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This action was instituted by the claimant against the Defendants vide a General Form of Complaint dated 30th May 2013 and filed on the same date. The reliefs sought by the Claimants are stated in the Claimants’ Statement of Facts and are listed below. 1. A declaration by the honourable court that the engagement of the Claimants as casual or contract staff of the defendant for a period between 1 (one) and 14 (fourteen) years without proper employment or guarantee of steady employment, is dehumanizing, unlawful, illegal, unconstitutional and tantamount to slavery. 2. An order of the honourable court compelling the defendant to pay to the Claimants all their accumulated entitlements and benefits in the form of proper monthly salaries, allowances and bonuses from their respective dates of engagement to the date of judgment in this case in terms with memorandum of collective agreement between the Chemical and Non-Metallic Products Employers Federation, and the National Union of Chemical, Footwear, Rubber, Leather and Non-Metallic Products Employees. 3. A further order of the honourable court compelling the Defendant to reinstate and regularize the employment of the claimant by the Defendant in the form of proper and steady employment. 4. General damages in the sum of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) only. By a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated the 25th October, 2013 and filed on the 28th October, 2013 and to brought pursuant to Order 11 of the National Industrial Court rules 2007 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court, the Defendant/Applicant seeks for the following reliefs: 1. An order of this Honorable Court dismissing and/or striking out the name of the Defendant/Applicant in this suit. 2. And for such further or other Order(s) as this Honorable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The application is brought on the following grounds: 1. The complaint issued and served on the Defendant/Applicant in this suit is incompetent 2. The Defendant/Applicant is a total stranger to the Memorandum of Collective Agreement dated 15/10/2006 between The Chemical and Non-Metallic Products Employers' Federation (CANMPEF) And National Union of Chemical, Footwear, Rubber, Leather And Non-Metallic Product Employees (NUCFRLANMPE). 3. The Enforcement of the Collective Agreement is at best a gentleman's agreement and non-justiciable. 4. That by reason of the above, this Honorable Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain this suit as same is incompetent. The application is supported by an 11 paragraph affidavit deposed to by one Blessing Nwandu a legal practitioner in the Law firm of Udeh & Associates, Counsels to the Defendant/Applicant. It is also supported by a written address canvassing arguments in support of the application. In opposition, Counsel to the Claimants/Respondents filed a 10 paragraph Counter-Affidavit deposed to by one Mr. Ndubuisi Moses, the 3rd claimant in this suit, as well as a written address canvassing arguments in opposition of the application. Counsel to the Defendant/Applicant based her argument upon three grounds for determination before this Honourable Court. In arguing GROUND ONE, counsel to the defendant/applicant submitted that, the mode of commencement of action is an indispensable aspect of our civil procedure; hence various courts have it embodied in their Rules. Counsel referred the court to the NIC rules 2007. Counsel stated that Order 4 rule 4(3) of the rules of this Court 2007 provides that an originating process (complaint) shall be signed by the Claimant or his legal practitioner where the Claimant sues through a legal practitioner. The case in the instant suit is that the complaint which is the life of this suit was neither signed nor endorsed by the Claimant(s) or their legal practitioner. She said that the threshold requirement in Order 4 rule 3 was not complied with. Counsel submitted further that where there is non-compliance with rudimentary requirements for the setting of a legal process in motion, the suit instituted in contravention of the requirement is grossly incompetent, and the court is equally incompetent to entertain the Suit. She cited the case of N.U.B LTD vs. SAMBA PET. CO. LTD (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt.993) Pg. 102. Counsel stated that the case of NZEKWE VS. ANAEKWENEGBE (2011) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1274) Pg. 434 is on all fours with that of the Defendant/Applicant, and therefore urged the court to take judicial notice of the complaint as same was neither signed by the Claimants nor their legal practitioner. Counsel cited the case of AJAO vs. OBELE (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 918) Pg. 415 paras H-C and submitted that the Honorable Court is only competent to entertain a case if the case is initiated by due process of law and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. Counsel to the applicant submitted that the non-compliance with the threshold requirement of signing the complaint fundamentally robs the Honorable Court of jurisdiction. The non-compliance is not a mere irregularity but fundamentally and incurably bad. See SKENCONSULT (NIG) LTD & ANOR vs. GODWIN SEKONDY UKEY (1981) I SC. In arguing GROUND TWO, counsel submitted that it is a long settled principle of law, that a contract affects only the parties thereto and cannot be enforced by or against a person who is not a party to it. Conversely, only the parties to a contract can sue or be sued on the contract. Generally, a stranger to a contract can neither sue or be sued on the contract even if the contract is made for his benefit and purpose to give him the right to sue or make him liable upon it. Counsel stated that the Defendant/Applicant is not a party to the Collective Agreement upon which the instant case is founded. A contract only affects parties to it. She referred, the court to U.B.A PLC vs. BTL IND. LTD (2004) 18 NWLR (PT. 904), 180 @ 233 and A-G FEDERATION V. A.I.C LTD (2000) 10 NWLR (PT. 675) 293. Counsel submitted that a look at the Memorandum of Collective Agreement will patently show and/or tell the Court who the parties are. Referring the court to paragraphs 5 & 6 of their supporting affidavit, counsel added that the Defendant/Applicant is not a party to the Collective Agreement neither is it a member of any of the trade unions. Counsel stated that flowing from the whole gamut of the Memorandum of Collective Agreement attached to the suit upon which the Claimants' claims are rooted, it is clear that there is no privity of contract between the Claimants and the Defendant. Counsel submitted that the Claimants have failed to establish their nexus and/or any connection between them and the Defendant in the Memorandum of Collective Agreement which is the basis of their claim, and therefore cannot institute any action against the Defendant. In arguing GROUND THREE, counsel to the Defendant/Applicant submitted that the suit presently does not disclose a cause of action against the Defendant/Applicant on the ground that the Memorandum of Collective Agreement dated 5/11/2006 is a collective agreement and same is non-justiciable. She stated that a collective agreement was defined by Ndoma-Egba JCA in the case of NIGERIA-ARAB BANK VS. SHUAIBU (1991) 4 NWLR (PT. 186) 450, who put it succinctly to mean a gentleman's agreement, an extra judicial document totally devoid of sanctions and also at best a product of trade union's pressure. Counsel submitted further that a Collective Agreement is known to Nigerian law and has been specifically provided for and contemplated under section 91 of the Labour Act as an important instrument in regulating relations between relevant employers and workers' union. However, a Collective Agreement cannot per se ground a cause of action as it is a gentleman's agreement, except where it was incorporated or embodied into the contract of service. It is an extra legal document totally devoid of sanctions. She relied on the case of U.B.N vs. CHINYERE (2010) 10 NWLR (PT. 1203) P. 457 and CHUKWUMAH vs. SHELL PETROLEUM (1993) 4 NWLR (PT.289) 512 AT 513, PARA.H; 544 at paragraph E-F; 567 at paragraphs. E-F, where the Supreme Court held that: “An extraneous agreement not entered into by the parties to a contract of service cannot be made the basis of an action by an employee unless it is incorporated into the contract of service of such employee.” Counsel submitted that the Defendant is not a party to the Memorandum of Collective Agreement. But assuming but not conceding, that the Defendant/Applicant is a party to the Memorandum of Collective Agreement between the trade unions, failure on the part of the Defendant/Applicant to act in compliance with a collective agreement is non-justiciable. U.B.N LTD. vs. EDET (1993) 4 NWLR (PT.287) 288 at 298, paragraphs B-C. She then urged the court to dismiss the suit with substantial cost. In their written address in opposition, Counsel to the Claimants formulated two issues for determination. 1. Whether the complaint is not in substantial compliance with form 1 (general form of complaint) as provided for by the Rules of Court. 2. Whether in the circumstances of this case, the claimants have not disclosed a cause of action against the defendant. In arguing ISSUE ONE, counsel to the Claimant/Respondent submitted that it is not in dispute that the mode of commencement of an action is an indispensable aspect of our civil procedure. As it relates to this court, the Form and Commencement of Action is provided for in the Rules of this court. Order 3 Rule 1 of the NIC Rules provides as follows: "Any action for determination by the court shall be commenced by way of complaint which shall be filed and sealed. The Complaints shall be in form I with such modifications or variations as circumstance may require." The said Form 1 being the General Form of Complaint is embodied in the Rules of Court. Without more, a look at the Form 1 as provided for in the Rules of court show that the complaint of the Claimants is in substantial compliance with it. It is submitted that in the Form 1, there is no provision for the signature of the Claimant or his legal practitioner but that of the Registrar of the court. The said Form 1 does not provide for application or strict application of Order 4 Rule 4(3). Counsel further submitted that in the material context, it needs to be pointed out that there is a difference between an "Originating process" and a "Writ" or "Complaint". An Originating process he said is an aggregate of bundles that initiates a court process and includes a Complaint, (See generally Order 3 of the Rules of Court) which non-compliance with its requirement is sanctioned by the Registrar of Court. Counsel stated that on the other hand the gamut of Order 4 of the Rules of Court pertains to the Claim (i.e. the Statement of Claim) of the Claimants which is one of the originating processes. He further stated that Order 4 Rule 4 (3) does not specifically refer to the complaint. Counsel submitted that there was a proper endorsement of the Claimants' claim and stated that the argument of the Defendant on this point is a mere technicality. Counsel further submitted that the law is well stated that the Rules of Court must be interpreted in such a manner as to prevent undue adherence to technicalities. He cited the case of PANACHE COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED vs. AIKHOMU (1994) 2 NWLR (PT327) PG 420. It was Counsel’s submission that the Claimants particularly complied with the Form 1 of the Rules of this court, but stated that assuming without conceding that the Form 1 was not complied with, Order 5 (1) of the Rules of Court empowers this honourable court to treat same as an irregularity and give any direction as it thinks fit. In arguing ISSUE TWO, Counsel to the Claimant/Respondent submitted that it needs to be observed that the Notice of Preliminary Objection of the Defendant is not procedural and thus incompetent. The law is trite that a Defendant wishing to challenge the competence of a suit by a preliminary objection on a point of law is entitled to file his Statement of Defence and raise the point of law in it and not by a Motion on Notice as is in this case. See: IDACHABA VS. ILONA (2007) 6 NWLR (PT 1030) PAGE 277 AT PP 297-298, PARAS. G-8, E-F. He urged the court to discountenance this preliminary objection accordingly on the ground of improper procedure. Citing Section 135(l) of the Evidence Act 2011, Counsel submitted that whoever desires the court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of which he asserts must prove that those facts exists. He said the requirement for proof of such facts is dispensed with where there is an admission of those facts in the Statement of Defence, since pleadings are aimed at narrowing down the scope of controversy or issues in question. See the case of: OLALE VS. EKEWELENDU (1989) 4 NWLR (PT 115) PAGE 326, RATIO I SC. By paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Statement of Claim, the Claimants aver thus: "10. The Claimants contend further that in 2006, a collective agreement was reached between the Chemical and non-Metallic Products Employers Federation and the said Union (i.e. Claimants Union of National Union of Chemical Foot wear, Rubber and Non-Metalic products Employees) where the conditions of service was detailed out. Copy of the Memorandum of Collective agreement made in that regard and entered on the 15th day of November, 2006 shall be founded and relied upon at the trial. Notice to produce the original copy is given to the Defendant". (Emphasis supplied). “11. It shall be contended further for the Claimants that the Defendant is a member of the said Chemical and Non-Metallic Products Employers and accordingly bound by the stipulated conditions of service". These facts without any contradiction were admitted by the Defendant in paragraph 9 of its Statement of Defence thus: "9. The Defendant admits paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Statement of Facts." Counsel therefore submitted that those facts contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Statement of Claim, having been admitted by the Defendant in paragraph 9 of its Statement of Defence needs no further proof. See N.A.S LTD vs. UBA PLC (2005) 14 NWLR (PT 945) Pg.42l RATIO 7 SC. He contended further that the crux of ground 2 of the Defendant's argument is that it is not a party to that Collective Agreement. He submitted that that is misleading, considering the state of parties’ pleadings. He therefore urged the honourable court to hold that parties are bound by their pleadings. Counsel further submitted that considering the reliefs sought by the Claimants in this case, it is not true that the cynosure of the Claimants' Claims is only the Memorandum of Collective Agreement as argued by the Defendant. The aggregate of facts in the pleadings averred, admitted and denied point to the fact that there are more issues in this case than the Memorandum of Collective Agreement entered into by the parties, the potency of which cannot be rightly considered at this stage. Counsel stated that a cause of action includes all those things necessary to give a right of action and every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the Plaintiff to succeed, and that the existence of a cause of action against the Defendant is already made out. He stated relying on PANACHE COMM. LTD vs. AIKHOMU (1994) 2 NWLR (PT 327) Pg. 420, that once a Statement of Claim raises some issues of law or fact calling for determination by the court, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed is not a ground for striking it out. He submitted that the criteria employed in determining the existence or non-existence of a cause of action in a suit is for the court to consider the Writ of Summons (i.e. the complaint in this case) and the Statement of Claim. See: NICON INS. CORP. VS. OLOWOFOYEKU (2006) 5 NWLR PT 973 P. 244. Counsel stated in conclusion, that ground 3 of the argument of the Defendant is not an issue at this stage, that it is premature and misleading. He then urged the court to assume jurisdiction, as the cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of the court as provided by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and the National Industrial Court Act, 2006. He urged the court to so hold and dismiss the notice of preliminary objection accordingly. Replying on points of law, Counsel to the defendant/applicant submitted that all the arguments and submissions of the claimants/respondents therein are highly misconceived and misapplied in the circumstances of this suit and in this application. As to whether a court can assume jurisdiction to hear a matter when such matter has not disclosed any reasonable cause of action against the Defendant, Counsel cited the case of ENEMUO vs. DURU (2004) 9 NWLR PT 877 P.83 where it was decided thus; “The threshold issue of justiciability of a dispute in a legally recognized right either at common law or in accordance with a statutory provision. The essential ingredient in determining whether a dispute is justiciable having regard to materials before the court is whether there is presented noticeable claims which can be judicially addressed. It is the entire petition itself which ought to be subjected to a strict scrutiny in order to ascertain whether it is justiciable and not the averments contained in the reply. Justiciability is a concept of jurisdiction for the reason that where a matter is not justiciable, the court cannot exercise judicial powers. Consequently, the concept of justiciability as a touchstone serves legally protected rights. " Counsel submitted that this suit has not disclosed any cause of action against the Defendant in this suit, as the claimant’s claim is hinged on a collective agreement; and urged the court to so hold. Counsel, referring the court to the case of N.N.B PLC vs. OSOH (2001) 13 NWLR PT 729 P.238, further drew the attention of the court to the position of the law on the legal status of a collective agreement. "A collective agreement between an employer and a trade union does not create a legally enforceable contractual obligation in favor of individual employees who are members of the trade union unless the terms of the collective agreement are adopted as forming part of the employee's term of employment or by subsequent Communication varying the terms of employment of the employee. In the instant case, the collective agreement between the 1st appellant and the respondents' trade union was adopted as a part of the respondents' terms of employment. Consequently, the terms of the collective agreement are non-justiciable.' Counsel contended that in this suit that the claimants are not members of the employees union referred to in this application. However, assuming but not conceding to the claimants' argument, a collective agreement has a peculiar nature and is at best a gentleman's agreement. It is non-justiciable and such cannot be relied upon to ground an action in law. She urged the court to so hold. On the issue of the propriety of this application that a party can raise a point of law by way of motion or preliminary objection even after filing a defence, counsel referred the court to the case of OLUWOLE vs. MARGARET (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1318) pg. 618, and urged the court to grant the orders sought in this application and dismiss the suit with substantial cost granted in favor of the applicant. I have carefully considered the arguments and submissions of Counsel on both sides. Three fundamental questions arise from the various submissions. 1. Whether the complaint is not in substantial compliance with Form 1 (general form of complaint) as provided for by the rules of this court. 2. Whether the claimant has disclosed a cause of action before this court. 3. Whether Collective Agreements are justiciable. In resolving the question as to whether the complaint is not in substantial compliance with Form 1 (General Form of Complaint) as provided for by the Rules of this Court, various provisions of the NIC Rules 2007 are hereby recalled as follows: Order 3 Rule 1 of the NIC Rules 2007 provides that: "Any action for determination by the court shall be commenced by way of complaint which shall be filed and sealed. The Complaints shall be in form I with such modifications or variations as circumstance may require" Order 4 Rule 4(3) of the NIC Rules provides that “an originating process shall be signed by the Claimant or his or her legal practitioner where the claimant sues through a legal practitioner.” Order 1 Rule 3 (2) of the NIC Rules defines an Originating process to mean “a complaint or any other court process by which a suit is initiated.” Order 3 Rule 4 indicates that “the complaint shall be accompanied by a statement of facts establishing the cause of action, copies of every document to be relied upon at the trial, and the list of witnesses to be called.” The cumulative effect of all the provisions cited above is that the originating process is made up of all the processes stated in Order 3 Rule 4. The complaint is not a document that can exist in isolation. Since the Form 1 does not contain any space for signature of the claimant or his solicitor, once the statement of facts, the list of documents and the list of witnesses to be called at the trial are appropriately signed by the solicitor, then Order 4 Rule 3 of the Rules has been complied with. This was the decision of the National Industrial Court in UZOIGWE M. C. & OTHERS vs. AGBOEZE & OTHERS (2011) 22 NLLR (Pt. 63) 443 @ 445. A cursory look at the Complaint reveals that it has been issued in compliance with Form 1 being the general form of complaint as provided for in the Rules of Court. The said Form 1 makes no provision for the signature of the Claimant or his legal practitioner but that of the Registrar of the Court. Counsel to the Claimant G. A. Elechi Esq. has signed the Statement of Facts, the list of witnesses and the list of documents to be relied upon at the hearing. I therefore hold that the originating processes have been filed in compliance with Order 4 Rule 3 of the NIC Rules. On the second question as regards whether the claimant has disclosed a cause of action before this court, it is pertinent to answer the question as regards when a cause of action can be said to have been disclosed. The courts have held that in determining whether or not a suit should be struck out due to non-disclosure of cause of action or reasonable cause of action, the court must restrict itself to the facts as pleaded in the Statement of Claim without resort to any extraneous facts. Claimant’s counsel had argued relying on the case of PANACHE COMM. LTD vs. AIKHOMU (Supra) and NICON INS. CORP. VS. OLOWOFOYEKU (Supra), that once a Statement of Claim raises some issues of law or fact calling for determination by the court, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed is not a ground for striking it out. I hold in line with the Court of Appeal decision in MOHAMMED vs. BABALOLA SAN (2011) LPELR-CA (Per Tsammani JCA), that “in determining whether or not a cause of action exists or a reasonable cause of action exists, a trial court is enjoined to restrict itself to an examination of the totality of the writ of summons or statement of claim.” Having examined the Complaint and Statement of Facts on this case, I hold that the Claimants have disclosed sufficient cause of action. As regards the issue of non-justiciability of collective agreement raised by learned counsel to the Defendant/Applicant, I find it necessary to recall the provisions of Section 254 (C) (1) (j) (i) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. “Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in the Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters: (j) Relating to the determination of any question as to the interpretation and application of any (i) Collective agreement. It is pertinent to take note of the use of the word “application” in the amended constitution. By virtue of the provision of S254 (C) (1) (j) (i) of the 1999 constitution as amended by the Third alteration Act 2010, the NICN has exclusive jurisdiction, both to interpret and apply collective agreements. The Court of Appeal, held in the case of The Rector, Kwara State Polytechnic & ors Mr. Ola Adefila & Ors. (2006) LPELR 8248 (CA). thus: “But in modern times, this country has through legislation, attempted to water down this extreme conservatism as far as enforceability of collective agreements are concerned…….” The Court of Appeal in the Kwara Poly case, which was decided in 2006, made reference to the case of UBN vs. Edet (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 287) pg. 288 as one of those cases decided when the Nigeria Courts still savoured the euphoria of unenforceability of collective agreements. The case of Osoh vs. Unity Bank Plc (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1358) Pg. 1 at Pg. 26-27 upon which the learned counsel has placed reliance, is clearly distinguishable from the case at hand. In the Osoh case, the cause of action arose in 1994 and the judgment of the trial court (the High Court of Edo State) was delivered in August 1996, while the judgment of the Court of Appeal (cited by Applicant’s counsel as N.N.B PLC vs. OSOH (2001) 13 NWLR PT 729 P.238) was delivered in March 2001. The erudite judgment of the Supreme Court in 2013 was given in line with the law in force at the time the suit was commenced. The Trade Dispute Act was the law in force at the time the cause of action arose. It follows therefore that the law applicable would be the relevant law at the time the cause of action arose. Clearly, the Osoh case was determined based on the laws applicable at the time of the cause of action. I therefore hold that it is not on all fours with the case at hand. It follows therefore from the foregoing, that by virtue of the provision of S254 (C) (1) (j) (i) of the 1999 constitution as amended by the Third alteration Act 2010, the National Industrial Court has exclusive jurisdiction, both to interpret and apply collective agreements. This court therefore assumes jurisdiction accordingly. On the whole and for all the reasons given, the Defendant/Applicant’s application fails, and is hereby dismissed. The case will proceed to hearing. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Presiding Judge