National Industrial Court Enugu division on the 9th day of August 2012. The law under which the defendant/applicant raised its preliminary objection is the Public Officers Protection Act Cap P41 LFN 2004 which provides that the Claimant should have come to Court within three months from the date of accrual of the cause of action. This means that the Claimant ought to have filed this action within three months from 26th September 2008 or even before that date, when his salary was withheld since January 2006. It still remains undisputed that the cause of action arose on the 26th September 2008, and this suit was filed on the 9th of August 2012, nearly four years after. This is clearly outside the three months limitation period prescribed by the Public Officers Protection Act for the filing of such suits, and indeed Edict No 4 of 1995 and SUBEB law No 6 of 2005 which also prescribes a three month limitation period. This means that the Claimant came to court outside the statutory limitation period and the defendants are protected from being sued in such circumstance, i.e. outside the three months period. See Hassan vs. Aliyu (2010), supra. The Claimant does not dispute the two basic facts above, namely the date that the cause of action arose, and that on which he came to court. He nonetheless argued that his case is not caught up by the limitation provided by Section 2a of POPA because it falls within the exceptions. That is, that the case is for claim for payment for work and labour done and where the public officer in question has acted with malice or outside the colour of his authority. Going by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of A. G. RIVERS STATE vs. A. G. BAYELSA STATE (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) Pg. 23 @ 144-150 which has clearly stipulated two conditions to be cumulatively satisfied for Section 2a of POPA to avail any person, and they are: (1) It must be established that the person against whom the action is commenced is a public officer or a person acting in the execution of public duties within the meaning of that law. (2) That the act done by the person in respect of which the action is commenced must be an act done in respect or execution of any Law, public duty or authority or in respect of an alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority. Per GALADIMA JSC; I am convinced from the facts before me that the two conditions above have been cumulatively satisfied, and the defendants are protected by the public officers’ protection Act. It my holding therefore that the suit of the Claimant is statute barred, having been brought outside the three month limitation period set by statute. The allegation of malice is made only against the 6th defendant who is said to have made a demand of N40,000.00 from the Claimant. No further details were stated in this regard, to enable the court determine the particulars of the perceived malice, or whether or not this demand was made by the 6th defendant on behalf of the other defendants. It therefore goes to no issue. The burden is on the claimant to establish that the Defendant had abused his position or that he has acted with no semblance of legal justification. In the case of Offoboche vs. Ogoja Local Government Council [2001] 8 MJSC 153 at 165, the Supreme Court put a stamp of finality on the point that malice vitiates the defence of Public Officers Protection Act. And only recently, this Court in Joshua Mnenge vs. Nigerian Army unreported Suit No. NICN/IB/22/2012, the ruling of which was delivered on December 18, 2012, reviewed the authorities regarding the Public Officers Protection Act. The Supreme Court in Chigbu v. Tonimas (Nig.) Ltd [2006] 31 WRN 179; [2006] 9 NWLR (Pt. 986) 189 SC at 210, held that the propriety or otherwise of the act of the defendants is not a relevant consideration for the applicability of the Public Officers Protection Act. The case continued that if an action against a public officer or public institution and organization is statute-barred having not been brought within the prescribed period of three months, there will be no basis for investigating the conduct of the public officer which gave rise to the action. That the conduct of the defendant as to whether he was malicious or not is irrelevant in determining whether the cause of action is statute-barred under section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act, referring to Egbe vs. Adefarasin [2002] 14 WRN 57 and Aremo II vs. Adekanye [2004] 42 WRN 1 SC. The attempt therefore by the claimant to found his case on malice as an exception to the application of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act fails in the light of the authorities and reasons given; and I so find and hold. Be that as it may, a critical consideration of the events preceding the filing of this present action would reveal that the previous actions sought basically the same reliefs as the present one. The Claimant however cannot be said to have filed multiple actions because they were not filed at the same time. The question that would rather arise is “what is the effect of the striking out of the Imo State High Court Suit No HO/2/2011?” It has been held in a plethora of authorities that when a matter is struck out for want of jurisdiction, the striking out finally disposes of the matter. See EHUWA vs. ONDO STATE INEC & ORS (2007) 149 LRCN 1543 @ 1562. Even if the Claimant had filed the earlier suit filed at the Imo state High Court within the statutory limitation period of three months, the fact that the suit was struck out puts an end to that earlier suit. It should be further understood that with the striking out of the earlier suit, HO/2/2011, that case had ceased or ended. The only thing that could revive the case is an appeal or an order of court relisting the suit. In the case of UTA French Airlines v. Williams [2000] 14 NWLR (pt. 687) 271, the plaintiff had first filed the action, within the limitation time, at the Lagos High Court. On the advice of the Chief Judge of Lagos State, she filed fresh processes at the Federal High Court. The latter case was held to be different from that of the Lagos High Court; and because it was filed out of the limitation period, it was held caught up by the limitation period of two years under the relevant law. In that case, the Court of Appeal, Per Sanusi JCA, at pages 279-280, held that: “I am not unmindful of the fact that the respondent had earlier filed a suit before the Lagos High Court in which the learned trial Judge of the Lagos State High Court declined jurisdiction and remitted same to his Chief Judge for transfer to the Federal High Court. The learned Chief Judge in turn did not transfer the suit i.e. LD/592/92 to the Federal High Court but instead ordered that the plaintiff/respondent be advised to file fresh action at the Federal High Court which she subsequently did. Ideally, what the plaintiff/respondent should have done was to appeal against the ruling of the Lagos State High Court declining jurisdiction. Be that as it may, one thing that is not in dispute is that the suit filed before the Federal High Court was freshly filed on 7th April, 1993 and was not on transfer to it from the High Court of Lagos State. There is therefore no how the two suits can be regarded as one and same suit or for two suits to be alive in two different courts as decided by the learned trial judge.” With this decision of the Court of Appeal which was applied by this court in the cases of Friday Idugie vs Auchi Polytechnic, Auchi & Ors unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/120/2011 delivered on February 13, 2013 and Joshua Mnenge vs Nigerian Army, Unreported Suit No. NICN/IB/22/2012, Ruling which was delivered on December 18, 2012, the position of the law is that when a suit is struck out and the Claimant whose suit is struck out brings another fresh one, that other fresh one must have its cause of action determined as from the actual date on which the cause of action arose; any intervening action not being capable of suspending or stopping the running of the cause of action. See Kanu & Ors vs A-G and Commissioner for Justice Cross River & Ors (2013) 32 NLLR (Pt. 91) 63. It would have been a different matter if the Claimant had the suit re-listed instead of re-filing a new one or the case was ordered to be heard following an appeal to the Court of Appeal, an option which still remains open to the Claimant. See the case of UTA French Airlines v. Williams (Supra) cited above, where Sanusi JCA held that “….Ideally, what the plaintiff/respondent should have done was to appeal against the ruling of the Lagos State High Court…...” See the case of ECHELUNKWO JOHN O. & 90 OTHERS vs. IGBO-ETITI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA, where the Court of Appeal sitting at Enugu in Suit No CA/E/261/2011, in allowing the appeal against an order of the Learned trial judge of the Enugu State High Court in striking out a suit instead of transferring it to the National Industrial Court, shed more light on the applicability of the provisions of Section 24(3) National Industrial Court Act 2006. With the finding that the suit of the Claimant is Statute barred, it is no longer necessary for the Court to go into the other issues, as it would be academic. In the circumstance therefore and for the reasons given, the Court hereby upholds the preliminary objection of the 1st to 3rd Defendants as it finds merit in it as the suit is statute barred. The suit is hereby dismissed. I make no order as to costs. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Presiding Judge