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This action was instituted by the claimant against the Defendants vide a General Form of Complaint filed on the 12th day of September, 2012. The Complaint, filed along with supporting originating processes, seeks the determination of the question: 1. Whether by the provision of Section 31 of the Civil Service Regulation1994 and Rule 02809 of the Imo State Public service Rules 2001, the defendants are empowered to retire the Claimant from the Imo State Civil Service when he has neither attained the age of 60 years nor 35 years of service. 2. If the answer to the question above is in the negative, the claimant seeks the following reliefs: a) A declaration that the claimant is only due for retirement on the 26/01/2018 when he would have attained 60 years of age, same being the same year when the claimant would have served the defendants for 35 years; b) A declaration that in computation of 35 years of service of the claimant, the five years study leave without pay granted to the claimant by the 3rd defendant between 1982 and 1988 by the defendant are not inclusive; c) An order of court restraining the defendants from retiring the claimant before 26/01/2018 when he would have attained 60 years of age; d) An order of court for the payment of the claimant's salary/emoluments up to January 2018 when the claimant will be due for retirement. By a Motion on Notice of Preliminary Objection dated the 28th October and filed on the 29th October, 2013, and brought pursuant to Order 11 Rules 1&2 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007, Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act 2004 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court, the Defendant/Applicant seeks for an order of court dismissing this suit for want of jurisdiction, and for such further orders as the honourable court may deem fit to make in the circumstance. The grounds upon which the objection is sought are: 1. The suit as constituted is statute barred and, therefore, incompetent based on section 2(a) of the public officers Protection Act Cap 4, Vol. 14, Laws of the Federation, 2004. 2. There is no reasonable cause of action against the defendants/Applicants. The application is supported by a 9 paragraph affidavit and a written address in which applicant formulated two issues for determination: (a) Whether the suit is statute barred, and therefore incompetent, having regard to section 2(a) of the public officers Protection Act Cap P4. Vo1. 14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. (b) Whether from the statement of facts of the claimant there is any reasonable cause of action against the defendants. In arguing ISSUE ONE, Counsel submitted that the suit as constituted is statute barred on the ground that it was commenced after the three month limitation period prescribed by section 2(a) of the Public officers Protection Act Cap P4, Vol.14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. He defined a public officer in accordance with Section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act, 2004 to mean a member of the Public Service of the Federation or of a state within the meaning of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. See ABUBAKAR V. GOVERNOR OF GOMBE STATE (2002) 17 NWLR (Pt. 797) 533 CA. Public Officers have been held by our apex court to include an artificial person, public officer, public bodies or body of persons, corporate or incorporate, statutory bodies or persons. See IBRAHIM vs. JSC (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt.584), Per IGUH JSC. Counsel submitted that the defendants in this suit fall under the ambit of the Public Officers Protection Act; and that in determining when the cause of action arose, recourse must be had to the Statement of Facts. He added that a cause of action generally accrues on the date on which the incident giving rise to the cause of action arose, which inference can be drawn from the following averments of the Claimant in his statement of facts: a. He went on study leave without pay between 20th July 1982 through 30/08/1988. b. He also avers that between 20/07/1982 and 30/08/88, he was not in the service of any of the defendants. c. He avers that he will be due for retirement by the year 2018 when he would have attained 35years of service (in exclusion of the five years study leave without pay) or sixty years of age whichever comes first. That the grouse of the claimant against the defendants as can be gathered from the above averments is that his retirement from service is without recourse to the period of study leave without pay, granted to him by the 3rd defendant. To the applicants, the claimant was retired based on the report of the committee on downsizing and right sizing of Imo State Civil Service set up by the Imo State Government in 2008, which report was published sometime in July 2010; and that it follows, that the cause of action of the claimant arose in 2010 when he became aware that the defendants intended to retire him in February, 2013. That assuming without conceding that the cause of action did not accrue from that period, Counsel stated that the claimant had the opportunity to contest his retirement date when the office of the secretary to the state Government issued exhibit MOJ 1 on the 8th day of June 2011 cancelling the waiver granted to him in May 2011, but he didn’t. In determining the period of limitation, counsel submitted that one has to look at the time the cause of action arose and compare it with when the Writ of Summons was filed. This can be done without taking oral evidence from a witness. If the time of the writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute barred. He referred the court to the case of OKENWA vs. MILITARY GOVERNOR IMO STATE (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 507) Pg. 154 at 167. See also IKURIE vs. EDJERODE (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 745) 446 He went further to submit that proceedings filed outside the limitation period prescribed by law, is statute barred; that actions caught by the provisions of Section 2a of the Public Officers (Protection) Act must be commenced within 3 months next after the cause of action arose. ADIGU V. AYORINDE & ORS (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 313) Pg. 516 @ 535. Thus an action for any act done in pursuance of or in execution of any public duty, alleging neglect or default which is not brought against a public officer within 3 months of the accrual of the cause of action shall not lie as the court, will lack the requisite jurisdiction. Counsel stated that as at the time the Claimant filed his complaint he was already out of time as prescribed by section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act (2004). He urged the court to hold that the court lacks jurisdiction because the suit is statute barred and resolve ISSUE ONE in favour of the defendants/applicants. EGBE VS ADEFARASIN (No. 2) (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1. See also OWNERS OF THE MV "ARABELLA" vs. NAIC (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1097) 182 @ 219. In arguing ISSUE TWO, it is Counsel’s submission that the claimants have no cause of action against the defendants and urged the court to so hold. He further posited that it is trite that a cause of action is made up of an aggregation of facts recognized by law as giving the plaintiff a substantive right to the claim or relief sought. See BESSONY LTD vs. HONEY LEGON (NIG) LTD (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 503) Pg. 1380 @ 1402. In IKENNE L.G. vs. WEST AFRICAN PORTLAND CEMENT Plc. (2012) All FWLR (Pt.642) Pg. 1747 at Pg. 1770-1771, it was held that all the court is concerned with in deciding whether there is a reasonable cause of action, is to look at and see whether the statement of claim standing alone or on its own disclosed a cause of action that has a chance of success. Cause of action has been defined in the case of S.P.D.C Nig. vs. OKONOEDO (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt.109) 85 @ 117-118, as a factual situation, the existence of which entitles the plaintiff to obtain from the court a remedy against another person or the facts which constitutes the essential ingredients of an enforceable right of claim. See also ACCORD PARTY vs. GOVERNOR OF KWARA STATE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 555) Pg. 220 @ 276. To Counsel, from the statement of facts, the claimant has not disclosed facts, the existence of which entitles him to the reliefs he is seeking before this Honourable court. He urged the court to so hold. He said the defendants have, both in their affidavit in support of this application and the defence they filed in this court established that the Pensions Act 1990 on which the claimant based his claim has been repealed. He urged the court to take judicial notice of the Pension Act 2004. Counsel stated that the claimant has lost the protection of section 14 of the repealed Act (Pension Act 1990), therefore, the court ought to hold that the question as to whether the period of study leave without pay should form part of the officer’s years of service is regulated by the Establishment circular of the Government of Imo State issued on 8th June 2011 which counsel says is the extant Policy regulating the pensionability or otherwise of the period of study leave without pay in computing the retirement period of public officers in Imo State. Counsel finally placed reliance on the case of LAZARUS IGWE vs. ALVAN IKOKU COLLEGE OF EDUCATION (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 88) @ 478, PER EDOZIE JCA: “Since the law settled that employee on approved study leave without pay is still in the employment of the employer during the period of leave, the inevitable conclusion is that in computing the employees period of service for purposes of his retirement date, the period of leave of absence or study leave without pay will be included or added. To submit otherwise will be preposterous. It is further submitted that this State of the Law cannot be amended or altered by an administrative directive, regulation or command.” Counsel concluded by urging the court to dismiss the complaint of the claimant. In opposition to the Motion on Notice of preliminary objection filed by the defendant/applicant, the Claimant/Respondent filed a counter affidavit of 11 paragraphs deposed to by the Claimant himself. Also accompanying the Counter Affidavit is Counsel’s Written Address canvassing arguments in opposition to the preliminary objection raised by the applicants. It is the claimant’s counsel’s argument that recourse should only be made to the writ and statement of facts as filed by the claimant. Citing the case of P.C.H.S. Co. Ltd. vs. Migfo (Nig) Ltd. (2012) All FWLR part 642 page 161 @ 163, he stated that "It is trite law that it is the Plaintiff's claim that determines and vest jurisdiction in the court." See also S.P.D.C NIG vs. OKONOEDO (2008) I NWLR (Pt. l09) and ACCORD PARTY vs. GOV. KWARA STATE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 555). Counsel urged the court to discountenance the applicant’s reference to Exhibit ‘MOJ 1’ as it does not form part of the Claimant’s claim and statement of facts. IKURIE vs. EDJERODE (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 745). Counsel stated that Claimant's relief 1 is a call on this Honourable Court to interpret a statute based on which the reliefs in paragraph 2 are predicated. Relief 2 (c) and (d) are praying this court to set aside the document pleaded in paragraph 12 of statement of facts and the restoration of claimant's salary and emoluments while 2(a) and (b) are declaratory which the court can assume jurisdiction to determine at any time in relation. Counsel submitted that, cause of action will not arise except; "when there is in existence a person who can sue and another who can be sued, and when all facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed" Counsel cited the case of N.E.C.O. vs. Tokode (2011) All FWLR part 574 Page 122 paragraph F. As at this material time as alleged by the applicants, all facts have not happened as claimant was not retired until 2013. Learned counsel stated that in view of the above authority, time was not running as at the time this suit was instituted hence the reliefs are declaratory and restraining in nature. What is more, the facts came to completion in February 2013 while this suit was already pending and urged the court to hold that the action is not statute barred relying on Exhibit'A'. Counsel contended however, that Statute Bar period is calculated from the cessation of continuous damage or injury, and that the non-payment of the claimant’s salary and emoluments since January 2013 amounts to a continuous injury, and urged the court to hold that the cause of action arises at the end of every month. He further relied on the case of Aremo II vs. Adekonye (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt.891) Pg. 572 @ 593 - 594 where the Supreme Court per Edozie JSC held thus: "Admittedly legal principles are not always inflexible. Sometimes they admit of certain exceptions. The law of limitation of action recognizes some exceptions. Thus, where there has been a continuance of damage, a fresh cause of action arises from time to time as often as damage is caused... for example, if the owner of mines works them and causes damage to the surface more than six years before action and within six years of action, a fresh subsidence causing damage occurs without any fresh working by the owner, an action in respect of fresh damage is not barred as the fresh subsidence resulting in injury gives a fresh cause of action….” Counsel stated that in view of the above authority and looking at the facts of this case, the claimant respondent was issued Exhibit 'A' in February 2013 and has not been receiving his monthly salaries and emoluments, causing fresh causes of action on monthly basis and urged the court to so hold. It is Counsel’s submission that the applicant’s argument that the claimant ought to have sued in 2004, holds no water, as the claimant was neither retired nor personally affected in 2004 rather in 2013 when he was issued with Exhibit ‘A' which he had earlier gone to court to restrain the defendants/applicants from issuing and that cause of action kept on arising at the end of every month since February 2013 by non-payment of claimant's salary. He concluded by submitting that this court is ceased with requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit on its merits; and that the arguments relating to the Pensions Act are issues that are best determined at the trial, and to delve into it at this stage is improper, especially as they are issues that do not rob this court its jurisdiction as expressly provided for under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended. By way of adumbration, Claimant argued that the limitation law does not apply to labour matters, citing the recent ruling of this honourable court sitting at Enugu delivered on the 10th day of December 2012 in CHIEF JOHN AKARUAYEN EWENEDE vs. SOLOMON AJOMATA ALA AND ORS. (Suit No. NICN/EN/149/2012 unreported), and the case of FGN vs. ZEBRA ENERGY LTD (2002) 12 SC Pt. 2, Pg. 136 where it was held that limitation law does not apply to labour matters. Counsel went further to state that Section 18 of the Imo State Limitation Law of 1994 provides a 5 year limitation period, and that Section 44 of the said law makes it clear that no other act governs limitation of actions in Imo State. He urged the court to so hold, and to dismiss the preliminary objection of the applicant, the claimant having sufficiently disclosed a reasonable cause of action against the defendants. I have carefully considered the arguments of Counsels, both for and against the grant of this application. I will jointly consider the two issues for determination raised by the defendants/applicants being: (a) Whether the suit is statute barred, and therefore incompetent, having regard to section 2(a) of the public officers Protection Act Cap P4. Vo1. 14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. (b) Whether from the statement of facts of the claimant there is any reasonable cause of action against the defendants. The most crucial question that arises from these two issues is when the cause of action can be said to have arisen. The courts have continually held that the only way to find out is to look at the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim (Statement of Facts) of the claimant. The Court of Appeal in determining how to compute the time or period of limitation both under the Limitation Law and Public Officers Protection Law, has held in the case of MUDUN & ORS V. ADANCHI & ORS (2013) LPELR-20774(CA) that: “In order to determine the period, consideration, must be given to the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim alleging when the wrong was committed and by comparing that date with the date on which the Writ of Summons was filed. This can be done without taking oral evidence from witnesses.” This was the reasoning in the in the case of WOHEREM vs. EMERUWA (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt.890) 398 @417 where the Supreme Court decided that “for the purpose of determining whether or not an action is statute barred, the period of limitation is determined by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim only.” The Supreme Court added in the case of MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR OF EKITI STATE & ORS vs. ALADEYELU & ORS (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1055) 619 that: “It is from either or both the writ of summons and statement of claim that one can ascertain the alleged date when the wrong in question is said to have occurred or been committed, thereby giving rise to the plaintiff’s cause of action. When that ascertained date is compared with the date the writ of summons or originating process was filed in court, it can then be determined whether the action was instituted within the period allowed by law or outside it. When it is found that the action was instituted within the period allowed by law, the action is said to be competent and the court and the court has the jurisdiction to entertain same but where it is found to have been instituted outside the period allowed by law, the action is said to be statute barred and consequently, the court is without jurisdiction to entertain same.” Per Onnoghen JSC. Briefly stated, the fact of the claimant’s case as pleaded in his Complaint and Statement of Facts is that he was employed in January 1978; and that in 1982 he sought and obtained leave to proceed on study leave without pay. That at the completion of three years, he applied for extension of the period of study leave, which was granted in January 1986, thereby meaning that the period of study leave covers the period between 20th July 1982 through to 30th August 1988. That by a letter dated 4th October 1988; he was re-instated after the completion of his study leave without pay, and that on the 27th day of March 2008, the defendants issued a notice to the Claimant stating that his new date of retirement is 26th January 2018. That on 19th April 2011, the defendants issued a circular titled “RESTORATION OF PERIOD OF STUDY LEAVE WITHOUT PAY” wherein they granted waiver to 51 public officers including the Claimant, with the effect that the period of study leave will not be counted in the computation of their pensionable period of service; and the said waiver was communicated to the claimant vide a letter dated the 24th May 2011. The Claimant filed this suit in September 2012. In his counter-affidavit, he stated that he filed the suit when he noticed that the respondents were having series of meetings to retire him before his actual year of retirement. The suit was therefore commenced with the objective of restraining the defendants from doing that, among other reasons as shown on the claim and the statement of facts. His further averments are to the effect that his salary was stopped since January 2013. Looking at the facts outlined above, one would ask: “when did the cause of action arise” or better put, what event triggered this action. It is noted that no notice of retirement was issued to the claimant before he commenced this action in September 2012. On the other hand, to the defendants, the cause of action of the claimant either arose in 2008 (when the claimant was retired based on the report of the committee on downsizing and rightsizing of Imo State Civil Service set up by Imo state Government in 2008) or on the 8th of June 2011 when Exhibit MOJ 1 was written by the SSG. I have looked at the content of Exhibit B which is a letter titled SUSPENSION/REVIEW OF APPOINTMENTS/PROMOTIONS NOT CONTAINED IN THE 2010 APPROVED BUDGET dated 8th June 2011written by the Secretary to the Imo State Government conveying the Governor’s directives to all ministries, departments and agencies that: i) All appointments that are not accommodated in the 2010 Approved budget will be subjected to review to ensure that appropriate due process was followed in making such appointments. This includes the 10,000 jobs offer. ii) In addition, all promotions, including command promotions that are accommodated in the 2010 Approved budget should be discountenanced, except with clearance from the office of the Secretary to the Government of Imo State. iv) All issues relating to extension of service should be discountenanced except with clearance from the office of the Secretary to the Government of Imo State. (The numbering of items listed in the said letter does not contain a number (iii). What the defendants did not address in this application, is whether or how Exhibits MOJ 1 was brought to the notice of the Claimant and/or how it affects the Claimant. They have not shown how the title/caption of Exhibit MOJ 1: “SUSPENSION/REVIEW OF APPOINTMENTS/PROMOTIONS NOT CONTAINED IN THE 2010 APPROVED BUDGET”, and/or the content therein specifically refer to the Claimant or anyone in his category. It is noted that the Head of Service of the Government of Imo State had earlier written a letter to the Claimant on the 27th March 2008 conveying adjustment of his retirement date from 3/2/2013 to 26/1/2018. Another letter had been written to the claimant conveying the same adjustment of retirement date to the claimant on the 24th May 2011. A combination of both arguments does not reveal any clear evidence to determine the date of the cause of action; therefore, the prescribed comparison with the date of filing cannot be effectively achieved to determine Statute Bar. See MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR OF EKITI STATE & ORS vs. ALADEYELU & ORS (supra) “……When that ascertained date is compared with the date the writ of summons or originating process was filed in court, it can then be determined whether the action was instituted within the period allowed by law or outside it…..” Per Onnoghen JSC. I will therefore not overflog the issue of statute bar, as it will be academic. Clearly from these facts and the various definition of “cause of action” in S.P.D.C NIG vs. OKONOEDO (Supra) and ACCORD PARTY vs. GOVERNOR OF KWARA STATE (Supra) as “simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles the plaintiff to obtain from the court a remedy against another person or the facts which constitutes the essential ingredients of an enforceable right of claim”, it is unclear as to when exactly the cause of action in this suit arose. That being so, comparing the date of the cause of action with the date the suit was filed, becomes impossible. This is because there is no clear evidence to determine the date of the cause of action. It had been noted earlier that there was no notice of retirement that may have been said to have triggered the filing of the suit. Nothing in the Claimant’s statement of claim shows or points to any action that can be said to have triggered the action. In Paragraph 5 of the Claimant’s counter affidavit, he deposed to the fact that: “The suit was commenced in 2012 when I noticed that the respondents were having series of meetings to retire me before my actual year of retirement in order to restrain them with an interlocutory application”. In Paragraph 6, the Claimant deposed that “While this suit was pending and before the hearing of the application, the defendants wrongfully retired me with a letter dated 22/02/13 (Exhibit A).” And in Paragraph 8, he said: “That upon issuance of Exhibit A, the defendant stopped my salary/emoluments since January 2013.” It can be properly inferred that the Claimant has not clearly disclosed a specific event or trigger that can be tagged “cause of action”. Exhibit A was issued after this suit was filed; and it possible to infer that the action was filed before the cause of action arose, which is absurd. No notice of retirement was issued before this action was filed. This case is clearly distinguishable from those in which notices of retirement were issued to the claimants before they filed their action. Paragraph 5 above is a mere speculation, and does not disclose a cause of action. Having considered the totality of the Claim, statement of facts and all the documents frontloaded, it is my view that there are no live issues to be determined, as there is nothing upon which the Claimant could have placed his claim. Perhaps the court would have viewed it differently if the suit was filed after the stoppage of salary, or after the notice of retirement was issued, or even after receiving Exhibit A; but definitely not on a mere speculation as deposed to by the claimant in Paragraph 5 of his counter affidavit which is the closest account he has, as to what could have amounted to a cause of action. Besides, no further facts were supplied in this regard. It is my holding therefore that the Claimant has not disclosed any reasonable cause of action against the defendants. This suit is hereby dismissed. I make no order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Presiding Judge